NATO - Ace Responses to an Intervention in Poland - meeting 2 July 1981

8/17/2019 NATO - Ace Responses to an Intervention in Poland - meeting 2 July 1981

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N TO SECRET

N O R T H A T L A N T l C M I L I T A R Y C O M M l T T E E

COMITE M l L l T A l R E DE L ' A T L A N T I Q U E N O R D

MMED IAT E

R ecord MC-CBX-29-81 ( R estr i cted S essi on )

7 J ul y 1981

S U M M A R Y

R E C O R D

Held on Thursday,

2

J u ly 1981 at

1000

hours

i n the S i tuation C entre, (P resentation

Room ,

NATO

H eadquarters, B r ussel s, Belgium

PRESENT

Chairman:

Belq um:

Canada:

Denmark:

Germany:

Greece:

I t al y :

Luxembourg:

Netherlands:

Norway:

Portugal

:

Turkey:

United Kingdom:

United States:

Deputy Chairman:

Director, IMS:

French M i l itary

Miss

o n

Admiral

R.H.

F a l l s

L i eutenant G eneral Y . Dedeurwaerder

L ieutenant G eneral R . Gutknecht

L i eutenant G eneral

P.O.W.

Thorsen

L i eutenant G eneral

E .D .

Bernhard

L i eutenant G eneral E . Papaefstathiou

Brigadier General

C .

C r u c i l l a

Colonel

P.

Bergem

L i eutenant G eneral J .C. Z outenbier

Major General

Ole

M i6en

L ieutenant General J . F erreir a V alente

V i c e Admiral S . Ergin

Admiral S i r Anthony Morton

General R.L . Lawson

Lieutenant General Sinclair L . M elner

R ear Admiral H .J . Uurbanus

ALSO

PRESENT

Ge/nc ral/da)Corps

d

Armde

P.

Crous i l l a c

@ 4L*M

D. Spottiswood

A i r 'Commodore, RAF

Secretary, IMS

DISTRIBUTION: MILREPS, CFMM, CMC, DCMC, DIMS, )One copy each

in personally

ecretary, A/D INT, A/D PGP,

A/D OPS, SACEUREP, SACLANTREPEUR)addressed

W

INCHANREP, Secreteriat, Rtcords)enveloDes

Record

-

MC-CBX-29-811Restricted Session)

SCAr.

T h i s

document

consists of a total

of 8

pag es

istribution completed a t

........

JUL 98

OR

2 . 9 . . .

.C.. .... . ... ..

........

.I......-...

by


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NATO SECRET

C O N T E N T S

I t e m

No.

PART

I

RESTRICTED SESSION

S u b j e c t

1

ACE RESPONSES TO AN INTERVENTION IN

POLAND NC)

ecord

MC-CBX-29-81

-

2

NATO

SECRET

Page

No.

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RESTRI CTED SESSI ON

PART I

NATO SECRET

NATO SECRET

I t em

1

ACE RESPONSES T O AN I NTERVENTI ON I N POLAND ( NC)

The Chai r man dr ew at t ent i on t o SACEUR' s l et t er ( 1)

cont ai ni ng pr oposed ACE r esponses to an i nt er vent i on i n Pol and.

He sai d he cons i der ed t hat t he f i r s t t hr ee par agr aphs of t he l et t er ,

whi ch r ef er r ed t o SACEUR' s i nt ent i ons, di d not necessar i l y i nvol ve

t he Mi l i t ar y Comm t t ee. I n par agr aph 4, SACEUR asked t hat nat i ons

shoul d consi der a ser i es of opt i ons whi ch he m ght r equest aut hor i t y

t o i mpl ement . Thi s l i s t o opt i ons cont ai ned par t of or var i at i ons

of opt i ons whi ch wer e al r eady cont ai ned i n t he Mat r i x paper( 2)

whi ch t he Comm t t ee had appr oved.

