The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Agreement beetwenNATO and the GulfCooperation CouncilCountries

- Obstacles and Propositions -

by Ashraf Kishk

NATO Defense CollegeCollège de Défense de l’OTAN

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Dr. Ashraf Kishk is the Director of the Diplomatic Center forStrategic Studies (Cairo branch) and a specialist in Gulfsecurity issues.This paper has been produced under the NATO DefenseCollege MED Fellowship Programme.

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE

COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L’OTAN

Research DivisionDivision Recherche

Fellowship Monagraph

The Istanbul Cooperation InitiativeAgreement between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

Obstacles and Propositions

Ashraf Mohammad Kishk

Rome, December 2009

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE

NATO Defense College Cataloguing-in-Publication-Data:“THE ISTANBUL COOPERATION INITIATIVE AGREEMENTBETWEEN NATO AND THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCILCOUNTRIES.OBSTACLES AND PROPOSITIONS”

(NATO Defense College “NDC Fellowship Mongraph Series”)

Edited by Dr Pierre RazouxCopy-editing: Maria Di Martino

The views expressed in this Fellowship Monograph are those of the authorand do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the DiplomaticCenter for Strategic Studies (Cairo), the NATO Defense College or theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Extracts of this Fellowship Monograph for academic purposes may bequoted or reprinted without special permission, provided that a standardsource credit line is included. To copy, to republish or to post on the worldwide web, requires the permission from the NATO Defense College.

© NDC 2009 all rights reserved

Copies of this Fellowship Monograph may be obtained directly from theNATO Defense College, Research DivisionVia Giorgio Pelosi, 1 - 00143 Rome, ItalyFax +39-06-50 52 57 97E-mail: m.dimartino@ndc.nato.intWeb site: http://www.ndc.nato.int

Printed and bound byTipografia Facciotti s.r.l. – Vicolo Pian Due Torri, 74 – 00146 RomaTel. 0655260900 - Fax 0655260907

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ............................................................................................... 5

PART I: SECURITY CHALLENGES IN GCC STATES ................... 6Geographical location and importance of GCC States

I- Internal threats ......................................................................... 10A - Demographic imbalanceB - SectarianismC - BordersD - Failure to establish a Common Gulf Defense Force

II- External threats ........................................................................ 14A - IranB - IraqC - Energy sector threatsD - Terrorism

PART II: OBSTACLES FACING THE ICI

I- Non-adherence by Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen................ 21A - Saudi ArabiaB - OmanC - Yemen

II- Popular opposition to the ICI in the Gulf .............................. 25A - Opinion polls B - Views of the Gulf’s intellectual eliteC - Views of the Gulf’s parliaments

III The ICI contents ...................................................................... 28A - Obstacles to defense sector reforms in the Gulf

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B - Obstacles to NATO-Gulf cooperation againstproliferation of WMDs

C - Difficulties relating to the fight against terrorism

IV Gulf States’ incapacity to find a balance between the roles ofNATO and the US ..................................................................... 31

V Obstacles faced by NATO ....................................................... 32A - Unspecified security obligations towards Gulf StatesB - Insufficient efforts to explain NATO’s current policiesC - The impact of NATO-Israel cooperation on the ICI

PART III MECHANISMS TO STRENGHTEN THE ICI ........... 36

I Level 1: NATO’s role in promoting the Gulf’s self-security .... 37A - NATO’s role in supporting military capacities in Gulf StatesB - Necessary efforts to convince Saudi Arabia and Oman to join the ICIC - Security engagements from NATO to ensure energy security

a - The pillars of a NATO intervention to secure energyb - Measures requested from NATO to ensure energy security

II Level 2: NATO’s role vis-à-vis regional security threats........... 48A - NATO’s role in IraqB - NATO’s role vis-à-vis IranC - NATO’s role regarding proposals to ensure regional security

III Level 3: NATO’s role in the Middle East peace process ........... 57

Recommendations for the ICI future ................................................. 60

Concrete proposals .............................................................................. 62

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Introduction

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was launched at theIstanbul summit, held from 28 to 29 June 2004. In line with NATO’s newpolicy, primarily aimed at dealing with security threats at their source, theInitiative reaches out to countries of the broader Middle East, starting withthe Gulf States, and promotes NATO-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)cooperation in a number of key fields such as defense reform, the fightagainst terrorism, prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction prolifera-tion, crisis management and border security. Under the ICI umbrella, GulfStates can benefit from NATO’s added value in those areas, especiallywhen facing threats requiring a collective effort.

Despite its importance, since its inception in 2004 the Initiativehas elicited only limited response from the Gulf States. Moreover, officialand popular perceptions of NATO’s role in the Gulf differ, and three GulfStates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman and theYemen, have not joined the ICI, thus limiting its effectiveness and under-lining the multitude of Gulf security perceptions. Furthermore, some aca-demics continue to oppose cooperation with NATO in general.

In this framework, the following three questions could be raised:

1 - What are the security challenges facing GCC countries?2 - What are the obstacles facing the Istanbul Cooperation

Initiative?3 - How could this Initiative be enhanced in the future in order

to maximize benefits for both NATO and Gulf States?

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PART I

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN GCC STATES

Geographical location and importance of GCC States

Geographically speaking, GCC States are located in the heart ofthe Middle East. Moreover, many economically and militarily significantislands are located in the Gulf, and whoever controls them has power overall passageways between the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Gulf is hometo the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most strategically important waterwayand the only passage to the open ocean for GCC States. The Strait connectsthe Gulf to the nearby Indian Ocean and from there to South East Asia,Russia, Europe and the rest of the world1.

The following figure illustrates the relation between Gulf securityand regional security:

1 Dr. Mohamad Al Said Idriss, The Regional System in the Arab Gulf, Beirut, Center of Arab UnityStudies, 2000, p. 73.

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The Six Gulf States: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United ArabEmirates.Gulf Territory (6+2+1): the six Gulf States + Iraq and Iran + Yemen

Economically speaking, the six Gulf States are the biggest produc-ers of the energy fueling the world’s economy. In 2007, proved oil reservesin the Gulf were estimated at 484.6 billion barrels (41.8% of the world’sreserves) distributed as follows: the UAE: 97.8 Million Barrels Per Day(8.045%); Bahrain: 1 MBPD (1.0%); Saudi Arabia: 264.3 MBPD(22.82%); Qatar: 15.2 MBPD (1.31%); Kuwait: 151.5 MBPD (8.76%);and Oman: 5.7 MBPD (5%).

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Because of its economic and strategic importance, the Gulf isaffected by regional and international conflicts which are a challenge tothe six rather small GCC States, which suffer from a “size complex”2.Given their limited size and small populations, GCC States have been con-tinuously targeted by their more powerful neighbors. Their dilemma isexacerbated by the fact that they are wealthy states and consequently havealways been the object of their neighbors’ cupidity, resulting in chronicinstability and leading them to seek alliances with the world’s superpow-ers to defend themselves. According to the Secretary General of the GCC,“external threats faced by GCC States are caused by two factors: the severepower imbalance and the wide geopolitical gap between Gulf States’ rela-tive material power, i.e. oil wealth possessed by each State individually andcollectively, and their military power, making them the envy of more pop-ulated and powerful regional actors”3.

2 The author uses this expression to compare the Gulf States with their two neighbors, Iraq and Iran.The Gulf States fall into one of the three following categories: Large States (Saudi Arabia); MediumSized States (UAE, Oman) and Small States (Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain).3 Speech by GCC Secretary General Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah at the “NATO and Security in the Gulf ”Conference, Doha, 30 November - 4 December 2005, www.nato-qatar.com

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The Gulf States are an indirect player in all regional conflicts4.Furthermore, they face numerous internal and external security threatsarising from their strategic location, important energy resources andsmall size.

4 See Ashraf Mohamad Kishk, The development of regional security in the Gulf: a study on the impactof NATO’s strategy, PhD thesis (unpublished), Faculty of Economy and Political Science, CairoUniversity, 2009, pages 86, 88.

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I - Internal threats

A - Demographic imbalance

The six GCC States comprise massive numbers of migrant work-ers recruited since the 1970s’ oil boom to help in the developmentprocess. In 2007, of the 23,980,834 people living in Saudi Arabia,17,493,364 were nationals (72.9%), while 27.1% were foreigners. InKuwait, 31% of the 3,399,637 inhabitants are nationals (1.048.598 peo-ple), while the remaining 2,345,039 inhabitants (69%) are expatriates.5.5 million expatriates live in the UAE (87.3%), while in Qatar, nation-als account for only 16% of the population (compared to 84% of expa-triates). In Bahrain, of the 1.5 million inhabitants, 517,0005 are expatri-ates, compared to 26%6 of the population in Oman. These migrant work-ers, mostly from nearby Asian countries, who were urgently needed afterthe oil boom in the 1970s to help implement national development plans,have become a threat to GCC States: during the period 2006-2008,migrant workers in the Gulf organized a number of protests and riotsover their low wages, obliging Gulf security forces to use force againstthem, a move criticized by International Human Rights Reports7.Moreover, high levels of crime (robbery, counterfeiting, murder andrape)8 are prevalent amongst migrant workers. But the most dangerousconsequence of such a large migrant presence is how it affects thenational identity of Gulf States. In this regard, the Bahrain Minister ofLabor, Dr Majeed Elalwi, said that “the region is about to face a disastermuch worse than the nuclear bomb or any Israeli attack…The region’straits are changing and it is being transformed into a predominantlyAsian area”. Another danger lies in international demands to grant thesemigrant workers citizenship of Gulf States, as explained by the Secretary

5 Fahmi Houwaid, “The Gulf: Before we win buildings and lose the UAE”, Al Sharq Al Awsat news-paper, 23 April 2008.6 Analysis of the demographic structure in Oman, Oman Al Yom newspaper, 27 December 2008.7 Report on migrant workers in GCC States, Kuwait Diplomatic Center for Strategic Studies, issue no.6, 16 March 2008.8 Report on migrant workers in the Gulf, www.alarabia.net, 24 April 2007.

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General of the Arab Labor Organization, Ahmed Lukman: “There is afrightening and worrying trend reflected by dangerous plans to grantmigrant workers in the Arab world the citizenship of host countries,threatening the demographic structure of those countries”9. Given thelopsided native/migrant ratios, this migrant force, in addition to deplet-ing Gulf resources and to its negative cultural effect, could turn into atime bomb if it is organized and if it adopts positions opposing those ofhost countries10.

B - Sectarianism

The six Gulf States comprise a large percentage of Shia Muslims:65% in Bahrain; 30% in Kuwait; 15-20% in Saudi Arabia; 15% in theUAE; and 10% in Qatar, in addition to adherents of the Ibadi branch inOman, as well as of Ismailism and other, smaller Sunni and Shia denomi-nations11. Although religious differences have not constituted a source ofconflict in the history of GCC States, such conflicts might arise in the pres-ence of sectarian-based political rifts and competitions, threatening theGulf’s national fabric. This was the case in Kuwait, with the creation of the“Kuwaiti Hezbollah” as part of an Iranian project to connect with Shiaminorities in the Gulf12. An official Bahraini report reflected these fearsby affirming that “the State is facing a major challenge which threatens thefuture of its national identity given the continuous fueling of sectarian-ism”. He called on religious figures to “review their religious rhetoric”13.Sectarianism is without doubt the key threat to internal security: theLebanese civil war provides a clear example of a population torn between

9 Fattouh Haikal, Asian workers in the Gulf: dangerous indicators, The Emirates Center for PoliticalStudies and Research, 20 January 2009.10 Analysis published in Al Sharq Al Awsat newspaper on the impact of migrant workers on GCCStates, 14 July 2007.11 Dr. Abdallah Bin Ibrahim Al Asqar, “Sectarianism in the Gulf: The Gulf did not and will not witn-ess a sectarian war”, www.alarabia.net, 20 June 2008.12 Jassem Al Shamali, “Iran’s provisional plan in Kuwait”, Al Watan Al Arabi Magazine, 2 April 2008.13 Mahmoud Sadeq, “Bahrain between the Al Qaeda threat and sectarianism”, Al Watan Al ArabiMagazine, 7 February 2008.

