COMMENTS AND CORRECTIONS ON THE CD-ROM VERSION OFNAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II

The CD-ROM version of this publication was preparedusing a scanner and Adobe Acrobat Capture 1.0 software.Several problems were encountering during the scanning andcorrecting of the scanned text. Since the document was notoriginally type set the scanning software and equipment hadsome difficulty reading the typewriter letters and numbersused in 1946. However, the major problems usually dealtwith the table headings, underlining and column lines beingto close to numbers or letters. These three problemsusually resulted in data that could not be read accurately.If a group of numbers could not be corrected they wereusually left in a digitized format. Occasionally thedigitized data would not include letters or numbers thatwere close to column lines and incomplete column lines.Hence, the quality of software and hardware available to theNaval Historical Center limited true reproduction of themonograph.

Following the initial scanning of the document thescanned and processed text was proof read several times.After each reading, corrections were made to the text. Theprimary emphasis was, of course, on accuracy and trying tomake the text word searchable without spending an inordinateamount of time making corrections and proof reading. Datathat was left in the digitized format will normally appearto be in bold and may not be the same type of font.

The monograph is being presented on the CD-ROM just asit was originally published. If there were any spellingerrors or grammatical mistakes they were not corrected.Terminology that would not be acceptable today was notchanged. The flavor of the document comes from the time itwas written, 1946.

A tabulation of commonly used words in the tableheadings is provided to help clarify words that may have nothave been read correctly by the software, could not becorrected or a letter was left off a word and could not becorrected. The following list of words or abbreviations maybe found in the monograph as a single heading or in variouscombinations: A/A, A/C, Action, Air, Aircraft, Airfield,Ammunition, Areas, Armored, Attack, Attacking, Base, Boat,Bombers, Bombs, Carrier, carrier designations (CV, CVE,CVL), Casualties, Combat, Complement, Dates, Defensive,Dest. (Destroyed), Destroyed, Enemy, Engaged, Engine,Expended, Expenditures, Fighters, Fl’ts (Flights), Flights,Float, Single, Flying, Force, Forces, Ground, Hand, Harbor,Hit, Including, Land, Local, Loss, Losses, Lost,Merchantmen, Military, Misc. (Miscellaneous), Mission,Month, Night, No. (number), Number, Offensive, On,

Operating, Operational, Other, Over, Own, Patrols, Per,Percent, Plane, Purpose, Ratios, Rec. (Reconnaissance),Reconnaissance, Rockets, Search, Ship, Sorties, Sqdns.(Squadrons), Squadrons, Strike, Support, Sweep, Targets,Tons, Total, Trainer, Transport, Transportation, Twin, Type,Unarmored, Under, Unknown, and Warships. See the booksUnited States Naval Aviation 1910-1995 or Dictionary ofAmerican Naval Aviation Squadrons - History of VA, VAH, VAK,VAL, VAP and VFA Squadrons for any questions regardingaircraft designations or aircraft class designations.

The original document did not have page numbers 12 or128. There is no page number listed in the CD-ROM documentfor the page with Table 19. The scanner did not pick upthis page number which should be 59.

THE FOLLOWING ARE CORRECTIONS BY PAGE NUMBER:

PAGE 31: In the 3rd column GHT should read FLIGHTS,

PAGE 35: In the 2nd column the last entry is blank andshould read 997 In the 3rd column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 48,831 In the 4th column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 43,383 and the number forJuly-August 1945 Period Total should read 11,494 In the 5th column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 14,794 In the 6th column the number for February-June1945 Period Total should read 121,302

PAGE 41: In the 2nd column the Dates of Action forGuadalcanal Support should read 10/12-10/16 and the Dates ofAction for Guadalcanal Battle should read 11/13-11/14

PAGE 43: In the 7th column under Air, the Okinawa Campaignnumber should read 1692; the CV-CVL Total number should read1563 and the Ryukyus Total number should read 1277.

PAGE 47: In the 6th column the heading should read OnGround

PAGE 49: In the 2nd column an * should be in the space for1943 Total

PAGE 50: In the 4th column the head should read OWN LOSSES

PAGE 53: The first sentence below the table should beginwith an *

PAGE 59: This page is missing the page number. The lastcolumn for Table 19, under Lost: the number for Land-Basedshould read 10.1, the number for F4F should read 18.6, thenumber for F2A should read 82.4, the number for SBD shouldread 22.1 and the number for PBY should read 35.6

PAGE 61: In the column head Sorties Engaging Enemy Aircraftwith the sub-head Number, the number for Carrier-Based VFfor 1944 should read 4127 and the number for 1945 shouldread 3844

PAGE 62: In the last column under Lost, the entries for1942 February, May, June, August and October should read11.5, 15.8, 29.7, 16.2 and 17.2

PAGE 63: In the last column under Lost, the entry for 1942February should read 100.0

PAGE 66: In the 3rd column under Grand Total the numbershould read 3019

PAGE 67: In the 2nd column, Action Sorties, the entry forCarrier-Based Ryukyus should read 37,421, for Marianas itshould read 18,747, for Western Carolines it should read10,234 and for Philippines it should read 22,323. In the 2ndcolumn under Action Sorties, the entry for Land-BasedWestern Carolines should read 11,456, for Marshalls itshould read 21,552 and for Bismarcks, Solomons it shouldread 62,628.

PAGE 71: In the 2nd column the entry for Carrier-Basedshould read 20,499.

PAGE 72: The headings should read SINGLE-ENGINE FIGHTER ORRECONNAISSANCE and SINGLE-ENGINE BOMBER and the Allied CodeNames should read ZEKE, HAMP; OSCAR; TONY; TOJO; NATE;FRANK; JACK; GEORGE; MYRT; OTHER & U/I; VAL; JUDY; KATE;JILL and OTHER.

PAGE 74: In the 2nd column under the entry for 1945 Augustthe number should read 35.

PAGE 76: In the 2nd column under the entry Grand Total thenumber should read 3518. In the 3rd column the aircraftdesignation should read F4U and the last entry under GrandTotal should read 1042.

PAGE 78: The heading for the 5th column should read % LOSTOF A/C HIT

PAGE 93: In the 2nd column the letter L should be under theheading KOREA, NO. CHINA.

PAGE 103: In the 2nd column under Grand Total the numbershould read 121,482.

PAGE 106: In the 4th column under Total the number shouldread 21,052.

PAGE 109: The two major headings should read LAND TARGETSand SHIPPING TARGETS

PAGE 110: The second major heading should read LAND-BASEDand the 4th column heading should read SBD with the secondpart of the column heading as % Total.

PAGE 111: The 3rd column (TRUK, MARIANAS) under the entryfor 500-lb. GP the number should read 197, the entry for1000-lb. GP should read 117, the entry for the 1000-lb. SAPshould read 124 and the TOTAL entry should read 610.

PAGE 113: The 3rd column (Carrier VTB) under TOTALS thenumber should read 1311 and under the 5th column (VPB) theentry for TOTALS should read 41.

PAGE 120: The aircraft designation heading after F6F shouldread F4U.

BACKGROUND ON THE MONOGRAPHNAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II

The publication Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II was compiled during thewinter of 1945—1946 and the following spring by a group of some 30 officers, enlisted men, andcivilians headed by Lieutenant Commander Stuart B. Barber, USNR.1 The group, a section within theAir Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), had the function of IBM tabulation of naval airaction. It began declining rapidly in size as wartime coding backlogs were eliminated and currenttabulations were kept up to date, and the production of this volume soon became its principal task.

Barber personally designed the final series of some 160 tabulations for this report and wrote theaccompanying text. He was uniquely experienced for this task. Originally assigned to the Bureau ofAeronautics to develop a standardized action reporting system, in 1943 Barber designed the AircraftAction (ACA-1 and -2) forms and drafted the instructions to be used in completing them. Following atraining tour at the Navy's Air Combat Intelligence School, he served at Pearl Harbor on the staff ofCommander Air Force, Pacific Fleet (COMAIRPAC) from November 1943 until July 1945. For mostof that period, he was responsible for producing the COMAIRPAC Analysis of Pacific Air Operations,from the incoming squadron ACA and higher-echelon reports which covered aircraft carrier operationsin detail, as well as providing a monthly statistical summary and an analysis and overview of all otherPacific air operations. During the final months of the war, Barber also initiated and wrote a series ofCOMAIRPAC Ordnance and Target Selection Bulletins, as a way of highlighting the important pointsraised in the Pacific Air Operations analyses.

The report included herein was completed in May 1946, and by the time Stuart Barber leftactive duty in June of that year, hundreds of copies were in the process of being printed for distributionthroughout the Navy and Marine Corps.2 It was at this point that the document fell afoul of postwarservice politics.

In the wake of the Navy Department's ongoing fight with the War Department over serviceunification, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal had set up an organization in the fall of 1945designated SCOROR (Secretary's Committee on Research on Reorganization) to review unificationand other issues. In July 1946, SCOROR was given a copy of Barber's report for review. A highlycritical memorandum resulted from this examination. In this paper, an anonymous SCOROR staff

1Information concerning the compilation of this document comes from an interview conducted bythe author with Mr. Barber on 25 February 1989; from a copy of a portion of a draft memoir by StuartBarber on his Navy service that was loaned to the author by Mr. Barber in May 1996; and fromadditional information supplied by Mr. Barber in a review of a draft of the introduction.

2For the proposed distribution, see Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II OPNAV-P-23V NO. A129 (Washington, D.C.: Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations, 17 June 1946), ii.

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member, apparently acting as a devil's advocate, asserted that the study had been "compiled for Navypropaganda purposes" and took the accompanying text to task for containing a number of apparenterrors of interpretation. Because of the Army Air Forces' express concern over the Navy's continuinguse of land-based aircraft, the reviewer seemed particularly upset that some of the tables illustrated theNavy's extensive (and successful) operation of land-based air in the Pacific War.3

As a result of this review, Rear Admiral Thomas H. Robbins, Jr., the Assistant Head ofSCOROR, sent a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Intelligence on 2 August 1946 providing hiscomments on Naval Aviation Combat Statistics—World War II. In this paper, Robbins stressed:

(a) As a compilation of statistics it is an excellent work containing much information ofvalue to those concerned with Operations Planning. In addition it serves as an excellent source ofinformation for historical and other purposes.

(b) Page iv contains statements which, while probably not intended to give theimplications which they do, nevertheless in my opinion would reflect discredit upon the NavyDepartment and the Naval Service. . . .

(c) Many of the tables of statistics could be misused, from the point of view ofmerger [of the services], were the publication to be given wide distribution among the armed services.

In light of these concerns, Robbins recommended that the publication not be distributed at that time,although he noted that pertinent excerpts could be made available on a "need to know" basis by thehead of the Air Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence.4 Agreeing with Robbins's recommendation,ONI ordered the destruction of all but a handful of copies of the printed report, which it kept for itsfiles.

Barber first discovered this fact when he returned to the Office of the Chief of NavalOperations (OPNAV) in mid-September 1946, as one of a dozen or so Reserve Air CombatIntelligence Officers (ACIOs) specially selected to support a project set up by Vice Admiral ForrestSherman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations. The idea behind the project was thatsuch a group of officers, possessing wide-ranging wartime experience, could assemble from the massof facts about Naval Aviation during the war material of great potential value for supporting Navypositions during the ongoing fight over unification. Each man was ordered to two weeks of temporaryduty, reporting to Captain Wallace Beakley and his assistant, Captain George W. Anderson, Jr.

At the end of the two weeks, Barber was given an additional week of active duty to enable himto pull the material together. While its final destination after delivery to Captain Anderson is not 3Copy of [SCOROR] memo entitled “’Naval Aviation Combat Statistics,’ Comments on,” no serial,29 July 1946; "A21/1-1 Navy (1917 thru July 1948) /S&C/" Folder, Series II, Op-23 Records,Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center (hereafter OA).

4Copy of memo from RADM Robbins to the Chief of Naval Intelligence, no serial, 2 August 1946;"A21/1-1 Navy (1917 thru July 1948) /S&C/" Folder, Op-23 Records, OA. Robbins had suggested inhis memo that all copies of page iv of the report be burned. This apparently was carried out, since nopage iv is present in the copy reproduced here.

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known, this material appears to have provided the main factual input to a thin, unclassified, hard-covervolume published in 1947 entitled U.S. Naval Aviation in the Pacific, for which Admiral Shermanwrote a preface.5 It contains many verbatim extracts from the material assembled by the group,including Stuart Barber's comparison of carrier and Army Air Forces air-to-air combat results.

Although all members of the Reserve ACIO group had had access to the suppressed reportduring their time in OPNAV, when a copy turned up missing, Miss Eleanor Linkous, the Air Branch'ssecretary, rightly suspected that Barber was the culprit. Fortunately, however, no one in the officetook any action to retrieve it, because this is the copy that he turned over to the Naval HistoricalCenter more than forty years later—the one from which this CD-ROM version is being reproduced.

The fate of the other file copies of Naval Aviation Combat Statistics remains unknown. Formany years, the Air Branch employed Miss Blanche Berlin, the only member remaining from thewartime coding and tabulation crew, whose knowledge was invaluable for filling special requests foraction report data from the files. But so far as is known, no broad release of statistical data from thesuppressed report has ever been made—with the conspicuous exception of the air-to-air combat datareleased in the spring of 1948 and described in the author's book, Revolt of the Admirals.6

While historians may still find the data in this report to be of great value, the fifty years of itssuppression undoubtedly have reduced its usefulness for other purposes. For example, one of itsimportant original objectives—documenting the reasons for the naval aviators' evident pride in theirwartime accomplishments—is no longer of concern for the majority of the participants.

What remains inexplicable to this day is why the Navy made no effort to prepare and issue acarefully edited version of the study, at least once the heat of the unification controversy had dieddown. It is particularly baffling since Stuart Barber served as a senior civilian employee in OPNAVfrom 1947 to 1970 and since as the report's author he was in a favorable position to have at leastproposed this course, but he never attempted to do so.

Whatever the report's current value, however, it is unthinkable that this mass of descriptive andinterpretative data covering the efforts of so many thousands of men—constituting one of history'sgreatest and most decisive striking forces—should not be released in full as originally written. One ofthe best lessons to be learned from this story may well be that rather than suppress information toprevent its possible misuse, the best course of action may be to aggressively use the information toconfound opponents, once it has been reviewed for accuracy.

-----This section, Background on the Monograph, was written by Dr. Jeffrey G. Barlow, a

Historian in the Naval Historical Center's Contemporary History Branch. Dr. Barlow is the author ofRevolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945—1950.

5See U.S. Naval Aviation in the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,United States Navy, 1947).

6Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945—1950(Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1994), 62—63.

NAVAL AVIATION

COMBAT STATISTICS

WORLD WAR II

AIR BRANCH

OPNAV-P-23V NO. A12917 JUNE 1946

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONSNAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICSWORLD WAR II

CONTENTSPage

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11. General Scope of Report 12. Data not Included 13. Scope of the Data 24. Sources and Methods 2

DEFINITIONS 4

COMPLETENESS OR ACCURACY OF DATA1. In General 92. With Respect to Specific Items 9

TABULAR DATA AND TEXTUAL COMMENT

A. GENERAL DATA ON FLIGHTS, ACTION SORTIES, BOMBTONNAGE DROPPED, ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED, ANDOWN AIRCRAFT LOSSES 131. General Summaries of Carrier and Land-Based

Operations 132. Carrier Operations, General Data 273. Land-Based Operations, General Data 45

B. SPECIALIZED DATA, BY SUBJECT MATTER1. Aerial Combat Data in Detail 572. Anti-Aircraft Loss and Damage 583. Attack Data, by Geographical Area 784. Attack Data, by Type of target Attacked 815. Ordnance Data 101

(a) Expenditures, General 101(b) Bomb and Torpedo Expenditures 106(c) Rocket and Ammunition Expenditures 114

6. Night Air Operations 119(a) Night Attack 119(b) Night Air Combat 121

7. Long Range Search Plane Operations 124

APPENDIX: JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY NAVAL AIRCRAFT 126

SUBJECT INDEX TO TABLES 129

EVALUATION SECTIONAIR BRANCH

NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS,WORLD WAR II.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL SCOPE OF REPORT

This report contains air combat , attack, and combat operations statistics of Naval andMarine aviation during the war. It is designed as a basic reference document, compressing intoone volume the most pertinent statistical data compiled in the IBM tabulation system maintainedby Air Branch, ONI, and its predecessors, Air Intelligence Group,Divis ion ,

ONI, and Air Technical AnalysisDCNO(Air). Certain related data from other sources, compiled on statistical bases com-

parable to those used in the Op-23-V tabulation system, have been added.

The 60 statistical tables herein are supplemented by an in terpre t ive text , t ied c losely tothe data presented. In no sense is any attempt made in this text to present a connected narra-tive account of the war record of Naval aviation. The essence of the report is combat statistics,and the s tory is to ld sole ly as the s ta t i s t ics themselves may be led to te l l i t . The story toldis a lso l imi ted to the overa l l s tory , a perspective of Naval aviation and its many components asa whole, and data for individual ships, squadrons or other units are not provided.

2. DATA NOT INCLUDED

Not all the story of Naval aviation, which could be told in statistical terms, is coveredin this report. The reasons for the omissions arise from the history and assigned functions ofthe s ta t i s t ica l uni t prepar ing the data , and from the lack of any integrated statistical organi-za t ion cover ing a l l naval a i r opera t ion . Postwar personnel shortages prevented this Branchfrom making good these deficiencies.

Naval a i r ant i -submarine warfare i s the f i rs t exclus ion. This resul ts f rom the es tabl ish-ment, many months prior to initiation of the general air combat statistical analysis program,of a special ASW statistical analysis unit, (directly under CominCh, and later under Tenth Fleet).To avoid duplication of a field well covered elsewhere, no records of air ASW activity were keptby this Branch or its predecessors.

The second principal exclusion is complete, detailed data on flights not i n v o l v i n g a c t u a laction with the enemy (for search, reconnaissance, defensive, or other purposes) , and lossessustained on such flights. This arose from (a) the prior existence of another office (FlightS t a t i s t i c , DCNO(Air)) primarily concerned with data on non-action flights, (b) the primary im-portance of devoting the limited manpower and facilities available to the analysis of actionstatistics not compiled elsewhere and (c) a lack of complete, uniform and detailed incomingrepor ts on non-ac t ion f l ights . This exclusion has been partly compensated by including in sometables herein data on total flights reported monthly (for 1944-45 only) by squadrons which wereengaged in action during any month, and non-action losses by such squadrons during the entire war.. —

These items, however, do not give a full picture of the extent of naval air defensive orreconnaissance pat rol ac t iv i ty or losses sus ta ined there in . It is doubtful whether data existwhich would permit a fu l l and accura te s ta t i s t ica l presenta t ion of th is ac t iv i ty .

A further exclusion is data on the operations of VO-VS aircraft. These operations were notregularly reported by the units involved, in a manner permitting their tabulation by the IBMcard system.

The final major exclusion is data on losses of flying personnel. Losses as reported inact ion repor ts are not f ina l , because of subsequent rescues, or return of captured airmen. Dataon these is maintained by BuPers, but is not compiled and reported on a basis comparable withthe a i rcraf t loss data herein .

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3. SCOPJ OF THE DATA

Despi te the exclus ions l i s ted , tie bulk of Naval avia t ion 's achievements , a t leas t in thePacific war, are covered by the data herein. Included are full data on all reported aerialcombat, and all reported attacks on enemy targets other than submarines, by all Navy and Marinecarr ier and land-based a i rcraf t . The following general categories of figures are provided~

Total Flights, by squadrons reporting action against the ene~

Action Sort ies

Losses and damage frora enemy action

Losses from operational ce.usee

Own planes engaging enemy aircraft

Enemy aircraft engaged

Enemy aircraft destroyed, air and ground

Planes a t tacking targets

Bomb and torDedo exwnditures on tarzets

Rocket expenditures

Ammunition expenditures.

And, with respect to each of the above itame, one or more of tie fol lowing cross-c lass i f ica t ionsof data are provided:

Carrier-based vs. land-basedType of carrierNavy vs. MarineTheater of operationYear, monthCarrier raid or campaignType or model of own aircraftType or model of enemy aircraftMission of own aircraftLocation of action, by general areas‘fype of target at tackedType of ordnance usedNight operations.

4. SOURCES AND METHODS

The rmthod used in compiling these data deserves brief description. The basic sourcematirial for most actions was the squadron ACA-1 report for each mission, or the individualsquadron or mission action report for actions prior to adoption of the ACA-1 form. Where noaction reports were available, carrier battle narratives or squadron monthly war diaries wereused. A check list of all carriers and squadrons in combat areas was maintained, and the wardiaries of all such squadrons, and battle narratives of all such ships, were checked for possibleactions in the event that no action reports had been received from any of these units.

The statistical items from these primary and secondary sources were then punched on IBMcards. The mechanical unit, for card-punching purposes, was the action cf one squadron on onemission. From the file of these cards, n u m b e r i n g sonm 48,300 in all, have COB most of thetabula t ions and cross- tabula t ions in this repor t . Additional supplenwntary files of summarycards , some 5,500 in number, prepared fran the main card file, have also been used in preparingsome of the tables.

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Statistical tabulation was begun in early 1944, starting with the air operations of January1944 and following with tiose of subsequent months in order. For 1944 operations a card systemwas used which required filling out not only one card covering each squadron on each mission,but also supplementary cards covering each separate engagement with enemy aircraft, and eachseparate attack on a major type of tar~et, in addition to the primary engagement or attackparticipated in by the squadron.

This system was eventually found unwieldy for handling the large-scale operations of late1944, and beginning with the operations of January 1945 a simplified card system was used inwhich all engagenmnts and attacks by one squadron on one mission were covered on one card. Thechange of card coding systems resulted in some lack of comparability between 1944~d 1945 sta-tistics (discussed in connection witi individual items under appropr ia te headings hereaf ter ) ,and in an inability to secure certain breakdowns of data for one year or the other. This willexplain the limitation of some tables to 1944 only, or 1945 only.

Because of time and personnel limitations, 1942-43 actions were not placed on machine cardsuntil after the end of the war, and the simplified 1945 coding system was therefore used forthese years .

Of the data appearing in the tables, all were taken from the IBM cards except the following,whose origin is described briefly$

(a) Aircraft on hand, and total flights, for squadrons in actiong

These figures, on a monthly basis, were obtained from Flight Statistics Section, DCNO(Air),from the monthly report of each squadron which reported engaging in action against the enemy(o+&er than ASW) during the month. Data were not obtained for squadrons which reported no actionduring a given month, even if they were in action durin~ the preceding or following month andwere known to have been in an active area. Thus these fi~res are not complete records ofplarm strength, patrols or other flights in war areas, but are, as the name implies, figures forsquadrons in action, directly comparable with the action data on a squadron basis. Where numbero f fl lghte~a~reported, or was obviously incorrect as reported, an estimate was made, basedon the performance of comparable units , and the squadrons combat activity. Where number ofplanes reported on hand differed excessively from normal strength and was also out of line withthe number of flights and action sorties reported, normal complenwnt was substituted. Thesefigures are given for 1944-45 only, as hey were not available on a monthly basis for earliery e a r s .

(b) Losses on”other (nonTaction) flights, and losses on ship or ground:

These figures were obtained from Aircraft Records Section, DCNO(Air), and also cover, on amonthly basis, only squadrons reporting action during the month of the loss. Thus they wouldnot cover losse= negatzve patrols by =f~n=c~s~t~,~ even losses on theground or ship to enemy action if the planes were not assigned to aduring the month.

(c) Number of Carriers in Action; Carrier Complenmnt$

The number of carriers in action was taken from action reports.on the apparent normal number of planes carried at the beginning ofcarriers of each class.

(d) Enemy Aircraft Eestroyed on Ground :

squadron reporting action

Carrier complement is basedthe monthts operations by

In the case of planes destroyed on ground by carrier-based aircraft, the final evaluationsof the carrier task force conunanders were used in lieu of the claims advanced in s q u a d r o naction reports. Squadron claims have been used, however, for grounded planes destroyed by ourland-based aircraf%, in view of the small n!xibers involved, and the general lack of final evalu-a t i o n s . (Squadron claims have been used consistently for enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat,since in few instances have higher comnands reduced these claims).

All statistical data, except the types listed in (a) to (d) above, have come from the basicsources previously listad.

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DEFINITIONS

NUMBER OF PLANES ON HAND Number of airoraft reported assigned to a unit during a month inwhich t h a t u n i t reporiied having action against the enemy (other than ASW). Data have beenchecked for erroneous reporting and adjustments made on basis of normal complement and volumeof operations. Not presented for months prior to January 1944.

CARRIER COMPLEMENT Number of a i rcraf t normal ly carr ied by carrier of the class at begimingof the operations in question.

NUMBER OF CARRIERS IN ACTION Totil number whose aircraft engaged in action against the enemyoth e r t ha n ASW) at any tuse during the period in question.

FLIGHTS, SQUADRONS IN ACTION Number of flights, for all purposes including combat and attack,reported for a calendar month by a squadron reporting action against the enemy (other tian ASW)during the sacm month. Data have been checked for erroneous reporting and failure to reportand adjustsmnts made. Not available on monthly basis prior to January 1944.

ACTION SORTIES Number of planes taking off on a mission which eventuated in an attack on anenemy t a r g e t or in aerial casbat, or both. This basis of tabulation was the number of planesof one squadron taking off on the mission. If any of these planes had acticn, the entire squad-ronsrs planes on the mission were counted as action sorties, including abortive planes, planeswhich reached the target but did not at+~ck, and planes which escorted or patrolled but did notengage in combat. Thus if 16 VP took off as escort, 2 returned early, 2 engaged in combat, and4 strafed, all 16 were counted as action sorties. Likewiee if 8 planes took off for CAP, andonly 2 engaged in combat, all 8 were action sorties. On the other hand, if 8 VF took off forescort, and none engaged in any sort of attack or combat, then none were counted as actions o r t i e s , eve=ough they raached the target , and even though t~scorted bombers attacked thet a r g e t . Likewise, CAP planes missions, none of whose planes engaged in combat were not countedas act ion sor t ies .

LOSSES OF OWN AIRCRAFT L O S S data have c- primrily from two sources: (1) action reports,squadron and ship, covering losses from all causes on missions involving actual combat with theenemy, and (2) loss reports, covering losses from all causes whatsoever.

The losses on action sorties reported herein have been taken primarily from action reports,in which the ex=t~ ~ can be determined more accurately. Two major exceptions tothis practice may be noted : (a) losses on unreported or poorly reported combat missions have beenadded from loss report sources; these may sometimes be inflated, because of a tendency in theearly loss reports to ascribe to “combat” or “enemy aircraft” losses whose caus”e was umknown;(b) a i rcraf t l i s ted in ac t ion repor ts as ser iously damged rather than los t , and la ter indicatedin loss reports to have baen scrapped or jettisoned kecause of this damage; these have been addedas losses on act ion sor t ies .

Losses other than on action sorties have been taken from the loss reports, with some confir-mation from carrier and squadron reports.. The accuracy of loss reports, particularly with respectto cause of loss and date of loss, is frequently debatable, and many adjustnwmts have been madewhere indicated.

LOSSES ON ACTION SORTIES I n c l u d e s all planes counted as action sorties, which failed ta return%0 a friendly base or were destroyed in.landing at base ) PIUS planes re turn ing and later d e s t r o y -ed because of damage sustained during the mission, plus P=S lost on unreported missions whichapparently involved action with tie enemy. Al l los=on action sorties have been classified bycause under the three ca tegor ies Enemy A/A, Enemy A/C, and Operational. Where the exact causewas not given in the action report (planes reported missing) the cause most likely under thecircumstances of loss described was arbitrarily assigned, or if the circumstances were not stated,the cause stated in the loss report was assigned.

Losses on Other Flights These are limited to losses, during each month, of planes assigned tosquadrons which reported engaging in action against the enemy during that month. For thesesquadrons these figures represent all operational losses of airborne planes, on missions notinvolving action against the e n e m y ; they include also planes later stricken because of operation-al damage sustained on such flights.

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Losses on Ship or Ground These figures are also limited to losses, during each month, bysquadrons reporting action during the scum month . For these squadrons they included all losses,regardless of cause , of p lanes not a i rborne a t the tinm of the loss, or at the time the damagewas sus ta ined that ultismtely resulted in the loss of the plane. Principal causes of theselosses includedt St ruck by a i rcraf t landing , tak ing of f or tax i ing , or by automot ive vehic les ;explosions and fires; storms, typhoons; enemy bombing or strafing or suicide attacks on carriers;own gunfire. It should be noted that all losses of grounded aircraft to enemy action are notincluded (some such losses were of air=ft assigned to pools or to squadrons not in actio~nor is the greaber part of the listed losses on ship or ground attributable to enemy action.The carrier losses in this category, however, do include all carrier planes lost in enemy attackso n c a r r i e r s .

It should be noted, in connection with all categories of loss, that the f igures for carr iersrepresent a l l losses in ac t ive carr ier combat opera t ions (excluding s t r ic t ly pat rol and escor toperations~n Pacif ic conbat a r ea s , while the land-based figures represent the bulk of, but notall, the losses of squadrons in active combat areas.— — ——

DAMAGE BY ENEMYA/A AND ENEMYA/C Planes receiving major and minor damage from the causess t a t e d , as reported In squadron action reports only.

OWN PMTES ENGAGING ENEMY AIRCRAFT Number of airborne aircraft firing guns at, or fired at by,ZFborne enemy aircraft. In fact, probably a number of p lanes a re inc luded which do not meetth is def in i t ion , but were in f l ights , or in sections or divisions of flights, of which otherplanes did fire guns or were fired at. Also, reports for many early actions did not specify theactual number of planes engaging in combat by any definition, and it was frequently necessary tomake arbitrary assumptions based on own and enemy losses in the engagement. On the whole, how-e v e r , these figures reflect with fair accuracy the number of aircraft engaging in and/or ex-posed to action with enemy aircraft.

ENEMY AIRCRAFT ENGAGED In general, this figure tends to approximate the number of enemy air-c r a f t observed In formations which were actively engaged in aerial combat. ~ attempt has beenmade to exclude formations or parts of formations which were not actively engaged by the re-porting squadron, but frequently tie action reports were so vague with respect to the numberof enemy planes actually enga(;ed that it was necessary to use the total number of enemy planesobserved in the area, or to adopt an arbitrary figure based on the nunber sho t down.

It should also be noted tkt the figures on enemy planes engaged were compiled on a squadronb a s i s . In engagements involving two or more of our squadrons at one time and place it is there-fore likely that the same enemy formations nay have been reported as engaged by each of thesquadrons. Thus from the viewpoint of our mission as a whole, the number of enemy planes engag-ed i s inf la ted by dupl ica t ion . On the othe= from the viewpoint of the number of individualp lane- to-plane engagexmnts, the figures on ene~ planes enga~ed probably represent an unders ta te-ment.