The Uni t ed St at es Member sai d he was pl eased t hat SACEUR

had addr essed hi s pr oposal s t o t he Comm t t ee. He poi nt ed out t hat i t

was onl y t he pr evi ous week t hat Member s had agr eed t o concl ude t hei r

i nt el l i gence appr ec i at i on o f t he s i t uat i on i n Pol and by addi ng a

par agr aph cont ai ni ng m l i t ar y cons i der at i ons . He sai d t hat i n r ecent

di scussi ons wi t h SACEUR and wi t h hi s own Aut hor i t i es, some addi t i onal

f act or s had become appar ent and r equi r ed consi der at i on. He

enumer at ed var i ous r ecent occur r ences whi ch had af f ect ed t he i n-

t el l i gence assessment ( 3) of t he s i t uat i on i n Pol and. These had l ed

t o a di scr epancy bet ween t he Comm t t ee' s r ecent m l i t ar y appr eci at i on( 3)

and t he l at er vi ews expr essed by SACEUR i n hi s l et t er ( 1) . Some of

t hese cvent s coul d cause t he Pol i sh l eader shi p t o pr epar e t o r eact

t o i nt er nal unr est and, i n hi s v i ew, i t was j udi c i ous of SACEUR t o

have acknowl edged t hat f act and f or hi m t o have pr cpar ed accor di ngl y.

I l i s Aut hor i t i es st r ongl y suppor t ed SACEUR' s pr oposal s and t he

oppr ot uni t y f or t he Comm t t ee t o comment on t hem si nce t hey mer i t ed

ear l y consi der at i on by Ambassador s.

The Uni t ed Ki ngdom Member sai d he wel comed SACEUR' s pr oposal s

bot h because t hey wer e a pr udent pr ecaut i on and because t hey enabl ed

t he Comm t t ee t o gi ve f ul l m l i t ar y cons i der at i on to t he pr obl em

bef or e hi s l et t er was f or war ded t o Ambassador s.

He sai d he was sur e t hat hi s Col l eagues woul d agr ee t hat

m d- J ul y 1981 was l i kel y t o be a per i od of par t i cul ar concer n t o t he

Sovi et l eader shi p. Al t hough he knew of no maj or m l i t ar y pr epar at i ons

he under st ood t hat Mar shal Kul i kov and some ot her key f i gur es had

r et ur ned t o Pol and, and t he poss i bi l i t y of t he Sovi et Uni on hol di ng

an exer ci se i n Pol and had been announced. For t hese r easons, he

t hought i t was cor r ect t hat SACEUR' s pr oposal s shoul d be st udi ed

but he di d not bel i eve t hat , at t he pr esent st age, t he Comm t t ee

need do mor e t han t o i nf or m Ambassador s f i r st l y t hat a l et t er had

been r ecei ved f r om SACEUR and secondl y t o poi nt out t hat i t woul d

be appr opr i at e f or t he aut hor i t y whi ch i t had del egat ed to SACEUR

i n December 1980 t o be r e- af f i r med. Thi s woul d conf i r m t hat t he

pr evi ous l y del egat ed aut hor i t y remai ned val i d, i nc l udi ng t he

aut hor i t y to r equest AWACS ai r c r af t . He bel i eved t hat s t af f di s -

cussi ons s houl d t ake pl ace as soon as possi bl e on al l par t s of t he

l et t er ot her t han par agr aph 2, and he poi nt ed out t hat t her e wer e

(1)

SACEUR' s l et t er ,

3

J un 8

2 ) MCM- EKD- 86- 80, 17 Dec 8 ( NS)

(3) CMCM- 11- 81, 30 J un 81(NS)

Recor d - MC- CBX- 29- 81 - 3 -

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mat t er s connect ed wi t h ai r def ence whi ch poss i bl y conf l i ct ed wi t h

t he deci si ons t aken by t he UPC i n December 1980. e al so poi nt ed

out t hat t her e wer e ot her quest i ons t o be answer ed such as whet her

cer t ai n measur es wer e r equi r ed bef or e or af t er an i nt er vent i on and

what t ype o f naval sur vei l l ance was requi r ed i n t he Bal t i c . He

f or esaw t hat t her e wer e many ot her s i m l ar quest i ons whi ch shoul d

be put ot t he MNCs ; t he answer s woul d need di scussi on bot h by t he

s t af f and by nat i onal aut hor i t i es i n or der t hat pol i t i cal and

m l i t ar y gui dance coul d be f or mul at ed bef ore t he meet i ng of

Ambassador s. Al t hough i t was r i ght t hat t he Comm t t ee shoul d be

put t i ng t hei r own and SACEUR' s m l i t ar y vi ews t o t he Ambassador s, i t

must be r ecogni sed t hat t he pol i t i cal v i ews may di f f er f r om t he

m l i t ar y advi ce and t hi s woul d r equi r e r esol ut i on.