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loyalties to the State and to religious leaders, where loyalty to religion –even when it conflicts with national interests14 – is often more importantthan loyalty to the State. Hence, Gulf States are prone to external infiltra-tions as various religious denominations seek support from external actors,jeopardizing internal stability and generating sectarian strife.

C - Borders

Border problems between Gulf States pose a security threat, espe-cially as the contested border areas are rich in resources, including oil andminerals. The complexity of the border issue is partly due to the fact thatarbitration rulings are taken on the basis of British documents which failto delineate these borders correctly. Therefore, borders are a continuoussource of tension, requiring huge political efforts and economic resources.Many border conflicts exist between GCC States: some have been settledthrough international arbitration while others await to be solved. For exam-ple, to reach the Omani peninsula of Ras Musandam15. Omanis are obligedto pass through the UAE. Border disputes in the Gulf are twofold: intra-GCC conflicts over border delineations, such as those between SaudiArabia and both Kuwait and Oman, and between Saudi Arabia and Qatar,which escalate from time to time; and border conflicts between GCCStates and their neighbors, such as the those between Kuwait and Iraq,Saudi Arabia and Yemen, or the UAE and Iran16.

D - Failure to establish a Common Gulf Defense Force

The GCC was set up in 1981 in response to the 1979 IranianRevolution. At the time, the Council’s Chiefs of Staff endorsed specificrecommendations for military cooperation, and agreed in 1986 to create

14Mohamad Dibo, “Sectarianism and why it continues”, www.alamean.org, 17 July 2008.15 Dr. Sufyan Al Tal, “Facing regional threats and challenges in the Gulf ”, Al Arab online, 8 July 2007.16 Kamal Mohamad al Astal, “Towards a theory for the security of GCC States”, The Emirates Centerfor Strategic Studies and Research, Strategic Studies Series, issue no. 33, 1999, pages 66 and 67.

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the “Peninsula Shield Forces”. However, wars in the Gulf have proven thatGCC States suffer from high exposure to security threats due to their fail-ure to become a real balancing force capable of facing both Iraq and Iran,As a result, they have been drawn into regional conflicts as an indirectactor. The following reasons could explain the GCC’s failure to establish aCommon Gulf Defense Force:

1- The GCC’s security performance is affected by the Gulf States’different perceptions of the GCC’s role as a collective entity. Proposals topromote a common Gulf army have not been formulated, as GCC Statesdo not want a supranational sovereign entity that would limit their sover-eignty. Consequently, the GCC remains a consultative body which takes itsdecisions unanimously17.

2- The condition of each State’s armed forces impacts the effec-tiveness of a Common Gulf Force. GCC States have small populations andlack the necessary technical skills to handle modern technology18.

3- Lack of strategies for military drafts in Gulf States. For exam-ple, in 2001, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense decided to end compulsorymilitary service. However, in 2007, a new compulsory service bill wassubmitted to the Kuwaiti National Assembly.

4- US policy towards GCC States affects the Council’s security per-formance. The US granted Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status to Bahrainand Kuwait, conferring a variety of military advantages on them. US flexibil-ity is also noted in the delivery of US weapons to Gulf States, which areexempted from the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994 prohibitingthe selling of US defense-related goods to any country complying with the pri-

17 Mohamad Al Said Idriss, “The Role of Security and Military Cooperation in Developing GCC as aRegional Organ”, Al Moustaqbal Al Arabi Magazine, issue no. 215, Center of Arab Unity Studies,Beirut, 1997, p. 28.18 Dr. Fouad Shihab, Gulf Security in 2003-2004, Gulf Strategic Report for 2003-2004, publishedunder the supervision of Dr. Abdel Khaleq Abdallah, Dar Al Khaleej Printing & Publishing House,Sharjah, UAE, 2004, p. 176.

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mary and secondary boycotts of Israel. Consequently, defense policies in theGulf compete against one another instead of being complementary.

The above-mentioned threats are structural, i.e. they underminethe viability of GCC States as independent entities with their own identi-ty. However, other, more dangerous external threats exist and are present-ed in the following section.

II- External threats

The current chronic power imbalance between Gulf States andIran (and between the States and Iraq in the past), the consequences of theUS invasion of Iraq and new energy threats all constitute external threatsto Gulf States:

A - Iran

The imbalance of power between Gulf States and Iran is consid-ered to be the main threat to Gulf States. Iran’s population is bigger and thecountry is more advanced militarily: GCC armed forces number 352,000soldiers while the Iranian army alone has some 545,000 men. Iran is notonly superior in numbers; it also enjoys a quality advantage in its weapons,land and marine forces19. The following table illustrates the increase inmilitary spending in Iran from 2001 to 200720:

(In billions of dollars)

Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Total 3029 3126 3369 3379 3909 6480 7160

Spending

19 Report on Military Balance in 2007/2008 in GCC States and Iran, IISS, London, p. 240-286.20 Source for 2001-2005: Gulf Strategic Report 2006/2007, Sharjah, Gulf Center for Studies, 1st edi-tion, The Sipri Military Expenditure, p. 377. Source for 2006-2007: Report on Military Balance, IISS,London, p. 242-244.

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The above table indicates that neither economic hardships nor thefall in oil prices in certain years has affected Iran’s military spending,regarded as a constant Iranian strategy. Iranian threats to the Gulf increaseas the country seeks to develop its nuclear program and to become a hege-monic regional power capable of changing the geo-strategic context toserve its own interests, thus influencing GCC decisions. Gulf States notonly fear the disastrous environmental consequences of a nuclear Iran;they also know that if Iran continues in its nuclear quest, they will have nooption other than to develop their own nuclear capabilities, even if forpeaceful purposes only, as they officially announced in 2006.Consequently, Israel might feel the need to boost its deterrence capabili-ties. Given the presence of adjacent nuclear powers in Asia (China, India,Pakistan), Gulf States may find themselves part of a violent nuclear armsrace21. On the other hand, Iran’s possession of the nuclear weapon couldshake the pillars of regional security, namely confidence-building meas-ures and prohibition of the use of force. Moreover, Iran continues to occu-py the three UAE Islands and threatens to use its gigantic 18,000-strongmarine force and 20,000-strong Revolutionary Guard Marine Forces toclose down the Strait of Hormuz -through which 90% of Gulf oil exportspass. Therefore, it remains a current and a future threat to GCC States22.

External threats are not limited to a possible military confrontationbetween Iran and the West, which would certainly be felt by Gulf States. Anearthquake, for example, could trigger a nuclear accident with catastrophicconsequences such as the death of 200,000 people (half the population ofBahrain). Potential water pollution could also lead to the shutting down ofwater stations in the Gulf, mostly located in coastal areas23. Threats fromIran itself are not limited to the above-mentioned forms of hard power: Iran’shuge influence on Shia populations in the Gulf became apparent during con-

21 Emil El Hokayom and Matteo Legrenzi, The Arab Gulf States in The Shadow of The Iranian NuclearChallenge, Stemson Center 2006; see also: Dr. Bruno Tertrais, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: settlement per-spectives and possible scenarios for the Gulf in 2006-2007, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, p. 287-288. 22 Ashraf Mohamad Kishk, “How the GCC States view the Iranian Nuclear Program”, Mokhtarat IraniyyaMagazine, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Al Ahram Institute, Issue no. 62, 2005, p. 113.23 James Noyes, Iran’s nuclear program: realities and repercussions, Emirates Center for StrategicStudies and Research, 2007, p. 77.

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frontations between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, when large demonstra-tions were organized in some Gulf States in support of Hezbollah. Officialstatements were made in the Arab world to warn against this Iranian influ-ence, considered a threat to the Gulf’s national fabric.

B - Iraq

By invading Iraq in 2003, the US sought to put an end to a majorthreat to Gulf States. However, political and security developments in Iraqin the aftermath of the invasion confirm that Iraq has become more danger-ous: it is torn by political quarrels among Kurds, Shias and Sunnis as wellas by divisions within each of these denominations, providing a livingexample of what Hobbes called “a war of all against all” in the absence ofa national project uniting all political powers. Moreover, security conditionshave largely deteriorated, resulting in the deaths of nearly 60,000 peopleover the period 2003 to 2007, causing around 2.4 million Iraqis to leave thecountry and internally displacing an additional 2 million people24. Stabilityin Iraq seems a very remote prospect, as the specter of civil war looms: nota single war between opposing political or religious factions, but one thatwill consist of a number of overlapping conflicts reflecting the highly com-plex Iraqi situation25. Given the deterioration of its economic conditionsand basic services, Iraq is currently considered a failed state, posing seriousthreats to its neighbors as it turns into a safe haven for terrorist groups, drugtraffickers and arms smugglers and is no longer capable of safeguardingitself as a viable political and economic entity. The threats posed by Iraq areaggravated on the one hand by the weakness of the Iraqi security forces andon the other by neighbors meddling in Iraqi affairs.

Consequently, Iraq constitutes a major threat to GCC security forvarious reasons:

- The power void, resulting in regional instability: Iraq’s withdraw-al from the Gulf’s power balance equation has led to an increase

24 Andrew Terrill, Regional Spillover Effects of the Iraq War, Strategic Studies Institute 2009.25 Gareth Stansfield, Accepting Realities in Iraq, Chatham House, 2007.

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in Iran’s regional hegemony (over the smaller Gulf States).

- Sectarian strife in Iraq has a negative impact on internal securityin the GCC, where religious denominations, tribalism and ethnicgroups play a major political and economic role given their tieswith the State26. Fears are growing in Gulf States with large Shiapopulations, while Kuwait fears the creation of a Shia State inthe south of Iraq with support from Iran27.

- Continuous Iraqi threats to Kuwait, especially its refusal to rec-ognize the borders delineated in 1994: Iraq has requested the set-tlement of pending issues with Kuwait without resorting toChapter VII of the UN Charter, a request rejected by Kuwait.Popular views on this matter are extremely categorical, reflectingthe continuous animosity between the two parties.

- The arming of Iraq by the US, with its possible impact on theregional power balance, as the future of Iraq remains uncertainand hostilities prevail between GCC States and Iraq. SheikhJaber Al-Mubarak Al-Hamad Al-Sabah, Kuwait’s deputy PrimeMinister and Minister of Defense, unequivocally expressedKuwait’s fears concerning the armament of Iraq: “Kuwait hasinformed the USA of its fears regarding the imbalance of powerin the region following the conclusion by the USA of weapondeals with Iraq. These weapons should only be used for defensepurposes”28.

- Iraq’s current and future oil production capacities and their impacton the Gulf: estimates indicate that Iraq possesses 9% of the totalworld reserves. In 2009, the Iraqi government awarded oil con-

26 Dr. Baqer Salman Al Najjar, “Categories and Groups: Identity and Citizenship Struggle in theGulf ”, Al Moustaqbal Al Arabi Magazine, issue no. 6, Center of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2008,p. 47.27 Jon B. Alterman, Iraq and the Gulf States: the balance of fear, United States Institute of Peace 2007.28 Statement by the Kuwaiti Defense Minister, Al Siyassa newspaper, Kuwait, 22 September 2008.

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tracts to foreign firms for rehabilitation and investment purposes,with a view to increasing production to 6 million barrels per daywithin the next ten years, placing Iraq in third position behindSaudi Arabia and Russia29. Iraq could become one of the world’smain oil producers without joining OPEC or being bound by itspolicies. This will affect OPEC’s negotiating positions in generaland regional oil policies in particular, with clear political and eco-nomic repercussions on the Gulf’s regional security.