It should be noted that data on number of enemy planes engaged are inherently the leastaccurate of any data in this report, because of the natural inaccuracy of aerial observation;estimates of the size of enemy formations may vary by 50 percent or more depending on the ob-server and the circumstances.

TYPES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT ENGAGED AND DESTROYED:

BOMBSRS Includes ident i f ied types of s ingle-engine and twin-engine bombers ; a l l unident i f ied~gine a i r c r a f t ; f l y i n g b o a t s ; and for 1942, 1943 and 1945 only, transports. Approximately9@ of the total consists of identified single-engine and twin-engine bombers, though the pro-portion varies from period to period.

FIGETERS (More proper ly ent i t led “Fighters and o ther types”) inc ludes ident i f ied types ofsingle-engine and twin-engine fighters; a l l unident i f ied s ingle-engine a i rcraf t , a l l f loat p lanes ;a l l t ra iners ; and for 1944 only , t ranspor ts . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 90% of the total consists of planesident i f ied as s ingle-engine f ighters , though the proportion may vary from operation to operation.

It may be noted that identification was frequently deficient, many instances having beennoted of Japanese Army planes reported in exclusively Navy theaters, of confusion between dive

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bombers and fip>ters, and between varicus models of single-engine fighters, and twin-enginefighters and bombers.

ENEMY AIRCPAFI’ DESTROYED IN COMBAT Airborne enemy aircraft olaismd destroyed by naval aircraft,In ae r i a l combat o n l y . P l a n e s d e s t r o y e d by own anti-aircraft fire or in suicide crashes are notincluded. Enemy aircraft reported as “probably destroyed” are not included. Squadron claims,as made in ACA-1 or other action reports, are the bas is for these f igures . They thus representthe evaluations only of the squadron intelligence officer, squadron commander, and in some casesthe air group commander. However, rarely was there any further evaluation by higher authorityof squadron claims with respect to airborne enemy aircraft.

In evaluating pilot claims for ACA-1 repor ts squadron inte l l igence off icers were ins t ructedto follow the definitions of “destroyed” established for the command or theater. Subsequent toearly 1944 this was the standard Army-Navy definition that the plane must be seen to crash, dis-integrate in the air, be enveloped in flames, descend on f r iendly te r r i tory , or tha t i t s p i lo tand ent i re crew be seen to bail out. Prior to this time the definitions varied between commands,but the def in i t ions used in the pr inc ipal naval thea ter (SoPac) were a t leas t equal ly s t r ingent .

The degree to which squadron in’=lligence officers and commanders succeeded in eliminatingduplicating and optimistic pilot claims is not known, but it is believed the amount of over-s ta tement i s re la t ively low. Since 93% of all enemy aircraft claimed destroyed by Naval air-craft were claimed by single-seat fighters and the bulk of the remainder were claimed by two-place dive bombers and by lone search planes, the tremendous duplication of gunnere~ claims ex-perienced by air forces operating large formations of heavy bombers with multiple gun poeitionsis largely eliminated. Duplication of claims between fighter planes can be more easily con-t ro l led by careful in ter rogat ion .

Over-optimism has always been difficult to control. During the early part of the war, beforestandard definitions were in force, before ful l - t ime t ra ined Air In te l l igence Off icers were avai l -able to apply them, and before the need for conservative operational intelligence was fullyapprecia ted, action reports may often have overstated enemy losses. Evidence from the Japanesehas tended to indica te tha t in SOSB of the ear ly ac t ions , and even as late as the Rabaul ra idsof early 1944, there was such overstatement.

It must be remembered, however, that the bulk of Naval aer ia l engagements in the Paci f icdid not involve the mass combat of Europe. Even the large-size engagements seldom involvedmore than 30 of our planes against 30 of the enemy~e at any one time within visible range of anyone point. By far the greatest number of engagements involved only 1 to 8 of our planes, or thesame number of the enemy!s. Thus in the main the claims under this heading, off set as they areby the exclusion of planes classified as “probably destroyed”, are belie-d to be near thetruth, with only local exception, and to be as conservative as those of any major airforce.

ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON GROUND In the case of carr ier operat ion, these f igures repreeentt he number of non-airborne enemy aircraft reported by the task force commander ae destroyed onground or water, or on enemy carriers. These figures were normally based largely on photo-graphic assessment, and only planes visibly burned out or obviously unrepairable were includedunless there was o ther pos i t ive evidence to w a r r a n t thei r c lass i f ica t ion as des t royed. Assess-ment was on a field-by-field basis, eliminating duplication of squadron claime. For small-scaleear ly opera t ions , where no report was available from the tack force commander, an estimate wasmade by OP-23-V-3, based on all available squadron and ship action reports, eliminating dupli-ca t ion of c la ims. For land-based opera t ions , in view of the small volume involved, the claimsin action reports were used.

TONS OF BOMBS ON TARGETS Calculated for each mission by taking the number of bombs of each%fpe (plue clustere, torpedoes and mines) expended on targets , multiplying by the nominal weightof each, and rounding the total to the nea=s%=.—Bombe jettisoned are not included, nor bombein abor t ive p lanes , nor bombs hanging up, nor rockets fired. In the case of search planes,par t icular ly PB4Ys on single-plene long-range searches , tonnage dropped is understated by thesefigures, because of the large num~r of miseions wherein less than ½ ton was dropped per mission,the tonnage being rounded down to zero in the figuree. For 1945 this difference is approximately120 tons for PB4Ys, and lese for other typee of VPB. For other types of planes there may be smalldi f ferences in e i ther d i rec t ion, due to &is rounding of tonnages.

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THEATER OF OPERATIONS For operations by land-based Naval and Marine aircraft, the breakdown~Y ~e a t e r o f operations (Tables 4 and 18) is based on the area command under which the oper-ations were conducted. Thus operations by planes based in ~S~cific Area were includedunder that area even thou& they attacked targets me Southwest or Centra l Paci f ic . Theofficial limits of each comnmnd ware used -out , except that actions in the first few monthsof the war, before establishment of the area commands, were distributed on the basis of the com-mands subsequently established.

The method of ass igning car r ie r operations to are- is explained in the text referring toTable 4.

AREA (GEOGRAPHICAL) OF TARGET OR ENGAGE?QWT Each geographical area includes not only the landareas covered by i ts name, but all coasta1 waters . Engagemmts and shipping a t tacks far a t seawere a l located to the nearest area. Most area names are believed self-explanatory, but tiefollowing additional explanations are given:

Hokksido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaR@cyus

FormosaBonins

Western Carolines

Eastern CarolinesSolomons, BismarcksKorea, North ChinaCentral ChinaSouth China

Japan, N. of 40°N.Japan, S. of 40°N., E. of 138°E.Japan, S. of 40° between 133°E. and 138%.Japan, W. of 133°E.All islands in area bounded by 123°E, 24°N., 132%, and 31°N.,

i n c l u d i n g Tanegs, Minami, Daito, Miyako and Sakishima groups.Inc ludes PescadoresIncludes IW O Jima, in addition to main group, plus the sea areas

within about 300 miles of Chichi Jima.West of 150°E., inc lud ing Pslau, Yap, Woleul and intervening sea

a r ea s .East of 150°E., i n c l u d i n g Truk, ponape, Kusaie, Nomoi G r o u p .Includes Nev$ Britain, New Ireland, Emirau and Bismarck Sea.Includes Manchuria end Shantung province.Chekiang and Kiangsu provinces .Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, Hainan Island, Hong Kong.

HIRPOSE OF MISSION OF OWN AIRCRAFT Assigned primary mission of aircraft at time of takeoff,regard 1ess o f l a t er changes. Thus a search mission which finds and attacks shipping is classi-fied as a search mission, a fighter sweep diverted ta defense of force is still an attack mission.Note tha t in th is repor t only ac t ion sor t ies - planes in actual action against the enemy - areclassified by purpose of mission, and~rge volume of negative patrols and searches, as wellas the small volume of abortive offensive aircraft, are not included in the data. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n sby purpose of mission differed in the 1944 machine tabulations from those for other years, andadditional detail is thus provided for 1944, not available for other years.

BASE OF OWN AIRCPA~ The base is that from which the planes operated on the mission in question.us carrier alrcraf% temporarily operating from land bases are classified as land-based.

PLANE MODEL OF OWN AIRCRAFT Because of lack of detail in many action reports and limitationsin the IBM system it has not been possible to distinguish between modifications or differentmanufacturers of the same basic aircraft. Thus “F4U” in the tables msy include F4U and FG air-c r a f t o f all m o d i f i c a t i o n s , “F6Fn will i n c l u d e the -3, -5, -3N a n d -5N, lt’fBF1~ or !tTB~ ~Y in-“clude modifications of either or both. However, the F4F and the FM-2 have been distinguishedthroughout.

SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS There are two definitions for this item, one for 1944, and one forother years, because of the differing methods used in preparing IBM machine cards:

1942, 1943, 1945 Each plane attacking targets is counted only once per mission, regardlessof how many targets it attacked successively, with bombs, rockets or guns.

1944 Each plane attacking targets is counted once for each major type of target attackedw= bombs, rockets or guns. This permits one plane to be counted as making two or moreattacks on one mission. The number of “sor t ies a t tacking targets” as reported on this basisfor 1944, is believed on the average to be about 15% greater than if recorded on the 1945 basis.

Note that “sor t ies a t tacking targets” di f fers f rom “act ion sor t ies” in a l l years , by excludingplanes taking off which did not individually attack targets.

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ROCKETS ON TARGETS Number of aircraft rockets (of all sizes) expended on targets by planesa ttacking targets, as defined above.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES For 1944 these figures represent expenditures on enemy targete, byplanes at tacking targets, and expenditures in aerial combat are excluded~ ~9~1945the f igures represent total expendi ture on targete and in aerial combat. Because of a generalfailure to report rounds expended prior to late 1943, ammunition expenditures for 1942 and early1943 are not given herein.

TARGET TYFE CLASSIFICATION Two moderately diverse systems of classifying the types of targetsa ttacked have been used in compi l ing these s ta t i s t ics , one for 1944, the other for the remainderof the war. These differences, combined with the varying methods of counting sorties attackingt a r g e t s , r e q u i r e smne discuss ion as to thei r ef fect on the s ta t is t ics .

For 1944, as has been noted, planes attacking targets were counted once for each major typeof target attacked on the same mission. In car ry ing out th is tabula t ing procedu=e exactnumber of planes xmaking primary or secondary attacks on a tar~t was allocated to that precisetype of target. Thus if from one 8 plane fighter mission 6 planes bombed a destroyer, 2 bombeda large tanker , and 4 in addi t ion s t rafed smal l f i sh ing craf t , the statistics on the 1944 basiswould show 6, 2 and 4 planes attacking unarmotied warships, large merchant vessels, and smallmerchant vessels, respectively, and the ordnance expended would be distributed accordingly.

The simplified tabulating system adopted for 1945, and carried back to 1942 and 1943, pro-vided for counting only once per mission each plane attacking targete, and for assigning onlyone ta rge t per squadron ~m=i~e target classification assigned was that receivi~e~a=e~t of attac~ ~e example above, if included in 1945 statistics, would show8 s o r t i e s , and all ordnance, expended on unarmored warships.

The 1944 syetem undoubtedly provided much greater statistical precision, but involved aninordinate amount of labor in tabulation. There is some question whether, in the end, theprecision was much greater than in the 1945 system, because: (a) the number of missions split-t i n g t a r g e t s , whi le substant ia l , is not a large proportion of the total, and (b) over a numberof missions the errors may well cancel, e.g. a target type which is secondary on one splitmission becomes primary on another split mission.

A rough estimate of the relative statistical effects of the two systems is as follows:the 1944 system, by giving full weig,~t as attack sorties to secondary strafing and rocket runson the types of targets normally attacked on such runs over-emphasized the we&ght of attack onsuch targets; the 1945 system, ignoring those types of targets which seldom receive the majorweight of attack, under-emphasizes the amount of effort expended on them. The principal typeof target affected is undoubtedly small shipping under attack by carrier aircraft; there isprobably a major effect in the case of minor military targets but this is emall when comparedto the to ta l weight of a t tack on mi l i tary targets ; there is probably a minor effect on the"harbor areas” and “ l a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ” t a r g e t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . on the whole , i t i s not bel ievedthat these fac tors unduly dist~rt the overali p ic ture of the propor t ion of thesive expended against the various classes of enemy targets.

Major d i f ferences in classification of specific items between 1944 and thebe briefly noted as follows:

(1)

(2)

The 1945 classification “Airfields” includes parked aircraft, runways,o t h e r a i r f i e l d bt’ildin~s, and a l l a i r f ie ld defenses . The 1944 f igures

Naval air offen-

other years may

hangars andf o r a i r f i e l d s

p r o b a b l y e x c l u d e most,-b~t not all attacks on airfield buildings,-”but include all theother ta rget sub- types l i s ted . (The 1944 attacks on “airfield runwaye” undoubtedly in-c lude SO- attacks on buildings and guns also). Airfield buildings not included underairfields for 1944 are covered under “Other Military Targets”.

“wrbor Areas” for 1945 includes waterfront A/A defenses. For 1944 sonm of these maybe included in “Other Military Targets”.

COMPLETIHTESS OR ACCURACY OF DATA

1. Completeness and Accuracy In Oeneral

Accuracy of Machine Tabulation: All general tables, and special tables of aerial combat anda n t i - a i r c r a f t d a t a (Tables 1 - 29 inclusive) have been cross-checked ta assure complete internalconsistency within each table and between tables, except as speci f ica l ly noted in individual cases .

All tables containing breakdowns by type of target, by geographical area, and by type ofordnance, have been checked to insure that no significant discrepancies are present. In tie caseof these tables the complications of machine tabulation have made a certain number of minor dis-crepancies inevitable; these were considered not to warrant expenditure of the inordinate mountof time required to correct them, since none can have any effect on conclusions to be drawn fromthe data .

For data on night operations no master check data were available. Spot checks were made,and the totals and breakdowns appear to be generally reliable.

Accuracy of Compilation: Human error, when thousands of coding cards are prepared from actionrepor ts of variable and confused pa t te rns by persomel of clerical grade, is inevitable. Themos t thorough prepexation of definitions and instructions, and oonstant supervision, do noteliminate the need for constant exercise of judgmmt by such personnel, when reducing to simplestatistics an operation as complex as an action by Naval aircraft bombing, rocketing and straf-ing a nmltiplici~ of targets and engaging in aerial combat. To this inherent difficul~ thelack of uniform report forms during the first half of the warof repor ts in the las t ha l f , cont r ibuted .

, and the lack of uniform qualityHowever, every possible source of error has been

either (a) anticipated and provided against, (b) checked and corrected, (c) checked and the dataeliminated as not susceptible ta accura te compi la t ion, or (d) checked and presented with foot-notes and reservations as expressed hereafter. It is the opin ion of those respons ib le for th i scompi la t ion tha t the data conta in no s igni f icant b iases resul t ing f rom the s ta t i s t ica l compi-lation methods used, which are not fully noted in connection with the items affected.

Accuracy of Reporting: It is axiomatic that observations made in the heat of fast-moving airact ion are subJeCt ~ a large margin of error. It is also well known to those who have partici-pated in carr ier opera t ions , and in land-based operations under the front-line conditions whichhave prevailed in such areas as the Solomons and Okinawa, that the obstacles in the way of fullin ter rogat ion of p i lo ts , eva lua t ion o} the data received , and preparation of thorough actionreports, have been extreme. The data herein suffer much more from the latter factor than fromthe basic difficul~ of inaccurate observat iondepend upon aerial observation.

, s ince the bulk of the s ta t i s t ica l i tems do not

Accuracy of observation enters into only two major items in these tables; enemy aircraftengaged and enemy aircraft destroyed in combat, and the second of these has generally been thesubject of the most careful interrogation and evaluation prior to reporting. The inabi l i ty ofthe intelligence officer to perform his duties at an optimum quality level may affect a largernumber of items, particularly thoee concerning attacks on targetst the number of planes actuallyat tacking each target , and tie number and type ordnance actually expended on each. The effectof these deficiencies on the statistics herein cannot be ~asured; items wherein it was beliewdto be large have been eliminated from the tabulations , and in the remaining items it is believedto be moderate, subject to a few specific exceptions described under individual items.

Completeness of Reporting: So far as is known, a 11 carrier air action against the enemy duringthe entire war is completely comred h e r e i n . It is ~d that 98% or more of every category

of action by land-based planes is cowred for the period from the latter months of 1943 to theend of the war. For the period from 7 December 1941 to mid-1943 it is known that a substantialamount of action by land-based planes has not been covered by the reports available, and is thusnot included. The amount excluded is not believed to exceed 10% of the total reported for thisper iod. Pract ica l ly a l l of th is def ic iency was in the Solomons a r ea .

For 1942 and 1943 particularly, and to a limited extent in later years, data were not alwaysavailable to indicate whether escort fighters on a given mission strafed or were fired at byenemyA/A. Where no informationwae available it was assumed Mat escort fighters did not meetthe def in i t ion for ac t ion sor t ies .~ Thus the number of fi@ter action sorties, and fighter sor-

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t i e s a t t a c k i n g t a r g e t s , may be understated for the early part of tie w a r . It should be notedthat the number of fi~hter sor t ies a t tacking targets (and offensive f ighter ac t ion sor t ies) ,as reported herein will in all years be less than the number of fighters over target (a figurenot compiled), by the number of escort fighters not actually attacking or engaging the enemy.The difference became progressively smaller in 1944 and 1945, however, as the increased ratioof fi@ters to bombers, the emphasis on strafing of parked aircraft and A/A guns, and the in-stallation of bomb racks and rocket launchers on VF, resulted in attacks by a larger proportionof the f ighters reaching a target area .

2. Accuracy and Completeness with Respect to Specific Items

(Iteme not mntioned have no speci f ic individual def ic iencies , but are subject to the gener-a l qual i f ica t ions above) .

Planes on Hand, and Flights: Original data have been arbitrarily edited to remove obviouserrorf3; s ee discus~ Defini t ions . Items are subject to inaccuracy in reporting, but nopar t icular b ias i s suspected.

Act ion Sor t ies : Subject to incomplete reporting (for land-based units only), and undercountingof fighters over target, as noted above.

Own Aircraft Losses: Losses to enemy aircraft are probably overstated by up to 25~for 1942-43 ,becauee of the l ack of an adequa~skem for reportin~ cause of loss accurate ly . Operationallosses are probably understated, but to a lesser amount, the difference being chargeable tolosses on ground. This item is not affected by incompleteness of action reports, because of thecheck available in the independent strike reports.

Own Aircraft Engaging in Air Combat: Probably slightly understated for 1942-43, because off a i l u r e o f action reports to specify exact number engaging, and slightly overstated thereafterbecause of inolusion of entire flight in some cases where only a part actially engaged .

Enemy Aircraft Engaged: .3verstated throughout. See discussion under Definitions.

Enemy Aircraft Destroyed: See discussion under Definitions. Also, slight understatement for1942-43 (land-based only~ because of incomplete reporting.

Bomb Tonnage on Targets: Believed slightly understated for -1942-43, because of incomplete re-porting (land-based only), and failure to report full bomb load in some instances (carrier-based and land-based). Affected somewhat by rounding bomb tonnage per mission to nearest ton;see discussion under Definitions.

No. of Squadrons in Action~ Affected in 1942-43 by failure of some land-based squadrons to re-p o r t a c t i o n .

Sor t ies At tacking TargetsS Affected by incomplete reporting, by inadequate reports (especiallyVP, see above), and @d ifference between 1944 and 1942-43-45 coding systems (see discussionunder Definitions). Note that, even for 1944, and increasingly for other years, the total numberof sortie s a t tacking targets .is greater than the number attacking either with bombs, or withrockets , o r s t r a f i n g , considered separa te ly , because inc luded in the figure are sorties whichattaclmd with only one of these three types of attack, as well as sorties combining two or threemethods.

Rocket Expenditures: Subject to some under-reporting, par t icular ly by CV f ighter squadrons inl a t e 1944 and early 1945, and to considerable carelessness in the reports of some squadrons.

Ammunition Expenditures: Not shown for period prior to late 1943 because of almost total failureto repor t thi s i t e m . Believed partially incomplete for late 1943 and first half of 1944, forland-based VSB and VTB operating in the Solomons. A tendency to report expenditures on ana r b i t r a r y b a s i s , such as 1000 rounds per plane per mission, has been observed in the case ofsonm f ighter squadrons , and it is certain that for a large proportion of the action reports theammunition expenditure figures were the roughest of estimates. To what extent this may biasthe overall figures or figures for any single plane model, i t i s imposs ib le to say , but i t i sdoubted that the error is in excess of 25‰ low or high.

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Own Planes Damaged by A/A or Enemy A,’C: These figures are probably considerably understated?or many 1942-43 act ions, and sllghtly understated for 1944-45, because of failure to reportall instances of minor damage, and damage inflicted by one of these agents to planes lost fromanother cause.

Purpose of Mission~ Subject to personnel error in coding. The only probable general bias wouldbe t o favor an off ensive classification at the expense of reconnaissance, but the extent of th iswould be small. It should be noted that defensive and reconnaissance missions are included inthese tables only if they actually engaf:e or attack the e n e m y , and thus are considerably under-stated from the point of view of total missions flown.

Type of Target : Subjec t to e r r o r s o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i ns u l t ing from the two coding systems used (see discussionof these factors are approximately as follows :

coding, and to systematic errors re-under Eefinitione). The net effects

1944, An overs ta tement of a t tack act iv i ty in compar ison wi th other years , but a re la t ivelyaccur~distribution of a t tacks , bombs and rockets by target type. Ammunition, usually arbitra-rily distributed by the coding clerk between the several targets on a mission, is subject toconsiderable er ror , but the d i rec t ion of the b ias , i f there i s any genera l b ias , cannot be es t i -mate d.

1942-43-45: A general bias in favor of large assigned primary targets attacked in forceby the majority of a mission's planes, at the expense of small secondary targets attacked byone or two of the mission's planes or on second runs over target. The net effect is probably tounderstate the amount of attacks, bombs, rockets and ammunition expended on small merchantv e s s e l s , on land transportation targets, and on harbor areas, and to overstate expenditures onlarge vessels , a i r f i e l d s , a n d m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s .

Type of Bomb: This item was subject to coding errors , which have been largely detected andcorrected. However, instances of inadequate reporting may also have resulted in slight errorsas to size and type of bomb, and number expended on target, but not suff ic ient ly to af fec t thegenera l va l id i ty of the f igures .

Models of Enemy Aircraft Destroyed: Subject to a major degree to mis-identification by pilots,and presented only as a matter of general interest, and as reliable only with respect to themajor type c lass i f ica t ions ( f ighters , bombers , f loat p lanes , e tc . ) .

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PART A. GENERAL DATA ON FLIGHTS, ACTIONSORTIES , BOMB TONNAGE DROPPED, ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED,

AND OWN AIRCRAFT LossES

The tables in this section of the report (Tables 1-18) provide a broad overall picture ofNaval and Marine air operations as a whole. There are three general subdivisions in thiss e c t i o n ;

1.

2 .

3 .

I n

General summaries of both carrier and land-based air operations, including breakdcmsbetween carrier an~l=~=en Navy an~ =ine, by plane model, by theater,and by months. (Tables 1-7).

General data on carrier operations~i~~o-ns,

, including breakdowns b:y plane model and by typeby areas, and by months, plus special tabular analyses of

carr ier opera t ing ra t ios dur ing var ious per iods . (Tables 8-15).

General data on land-based air operations, including data broken dom between Navy andMm ~=e model, by =a~er, and by months. (Tables 16-18).

general the tables will be allowed to tell their own story, but for each table or zrou~of re la ted tables a narra t ive conmntary wi l l ca l l a t tent ion to s ignif icant i tems or relat~on-ships, and note any special qualifications applying to the data -presen~d.

1 . General Summaries of Carrier and Land-Based Operations

NOTES TO TABLES 1 AND 2

Tables 1 and 2 assemble, for the entire war, all tie basic general s ta t is t ics of Naval andMarina carrier and land-based oombat operations included in this report. Table 1 breaks downthe data between land-ba8ed and carrier operations, and between Navy and Marine aviation; Table2 consolidates the data by plane model without reference to base or arm of service.

A further breakdown of the carrier figures by type of carrier will be found in Table 8.

Table 1 shows the overall combat effort exerted by Naval Aviations 284,073 sorties engagingin attacks or aerial combat, or both, and 102,917 tons of ~mbs, torpedoes and mines expended ont a r g e t s . Of these to+~ls the carr ier forces held a s l ight edge in number of ac t ion sor t ies ,whi le land-based avia t ion (with a lesser proportion of fighters to bombers) held a slight advan-tage in bomb tonnage.

5@ of the combat effort, about 165,000 sorties out of 284,000, was by planes attached toNavy units. From carriers, 9 8 ‰ was by Naval planes; from land bases 84$was by Marine aircraft.Of the Navy’s share of the land-based action sorties, about 4% were flown by VPB, the remainderby carrier squadrons temporarily based ashore in emergency or when opportunities for carrier em-ploymnt were lacking, and by a few land-based Naval support squadrons employed in 1943 andearly 1944.

The overall loss rate for Navy and Marine aircraft on action sorties was 1.5 percent. Ofthe losses on ac t ion sor t ies , 47 percent resulted from enemy antiaircraft, 21 percent from com-bat with enemy aircraft and 32 percent from operational causes. The loss rate on action sortiesby carr ier a i rcraf t was 2 .0 percent (49% to antiaircraft, 16% to enemy a i rcraf t , and 35$ o p e r -a t ional causes) . The ac t ion loss ra te for land-based a i rcraf t was only 1 .0 percent of sor t ies ;this difference reflects the greater employment of carrier aircraft against heavily defendedadvanced tarEets, while a major employment of land-based planes was in clean-up operationsagainst by-passed enemy bases or secondary targets.

o-rational losses of Naval and Marine aircraft on fli~hts not involvin~ ac t ion (but made-=.- .—by squadrons having otherable against an estimatedal loss rate of about 0.5this non-action flying by

700380 0- 46- 2

action during the same month) were 3,045 in number; these are charge-600,000 non-action flights by these squadrons, indicating an op%ration-percent on the patrol and search missions which made up the bulk ofcombat squadrons. 1313 planes attached to %e same squadrons were

(Cont. on p. 15)

- 1 3 -

TABLE 1. CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY OF NAVY AND MARINECARRIER AND LAND-BASED AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS FOR ENTIRE WAR.

By Model of Aircraft Employed

ENEMY AIRCRAFTTOTALiCTIONSORTIES——

147,094

143,357mqzm6,48812,9251,102

18,8086,048

35,564182

3,737~

1462

496

136,979

114,127m

1,6461,074

2540,8722,023

177,1518,390

52169

21,373~1,269450

5,283332

3,2903,6242,6361,371

506142

1,479

2844048413741

TONS OFBOMBS

OliTARGETS—

CkTN LOSSESON SHIPOR

GROUND

974.

936m7671228835

22714

%o00

.—

339—

135

5260

3600

162200

202

0201963

72224393

;00000

— . .1313——

BASIS, SERVICE,PLANE MODEL

ONOTHJZRLIGHTS

1988

1932

1822834918465

3391

+801

1057

724

27340

104131

5623503

333

529552

20853447332

0T00000

3045

DESTROYEDIN COMRAT~ Fighters

CARRIER-BASED, TOTAL 1428 452 1001— — —

1577 436 979-5m Z%m93 18 4862 13 7517 47 31268 18 21840 43 48

348 27 23111 25 8

1997 4487—— 45,659

Navy TotalF6FF4U, FGFMF4FSB2C, SBWSBDTBF, TBMTBD

1938 4328mm??m100 260194 228190 11213 3031 7522 501 5

%%o 00 00 0

44,972~

954148

610,9942,524

24,245134

Marine TotalF4U, FGF6FF4FTBM

-%4+2 0 00 0 15 0 0

687~

250

304

L4ND-RASED, TOTAL 759

533m46

175600010500

225

1953000

1253067

1T01000

——

2048

1484mm

47281

42206

180600

562

141941007

18169

101

400000

554 455.

270m

275142401

110101

344—

259

3110

5633

1412000

-%4741

151812511

1700100

57,258

Marine TotalF4U, FGF6FF4FF2ASBDSB2C, SB’iVSB2UTBF, TBMPBJPvPB4YPBY

386

540

9611

5318100

47,269m

28400

18,1471,086

55,4378,002

201

l?a~ TotalF6F

168 185 9,796227

40

2,185104

F4UF4F, FMSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMpB4yPvPBYPBMpB2Y

53

172

16602815131

14561209

285

3530

2,7o11,4131,912

94920497

Service UnknownF4U

0700000

0700000

193

F6FW, type unknownSBDTBFVPB, type unknown

014865043

GRAND TOTAL 1982 907 1345 102,917284,073 2756 6535

- 1 4 -

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS, FOR ENTIRE WAR

PL4NE MODEL

~ ~~t~lF(37F4U, FGFMF4FF2AType Unknown

VSB TotalSBDSB2C-SBWSB2U

VTB TotalTBF, TBMTBD

VPB TotalPB4YPvPB ,JPBYPBlhPB2YType Unknown

—. -. .—

GRAND TOTAL

By Type and Model of Aircraft(Land and Carrier, Navy and Marine Combined)

TOTALLCTIONSORTIES

146,599m,m64,05112,9252,628

25440

73,867W21,163

17

46,820m

182

16,787~2,6888,3901,380

50614241

— — - .

284,073

———

— . .CWN LOSSES

2X ACTION .SORTIESTo Enemy Opera-~ tional

988m349622400

425*.

2711

433m11

136m~g

18151310

.—-.

66427018913

178140

98m181

72n25

73m60

36300

— — -

694

230754900

334

2223

268m

8

49m12125110

-—1:)82 907 1345

.—-—.—

—

ON3THIiRFLIGHTS

1972-Tzzi692283112

00

424m199

1

417WG

1

232m3923503s20

—-

3045.—

ON SHIPOR

GROUNE

716

164716800

184m940

260m14

1537242

43930

——

1313

— .

ENEMY AIRCRA~—DESTROYEDIN COMRAT~ Fighters

2542m478194418

61

E130

&1

146m

800670

6099

1662228487

40

143m306

E5

213m1209

1010

2756 6535

TONS OFBOMBS

ONTARGETS

22,292~15,621

14860

14

35,131-12,184

5

32,871_

134

12,623~1,9148,002

9502049743

—.

102,917

lost to enemy action or in accidents while not in flight. More detailed analyses of loss rates,for tie years 1944 and 1945 only, are given in Tables 9 and 16 of this report.