He cons i der ed t he Al l i ance was f ac i ng a hi ghl y pol i t i cal

s i t uat i on and i t was essent i al t hat t he Mi l i t ar y Comm t t ee' s

r ecommendat i ons wer e wel l t hought out and pr eci se.

t he r equest by SACEUR f or a st udy of measur es t o speed up t he

deci s i on maki ng pr ocess i n t he event of an i nt er vent i on i n Pol and.

Ref er r i ng t o t he Matri x(l ), i n whi ch t he Comm t t ee had set out

poss i bl e opt i ons f or m l i t ar y measur es i n t he event of t he ac t ual

occur r ence o f any of t he cont i ngenc i es t hen pr evai l i ng, he sai d

t hat i t woul d have s i mpl i f i ed mat t er s i f SACEUR had ref er r ed t o i t

when f or mul at i ng hi s pr oposal s . I t was t he v i ew of t he Chi ef of

Def ence of Nor way t hat onl y t hose measur es whi ch had al r eady been

cl ear ed shoul d be consi der ed and he had t he f ol l owi ng m l i t ar y

comment s on t he det ai l ed pr oposal s:

The Nor wegi an Member sai d t hat hi s Aut hor i t i es appr eci at ed

- Par agr aph 3. As t he Ai r Def ence measur es wer e not cont ai ned

i n t he Mat r i x, i t s i ncl usi on was war r ant ed and Nor way was pr epar ed

t o : i d j u s t i t s Ai r Def ence al er t s t at us accor di ng t o t he s i t uat i on.

- Sub- par agr aph 4a. Thi s mcasur e was l i st ed r t hi n t he Aat r i x

under t he gr oup

of

Hi gh Responses af t er i nt cr vent i on. I t i ras

vi s i bl e mcasur e and i t s accept abi l i t y r est ed pr i nc i . pal l y wi t h t he

nat i ons i nvol ved.

Sub- par agr aph 4b. The Mar i t i me Sur vei l l ance mcasur c

cou ld

possi bl y bc pl aced wi t hi n t he sel ect ed r eadi ness exer ci ses whi ch wer c

i ncl uded i n t he maj or i t y o opt i ons i n t he Mat r i x . I mpl cmcnt at i on o f

OPLAN GLASS FL I PPER, whi ch had s t i l l not r ecei ved appr oval , r equi r ed

a number

o f

Nor wegi an f r i gat es. Nor way had i mpor t ant t asks i n t he

Nor t h wher e moni t or i ng and shadowi ng oper at i ons of t he Nor t her n Fl eet

woul d r equi r e i t s r esour ces. Thus Nor way was not at pr esent pr epar ed

t o pr oduce t he f or ces requi r ed.

-

1) SACEUR' s l et t er , 3 J un 81 ( NS)

Recor d

-

MC- CBX- 29- 81 - 4 -

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Sub- par agr aph

4c.

Thi s measur e, concer ni ng not i ce

t o depl oy, was i n t he Mi l i t ar y Vi gi l ance Gr oup MV and was bot h

a medi um r esponse af t er i nt er vent i on and a hi gh r esponse bef or e

i nt er vent i on opt i on.

I t

coul d al so f al l under sel ec t ed r eadi ness

exer ci ses, at Annex C of t he Mat r i x( l ) , poss i bl y even under Low Key

exer c i ses not r equi r i ng appr oval .

Sub- par agr aph 4d. STANAVFORCHAN had been di scus s ed i n

December 1980 and was ment i oned i n Annex of t he Mat r i x( 1) and ?ar aSr aPh

4

of

t he Mat r i x( l ) , whi ch cover ed sust ai ned oper at i ons. As

i t

was

not cl ear f or what pur pose t he f or ce woul d be used, Nor way was not

i nc l i ned t o ext end i t s par t i c i pat i on of one shi p beyond t he pl anned

dat e of

10

J ul y 1981.