C - Energy sector threats

Energy security can be defined as the provision of reliable and unin-terrupted energy supplies – which include both oil and gas – at reasonableprices, while ensuring the physical security of energy facilities and pipelinesto protect them against terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Energy securityis the shared responsibility of producers, consumers and transit countries. Itcomprises the development and rationalization of energy consumption meth-ods in order to minimize environmental damage. According to this definition,energy security poses economic challenges such as the imbalance betweenenergy production and consumption, which can be controlled through marketmechanisms. However, there are other challenges to energy security, especial-ly now that energy facilities have become a target for Al Qaeda. Osama binLaden had called explicitly for the targeting of oil facilities and pipelines in theregion in 2004 and 2005. Moreover, in a videotape, Al Qaeda’s number two,Ayman Al Zawahiri, warned that Israel and the Gulf States would be the targetof a future campaign aimed at wiping out the West’s economy. Al Qaedaunsuccessfully launched a terrorist attack against Abqiq refinery in SaudiArabia on 24 February 2006 concurrently with a series of attacks against Iraqipipelines30. Supply routes and energy pipelines linking producers to con-sumers are also being threatened by a widespread terrorist network. Estimatesindicate that from 1980 to 2000, 90 energy-related terrorist attacks took placeworldwide: 18 attacks in Africa, 29 in Latin America, 17 in Europe, 6 in Asia

29 Simon Henderson, Iraqi Oil, Baghdad Looks for a Bigger Role, The Washington Institute for NearEast Policy 26 June 2009. 30 Al Watan newspaper, Qatar, 9 December 2006.

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and 16 in the Middle East31. Another menace to energy security lies in the con-stant Iranian threats to seal off the Strait of Hormuz if it were attacked by theUS. 40% of the world’s oil supplies pass through this Strait, a percentageexpected to rise in the coming twenty years32. Iran, with its advanced navalcapacities and its continuous occupation of the three UAE islands, has undis-puted control of the deepest chokepoint in the Gulf through which giant ves-sels are obliged to pass. Consequently, it can in practice seal off the strait inthe case of a military confrontation with Western states.

Terrorist threats to energy security would have two major conse-quences. First, they would wreak havoc in markets, increase insurancecosts, and force oil companies to consider providing their own security.Second, as the number of oil tankers and pipelines grows, many countriesthat depend on energy supplies from distant countries by ship or throughpipelines across entire continents would face an increasing danger from ter-rorist attacks, creating a huge challenge for producers and consumers alike.

D - Terrorism

When asked about the order of importance of threats facing GulfStates, Nawaf Obeid, former Managing Director of the Saudi NationalSecurity Assessment Project, said in 2006: “Terrorism and Al Qaeda comefirst, followed by Iraq and Iran”. Even though Saudi Arabia faces more terror-ist threats than other Gulf States, such threats pose a serious challenge to allGCC States, where emerging religious movements promote Al Qaeda views.Moreover, Al Qaeda itself is undergoing structural transformations: in January2009, its leader in Yemen, Nasser Al Wohishi, announced the merging of theYemeni and the Saudi Al Qaeda operations under one command known as “AlQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”33. Such transformations indicate that AlQaeda has changed from an organization into a “condition” capable of adapt-

31 Dr. Ammar Ali Hassan, The Gulf’s oil within Iranian range, www.islamonline.net, 26 February2006.32 Energy security: NATO’s potential role, www.nato.int/docu/review200633 Khaled Al Hamadi, Al Qaeda in Yemen announces the creation of a United Al Qaeda Command inthe Arabian Peninsula, www.altagheer.com, 23 January 2009.

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ing to all changes. When the net tightened around it in Iraq, it turned to near-by Gulf States, where it formed groups called the “the Returnees from Iraq”,as well as to sea piracy operations. Al Qaeda stated in a letter to its cells in theregion that “maritime terrorism has become a strategic requirement” and that“controlling waterways is Al Qaeda’s number one priority”. Moreover, AlQaeda has found fertile ground in ICTs, mainly the internet, which it uses toplan for cyber-terrorism attacks.

In the light of the current situation, it is apparent that GCC States,as small-sized States, face several security challenges which threaten theirviability as independent and sovereign entities, arising mainly from theimbalance between the States and their powerful neighbors. Consequently,GCC States continue to rely on the world’s superpowers to guarantee theirsecurity, a mission ensured for decades by the US. Failure by the US toachieve its objectives and to implement the project underpinning the inva-sion of Iraq in 2003 created doubts amongst the Gulf’s elite that the UScould continue to be the one and only power capable of protecting the Gulfand of ensuring its security. Other world powers are very interested inentering the Gulf’s regional security equation. As a result, four GCC States(Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE) agreed to join NATO’s IstanbulCooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004. According to the Former SecretaryGeneral of the GCC, Ambassador Abdallah Bishara, “Gulf States possessrare energy resources needed by the world. It would be unwise for us tohave the USA assume full responsibility for our security and to contentourselves with moral and political support from Europe that does notreflect real European interests in the Gulf ”34. Despite the menu of bilater-al NATO-GCC activities offered by the ICI, including defense reform, mil-itary cooperation, the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMDsand civil emergency planning, and in spite of the many meetings and con-ferences attended by officials and academics from Gulf States, the ICI hasnot as yet achieved its expected outcomes. Its success is hampered by anumber of obstacles relating to GCC States, ICI provisions and NATOpolicies. These obstacles are presented in the following section.

34 Ambassador Abdallah Bishara, “NATO: Talk about the hardships of power”, Al Watan newspaper,Kuwait, 18 December 2006.

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PART II

OBSTACLES FACING THE ICI

Although the ICI is important to them, Gulf States also have spe-cific security demands relating in particular to the regional power balance.Moreover, views on the Gulf’s security differ and there is a certain degreeof overlap between the security of each of the six States and the security ofthe region as a whole, comprising both Iraq and Iran, not to mention the factthat the Gulf is part of a chaotic Middle East. In this context, implementingthe ICI is not an easy task, and the Initiative faces a number of obstacles:

I- Non-adherence by Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen

None of the three countries has expressed a categoricalacceptance or rejection of the Initiative, but all three are examining its con-tents and assessing its relevance to their security needs. The positions ofthe three countries can be described as follows:

A- Saudi Arabia

The Saudi position vis-à-vis the Initiative is closely linked to thealtered Saudi perception of the Gulf’s security in the aftermath of the USinvasion of Iraq in 2003, and the withdrawal of US troops from SaudiArabia and their redeployment in other, smaller Gulf States, reducing thepossibility for Saudi Arabia to rely on Western forces for its security. Thiswas explicitly stated by the Saudi Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs,Prince Khaled bin Saoud, when asked whether the Kingdom would jointhe ICI: “We in the region are trying to move away from regional andinternational alliances. We want an alliance-free zone because we haveenough troubles and we do not want to add to our problems”35. This state-

35 Al Ra’i Al Am newspaper, Kuwait, 10 November 2008.

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36 Dr. Mostafa Alawi Seif, NATO’s Strategy towards the Arab Gulf, Strategic Studies Series, Issue no.129, the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2008, p. 49.

ment is in line with the Saudi vision presented by the representative ofSaudi Arabia at the Gulf Dialogue Forum organized by Bahrain in 2004in cooperation with the International Institute for Strategic Studies.According to this vision, the Gulf ’s security can be achieved on threelevels: A) the internal level, comprising comprehensive reforms in GCCStates respectful of each State’s specificities; B) the regional level, wheresecurity has four pillars: a united GCC, a prosperous Yemen, a stableIraq, and a friendly Iran; and C): the international level, featuring guar-antees by world powers which must not replace regional efforts or beprovided to each State separately or on an individual basis. They are tobe provided by the international community represented by the UNSC inorder to ensure the sovereignty, independence and regional integrity ofall Gulf States36.

The Saudi position towards the Initiative reflects the followingpoints: First, the Initiative’s effectiveness would be limited if SaudiArabia, given its regional weight, did not adhere to it. Saudi Arabia clear-ly is not opposed to the principle of international protection for GulfStates, but would like such protection to be regulated and provided underUN auspices, ending the monopoly enjoyed by individual actors; andsecond, if Saudi Arabia decides not to join the ICI, questions could beraised about the viability of the GCC as a collective entity, given theexistence of three security visions for the Gulf: The first vision is sharedby the four GCC States which joined the ICI; the second vision is adopt-ed by Saudi Arabia and calls for the presence of several internationalactors under the umbrella of the UN; and the third is a neutral visionadopted by Oman which underlines the importance of enhancing coop-eration with Iran.

It is to be noted that there was no categorical rejection of the ICIby Saudi Arabia. According to the Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs, SaudAl Faisal, “the Kingdom shall take the appropriate decision in this regard”.

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He also underlined “the importance of understanding the aims, purposesand bases of the ICI in order to ensure that it will not affect the Kingdom’straditional positions. We always welcome cooperation in the fields of intel-ligence sharing, exchange of experiences and technologies related to thefight against terrorism, border security, disaster assistance, the non-prolif-eration of WMDs, advice on defense planning, education and trainingactivities between relevant bodies.”37

B- Oman

Despite the lack of official Omani information on the Sultanate’svision on cooperation with NATO within the ICI, Oman’s general percep-tions of the Gulf’s security differ from those of other GCC States –accord-ing to a study by an Omani researcher. Oman’s vision is based on two pil-lars: 1) the Sultanate’s geo-strategic position at the entrance to the ArabianGulf (overlooking, together with Iran, the extremely strategic Strait ofHormuz). Consequently, it has always sought to protect first and foremostits interests but also to protect international sea-traffic; 2) Oman’s experi-ence throughout history with international and regional forces in thewaters of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. For these reasons, Oman’s visionof the Gulf’s security reflects the following elements:

- The Gulf’s security is the responsibility of Gulf States. Relyingon external powers entails dependency on them.

- Security in the Gulf is a sine qua non for economic and socialdevelopment in GCC States.

- The interests of other regional actors must be taken into account.Therefore, interference by external powers in Gulf affairs is notjustified38.

This vision highlights the following facts: First, Oman enjoys

37 Al Sharq Al Awsat and Al Siyassa newspapers, 22 January 2007.38 Mohamad Mobarak Al Arimi, The Omani vision of Gulf Cooperation, Strategic Studies Series, issueno. 121, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Abu Dhabi, 2007, p. 21 and pages24-25.

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privileged relations with Iran due to the Sultanate’s geographical position.For Oman, joining an Initiative which excludes Iran could be interpretedas a sign of animosity towards Iran. Second, Omani policies have alwaysdiffered from the ones adopted by other Gulf States, even those regardingArab affairs. For example, Oman was the only Arab State not to take partin the Arab boycott of Egypt following the signature of the Camp DavidPeace Agreement with Israel.

C- Yemen

Although Yemen is not a member of the GGC, the Council resolu-tion in 2000 to include Yemen gradually in some of the Council’s institu-tions is considered a step forward to enable Yemen to join the Council inthe future. It also reflects the Gulf’s recognition of Yemen’s strategicimportance for the GCC’s six countries, due to several reasons: its borderson the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea, its situation at the entrance to theStrait of Bab-Al Mandab, and its important strategic location in the southof the Arab Peninsula. However, the confrontations between the Yemenigovernment and the Hotheen will most certainly affect Gulf regional secu-rity, especially after the declaration of the Yemeni president Abdallah Salehthat war may last for many years. The main threats that Yemen representsfor the Gulf States can be summarized as follows:

1- The continuing deterioration of security conditions in the countrycould turn Yemen into an “Afghanistan of the Gulf ”. The processwill be accelerated after the significant increase in the region thisyear of Al Qaeda, which announced its merger with its counter-part in Yemen to form one organization on the Arab Peninsula.

2- The separation of Yemen will threaten the Gulf States in gener-al and Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s back yard, in particular. The frag-mentation of states sometimes provokes an exodus of civiliansand terrorist groups from neighboring states, especially whenthere is a fragmented state like Somalia on the other side.

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3- Continuing war in Yemen means increased external interest inYemeni affairs. The most important example is the announce-ment made by the Iranian foreign ministry on the Middle Easton 17 August 2009. The content of this announcement reflectsIranian concern regarding the Shi’i conditions in Yemen and itshopes of a peaceful agreement being reached on this crisis.Iranian interference in the matter in Yemen threatens SaudiArabia, which like the other Gulf States suffers from the Iranianrole in Arab issues in general.