Over ten enemy aircraft were shot down by Naval and Marine aircraft for each loss in aircombat. The great bulk of the destruction of enam!! aircraft in aerial combat is credited to theF6F, which shot down 5,163 enemy planes (56% of the total for Naval aviation) in exchange for270 air combat losses, or over 19 enemy planes destroyed per loss in air combat. The F4U wassecond, with 2,140 enemy planes to its credit, the F4F, FM, and PB4Y following next in order with915, 422 and 306 respectively. only 355 enemy planes were shot down by all other types of navalaircraft combined. It may be noted that all ty~s of bombers combined shot down 650 enemy plane~,and lost 243 in combat, a superiority cf over 2½ to 1, evidencing super ior equipnwnt, tactics, andgunnery t ra in ing . bss than 1/5 of one percent of all naval banber sor t ies a t tacking or engagingthe enemy were shot down by enemy aircraft. (Most of these were in the early stages cf the war,as Table 21 will indicate).

For carrying the maximum weight of explosives against the enemy the TBF (and TBM) aircraftwas the Navyts workhorse . F ly ing cnly 16 percent of the total action sorties, it delivered 32percent of the total tonnage (plus 29~ of all rockets expended on targets; see Table 50). Divebombers accounted for 34% of total bomb tonnage, but in a 58% greater number of action sortiesthan the VTB f lew. F i g h t e r s , f l y i n g o v e r 5Q% of all act ion sor t ies , de l ivered only 22% of totalbomb tomage; on ly 3@ of tk.is (or 16?{ of total carrier bomb tonnage) was dropped by carrier-basedfichters, w h i c h f l e w n e a r l y 6@ of all carrier action sor t ies . Fighters, however, fired over138,000 rockets at targets, two-thirds of the Navy total , and fired offensively over 50,000,000rounds of armnunition, which was also over two-thirds of the total for Naval avia t ion .

Patrol bombers, flyin~ @ of the Navyts a c t i o n s o r t i e s , dropped 12% of the bomb tonnage. Halfof these sorties and nearly two-thirds of &is tonnage is credited to Marine PBJ attack bombers.The Navy VPB, being primarily search planes, seldom carried or used their maximum bomb loads, andengaged in action against the enemy on only a small fracticn of their missions.

- 1 5 -

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF MONTHLY OPERATIONS AND RESULTSFOR ALL CARRIER-BASED AND ALL LAND-BASED NAVAL

AND MARINE AIRCRAFT

MONTH

1$11+1-December

lg42J8nuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMqJuneJulyAuguetSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1~43-JonwryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDoc&mber

lg4WmuuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuIyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAU#w?.t

1941-42 TOTAL1943 TOTAL1944 TOTAL1945 TOTAL

GRAMU TOTAL

FLIGHTS,3QUADIK)NS[N ACTIOI

*

************

************

17,04513,1118,603

13,9063, 4g6

~, 93224,1426,E05

?2 ,4792 ,911ll,oq11,005

25,74720,89628,31241,24830,19719,79324,089

17,726**

Mo, 522208,008

XU3!l

* No data available.

CA

ACTION

SORTIES

0

0243142

6332374

6s:

28;608

0

78200

i07

290196933

2,989528

2,7934,7721, 7fq5,2T0

902g, 766

12,5491,716

13,16610, 94g4,3972,062

g, 6375,y59

12,13216,0529,0535,635g,J6g

_Ux!2,6735,127

6g,12g70,166

147,094

.IER-BASQNS OFBOMBS ONTARGETS

0

7:51

13;100

0Ml

:ggo

23000400

116

3;;962lgg

go1,4L

6081., 77g

3432,4354,266

473b,20T3,3391,517

333

2,3081,2463,1625,0333,5251,8282,969

&!x.l_707

1,72121,633

?UzK45,659

)mEMY PLAmDESTROYEDAir Groun

0

3;

(ii

o86

9:3;

114000000

4;19146

5216211194

79?112

3?31,189272111

2434323491,04927821

L

0

0120021

140

3:0

21300

00000007

15

:;32

106154

3921521

215g4

5;;6624g13230

4742313369304122

4;;610—

yt4 254300 1243301 2gol2499 2675

6484 5854

.16-

FLIGHTS ,IQUADRONSIN ACTIOll

*

************

************

14,37814,17520,228U3,gqg19,20516,74/315,2g7lg,i3133;:; ;;~

25,39525,019

20,37720,41722,g6327,01230,44534,85328,761

17.207**

232,626

~

!3!@x

LAND-BASEDlTONS OF

ACTION BOM6S Oi

70 5

13 00

: 00 06 3

100 204 1

M5?: 74%48606

M{

334 g3

?96

4897

30 261$

211159

u;! 226

4?344

3,17 1,6751,135 4271,643 5991,602 6~92,835 1,181 2,924 1 # 379

3s293 g6g4,203 1,146; ;;~; 2, g37

5,638 ;:$;3,591 1,0275,45&l 1,9557,326 2,8476,195 2, 2g27,270 2, go27,0gi3 2,5114,457 2,133

ENEMY PLANESDESTROYEDAir Ground

12 0

1 01 01 00 00 c1

21 00 .

52’ 0111 117777 ;19

04i 015 0

128 0186109 2;108 9

3701492014M21449

19

$

152726

15626113828

1

205

:80

102

3;*

1223

20213015105

2211 1

476941 6;728 127662 124

2807 328

NOTES TO TABLE 3

This table presents condensed monthly data for carrier and land-based operations. Inp a r a l l e l c o l u m n s i t i l l u s t r a t e s :

(a) the slow growth of air activity from 1942 to the peak in April 1945;

(b) the great preponderance of land-based operations during the rebuilding of the carrierforce in 1943;

(c) the rapid rise of the carrier force during 1944 to the point where its major operationsfar exceeded the more regular monthly volume of effort of the land-based air forces.

Revealed in the table are the peak performances of Naval aviation:

( a )

(b)

( c )

(d)

( e )

( f )

The

the 41,248 flights made from carriers in cmnbat in April 1945, the 16,052 action sor-ties flown that month, and tie 5,033 tons of bombs dropped on target (40,870 rocketsand about 6,500,000 rounds of ammunition were expended by carrier planes during t~same month);

the tremendous destruction of enemy planes by the carrier forces in June 1944 (1,012),October 1944 (1,851), and April 1945 (1,353);

the seven other months in which carrier aircraft destro~d more than 500 planes permonth (9,250 enemy planes were destroyed by carrier aircraft in their 10 peak months,and 10,319 in the last 15 months of the war alone);

the exceptional feat of increased performance by the small South Facific air force forthe New Georgia operation of July 1943;

the relatively high destruction of enemy planes by the small forces engaged in thebrief carr ier oprations o f 1942 , and the land-based Solomons operations of lateAugust to November 1942;

the air-combat peaks by land-based aircraft over Rabaul in January-February 1944,and at Okinawa in April-June 1945.

table also shows the superior record of carrier-based planes over land-based planes indestroying enemy aircraft: over twice as many in air combat, 18 times as many on the ground and4 times as many in total. The ruling factor here was the mobility of the carrier forces, theirability to penetrate deep into enemy territory, concentrating. overwhelming force in surprisestrokes against large sectors of the enemyfs secondary a i r defenses . Land-based aircraft, onthe other hand, were seldom within reach of main concentrations of enemy air strength, exceptfor a tirm at Rabaul, where the heavy defenses precluded successful attack on grounded aircre.ft.Thus the land-based Marine and Nawal air forcee, whi le ef fect ive agains t ene~ ai rborne a i r -craft both in a defensive capacity and as bomber escorts, could not be the main agent of theirwholesa le des t ruct ion . It is doubted that any other airforce has been as effective in destroy-ing grounded enemy aircraft (or grounded and airborne enemy aircraft combined) as the Navalcarrier force; in the last year of the war our carr ier a i rcraf t des t royed 4 ,622 grounded enemyaircraf t , and 4 ,944 a i rborne a i rcraf t , for a to ta l of 9 ,566.

- 1 7 -

TABLE 4.CARRIER-BASED

COMBAT AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS,AND LAND-BASED, BY THEATRE AND BY YEAR.

THEATRE,YEAR

CARRIE&BASED

Central Pacificl+l_J2194319441945

Smth Pacific1942194319U

SOuthwest Pacific1912194419115

Wrth Pacific

Atl~ti~

S~utheast Asie

=FDAASED

Central Pacific1941-12194319441945

South ?acific194219~31244 (to 6/30)

South!?est Pacific1941-42;::

;1545

Atkntic

North Pacific-—

TOTAL

Central PacificSouth PacificSvdthwe5t PacificXor%h PacificAtlFJlticSo.~thezst Asi?.

ACTIONS0RTIES

147,094

%#

41;95661,447

++%915?o~

*35,496b3

26,3148,719

~

u

u

136,979

w*1

16525,15EiM,W8

=

15:73720,904

52,862 40

lM20,38332,321

~

jQ——

284,073

152,44341,20488,358

79)1,161

117

—-

TONS OFBOMBSONTARGETSm

2L!$

1,43313,29819,261

26874

10, 65;

8,1412,337

L.z4

2— . . .57,258

q

9, 0;;6,327

l&cJJ512

7,0457,529

1048,316

IZ, 926

. — .

102,917

49,60215,69037,10s

30117739

—--

ENEMY AIRCRAFTD.EsTROYD

In On–

6+ q

1363 2;

569 30

533 33

4449 32612264 l~q2526 2670

14;

5 2;

-—--—

——-- — .OWN IASSES

ON ACTION SORTIES

m

!@ U5 --3E-

—— -.-—

1982 907 1345

1140 303 727224 416 18456g 162 41213 16 1334 10 9300

—-

ENTAGES OF TOTons Enemy~f A/cBombs Dest.100.0~

* ~

3.1 ?.029.1 16.542.2 36,1

1.4 U~ 1.9

. l.)i

. 0.2

; ~;.—0;17.8 32:35.1 5.8

* 00- A

Q 0 6=-

01 0 4A -

&~ &* 1.00.1 0.5

lp.g 2.811.1 19.1

~ 64.00.9 m

12.3 31.713.1 lg.Cl

4& ~* 0.10.2 (?.0

14.5 6.031.5 !5.2

*_- Q

~- O&

100.0 100.0

48.2 49.815.2 15.336.1 33.60.3 *0.2 0.5* ~.3

——TALSKActionLosses-—~

22.435.2

15.6

&410.425.415.6

7.111.0

2J— .—100.0

51*P19.527.01.01.20.1

* Less than l/20 of one psrcent.

- 1 8 -

NOTES TO TABLE 4

This table measures the contributions of the Naval carrier and land-based air forces to thecampaigns in the various theaters of war. Land-based operations are allocated to theaters onthe basis of the command under which the individual squadron operated, regardless of the locationof the target attacked. Thus operations by South Pacific aircraft against the Bismarck A r c h i -pelago (in the SoWesPac area) are classified under SoPac (and in fact they were normally insupport of SOPSC object ives) ; in few other cases were attacks made over theater boundaries.

In the case of carr ier operat ions , the fact that the fast carriers remained under CinCPOAcommand in all operations, though actually directly supporting oampaigns in other areas, hasnecess i ta ted adopt ing a geographical bas is of c lass i f ica t ion. Thus all carrier operations areallocated to areas in accordance with (a) the theater in which the target area was located, or(b) the theatar whose current campaign the carriers were primarily supporting.

Under these definitions all carrier operations against New Guinea, Halmahera, Morotai andthe Philippines, the Coral Sea Battle, and the Formosa-Ryukyus-China Sea operations of October1944 and January 1945 have been classified as Southwest Pacific. The Palau and Truk oprationsof March and April, though partly subsidiary to the Hollandia strikes, have been classified asCentra l Pacif ic ; the carr ier s t r ikes on Rabaul and Kavieng as South Pacif ic . I t i s bel ievedthat a l l o ther carr ier opera t ions fe l l c lear ly wi thin one theater .

The overall picture presented by this table shows that slightly over half of Naval aircombat operations, in terms of sorties and enemy planes destroyed, were conducted in the CentralFacific t h e a t e r , about one-third in the Southwest Pacific, s l ight ly less than one-s ix th in theSouth, P a c i f i c , and less than one percent in other theaters. (Addi t ion of ASWactivi~ wouldof course substant ia l ly a l ter the balance in favor of the At lant ic) .

These figures should dispel any impression that naval aviation’s primary war contributionwas in the South Pacifio theater . Less than 2% of the total carrier action was in this theater,though most of this minor total consisted of critical actions involving all our carriers avail-able a t the t ime. Of the to ta l land-based ac t ion, only slightly over one quarter was carriedon by aircraft under SOPSC command (an additional 15% was action by Marine aircraft in theSolomons-Bismsrcks area after command passed to SoWesPac).

The carrier force was primarily a Central Pacific force, the spearhead of the mainadvance agains t Japan. Near ly three-four ths of i t s ac t ion was in th is theater . Yet i t s con-t r ibut ion to the Southwest Paci f ic thea ter , accounting for nearly a quarter of total actions o r t i e s , was vi ta l , and was the action which in fact culminated the military defeat of Japanas an air-sea power.

The bulk of the carrier contribution to the Southwest Pacific campaign occurred in the fivemonths from September 1944 to January 1945. In these f ive months pract ica l ly al? of the fastc a r r i e r o f f e n s i v e , and the majority of the CVE effor t , was employed against Southwest Pacifictargets. In these five months over 4500 enemy aircraft were destroyed by the carrier forces inthe campaigns suppor t ing SoWesPac operations; this represents nearly three-eighths of the totalenemy planes destroyed by carrier forces during the war in all theaters. This contribution(involving also a wholesale destruction of shipping in the Philippines-Formosa-Chine Sea area,and the destruction of the bulk of the remsinin~ Jap battle fleet) assured the capture of thePhilippines by Southwest Pacific Forces.

The contribution of Naval and Marine land-based aircraft to the Southwest Pacific campaignhas not been fully recognized. Leaving aside the 22,000 attack sorties flown against targetsin the Bismarcks and Solomons after control of the Solomons air force passed to SoWesPac, N a v a land Marine planes flew some 30,000 sorties in the Southwest Pacific area. The bulk of these26,000 were attacks by Marine aircraft on targets in the Philippines. Marine fighters werebased at Leyte from late November 1944, and took part in assuring the conquest of that islandand defending it from Jap suicide attackers and reinforcing sea convoys. These f ighters la terassisted in the recapture of the Central and Southern Philippines. Marine dive bombers wentashore at Lingayen in January 1945 and provided air support to Army ground forces in Luzonunt i l the i r la ter d ivers ion to ass is t the reconquest of the Cent ra l Phi l ippines and Mindanao.Navy patrol bombers extended their searches to the Philippines and began their single-planeattacks on shipping as early as August 1944, and continued them until capture of Philippinesbases and the end of Jap shipping movermnte in the area enabled them to extend their searchesand attacks to Formosa, the China Coast, Indo-China and Malaya, protecting all enemy paths ofapproach to the Philippines. For the year 1945 well over half the offensive operations of Navalland-based air were carried on in the forward sectors of the Southwest Pacific theater.

- 19 -

TABLE 5. NUMBER OF SQUADRONS IN ACTION, AND ACTION SORTIES FLOWN, MONTHLY,

MONTH

1942-FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneAugustOctoberNovember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMayJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

F4F, FM*No. of Ac-Sqdns. tion

in Sor-Action ties

33

24326

212

111

2525

89

1315

6

181118161412

2

4924

8391

181143367

382086

21144

23841443

517748

15351273

191

11651132180324734741409

23

938183

4,4288,479

14,028

By Model of Aircraft

A. CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT

F4U, FGNo. of Ac-Sqdns . tionin Sor-

Action ties

1

11

29

1711108

1111

2

61

131652

227419161021520

20121C47

009

9,573

9,582

F6FNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

336

157

131511167

18191219201713

1320192022181818

10885

3781382208

13862166907

2607402

4538580411225546497224531600

44822465385356523583142534731789

02,161

33,50326,722

62,386

——S?3D

No. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

5 1476 932 64 1836 23$6 4224 825 198

2 24

1 72 881 504 2947 6424 105

8 5508 10273 3144 7681 192 6362 154

1,3701,2103,468

0

6,(!48

SB2C, SBWNo. Of AC-Sqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

11

1122357689

117

57

109879

10

17968

152197145558275

11312698316

290321961008108

703500

12311515921288

1162554

0247

11,6876,874

18,808

* F4F through October 1943, FM thereafter.#TBD through June 1942, TBFand TBM thereafter.

NOTE : No carrier action was reported for the months not listed in the table.Composite squadrons are counted once for each type of plane included.

TBD, TBF, TN+#No. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

22

23324

1

337

147

172013217

26281132351719

3127383635292022

4725

6644786243

16

9461240768147

6821298407

129220619383144278

31822507936163

2156121029714496305419931821817

3651,326

16,03318,518

36,242

(Notes to this table are on p.23)

- 2 0 -

MONTH

1$)41.Dec@mber

1942 -Merch*June#AugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

194142 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRANTI TOTAL

F4F, FMNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tierin Sor-

Action ties

1

123763

2311143

1

49

657

25947817540

8410

8793

81167

11

125

1,064432

c2E

1,524

TABLE 5. Continued

B. LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, OF CARRIER TYPES

F4U, FGNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

346655796

109

14131213142021232324

1917181921191915

118113156358414430384821467

115117501108115915941332290142873563472448752932

2365311827753463243127112423547

03,261

31,37619,833

54,470

F6FNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tiOnin Sor-

Action ties

4343

314411122322

22346463

16972

100261

25414940240535823123444423

27326

68206245164232274116

5

0602

2,2321,310

4,144

SBDNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tierin Sor-

Action ties

1 222 316 2255 3117 3594 284

3 2845 3575 1574 8~2 1284 2709 14305 3748 5588 6469 107710 1232

6 9157 132211 304611 251610 242110 15268 21129 232410 19979 19209 866

10 370

7 3848 39997 43507 30178 29126 17976 1012

1,2326,601

21,33517,471

46;639

SB2C, SBWNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

TBF TBMNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tion

in Sor-Action ties

245554

50281379768556321

000

2,355

2,355

1

1131

124426645465

545531111233

22422343

6

2249727

2629

159152203218

1125315393353646751

427661

1439943600484

282118

16197

27012916413237427021749

1564,3704,4471,605

10,578

* 1 F2A squadron flew 4 action sorties.# 1 F2A squadron flew 21 action sorties and one SB2U squadron 17 action sorties.11~: NO action by these types of planes was reported for the months not listed above.

Compositi squadrons are counted once for each type of plane included.

- 2 1 -

TABLE 5, Continued

MONTH

1941-December

1942-JanuaryFebruaryMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1941-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

SRAND TOTAL

PBYNo. of Ac-Sqdns. tionLn Sor-

Action ties

4

3229234312

144252543369

696356356363

2431

1

21

1366

284108

10

3

21614578

251017355463

14564

12562

10763547394735839

331941

1

10925695758

1,380

;%

Sqdns. tionin Sor-1

Action tieel

111

21111

2

12i’87862

251

64211

22

44

73100133874714

00

44462

506

PATROL AIRCRAFT

PB2YNo. of Ac-Sqdqs. tionin Sor-

Action ties

221111

1

11111

171856

215

19

1524282

00

9151

142—

PB4Ym’FSqdns. tionin Sor-

Action ties

111

1323566

567586684586

87

111214141615

18234

4251764519396

10011063

116828797

1044684

105145

52171261259408356425174

0395

1,1392,106

3,640

PViix-o~Sqdns. tionin Sor-

LCtiOn ties..—

2332535

765564566774

56754434

38145

12614454

9612325616930215281

21296

105105141

5371

11274

1781061315

0228

1,838622

2,688

PBJo. ofN

Sqdns. Actionin Sor-

&ction ties

1 1291 1422 1531 1413 1824 2334 3334 3226 6556 685

6 5157 8455 6987 10207 10237 5267 6286 160

00

2,9755,415

8,390

NOTE : No action by VPB aircraft was reported for March and April 1942.

- 2 2 -

NOTES TO TABLE 5

Among the items worthy of note in this table are the following:

( a )

(b)

(c)

(d)

( e )

( f )

(g]

(h)

( i )

( j )

(k)

(1)

(m)

( n )

(o)

The predominance of dive bombers, and the relatively small number of f ighter sor t ies ,in the carrier actions of 1942, resulting from the relatively low fighter complementsof the time.

The t ransfer f rom the F4F to tie F6F in the rebuilt carrier force of 1943, the gradualtransfer from SBD to SB2C in 1944, and the decrease in SB2C use in late 1944 and 1945as Complements changed to meet the kamikaze threat.

The slow emergence of ‘&e FM as an offensive aircraft, beginning in June 1944, after6 months of primarily defensive use.

The sudden rise of the F4U as a major carrier aircraft in early 1945.

The predominance of tie TBF as the primary carrier bomber from 1944 on.

The shi f t , in land-based a i rcraf t , f rom the F4F to the F4U, and the later addition ofthe F6F. (Note that land-based F4F action sorties are probabl-- ser ious ly unders ta ted ,because of inadequate reports of most of their offensive missions; the same applies, toa lesser extent, to land-based F4Us for 1943).

The deoline and subsequent rise of land-based F6F combat activi~. The decline re-sulted from the abolition of land-based Navy support squadrons in early 1944 (and theincreasing problem of supplying a larger number of carriers with F6FS). The later re-turn of the F6Fs was as Marine land-based night fighters.

The decline in use of the land-based F4U in 1945, as carrier demands for fighters in-creased.

The persistence of the land-based SBD in combat mtil nearly the end of the war.

The withdrawal of the TBM from general land-based combat duty after the peak of theSolomons campaign, and its restriction to a few Marine squadrons engaged principallyin local anti-submarine patrol and special support duties, including supply dropping.

The persistence of the PBY in combat (largely night attacks on shipping and by-passedJaps) unt i l ear ly in 1945.

The sudden expansion of PBM combat activity in March 1945 aftar 14 months of largelynegat ive pat ro ls .

The considerable volm of offensive activity by PB4Y patrols and anti-shipping missionsin early 1945.

The diversion of PVs from offensive to more routine missions in 1945.

The sizeable offensive volume flown by the relatively small force of Marine PBJs.

- 2 3 -

NOTES TO TABLES 6 AND 7

These tables classify, by assigned mission of own aircraft at time of takeoff, all sortienwhich actually attacked or engaged the enemy. It should be noted that sorties which did notac tual ly engage the ene~ are not included; thus the bulk of defensive patrols, search and re-connaissance missions, and a re la t ively smal l number of abor t ive offens ive sor t ies , a re not re-flected herein. The purpose of the table is to show the origins of the missions that resultedin ac t ion .

It has been necessary to make this presentation in two tables because of differences be-tween the classification methods employed for 1944 and for other years. Table 6 presents year-ly data by plane type, with a little less detail for 1944 because of inability to make the 1944class i f ica t ions f i t those avai lable for o ther years . Table 7 presents the expanded detailedclass i f ica t ion avai lable for 1944 only .

The fo l lowing explanatory mater ia l will assist in an appreciation of the data in Table 6 :

(a) Ground Support: The considerable increase in the volum of direct air-ground supportmissions flown by carrier aircraft from less than 15% of total action sorties in 1942-43, toover 2% of a greatly increased total in 1945, deserves notice. In the case of land-based ~and VSB-VTB the increase was from 2% in 1942 to over 3@ in 1945. This ref lects the increasingperfection of air-ground teamwork between Naval aviation and Army-~rine ground forces, - thefunction of direct air support having always been recognized as a primary mission of Naval andMarine avhation. The record of Naval aviation s destruction of such primary enemy strategictargets as aircraft and shipping indicates that this large volume of air-ground support wassuppl ied wi th no loss of s t ra tegic ef fec t iveness .

In fact the number of action sorties on missions classified in the Table as “Air-GroundSupport" does not reflect the full weight of offensive put forth by Naval aviation, and parti-cularly by the carrier forces, on behalf of ground forces. Carrier offensive missions wereclassified as air-ground support only when flown under the control of air support commanders.A number of pre-invasion offensive missions were flown against beach defenses, gun positions,and other ground targets, which were not controlled by air support commands, and are thus classi-fied as strike or sweep missions.

Also, the bulk of the carrier “VP ac t ion sor t ies l i s ted under “Defensive pat ro ls Over Tar-get or Other Forces" involved atticka by patrolling VP on qnemy ground forces, under the direotionof air support commanders, rather than merely defensive engagements with enemy aircraft. It wasa normal practice for fighter combat patrols over invasion beachheads to carry bombs and rockets,and to report to the air support commander for assignment of targets on completion of the patrolperiod. It is estimated that a total of some 40-45,000 car r ie r ac t ion sor t ies , and some 20-25,000 land-based action sorties, were flown in effective direct support of ground forces.

(b) Search or Reconnaissance Missions, A noteworthy trend was the increasing displacementof’ carrier bombers by carrier VF on search missions. In part the large volume of carrier VFmissions in this category in 1944 and 1945 reflects a vast increase in number of photographicmissions, includinK escort fighters which often strafed guns and other targets. However, therewas also an increased use of VF for sector search in place of VSB and VTB.

It should be noted that the action engaged in by most search action sorties was attack ontargets of opportuni~, rather than combat with enemy aircraft. Only 425 carrier-based searchand reconnaissance action sorties out of 4,672, and 789 land-based (mostly VPB) out of 8,431,actually engaged enemy aircraft in combat (See Table 23). Some of those which engaged in com-bat, and all of the remainder, attacked land or ship targets in addition to carrying out theirreconnaissance funct ions .

(c) Defensive Patrols: The increasing predominance, as the war advanced, of action bydefens ive pat r ols over Invasion forces afloat and ashore, as agains t ac t ion res t r ic ted to de-fense of base, i s c lear ly i l lus t ra ted by f igures for both carr ier and land-based ~. In 1942our fizhters were devoting most of their defensive energies to warding off attacks on their ownbases . By 1945 the bulk of the defense could be diverted to keeping the enemy from attackingother land ins ta l la t ions or f r iendly forces .

The relative lack of defensive action by land-based ~ in 1944 deserves notice. During

(Cont. on next page)

- 2 4 -

TABLE 6. ACTION SORTIES, BY PURPOSE OF MISSIONBy Plane Type, Carrier-Based and Land-Based., by Years.

BASE ,PLANE TYPE,

YEAR

1$)42194319441945

CARRIER VSB-VTB:

1942194319441945

LAND-BASED VF:

1941-4219h319441945

LAND-BASED VSB.VTB:

l’jb2194319441945

PATROL BOMBERS

lyul~2194319441945

ACT 10~OFFENSIVE

Strike AiF

Sweep Support

396 1091,547 257

32, 241*26,371 6,512

1,274 2872,396 342

29,499*15,126 9,590

411 03,050 56

32,848*14)40&3 4,4go

1,16510,215 3%

25,016*11,459 9,372

27 0334 0

4,513*5,850 64

&%i%F-OR REC-CONNAIS-SANCE

6

96Z2,388

128

72390

6;93194

164125719530

69484

2,4232,8l8

BY PURPOSE OF MISSIONDEFENSIVE PATROLSCarrier Target,

Force, Base, or otherother Local Forces

427406

2,528

3121

90

652a15

67

00

3:

:

5

0125

4,633*6,758

00

84P27

13290

1472,066

070

10

02Ei

24* 3

*1944 data are not separsble between these types Of Offens ive or defens ive miss ions .

ORUN-KNOWN

0

9?217

156

t33169

617

12256

42404730

1333

12574

TOTAL

93fli2,34037,94044,774

1,7352, 7g7Jl,l&3?5,392

l,ot394,29534,0482l,171

1,40510,97125,78221,431

109g83

7,0g5g, 714

(Cont. from preceding page)

this year the enemy was unable to bring any appreciable offensive effort to bear against thebases ( largely in the Solomons, Marshalls, Marianaa and Palau) gar r i soned by Naval a i r c r a f t . T h e1945 increase reflects the use of Marine ~ at Okinawa.

Another in teres t ing var ia t ion is the high rate of action by carrier bombers on defensivepatrola in 1944. These were largely anti-submarine patrols by VTB over landing force areas;after completion of patrols the planes bombed nearby shore targets. In 1945 this practice gener-a l ly ceased, or the duties were taken over by fighters.

(d) General: The predominance of offensive missions amofig sorties involving action with thee n e m y , fo~~pes of planea other than VPB, is clearly s h o w n . Even in the case of carrier VF,near ly 8% of their missions which eventuated in action were offensive. For single-engine bombers,and land-baaed fighters, of fens ive miss ions resul ted in a l l but 3% to 1~ of the i r ac t ion agains tthe enemy. In the oaae of patrol bmnbers, over one-third of their action was on eearch miss ions ;if the primarily offensive Marine PBJs were deducted, Nell over half of their action would be onsearch !nisaione.

- 2 5 -

TABLE 7. ACTION SORTIES, BY DETAILED PURPOSEAND OBJECTIVE OF MISSION, 1944 ONLY

By Type of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based..—. .——.— —

PURPOSE OF MISSION

BONBING OR ROCKET ATTACK:Lznd Objective —

Ship ObjectiveLand ,and/or Ship

SWEEP, OR STRAFING ATTACK:Lend ObjectiveShip ObjectiveLancl and/or Ship

RECONNAISSANCE WITH BOMBS

RECONNAISSANCE WITHOUT BOYJ3S

DEFENSIVE STANDING PATROLS#

INTERCEPTION 01’ ATTACK

MINE.LAYING*

MIsCELLANIDUS

UNKNOWN

l’OTALS ——

x

VF

21,0613,5943,916

3,073

5ii

630

339

3,969

664

31

61

L

37,940

.IER&

VSB

9,/3512,5672,266

20264

325

45

43

0

0

a

0

15,155

ACTION SOa

VTB

10,5442,2341,947

30~2

346

4g

793

6

53

15

7

16,033

RTIES, BY BASE AND

VF

27,955627359

2,2591,116

532

651

2~o

139

a

0

go

42

34,048

VSB

20,253440100

100

530

2

0

0

0

0

2

~

TYPELAND-BAS

Vm

4,025193

0

400

179

g

0

0

27

0

11

4,447

— . .AIRCRWI

EDPBJPv

3,912SI13

100

726

35

16

0

14

3

12

4,813

PB4Y

923CI1

000

EK?y

150

3

0

32

4

2

~_

— .FlyingBoats

322

:;

000

6g1

6

5

0

2g

22

g—

~# Includes Cm, A S P , and ~trols over target .* Some addi t iona l minelaying attacks may have been classified as bombing ottacks on shiD

ob~ectives.NOTE: This de ta i led breakdown of -purpose of mission is. not available for yeers other than lqbA.

It should be noted that the targets ultimately attacked may have differed from the or~gin,alo b j e c t i v e s listed in the table.

Table 7 provides a more detailed analysis, for 1944 only, of the missione flown by Naval air-craf t which resul ted in ac t ion. Of interes t are

(a) The high proportions of carrier bombersf ighters agains t land targets .

(b) The relatively small number of fighterspatrols in warding off enemy attacks. Naval airi n the a i r .

the following items;

sent out against shipping targets, and of carrier

sent up especially to reinforce the standingdefense was largely by standing patrols already

(c) The relatively small volume of anti-shipping attacks by land-based VF, VSBand VTB (gener-ally based out of reach of major enemy shipping). A partial exoeption is noted for VF, which flewmany s t raf ing miss ions agains t smll craft in the Solomons area.