-

Sub- par agr aph 4e. STANAVFORLANT had been i ncl uded i n t he

Mat r i x( 1) under

a l l

opt i ons and r esponse l evel s. I n order t o meet

t he r equi r ement s f or not i ce t o sai 1, t he For ce woul d have t o be i n

Eur opean wat er s and not i n West l ant . Nor way had no shi ps

i n

t he

f orce at pr esent and, because

o f

t he ot her t asks whi ch had al r eady

been ment i oned, i t was not consi der ed f eas i bl e

t o

make any ear l i er

at t achment t han was cur r ent l y pl anned.

t he Nor wegi an Chi ef of Def ence' s m l i t ary vi ews, had not been c l ear ed

by

hi s pol i t i cal aut hor i t i es ; t hi s woul d be necessar y bef or e a

deci s i on coul d be r eached at Ambassador i al l evel .

Ile

r emar ked t hat t hese comment s, al t hough r epr esent i ng

The

Ger man Member sai d t hat i n hi s vi ew di sc ussi on of

SACEUR' s pr oposal s shoul d i ni t i al l y concent r at e on t he di scr epancy

whi ch ex i st ed bet ween t he m l i t ar y appr eci at i on( 2) r ecent l y f or war ded

t o t he DPC and SACEUR' s l at est ass ess ment t hat t her e was an i ncr easi ng

possi bi 1. i t y of an i nt er vent i on t aki ng pl ace; SACEUR' s comment s on

t hi s woul d

be

hel pf ul . Ne sai d t hat t he Comm t t ee' s assessment

of t he s i t uat i on shoul d i ncl ude a short summar y and i t s own appr eci at i on

of t he cur r ent s i t uat i on i n Pol and. The at t i t ude of t he ot her nat i ons

of t he War saw Pact t owar ds Pol and cont i nued t o be char act er i zed by a

des i r e t o i nf l uence t he f eder at i on of t he Pol i sh Par t y Congr ess i n

or der t o s t r engt hen t he Mar x i s t - Leni ni s t or t hodox f or ces . However

t her e wer e var i ous i ndi cat i ons of i r r esol ut i on on t he s t eps r equi r ed

t o sol ve t he cr i s i s . The Sovi et Uni on was obvi ousl y encour agi ng

Bul gar i a and I i ungary t o t ake a harder l i ne on t he Pol i sh s i t uat i on,

at l east i n t hei r news medi a and of f i c i al s t at ement s .

A

mor e

uni f or m r esponse by a l l t he War szw Pact count r i es , except poss i bl y

Roumani a, woul d enabl e t hem t o enf or ce t hei r mut ual i nt er cst mor e

ef f ec t i vel y. For t hi s r eason he t hought i t was i mpor t ant t o c l ar i f y

t he di scr epancy t o whi ch he had r ef er r ed.

Tur ni ng t o par agr aph 2 of SACEUR' s l et t er ( 3) ,

he

sai d he was

aut hor i zed t o r e- af f i r m t he pr econdi t i oned pr ecaut i onar y measur es

as deci ded by t he DPC i n December 1980. He dr ew at t ent i on t o some

o

t he condi t i ons at t ached t o t hi s dec i s i on and

use

of t hem shoul d

onl y

be

wi t hi n t he i nt egr at ed coi nmand st r uct ur e; he a l s o emphas i sed

t hat t hese condi t i ons woul d al so appl y t o any s i m l ar measur es .

( 1) MCM- EKD- 86- 80, 17 Dec 80

Ns)

(2) CMCM- 1. 1- 81,

3

J un 81

( NS)

(3)

SACEUR' s l et t er ,

30.

J un 81 (NS)

Recor d

-

MC- CBX- 29- 81

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Regar di ng t he measur es cont ai ned i n t he ot her par agr aphs

of

SACEUR' s

l e t te r ( l ) , i t was t he Ger man vi ew t hat t hey s houl d be di scussed

af t er t hey had been st af f ed.