II- Popular Opposition to the ICI in the Gulf

At conferences attended by NATO and Gulf officials, parliamen-tarians, authors and academics from the Gulf expressed their views on theICI. Below is a summary of the main opinions expressed:

A- Opinion polls

Ghassan Al Shihabi, a journalist from Bahrain, surveyed pub-lic opinions on NATO. The poll sample included 276 Bahraini citizens andyielded the following results:

- 27% of the poll sample did not differentiate between NATO and theUS-led Multi National Force deployed in Iraq in 1991 and in 2003.

- 44% of those polled believe that NATO’s intervention inAfghanistan helped eliminate the Taliban Movement but that italso destroyed the country’s infrastructure and failed to providean alternative to the Taliban Movement.

- 92% of polled opinions believe that NATO is run by the US andthat it implements US policies aimed at controlling the worldunder an international cover.

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- 96% of the poll sample believe that NATO is merely a militaryinstitution and are not aware of the Alliance’s other activities.

- 64% of those polled think that NATO seeks to impose “democ-racy according to America” without taking account of regionalspecificities.

- 13% of polled opinions could not identify NATO’s emblem pre-sented to them together with other international organizations’emblems.

- 30% of the poll sample believe that NATO as an alliance disap-peared with the end of the Cold War, and that its focus today hasshifted from Eastern Europe to the Arab and Muslim worlds inparticular.

- 78% of those polled believe that the world’s military powershould be united under the UN umbrella in order to ensure equi-ty in military and peace-keeping operations39.

Even though the poll sample was small and covers only oneGulf State, it is considered as an important indicator of public opin-ions on NATO in the Gulf. Moreover, a large percentage of polledopinions think that NATO is a military entity and a tool in the handsof the US, i.e. NATO officials have failed to convince public opinionin Gulf States of the new NATO policy and its role in ensuring secu-rity in the Gulf.

B- Views by the Gulf’s intellectual eliteAn analysis of several articles by Gulf authors shows that views

regarding NATO range from strict opposition to NATO’s role to demandsfor a more comprehensive NATO role in ensuring regional security.

39 Ghassan Al Shihabi, Perceptions in the Gulf: the case of Bahrain, Conference on “Media in aChanging World: between the visions of NATO and the GCC”, op.cit., pages 266-267.

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According to some authors, excluding Iran from the ICI means that aGulf-Iran confrontation remains possible, and that NATO is only inter-ested in protecting the interests of its members, mainly oil. Moreover,they argue that GCC’s dependence on NATO could hamper Gulf securi-ty integration efforts and that it is unacceptable to operate with NATOunder a US umbrella given the strategic relations between Israel and theUS on one hand, and the consequences of the US invasion of Iraq on theother. They also argue that what NATO has to offer does not include acommitment to protect Gulf States should they fall prey to any externalaggression40.

Other authors tend to support NATO’s role on the conditionthat it is an active role, not only vis-à-vis Gulf States but also towards Gulfregional security issues as a whole. They argue that NATO should take partin stabilizing Iraq as well as in international efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, as both issues impact Gulf security. They also call for spe-cific security-related commitments from NATO to face threats in the Gulf,mainly by developing plans different from those of the US to protect theenergy sector. This would help translate on the ground NATO conceptssuch as “dialogue” and “partnership” and change negative perceptionsamongst the Arab public opinion of alliances and their traditional role,which is military.41

C- Views by Gulf Parliaments

An overview of Arab parliamentary positions vis-à-vis the ICIindicates that the Initiative has not been widely discussed by Gulf parlia-ments, except in the Kingdom of Bahrain, where two conflicting views

40 Views from the Conference on “NATO’s role for peace and stability”, Qatar Center for MilitaryStrategic Studies, Qatar, 28 January 2008, published in Al Raya newspaper, Qatar and Al Wasat news-paper, Bahrain, 7 June 2007; and from the Conference on “Media in a Changing World: GCC andNATO visions”, Bahraini Ministry of Information, 5-6 June 2007, published in Akhbar Al Khaleejnewspaper, Bahrain, 6 June 2007.41 Views from the Doha Conference on NATO Transformation and Security in the Gulf ”, 19-20 April2007, Doha, Qatar; and from the “Media in a Changing World” Conference, op. cit.

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appeared. On the one hand, Sheikh Khaled bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, mem-ber of the Bahraini parliament, believes that NATO’s presence in the Gulfis necessary to deter war and to prevent Iran from controlling the Gulf. Onthe other hand, at a meeting with members of the NATO ParliamentaryAssembly’s Mediterranean Special Group, Sheikh Adel Al Moawdah,Head of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Committee in theBahraini parliament, criticized NATO’s role and objectives in the Gulf. Heaffirmed that Gulf States have no intention of confronting Iran and thatNATO’s role is to support Israel, a State which implements aggressivemeasures against Palestinians42. Not all Gulf parliaments share this view;however, given their growing role and the increasing representation of reli-gious movements within them, they could hamper future agreementsbetween their governments and NATO.

III- The ICI contents

Although security sector reform could positively affect politicalreform efforts in general and civil-military relations in particular, anddespite the important “menu” of activities offered by the ICI in the fieldsof defense reform, fighting terrorism, WMDs and border security, the exe-cution of these activities is hindered by the following obstacles:

A- Obstacles to defense sector reforms in the Gulf

Gulf States have embarked on a series of political and economicreforms, although defense sector reform might be delayed for the follow-ing two reasons: first, the secretive nature of this sector, which contradictswith one of the avowed objectives of the Initiative43, i.e. transparency; andsecond, the way the military institution is viewed by the Gulf’s ruling elite,who believe that professional militaries in the Arab world pose the most

42 Statement by Sheikh Khaled bin Khalifa at the “Media in a Changing World” Conference, op. cit.,full speech published by Akhbar Al Khaleej newspaper, Bahrain, 27 May 2007.43 Legrenzi Matteo, NATO in the Gulf: who is doing whom a favor? Middle East Policy, April 2007,www.mepc.org/journal, vol. 14.

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potent threat to regimes in power. As a result, Arab regimes did notempower their militaries which explains why coups in Gulf Statesoccurred within the ruling families and were not initiated by the army(Oman in 1970 and Qatar in 1995)44. Moreover, the Initiative’s provisionsare not in line with prevailing civil-military relations in the Gulf, where theexecutive branch clearly dominates the legislative branch. Military institu-tions refuse to be subjected to control and questioning especially when itcomes to defense budgeting and military policy-making, which provideone of the main sources of patronage for influential members of the royalfamilies45. Military institutions are directly run by ruling families, who usethem to reward their supporters and to assert their authority, in contradic-tion with transparency provisions underlined by the ICI46. Defense sectorreforms succeeded in Warsaw Pact States because they were part of a com-prehensive and integral transformation process which rendered them pos-sible in a relatively short period of time, whereas reforms in GCC Statesare implemented while preserving the culture and constants of theseStates. Moreover, programs are needed to absorb the large numbers of mil-itary-sector employees who will be made redundant if such reforms takeplace. Defense reforms call for the destruction of surplus arms and muni-tions or their conversion to peaceful purposes, as well as for the closure ofmilitary bases and facilities, which are very unlikely prospects since GulfStates are the largest buyers of weapons in the world.

B- Obstacles to NATO-Gulf cooperation against Weaponsof Mass Destraction

WMDs are a major security threat to Gulf States. GCC SecretaryGeneral called upon NATO to fight these weapons by “urging NATO toexert direct pressure in order to eradicate WMDs from our region withoutany exception”47. Even though the Secretary General did not specify the

44 Ellen Laipson, Editor with Emil El. Hokayam, Any Buenning Sterm and Wael Alzayat, SecuritySector Reform in The Gulf, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, 2006.45 Walter B. Slocomb, Philip Fluri, Geneva Center For The Democratic Control of Armed Forces. 46 Legrenzi, Matteo, Op Cit.,47 Al Watan newspaper, Kuwait, 14 December 2005.

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actors on whom this pressure should be exerted, the issue of double stan-dards will be raised if NATO decides to exert pressure on Iran, and there-fore in future, if NATO is to have true credibility in the matter of WMDs,it should call for all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, to dis-mantle their nuclear arsenals. Final statements issued at GCC summitsfrom 2000 to 2008 have all called for a WMD-free Middle East and Gulf.Gulf States have continuously stated that their territories will not be usedto launch military operations against Iran. Any use of force by NATO todemilitarize Iran –as in the case of Iraq – would be problematic for GulfStates as many GCC countries have bilateral security agreements withNATO members and at the same time enjoy good relations with Iran. IfNATO wants to cooperate with GCC countries in dealing with the issuesof Iran’s nuclear programs, these countries will be in a difficult situation,especially if NATO asks to use the GCC countries’ land for facilities.

C- Difficulties relating to the fight against terrorism

Terrorism is a key security threat to Gulf States, compellingthem to establish or to activate National Security Councils and to enactrelevant legislations48. However, many obstacles stand in the way ofNATO-Gulf cooperation, mostly differences in views of the concept ofterrorism itself: Gulf States differentiate between terrorism and legitimateresistance – mainly in the matter of Israel and the Palestinians. Thus thereis a contradiction between the GCC’s obligations under the GCC agree-ment on facing terrorism signed in 2004 and its obligations towardsNATO. Cooperation to face terrorism inside GCC countries is difficultbecause of the many Islamic groups in a strong position that still seeNATO in a bad light.

The other important point is that the terrorist phenomenon inGCC countries was a result of the invasion of Iraq. These terrorist groupsbelieve that they should fight Western troops in Iraq. So the question is

48 Dr. Mostafa Al Ani, Internal security developments and terrorism issues, The Gulf in 2006-2007,Gulf Research Center, Dubai, p. 247.

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how NATO can cooperate with GCC countries in order to prevent youngpeople from adopting this way of thinking.

IV- Gulf States’ incapacity to find a balance between the roles ofNATO and the US

Gulf States have signed bilateral security agreements withNATO members, including the US. However, they need to fully realize thatNATO is an autonomous security entity whose policies are separate fromthose of its individual members. Views on this matter differ amongst GulfStates. According to Dr. Mohamad Al Sabah, Kuwaiti Minister of ForeignAffairs, “the power imbalance within the region has led GCC States,including Kuwait, to examine security cooperation options with States andpowers enjoying common values and interests”49. On the other hand,according to the Bahraini Minister of Information, Bahrain believes thatenhancing Gulf self-security capacities is a requisite for Gulf-NATO coop-eration50. In Qatar, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said that “secu-rity cooperation with NATO is extremely necessary. It is important in thefuture to discuss military cooperation agreements instead of limiting coop-eration to the few areas mentioned in the ICI”51. These differing views canbe attributed to varying interests in Gulf States. Kuwait, which was invad-ed by Iraq in 1990 and fears that the division of Iraq could lead to the cre-ation of a Shia State near its northern borders, believes that the Gulf’ssecurity problems stem from the power imbalance in the region. Qatar,which hosts a large number of US troops, could use the same argument tocall for a future NATO military presence in the region, whereas Bahrain,which is home to a large Shia population, believes that enhancing self-security is the basis for cooperation with NATO.

According to the GCC Secretary General, Abed Elrahman hamad

49 Statement by the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs, Al Qabas newspaper, Kuwait, 13 December2006.50 Akhbar Al Khaleej newspaper, Bahrain, 12 June 2007.51 Full speech published in Al Raya newspaper, Qatar, 29 January 2008.

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52 Abdel Aziz bin Othman bin Saqr, NATO and the Organization’s security, Oman newspaper, Oman,4 May 2004.