(d) The contrast between the employments of the various types of patrol bombers. The MarinePBJs were used predmninantly as formation bombers and night hecklers, rather tian as single searchplanes, while the Pvs were used extensively for small strikes by 2 to 6 planes against minor landtargets in the Solomons area, at Nauru, in the Southwest Paci f ic , and in the Kuriles. Both t:ypeswere used for search, but principally in negative sectors. PB4Ys, on the other hand, were usedmainly for sector search. The flying boats were used for a variety of purposes, and the 1944 datareflect such diverse missions as night anti-shipping eearches by PBY Black Cats, PBY missionsagainst barges and coastal targets in the Solomons in cooperation with PT boats, sector searchesby PBMs and PB2Ys, night heckler missions over enemy bases by PBYs,by PB2Ys .

and bombing strikes on Wake

- 2 6 -

2. CARRIER OPERATIONS, GENERAL DATA

TABLE 8. SUMMARY OF CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS FOR ENTIRE WAR,By Type of Carrier, by Plane Model, and by Service (Navy-Marine)

TYPE CARRIERPLANE MODEL,SERVICE—.—. —

W TotalF6FF4U (Navy)F4U (Marine)F4FSBZC, SEWSBDTBF, TBb!TBD

CVL, TotalF6FTBF, TBld

CVE, TotalFMF6F (Navy)F6F (Marine)F4U (Marine)F4FSBDTBF, TBM (Navy)TBF, TBM (Marine)

GRAND TOTAL

— .

TOTALACTIONSORT IES—.—

94,917~-56,4882,650

96818,8085,852

18,254182

21,478m6,379

30,699V5,426

146443136196

10,931496

147,094

OWIJ LOSSESON ACTION SORTIESTo Eneqy Opera-‘~ tional

1,028

934011

268 4019911

200

72

200

442460

775

370

18164418432125

%4

E2003020

719

482122

21843

1478

131

40

151

180095

440

1,428 452 1,001

~CYNmRFLIW’TS

1,148-5W

1824242

18461

1271

364

85

476

418574

1271

1,988

ON;HIP

610m7637208833

10914

179

57

185

480122

610

974

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

10053

1851330131

3,317m 2601591093075385

410 882m m

4

259

48065150

6

288

51003060

1,997 4,487

TONS OFBOMBS

ON!ARGETS

31,755~

954277

210,9942,46713,461

134

6,323~4,831

7,58114~

1,00925814

575,953

304

45,659

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, all planes are Navy.

‘fha table indicates that some 65% of a l l ac t ion sor t ies were f lown from ~Vs, 15% from CVLS,and 2QZfrom CVES. CVLS accounted for 2% Of all enemy aircraft destroyed in combat, CVBs forless &an 9$, while CVS were creditid with Over 7%.

Attention is invited to the low CVE plane losses to enemy aircraft in comparison with then~bers destroyed in combat: 20 losses as against 547 destroyed. The CVE F6F record Of 99enemy planes destroyed against 2 air combat losses, and the FM record of 422:13, far exceed thefast carrier records, and only 2 CVE bombers are credited as lost in air combat.

-27-

TYP13 CARRIER,PLANE MODEL,

SERVICE

CV TOTALF6FF4U , Na~F4U, llarineSB2C, SBWSBDTBF, TBM

CVL TOTALF6FTBF, TBM

CVE TOTALFMF6F, NavyF6F, MarineF4u, MarineS13DTBF, TBk, NayTBM, Marine

GRAND TOTAL

TABLE 9. LOSSES, LOSS RATES, AND OPERATIONAL DATA,CARRIER-BASED NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT. PACIFIC ONLY. 1944-1945 ONLY

By Carrier Type, Plane Model, and Service (Navy-Marine)

AIR- FLIGHTSCRAFT SQUAD-ON RONS INHAND ACTION

*

I15430 209,1507369 108.6671384 22:266539 7,554

2764 30,506633 7,786

2741 32,371

3892 69,2742-&ilT ~1046 17,099

I5914 109 0752’m-3&i2670 14,72724 513

118 2,23654 903

2078 37,77072 1,614

25236 387,499

ACTIONSORTIES

88,335’40,1786,4892,650

18,5613,33117,126

20,679,~6,062

-1

29,744m4,748

146443137

10,867496

138,758

OWN LOSOPERATIONALAc- Ontion OtherSor- F1’tsties

619 1013m x48 18221 42

216 1828 17

126 109

125 325m m39 78

138 450T m18 390 80 54 3

41 1140 1

882 1788

SES

ONSHIP

540m7637883

107

175m55

179

47012

600

894

TOTAL,Inclu-dingEnemyAction

3366m41715676646

543

862

240

963m13710109

2926

5191

OWN LOSS~Per Per100 100Action OtherSor- Fl'tsties

0.70 0.84m m0.74 1.150.79 0.861.16 1.520.24 0.380.74 0.71

0.60 0.67m m0.64 0.71

0.46 0.57m m0.38 0.39

0 2.180 0.28

2.92 0.390.38 0.42

0 0.09

0.64 0.72

RATES -smP-Per100

Planes Per

Month

3.5m5.56.93.20.53.9

4.5n5.3

z7.0@

0.8@

2.9@

3.5

I5mr- FLIGHTSPer Per Per100 Plane Ac-Planes P8r tionPer Menth Sor-

21.819.530.128.927.87.3

19.8

13.6 2.414.7 m16.1 3.414.0 2.911.0 1.612.3 2.311.8 1.9

22.1 17.8 3.3m m m22.9 16.3 2.8

16.3 18.4 3.7T’?Z m m20.4 22.0 3.1

@ @ 3.58.5 18.9 5.0@ @ 6.6

14.1 18.2 3.5@ @! 3.3

1

* In terms of plane months ; sum of aircraft reportsd on hand each month by squadrons in action.fiero no sui-q-was reported for ai~craft on hand , authorized complement was used. Amonthly average strength in action can be Obtained by dividing by 20.

@ Re.tio not calculated; less than 100 planes on hand.

NOTE: All planes are l?a~ unless o therwise speci f ied .—

-28-

NOTES TO TABLE 9

T h i s t a b l e is of pr imary in teres t as a source of overal l carr ier a ircraf t loss rates incombat operations for tie last 20 months of the war - the months of fu l l -scale , regular carr iero p e r a t i o n s . I n c l u d e d a r e a l l f l i g h t s , action sorties and losses for each carrier, for the wholeof each month that the carrier reported any air action against the enemy.

Many interesting comparisons between loss rates are invited by the tablet

( a )

(b)

( c )

(d)

( e )

Operational loss rates, both on action sorties and on other flights, are highest on CVS,lowes t on CVES. This is true for all types of planes combined,and also for the F6F andTBF separately; the F6F and TBF were used on all three types of carrier. When thesetwo types alone are considered, the margin of the CVL over the CV is very slight andthe superiority of the CVX more pronounced .

Operational loss rates are almost invariably lower for sorties involving action againstthe enemy than for other flights. This may reflect only the erroneous attribution toenemy action of mission planes actually lost for operational causes; this factor ismore likely to apply to fast carriers than to CVES.

The SBD was the shfest plane , operationally, follcwed in order by the F6F and TBF.F6F operat ional 1 0SS rates were far lower than those for the FM and F4U. The SB2Cranked a poor last operationally.

NO par t icular pattarn is discernible in lOSS ra tes for non-airborne a i rcraf t aboardship , o ther than &at CVLS had the highest losses, and CVES the lowest . These areinfluenced heavily by the accidents of kamikaze attack (which affected the CVES least)and typhoons.

In total losses to all causes , inc luding enemy ac t ion , CVES again fared best, partlybecause of their lower rate of losses to enemy action, and their lower proportion ofa c t i o n s o r t i e s t o t o t a l f l i g h t s . The relatimsly low operational loss rates of the F6Fand TBF help them to maintain their superiority over the F4U and SB2C in total losses.SBD and FM totil losses remain the lowest, however.

From the table it will W seen that the average carrier aircraft in combat operations madeabout 15 flights per month, about 5 or 6 of which resulted in action against the enemy. ForCVES and CVLS these figures would read 18 and 5, for CVS 14 and 6. These averages, however,include months of very light operations; figures for peak months are given in Tables 12 and 13.In general, fighters made more flights and had less action sorties per month than the overallaverage, while bombers had more action in a smiler number of flights. The highest average ofaction sorties per plane per month, however, was reported for CW F6Fs (7.1) which also had thehighest average flights per monti, showing the heavy reliance placed upon the SANG&MON classcarriers during amphibious operations; SB2CS were next with 6.7.

700360 0- 46- S -29-

TABLE 10. SUNM4RY OF CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS, MONTHLY

A. LARGE CARRIERS (ESSEX ClaSs and other CVS)

MONTH

1941-December

1942-FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneAu~stOctoberNovember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilHayJuneJulyAufyetSeptemberOotoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryPsbruarytirchApri1MayJuneJulyAugust

1941-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

CVsINAc-TION—

#

33123322

21121465

6656478689

107

811101098

1011

FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION

*

********

********

10,3145,9385,6426,0442,2209,474

11,9234,32212,26912,2908,4467,416

12,76812,04615,00419,63014,2637,78317,85213,506

*

96:298112,852

209,150

— .

ACTIONSORTIES

#

243142

6332374681287494

78207

270128763

2,286471

1,9523,1?,51,4153,747

8155,4926,3201,0368,7797,2763,8301,551

5,7843,8657,2807,7954,6231,3356,8853,440

2,5594,023k7,328L1,007

94,917

. .ON ACTION SORTIES

%%%- ~=

0 1

3 62 00 01 2120 416 231 209 2

0 00 10 03 01 07 012 165 3

9 216 618 221 48 075 3148 1021 351 10113 5773 923 0

82 835 3584 3171 1138 510 4129 433 4

42 11428 20476 134482 102

0

900

11166

192

00012

12211

7139

211

98343

29722918

4634614222154718

6337

334285

1028 370 719

5N-OTHERFL'TS

0

6453

251455

311649

2717

232019151123301521644038

618889772622

24883

6768

319694

1148

7X-SHIP

0

200

37111

150

00000022

13030

1172

1556278

54488989110971

664

133407

610

8NEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYNDIN COMBAT

Bombers Figh-t ers

#

2310

243365483

1140003

836

9186

212

16595

271962913

444573

290410

1021

197107500524

#

1000

4236234225

00000

268235

2512547311

3537511

21155518946

75332206455190172923

178143

1,6691,327

1,328 3,317

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

#

77511

1391001816074

2300

10955

298767183

6271,008

5431,377

3231,7303,068

3553,3322,5901,349

263

1,581915

2,0102,8161,817452

2,2811,200

6831,43516,56513,072

51,755

#Na action r e p o r t e d ; loss reported maybe from unreported action, or may be an erroneousr e p o r t .

* NO data available.

- 3 0 -

MONTH

1943-AugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryHarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryIkirchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

CVLsINAc-TION

12352

666‘738738866

55666467

GRAND TOTAL

* No data available.

NOTES TO TABLE 10

TABLE 10.Continued

B. SIL4LL CARRIERS (CVLS, INDEPENDENCE Class)

SQUAD-R0NS INACTION

*****

4,5883,0742,2483,9371,2765,9384,519

8435,2735,2092,6412,133

2,6802,5774,1325,1203,7071,6084,4813,290

41:67927,595

69,274

ACTIONSORTIES

2068

17048457

7231,136

3451,276

872,0541,559

1351,7291,177

567309

921487

2,0152,2771,349

3391,447

747

79911,0979,582

21,478

—OWN LOSSES

~ ACTION SORTIES

~

0 04 06 13 101 0

3 32 04 111 10 0

22 138 41 013 316 109 25 0

16 05 525 113 58 01 020 34 0

14 1194 3792 14

00240

45231

158

1:979

77

1865171

67352

200 62 131

High points in the 3 pages of this table are:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

m-OTHERFL'TS

o95

196

15107

155

21135

11381016

21211917137

4714

39166159

364

m-SHIP

00040

121002302

672

35

142

1728

1421

1:60

179

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

05684

11315110

6310

19121202

74

296710022

23266121

008

171

176

42300

165280

115116345

265035

125290

1815

26558298

410 882

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

72837

16015

18723464

28420

46853734

38221916867

261110599796500163656327

2472,6643,412

6,323

The peak CV flight performance of April 1945, when 10 CVS averaged 1963 flights pership for the month.

The peak CV combat performance of September 1944, when 8 CVS, during 11 or 12 strikedays per ship, flew an awrage of 1,534 flights and 1,097 action sorties per ship, andplaced an average of 416 tons of bombs on target per CV, with a loss of only 16 planesper ship, a record not equalled subsequently, but approached in July 1944.

The peak CV records for planes destroyed in combat per month: 518 by 8 CVS in June 1944,751 by 9 CVS in Ootober 1 9 4 4 , and 745 by 10 in April 1945.

The peak CVL perfornmnce record of April 1945, when 6 CVLS averaged 853 flights, 380a c t i o n s o r t i e s , 753 roclmta and 133 tons of bombs per CVL for the month, with 7 planelosses per CVL.

(Cont. on next page)

-31-

TABLN 10. Continued

c. ESCORT CARRIERS (All Classes)

MONTH

1942-November

1943-MarchMayAugustNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFwbruaryI&mchAprilJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1942-43 Total1944 Total1945 Total

—GRAND TOTAL

CVEsINAC-TION

3

f

g

1

5828

11114

16186

18111520201743

FLIGHTS,SQUAD-ONS INACTION

*

*****

2,1434,099

7133,9255,5207,7001,6407,9377,4121,456

10,2996,2739,176

16,49812,22710,402l,756

930

*42,54567,561

11O,1O6

ACTIONSORTIES

114

#86#

2154

11852127

2471,2202,670

5452,6582,495

202

1,9321,6072,8375,9803,0813,961

13643

41910,70319,577

30,699

CWN LOSSBSON ACTION SORTIBS

i%%- $=

5

00200

0100

188

148

380

10131239161411

787

106

0

10200

0000400072

20020000

3134

5

07010

3202

14608

460

133

11149700

138157

——200 20 151

im-OTHERFL'TS

11

021

100

9141

1435302

23488

94244144421643

24184268

476

mSHIP

2

00020

70039013

3 71

22302

19361100

461

120

185

.—

BNEUY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMRAT

Bombers Fighters

6

g

f

0

0001

26050

9210

2314

748134

7134118

3

g

~

0

0010

25031

10935

6802

380300

3174111

259 288

—

TONS OF

OliTARGETS

24

f

#350

56222

111723766184

493530

3

466221553

1,4211,2081,213

320

632,4045,114

7,581

* No data avai lable .# NO action reported; losses reported may be from unreported action or may be erroneous reports.

(Cont. from preceding page)

(e) AISO during April, the 192 enemy planes destroyed in combat bya c t i o n . Other peak CVL performances were in June 1944, when 8and in October 1944, when 8 CVLs destroyed 237 of the enemy.

airdraft of the 6 CVLS i nCVLs deatropd 228 planes,

(f) CVE peak performance in April 1945, when 20 CVES averaged 825 flights, 299 action Eorties,71 tons of bombs and 1,335 rockata per ship for the month, and shot down 112 enemy planeswith only 2 air combat losses.

(g) The CVE air combat record of Ootober 1944 , when 201 enemy planes were shot down against7 losses to enemy aircraft.

-32-

NOTES TO TABLES 11, 12 AND 13

These three tables provide analyses of some aspects ofmonths or per iods , durti~ tie rna.ior pert of the Pacific war

carr ier operat ions for success ive(early actions and Atlantic oper-

a t ions excluded) . Percentages and averages have been calculated, to show trends in performancewith respect tog

(a)

(b)

( c )

The

R e l a t i v e VQIUUEI Of f l ights , ac t ion sor t ies , and ordnance on target, credited to eachtype of carr ier and type of a i rcraf t .

Average bomb and rocket load delivered to target by each type of aircraft and each typeo f c a r r i e r .

Flights and action sorties flown per plane of complemnt, for each type of aircraft andeach type of carr ier .

data will be useful to show, among other items :

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Most of

The composition and employment of the combat carrier forces during various periods.

The physical capabilities of the f’orce and its components during varicus types ofopera t ions , and for periods of various lengths.

The extent to which the offensive potentialities of the force or any of its compo-nents were less than fully utilized during various periods.

The relative parts played by various components of the force in providing the airef for t necessary for the opera t ion.

the informat ion in these tables i s of technical ra ther than ceneral interest . andno detailed analysis will be made, but the following will be crf general interest$

,

( a )

(b)

( c )

(d)

( e )

( f )

The increased utilization of carrier VF for bombing and rocket a t tacks , par t icular lyCVL and CVE fighters, which during some periods averaged as much as a quarter ton ofbombs per F6F attack sortie, and 3 or 4 rockets per a t tack sor t ie .

The average loading of over 5 rockets (plus over 1000 pounds of bombs) per attack sortiecarried by CVE TBMe in the IW O J ima and Okinawa opera t ions .

The general tendency for CVL and CVE ordnance loadings per sortie to equal or exceed thoseof CV planes of the same types, particularly in 1945 operations, despite the smaller sizeof the carr ier .

The general reliance on CVL and CVE planes for the bulk of the patrols not involvinga c t i o n , and on CVE for the major weight of offensive activity. This pract ice was par t i -ally reversed during the Okinawa operations, when the offensive capabilities of theCVLS were for tie first time fully utilized on a scale comparable with the CVs, the CVEstook over a major share of the offensive, and the CVS increased their re la t ive vol~o f p a t r o l a c t i v i t y .

The parallel tendency of requiring CVLs (and the CVEs in months of major amphibiousoperations) to fly a higher number of flights per plane per month than the CVs, and alower number of action sorties per plane. Even in the Okinawa operations this tendencywas not eradicat-e Table 12 for April 1945, when CVLS and CVES not only made 26f l ights per p lane agains t the CVSI 20 , but flew far more action sorties as well).

The record performances in flighte per plane per month,

F6F : 37.1 from CVES, 30.3 from CVLS, and 24.2 from CVs, in April 1945.

TBM: 28.7 frm CVES in July 1944, 20.0 from CVs in October 1944,21.3 from CVLs in July 1944.

-33-

TABLE 11. ANALYSIS OF CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS DATA, FORSUCCESSIVE PERIODS IN 1944-45 (PAIFIC ONLY)

By TYPE Carrier and by Model Aircraft

PEECENT OF PERIOD TOTAL AVERAGUSTons RocketsAc- Tons

tion of Rock-Tllts Sor- Bombs ets

ties

per perAttack AttackSortie Sortie

January - Xey 1944

15,3724,7902,6101,4622,402

0

2,107926

77lm

A

~202

1,119714

1,s430

:1

0

3;

~00

76;0

00

000

13FIIOD WTALCL F@

SBD

5Q214,M06,5663,0256,226

161

10,3154,!308

2,2913,152

{J&__

0% %%0:43 0.000.49 0.000.77 0.320.00 0.00

SB2CTBF , TBNF4tJ

CVL F6F—TBF, TBM

0.04 0.000.77 0.00

CVE F@’— FM

SBDTBF,TBM

0.00 0.000.04 0.00o.2g 0.000.67 0.73349 i 384

June - &yst 1944

PERIOD TOTAL o gllg~ F6F %12, 1

SBD 1,220SB2C 6,610

22,294+, ;:;

4,2043,047

0

2,178l,lM

l,w61,1411,134

%2o

2,;$2,060

0

2379;

32;

JisL

54281,487

00

1,8700

00

0

A&_

~ ~0.07 0.220.47 0.000.54 0.00o.6g 0.610.00 0.00

TBF, TBMF4U

5 ;099176

CVL F6F— TBF,TBM

6,g743 ,L24

0.11 0.000.71 0.00

CVE F@— FM

4,2204 ,Mo

A&L

0.17 0.000.00 0.050.52 1.78TBF . l’BM

September - October 1944

PERIOD TOTAl~ F67?

SB2CTBM

CVL F6F— T B M

CVE F@— FM

TBM

%3’o

13,6,8344,279

7,7372,745

1,9337,666JL.liL

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0S- 77?* s %

0.57 0.000.70 0.32

13.6 Z.i 41.g 0.0f3.5 13.2 30.1 7.4

15.4 9+.2 1.2 14.75.4 2.g 6.8 0.0

3.g 11.6 0.4 0.015.2 2.2 0.01104 7.6 l;:t ?7.3

0.04 1.020.74 0.00

0.01 0.000 .Og 0.010.52 2.90

NOTE : Sorties attacking targets, end averages based thereon, are not comparable between1944 and 1945, since attacks on multiple targets were counted as multiple attacksin 1944 end single attacks in 1945.

- 3 4 -

TABLE 11. Continued

TYPE OFCARRIER,

PLANT MODEI

PERIOD TO!CAIg F6F

F4USB2CTBM

CVL F6F—TBM

CVE FM—‘l?BM

PERIOD TOTAL~ F6V

F4u,F@SB2CTBM

CVL F6F—TBM

CVE F6F— F4U,F’G

mTBM

PERIOD TOTfiQ F(2?

F4U,FGSB2CTEN

CVL F6F—TBM

cm F6F— F~,FG

FMTBM

ACTION I I TARGIWSI TARGETS

47, g3q21, l&7

3, IQ()3,433

6,2&+1,190

-xl-

+1 446.39

18, ml6,/337~, 719

13,9453,199

7,4951,190

27,373M. w

41, q12, ggo10,0633.7!304,615

6,03g1* 733

~ .3&

‘w

15,096%7.2

ROCXETSIXPEND.m 0sTARGETS

p~cm OF PZRIOD TOTAL I AVIWGESAc- Tong I Tons Rocketstion of Rook- per per

I?llts Sor- Bombs ets Attack Attackties Sortie Sortie

November 19~ - January 1945

WI%101 12

1,709 l,oLq1, g3g l,kog

1,175 117507 379

4; 3214,562

3,6701, ggg

2,697339

6, tm6. g22

1;730

1,217790

+1 &Tl10, 3

4;y17

2,2900

2,475~

February - June 1945

14,794-%1,00

72132, goo3,478

6761,492

60976

&

121 02+1 lg14:0113,9543,116

10,1401,756

10,348l,yg

25,70j’W&L_

July - August 1945

4 4 6+-42&55

1,505

2EW695

35

2!

22.2269,131g,og6

58146

3,841113

54173

-1

0.11 0.000.64 0.030.77 0.21

0.10 1.950.75 0.00

2.76:% 3.20

%! $&0.15 2.900.65 0.920.76 o.6g

0.18 2.760.79 0.92

a 23 3.840.22 4.100.01 3.770.56 5.34

~ 1.-%2.7

O:M 3.040.52 0.35o.f37 0.03

0,24 3.16O.m 0.14

0.13 2.25O.og 2.750.00 6.33o.n 2.g2

See note on previous page.

-35-

TABLE 12. CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS DATA AND OPERATING RATIOS,By Type Of Carrier, Monthly frOm August 1943 to August 1945, Pacific only.

MONTH

1943Au~

September

October

November

December

1944January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

September

CAR-RIESINACTION

2 w1 CVL

1 Cv2 CVL

3 CV3 CVL

6 CV5 CVL5 CVE

5 CV2 CVL

6 CV6 CVL5 CVE

6 CV6 CVL8 CVE

5 CV6 CVL2 CVE

6 CV7 CVL8 CVE

4 CV3 CVL

7 CV8 CVL11 CVE

8 CV7 CVL11 CVE

6 CV3 CVL2 CVE

8 CV8 CVL16 CVE

—

:oM-%E -LENT

18033

9066

27099

510165128

43066

513198138

513198210

43019856

524231232

33899

617264311

706231311

5339957

728256452

FLIGHTSSQUAD-RONS INACTION

**

**

**

***

**

10,3144,5882,143

5,9383,0744,099

5,6422,248

713

6,0443,9373,925

2,220 1,276

9,4745,9385,520

11,9234,5197,700

4,322843609

12,2695,2737,937

ACTIONSORTIES

.—

27020

12868

712170

2,286484215

47157

1,952723118

3,1151,136

521

1,41534527

3,7471,276247

81587

5,4922,0541,220

8,3201,5592,670

1,036135

9

8,7791,7292,658

TONSOF

BOMBSON

TARGETS— ..—.

1097

5528

28237

76716035

18315

62718756

1,008234222

543641

1,377284117

32320

1,730468237

3,068537661

355343

3,332382493

— — - .OPEIWTINGRATIOfiACTION ACTION TONS

FLIGHTS SORTIES SORTIES PERPER PER PER ACTION

.PERCENT OFMONTIi TOTAL

ACTION TONSFL’TS SOR- OF

TIES BOMBSPLANE PLANE FLIGHT SORTIE

**

**

**

***

**

20.123.215.5

11.615.519.5

13.111.412.7

11.517.016.9

6.612.9

15.422.517.7

16.919.6

24.8

8.18.5

10.7

16.920.617.6

1.50.6

**

0.400.35

0.430.41

0.400.22

0.340.330.16

0.390.26

0.320.260.47

0.320.210.43

0.380.190.04

0.370.220.47

0.400.23

0.320.230.19

0.370.340.25

0.340.250.33

0.380.220.19

937

6535

8119

77167

8911

70264

652411

79192

71245

9010

632314

661321

88111

671320

946

6634

8812

80164

928

72217

691615

89110

77167

946

711910

721315

9091

799

12

**

**

**

***

**

612712

452431

66268

442828

6436

452926

491932

751510

482131

1,41.0

**

2.61.7

**

4.52.91.7

***

1.10.9

**

3.83.70.9

0.190.160.06

6.15.72.5

0.520.370.13

3.31.70.5

@.250.150.04

7.25.51.1

0.620.320.06

2.40.9

0.370.07

8.97.83.9

0.580.350.22

11.86.78.6

0.700.340.35

1.91.40.2

0,240.160.01

12.16.85.9

0.720.330.33

* Data not available.

-36-

MONTH

1944CcW%&

November

December

1945Ja=y

February

March

April

May

June

July

August

-—

CAR-RIERSIN

ACTION

9 Cv8 CVL18 CVE

10 CV6 CVL

7 CV6 CVL6 CVE

8 CV5 CVL18 CVE

11 CV5 CVL11 CVE

10 CV6 CVL15 CVE

10 CV6 CVL

20 CVE

9 CV6 CVL20 CVE

8 CV4 CVL17 CVE

10 CV6 CVL4 CVE

11 CV7 CVL3 cm

COM-PLE-MENT

805256506

960190

721190198

775157574

1,055165350

981198 474

981198634

878198630

775132536

981198122

1,08423194

FLIGHTSSQUAD-RONS INACTION

12,2905,2097,412

8,4462,641

7,4162,1331,456

12,7682,680

10,299

12,0462,5776,273

15,0044,1329,176

19,6305,120

16,498

14,2633,707

12,227

7,7831,608

10,402

17,8524,4811,756

13,5063,290

930

TABLE 12. CONTINUED .

ACTIONSORTIES

7,2761,1772,495

3,830567

1,551309202

5,784921

1,932

3,865487

1,607

7,2802,0152,837

7,7952,2775,980

4,6231,3493,081

1,335339

3,961

6,8851,447

136

3,44074743

TONSOF

BOMBSON

TARGETS

2,590219530

1,349168

263673

1,581261466

915110221

2,010599553

2,816796

1,421

1,817500

1,208

452163

1,213

2,28165632

1,200327

0

OPERATING RATIOSACTION ACTION TONS

LIGHTS SORTIES SORTIES PERPER PER TER ACTIOli

PLANE PLANE FLIGHT SORTIE

15.320.314.6

8.813.9

10.311.27.4

16.517.117.9

11.415.617.9

15.320.919.4

20.025.926.0

16.218.719.4

10.012.219.4

18.222.614.4

12.514.29.9

9.0 0.594.6 0.234.9 0.34

4.0 0.453.0 0.21

2.2 0.211.6 0.141.0 0.14

7.5 0.455.9 0.343.4 0.19

3.7 0.323.0 0.194.6 0.26

7.4 0.4910.2 0.496.0 0.31

7.9 0.4011.5 0.449.4 0.36

5.3 0.326.8 0.364.9 0.25

1.7 0.172.6 0.217.4 0.38

7.6 0.397.3 0.321.1 0.08

3.2 0.253.2 0.230.5 0.05

0.360.190.21

0.350.30

0.170.220.01

0.270.280.24

0.240.230.14

0.280.300.19

0.360.350.24

0.390.370.39

0.340.480.31

0.330.450.24

0.350.440.00

FllRCENT OFMONTH TOTAL

ACTION TONSL,TS SoR - oF

TIES BOMBS

492130

7624

672013

501040

581230

531532

481240

471241

398

53

74197

76195

661123

8713

751510

671122

658

27

601723

491437

511534

246

70

81172

81181

777

16

8911

79201

691120

739

18

641917

561628

521434

259

66

77221

79210

-37-

TABU 13. CARRI~ AIR OPERATIONS DATA AND OPm ING IWIOS,By Type of Carrier and by Model of Aircraft,

for Selected Months of Major operations (Pacific Only)A. FAST CARRIES FORCE

PLANETYPEANDcoMPIiE.

216 F6F160 SBD32 sB2c

105 TBF

120 I@45 ml’

304 F@3 F4U

40 SBD21/3 SB2C141 TBF

16g 3’6F63 TBF

FLIGHTS,QUAD-ONS INACTION

****

**

TONSOFBmBsON

!ARGENU

o256

&$

o160

OPIEWTING RATIOS—TAction Action

Flights Sorties Sorties perPer Per Per Actionplane Plane Flight Sortie

PERCENT OFMONTH TOTALCAIL

IERSIN

cTXOX

6 CV

5 CVL

g Cv

7 CVL

MONTH ACTIONSORTIES

957615in535

283201

Comple- Flightsrnent

@gNovembe] * 4.4 * 0.00

* 3.8 * 0.42* 5.6 ~ ;.;* 5.1 .

* * 0.00* ::; ‘ 0.80

32 @23 *

5 *15 *

18 *

7 *

569013

25234652503

31761343

3640

1$26g81827

1074485

2920

15$1200

192345

1~.7 12.0 0.64 0.084.J 0.3 0.08 0$006.3 3.9 0.61 0.45

15.9 12.4 0.78 0.5617.a 13.0 0.73 0.66

lg.g 6.4 0.34 0.1821.3 7.7 0.36 0.71

19.4 9.9 0.51 0.0711.6 8.1 0.70 0.6220.0 g.p 0.71 0.72

21.3 5.0 0.24 0.0218.0 3.6 0.20 0.77

4 223 2115 15

18 197 g

374 F6F272 s32c159 TBM

lg4 F6F72 TBM

9 Cv

8 CVL

$ Cv

5 CVL

10 Cv

6 CVL

10 Cv

6 CVL

7272316

1907

39131296

372121961359

921256

2551359976

22197

17 227 6

UJ4JJanuary 551 F6F

36 F4U75 SB2C

113 Ttw

112 F6F45 !FEM

390 F6F303 F4U135 SB2C153 TBM

144 F6F54 TsM

9673600

10011494

224Ef432

y370131703

logo

612309

27791916151515/35

1644633

2554193711621232

8g2555

435

3%753

49212

17.6 7.0 0.40 0.1116.7 0.22 0.0913.3 ;:: 0.70 0.5413.2 9.6 0.72 0.70

52 624

g 612 10

12 155 3

20.1 5.5 0.27 0.089.6 6.9 0.72 0.69

24.2 7.1 0.29 0,1119.9 6.3 0.32 0.1314.3 11.2 0.79 0.6514.8 10.4 0.70 0.81

30.-3 11.4 O.y 0.1614.0 11.7 0.84 0.85

9426601719292258

4365755

7347537423622769

3499982

April

July

292250g84

1290

259537

y32 241113 ;

12 1/35 3

412 F6.V281 F4U135 SB2C153 TBM

1~ F6F$ TBM

ailable.