The Chai r man poi nt ed out t hat t he Uni t ed St at es Member

had dr awn at t ent i on t o sever al poi nt s whi ch i n hi s own vi ew and

pr obabl y i n SACEUR' s vi ew, expl ai ned t he appar ent di scr epancy bet ween

SACEUR' s l et t er ( 1) and t he i nt el l i gence assessment ( 2) . fie cont i nued

t hat SACEUR had gi ven hi m t he i mpr essi on t hat he woul d l i ke t he

Comm t t ee t o deal wi t h t he mat t er expedi t i ousl y and i n or der t o

achi eve t hi s , he was pr epared t o r ecal l t he Comm t t ee as of t en as

was necessary pr i or t o t he meet i ng of t he Counci l t o di scuss Pol and.

had pr ovi ded t he Comm t t ee wi t h anot her oppor t uni t y t o consi der

measur es r esul t i ng f r om t he s i t uat i on i n Pol and. He f ul l y suppor t ed

SACEUR' s cont ent i on t hat t her e was an i ncr eas i ng poss i bi l i t y o f a

Wars aw Pact i nt er vent i on. The Comm t t ee woul d r ecal l t hat at i t s

meet i ng on J une 1981 he had gi ven hi s vi ew t hat t he quest i on was

not whet her t her e woul d be an i nt er vent i on but when i t woul d occur ,

and he had ment i oned m d- J ul y 1981 as bei ng a cr i t i cal per i od because

of t he pl anned Congr ess

o

t he Pol i s h Par t y. He al s o r ecal l ed t hat

;1 numhcr

O

m l i t ar y Kcasur es i ncl uded i n t he r l atr i x(3) had been

del cgat cd t o SACEI J R. Regar di ng t he par agr aph on t ie ai r def ence

mcasur es,

hc

poi nt ed out t hat t he r eason t hese Lad been om t t ed

Trorn

tli c Mat r i x(3)

was

because

i t

was consi der c~l t h a t SACI? TR al r eady

h d

aut hori t y t o i mpl em2nt t hem

The Bel gi an Member sai d t hat he was gr at ef ul t hat SACEUR

Sayi ng t hat he had not yet r ecei ved i ns t r uct i ons f r om hi s

Aut hor i t i es, he asked f or a shor t del ay but r ecommended t hat SACEUR' s

l et t er ( 1) shoul d agai n be consi der ed by t he Comm t t ee bef or e t he

meet i ng of Ambass ador s on 8 J ul y 1981. He suggcs t ed t hat

t he Mat r i x( 3) shoul d be br ought up t o dat e because t her e wer e var i ous

changes r equi r ed, f or exampl e t hose made necessar y by t he pr esent

l ocat i on o f t he St andi ng Naval For ce At l ant i c .

The Net her l ands Member sai d t hat a bal ance s houl d be st r uck

bet ween t he t hr eat as i t was now per cei ved and t he ur gency t o f or war d

SACEUR' s pr oposed measur es t o Ambassador s. He sai d he t hought i t was

necessar y t o r e- def i ne t he measur es al r eady del egat ed t o SACEUR.

As t her e wer e var i ous quest i ons a st af f meet i ng s houl d be hel d as s oon

possi bl e i .n order t o addr ess t hem

The Dani sh Member sai d t hat he had not yet r ecei ved

i ns t r uc t i ons f r om hi s Aut hor i t i es . He suppor t ed hi s Net her l ands

Col l eague' s pr oposal as a st af f l evel paper shoul d be pr epar ed as

soon

as

poss i bl e set t i ng out new pr oposal s f or cons i der at i on by

Ambass ador s and he appr eci at ed t he oppor t uni t y bei ng af f or ded t o

f or mul at e m l i t ar y advi ce on t hem He dr ew at t ent i on t o t he

(1) SACEUR' s l et t er , 30J un 81 NS)

2 ) CMCM- 11- 81, 30 J un 81 NS)

(3)

MCb f - EKD - 8 6 - 8 0

17 Dec 80

NS)

Recor d

-

MC-

C B X - 2 9 - 8 1 .6

ATO

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NATO SECRET

s ens i t i vi t y of measur es af f ect i ng t he Bal t i c and sai d hi s Aut hor i t i es

wer e al er t t o t he pr obl ems whi ch m ght occur i n t hat ar ea.