El Attia, “the USA will continue to play a major role in ensuring regionalsecurity in the Gulf for years to come. Gulf-NATO cooperation shall notlimit the role of the USA as a key guarantor of Gulf security. On the con-trary, cooperation with NATO shall enhance this American role”. Despiteformal acceptance by Gulf States to cooperate with NATO in specificareas, such cooperation faces two main obstacles: 1) Gulf States do notdifferentiate between the role played by NATO members individually andthe role played by NATO as an autonomous entity; and 2) Gulf States donot realize the added value of NATO’s ICI, which mainly aims at develop-ing their armed forces to ensure future cooperation in fighting terrorismand WMD as well as in security fields. Moreover, many Gulf citizensbelieve that overdependence on their American ally could lead to compla-cency and laxness in the Gulf and could postpone the adoption of alterna-tive security policies52. On the other hand, Gulf States still confuseNATO’s modus operandi with that of the US, even though the US signsbinding and non-optional security agreements in specific fields, whileNATO offers a variety of cooperation fields from which States can choose.

V- Obstacles faced by NATO

Since both NATO and Gulf States are partners in the ICI, NATOis partly responsible for the lack of progress in implementing the Initiative.The reasons are as follows:

A- Unspecified security obligations towards Gulf States

Article V of the NATO Charter clearly states the Alliance’s mission,i.e. defending the territories of NATO member states against any threats.However, NATO strategy does not mention the defense of non-NATO mem-bers, even though “security” threats prevail over “defense” threats, requir-ing NATO to adapt its policies. Consequently, a gap persists between what

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NATO has to offer and the real security needs of Gulf States as small oil-producing countries suffering from a regional power imbalance.

According to Dr. Abdallah Elshaije, in the newspaper on El-Etehad on 28 September 2009, “neither Gulf States nor the extremely sen-sitive regional security balance should be encumbered by adding an exter-nal element to the regional security equation”. However, the Gulf’s energysector has security needs, and has to counter terrorist threats against trans-port routes. NATO could have provided Gulf States with plans detailingwhen and how it would intervene to protect this vital resource, an issueraised on numerous occasions at NATO-Gulf meetings. The seminar host-ed by the Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 October 2008 in coordi-nation with NATO’s political leaders concluded that close cooperationbetween both parties is essential for energy security.

B- Insufficient efforts to explain NATO’s current policies

Despite the large number of Gulf-NATO meetings and their widecoverage in the media, doubts persist in Gulf States, especially amongstacademics, over the Alliance’s role and objectives. Dr. Ibtissam Al Katbi,professor at the UAE University, believes that “NATO is one of the leastwidely known Organizations in Arab States. It is negatively perceived bythe ordinary Arab citizens”. At the “Media in a Changing World”Conference held in Bahrain in May 2007, NATO should have worked hard-er to present its new policy to the Arab world through publications andseminars in order to do away with Arab doubts over alliances and their tra-ditional role. Although many meetings – including the “Media in aChanging World” Conference mentioned above –have been held with theparticipation of NATO officials and their counterparts from Gulf States,they have failed to tackle media issues and global transformations, and onecould say that they have failed to achieve their expected results.

C- The impact of NATO-Israel cooperation on the ICI

The more NATO-Israel cooperation grows, the more the ICI stum-

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bles. When Gulf States joined the ICI, they feared that it could be a firststep towards a wider NATO perception comprising Israel, thus creating adilemma for them. Although Gulf States are not considered as “frontlineStates”, they do host civil society organizations which oppose any normal-ization with Israel. Moreover, the power of Islamic movements in theseStates has increased and so has their influence within political institutions,including parliaments. Gulf governments could find themselves tornbetween the requisites of their partnership with NATO as it develops itsties with Israel, pressure exercised by CSOs who oppose building ties withIsrael unless it respects its engagements towards Palestinians, and theirown public opinion, which is against NATO in general. Regarding UAE-NATO ties, which have noticeably improved, the UAE newspaper “AlKhaleej” expressed views that differed from the official government posi-tion. In its editorial on 2 June 2006, the newspaper described Israeli-NATOmaneuvers organized at the time as a “reward to Israel”53. By requestingon 14 July 2009 to take part in NATO’s Active Endeavour operations in theMediterranean, Israel manifested a clear wish to strengthen cooperationwith NATO. If NATO accepts this request, Israel would be the first non-NATO and non-EU state to take part officially in joint operations withNATO’s naval forces, allowing Israeli vessels to approach Arab coasts andcreating a dilemma for ICI partners in the Gulf.

d-The lack of consensus inside NATO: although NATO membershave common interests as a multinational organization, there are obstacleswithin NATO to out-of-area operations. The American invasion of Iraq in2003 was a clear example of these differences. This means that NATO mayencounter similar obstacles in the future, if it wants to prevent Iran fromcontinuing with its nuclear weapons program, as many European countrieshave good economic and political relations with Iran. Furthermore, UShegemony within NATO means that if NATO wants to play an effectiverole in the Gulf region the Alliance should determine NATO’s area ofresponsibility in this region, especially as the US has not mandated any

53 Editorial, Al Khaleej newspaper, UAE, 2 June 2006.

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international partner to defend Gulf oil and has provided security guaran-tees to Israel. It may be that the rivalry inside NATO arises from competi-tion between the EU and NATO, especially among countries that are mem-bers of both organizations. Lastly, the disagreements over money andtroops needed by NATO for out-of-area missions, as in the case ofAfghanistan, clearly illustrate the differences within the Alliance.

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PART III

Mechanisms to strengthen the ICI

Although the ICI comprises important security cooperation fields, itssignificance would increase if it responded to the real security threats facingGCC States. Unfortunately, the ICI’s modest steps in dealing with increasingregional threats mean that the gap between reality and desires has not beenbridged, preventing the Initiative’s full implementation on the ground. NATOshould revisit the context in the Gulf, taking into account the region’s speci-ficities, as well as regional and international complexities, from the followingperspectives: 1) the increasing importance of the Gulf entails growing secu-rity threats, and moreover, as the US stumbles in Iraq, the need for Gulf Statesto re-establish a regional balance; 2) Gulf security is linked to Arab andregional security in general: superpowers will not be able to help Gulf Stateswithout the support of major Arab States, a fact which became apparent dur-ing the 1990/1991 crisis; 3) a full understanding of both ties and alliancesbuilt by GCC States is required: these States are keen on protecting their bilat-eral ties with the USA, and therefore, if the US and other NATO members dif-fer over a certain matter, Gulf-US ties will have precedence even over tieswith NATO itself - consequently, consensus must be reached within NATO onits policies towards the Gulf; 4) “security” is a comprehensive notion thatgoes beyond military aspects: according to the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, NaserEl Mohamed El Sabah, Gulf States, despite attempts to adopt political andeconomic reforms, will continue to lag behind developed states and a possi-ble active role could be played by NATO in this regard54. This does not meanthat NATO and Gulf States are incompatible. On the contrary, the ICI itselfreflects efforts by both parties to cooperate and to implement joint action. Asthe Gulf’s importance increases, so do security threats, calling for a mixtureof soft and hard powers to help strike a balance between US hegemony in the

54 Speech by Prime Minister of Kuwait at the International Conference on NATO and Gulf countries,Kuwait, 12 December 2006, in Al Ra’i Al Am newspaper, Kuwait, 13 December 2006.

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region, which is a fact, and the region’s sensitivities and specificities. The fol-lowing section discusses requisites for activating the ICI.

I- level 1: NATO’s role in promoting the Gulf’s Self-Security

NATO should fulfill the three following missions: 1) support mil-itary capacities in Gulf States; 2) redouble efforts to convince Saudi Arabiaand Oman to join the ICI; and 3) ensure energy security.

A- NATO’s role in supporting military capacities in Gulf States

An analysis of the structure of interaction between regional sys-tems reveals interaction between three forces: a pressuring force (in thiscase, the US); an antagonist force (Iran); and a balancing force (GulfStates). The latter’s role is the most important as it keeps conflicts withinthe regional system under control and prevents a possible confrontationbetween the two other forces55. As small oil-producing countries withpowerful neighbors, Gulf States continuously seek to strike a balance withthose neighbors and to this end they have opted to become the allies of theworld’s superpower. However, this option is quite delicate, as regional andinternational developments could affect this alliance. Consequently,enhancing self-security in the Gulf emerges as the most important andstrategic option. NATO could assist in this area by:

1- Providing continuous training to the Gulf armed forces, whichlack trained human resources capable of using modern military technolo-gies –despite the huge quantities of arms purchased by their countries. Thelack of trained human resources has negatively impacted the Gulf’s com-mon defense policies, as proved by the modest contribution from thePeninsula Shield Forces during regional crises. NATO, in its efforts to pro-vide support to these armed forces, should implement programs adapted totheir nature (police or general security forces, national guards, etc).

55 Dr. Mohamad Al Said Idriss, “The Balancing Force”, Al Khaleej newspaper, UAE, 6 August 2005.

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2- Enhancing the quality of arms in GCC States: Iran possessesmore and better quality weapons compared to Gulf States, which are exposedto the threat of Iran’s state-of-the-art air force. One scenario suggests thedeployment of a three-level air defense system in the Gulf. Level one com-prises the deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles ina number of airbases in the region. Level two comprises the deployment ofS-300PMU1 missiles to intercept targets, ballistic missiles, planes and heli-copters. Level three comprises Tor short range air defense systems (Tor M-7), i.e. in addition to the high to medium altitude PAC-3 missiles, the airdefense system can employ S-300 PMU-1 protected by Tor M-1 missilesagainst anti-radar missiles56. NATO, with its huge military capabilities, canhelp Gulf States overcome this disadvantage vis-à-vis Iran by participatingfor example in the defense umbrella extended by the US to its allies in theregion to contain a nuclear-armed Iran. In this vein, a member of a Gulf mil-itary force declared off the record that “if NATO provides a defense securityumbrella to Gulf States, these States would not oppose any military action tostop Iran’s nuclear program”. This statement clearly reflects continuous fearsamongst Gulf States over the power imbalance in the Gulf.

3- Contributing to the empowerment of the Peninsula ShieldForces: the Saudi Minister of Defense explained his government’s propos-al in 2005 to disband and further develop these forces by saying that “eachState would control and supervise its own forces, which would operateunder a joint command. The Forces would employ their own commanders,officers and officials and would hold continuous maneuvers”57. NATOcould help develop these forces by:

- Providing Gulf States with the required experience to create,deploy and summon these forces, based on the large similarities betweenthe NATO forces’ modus operandi and that of the newly empoweredPeninsula Shield Forces.

56 Abdel Jalil Zeid Al Marhoon, Preliminary Approach to the Air Defense Issue in States in the Region,Views on the Gulf Magazine, Gulf Research Center, February issue, 2008.57 Statement by the Saudi Minister of Defense, www.aljazeera.net.news

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- Helping Gulf States develop a rapid reaction naval Gulf Forcesimilar to the one operating within NATO, providing a basis for Gulf-NATO military cooperation.

- Conducting specific NATO-Gulf joint military maneuvers, likethe one held in 2008, which are important to the security of Gulf States.According to the head of the National Security Apparatus in Kuwait, thesemaneuvers help his country face maritime terrorism on the one hand andfight drug maritime trafficking on the other58. Moreover, they help strikea power balance with Iran, which occasionally conducts maritime maneu-vers in the Gulf.

4- Contributing to the development of joint military programs inthe Gulf. This could include the development of a military communica-tions system between Gulf armed forces, connecting the OperationsCenters of Gulf Air Forces and Air Defense to radar coverage networks andto early warning systems through the Cooperation Belt Project, whose firstphase was operated towards the end of 2001, and conducting joint militaryexercises. NATO could examine the possibility of providing Gulf Stateswith a military satellite. Iran has launched its own local-made satellite in2009, thus enhancing the power imbalance in the region.