17.g 6.2 0.35 0.1519.1 6.9 0.36 0.1617.5 8.6 0.49 0.49lg.1 13.1 0.44 0.82

387319569

1(M6

197459

35 3324 2411 1113 12

24.3 6.2 0.25 0.2218.2 10.3 0.57 o.g3

12 165 b

-38-

TABLE 13. continued

B. ESCORT CARRIERS

T

CVESMmTH n’?

Ac-i! ION

T

Q&February g

-

JuIy 11

October ! 18

1945January 18

April 20

PLANE FLIGHTS,TYPE SQUAD-AND RONS IN ACTIONcoMPLE- ACTION SORTIESMENT

41;2; /34522 log

li377 2sf3

60 F@12g FM123 Tm

171d

109024 74f33533 g32

54 F6P24/? ml204 TBF

gg3 33038g7 12732622 gg2

364 FM210 !mM

@+ I@32t3 FM222 TBM

7137 11653162 767

3117 12291303g 247353k2 227g

TONSOF

BOMSSON

TARGETS

0

3;la

2360

b25

13

51:

h462

23616

1169

P& Per Per Action Comple- FlightsPlane Pl~e Fli&.t Sortie ment

16.5 6.1 0.37 0.0415.7 0.33 0.0012.9 ?:; 0.34 0.57

19.6 3.? 0.16 0.0015.1 3.7 0.24 0.60

37.1 14.6 0.39 0.1924.5 7.5 0.31 0.o124.1 10.3 0.43 0.51

63 @37 31

13 1949

% 32

-39-

NOTES TO TABIE 14

h this table all c a r r i e r c o m b a t a c t i v i t y h broken down into cmpaigns, r a i d s a n d b a t t l e s ,

and the longer campaigne into major periods and areas of activity.

Especial a t tent ion

of enemy planes engaged

ations here in .

is invited to the known overstatement, in these data, of the number

(see Def in i t ions) , which will be obvioue in sonm of the smaller oper-

Among the in teres t ing i tems in this table are the figures ehowing the re la t ively smal l

scale of opera t ions , compared with results accomplished , in some of the operation, including

Coral Sea, Midway, the Solomons actions, the North Africa landings, the Tarawa raid, the

Rabaul raids, the first Truk strike and Marianas raid, and the Bonins s t r ikes of June-July 1944

(par t icular ly th; second, on 24 June) .

Also worthy of note is the tremendous destruction of enemy aircraft. achieved in the

Philippines in the operation of September-December 1944, against Japan on three days of

February 1945, in the Okinawa campaign, end in the final assault on Japan..

-40-

TABLE 14. AIR OPERM?IONS AND RESULTS. FOR INDIVIDUAL

RAID, BAITLE,OR CAMPAIGN:Target Area,Tme of Carrier

1942i4~*Ds

Marshalls RaidsRabaul RaidFirst Walce hidFirst Marcue RaidSalamaua RaidTokyo Raid

CORAL SEA BATTLETulagi RaidMain Battle

BATTLE OF MIDWAY

SOLOMONS CAMPAIGNGuadalcanal Landi~Eastern Solomons -

Tonolei RaidGuadalceQal SupportBattle of Santa CruzGuedalceuml BattleKolombangem. RaidRennell I. BattleSolomons Su&pport

NORTH AFRICA LANDING

ATTU LANDING

SECOND MARCUS RAIDBAKER ISLAND IANDINGTARAWA RAIDNORWAY RAIDSECOND WAJQi RAID

BOUGAINVILLN SUPPORT. Buka-Bonis Strikes

First Rabaul Raidl Secund Rabaul kid

GILBIiRT IS. CAl@AIGNGilbert Is., CV-CVL

" " C’?FISoutheru MarshallsNauru StrikeKwajalein RaidlTau.ru Strike

FIRST KAVIENG RAIDSE03ND K4VIENG BALDTHIRD KAvIENG RAID

* Estimated lost aboar# Estimated.

CARRIER OPERATIONS AND PHASES THEREOF.

JMHEB or&RRIERsIN ACTIONCV CVL CVE

5 - -2--L--l--L--2--l--

2--l--2--

3 - -

4-3--3--l--l--2--l--l--l--l--

1 - 3

- - 1

21--2-12-l--33-

7 2-11-11-

6%L5- - i21-

;;:11-

11-11-11-

rriers, or be

ACTIONSORTIES

+1

152751y

1046

+$

225

374

1.16250317t369sg

129;:

1624

512

g6

29012

lg4

13z

g

3;;

*2 01, 1

2154602102s7130

103w90

cause of

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

~

o1/311401

~

go

100

@

2s121929212300

77

4

1160

g316

319

210z

;;

ill?13

1;;a

1154g

35y?35

AIR-

NGAGED

g

301010

+1s

172

294

6 0+12200

66

2162so

226

61

0

032

9;

3.7.+

llg252

-%1

12110

1021

227

AIRCRAFT

Air Ground

~1002000

+

20*

140*

g

10*4

125*o000

#

o

70

150

27

~

o0

630

192

275

000

sinking of enemy csniers.

OWN LOSSESNJLCT ION SORTI~QEtaemg ~era-AjA A/C tioaal

H0 21 01 01 00 0

~ ~0 11 20

20 41

:3

5 100 00 01 201 10 00 00 1

14 1

0 0

300 04 03010 1

f~lg3 14

~ $;0

4 10 123:

1 00 30 1

io1000

Q3g

16

~

501

lgo000

7

7

1021

13

Q703

y

17110

000

-41-

TABLE 14. Continued

I&iID, BATTLE,OR CAl@AI@i

g4JMARSHA.LLS CAMPAIGNMarsholl Is., CV.CVL

" " CVEFirst Truk StrikeMarisnas Raid

MILLE STRIKER.iIRAU SL%PPORT

PALAU, YAP, WOLEM

HOLLAND IA-AITAPEFast CarriersCVES

SECOND TRW STRIIGi!

SABANG RAIDsOERABAJA RAIDTHIRD WAKE & MAR(WS

SOUTHERN FIWiCEI’IFT.H BONINS STRIKXFOURTH WAKE RAID

PALAUJ!OROTAIW. Carolines, CV-CVLW. Carolines; CVEPhilippines, CV-CVLHalmahera-MorotaiCelebes, Borneo

LEYTE CAMPAIGNRydryug AreaFormosa AreaphilipphI13S, CV-CVL

" cm"I CV-CVL

Western Carolines

MINDORO CIMPAIGNFast Carriers,kzonCVXS, Vieayas

ACTIONSORTIES

i“++,ggg639

1,456w

11127

2,172

+2 412,31

227

2,2i33

62

722

2242e,gg21,2207,4552,679

47gg6

873q2

l,jtq

556

53361

12.653j,wg2,2g26,025

li23

9

15,3211,5382, gog4,1002,4844,299

gg

2.062l,g52

210

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS— .

@l,y32

278499102

461

712

~

117

tn~

1920

2g6

0 0%1-2,0 5

2372,726

664152

30;3076Q9

1;;34

%-1, ‘;f?40

?,ll~560

+g-+;6;

1, 2i32524

1,47146

#

3

OWN LOSSES2N ACTION SORTIESTo Enamy Opera-A/A AiC tional

f

o

;

o0

3

0Eo

5

000

g

41025

1312

000

y

91200

8+

23427

110

~o2

5g1

00

15

2

3

001

040

4+

6 2g20

0

-42-

TABLE 14. Continued

RAID , BATTLE,OR CAMPAIGNTareet Area.voe of Carrier

+&_ ~mA1w

Philippines, CV-CVL" CVE

TormosaIndo ChinaSouth ChinaRyakyus

IWO JIMA CAMPAIGNJapanBonins, CV-CVL

II CVERyukyae

OKINAWA CAMFAICN

Ryukyus, CV-CVLII CVE

Japan

Ryu.ky-us, CV-CVLII cm

Jq)an

CV.CVL TOTALCVE TOTAL

RYUKYUS TOTALJ2J?AN TOTAL

ASSAULT ON JAPANHokkaidoTokyo, N. HonshuCentral HonshuKjmshu, Kure Area

MINOR 1945 ACTIONSMaloelap StrikeFifth W&e StrikeBelikpapan LadingActions off OkinawaSixth Wake StrikeMarianas StrikesSeventh Wake StrikeChina Sea Stri.kcsEighth Wake Strike

DATES OFACTION

1/3 -1/30~/6 -~/71/4 -1/301/3 -1/21

1/12~/~5-~/~6

l/22

w?2/u3-y82Jl;7:/g

LL!&44@

21-31 Mamh25-31 MarchL?-29 March

1-30 April1-30 April7-17 April

1-31 May1-31 May.3-21 May

1-10 June1-22 June3-8 June

3/&6/lo3/25-6/22

3/21-6/223/w6/8

m7/ l0-8/157/24-8/ 107/2 L7/2g

w

6/20J[l -7/37/6+,;~23

7j2b, 7/ 26@

@ -8/6gj 6

NUMBER OFCARRIERSIN ACTIONCV CVL CVE

:$2

- 1;g5-g5-g5-75-

ll~g1111 ; ~

- 12;3-

& ~ g

a6-; 13

10 -

10 6- G

Y6-

9 6 -- 20

;4-

6 3 -- 17

5 3 -

14 g -- 2g

13 &3 2g13 g -

QQJ

:~~- -

21-- - 1- - 1l - -- - 1

1 -- - 3

1-:

-——

ACTIONSORTIES

g 6-H1, 21,9322,8g4

910799676

gol+2, 931,9322,746

920

40,157

y, 24~1,6983,054

9,442S,ggo

630

4,0003,0$31~,777

8553,961

431

25,43714,720

34,265s,g~p

12,1532,3495, 66g2,6651,471

1,128195ymg216

~673$33935

168

.—TONS Ol?BOMBSON

TARGETS

q

466834324235161

1 6 1*37

667441207

12,888

1,640

333744

3,3741,421

23~

1, yn1,208

656

4261,2139

8,7131+,~75

11,1961,692

4 %2~l,E%2

&3gg619

ZJ

13529

3?

;

4;

ENEMYAIR-CRAFTENGAGED

151120

&o

1 262@i

1297

Ygo

1,155147130

337

142

17

9?

20J2

o0300040

OWN IOSSESON ACTION SORTIES

~

108 10~ ~

23619 ;26 4g o

g +

15 225 012 0

m !u

4s 2

4: 3:

59 1639 ;25

28 316 018 2

2 014 07 4

235 5769 2

206 23gg 36

186 11T 753 767 3Y+ 1

4 g5 02 01 00 00 00 00 01 00 0

# Approximations based on proration of Force total for campaign.

-43-

TABLE 15. MARINE CARRIER AIR OPERATIONS AND RESULTS, 1945Monthly, By Model of Aircraft and Type of Carrier

TYPE CARRIER,TYPE PJ.ANE,

MOIWH

~ F4U January—FebruaryMarchAprilMayJune

TOTAL

CVE F4U May— —JuneJulyAuguet

TOTAL

CVE F6F May— —JuneJulyAuflBt

TOTAL

CVE TBM May— —JuneJulyAugust

TOTAL

GRAND TUT.AL

FLIGHTS,

-1

SQUAD-RONS IN ACTIONACTION SORTIES

6001780184920251000

131498897702399

586 62604 288887 75159 I 18

2236 443I

4=

287 59157 7755 814 2

513 146

473 181513 298399 17229 0

1614 496

11917 3735

OWN LOSSES ENEMY AIRCRAFT~ON SORTIES ON DESTROYEDTo Enemy Opera- OTHER ON IN COMBATA~ tional FLIGHTS SHIP Bombers Fighters

1 1 7I

4I

1I

9 08 6 5 21 0 5 24

2 0 0 3 1 1 02 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 0 3 00 0 0 1 0 2 04 0 0 5 1 6 0

0 0 0 6 0 0 01 0 0 1 0 0 01 0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 0 0 8 0 0 0

3 0 0 0 0 0 02 0 0 1 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 05 0 0 1 0 0 0

51 16 21 56 38

I

59 159

NOTES TO TABLE 15

TOILS OFBOMBS

ONTARGETS

12525384733

277

136350

81

101500

25

106186120

304

687

This table ehowe the eeparate eotivity of Marine carr ier a i rcraf t , which has been includedin all previous tables but not shown separately. A total of twelve 18-plane F4U squadronsoperated from CVe for varying periods, and four CVES fully oomplementid by Marine VF, VF(N) andVTB were in action during the laet four months of the war.

-44-

3. Ixind-Based Operations, General Data

TABLE 16. LOSSES, LOSS RATES, AND OPERATIONAL DATA,LAND-EASED NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT, PACIFIC ONLY, 1944 - 1945 ONLY,

By Service (Navy-Marine) and Plane Model

SERVICE,PLANE MODEL

IK4RINE SQUADRONSF4U, FGF6F*SBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMPBJPBY#PVPB4Y

NAVY SQUADRONSF6FF4U, FGFMSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMPB4YPVPBMPBYPB2Y

GRAND TOTAL

AIR-CRAFTONHAND

*.—

138737715511

13115418995

10483

4621

6751

10918

39682

12822441406730

1C63213

20624

FLIGHTSSQUAD-RONS INACTION

346,342201,35211,038

2569,52613,79628,11820,770

611,413

243

88,219~2,123

2427,2302,0092,421

26,98716,8967,672

12,6002,332,

434,561

ACTIONSORTIES

102,32450,1181,646

335,3412,0234,7588,390

82116

14,414~

74225

2,981332

1,1573,2152,439

5061,007

142

18,217

OiiN LOSSOPERATIONALAc- Ontion OtherSor- F1’tsties

189 523m m

3 270 133 513 137 3112 230 00 50 0

E %2 40 11 161 23 413 689 231 331 201 2

234 709

ES

ONGR'D

4

90 ~G50

250

152000

120To0063

7018973

—212

~Inclu-dingEnemyAction

1169m

421

173178755060

521

191

291116

2247959357

1693

OWN LOSS RATESOPERATIONALPar P8r100 100Action OtherSor- F11 tsties

0.19 0.210.26 m0.18 0.29

@ @0.09 0.150.15 0.110.15 0.130.14 0.19

@ @@ 0.36@ 0.00

0.31 0.25m m0.27 0.29

@ 0.460.03 0.380.30 0.120.26 0.320.40 0.290.37 0.160.20 0.460.10 0.170.70 0.09

0.20 0.22

GROUNDPer100PlanesPerMonth

0.7m1.0@

0.80.01.50.2@@?@

+$0.0a

0.0@

2.33.11.31.20.71.4

1.0

TOTALPer100PlanesPerMonth

8.4l?XZ8.2@

5.64.18.75.2

@l@@

&17.3

@7.3@

12.510.05.68.13.33.3

8.2

FLIGHTSPer PerPlane .\c-Per tionMonth Sor-

tie

25.0 3.4— .26.1 4.021.6 6.7

@ @22.3 1.733.0 6.828.3 5.919.8 2.5

@ a@ e@ e

13.1 6.1m Kf19.5 2.9

@ @18.3 2.424.5 6.118.9 2.112.0 8.412.0 6.910.5 15.211.9 12.510.9 16.4

21.1 3.7

* In terms of plane-months; sum of aircraft reported on hard each month by squadrons in action.Where no sui= -was reported for aircraft on hand, authorized complement was used. Amonthly average strength in action can be obtained by dividing by 20.

# Attached to Hedrons.@ Ratio not calculated; less than 100 action sorties, fliEhts, or planes on hand.

NOTE: 1481 action sorties by planes not identified as to branch of service are excluded from allf igures in th is table except the grand to ta l . These are broken down by plane model asfo l lows: 349 F4U, 28 F6F, 440 unidentified VF, 484 SBD, 137 TBF, 41 unidentified VPB.Also in the same catagory are 2 F4US destroyed on ground, and 1 SBD lost operationally onan act ion sor t ie .

NOTES TO TABLE 16

This table presents deta i led data on loss ra tes and f l ight activi~ for land-baeed aircraftin combat operations, for the yeare 1944-45 and in the Pacific only. The data are comparablewith those for carriers given previously in Table 9.

Attention is invited to the low operational and overall loss rates for land-based planes,part<.cularly for SBD, PBJ and PBY aricraft. Overall loss rates were influenced by the low loseesto enemy action sustained by land-based aircraft, which made a large proportion of their attackson lightly defended or undefended targets, with little airbor~e opposi t ion in the per iod coveredby &is table. The higher lees rates for Navy planes of same types than for Marine planee of thesam types are not especia l ly s igni f icant ; tie Navy planes in these cases were frequently usedin more demanding operations, and in any event the volume of Navy action in this period waa rel-a t ively smal l .

(Cont. on next page)

700380 o-4&4 -45-

(Cont. from preceding page)

It will be noted that land-based VF, VSB and VTB generally made far more flights per monththan carrier planes; about 25 per VP, 22 per VSB, 27 per V’fB, compared with carrier averages ofabout 17, 11, and 15 respectively. Land-based planes of these types also flew more action sortiesp e r m o n t h: ovwr 6 per VP, 10 per VSB, 5 per VTB, as against 5, 6, and 6 respectively.

Patrol bombers, other than tie Marine PBJs, avwraged 10 ta 12 flights per month; only from6 to 17 percent of these resulted in action. PBJs, used primarily as shor t - range format ionbombers, averaged 20 flights per month, 40 percent of which resulted in action.

Marine F6Fs were almost entirely night fighters, and flew a higher ratio of patrol toaction flights than the F4U day fighters. Marine TBMs were also largely used for patrol work,as were the Navy SB2CS in inshore patrol squadrons.

NOTES TO TABLE 17 (The purpose of this table is primarily to provide a historical record. Anumber of interesting observations may be made from the tables:)

(a) Marine fighters carried the greatest burden of aerial combat activity of any of theland-based planes. Part A shows their defensive and offensive combat record through the Solomons-Rabaul campaign. In few months from August 1942 to February 1944 did their relatively smallforce fail to shoot down 50 or more Jap planes. In Decenber 1944 a Marine fighter group wentt o IAe rescue at Leyte. In April-June 1945 at Okinawa Marine VP renewed their early performancesby accounting for 479 Jap planes in 3 months, this time without the high losses that had markedtheir successes under the difficult conditions of Guadalcanal (when tb combination of F4Fs,p o o r a i r s t r i p s , and superior enemy forces had held them to a 5 or 6-to-1 combat superiority overthe Japs instead of their 36-to-1 ratio of 1945).

(b) After the remo=l of the enemy air force from tie Bismarcks area, the Mrine VF tookto bombing, and after the middle of 1944 averaged nearly a third of a ton of bombs on each ofthei r low-level sortiee against the Japs.

(c) The Marine dive and torpedo bonber force, building up from small beginnings to a sub-s tant ia l s t r ik ing power , was the backbone of the anti-shipping and tactical striking force inthe Solomons, contributed greatly to the reduction of the Jap bases in the Marshalls, and latercontributed the bulk of its strength to give tactical air support in the reconquest of Luzonand the southern Philippines. During late 1942 and early 1943 its few planes were devoted main-ly to stopping Jap naval and transport vessels from reinforcing Guadalcanal. Later it carriedi t s an t i - sh ipping s t r ikes to Bougainvi l le , and in early 1944 cleaned the last Jap ships out ofRabaul. Meanwhile as its force expanded it built up its attacks on nearby airfields (Munda andVila), gave heavy direct support in the New Georgia and Bougainville campaigns, and made the mostaccurate and effective attacks in the campaign for destruction of the Jap base at Rabaul. InMarch and April 1944 it was a major factor in turning back the Jap counter attacks on Bougainville,doubling its previous volume of activity, then returned to neutralization of the entire Bismarckarea. In late 1944 the Marine SBDS were largely withdrawn from the Bis~rcks area for transferto Luzon, where they began their biggest, though not their most important, job of the war.

(d) Navy fighters and single-engine bombers were used ashore largely to supplemmt theMarines in cr i t ica l per iods . Son@ of the shore-based naval squadrons were from sunk, damagedor non-avai lable carr iers ; others were merely surplus carrier groups for which there was nocurrent need afloat; a few in late 1943 and early 1944 were specially formed as shore-basedsupport squadrons. After June 1944 the latter were decommissioned, and the surplus of carriergroups disappeared; thereafter the only Navy VP, VSB and V’TB in shore-based action were fromcarrier groups conducting training exercises in forward areas, or Navy inshore patrol squadronspat ro l l ing in the Marshalls.

Navy shore-based fightars provided the extra strength needed in the Solomons in late 1942,in the New Georgia and Bougainville campaigns, and against Rabaul. In tkse campaigns theyaccounted for 422 Jap planes (in some 2,500 action sorties flown). In addition, one squadronaided in the early neutralization of the Marshalls.

Navy shore-based bombers, while used more continuously than the fighters, were also employedto bolster our Marine forces for major encounters. Thus in September-November 1942 carrierbomber squadrons were used ashore in the critical struggles on Guadalcanal, then withdrawn whenthe emergency ended. From March to June 1943 (when the Marines had few VTB) Navy squadrons pro-vided most of the weight of attack in the Solomons. In July reinforced Navy equadrons delivereda remarkable total of 1,238 tons to support the New Georgia campaign (against the Marine bombers!395 tons), then withdrew again for rest. Thereafter Navy land-based bombing effort continued at

(Cont. onpaga 52)-46-

TABLE 17. MONTHLY OPERATIONS AND ~SULTS, FOR IAND-BASED AIRCRAFT,By Type of Aircraft and by Service (Navy-Marine), Pacific only

A. MARINE FIGRTERS

MONTH

1941-December

1942 -FebruaryMarchJuneAugustSeptemberCctoberNovemberDecember

1943-Janu~FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarc!Apri1MayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JcummryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugu8t

1941-2 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 TotalGRAND TU1’AL

* NO data available

~G~SQUAD-RONS INLCTION

*

********

************

3,6794,5546,5935,9568,3347,3148,029

11,05611,14515,01314,63815,533

11,61110,0367,914

12,43515,39518,83715,7538,590

**

11,84400,57112,415

.

ACTIONSORTIES

49

f

2757

17740116840

8410#

197113156358414430282401462

9511,160

8191,1691,5941,3322,9014,3313,6074,7475,1482,958

2,4333,3242,9453,6182,6622,9802,540

548

9232,90730,717?1,05055,597

~ LOSSESON ACTION SORTIESTo Enemy Opera-A/A A/C tional

0

00001110

000100013442

227

139

101088

121612

1111129

1515142

315

10989

0

10

157

1219164

752

115

1718101435

10

20130100000003

00

2

00000360

000310248134

660353648598

89

0 55 123 95 131 130 2

74 11107 2637 6314 71

216 232 171

m--OTHERFL’TS

0

00016444

58061

20139798

14

147

14118

116

11109725

3216182846427213

19100133267K

ON

18

00020600

000201000011

201122001035

580

135000

265

173179

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

10

f

8215551220

4

i130

24271511070

07020000000

10

100

98844182

10810619

0

~

73122

1004417

4810#331565909359571273

249731500100010

44

411

4713376101

221555383

234 273527 1,432

TONS OFBOMBS

ONTARGETS

0

~

o00000

0

:000000000

00

51149278165745

1,4201,0911,5581,4021,056

6211,127

9531,173

924976767133

00

7,9156,67414,589

# No action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions during thismonth, or in previous monthat ac t ion , or may be erroneous reports.

No action was reported during months not listed above.

-47-

TABLE 17. Continued

B. MARINE DIVE AND TORPEDO BOM8ERS

MONTH

1942-JuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAu~atSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944 -Janua~FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptamberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAUgU8t

1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

FLIGRTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION

******

************

3,4953,4215,1545,8554,7005,1564,4134,7614,3606,3356,0195,234

4,0845,7687,4947,8038,5679,3276,3073,167

*

58,&f52,537

111,440

* No data available.

ACTIONSORTIES

3920125123321291

31037416212269

102808655788774

1,3311,527

9141,4212,9512,2692,0301,5742,1162,3522,0181,9381,026

466

6544,1284,5083,4023,6232,7311,699

302

9197,02221,07521,047

50,063

OWN LOSSESON ACTION SORTIES

~

410453

280

1111417223

101578

137323200

14553130

17427022

602211

490101100010

410000000000

02000000

121752

304210

101225121314

620411100131

03921431

10232023

151 36 76

m-OTHERFL’TS

114418

596

1015311667

4103142042466

2216

1511111

19604649

174

;ROUNI

o00700

000000002120

21110010001

10

02199110

75

1723

52

ENEMY AIRCRAFT—DESTROYEDIN COMBAT

lombers Fighters

o00000

000000000000

000000000000

00000100

0001

600442

261000202000

1420000000000

00001000

1613161

1 46

TONS OFBOMBSox

I!ARGETS

118

3151

12683

9716781614757

395373460435874

1,000

427707

1,6581,205

942659983

1,047915892455214

2931,7672,1271,6021,9291,422

919155

3104,(X710,10410,214

24,675

NO ackion waa reported during months not listed above.

-48-

.

TABI.E 17. Continued

C . NAVY FIGHTERS

FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INkCTION

***

**********

1,8041,2422,0771,7481,015

9000

886891

48262

*

8,7861,286

ONN LOSSESON ACTION S~TIES

ENENY AIRCRAFT TONS OFBOM8SON

TARGETS

o00

g

~

o00000

01

1985

10150

200000

00

21120

MONTH ACTIONSORTIES

82777

~

~

81167169174520266

41262949436735823123

761015

29

1661,3882,514

121

GROUNDOTHERFL‘TS

221

5012782142

5045200

10001

532162

DESTROYBD

* ‘ra-A A A C tlonalIN COMPAT

Bombers Fizhters

1960

g

g

20800

281

2000000

00000

255720

1574

g

g

1949277

3921

945600000

00000

26162150

0

1942-SeptemberOctoberNovember

0 40 150 0

2 40 01 70 00 100 160 80 46 40 3

0 152 33 00 00 00 00 0

1 00 00 01 00 0

0 199 565 182 0

110

0000231050

6132020

00000

211140

0163

1000000001

1010000

20000

19222

1943-FebruaryHarchAprilMayJuneJulySeptamberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFbbruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly

1945-MarchAprilMayJuneAugust

1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

84 338GRAND TOTAL 10,072 4,189 16 93 27 55 25 231

D. FIGHTERS, SERVICE UNKNOWN

1944-January * 288 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0February * 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0March * 420 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0April * 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14

Total * 817 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 14

* No data avai lable .# No action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions during this

month, or in prev ious mouthsv aotion, or may be erroneous reports.

No acticm was reported during montia not listed above.

- 4 9 -

——

MONTH

1942-JuneAugustSeptemberOctoberITovemberDecember

1943-FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAu~6tSeptemberoctoberNov8mberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryl&wchAprilmyNovemberDecemkr

1945-MarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

FLIGRTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION

******

***********

1,508977

2,4372,4581,423

225249

219323364447394636

*

9,;772,383

11,660

TABLE 17. Continued

B. NAVY DIVE AND ‘IQRPEDO BOMBERS

ACTIONSORTIES

611

122237110#

12154118262386

1,74734

163225392456

405537

1,1151,051

97611

562842

1048668

4863,9494,086

384

8,905

001120

00122300301

3353200

002100

412163

500622

10001200010

0000000

000010

15501

000500

01031201110

0112000

000010

51041

35 21 20

=m-3TBER?LITS

0043

127

1221

10401512

6435000

100120

2629184

77

TN-}ROUND

000

1710

00000000001

0010000

800000

18118

28

AIRCRAFTcDESTROYRDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

o000

;

o0000000000

0000000

000000

0000

0009

;

o0000400000

1000000

000000

12410

0 17

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

44

4210458#

69791

179248

1,23825

103160227262

161236533555523

00

3521

423024

2122,6362,008134

4,990

F. DIVE AND TORPEDO BOM8ERS, SERVICE UNKIKXN

1944-January * 23 1 0 0 0 0 0February

o 0 1* 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8

March * 419 0 0 1Apri1

0 0 0 0139

56* o 0 0 0 0 0 0

May 1569

* o 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

Total * 621 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 136d

* No data available.#No action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions during this

month, or in previous monthst actions, or may be erroneous reports.

NO action was reported for months not listed above.

-50-

TABLE 17. Continued

G. IL4VY PATROL BOMBERS

MONTH

1941-December

1942-JanuaryFebruaryMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarch @AprilMayJuneJulyAugu8tSeptemberOctoberNovemberDeoember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1941-2 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRANtI TOTAL* No data available

FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INACTION

*

**********

************

3,5413,5603,2802,6572,8562,9422,3663,2202,2792,5433,1992,729

2,9002,7264,9214,3954,0274,3904,4333,523

*

35,17:31,31566,487

.

ACTIONSORTIES

21

1366

284108

10~

2343797

50633088

143176164

349313486353506302226403237263267347

141265450449743552493205

109803

4,0523,2988,262

OWN LOSSESINACTION SORTIES

m ~=

o

0005000000

001000020012

522423212625

19

106

201074

56

36

8

250

13010120

030000110002

100010112332

00103311

327

14c1

o

0021000000

002000002400

102012120010

23103321

38

10

ON

FL'TS

o

0006213000

001041514467

8842

119254546

66

129

1014147

123368

+

ONGROUND

18

4500011341

000000003103

3510040311

168

02

10159

11135

347

42

-I-%

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

o

0000000

;

o00000112421

23499

12216929

313149

15132

01168

2

1100040

;

o00000505198

61038823398

27

713112

281976

82878

T2i72+-

# NO action reported; losses reported may have been sustained in unreported actions, or in pre-

-I&-2%-

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

5

0035161

~

o753370

394129369479

114

280193450249383155108237103154147193

4242

17316136734720358

23547

2,6521,3934,615

vious monthst actions, or may be erroneous reports. .

@ Including 33 sorties, and 41 tins of bombs, by VPB of unknown branch of service. .

No action was reported in months not listed above.1

1

-51-

..