I J nder t aki ng t o obt ai n hi s Aut hor i t i es ' v i ews as soon as poss i bl e, he

r ecommended t hat s t af f wor k shoul d i mmedi at el y be i ni t i at ed t o combi ne

and br i ng up t o dat e t he cont ent s of t he Mat r i x paper ( 1) and SACEUR' s

new pr oposal s(2) . He al so agr eed t hat a mor e det ai l ed i nt el l i gence

i nput was r equi r ed.

but , speaki ng per sonal l y, he suppor t ed t he r ecommendat i ons of hi s

Net her l ands and Uni t ed Ki ngdom Col l eagues f or t he st udy t o be st ar t ed

as soon as possi bl e. He emphasi sed t he ef f ect whi ch t he di scr epancy

bet ween t he r ecent m l i t ar y appr ec i at i on( 3) and t he t i m ng of t he l et t er

cont ai ni ng SACEUR' s pr oposal s( 2) coul d cause. Al t hough he f el t t hat hi s

Uni t ed St at es Col l eague had pr oduced s ome val i d r easons why t he

di scr epancy had occur r ed, he sai d t hat i n hi s v i ew i t was i mpor t ant

t hat any di sc r epancy s houl d be r esol ved bef or e a r ecommendat i on was

f or war ded t o Ambass ador s.

T h e

Canadi an Member sai d he had not yet r ecei ved i nst r uct i ons

The Tur ki sh Member sai d t hat he was awai t i ng i nst r uct i ons

f r om hi s Aut hor i t i es but he appr eci at ed SACEUR' s addr ess i ng hi s

l et t er t o t he Comm t t ee.

The Uni t ed Ki ngdom Member sai d he t hought i t i mpor t ant

€ r t he Comm t t ee t o f or mul at e i t s advi ce on SACEUR' s pr oposal s

bef or e t he meet i ng of Ambass ador s on 8 J ul y 1981. He bel i eved

i t

was vi t al f or t he del egat i on of aut hor i t y t o SACEUR t o be r e- conf i r med.

lie di d not r ecommend t hat t he Comm t t ee shoul d r el at e i t s advi ce t oo

cl osel y t o t he advi ce cont ai ned i n t he Matr i x(1). He poi nt ed out t hat

s t he Mat r i x( 1) had not yet been consi der ed by t he Ambass ador s, t hi s

m ght pr esent an oppor t uni t y t o ensur e t hat t he Mat r i x( 1) di d r ecei ve

consi der at i on. He di d not consi der t hat t he r ecent l y pr oduced

a~pr eci at i on( 3) d i f f er ed t oo s i gni f i cant l y f r om SACEl J R' s assessment ( 2) ,

par t i cul ar l y i f SACEUR' s pr oposal s wer e r egar ded as pr ecaut i onar y

measur es.

e pr oposed t hat a st af f meet i ng s houl d t ake pl ace on

, J ul y 1981 i n or der t o pr epar e pr el i m nar y advi ce f or t he meet i ng o f

Ambass ador s on

8

J ul y 1981.

h e Chai r man sai d t hat he agr eed t hat i t was necessar y

f or t he Comm t t ee t o have i t s vi ews pr epar ed i n t i me f or t hem t o be

pr csent ed at t he meet i ng of t he NAC on 8 J ul y 1981. e sai d he al so

suppor t ed t he vi ews of some member s t hat t he di sc r epancy was not

par t i cul ar l y s i gni f i cant ; i t had pr i nc i pal l y been caused by di f f er ences

i n i nt er pr et i ng r ecent pol i t i cal event s wi t hi n t he War saw Pact .

He

consi der ed t hat i t coul d be assumed t hat t he aut hor i t y del egat ed t o

SACEUR r emai ned val i d al t hough i t woul d be possi bl e t o ask f or i t t o

be r e- af f i r med i n necessar y. Ther e wer e t wo speci f i c pr obl ems whi ch

shoul d be addr essed, t hose af f ect i ng STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORCHAN.

He dr ew at t ent i on t o t he f act t hat SACEUR had not r ef er r ed

t o

t he Mat r i x( 1) i n hi s pr oposal s and asked SACEUREP t o expl ai n t he

r easons f or t hi s .

1) MCM- EKI ) - 86- 80, 17 ec 8 ( NS)

12) SACEUR' s l et t er , 30 J un

81

( NS)

(3) CMCM- 11- 81, 30 J un 81 ( NS)

Recor d - MC- CBX- 29- 81 - 7 -

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SACEUREP sai d t hat t he Mat r i x( 1) had been t aken i nt o

consi der at i on when t he pr oposal s wer e bei ng f or mul at ed; SACEUR' s

pr oposal s wer e a r ef i nement of cer t ai n o i t s cont ent s .