B- Necessary efforts to convince Saudi Arabia and Oman tojoin the ICI

The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman have not joined the ICI seri-ously hampers the Initiative for the following two reasons: first, the weightof Saudi Arabia not only as a GCC member but also in the region and inthe Arab world is such that it is described as “the locomotive of the GulfStates”; second, the strategic position of Oman on the Strait of Hormuz aswell as its special ties with Iran. Failure to join the ICI by both countrieswould lead to more than one perception of Gulf security. NATO could usethe following mechanisms to convince both countries to join the Initiative:

58 Al Siyassa newspaper, Kuwait, 11 November 2008.

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a- NATO could adopt a wide perception of regional security in linewith the Saudi vision according to which actors such as Iraq, Iran andYemen should take part in ensuring the Gulf’s security. This perceptionshould also take into account Saudi Arabian fears of regional securitythreats, mainly the growing Iranian influence in Iraq and its impact on theShia minority in the Kingdom’s eastern oil rich areas, threatening itsnational security. As Al Qaeda grows in Saudi Arabia and calls for “Jihadin Iraq”, the Kingdom’s rather small security forces are faced with a hugechallenge. A further concern is the uncertain loyalty of parts of the securi-ty services which are sympathetic to Islamic views59.

b- Saudi Arabian sensitivities towards Alliances and the roleplayed by the West to ensure security in the Gulf should be dealt with care-fully. NATO should not present itself as a substitute for the US: indeed,some Gulf States believe that NATO’s new role consists in “replacing onepoliceman by another”. Efforts must be made to establish what Dr. AbdelAziz bin Othman bin Saqr has called “the coalition of the willing”, a flex-ible concept reflecting both parties’ understanding of their common needto cooperate and to build partnerships. In other words, NATO should workto assert its role on a win-win basis without dictating to others or exertingpressure on them.

c-The ICI features important items such as civil emergency plan-ning and combating illegal trafficking. Saudi Arabia, like other regionalStates, does not have crisis management plans for situations such as thenegative effects of a war between the US and Iran.

d- NATO should highlight the need to settle the Arab-Israeli con-flict on the basis of a two-state solution, as proof of the issue’s importanceto the Alliance. It could help control the borders between the Gaza Stripand Egypt and provide training to Palestinian security forces. Such effortswould increase convergence between NATO and Saudi Arabia, as the

59 Simon Henderson, Saudi Arabia, The Nightmare of Iraq, The Washington Institute for Near EastPolicy, July 2009.

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Kingdom was behind the Arab Peace Initiative proposed in 2002 envisag-ing full withdrawal by Israel from Arab land in return for a comprehensivepeace with Israel.

e- NATO should try to persuade Oman that Iran’s strategies do notdifferentiate between one Gulf State and the other, i.e. that agreementssigned between Oman and Iran (whether in the security or the economicfields) will not prevent Iran from targeting all Gulf States should a crisisbreak out with Western countries over Iran’s nuclear activities.

f- NATO officials should stress to their Saudi counterparts thatcollective efforts are required to face certain threats such as piracy, as wasthe case in 2009, when a giant Saudi oil tanker was seized by pirates, whoforced Saudi Arabia to pay a huge ransom. NATO contributes to counter-piracy operations in the Red Sea and has dispatched seven vessels to thearea in conformity with UNSC resolutions. In August 2009, the NorthAtlantic Council announced the commencement of Operation OceanShield, a long-term counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. Thiseffort will aim to “assist regional states, upon their request, in developingtheir own ability to combat piracy activities” in order to complement inter-national efforts to counter this serious threat. According to theInternational Maritime Organization, Somali pirates attacked more than130 ships and vessels in 2008, i.e. a 200% increase compared to 2007.These attacks saw a ten-fold increase during the first quarter of 2009 com-pared to the same period in 2008, jumping from 6 to 61 attacks. Within thiscontext, NATO can contribute to countering world security threats to thebenefit of Saudi Arabia, the world’s top oil producer, especially throughNATO’s rapid reaction force, which can secure current or alternative oilcorridors should Iran decide to seal off the Strait of Hormuz.

g- NATO officials should explain to Saudi Arabia that NATOenjoys ties with more than 55 States: 28 member States and 20 stateswhich have signed bilateral agreements with it, in addition to the 7Mediterranean Dialogue partners, i.e. NATO has ties with more than aquarter of UN members, enabling it to take military action outside the

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UN framework if necessary. Moreover, 17 NATO partners are MuslimStates. Consequently, Saudi Arabia should reflect on the actual weight ofNATO, which has become a practical alternative to the UN should opin-ions diverge on the legitimacy of a potential military intervention. Duringthe US invasion of Iraq, and despite opposition from certain NATO mem-bers, the Alliance provided its military bases to the US and offered bothfinancial and military assistance to Turkey during the war. On anotherlevel, Saudi Arabia and Gulf States in general have a vested interest infighting terrorism and in ensuring international understanding throughimportant security institutions such as NATO in order to convey a clearmessage to Iran that they oppose its nuclear program60. Individual actionby GCC States would limit efforts to combat terrorism, which threatensall Gulf States61.

c-Alternative approaches for NATO towards Saudi Arabia, Omanand Yemen:

If NATO fails to convince Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen to jointhe ICI, it could nevertheless examine the following alternatives:

a- NATO could sponsor an annual security meeting similar to theManama Dialogue Forum to discuss NATO’s views regarding cooperationwith Gulf States as well as these countries’ visions, and to convince SaudiArabia and Oman of the feasibility of the ICI.

b- NATO could learn from the difficulties encountered by the MDand from how reticent countries were convinced to join the Initiative,which takes into account the specificities of each country. MD started as apolitical dialogue to build bridges of confidence and later on developedinto a bilateral cooperation framework.

c- Bridges must be built between NATO and Saudi Arabia. In2008, Saudi Arabia created the first Saudi War College, the highest rank-ing military college in Saudi Arabia, which can accommodate 100 studentsper year and meets the standards of similar institutions worldwide. NDC

60 Adel bin Zeid Al Tarifi, “What should Saudi Arabia consider when thinking about NATO?”, AlRiyadh daily newspaper, 29 March 2006.61 Moussa Hamad Al Qallab, NATO’s regional roles and its potential role in the Gulf, Gulf ResearchCenter, Dubai, 2005, p. 57.

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could offer training programs to Saudi Arabia and organize discussionseminars on key security threats to both parties, namely energy sectorthreats, in order to build confidence between NATO and both Saudi Arabiaand Oman in the future.

d- Meetings between NATO officials and their counterparts fromSaudi Arabia and Oman should be intensified, especially since neithercountry has categorically rejected the Initiative. According to the SaudiMinister of Foreign Affairs, Saud El Faysal :“We always welcome cooper-ation in the fields of intelligence sharing, exchange of experiences andtechnologies related to the fight against terrorism, border security, disasterassistance, the non-proliferation of WMDs, advice on defense planning,education and training activities between related bodies.”62

As a result, and in order to activate the ICI, NATO should adopt astrategic vision to enhance security in all six Gulf States through the ICI.This could be achieved through interoperability programs, which wouldsucceed if Saudi Arabia and Oman join the Initiative, given their large sizeand important human resources.

D- Security engagements from NATO to ensure energy security

Energy is more than just a political or an economic issue: it is firstand foremost a security issue. There is a close strategic link between ener-gy security worldwide and the security and stability of Gulf States, whichpossess the world’s largest hydrocarbon reserves.

By developing practical plans to protect this resource, NATOwould be increasing the credibility of the ICI as follows:

a-The pillars of a NATO intervention to secure energy

In 2006, prior to the Riga Summit, the NATO Secretary Generalstated that “energy security is a serious matter for NATO”. Speaking

62 Al Sharq Al Awsat newspaper and Al Siyassa newspaper, Kuwait, 22 January 2007.

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before the European Parliament that same year, he said that “NATO couldconsider the use of force if energy supplies were threatened” According toShehata Nasser, in his article “NATO and Energy Security”, published bythe Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, June 2006,NATO’s intervention to secure energy could be based on two pillars:

- A legal pillar: Senator Richard Lugar called on NATO to cometo the aid of any member of the military alliance whose energy sourceshave been cut off. This denial of energy supplies would be defined as anact of aggression or an act of war, and NATO’s Mutual Defense Clause(Article 5)63 could be invoked. If the question of operating outsideAlliance territories is raised, NATO can obtain approval from the UNSCthrough a resolution similar to the 2008 UNSCR on the fight against pira-cy, under which NATO dispatched, on 16 October 2008, seven militaryvessels to the coasts of Somalia64.

- Precedents: NATO intervened to secure energy in the Gulf ontwo occasions. In 1991, NATO key members intervened to secure energyresources to ensure that Iraq does not control Kuwaiti oil and threatenother Gulf producers. NATO governments also took part in a military oper-ation in the 1980s designed to secure the supply of oil by protecting tankertraffic in the Gulf during the Iraq-Iran war. At the time, the Reagan admin-istration formed a coalition of like-minded States, mainly from NATO, toprotect tanker traffic in the Gulf, and the allies captured Iranian vesselsthat were mining shipping lanes in the Gulf65.

b- Measures requested from NATO to ensure energy security

While the USA continues to protect energy sources in the Gulf,NATO could ensure the protection of energy corridors by providing addedvalue to Gulf States as follows:

63 Mahdi Darvius Nazemeroaya, Globalization of Military Power: NATO Expansion, The BroaderNetwork of U.S Research 2007, www.globalresearch64 www.alarabonline.org 18 October 2008.65 Paul Gallis, NATO and Energy Security, CRS Report For Congress, March 2006, www.fas.org

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- In an attempt to combat Iranian threats to seal off the Strait ofHormuz, GCC States approved a contingency plan in which GulfTransport Ministers agreed, should this threat materialize, to use GCCports. NATO, with its efficient and effective maritime capabilities andexperience, including its NRF, can help secure these alternative water-ways*.

* Map illustrating waterways for oil exports

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The alternatives suggested are: 1) the pipeline linking northernIraq and the east of Saudi Arabia with the Mediterranean Sea; 2) thepipeline from eastern Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea; 3) the coast of the Gulfof Oman.

- Enhance Gulf-NATO maritime cooperation on two levels: 1)increase opportunities for Gulf naval forces to participate in NATO exer-cises and increase NATO port visits to Gulf ports66; 2) engage GCC Statesin the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched by the USA to pre-vent unregulated and dangerous uses of waterways, including the Gulf. IfNATO succeeds in convincing GCC States to join PSI, they would be ableto effectively control their valuable maritime holdings and their sharedwaterways. PSI would also draw GCC States into international waters,preparing them for a broadened role on the high seas, by integrating theirforces into multinational command and control networks. It would alsoenable NATO to protect giant oil tankers. For example, PSI conducted theSea Saber interdiction exercise in the Gulf, with participants drawn heav-

66 Diego Ruiz Palmer, “New operational horizons: NATO and maritime security”, NATO Review, win-ter 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue4/english/analysis4.html

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ily from NATO and EU members. A number of NATO members havealready demonstrated their capability and willingness to take on long-termmaritime commitments in the Gulf67. Gulf States would certainly welcomemaritime cooperation, as most Gulf trade depends on sea transport andconsequently needs protection against piracy threats68, a major securityissue worldwide in both 2008 and 2009.

- Enhancing NATO-Gulf cooperation in the sharing of intelligenceon the sources of threats to energy security. In this regard, GCC States canbenefit from the plan suggested by Jamie Shea, NATO Director of PolicyPlanning, whereby NATO could provide protection to oil pipelines runningthrough the desert and to giant oil tankers in the sea.

- NATO should draw up practical response plans in case Iran sealsoff the Strait of Hormuz, the main sea passage for oil tankers in the world,connecting the world’s largest oil producing region to the world market.40% of the world’s seaborne oil shipments pass through this Strait, i.e. 17million barrels of crude oil (200-300 tankers per day). Iran, which hashuge naval bases and continues to occupy the three strategically locatedUAE islands, is indeed capable of sealing off the Strait69. Should this hap-pen, a military response would be expected from NATO, which would useWestern military bases in the Gulf, namely the French naval base built inthe UAE in 2009. When asked about the reaction of French marine forcesin the case of an Israeli attack against Iran, the Commander of FrenchNaval Forces in the Indian Ocean said that “a political decision would betaken in this case by the French President. We oppose any attempt by Iranto seal off the Strait to impede international sea traffic, and we should allwork to prevent this from happening”70.