TABLB 17. Continued

H. MARINE PATROL BOMBERS

MONTH

1943, Total

1944-JanuaryFebruaryl&uchApri1MayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovwmberDecember

1946-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1943-4 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

FLIGHTS,SQUAD-RONS INACT ION

*

351421687285877436479846789885

1,3141,274

1,7821,8671,4291,9672,0911,8041,8741,029

8,64413,843

22,487

&CTIONSORTIES

32

116

132142158148188239333322655685

516845698

1,0201,023

526628160

3,0515,416

8,467

–, –-–,.

o

012011105100

02014000

127

2

000000000000

00000000

20

0

000201000110

02300200

57

19 2 12

ONOTHERFL’TS

3

015020011140

11051122

1813

31

oxGROUND

2

000000000000

00000011

22

4

BNEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

ombere Fighters

2 1

1 01 41 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 0

0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0

5 60 0

5 6

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

3

00

70816043119143173198507670

560817731

1,1901,278489724149

2,0675,938

8,005

*Data not available.(Cont. fromp. 46)

a reduced scale in the Bougainville and Rabaul campaigns ,tion in ktay 1944 .

a n d i n t h e Marshalls, until its cessa-

(e) The story of Navy Patrol bombers, par t icular ly wi th respect to thei r ant i -shippingcampaign of 1945, is more fully told elsewhere in this report. Certain items of Table 17G re-quire detailed comment here~

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(f)

Patrol bomber losses to enemy aircraft in June 1942 are believed overstated, but towhat extent is not known. .

The high bomb tonnages reported for February and March 1943 result from initial use ofthe first PB4Y squadron for horizontal bcrabing in formations. They were later restoredto their norml s ingle-plane search funct ion .High tonnage in January 1944 rssults from extensive minelaying operations in the Marshalls.High tonnages in March 1944 result from the use of VPB to meet the emergency created by theJap counter attack on Bougainville, plus extansive use of PVs (during April and Mayalso) for bombing strikes against the Marshalls and Nauru.The lull in activity in ear ly 1945 represented exhaus t ion of ta rge ts wi th in r~nge of pre-sent bases , followed by redisposition of the force to Luzon, Iwo, and Okinawa, from whichextensive new target areas came within range.The record of the pa’:rd bombers against enemy aircraft in 1944 and 1945 is worthy of note.Though VPB generally operated singly, without esccrt, they were able to destroy 146 planesagainst 14 losses in combat in 1944, and 153 against 9 losses in 1945.

M a r i n e VPB activity is largely the story of the PBJ, which first appeared in combat inMarch”1944. These planes were used-for day and night patrol; for night heckling strikes in theSclcmons a r ea , and for daylight formation attacks almost entirely in the Sclcmons. The PBJ con-stituted the bulk of the bombing force in that area during 1945, and the only significant Naval airs t r e n g t h rerrxiining in * a rea . During late 1944 and 1945 otier PBJ squadrons undertook long-rangeanti-shipping searches and similar specialized missions from Central Pacific bases.

-52-

MONTH

~9h2-&YJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943-Jm UaryI’ebmaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptanberOct~berNOvem&rDecember

lgbumualyFebruaryMarchAprilMay June*

1942 TOTU1943 TOTAL1944 TOTAL

GRAND TOTAL

TABLH 18. CONDENSED MONTHLY DATA ON OPERATIONS AND RESULTS,NAVAL AND MARINE LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT

By Operational Thea,tre and by Type of Aircraft

A. SOUTH PACIFIC THEATRE

m

ACTIONSORTIES

-TONS 02?BOMBSON

TARGETS

o000000

000000000000

013

14

7:

0

-&_

%

ENEMYAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

o

5:1111647017

5215

4:15

12g1741089764a694

346138

7001

414879

__w-

-.Lm-

ACTIONSORTIES

o0

2G3&l431291

310386316240

{31w

2,5556gg951999

1,723l*97g

1,3421,9834,0812,8392,348

g3$3

1,360.0,966-

D

VSB-VTBTONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

o01273

155N34133

1;:17Z3152226305

1,633Jgg563595

1,1011,260

5Z39951

2,0721,5691,2253 9 3

6,%!-&_7X_13.987

ENEMYAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT — .

o000

1372

261000602000

1520000

22

-&_

-_@_

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

3200000

0

;;70

10312236

[:M

6531

223116115g4

5

_&l_

A&93_

“mAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN 00MBAT

o020000

000000617

:2

393531

3;24

56

☛ South Pacific Theatre combat areas were placed under operational control of the Southwest. P a c i f i c e.rea ~mmend on 16 June 1944. The figures here for June 1944 cover the entiremonth, and no division ia practicable.

No action waa reported during montfis not noted above..

NOTES TO TABLE 18

Sou th Facific combat activity has already been diacu88ed, and will be covered in more de-t a i l i n s t u d y i n g tie Solomons-Bismarck area in later tables.

.

-53-

TABLE 18. Continued

B. SOUTH’W13ST PACIFIC TFDIA!l!RE

MONTH

1~1-December

1+2-JenuaryFebruarySeptember

lgb+OctoberNovemberDecemter

lg44-JenuaryFebrunryMarchAprilM~JuneJtiyAugustSeptemberOctoberYovemberDecember

1945-JenuryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJd.yAugust

194143 TOTAL1944 TOTAL1945 TOTAL

TOTAL

w’TONS OF ENEMY

ACTION BOMBS AIRCRAFTSORTIES ON DESTBDYED

TARGliYCS IN @MBAT

l,4g6 431~,343 7252,041 m?2,1922,27g 5931,001 239

1 ,05g 2921,644 919l,34g1,994 2;2

goo 93yo 146515 294

0000

5:

4012000

129 53 00 0 0

11,341 3,;$ 547,788 3.

19,129 6,522 61

TSB - VTBTONS OF ENEMY i

ACTION BOMBS AIRCRAFTSORTIES ON DESTROYED

TARGETS IN COIGIAT

1,Q951,0741,3481,405

644152

2go3,9g94,3503,0162,9111,9471,012

5J355156x)6632@j74

1111,7192,0321,3921,475‘y2475

000000

0000000

18l ‘gg o0 0 0

5,718 2,742 017,686 g.2T5 0

23.404 11,017 0

VPB~ACTION BOM8S AIRCRAIT30RTIZS ON DESTROYED

TARGETS IN COMBAT

19

1362

274546

43

:;337

2;;12

?445:772wl

5591,011

9531,2651,438

7c@727

5

000

5

$

37

g2526

150lp2323015137729

566&jo7U

1,270l,?:

744194 i4sl!X 109 h

NOTE: From 1 July 1944 the data include aircraft operating in the Solomons-Bismarcke area..

transferred from the South Pacific commend on 16 June 1944. 1941 and early 1942figares aover activities by VPB of PatWing 10 before establishment of SouthwestP a c i f i c Commaad, in territory later aseigned to tha t commend.

ITo action was reported for months not shown above.

In the Southwest Pacific VPB were the sole naval aircraft until transfer of the SouthPacific air force to this command in June 1944. From November 1943 to Narch 1944 these VPBwere the celebrated PBY Black Cats, on their nightly anti-shipping sweeps of the Bismarck Seaand New Guinea coaat. Thereafter PB4Y and later PV search planes began to operate frcmn SoV?esPacbases, and by 1945 a major part of the land-based Naval air force was under SoWesPec cont ro l ,and was shifted progressively westward and northward to met the changing needs of that command'scampaigns.

- 5 4 -

MONNI

lghl-December

lgb2-MarchMayJuneOctober

1943-JulyAugutOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JEmla ryFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JamuwyFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly

TABLE 18. Continued.

c. CEN- PACIFIC THEA~

49

40

270

0006

38

0

47:1,0301,4281,0251,438l,gi3g1,566:.;;:

1:957

1,5751,6801,6731,6341,8632,6g5

o

0000

00000

0

6;23437596

314695hga877809g17

329

R4&

S30473go

10

10

150

00001

00g200000100

11c

143217117

:2,025

+% O 2716,333 4,782 li13,383 3.434 500

29,840 8,216 53s

VSB - VTBTONS OF ENEMY

ACTION BOMBS AIRCBM’TSORTIES ON DESTROYED

TARGETS IN COMMT

o

0

4;o

00005

0

40!620673736

1,0211,27S

6705333s3315

374139214414-l%

o

00

150

00002

00

175260242266398532295229170140

1824g1302124554g247490,7

0

0060

00000

000000000000

0000110

10.U2I3 4.797 6

VPBTONS OF ENEMY

ACTION BOMBS AIRCRAFTSORTIES ON DESTROYED

TARGRi?S IN COMBAT

2

02

141

23

257

200211247178331U3611726653

log142151

9479

1s0186306

0

0030

003

2:

159116:;:

279626~

1s3

K67

134

369

12381

132200

0

0000

000

i!

6022

116016

1242

20

350394 1/33 $151 56 6135 12

2,192 ls:~ 521,740 67

3115

4,o67 2.406 131

NOTE : Includes all operations by aircraft based at Hawaii, Midway, Wake, the Ellice andGilber t Islend~, the former Japanese Mandated Islands (Mar&alls, Camlines, Marianas),Iwo Jima, and the Ryukyus.

No action was reported during months not listed above.

The Central Pacific data also represent a series of campaigne in successive areas (seeTable 33). First cam the early actione at We&a a n d M i d w a y , then the atticks on the Gilberts andMarshalls from bases in the Ellices and Gilberts, s u c c e s s i v e l y . Then as short-range planes cameinto the Marshalle to maintain pressure on local targets, the VpB reached out to the Carolines.Acquisition of the Marianas and Peleliu took the VF to these islands to wipe out enemy remnants,while the VPB extended their range still farther. Finally the VP and light bombers moved fromthe umndatad islands to Okinawa, and VPB based there co-red Japan, Korea, and the entire Yellowand China Sea areae.

-55-

MONTH

J~ua.ryFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberEovemberDecember

Y&U? TOTALS

T~LE 180 Continued

D. NORTH PACIFIC THE4TKN (All Plmes ~e VPB)

19&2TONS OF

ACTION BOMBSSORTIES on

TARGETS

0 00 00 00 00 0

12 04 19 6

1; 20 01 0

M 10

1943TONS OF

ACTION BOMBSSORTIES ON

TARGE?l!S

2 01 03 01 02 0

39 2917 11u 70 02 00 06 4

a 51

1944!RINS OF

ACTION BOl&3SORTIES OIT

TARGETS

25 1926 lg

lgcgi3 :;52

262 964 2768 2219 3g o0 0

4?6 216

1945TOW OX’

ACTION BOUBSSORTIES OF

TARGETS

42015lg222go

20

00001

1603

127 20

GMND TOWLS: 704

Two enemy aircraft

s o r t i e s , 297 t o n s .

were destroyed in August 1942, one in August 1944, twm in September 1944.

The North Pacific air campaign had three phases. First came the holdin~ period, whenNaval PBYs were confined largely to patrol. This culminated with the capture of Attu inMay 1943. T h e n f o r t h r e e months the Na~l PV force helped to h~r Kis~. FinallY, b e g i n n i n gin the early winter of 1944 the PVS began reguler night strikes (and later day searche6 andst r ikes) on Jap ins ta l la t ions and ships in the Kuriles. These continued until the end of thewar, rocket loadings be ing subs t i tu ted for bombs dwing eonm months, and the PVS being relievedby PB4Ys at the end.

- 5 6 -

PART B. SPECIALIZED DATA, BY SUBJECT MATTER

This section of the report is composed of six sub-sections covering specific types of data,a s followsx

1 .

2 .

3 .

4.

5 .

6 .

7.

Detailed Date on Aerial Combat, by both Carrier-Based and Land-Based Aircraft, includ-ing 1 0SS rates and combat r a t i o s . BreaEd owns are provided for Navy vs. Marine, and byplane model, type of carrier, year, month, area, and mission of own aircraft. Data Onmodels of enemy aircraft destropd are also inc luded . (Tables 19-28).

Anti-Aircraft Loss and Damage, and Loss Rates, with breakdown by plane model, carrierand land-based , year ly . (Table 29).

Atticks on Targets, by Geographical Area. Detailed breakdowns of attacks on targets,and total bomb tonnages expended on target, monthly and yearly, by area, and brokendown between land and ship targets, with special emphasis on shipping targets.(Tables 30-35).

Attacks cm Targets, by Type of Target Attacked. Attack sorties and bomb tonnage, forcarrier-based and land-based aircraft, yearly, by plane model attacking, and monthlydeta i l on sh ipping a t tacks . (Table 36-40) .

Details of Ordnance Expenditures. TPS of bombs used, and torpedo, rocket andammunition expenditures, broken down by plane type, by type of target, yearly andmont~y and by operation. (Tables 41-54).

Night Air Operations. Data on night attacks and aerial combat, for carrier-basedland-based a i r c r a f t , monthly and by plane model. (Tables 55-59).

and

Long Range Search Plane Combat Operations, 1945. Detailed data on PB4Y and PBM per-formance. (T %1a es 60-61).

-57-

1 . Aerial Combat Eata in Detail (Own and Enemy PlanesEngaged and 12estroyed; Loss Rates and Combat Ratios)

NOTES TO TABIES 19, 20, 21

One of the principal achievements of Naval aviation in the war was the devastating supremacyNaval p lanes a t ta ined over Japanese a i rcraf t in a i r ccsnbat. These tibles, and otbera in thissection, provide the evidence.

At the beginning Of the war Naval superiority in the air was rather slim. Our forces weresmall and scattered. When they met the enemy in air combat they were often outnumbered. Eyenif the opposing forces were of equal strength a clear-cut victory could not be assured, thoughfor 1942 as a whole we claimed a 3-to-1 ratio over the enemy in air combat.

In 1943, with newer planes, more planes, better training, and some deterioration of theenemy, our air combat superiority rose to approximately 5-to-1, and the F6F, employed in strong,concentrated surprise attacks from the new, more mobi le carr ier forces , showed.promise in thelast months of tie year. In early 1944 the praise was proved. In the f i r s t four months of tha tyear Naval carr ier aircraft , roaming the Central Pacific from the Marshalls to Truk, Saipan,Pslau and New Guinea, shot down 419 Jap planes and lost but 19 in air combat, a ratio of 22 to 1.This ra t io fe l l dur ing Vm oampaigns a@inst the Marianas and Iwo, and in the b i t te r ba t t les ofFormosa and Leyte, but it was exceeded in the Visayas and Luzon operations of September, October,and December, and the roving raids of January 1945. After falling to 11-to-l in the ‘To~o a n dKyushu strikes of February and March, the supremacy became almost absolute in the Okinawas dur-ing April and May; the enemy might get planes through to attack our ships, tut he could notcompete successful ly agains t our a i rcraf t . During these two months the Japanese lost 1,744planes in aer ia l combat , to the Navyts 34 losses, a ratio of over 51-to-l.

For these la ter opera t ions , of course , the Japanese had few effective combat pilots orplanes remaining, and generally attempted to avoid direct combat with our planes. Nevertheless,over half of the Jap planes shot down in these two months were of single-engine fighter types,including 461 Zekes and 197 newer VP types.

Table 19 presents the record for individual types of a i rcraf t for the ent i re war . I t wi l lbe clear from the foregoing data that direct comparisons cannot always be made between varioustypes of aircraft, because of the varying tires and conditions under which they engaged in combat.Thus comparisons are valid between the carrier F6F and F4U totals because they generally operatedfrom the sanm ships during the sam periods. The FM, howevor, opera t ing from CVES, did not usuallyencounter the same heavy res is tance as d id tie fast carriers operatin~ in advance of the Fleet.Marine F4Us were used on CVs largely in the more difficult February and March actions, and werepresent only in small quantities to reap the rich April and May harvest which fell to Navy F4US.Land-based F4Us were handicapped by the difficult conditions of the Solomons in 1943-44. Land-based Navy F6Fs operated in the Solomons; land-based Marine F6Fs operated under the comparative-ly lush conditions of Okinawa in 1945. The effect of these differences on the totals for theentire war may be partly judged by comparing the yearly data

Certain tentative conclusions may Ee reached from these

( a )

(b)

( c )

(d)

( e )

The F6F was slightly superior to tie F4U in combat,greater ability to survive damage.

CVL F6Fs enjoyed an advmtage over CV F6Fs.

FMs and CVE F6Fs both turned in remarkable records.superior to the FL! under CVE combat conditions. but

by plane model in Table 20.

two tablest

apparently chiefly because of its

The F6F appeared b be clearlythe high combat ratio in favor of

the FM, its ability to destroy over 55% Of the planes it engaged, and its low ratio ofloss to damage indicate that it was an exceptionally good fighter within its speedl i m i t a t i o n s .

The PB4Y, normally flying unescorted single-plane long range searches, was one of tieNavy’s best fighter planes.

Navy single-engine bombers, far from being the highly mlnerable aircraft claimed byt h e i r d e t r a c t o r s , gave out far more punishment than they took.

(Cont. on page 60)

- 5 8 -

.

BAm, —

PLANE lK)DEL ,TYPE CARRIER,

SERVICE

OARRIER-BASEDF&F4U,F13FNFMSS2C, SWSBDTBF ,TBMTED

LAND-BASED@F4U, F@F@’I?4FF2ASBDSB2UTBF-TBM

PB4YPvPBSPDTPBMPB2Y

F@, Cv, NavyF6F, CVL, NavyF6F, CVE, NavyF@, Land , NavyF@, Lend, USMC

F4U , CV , NavyF4U , CV , USMCF4U, CVE, USMCF4U, Land, NavyF4U , Land , USMC

F4F , CV , NavyF@, CVE, NavyFM, Land, NavyF4F , Land , USMC

FM. CTE, Nav

TABIJ 19. AERIAL COKSAT DATA, FOR ENTIRE WAR,By Model of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based,

and for own VF, by Type of Carrier and by Service (Navy~arine)

)Rl!IESWiGIIVGDmlYEK)RAm

982065821042753422237yl4%

44S13w

;:{

1;;

;;

5957611

101

x

b71217121513307g6

60341920

21520bj

40913

2bIj459

ENEKYAIRCRAFTENGAGED

mberB Fiehtera

~l/37i320005

{173776601

d161

6;;31202

27522

5:26

ENEMY AIRCRAFTlIESTROYIIDIN 00MBAT

Bombers Fkhterg

~

159194190133221

~

5g22g

6001

125go067

4487356841922g1123075505

204gZz’i150375

3;6

25

1s11209

10., 1,

933 2641406 8764L3 51

103E 47

100 26053 1596 0

1413:: 1100

Wj 109

5; 9<12 103

194 228

OWN AIRORAIWCASUALTIESTO ENEMY A/CLost Damaged

622q31262311

:20

g

jg62

2;

3[

99:

32

--L

1s5 *Jy3 *2 *23 *2 *

lg *16 *O*14 *1 4 1 *

44 **

52 *7 5 *

13 26

FEimmESTROYkDPER OWNLOSS

*

17:052.56.42.42.52.70.2

&10.1

::2

$!

1:3

10.93i3

0.3

x

19.322.149.5

4%;

20.013i3

11.49.9

6.72.72.61.5

~

ERomT OFOWN A/CENGAGINGLost Dameged

!y~

3:3 3:01.7 3.511.1 5.57.6 4.614.3 21.96.3 10.746.3 0.O

4.7 16.67.9 11.8

3.9 *3.4 *1.3 *

*

::; *

3.0 ;~g0. 0 *6.5 *6.9 *

10.8 *23.1 :22.916.3 *

# No l o s s e s ,@ Includes a negligible amount of combat tiy planes of unidentified types, not shown sepruately.* Data not available.

.

TABLE 20. AERIAL 00MBAI DATA, BY YEARSBy Model of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based,

( Principal plane models only)

BASE,PLANE MODEL,

YEAR

CARRIER-BASED:1942—194

y&i 19d1945

F@’ 194—19d1945

F4U,FG 1945

SBD lg41-2—194319d

SB2C 1943194?1945

mm, 1942TBM 1943—

194.?1945

LAND-BASED:F4P lg41-2—

1943

F4U.FG 19419d1945

m 1943—19d1945

PB4Y 194319d1945

(a)

ENGAGINGENEMYAIRCRAFT

383

3i?;362

404

4?373127

1035

la

g

819534

1656

2t3473

501203

7g139794131

17415366

91251

3

AIRCRAFTENGAGED

Bombers Fighters

y37

1;106

1471128603

185

6673

$1

1123413

57974

213M

231

25

E

101;;

3750

2614?

yo4og&?2409

1024

2674347

2020221

3262

266gei

563385

16641592361

23121734

216376

J!I?_

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

17317

10193

10772510

154

2821

1120

1g76

1::

11014

195

12

3;

13

L

112

13!94

14g22061214

419

60114

221

4

3:

243132

526;g

59

??

2872a

CASUALTIESTO ENEMY A/cLost Damaged

4{

221

12 171 9

18 55149 24

i?lg 11

34 31

39 ;!22 8

0lt 112 0

7 2g M7 21

5 5

79 4052 20

24 1179 97

12 17

11

20M

2 0

10cL

ESTROY7JDPER OWNLOSS

t;19.6

l&f.o

13.920.022.1

16.9

2.36.52.5

2.0

$;

0.71.5. z2.13

5.11

3.3

6.g10.036.3

4.210.836.0

4.111.9

_xliL

OWN A/CENGAGINGLost Danmgd

11.2 5.710.3 2.63.1 4.40.3 2.5

4.5 13.64.93.2 ::;

3.3 3.~

20.7 19.73.1 32.&34.1 16.3

25.0 0.07.2 5.65.9 O*O

43.8 12.514.3 32.1~.5 7.46.8 6.g

15.8 g.o25.6 9.9

11.8 14.75.9 9.92.5 3.5

9.8 11.53.9 11.83.0 0.0

11.0 22.0 .4.4 15.2.8 15.?

,Table 21 gives evidence ofx

(Cont. from page 58)

The formidable enemy air opposition to Naval air operations throughout the war. Far

(b)

(c)

more enemy planes were engaged (and destroyed) in combat in 1944 and 1945 than duringthe adverse years of 1942-43.

The relative decline in enemy air opposition in proportion to the vast increase in ouro w n offeneive and defensive air effort. In 1942 a quarter of our action sorties en-gaged enemy aircraft; in 1945 only 4 percent engaged.

The increasing effectiveness of Naval aircraft against the enemy, measured in the ratioI

of enemy planes destroyed to own losses, in the percentage lost of own planes engagingin combat, and in percentage of own action sorties lost in air combat. In 1942 ~ ofall Navy action sorties were lost in aerial c o m b a t . in 1945 less than one-eighth of onepercent ..

-60-

(Cent. on next page)

TABLE 21. AERIAL COMBAT RATIOS , BY YEARSBy Type of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Rased

BASE , ACTIONPLANE TYPE SORTIES

CARRIER-BASED:I

g 1942 961943 i2,3 01944 37,9401945 44,774

wLU?ILBASED:

I

(Cont. from preceding page)

ENEMY AIRCRAFTENGAGE

Bomb- Fight-ers ers

3f37 ;g;1791340 4363&14 3577

6g 33721 12571 51514 119

610 !jp312 228029 Mog

271 395

1 lgo1 951 2301 3

32 67ly 252116 498105 449

ENEMYAIRCRU’TDESTROYXDIN COMBATBomb- F’ight-ers era

173 112120 148Wo 2340757 1727

30 6911 2120 616 9——

193 247163 71722 535

234 273

0 2g0 170 171 1

0 815 29

%3i% 93-

Mn?MY?LANEsI)Es.PROYEDPER OWNLOSS

6.612.220.022.0

1.42.73.52.1

4.75.4

10.136.2

1.0O.L!3.k

0.7

0.3

;:?

JiL!L

‘mmam OFOWNLAN-asiNGAG_ING

11.24.9

u

27.59.44.46.5

U3.O13.94.92.6

25.240.74.9

75.0

y).o11.2

L

(d) The increas ing ef fec t iveness of Naval f ighter escor t of single-en~ine bombere. In1942 fifteen percent of carrier VSB-VTB action sorties had to engage enemy aircraftand four percent were lost to enemy air action; in 1944 only 1.7 percent met enemyaircraft, and only one-thirteenth of one percent were lost; in 1945 less than ~ of onepercent were forced to engage enemy planes, and only 7 bombers, or l/36 of one percent,were lost in air combat.

700380 0- 46-5- 6 1 -

MONTHSORTIESENGAGING

AIRORAFT

*

52

13;:g

11657

1520*

1*

15gb

36274

121222142203

gg13147

57$31572483154

4g6950630lwj363113

&11

57;4655

E

TABLE 22. AERIAL COMBAT DATA, MONTHLY

A. ALL CARRIER-BASED AIFf-

AIRCRJWCENGAGED

Bombers Fightere

*

3:

37a

2079015

235*

1*

517

13019

$243s

47:1215

6:6131

g5

1;;4747;

17

*

150

14122611913t!74

00*

0*0

3:92

119223179133

1n 311:;

66916454s3114

2s71184574::g

811S6

200 bg:1411

ENEMY AIECW.FTDESTROYEDIN COMBA!I

Bombers Fighter!

*

231

243365u9

114*0*

5

9;10

10312133

2$10

24094925

7450

1064315:

1527 7i

203 la131 169900 2401

%+H%

OWN AIROR.AFICASUALTIEST0 EX?L3MY A/C&at Damaced

1

60

e23202

011020

2;3

5635

4:143

17{112

104032M

z7

ii+t

o

90

214

13122

100001

7210

17191311

7?11

3?1051s3

21642530707K

184 3:;

L1

2 22

ENEMY A/CESTROYEDPER OWNLoss

*

5i5

3.11.7

;:;U3.5

4:0

;

;43.07.3

15.3

10.427.037.0lg.g+

16.6S.1S.o

2s.716.124.755.5

24. jlo.a10.9ys.355.6

S:g

c3.S.s

17.920.8r

3, 4.0L

+ No l o s s e s .* No ange.gementg reported; the losses reported may have been sustained in unreported

actio& during this month, or in previous months’ acticm, or the cause of 10SS m a yhave been incorrectly ascribedother months in 1942 and 1943.

NOTE: No engagements were reported

to aerial combat. The latter factor may apply also to

in months not listed above.

-62-

TABLB 22. Contizlmsd.

B. ALL IJUKMASED AIRORAIW

MONTH

lg41-December

1$)42-JamaryFebruaryMarchMayJuneJdyAugustS.eptenbexOctoberNovemberDecember

1943 -JamlaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchApri1wJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

lg4~-JanuaryFebruarykiarchAprilMayJuneJuly

-lcj44?