The Uni t ed St at es Member agr eed wi t h hi s Col l eague t hat t he

Mat r i x( 1) had not yet been pl aced on t he Agenda of t he DPC and he

di d not know whet her i t had even been c i r cul at ed unof f i c i al l y t o

Ambassador s. For t hat r eason, he sai d i t had occur r ed t o hi m t hat

t her e m ght be advant ages i n r ef er r i ng t o t he Mat r i x( 1) when pr ovi di ng

m l i t ar y advi ce on SACEUR' s pr oposal s. He sai d he had r evi ewed t he

i nt el l i gence avai l abl e t o t he I MS car ef ul l y and asked Member s t o

cont r i but e any addi t i onal i nt el l i gence whi ch became avai l abl e as

qui ckl y as poss i bl e. Hi s nat i on was doi ng i t s best t o ensur e t hat

i t pr ovi ded t he I MS wi t h the l at es t i nt el l i gence avai l abl e i n or der

t o bui l d up a bank of i nt el l i gence dat a, as i t was i mpor t ant f or nat i ons

t o resol ve t he appar ent di scr epancy and t o r each an agr eed posi t i on.

Comment i ng on t he poi nt made by hi s Bel gi an and Uni t ed Ki ngdom

Col l eagues concer ni ng ai r def ence, he sai d t hat SACEUR had been r e-

st at i ng some of t he measur es whi ch had al r eady been del egat ed t o hi m

i n cur r ent di r ect i ves . I t m ght be t hat some f ur t her gui dance on

ai r def ence mat t er s shoul d be f or mul at ed. Thi s coul d

b e

i nc l uded i n

t he m l i t ar y advi ce whi ch was bei ng s ent t o Ambassador s.

e

sai d he was i n compl et e agr eement

w i t h

t he vi ews

expr essed concer ni ng t he r equi r ement f or s t af f meet i ngs and t he

i nt ent i on t o pr oduce m l i t ar y advi ce f or Ambassador s on SACEUR' s

pr oposal s i n t i me f or t hei r meet i ng on Pol and.

The Canadi an Member , r ef er r i ng back t o hi s ear l i er

i nt er vent i on, sai d t hat t he r easons f or t he di scr epancy had now

been f ul l y expl ai ned by hi s Uni t ed St at es Col l eague. When SACEUR' s

p r o po sa l s wer e f or war ded t o Ambass ador s, he consi der ed t hat t he

f act or s whi ch had caused t he di scr epancy shoul d be expl ai ned even

i f t hey wer e not of a m l i t ar y nat ur e.

whi ch showed SACEUR had r ecei ved aut hor i t y f r om t he DPC t o i mpl ement

some of t he measur es of m l i t ar y vi gi l ance even t hough t he DPC had

not yet consi der ed t he f ul l cont ent s of t he Mat r i x paper(1).

The Bel gi an Member quot ed f r om par agr aph

4

of t he Mat r i x( 1)

Thc Chai r man asked Member s t o conf i r m t hat t hey agr eed

wi t h hi s own vi ew t hat t he Comm t t ee had an obl i gat i on t o ensur e t hat

SACEUR' s pr oposal s r eached t he Ambassador s bef or e t he st ar t of t hei r

meet i ng on 8 J ul y 1981 and Member s si gni f i ed t hei r agr eement .

par t i c i pat ed on t he most sui t abl e

t i m ngs f or t he s t af f meet i ng and

t he next meet i ng of t he Comm t t ee.

meet i ng woul d be hel d at 1400 hour s on 3 J ul y 1981 and t hat t he

Mi l i t ar y Comm t t ee woul d meet at

1 4 0 0

hour s on

6

J ul y 1981.

Ther e f ol l owed a di scussi on i n whi ch var i ous Member s

I t was agr eed t hat a s t af f l evel

THE COMMI TTEE TOOK NOTE.

Recor d - MC- CBX- 29- 81 8

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Documents

NATO - Ace Responses to an Intervention in Poland - meeting 2 July 1981