67 Michael Knights, Maritime Interdiction in The Gulf: Developing a Culture of Focused InterdictionUsing Existing International Conventions, www.npec-web.org 2005.68 Geoffrey Kemp, “France and Security in the Gulf ”, Al Itihad newspaper, UAE, 8 February 2008.69 Mohamad Seif Haider, “The Strait of Hormuz in the heart of an expected war: possibilities andstrategic consequences”, Views On the Gulf magazine, Gulf Research Center, Dubai, Issue no. 41,February 2008, p. 62.70 Al Hayat newspaper, 12 March 2009.

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- Intensifying NATO-Gulf meetings to discuss energy security.Positive results were obtained through previous meetings such as the col-loquium hosted by the Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2008,during which the Chairman of Qatar Petroleum called for a NATO strate-gy to secure energy. Even though this issue is not on the ICI’s agenda, itreceived much attention from both parties. An annex to the ICI could beprepared on NATO’s future vision regarding energy security.

- NATO could provide advice and security assistance to oil com-panies working in the Gulf to enhance the Alliance’s credibility and to con-tribute to the protection of energy sources.

In all cases, security threats as seen by NATO and Gulf States mustbe prioritized, with priority given to urgent threats such as terrorism.

II- Level 2: NATO’s role vis-à-vis regional security threats

The ICI includes numerous areas where NATO can bring addedvalue to self-security in the Gulf. However, NATO should understand thatthe security of GCC States constitutes an integral part of security in theGulf, which also comprises Iraq and Iran, and should have a clear visionon how to achieve that security. GCC States are convinced of the impor-tant role of the international community in achieving a power balance inthe region71. Moreover, the Gulf is an integral part of the Middle East,where instability stems from a number of factors, mainly the ongoingArab-Israeli conflict.

Before discussing NATO’s role in ensuring regional security, theregional security equation in general should be presented. In the 1980s, theregion was considered as a triangle comprising Iraq, Iran and GCC States.Following the Kuwait Liberation War, the US entered the equation and the

71 Ashraf Mohamad Kishk, NATO Dialogue and the Gulf: Mutual interests, www.islamonline.org, 4December 2005.

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region turned into what James Bill calls “the rectangle of tension”. Thecomplex relationships between these four actors include patterns of collab-oration and conflict. However, with the US invasion of Iraq, the situationturned into a “rectangle of chaos”, reflected by Iran’s insistence on pos-sessing nuclear weapons, jeopardizing regional and international interests;and by the instability in Iraq, which threatens regional security in generaland that of the GCC in particular. The imbalance of power in the regionalsecurity environment has increased with the US invasion of Iraq. NATOshould play a role in redressing this imbalance as described below.

The following figure illustrates the development of regionalsecurity from 1971 to 2009

_______ cooperation----------- struggle

Irana) After 1971

Saudi Arabia

• A + B: mutual enemies - competition for regional leadership inthe Gulf

• C + D: cautious co-operation • E + F: competition for regional leadership; mutual suspicion

C A

F

D B

E

Iraq

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b) In 1980The tension triangle:

Iraq

struggle

The Gulf States struggle Iran

c) During the 1990s:

The tension rectangle:GCC Iraq

Iran U.S

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d) After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003:

The chaos rectangle:

GCC Iraq

Iran U.S.

(Source: Dr. Mohamad Al Said Idriss, The Regional System in the Arab Gulf, Beirut,Center of Arab Unity Studies, 2000, pp. 44 - 400)

A- NATO’s role in Iraq

Although the ICI initially targeted GCC States, it must comprise allGulf security actors and ensure their stability if it is to succeed in guaranteeingsecurity in the Gulf. Regional security cannot be achieved without securingeach of its components72. Consequently, GCC States continue to call for stabil-ity in Iraq. NATO has started to play a role to this end in conformity with the2004 Istanbul Summit Statement in which NATO decided to offer assistance tothe government of Iraq with the training of its security forces, based on the twofollowing elements: 1) the Iraqi government officially requested NATO’s assis-tance in this regard, and 2) UNSC 1546 requested international and regionalorganizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force in Iraq.Currently, NATO has a 300-strong force in Iraq providing training to 1000 offi-cers per year inside Iraq and to 500 others outside Iraq under US command.

72 Steven L. Spiegel, Regional Security and the Levels of Analysis Problem, Journal of StrategicStudies, vol. 26 Issue 3, September 2003, pp.75-98.

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NATO could enhance its activities targeting Iraq in the followingways:

- As conciliation is a key step towards stabilizing Iraq, NATOcould sponsor an Iraqi conciliation conference.

- By focusing on building the Iraqi army to enable it to defend itsterritory. Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins foreign affairs expert,notes that ‘’Iraq needs an army that is big enough to deter Iran and yet notso big that it could be used to smother Iraqi democracy and threaten thewhole neighborhood, the way Saddam’s huge army did”73. NATO is capa-ble of balancing this difficult equation, and there is wide Iraqi acceptanceof NATO’s role, reflected by the training agreement signed between NATOand the Iraqi government, and by continuous calls from Iraqi officials formilitary cooperation with the Alliance.

- By limiting NATO’s very important role in Iraq to safeguardingthe country’s security and stability, despite Iraqi proposals to join NATO.Sources at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have affirmed that Saadoun AlDulaimi, Iraqi Minister of Defense, “would like Iraq to join NATO”74.Should this happen, the Gulf’s regional security equation would change. Inpractice, such a move would spell the death of the ICI, given fears amongstGCC States about normalizing their relations with Iraq. It could also leadthem to resort to other international actors to face this new reality. As Iran’sregional power increases, Gulf States seek to establish new regionalalliances such as the strategic MoU signed between GCC and Turkey.

- NATO can begin a direct dialogue with Iraq to discuss the com-mon interests of the two sides, especially energy security and how NATOcan enhance the stability of Iraq, particularly if the US withdraws itstroops from Iraq by 201175.

73 Thomas Friedman, “Expanding Club NATO to include Egypt, Israel and Iraq”, Al Sharq Al Awsatnewspaper, 28 October 2003.74 The Ministry of Defense seeks to join NATO, www.albayyna.com75NATO: No intention of establishing permanent headquarters in Iraq, Al Mada newspaper,www.almadapaper.net

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The success of NATO’s mission in Iraq and in Afghanistan has agreat impact on the ICI: if NATO fails to achieve its objectives in these twocountries, it will be difficult to convince Gulf States to enhance their coop-eration with the Alliance.

In general NATO should realize that the rebuilding of Iraq is veryimportant for regional security, in order to recreate the balance betweenGCC countries and Iran and Iraq that was destroyed by the US invasion ofIraq in 2003.

B- NATO’s role vis-à-vis Iran

Iran views the ICI as a threat to its national security for two rea-sons. First, it believes that NATO-Gulf cooperation, as well as Westernmilitary presence in the Gulf and Asia, indicate a Western tendency to con-trol the lion’s share of the region’s wealth while depriving Iran of it76.Second, there is an apparent conflict of interest between Iran and NATO’snew policies: NATO’s new role includes fighting terrorism and WMDswhile Iran continues its nuclear quest. Therefore, a confrontation betweenIran and the Alliance remains possible. Speaking about the Caucasian cri-sis in 2008, President Ahmadi Najad made the following statement at ameeting with the Armenian Foreign Minister in Tehran on 14 September2008: “There is no need for NATO to intervene to solve problems betweenstates in the region”77. Iran understands the threats posed to it by NATO’spresence in the region, as described in a study issued in 2005 in Farsi bythe Strategic Research Center of the Iranian Shura Council on the impactof NATO’s presence near Iran. The following key findings emerged fromthe study:

- NATO’s presence close to Iran in Afghanistan, Iraq and CentralAsia has an impact on Iran’s defense decisions.

76 Shahram Chubin, Debating Iran’s nuclear aspirations, Arab Scientific Publishers, Beirut, 2007, p. 182.77 Statement by the Iranian President, 17 September 2008, www.irna.ir.com

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- NATO members have replaced their defensive approach by anoffensive one. Any threat –however small – felt by any member could beused to justify NATO’s military and political presence in the threat area.

- As NATO turns eastwards, Iran’s concerns would increase ifAlliance forces were present nearby, given Iran’s location as a strategic linkbetween Eurasia and the Middle East.

The study recommended that Iranian decision makers look moreclosely at the new Iraqi army, its size and the types of weapons NATOoffers to it78.

Given the complexity of the Iranian nuclear issue, non-military solu-tions are required. The military option would be problematic to Gulf States asthey seek to balance their relations with Iran and the West on the basis of geo-graphic and political considerations. NATO could launch a political dialoguewith Iran, parallel to US-Iran talks, on means to face common threats and tosettle the nuclear issue. This dialogue could be based on the following:

- A study published in an Iranian periodical in 2005 calls for NATO-Iran cooperation, given that Iran sent observers to NATO’s Summit inMunich in 2003. Iran, it argues, could help NATO control Iraqi borders,which run for 1,400 kilometers with Iran, a matter discussed between Iranand Polish troops present in Iraq. The study further notes that NATO-Irancooperation would limit the impact of events in Iraq and Central Asia onIran’s National Security. NATO is not a synonym for the US: it comprises 25European States enjoying close ties with Iran, preventing Iran’s isolation inthe future. The study concludes that Iran’s interest lies in not irritating NATOand in cooperating with the Alliance. It also suggests the creation of a NATO-Iran Council similar to the NATO-Russia Council to discuss common inter-ests in central Asia and in the Gulf79, as both parties have interests in theregion located between the Caspian Sea, Afghanistan and the Gulf.

78 Ashraf Mohamad Kishk, “NATO’s new role in the Gulf: a new challenge for Iranian NationalSecurity”, Mokhtarat Iraniyya magazine, issue no. 46, November 2004, p. 88.79 Manda Tesh Yad, NATO’s presence in dialogue with Iran, Al Majliss wal Bahth quarterly, year 12, issue no. 4

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- The possibility of a NATO-Iran dialogue: Iran was invited byWestern states to attend the International Conference on Afghanistan heldthis year (2009). Moreover, official NATO sources have affirmed (26March 2009) that diplomats from NATO and Iran took part in Brussels intalks on Afghanistan80, the first talks between them in the past 30 years.NATO-Iran cooperation on issues affecting remote areas is an importantfirst step towards similar cooperation on issues in the Gulf itself, and couldlead to the creation of a regional security organization with Iran as a mem-ber. However, this dialogue and its results are contingent on progress madein settling the Iranian nuclear issue and on Iran’s will to abandon itsnuclear quest. NATO could try to counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions indirect-ly by declaring its support for regional initiatives aimed at building aWMD-free Middle East, such as the initiative launched by the GulfResearch Center in Dubai on the establishment of a WMD-free zone.

C- NATO’s role regarding proposals to ensure regionalsecurity

Once NATO succeeds in moving the ICI forward and in engagingboth Iraq and Iran in a wide regional security and political dialogue, theAlliance’s main task would be to promote a regional security architecturecomprising the eight states in the region, i.e. the six GCC States, Iraq andIran. However, NATO should take the following facts into consideration:1) this security architecture cannot be built without help from an externalactor, given the power imbalance between GCC States and Iran81; 2)NATO’s potential role in ensuring the Gulf’s regional security falls withinthe Alliance’s acting out of area in collective security operations, contribut-ing to the development of relevant customary international law and writ-ten laws82; 3) since it took over the responsibility for security in the Gulffollowing the British withdrawal, the US has achieved the main objective

80 www.xinhuanet.com, 27 March 2009.81 The Small States: The Best Case Example in The Arab World? Panel Discussion, The Middle EastReview of International Affairs, June 2009.82 Dr. Gülner Aybet, NATO’s Developing in Collective Security, The Center for Strategic Research.www.sam.gov

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of the Carter doctrine: to prevent any extra-regional state actor from gain-ing control in the region.