TO ML1~ TOTAL1545 !JOTNG&WD TOTAL# No loese

TSORTIESN13AGINGENW’AIRCRAFT

34

961

7{

4;lgl2049227

54264

53

1:26!)167224106143189

71444531326L17302325

<7

17

23

$175279216619

6;913631577 ;

*

AIRORAFTENGAGED

Bombers Fi&ters

90

12g1

4;

3:2741175:

g7

3;

62

z61Mf3234

71511221122

4

;102

29

72716

129ly5014L

22

1500

109

7;20124013543

10947177625

18457736840220919541g

130865139

g49

$

2469

199

145949

10725925172?6

64 133545: 2627146 2537377 g47

1617 6846

ENEMY AIRORAFTDESJ?ROYEDIN COWJW

3ombers Fi&ter

10

0010go

217457220

450

13

4!3616154

3/33

6115

119

1221692

19

41314

107994311k

2

1100

130

??Ml5519

5016

3;1584

15093936560

103

36413i315

$

2

;10

7:

11141249

16295177

WN AIRCRAFTCASUALTIES

TO ENIW A/CLost DamaEed

g

260

3;og

C217

11222

20

2Y313267

1116

40lg2110112

;5

02156g~

5

30

!lto4

281072

182

115M342526162035

10442405

;7227

20

{15

241764

Lp; 77200 20177 20326 64455 545

imi’qtDESTROY3ZPER OWNLOSS

1.5

0.50.2##

cl. ~+7.06.24.13.72.7

4.91.0o.~2.3

U4.9

:::9.9g.~6.6

9.38.3

10.014.018.0#

:::4.56.33.3M.o

#13.526.031.243.517.39.3

11.03.1

9:5

2:2

PERCENT orOWN A/CENGAGING

Lost Damez~

17.09.I.La.122. g25.9

20*1.Lz4.6y.o37.723./325.014.6

14.7

3;.;

100:0100,()18.90.0

3::;50 .~20. r323.g15.513.115.C

1::: 11.66.6 l~; l7.7 14.@g.~ lg.~

5.6 14.64.0 9.k6.5 12.93.1 0.02.L3 13.9o.@ 17.55.9 17.63.3 23.3g.7 i3.712.0 g.o8.1 18*:3.4 13.6