As for the protection of oil resources, this calls for diplomaticaction rather than military intervention83. The emergence of new players inthe region (China, Japan and India) who also depend on Gulf oil indicatesthat the US might gradually lose its sole control over Gulf security.However, as this might take more than a decade, the US continues its poli-cies in the Gulf, such as granting Kuwait and Bahrain non-NATO ally sta-tus, which no doubt helps NATO to play a bigger role in the Gulf.Conditions are now ripe for NATO to sponsor a regional security architec-ture similar to the one created by the 1975 Helsinki “Conference onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe” which underlined respect for therights inherent in sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force,inviolability of frontiers and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

According to Richard Russell, Europe managed to put an end toconflicts through balance-of-power politics which do not exist in theGulf84. Therefore, NATO’s mission would be to help achieve this powerbalance through the role it could play in the Gulf and in both Iraq and Iran.

Another approach would be for NATO to take part in a regionalsecurity arrangement together with all states in the region. This idea waspresented by Kenneth M. Pollack in the Foreign Affairs Review in 2003:the US could create a regional Alliance similar to NATO to keep theAmericans in and the Iranians out85. Such an approach is very important,but it must not exclude Iran. NATO could play a key role in this approach,which would enhance the interoperability of land and air Gulf forces.Furthermore, by extending this new Alliance to include Iraq, Iraqi militarycapabilities would be controlled, Iraq would cease to pose a threat to small-er Gulf states and its need to develop defense capabilities, as it sought to

83 Lawrence Korb and Ian Moss, Moving Beyond The Carter Doctrine: Rethinking The U.S MilitaryPresence in The Persian Gulf, The Century Foundation, New York, 2008.84 Richard Russell, The Persian Gulf’s Collective Security Mirage, Middle East Policy, 22 December 2005.85 Kenneth M. Pollack, Securing The Gulf, Foreign Affairs, July, August, 2008, pp. 11-12.

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do under Saddam Hussein, would be obviated, except for those required todeter Iran86. NATO could sponsor conferences similar to the Manama GulfSecurity Dialogue to expound its vision on Gulf security, hence achievingtwo goals: it would prove its genuine desire to defend Gulf States, and itwould help contain Iran. Any security architecture suggested for the Gulfmust be consensual, comprehensive and functional, which is where NATOcould play a role, given the US failure to establish systematic interactionwith the region and to create a more stable Gulf security architecture,despite efforts ranging from “Pax Britannica” to “Twin-Pillar” to “Balanceof Power” to dual containment and ultimately to US hegemony. NATOshould convince Gulf States that the USA and Iran cannot be left to deter-mine the region’s destiny on their own, as GCC countries and NATO havemany common interests in the Gulf region and Iran is still improving itsmilitary programs. The Alliance should present security guarantees to GulfStates under a UN umbrella, in line with Gulf perceptions in general andwith the views of Saudi Arabia, a key GCC component.

III- Level 3: NATO’s role in the Middle East peace process

Even though Gulf States are not direct parties to the ongoingArab-Israeli conflict, they are affected by it. According to the GCCSecretary General, “in addition to the important areas tackled by NATO’sICI, parallel steps must be taken to ensure that security extends beyond theouter borders of its two parties, and to create a regional structure based ona lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict”87.

The Palestinian cause is in point of fact linked to security in theGulf, although Gulf States are not “frontline States”. Gulf States, whichare well aware of the impact of this ongoing conflict on their security, callfor a bigger engagement from NATO for two main reasons: 1) existing

86 Martin Indyk, “US policy priorities in the Gulf: Challenges and choices”, in International Interestsin the Gulf Region, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2007.87 Speech by GCC Secretary General Abed Elrahman hamad El Attia at the International Conferenceon NATO and Gulf Countries, Kuwait, December 2006, www.library-gcc-sg.org

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doubts in some GCC States over NATO’s new role, prompting them to callon the Alliance to contribute towards settling what could be described asthe “Main Cause” for the Arab and Muslim world to which they belong, inorder to enhance NATO credibility; and 2) movements opposing the nor-malization of relations with Israel are active in Gulf States, hence alldevelopments relating to this conflict have a widely felt impact on them.This was reflected by demonstrations in some States in support ofHezbollah during its confrontation with Israel in 2006.

According to the Alliance, any NATO intervention in this conflictshould be in conformity with a UNSC resolution. The UNSC is in favor ofa two-state solution as part of a final settlement to be guaranteed byNATO88. In the meantime, the Alliance should take part in all efforts tosolve this conflict and has already taken key steps in this regard: it has con-tacted the PNA with a view to presenting NATO’s MD Initiative to it andhas examined means of cooperation in the fields of training and informa-tion exchange, and a US-Israel security agreement to end Gaza armssmuggling was signed on 16 January 2009 calling for cooperation withNATO partners to address this problem.

Although NATO’s policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict is basedon thorough considerations, there are important steps it could take toavoiding adding to the complexity of the conflict, without affecting theAlliance’s interests or altering the nature of the conflict. For example, itcould call for an international peace conference in which all parties wouldpresent their views on the future of peace. The dilemma for NATO lies inbalancing the need to settle this conflict with NATO-Israel cooperation.Israel is an MD partner and requested in July 2009 to take part in NATOoperations in the Mediterranean. This request was described by theSecretary General of the Arab League as “an attempt to besiege the MiddleEast”. Hence, the security of Gulf States has regional, Middle Eastern andinternational dimensions. NATO should understand these dimensions as

88 Statement by NATO Secretary General, Al Watan Kuwaiti newspaper, 8 July 2007.

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well as interactions between them, before setting the priorities of a jointGulf-NATO vision of potential threats. NATO’s efforts should extendbeyond the ICI and Gulf States, because Gulf security interacts with,affects and is affected by these three dimensions.

Despite the importance of the suggestions presented here regard-ing NATO’s role in the Gulf’s self-security and in adopting wider regionalsecurity architecture, the success of this role depends on NATO’s ability tohelp Gulf States carefully define their security interests, because theirvarying interests affect their perception of NATO’s role. The next stepwould be to develop a framework – which must reflect the real needs of thesix GCC States – to transform these interests into effective coordinationmechanisms. Bilateral security agreements signed between NATO andsome Gulf States within the ICI should benefit all GCC States. To succeed,NATO should enhance its formal training and education activities in theseStates to increase targeted groups’ awareness of general security issuesand concepts89.

89 Dr. Mostafa Alawi Seif, NATO’s strategy towards the Arab Gulf, op. cit., p. 68.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ICI FUTURE

In view of the above, much effort needs to be made to activatethe ICI in a way that guarantees the interests of both NATO and GulfStates. This would depend on the approach adopted by the Initiative. Intheory, the ICI could adopt one of the following three strategies:

A- Modest Ambition Strategy: NATO’s participation would belimited to the field of Soft Security. It would focus on information andintelligence exchange as well as on confidence building measures, andwould not impose conditions on States joining the Initiative. This strate-gy has a number of advantages: it is flexible, takes into account thespecificities of each regional partner and does not impose any internalpolitical transformations. However, it also has shortcomings: it lacksbinding commitments, does not earmark financial or human resourcesfor its implementation, does not help improve NATO’s image and doesnot help much in solving issues arising from the changing strategic envi-ronment.

B- The Intermediate Strategy: This is the rationalized partici-pation strategy. It aims at moving from the bilateral 28+1 approach to amultilateral approach, encouraging both parties to enhance collaborationand to move from soft security to hard security cooperation.

C- Large Ambition Strategy: States that are not members of theGCC are encouraged to join the ICI as an “additional partner” from out-side both NATO and the GCC. This Strategy would dissipate doubts andfears clouding relations between these “external additional partners” andICI partners. In the long term, it aims at creating a regional securityforum comprising all regional actors. This Strategy has numerous advan-tages, such as promoting the principle of burden sharing in order toenhance security and stability in the region. In practice, however, it isdifficult to imagine support to this strategy from all NATO members andGCC States.

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The ICI has apparently adopted the first approach, i.e. the ModestAmbition Strategy, even though Gulf-related security and economic goals(oil and money, Iran’s nuclear program, the future of Iraq) are not simpleor modest challenges. On the contrary, these are vital and important objec-tives for the international community in general and for NATO membersin particular.

NATO needs a new approach comprising the advantages of theabove-mentioned three strategies, i.e. one that 1) respects the specificitiesof all partners, but first of all encourages Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemento join the ICI; 2) encourages States from outside the GCC to join on a dif-ferent level (Iraq and Iran); and 3) focuses on security issues (both soft andhard security). Its ultimate goal would be the creation of a regional securi-ty forum for all States in the region under NATO auspices –or with NATOparticipation. To achieve this, a number of elements are required: overcom-ing Iran’s nuclear programs, achieving stability in Iraq, changing GCC atti-tudes to NATO and changing the NATO Defense Concept.

Finally, the ICI will not make noticeable progress unless its mem-bers and NATO work together in line with its provisions and recommenda-tions. Some of the Initiative’s items might also need to be carefully revis-ited90.

90 Philip Gordon, NATO’s growing role in the greater Middle East, Emirates Lectures Series no. 115,Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2008, p. 26-27.

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Concrete proposals

This study provides an analysis of security threats to GCC Statesand defines NATO’s potential role in addressing these threats in line withthe ICI. Moreover, it presents the obstacles on the road towards implement-ing the ICI as well as mechanisms to activate the Initiative. In the light ofthese considerations, the following recommendations are submitted:

1- NATO officials should understand that if Saudi Arabia, Omanand Yemen do not join the ICI, the Initiative’s effectiveness and futuredevelopment would be limited. NATO should adopt a strategy with cleartimeframes to ensure the membership of these three States by drawing les-sons from the MD and how it overcame similar obstacles. For example, theICI should note that existing key security issues were rarely tackled with-in the MD. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli conflict was considered as an obsta-cle to cooperation between Dialogue partners.

2- NATO-GCC cooperation must give tangible and immediateresults at least regarding Gulf self-security. NATO’s negative image in GulfStates would be exacerbated if these States have to wait too long before theresults of this Initiative materialize.

3- The ICI has important objectives for both Gulf States andNATO. Consequently, there is a need for both parties to allocate financialresources to it. However, this depends on the extent to which NATO mem-bers agree on these objectives and on the will of Gulf States to accept addi-tional financial burdens.

4- NATO should develop detailed plans to fight nuclear prolifera-tion and terrorism as well as to ensure energy security. GCC States shouldbe part of these plans and should contribute to their implementation. Thismight require amending article V provisions regarding NATO out-of-areasecurity obligations.

5- The present form of NATO-GCC cooperation should be modi-

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fied by replacing the 28+1 format with a 28+6 approach similar to the onegoverning the EU-GCC partnership. This would maximize GCC benefitsfrom NATO given the Gulf States’ comparable conditions. The 28+1approach could explain in part why Saudi Arabia, Oman and Yemen havenot joined the ICI.

6- NATO must make additional efforts to promote its new policy.It must not rely entirely on media coverage of visits by NATO officials tothe region, which might not always have a positive resonance. NATO couldissue periodic publications in Arabic providing an analysis of theAlliance’s policies and could hold a regular NATO-GCC academic dia-logue –parallel to the ICI –at least twice every year, to dispel misunder-standings and clear up ambiguities about NATO policies. This dialogueshould cover various security issues related to the real needs of Gulf Statessuch as energy security, environmental protection and securing naturalresources.

7- Gulf States should be invited to provide a clearer definition ofthe security needs to be met by NATO, based on an order of priority. NATOis also invited to determine its security obligations –different from those ofthe US –towards Gulf States. Indeed, the ICI covers both strategic andcooperative security issues, while US-Gulf alliances are considered asstrategic security alliances which could lead to the militarization of theregion.

8- Any NATO intervention or mission in the region should beauthorized by a UN mandate.

9- NATO could seek the help of researchers and experts from theGulf in particular and the Middle East in general in order to harness theirexperiences to define and reflect real security threats, instead of relying onWestern literature. Moreover, NATO could consider establishing liaisonoffices and regional defense colleges to the benefit of both parties.

10- NATO should keep its cooperation with Israel within reason-

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able limits. The more this cooperation grows, the more the ICI stumblesand GCC governments might find themselves torn between the requisitesof their partnership with NATO and internal pressure to put an end to thispartnership.