0.0 13.0j.g 7.72.9 2.9

2.9 2.92.7 8.6

Yote: Delsyed repor t ing of losses , and failure to report exact date of loss, may have undulyinflated apparent loss rates for come moaths of light combnt activity succeeding months of heavy

~~~i8~~~AoEYf~~~1~$ et~~&~9~~~ been $@orte&, an%th~t s o m e ~ossesqrom other ca.u.eskveAlso there is reason to believe that some aerial combat in

.been incorrect ly ascr ibed to-enemy ai rcraf t b; the reporting unit.

-63-

NOTE TO TABLE 22

This table is inser ted largely for h is tor ica l record , and i t s majortouched on in previous discussions. T h e rather violent f luctuat ions in

features have beenm o n t h l y volum of air

combat activity my be noted , as well as f luc tuat ions in the loss ra t ios . To smse extent thela t ter are chance f luctuat ions , but largely they represent ac tual var ia t ions in the in tensi tyand quality of enemy aerial resistance encountered, and in the predominant types of enemy planesengaged.

NOTES TO TABLES 23 AND 24

These tables provide a breakdown c-f air combat activity by type of aircraft and primarypurpose of the mission during which the combat occurred.

Well over half of the total number of sorties engaging enemy aircraft in combat were onoffensive missions, one-twelfth were on reconnaissance and miscellaneous missions, and less than40 percent were on defensive missions. Of the total enemy aircraft shot down, 7 percent wereencountered on reconnaissance and search missions , and the remainder were evenly divided betweenoffeneive and defensive encounters. Thus, as would be expected, more enemy planes were destroy-ed per own plane engaging in defensive combat than in offensive combat.

On offensive missions the enemy planes engaged were over 9@ fighter types, while in defen-sive actions about 4C@ were normally bombers. For the same reason losses in air combat were nor-mally higher on offensive missions; over 6@ were sustained on such missions, and only 3@ of thetotal in defensive engagements. Normally from 40~ to 7% of the ene~ planes engaged by ourfighters were reported destroyed. Bombers claimed the destruction of only about 15% of theenemy fighters encountered, and 30% or more of the enemy bombers engaged.

Table 23 gives anti-aircraft and operational losses on action sorties as well as losses inair combat. Of the total losses on action sorties over 80 percent were on offensive missions,12 percent on defensive missions, and about 7 percent on search, reconnaissance and miscellan-eous miss ions resul t ing in ac t ion . Primarily the combat action of Naval aircraft was offen-s i v e , and the losses sustained in action were in lar~e part sustained in carrying the offensiveto the enemy.

Table 24 is an ex~nsion to a monthly basis of the “Enemy Aircraft Destroyed” columns ofTable 23. It provides an interesting historical record of the fluctuations between offensiveand defensive combat at various stages of the war. In 1942 the air combat, by carrier andland-based planes, was predominantly defensive. In addition, because of a shortage of fighterson carr iers , carrier bombers had to handle a considerable share of the combat on offensivemiss ions . In the latter part of 1943 the balance shifted in favor of the offensive, and so re-mained during most of 1944, with the exception of the two great air campaigns of June and Oct--ober, when the carriers defended themselves and the amphibious forces against everything theJaps could get into the air to stop the carrier-paced invasions of Saipan and Leyte.

The emphasis on offensive air combat continued into early 1945, particularly in Februaryand to a lesser extent in March. In April and May combat shifted almost wholly to the defensiveas carriers and land-based aircraft combined their efforts to turn back the Japanese counter-attack on our forces at Okinawa. For 1945 as a whole the balmce was clearly in favor of de-fensive combat, by 2-to-1, while in 1944 it favored the offensive by the sam ratio.

-64-

TABLE 23. URN SORTIES AND LOSSES, AND COMBATWITR ENEMY AIRCIWT, BY MISSION OF OWN AIRCRAFf

By Type of Aircraft, Carrier-Based and Land-Based, for Entire War.

BASE, PLANE TYPE,PURPOSE OF MISSION

CARRIER-BASED :OffensiveDefensiveRecce. & Misc.Unknown

VSB- OffensiveVTB Defensive

Recce. & Misc.unknown

L4ND-BASED:V-F Offensiva

DefensiveRecce. & Misc.Unknown

VSB- OffensiveVTB Defensive

Recce. & Misc.U-own

VPB OffensiveDefensiveRecce. k Misc.Unlmown

*

ICTIONSORTIES

67,43714,8773,596

106

58,5141,1361,3CM

144

55,2534,1931,099

58

57,68347

1,84712

10,69064

5,99637

mFmE-rENGAGINGENEMYAIRCRAFT

4,3774,081

3421

85482830

1,9631,378

300

2370

320

9516

72710

ENEMYAIRCRAFTENGAGED

Bombers Fighters

513 5,4832,090 2,883192 324

1 0

69 95161 6548 860 0

1891,034

10

1030

1317

3590

3,2991,725

350

4570

620

1467

1,10312

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTRoYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fighters

380 2,5691,394 1,624

155 1341 0

28 13221 918 190 0

79 1,028533 726

0 180 0

0 550 01 80 0

1 136 4

139 1960 0

OWN LOSSESON ACTION SORTIES

m=;

614 204 35753 102 12431 10 1458* 23w 1*

597 86 4940 8 325 9 750* 10* 1*

180 141 15816 120 397 1 129* 63* o

136 28 890 0 015 5 735* 24* 1*

33 12 210 1 082 38 2821* 22,* o

Lo8ses l i s ted under “Unknown” are not comparable with the action sorties reported underthis category; they represent larg~ losses on offensive, defensive or reconnaissancemiss ions which were repor ted tirough aircraft record channels rather than in action re-ports and are thus not classifiable by type of mission. These losses should be pro-ratedamong the three types of mission, in proportion to the losses where type of mission wasknown, if loss rates for various types of mission are computed.

NOTE : Losses to enamyA/A on “defensive” miss ions are largely a t t r ibutable to a t tacks~tirget combat air patrols after comple t ion of the i r defens ive pr imary miss ion . I t

should be noted that action sorties ~hose primary purpose was search or reconnaissancenormally involved attacks on targets of opportunity.

(See notes on page 64)

TABLE 24. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED IN AERIAL COM8ATBY ALL NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT

By Base, Mission, and Type of Own Aircraft Accomplishing tieir Destruction, Monthly.

BASCARRIER-BASDEFENSIVE

VSB

MISSION, I

REC. & MISC(VSB-

VF VTB

TYPE OF OWN

OFFENSIVEVSB-

VF VTB VPB

AIRCRAFTLAND-BASEDDEFENSIVE TOTAL

12

1342

6690

14411126711419 \

65251

4615

128186109113112289152

422311131108 21

81811728

3821208282201

258459375

12055391599076

860124140293161Zzz3-i

OFFENSIVEVSB -

VF VTB

MONTH REC. & Misc.VSB-

VF VTB VPBVFVPBVF VTB

1

131

323

1058

1941-December 10

1

155177

13848

10

401582817342

785

3612

36

41

141214108103

34039048

481

1

11

4

6195

119

855

121820318

189

36

9262511431785

741

143144

- -

- -47

118 1621 4

10- -16 232 4- -

- -- -- -- -- -- -- --.- -27 -120 2030 8

34 1139 387 270 31 1

279 696 -16 -349 5499 29196 765 -

88 2378 5184 1131 128 110 -43 -18 -

61 65177 281831 57880 102949 160

21

164472

4130

114

516477

17171921

465151

165815845

14828

136823246111741

22490

12551450

1

14

2

3

3

41

1

17381

1

22

138273

68101

42127923

26

01

134155

2

4

101

1

11

6

8

12

171

163

- -

- -- -- -- -

61 -34 -26 820 517 2

42 215 6- -6-- -46 -93 627 -93 262 -8 -90 -

343 15132 213 -- -- -1-- -.-- -- -- -14 -

1-- -1-4 -3 17-8-- -

98 21482 16503 1724 1

12

14

1

1

0361

1942-JanuaryFebruaryMarchMayJuneAugustSeptemberCetoberNovemberDecember

252

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSept8mberOctoberNovemberDecember

1

8

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilIdayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberEecember

1

1

4

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1S41-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

--

2 1

2862

7101

GRAND TOTAL 290 37 1107 55 14 ~6 9 335

No enemy planes were destroyed in April or July 1942.

(See notes on page 64)

-66-

TABLE 25. OWN SOR3?IES AND COMSAT IOSSES. AERIAL COMBAT DATAAND ENZMY AIRCRAF?C DESTROYED ON GRiIJND. BY AREA.

BASE,AREA OF ‘I?ARGET OR

ENGAGEMENTCARRIER-BASEDHokkaido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuK<yushu, Kure Ars.Ry.dcyusFormosaCentral & South ChinaIndo China

BoninsMarianasWestern CarolinesEastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruWalct>, MarcusMidway Area

Philipl)inesRew Guinea, HalmeheraCelebes, BorneoSumatra Java

Bismarclcs, Solomons

Aleutians

Europe, AfricaLAND-BASEDTokyo, Central HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaRyukyusFormosaKorea, North ChinaCentral & South ChinaIndo ChinaMalay Peninsula

BoninsMarianasWestern CarolinesEastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruWake, MarcusMidway Area

Philippines,Rew Guinea, H<itmaheraCelebes, Borneo

Bismarcks, Solomons

AleutiansKurilesAt~a tic

(See notes on pp 69-70)

FOR ENTIRE WAR

-—SORTIESENGAGING

AIRCRAFT

410022206gl

16126414432

24298g15727614997

1:;

24~11340

13

819

0

___@._

;:

537

&30

3319

613223go37162372

167

:;

3014

23372g

ENEMYMRCMFLIENGAGED

Bombers Fighter~

9;3565

684207

95

394$3026

;:421771

5872904

494

0

01191146g62

12595ql3913

3341012M4322lg735g2

226

24591501

787

0

22 51

-67-

ENilM AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMWT

Bombers Fi~ters

6;

22

5/3:157

84

272632221q23

3;

3g72304

247

0

14

44

?4g103

10104

925

2032

119

24g5

364

012———

41:47

3487t303001710

205)+7g92135lo2223436

1235901

202

9

26

1927

26210118

147

13g3

201720

13

75g

10

1513

220

AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDON GROUND

91;

?1

4;:521

9;

167217991671622536

140

1590133

;;

91

0

30

25

lg603

11g

92

111160

2

1120

la

ltil

o10

OWN LOSSESTo ToEnemy EnemyAfA A / C

32;;

130236.s02g17

.s7141643g27102320

27i31113

19

c1

X__

g

:4

101560

114

39

5!

{4

6635

241

5

L

1?1400111

100031

3;

16’36

343

11

3

TABLE 26• OWN SORTIES MD I.OSSES , mRIAL COMBAT DATA,AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED ON GROUND, MONTHLY, IN

BASE,MONTH

UND-BASIJD1+2-August

SeptemberOctgberNovemberDecember

1943-JmaIYP ebruaryMarchApri1MeyJuneJdyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecemker

1~44-JanuaryI?ebrwwyMarchApril%’JuneJulyAugustSe~temberOctoberNovemberDecember

1~45-Jan.-Aug.

CARRIER-BASED1942_~ebruaq?

MayAugustOctoberNovember

1943-Janw3ryFebruaryJulyNovanberDecember

ACTIONSORTIES

62,622

5%838606334

39442935s445451729

3,1191,1161,6091,5652,7722,781

j,04a3,$Ik25,6303,6453,0g7l,55g2,7633,6733,73g4,0193,5931,173

4,612

-ZzE

3;;bgl2~796

7g20

70;103

17s254

;5.~67

SORTIESENGAGINGLNFJ4YAIRCRAFT-—

017

*2lg6204yz27

54254

5320

1152C01572131011~~153

7044441~

i4020001

0

~

13314211620

1520

26;12

6942—.—

-L&L

NIJOR AREA CAMPAIGNS

A. SOKM3NS -ENEMY

AIRCRAFTENGAGED—.-

Bombers Fkhters%+-5,122

7227i 1$8117 24o59 1350 41

g 1097 451 17

30 7625

6; U3395 57731 35335 380

2og6; l?gg 341

7 1,:;;122 PO2 301 :0 01 10 00 00 00 13

0 0

--Q+ ~30 0~7 141

207 119qo 13g2 26

23 05 01 0

93 2784 0

1 860 2

0~ 35: 5,919

BISMARCKS mEi4ENEMY AIRCRAFT

DESTROYED

7457220

4

213

4:3616134

362

4102001000000

0

3i1205519

5016

3;15g4

150919165

;:

36013~

6011010000

0

24 42654g :?2 5

11 04 0

1; 6;3 0

1 240 11 0— .

611 1,717—..

ENEMYAIRCRAFTDESTROYEDON GROUND

1017

1700

4200003

21g

2310

1753020011100

0

910

2130210

000

190

000

-_KE__

OWN U3ssrsON ACTION SORTIES

cpera-

?=PA/A A/C tional21~~ 1 g 0

26 ;!!g 213 g

0 0

~+!g

1 21 115 23 61 20 191 1 0

0 0 00 1 00 2 0g 22 101 0 0

lg44-Janmry 0 4 0March 0 0 0Apr i l 0 c1 Q

GRi4.ND TOTAL 273 444 225Note: M i n o r d.iscreyaucies between this snd the preceding table resul f rom ineradicable dl.ffer-

ences “oetween m:.chine tabula t ions and are too small to affect the usefulness Of tile d a t a .

(See notes onpp 69-70)

- 6 8 -

BASE,MONTH

CAIUUER-BASED1944-September

OctoberNovemberDecember

1945-January

LAND-BASED~

AugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMerchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

GR4ND TOTAL——

ACTION;ORT IES

22,328 6,0256,5844,2992,062

3,356

&!w

i!;;

7;;

1,3475,6615,7345,1963,9092,2891,567

310

A2@5

See note to Part A of this table

NOTES TO TABLES 25 AND 26

TABLE 269 continued

B. PHILIPPINES AREA

EmMTAIRCRAFTENGAGED

Bombers l’i~htere

33 159

1 00

2 30 21

20 134

1000000c1

70110000

624 2,666——

ENEMT AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COKBAT

Bombers Fighters

30 86

0ii 040 :

14 59

0 70 00 10 00 00 00 00 0

409 1,307

ENEMY\IRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN GROUND

+?1

29249t3230

103

1127

07

211016

20M1361000

1,702

OWN LOSSESIN ACTION SORTIES

QdlnemY %era-A/A A/C tional

~zz2g*

112 49 112m 11 3628 2 27

19 3 39

0 0 60 0 04 1 01 2 0

12 5 1

9 0 913 2 1210 0 1313 0 6

0 2$ 1 g0 0 71 0 0

348 &3g 300

Table 25 shows the distribution among areas of aerial combat by Navy and Marinefor tie ent i re war . Table 26 gives the mo~thly record for the four &jor-areas whereest destruction of enemy planes took place.

The area in which Naval aircraft destrowd the largest nunber of enemy aircraft

a i r c r a f t ,t h e great-

was thePhi l ippines - 1,721 in air combat, 1,702 on the ground. Nearly all of this was accomplished thelast four months of 1944 and January 1945, 1,073 in October alone, 833 in Sepkember, 770 in Nov-ember.

Second in importance were the Japanese home islands taken as a whole. In Japan the des-truction was primarily of grounded aircraft, the bulk of which (1,102, plus 120 in air combat)were destroyed in the concluding carrier campaign of July and August 1945. The greatest enemylosses in aerial oombat (420) were sustained in the February carrier raids on the To~o area;during the same month 228 grounded planes were also destroyed, for a total of 648. The remainderof the total of 2,831 planes was accounted for in the four intervening months, March-June 1945.

The area of third importance was the Ryukyus, where destruction was accomplished largelyin air combat. Here too the results (1,871 in air combat, 509 on the ground) were largelyaccomplished in a verywere destroyed in &is

In all the above

few months, the bulk in the one month of April 1945, when 1,337-Dlanesarea a lone, and May 1945, when 466 were accounted for.

areas carrier aircraft were the primary ar,ent of des t ruct ion , of grounded

(Cont. on next page)

- 6 9 -

I

TABLE 26. Continued

c. RYUKYUS ARIA

=7

CARRIELBASED1944-October

1945-JanuaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly

LAND-BASED1945-Jauar7

FebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJtiyAugust

GRAND TOTAL

ACTIONSORTIES

421%1. 3

6767,866

lIj,b2j7,0tn4,8].6

16

q

z846

1,3712,021

957137

*

ENGAGING

AIRCRAFT

1,61287

13;1,100

2572g4

5+

55

151212149103

2,149

-

Bombers Fighters

052

4$ g4627g

1 213 0

1z 2

117 82112 16746 1409 22 1

gal 1.654

ENEMY AIRCRAFTDESTROYEDIN COMBAT

Bombers Fi~hters

0 0

4: $:521 103 0

2k3 262-z 3

4 13

100 4;

W9 1,042

irRcRm!OESTROYEEIN GROUNE

~

2810622729130

~000212

130

-JQ-

OWN LOSSESN ACTION SORTIES

~

0 26: 2102 M44

%: 34

17 120 0 0

See note to Part A of this table.(Cont. from preceding page)

aircraft bulked high in the total, and the campaigns were short. In the fourth-ranking area, theSolomons and Bismarcks, land-based aircraft accounted for 1,988 of the 2,520 planes destroyed,all but 192 were destroyed in air combat, and the active air campaign lasted 20 months. It wasalso the most expensive campaign for the Navy, in terms of air combat losses.

The Japs had a number of bad months in the Solomons and Bismarcks, but their woret three,from the standpoint of planes lost, were January 1944 (406 lost to the Navy, largely in raids onRabaul), November 1943 (246 lost between Rabaul and Bougainvillea), and October 1942 (295 lossesnear Guadalcanal and Santa Cruz). Other particularly bad months for the Japs were June and July1943 (the New Georgia campaign), and August 1942 (the initial invasion of Guadalcanal, and theBattle of the Eastern Solomons). In all of tiese peak months except June-July 1943 our carrierforces helped increase the total des t ruc t ion .

In %ree other areas was the destruction of Japanese aircraft sufficiently high to warrantspecial notice. These were: (1) Formosa, where 477 were downed in air combat and 527 destroyedon the ground, almost entirely by carrier planes in October 1944 and January 1945; (2) the Marianss,where 751 were destroyed in air and 219 on ground , also almost entirely by carrier planes and large-ly in the one month of June 1944; and (3) the Bonins, where 430 Jap planes were accounted for,pr inc ipal ly in three br ief car r ier ra ids in June-July 1944.

Over three hundred plaes were destroyed in each of two other areas, the Narshalls and theEastern Carolines, over two hundred in the Midway area and the Western Carolines, over a hundredin Hew Guinea and Indo China.

- 7 0 -

!!~~ 26. Continued.

D. JAPANESE ROME ISLANDS

BASE , AREA,MONTH (1945)

CARRIER43ASED

HOKXAIDO, NO. HONSHUJulyAugust

TOKYO AREAFelmmryMarchJulyAugust

CEWLWJ.I HONSHUFebruaryMarchMayJulyAugust

KYUSHU, KuRE AREAFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJUIyAugust

LAIuuMsm

TOKYO, CENTRAL HONSHUMarchAprilMayJuneJuI.yAugust

KYUSRU, KURE AREAMarchAprilMayJuneJUIyAugust

GRAND TOTALSee note to Part A of this

ACTIONSORTIES

NEMY PLANESENGAGED

Bomb- Fight-ers ers

XUWU

~ 02 T0 0

??%4 02 15

2g 58

T146F

21 210

10 4;0 20

8626+=

36 4971$3 1129 1351 930 251 0

& 16J

++

0 07 242 320 60 24

Q;0

01 3:2 142 3:0

211 2366

TINY PLANES DESIN COhC3AT~Oab- F@ht-ers ers

&

17

0

%21

23

~

200

100

413724167001

SwJ

0T

0

LLlcj~

3!

q

?2

197

yw+

191715710190

g M

4 ~750 04 50 g0 00 6

4 ZJ750 11 111 52 100 0

157 J3jl

TROYEDON GROUND

2

~001001

~

50000

&xi

OWN I13SSESON ACTION SORTIES

&n_x.3

309 85

06: 30 0

130 370 0M 3025 01~ 2

43; 10 0

P-J

*124

g

01513

&830130

W_0

3;

110150

0 0 051:1 00 1 00 1 0

loJ g0 0 00 0 01 2 02 0 261g1 0 2

(See notes on pp. 69-70)

- 7 1 -

TABU 27. JAF’A14Es2! AIRCRAFT DES’i!BDYED Il? AERIAL COMBAT

MONTH

lgbl-December

lgq2-JsuNwyFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

lg4j-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

lgU-JanuaryFebruaryMarchApril&JuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovenberDecember

1945-Jrmum’yFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJ~yAWUst

TOTALS

SINK=3

—

0

1

;02426

4:25

1215015

47161

?;69

14gg48996

127117

386200&352

46:gg

:3517066

1;?122361100426

ISJ

3896

MB—

61

1

;3000

52124

E

34761961221331—-

529

BY UL NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAIWBy Type and Allied Code Name, Monthly

m—

ATX—

100

25901

017

4:3780~

~

Zim

012;3537426K

@_

iiE&—

ACK—

613

1

;1663

A

*

fCE

mln.

:

15

14156056——

J&

ITHES

L?uL

1

01000

14230

133

1s00

000000010010

626g20rK21

1952

1

45

;6200

247

rAL—

g20

4;

3240

450

130

174

1510

20

1;100

2g00

lay

9

11?6

30461M20—

801_

iim—

m—

00

t0

g200

6?6

5

46

15501032g—

a

m—

Am—

0

0100

1019070

1100

000000000

3;1

3605

4;222

10.21

13

2;3002—

20J

ii-m

JILL

0002

3:00

5:73

;1926121

L

174

Em

lmR

000100000101

00

2;

;

Q_

L

(See notes onp.75)

- 7 2 -

.

TABLW 27. Continued

MONTH

lghl-December

1912-JanuaryFebnaaryMarchAprilwJuneJulyAuguEtSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943-JsnuaryFebrueryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

l$W-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilwJuneJdyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

lg4~anuaryFebruaryMsrchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTALS

FLO—

RUFE—

97

:

0000000100

z

011100190~

010

06604100—

L

AT P—

JAKE—.

20000

27001

Is111

252

12

11159

12410—

m

LANES—

PETE—

20022

070000003211

i00

14

:2—

AL

OTHER& U/I

1

0000720401690

30000

15200122

151000000201

112g7120

—

NELL—

301200

100001001

1210

33301101—

*

TWIN

SALLY

216000

000000000020

000713002

29

:

62133320

ENGINE

BETTY

120

114000

2723

:9

2710

g1514M

4;01

165;

g

4

24g201162

4J’J_

BOMB—

NICK—

01030220g

1712

269

123

:

EL

ER,DI-NAH

00010001

10633

88

:2316J

3

FIGHTIR-VING

90027

;

2

ii42101

41

ER, REFRAN-CES

230

7{104

608

2491

1

149_

CONN

LILY

02000200

3;35

3105

:00

AISS

HELEN

10

00010

;01700

73201000

~

NCE

PEGGY

002:

000

OTHER& U/I

9

0M10000

27555020

000000600010

04160

1550

1?51

001:

000

=

(See notes on p. 75)

-73-

TABU 27. ‘Continu&

MONTH

1941-Deceuber

1942-JmumyFebruaryMarchApril&JuneJd yAugw tSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

194j-JanuaryFebruaryMachApril%JuneJulyh@8tSeptemberOctoberNovanberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuI.yAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuxyFebruaryMarchAprilMegJuneJulyAugust

TOTALS

SINGLE-ENGINllFIGHTER

1

11100g

{9

~

1395015

47161

;;69

14L3

!;981P131

4042Y310460

51;9312

295727214123

1623652s6432gg10356

5962

-SINGLE-ENGINEBOMBER

0

0100M39

5:

4;

0

450

130

174

1510

9:1

52110120

MT22

1%1$119

290

?443691271020

Jz?fL

TOTALS, BY

FLOATPLANE

1

00007204

2;104

;

000

15250

;g

3;201

1610

i294

14

132617

Gg7

2

-3!&_

MAJOR TYPTWIN.ENGINIl:OKSAT

9

0M10000

;?53M0

114000

273205

113110

922153610in10

4;2583533

443173

1077321

_i-

1267

ES

FLYING30AT

1

041030050320

000000013022

00001923

;

;

11513000

_!z!.-

!RANSPORT

;001600

116

;

96g75022

80

DU.INER

2g010

_251_

TOTAL,ALL

TYPES

12

42231113110s21W3117

3::12WZgz201

2y3459375

12055391599076

-QEL__

-74 -

NOTES TO TABLE 27

Table 27 shows the monthly bredcd~ by model and type of Japanese aircraft destroyed incombat by carrier-based and land-based aircraft combined.

If the reported identifications by Naval pilots can be accepted as generally correct,65 percent of tie Japanese aircraft destroyed in air combat were single-engine fighters, 16percent were single-engine bombers, 14 percent were twin-en~ine fighters or bombers, and only5 percent were float planes or of miscellaneous types.

The 65% of single-engine fighters may h further broken down: nearly two-thirds were Zekes,less than one-fifth were Tonys, Oscars and Nates, one-tenth were Tojos and newer types, and thesmall remainder were of other or unidentified types.

@or half of the single engine-bombers were the vulnerable Vals, the remainder Judys,Kates and Jills in decreasing magnitude. Nearly 40 percent of the twin-engine planes wereidentified as Bettys, 12 percent as Frances; eiZht other principal types were identified insmall numbers, and over 15 percent could not be identified.

The worst month for Zekes was June 1944, when 461 were shot down by Naval planes, but alltypes of Jap fighters had bad months in October 1944 (727 shot down) and April 1945 (698 lost).By far the worst losses of single-engine bombers were in April 1945, when 304 Vals and 132 otherswent down. Twin-engine planes had their worst month in October 1944, when 258 of assorted typeswere destroyed in combat off Formosa and the Philippines.

-75-

TABLE 28. AERIAL COMBAT RESULTS , INDIVIDUAL MODELS OFOWN VS. JAPANESE AIRCRAFT, 1 SIIPTEMIYiR 1944 . 15 AUGUST 1945

(Figures in left-had column for-each plane type are enemy planes destroyed in combatby own planes of type listed; figures in right head column are cwn planes lost in

combat with enemy plaaee of the types listed. )

AIRCRAXTMODEL

Zeke, HampOscarTonyTojoFrankJackGeorgeMyrtNateU/I S’IE VF*

TOTAL S/E VF

ValJudyKateJillSoniaOther VB-VT

TOTAL m-w

JakePeteRufeRexPaulDave

TOTAL F/P

BettyDinahFrancesIrvingNicksallyHelenLilyNellPeggyU/I T/E Combat

TQTAL T/E COMBA!

FLYING BOINSImAmsPoms

GRAND TOTAL.—

F6F

1000396 ;;275 1128

{9

11 1233 928 036 0

u

2314 149

215134 126

1052114 1

515 2

50lg15060

89

185 648

ll&3

til331227M6

M--A

* 27 F6% shot down by unidentified VF,

.—.—

FM

.!37 2y 32917 201001

10

U33 7

n

?710

L05

700000

7

21M94

16021 11

-&.

gl 1

010

0 1

377 9

14 F6F

OWN AIRCFAI’T K) DEL——SB2C,TM

17 g14 14 261000

L

44 16

;1000

6

301010

5

30015102000—

12

130 0 4

71 20

s l o s t

. — .

PB4Y

25 41~ 2

221600

L

64 11

1217320

25

31g232

2

4g

14310

3200701

31

/32go02-—

204 13

—.-)THERVPB——

2 221200 100

L

10 6

203200

7

20000~

3

00000000000— .

0

1100

22 6

TO&.LF’IGH’lJERj

11114 1044go 30364 13;:: 15

1643 123555

142al

3131 198

490 2175 243

1352919 1

891 5

6326156

__l___

120

216 772

1433166 15421 151 1191026 I

709 11

!.740%1

4937 2M.-

——TOTALBOMBERS

39 1431 310 41626 100

L

118 33

191

11520

38

36i?33

L_

56

173111330270~

43

103200[

297 39

——GRANDTOTALS

1453 118511 33374 17369 15144 1649 13 3555142 2110 lZ

3249 231

509 2176 254

1403119 1

9934My

196

176

3274 15721 153 126

2772$9d

to unknown types of aircraft, and 1down by unidentified ~, have been arbitrarily prorated among the various single engine enemyfighter typee in accordance with the number of ee.ch reported to have been shot down by F6Fs andF4US, and the number of F6Fs and F~s reported shot down by each. Similar proration is notpossible for other plane tfles.

-76-

NOTES TO TABLE 28

Table 28 is a combination of two tabulations. It covers only the period from 1 September1944 to 15 August 1945, during which period were destroyed 5,234 airborne planes, or 577%, ofthe to ta l Jap planes credi ted to Naval a i rcraf t during the w a r . The f i rs t l ine of f igures ineach column is the number of Jap planes, of tie model and type listed at the left, destroyedin combat during this 12-month period by Navy and Marine carrier and land-based planes of themodel or type listed at the top. The second line of fiowres is the number of Navy and Marineplanes lost during the same period in encounters between the same types or models of aircraft,based on a special study of our own aircraft losses.

In tie case of F6F and F4U losses the bulk of those reported as destroyed by unidentifiedtypes, amounting to one-fourth of the total, have been prorated as noted in the footnote to tietable . This , pl:s the errors in identification which may normally be expected in the action re-ports, results in a decrease of accuracy wi.ich leaves somdhing to be desired, but permits com-parisons which are believed sufficiently near the truth to be of considerable value and in teres t ,and are in any event the best available.

The result of comparing each pair of figures is to produce a combat ratio for air combatbetween each two models or types of planes involved - subject to the limitation on accuracy notedabove.

The F6F appears to have shot down 15* sin@e-engine Jap fighters for each F6F destroyed incombat with them. Against the Zeke the F6F ratio was over 13-tc-l; against Oscar over 15-to-l;against Tojo (probably including a large proportion of misidentifications) over 31-to-l. Againstthe most advanced types the F6F did less well: 8&to-1 against the Frank, Jack and George com-bined .

Unusual is the loss of 6 F6Fs in combat with Betty; however, with respect to enemy twin-engineplanes as a whole the ratio was 66-to-1, and against all other bomber types combined =8s 225-to-l.

The F4U nearly matched the F6F performance during this period, wi th a 15- to- l ra t io agains ts ingle-engine fi@ters, and 12-to-l against Zeke. The F4U, however, included a relatively largenumber of obsolete Nates among its kills, and while its record against Oscar and Tony was super-ior to the F6F$f, the F4U scored only 13-to-l against Tojo, and only 6-to-1 against Frank, Jackand George combined.

The phenomenal FM leads all fighters during this period, with a 26-to-1 ratio over Japs ingle-engine f ighters , only 2 losses sustained in destroying 87 Zekes, and only two losses indowning 194 bombers and miscellaneous types.

Bomber losses, as might be expected, were higher against enemy fighters, though the PB4Y re-ported destroying over 5 fighters for every PB4Y combat loss. NO Navy bombers were lost, h o w -ever , in the combats which resulted in destruction of 179 enemy bombers, float planes. andmiscellaneous types during this period.

The catholic taste of the PB4Ys during the 12 months may be no+~d. They accounted, in all,for planes of 24 different identified combat types, plus transports and unidentified types, andthey destroyed over 15 Jap planes for each of their own losses.

From the Japanese angle, the ineffectiveness of their e.ir forces against the Navy duringthis period is clearly shown. They lost 3,131 fighters in destroying 198 of ours, and expended118 of their fighters in destroying only 33 of our bombers. Even their best fighter, Jack,sustained 49 losses in destroying 13 Navy planes.

700380 0 4E 6- 7 7 -

The Japanese single-engine bombers knouked down only one of our planes for every 186 oftheir losses (our VSB and VTB enjoyed a 3~-to-l advantage over the Japs). Their twin-enginebombers and f ighters d id l i t t le be t ter , losing 68 planes for every kill they made. Their fly-ing boats and float planes made no kills at all to offset their 203 losses. Nor did their 72trtinsports l o s t - 4% of which were destroyed by our roving search planes. In a l l , the Japslost over 20 planes for each of ours destroyed in air combat during this period.

TABLE 29. ANTIAIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE,By Plane Model, Carrier-Based and Land-Based, by Years.

1941-42 1943LOSS AND lmRCENT OF ~ “ SORTIES

OST ATTACKINGSORTIES

ATTACKINGTARGETS

With AATotal Present

LOSS AND PERCENT OF)AhWGE TO SORTIESBASE ,

PLANEMODEL

-J--

DAMAGE TO SORTIESENEMY AA MEETINGM

Dam- Dam-Lost aged Lost aged

CARRIERI’4F

1,976 1,238-’?-% -I?%

4,217 3,6327 71,481 1,2931,147 973

237 213

44 4857 724 1876 892 3110 l?20 0

1.2 13.4mm1.9 14.50.6 9.10.9 14.60.9 16.10 0

&116650

G4425100

2166

40

F6FSBDSB2CTBFTBll

0 01,209 817

0 0142 83169 169

0 0 0 018 37 2.2 4.50 0 0 03 4 3.6 4.8

11 11 6.5 6.5

0330

4350

E00

5525116000

1,2450

11,94456

1,053131

6,0220

4,077184217204

1,0670

LAND-BASEDF4F

1,564x %

86 43373lv 232 623 2150 031 1162 332 314 6

9,090T

42766

4,9410

3,24913115696

0.9 4.8mm4.2 5.43.0 9.10.5 4.40 0

1.0 3.61.5 25.21.3 19.94.2 6.3

F4UF6FSBDSB2UTBFPBYPB4YPv

00

1,14917

1353900

00

55017

1012300

00

1812600

0 0 00 0 0

15 3.3 2.73 5.9 17.6

16 2.0 15.84 26.1 17.40 0 00 0 0

1 1945

I944

%0

34112821

61,951 41,943m -7,993 5,9827,651 3,396

0 06,555 4,87017,787 11,357

CARRIER~F4U, FGmSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBM

69,752 33,592

04,2743,539 12,341 16,006

44,684_

02,1372,5269,3289,674

657 2060mm0 022 4216 131162 424174 646

1.5 4.6m ?mo 0

1.0 2.00.6 5.21.7 4.51.8 6.7

680 1808mm137 20140 1300 0

104 215166 584

1.6 4.3m m2.3 3.41.2 3.80 0

2.1 4.41.5 5.1

1.1 4.9m -2-zT2.6 2.20.0 0.00.3 2.10.3 5.61.1 5.23.4 31.06Y5 28.44.2 20.84.5 28.23.6 13.50.6 2.10.0 0.0

27l-%4124

3:22

:540

125

171019171421220

E11090

109

13

48,068~

16,578~

LAND-BASEDF4U, FGF6FU/i VPSBDSB2C, SBWTBF, TBMPBYPBMPB2YPB4YPVPBJU/i VPB

59,716 27,4981,587

51 19,713

04,109

9933776

1,0681,6602,884

40

31,614m

77427

13,6670

2,7653081846

5121,1121,512

5

248 1646 0.8 5.2mnz-z m m

4 31 0.5 4.00 0 0.0 0.059 591 0.4 4.30 0 0 027 251 1.0 9.16 59 1.9 19.22 14 11.1 77.80 14 0.0 30.4

15 101 2.9 19.714 94 1.3 8.511 69 0.7 4.60 0 0.0 0.0

190 808-m m

1,19127

26924

4,60294984829

16924

953304

7 60 013 973 539 441 911 481 543 26911 417 250 0

17,0132,1951,530

5538736

1,769569

0131314 5,249 1,1990 0 0

2 . ANTIAIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE

Data on number of planes lost to enemy A/A fire, from which can be.calculated loss rates interms of action sorties flown, will be found in many of the preceding tables of this report. In

7Table 29, are additional data on number of planes damaged by enemy A A, and loss and damage ratesin terms of (a) Number of sorties attacking tar~ts, and (b) Number of sorties attackinr tarzetsin the face of enemy A/A fire.

, . .0.

On first glance at Table 29 the predominant impression will be the diversity of the figures.It may be grantmd that some of the smaller figures involved are affected by chance (and possiblypoor reporting). Yet upon closer inspection a number of fairly consistent relationships becomev i s i b l e :

(Cont. on next page)

-78-

(Cont. from preceding page)

(al Loss rates to enemv A/A were hiphest in 1942. and ~enerallv lowest in 1943. increasiruz.,— . ,slightly from then until the end of the war. The 1942 rates reflect the predominance of largeenemy warships among the targets for that year, figures for 1943 and subsequent years the relative-ly lower but increasing effectiveness of Japanese land A/A. Actually enemy A/A mterial improvedand increased in volume at a far greater rate, but th is t rend was offse t by the improwd perfor-mance characteristics of Naval a i rcraf t , and improved tictics agains t A/A.

(b) Loss rates for carrier-based aircraft were consistently higher than for land-based air-craft, despite inclusion in the latter of the re la t ive ly vulnerable VPB. The reason is thatland-based aircraft generally were assigned to attack the less well-defended rear area targets,already well beaten down by the carrier forces, such as those in the Marshalls and Phi l ipp ines .Also their campaigns against such heavily defended targets as the Rabaul area were of long duration,and by the later stages enemy A/A guns had been Sreatly reduced in number and ammunition suppliesdeple ted . C a r r i e r a i r c r a f t , on the other hand, were constantly reaching out toward the mostheavily defended targets, pressing their attacks close to wipe out such small and vital targetsas grounded aircraft, warships and merchant vessels, and seldom staying long enough to enjoy thebenefits of the reduced A/A defenses resulting from their attacks.

(c) The lesser effectiveness of enemy A/A against our land-based planes did not result froman appreciably lower rate of hits per sortie attacking defended tarEets, but fro= generallylower le thal ef fect of h i ts . A smaller percentage of the land-based planes hit by A/A was lost.. —In part, also the lower rate of losses for land-based planes reflected the extensive use of theless vulnerable SBD, whi le tie carriers were shifting to the highly vulnerable SB2C.

(d) The SBD, carrier-based or land-based, had consistently the best record of any plane model.It generally received slightly less hits per sortie than other planes, and in addition had thelowest ratio of losses to hits of any single-engine plane.

(e) The F6F appears to have had considerable advantage over the F4U when flown under the samecondi t ions . Receiv ing about the same number of hits per sortie in comparable operations, theF6F had a far lower rate of loss per plane hit.

(f) The TBM 1oss rate appears to have been lower than that of the SB2C. It received more hitsper sor t ie , but showed grea ter abi l i ty to survive h i t s . Both SB2C and TBM were somewhat moresubject to A/A loss than fighters.

(Note that in the above statements allowance has been made for non-comparable emplo~ent ofthe various plane models, not shown in the table, and particularly for the heavy use of the TBMin CVE support operations against targets whose A/A defenses had already been well reduced. The‘TEL! A/A 1oss rate “on fast carriers was 5@ greater than on CVES, but was still less than thefast carr ier ra te for SB2CS. The following table shows loss ra tes per 100 ac t ion sor t ies for theent i re war :

— —

CV-CVL CVEF6F .e7 xF4U 1.46 .90FM .40SBD .68SB2C 1.43TBM 1.10 .72

.

(g) The loss rates for VPBwere generally higher than for single-engine planes, but not ex-cessim considering the effectiveness of the minimum altitude attack tactics customarily used.The PBJ is an exception; the bulk of its attacks were made from higher altitudes against ratherpoorly defended targets, and its loss rate is correspondingly low.

The following table combines and summarizes the data for the principal models of bothcarrier-based and land-based planes for the entire war. I n u t i l i z i n g i t , it should be noted

(Cont. on next page)

- 7 9 -

(Cont. from preceding page)

that the use of F6Fs, SB2CS and TBW predominantly in carrier operations, and of F4Us and SBDSmainly in land-based operations tends to distort the relationships between these planes, andproduces rates differing from those which would be expected from figures based on performancein comparable operations.

Plane Model

lL/A Losses per100 Action

Sorties

Planes Hit Per100 Attacks,A/A Present

F6FF4U, FGFMSBDSB2CTBF, TBM

PB4YPVPBYPBJ

.83

.55

.48

.291.28.91

1.651.081.09.21

5.734.924.234.736.477.74

28.411.224.54.1

A/A Losses per100 Attacks,A/A Present

1.391.421.12.54

1.761.45

3.701.923.06.66

$ Lostof Planes

Hit

242927122719

13171316

.

.

-80-

3 . ATTACK DATA . BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA

(It should be noted that, because of mechanical difficulties arising from the use ofseveral different machine tabulations made at different times, there are s l ight d iscrepanciesbetween the tables covering attacks on targets, broken down by area and by target type. Noneof these are suff ic ient to af fect the val id i ty or essent ia l accuracy of the data . )

This section of the report breaks down the offensive effort of Navy and Marine carrierand land-based aircraft by the geographical areas in which the targets were located, withfurther detail in some cases on tie types of targets a t tacked in each area . Offensive effor tis expressed only in terms of (a) sorties attacking targets (see definition of this term, andnote difference between definitions for 1944 and for other years), and (b) tons of bombs ex-pended on targets. Data on rockets and ammunition expended will be found in subsequent sec-t i o n s , but not broken down by area.

Table 30 is the comprehensivein each major area, for tie ent i re

Table 31 breaks down the areas h i p t a r g e t s , and by years.

picture of the effort placed upon each major type of targetwar, by all of Naval aviation.

totals of sorties attacking targets between land targets and

Table 32 breaks down on a monthly basis the attack sorties andareas where the most important long campaigns were carried oq: thethe Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. Dab are given separatelyland-based attacks, for land targets and ship targets, on a monfily

bomb tonnage for the fourSolomons-Bismarcke a r ea ,for carr ier-based andb a s i s .

Table 33 gives data on a monthly basis, for attacks on land targets in the principalCentral Pacific island groups. Tables 34 and 35 show monthly shipping attack sorties. for1944 and 1945, for all major areae.

.

-81-

TABLE 30. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS, AND BOMB TONN4GEEX133NDED ON TARGETS (CARRIER-BASED ANO LAND-BASED cO~Iw,D)

By Type of Target, and by Target Area, for Entire War

Other Land Other WARSHIPSAir- Mili- Trans- Harbor & Un-

TARGET AREA fields tary porta- Areas known Ar- Unar-Targets tion Land * mored mored

Hokkaido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaRyukyusFormosaPhilippines

BoninsMarianasWestern CarolinesEastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruMidway, Wake, I&u_cus

Solomons, BismarcksNew Guinea, HalmaheraOther NEI, I@.laya

China, KoreaIndo China

Aleutians, KurilesAtlantic

TOTAL

Hokkaido, No. HonshuTokyo AreaCentral HonshuKyushu, Kure AreaRyulvsFormosaPhilippines

BoninsMarianasWestern Carolines!Sastern CarolinesMarshallsGilberts, NauruMidway, Wake, Marcus

Solomons, Bism~rckeNew Guinea, HahsaheraOther NEI, Malaya

China, KoreaIndo China

Aleutians, KurilesAtlantic

TOTAL

* Includinz industrial

SORTIES ATTACKING TARG

566 334 232 904259 382 144 2551556 126 64 1204250 318 44 144

14554 17665 810 12531842 1176 102 1268792 26578 2323 655

1304 4388 loi’ 743630 13822 432 42798 12649 991 11531613 1687 1 613519 20156 85 416771 1238 1 133737 1907 12 5

10777 33009 1928 9681394 1259 15 49161 332 28 73

188 104 65 184114 56 102 45

196 279 (J 797 312 390 0

63118 137777 7876 5815

2881222427

12394575348

2318

3291215743557

1473400403

699641945

4320

1437

23210

12716243llC

7528541

12153

128442943833665

8640497828

17980476237

4830

11665

59657

TONS OF BOM8S85 2932 14621 374 49

343 38424 55

720 306

14 26162 0221 381

0 4630 2041 548 6

806 5316 192 8

29 8465 6

0 256 0

2629 2373

22376168

23212414641022

232773

196118

16316

144

10521311

131

5101

8514

PENDED

Y3391180

408221362

16191443

9795

35

49304

60

22

G

mrgets ~so-ons ).# Includin~ minelaying.

ETS

10 76259 166533 134919 182

5 2734 222

1526 1123

55 302152 8273 332

178 319119 49

0 0308 54

766 92629 92 6

5 5324 239

0 1133 28

5000 4586—

5 44125 51333 44604 76

5 790 75

722 307

21 11099 724 7889 7477 00 0

100 7

472 46511 62 3

4 2915 99

0 614 3

2722 1563

493 106291 291172 151496 2531325 11881163 4204175 1591

699 405541 494

1129 1534754 237716 109519 3026 30

1069 2029270 314128 291

474 344400 92

9 6045 35

14394 10990——

2066368243461543

1716

221151342262115

610

60510549

226196

6

70713053

16658

238

81205420

15745

3353441

10830

816 6

5610 1589

623

285188

91

341

9560

15500

44141

502

733

1134

300

2421203

70

11414

12800

30000

870

38—

741

TOTAL

2192681129526889

383225527

47876

760019931227154928

2647322083223

5296533561033

14801075

5741074

259204

982221110382479139511865

18845

2109613962331736

10903967

1402

289831076391

664461

286177

102898

-82-

NOTES ‘TO TABLE 30

This table makes it clear that the three areas of heaviest Naval offensive a i r ef for t werekhe Solomona and Bismarcks, t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , and the Ryukyus, in that order, followed next bythe Marshalls, the Western Carolines, the Marianas, and Japan as a whole. Other areas, thoughimportant a t par t icular t imes , received a far less to ta l weight of a t tack.

These seven pr inc ipal areas were the targets of over 85$ of tie Navy’s a i r of fens ive;over 2@ of the total sorties and 28% of the bomb tonnage were expended against Bisrmrcks-Solomons targets, 18% of each were expended against Philippines targets, and 14% of each wereexpended against Ryukyus targets, while the Marshalls claimed 1%.

The targets attacked =ried with the area and the purposes of theabout a quarter of tie to ta l offensive was di rected agains t a i r f ie lds ,other military ground targets, about one-seventh against shipping, andcellaneous land tar~ets. In Japan. however. nearly 60% of the attacks

campaign. Overa l l ,about one-half againstone-tenth against mis-were on airfields. and. . .

a b o u t 25$ on shipping, with less attention to other land targets. I n t h e Marshalls thre~quarters of the attacks were on military ground targets other than airfields. In Formosa andthe Eastern Carolines airfields and shipping each accounted for a third of the total. ForChina and Indo China two-thirds of the attacks were on shipping along the coast and in theharbors .

The pr incipal areas of a i r f ie ld a t tack were the Ryukyus, the Solomons and Bismarcks,Japan, and the Philippines. In the Solomons airfields were principally bombed; in the otherareas fighter strafing and rocket attacks were moro impor tant .

Heavy attacks on military land targetsMarshalls and tie Western Carolines,

s p redominant in the Solomons end Bismarcks, thewere largely the result of the long campaigns for complete

neutralization and reduction of enemy installations in the parts of these areas that were by-passed, though a large volume of pre-invasion and direct support attacks was made. The heavyat tacks on mi l i ta ry land targets in the Phi l ippines , the Ryukyus, the Marianas, and the Bonins,reflect almost entirely pre-invasion air bombardment and direct air support of ground forces,by carrier and land-based planes.

The heaviest volume of shipping attack, 25$ of all Navy shipping attacks, was f lown,largely f rom carr iers , in the Philippines campaign. Japan itself was the second most importantarea for shipping attack, particularly attacks on heavy warships in harbor. Rnemy warshipswere also heavily attacked in the Solomons area, and merchant shipping was heavily attacked inhalf a dozen other areas.

- 8 3 -

TABLE 31. SORTIES ATTACKING LAND TARGETS AND SHIP TARGETS(C.4RR13tR-BAS~ AND ~ND-BAsED COMBI~)

By Target Area and by Years

TARGET AREA

Solomons, BismarcksNew Guinea, HalmaheraCelebes, Bornoo

Midway AreaWake, MarcusGilberts, NauruMarshallsEastern CarolinesWestern CarolinesMarianasBonins

PhilippinesFormosaRyukyus

Kyushu, Kure AreaCentral HonshuTokyo AreaHokkaido, No. Honshu

Korea, No. ChinaCentral ChinaSouth ChinaIndo ChinaJava, Sumatra, Malaya

AleutiansKuriles

Atlantic

TOTAL, ALL AREAS

NOTES TO TABLE 31

SO1942

1,09018

0690

7?

20

430

1,686

RTIES AT1943

10,639109

01,o381,830

5448

1245

0

14,207

TACKING1944

31,5892,691

115

0857297

21,2683,127

11,98618,5671,860

12,1542,273

860

98

0278

483

108,503

LAND TARm

4,4872

372

082632

2,457245

7,56896

4,239

27,2141,43034,613

4,9521,9345,7941,445

3235

48331719

078

0

98,670

GETSI’OTAL

47,8052,721

496

02,7902,15924,3463,38019,55418,6636,099

39,3683,703

35,473

4,9521,9345,7941,445

3235

483317117

126361

913

223,066——

— .SORTIES

1942

1,239851

32042

063

6

140

67

1,837

-

%&— .

1,66880

05

47180

5

0

21

55

1,971

——ATTACKING1944

2,266525169

0362

1,7171,5172,7661,2701,224

7,839683849

11

31

041

39

20,976

SHIP TARm

18

192

000

17226

3970

270

6611,1341,950

1,9011,0181,012

747

28211952675636

029

0

11,237

GETSX’Ol!AL

5,174626362

3208349

2,1321,5483,1631,2701,494

8,5C61,8172,799

1,9011,0181,012

747

28211952775767

1671

161

36,021

The predominance of the Solomons campaign in 1942-43 is clearly shown. The equal importanceof land and shipping targets in 1942, and the staady decrease in th~ relative importance of ship-ping as a target i s a lso i l lus t ra ted . 1944, as the table indicates , was tie year when Navalaviation was first able to come to grips with sizeable quantities of the Jap ~rchant m a r i n eand was the year when the ‘bulk of it was eliminated.

The table a180 i l lus t ra tes graphical ly the expansion of the areas of operation of theNaval a i r forces , and the shifts from old areas to new as enemy bases were captured or ky-passed and neutralized , and ene~ shipping eliminated from successive areas.

-64-

TABLE 32. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS , AND BOMB TONNAGEEXPENDED ON TARGETS, IN MAJOR ARFA CAMPAIGNS

Monthly, for Carrier-Based and Land-Based Attacks, on Land and Shipping Targets.

A. SOLOMONS - BISMARCKS AR!%

MONTH

1942 - MayAugustseptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNo~mber

Ee cember

1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

~ttackinz Bombs onTargets Targets

30

89154197212

1s1258201224229408

2,127670983

1,0431,8842,130

1,0461,5543,9383,1132,5831,4092,5743,4853,5663,7993,3971,118

465805644765798426458

30

24545748

46138116145129303

1,482363592674

1,0991,272

519866

2,1531,6581,320

5481,1251,3861,3781,5801,397

818

550815726885

1,044457624

126 143655 186

10,348 6,35931,582 14,7484,487 5,244

47,072 26,537

——

TTACRSSHIPPI1$G TARGETSSorties Tons of.ttackinc Bombs onTargets - Targets

028

17226624793

1291069532

12718

3079089

11918387

26331651517214055

1268179

23617810

0000Io0

01149

10112735

511109514977

1765639

7359

15912814335203

10112768311

0000200

0 0—806 323

1,382 7502,171 636

1 2

4,360 1,711

ttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

0 0389 147

0 044 190 00 0

51 23

240 880 0

0 00 07 0

.—433 166291 111

7 00 0

731 277

BASED ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETS

Sorties Tons ofttacking Eloxbs onTargets Targets

220 13965 340 0

89 4159 210 0

0 0

217 12269 35

91 731 03 0

433 235286 15795 730 0

814 465

NOTES TO TABLE 32A.

The predominance of land-based operations in the Solomons-Bismarcks area may be especiallynoted. ~arrier o f f e n s i v e a c t i v i t y a~ainst l a n d t a r g e t s w a s l a r g e l y l i m i t e d t o ~utting” the -

Marines ashore in August 1942, and neutralizing Buka and Bonis airfields in support of theBougainvillea landings in November 1943. The carriers concentrated solely on enemy shipping in

(Cont. on next page)

-85-

the

(Cont. from preceding page)

Coral Sea , Eas tern Solomons, Santa Cruz and Guadalcanal battles of 1942, and in the Rabaul andKavieng strikes of 1943-44.

Land-based aircraft were forced to devote a major part of their offensivm effort to ship-ping targets during the first ten critical months of the Solomons campaign, to prevent enemyreinforcement of their forces and naval bombardment of our installations. A substant ia l anti-shipping effort continued throughout the balance of 1943 and 1944, reaching a peak in the early1944 strikes which nxide Rabaul Harbor untenable, but after l!ay 1943 land targets received farg r e a t e r attOntion.

Peaks of offensive activity against land targets may be noted in July 1943 (direct supportof New Georgia landings), Novembar-l)ecember 1943 (Bougainville landings), March 1944 (Japanesecounter-offensive on Bougainville). The decline in volume in January-February 1944 reflectsthe longer missions flown against Rabaul during these months , contrasted with the previousshort-range hops in the Solomons. The heavy volume of attacks in July-November 1944 reflectsthe withdrawal of Army planes, leaving the principal responsibility of neutralizing the Solomonsto an increased force of Marine aircraft operating from Bougainvillea, Green Island and Emirau.It also reflects the withdrawal of enemy air strength, permitting use of Marine VF entirely foroffensive purposes.

In December 1944 the bulk of the single-engine planes were withdrawn from this area fort ransfer to tie P h i l i p p i n e s , leaving PBJs as the principal Naval a i rcraf t remaining. Thisaccounts for the larger bomb tonnage per sortie thereafter, and the cessation of shipping attacks,which during late 1944 had been largely fighter attacks on barges.

-86-

MONTH

1944 - AugustSepteaberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTAL

TABLE 32. Continued

B. PHILIPPINES P.REA

CARRIER-B‘UIJD TARGETSSorties Tons of

Lttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

0 03,944 1,4143,386 8072,o83 4762?,205 287

2,270 6630 00 00 00 00 00 00 0

13,888 3,647

ASED ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETSForties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

o 02,300 6992,737 9951,958 995

501 46

3870000000

910000000

7,883 2,826

LAND-BASED ATTACKSIAND TARGBXT3

Sorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

1 04 3

33 117 0

481 125

1,183 4015,446 2,6165,594 2,5865,022 2,3803,752 2,0062,212 1,1601,434 794

301 142

25,480 12,214

SHIPPING TARGETSSorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

3 033 847 li55 21

204 66

104 6107 2538 515 510 80 00 00 0

616 155

NOTES TO TABLR 32B

There were three main stages to the Naval air campaign in the Philippines : (a) the des-truction of enemy air strength and shipping throughout the area (plus a minor amount of pre-invasion shore bombardment and direct support) carried out by carrier forces during September,October and November, 1944; (b) protection of the amphibious forces and direct support of groundforces by both carrier and land-based planes in the Mindoro and Lingayen landin~s of Decemberand January; end (c) extensive ground support end pre-invasion bombardment by Marine aircraftin the Luzon campaign and subsequent invasions of the Visayas and Mindanao.

The table shows t!le considerable emphasis on shipping attack in the first stage; half ofthe bombing offensive was against enemy naval and merchant vessels, while the remainder of thebombing effort, plus most of the fighter offensive, was sent largely agains t a i r f ie lds . Theat tacks of September-November 1944 in the Philippines constituted the Navyvs heaviest sustainedanti-shipping offensive; they resulted (see Appendix) in 279,000 tons of combat veseels and474,000 tons of large merchant vessels sunk (including attacks at Formosa and the Ryu@ue). Atthe same time the air offensive resulted (see Table 26B) in the destruction of 1406 enemy air-craft in air combat and 1,295 on the ground.

By the beginning of the second stage, enemy shipping had been almost completely eliminated,and the enemy air force largely nullified. 676 more planes were destroyed, however, and sub-stantial attacks were made on ground targets in support of ground forces.

For the third stage the carriers were no longer required, enemy aircraft were almost com-ple te ly absent , and the bulk of the offensive consisted of direct air support of Army groundtroops. The table shows the considerable volmne of attacks flown by Marine fighters and divebombers in the Philippines from December 1944 to the end of the war. Although the Marineoffensim in this theater during these few months amounted to nearly a quarter of Marine aviationstota l for the war , i t has been prac t ica l ly ent i re ly unpubl ic ized.

-8’7-

TABLE 32. Continued

c. RYUKYUS ARM

CARRIER-IAND TARGETS

MONTH Sorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs orTargets Targets

1944 - October 859 249

1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTAL

536 1600 0

6,347 1,96212,799 4,6716,332 2,7694,555 1,629

0 00 0

31,428 11,440

BASED ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETS=ties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

845 318

53 10 0

868 218522 113172 2047 100 00 0

2,507 680

L4ND-BASED ATTACKS

=

4t+~cking Bombs on Attacking Bombs on

160

585982

1,60077595

000

305584700195

2

823371023

1056220

2250

10920

4,045 1,786I

292 33

NOTES TO TABLE 32c

The pattern of the Philippines campai.m was repeated in the Ryukyus, but in more condensedform. Enemy shipping was more quickly and easily eliminated in March-and April 1945 (it hadalready been hit in a one-day strike incidental to the Lay+& campaign) , but the a i r f ie lds ,which had been hit comparatively lightl-- in October and January, presented more difficulty.Those on Okinawa were quickly neutralized, but it was necessary to attack those in the SouthernRyukyus constantly through the entire 5 months of the operation. The bulk of the remainingoffensive effort was concentrated on beach and inland defenses, and on guns, caves, and otherdefens ive pos i t ions , in direct support of Marine and Army troops. In this work land-basedMarine aircraft began to assist the carrier forces early in April; they assumed an increasingproportion in May and June, and on 22 June took over from the carriers the entire burden ofsuppor t .

NOTES TO TABLE 32D

This table (see next page) shows the distribution of Naval attack effort between landand shipping tar@s in the various segments of Japan. (See Definitions for geographicallimits of the various areas; note especially that the Tokyo area includes all of northernHonshu except the tip*.

Tokyo area land targets , par t icular ly a i r f ie lds , received the heaviest fraction of thec a r r i e r o f f e n s i v e , o v e r 4% of the total attacks on land targets. These attacks were deliveredin three periods: (a) the first strikes of 16, 17and25 February , were concent ra ted on a i r -fields a n d a i r c r a f t f a c t o r i e s , and resulted in the destruction of 203 grounded aircraft aswell as 413 in air combat; (b) the strikes of 10-18 and 30 July, and (c) the final operationsof 9-15 August. In the latter two periods 762 grounded enemy aircraft were destroyed in thisarea alone . Over half the enemy aircraft destroyed by the Navy in or over Japan, were in theTolqJo area . (See Table 26D).

In the Kyushu-Kure area, the next most heavily attacked, the offensin effort was spreadover fivs months, though the heaviest concentrations were in March and May, in strikes aimed atbreaking up enemy air concentrations capable of being employed against Okinawa. The Apriloffensive involved also the strikes against the YAMATO and her escorts, which resulted in des-troying the bulk of that suicide naval force.

Central Honshu, including the Kobe-Osaka (Inland Sea) area, and tie Nagoya area, wasattacked heavily only during the short period of 24-30 July. Half of the bombing effort wasdi rec ted agains t sh ipping.

Hokkaido, and the adjacent tip of Honshu, were attacked only on 14-15 July and 9-10August .

(Cont. on next page)

-88-

TABLE 32. Continued

D. JAPANESE HOME ISLANDS

MONTH

KYUSHU, KURE AREA1945 - March

AprilMayJuneJulyAugust

CENTRAL HONSHO

1945 - FebruaryMarchAprilMay.TuneJulyAugust

TOKYO AREA

1945 - FebruaryMarchAprilMay,TuneJulyAugust

HOKKAIDO, NO. HONSHI

1945 - JulyAugust

GRAND TOTAL

CARRIER-BASED ATTACKSLAND TARGETS

Sorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

4,329

1,761233

1,570341424

0

1,911

20587080

1,508103

5,782

1,3390000

2,1002,343

1,445

830615

1,357

52722

65154

1030

539

811000

40948

Qy285

0000

736873

627

299328

13,467 4,417

SHIPPING TARGETSSorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

1,688

407313300

9380

920

3697080

7790

865——244

0000

366255

747

521226

914

182216

00

5160

481

T34050

4420

283

100000

156117

355

~110

4,220 2,033

LAND-BASEDLAND TARGE?TS

Sorties Tons of’Attacking Bombs onTargets Targeta

630 126

T 721 1113 7

123 17336 82137 9

23 0

T 70 01 0

11 00 00 0

11 0

12 7

T To 00 03 15 30 04 3

0 0

Y xo 0

665 133

ATTACKSSHIPPING TARGETSSorties Tons ofAttacking Bombs onTargets Targets

211 83

7 128 1124 1334 1780 2941 12

100 18— —0 0

10 115 029 823 721 22 0

147 27

012112634568

00347

112

0 0

458 128

(Cont. from preoeding page)

The heaviest carrier attacks on shippin~ in Jap home waters were on 21-28 July in theInland Sea; in this series of strikes tl.e-buik of tie remaining Jap Navy was crippied.

L a n d - b a s e d Naval air attacks on Japan were carried out largely by Naval search planes,though Marine fighters from Okinawa were active against Kyushu from June on. Search planetargets were normally shipping, usually of the smaller types, along the coasts. It should benoted tiat the bomb tonnages expended in these attacks by single search planes are understatedin the above table. Where such a plane dropped less than half a ton in an attack, it was re-corded in the machine system as zero. Frequently 2 or 3 small bombs, and heavy strafing, weresufficient to destroy the small vessels encountered, an d the remaining bombs of the usual loadof a ton or less were saved for other targets that might be found.

-89-

TABLE 33. NAVAL AND MARINE AIR ATTACKS ON PRIIJCIPAL CENTRAL PACIFICIsLAm GR0t77 (LAND-BAsED AND cARRIER-BAsED c0M81m )

Sorties Attacking, and Tons of Bombs Expended, on Land Targets Only, Monthly

MONTH

1942 - FebruaryMarch

1943 - JuneJulyAugustSeptnmberOctoberNovwmberDecember

1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptembbrOctoberNovemberDecember

1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1942-1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

WAKE,MARCUSS T

45* 1824* 6

000 0

261* 1140 0

775* 3190 00 0

17 2021 22841 0

690* 2%50 00 0

12 861* 346 423 2218 19

10 121 046 789 19

21 34393* 169153* 31193* 59

10? 457857 416826 402

2790 1275

GILBERTS

e

6 56 60 0

165* 855 2

1515* 551133* 60

5 54 31 11 29 642 2212 11

135 12613 113 0

54 1918 19

20 200 00 00 00 00 012 30 0

1830 709297 22532 23

2159 957

MARSHALLSs T

77 300 0

0 00 00 00 06 1

424* 193114* 13

2218* 8072363* 924971* 4831526 6042147 8311674 4012332 7472895 12251620 7241468 8011164 609890 624

479 25633 15

241 129196 119438* 227526 256418 331126 76

621 23721268 87802457 1409

24346 10426

EASTERNCAROLI1/lt%——s T

5 53 2

16 9452* 11063 12

2064* 790170* 4930 925 1541 91 060 30118 5787 37

0 080 3389 5823 169 127 619 1018 8

8 73127 1127245 143

3380 1277

=

s T

809* 160465* 1573 02 0

1897* 57314 4

6142*1769859 258

1228* 262567 150

983 2461536 2171468 397725 256896 329879 339907 415174 89

0 011986 33337568 2288

19554 5621

MARIANASs T

214* 550 0

10 020 0

6617* 20589722* 3305398* 102285 56392 15503 74406 193

27 08 03 06 05 05 042* 40 0

0 018567 5858

96 4

18663 5862

BONINSS T

491* 129614* 178304* 94426* 183

4 112 19 2

2 03102* 8491132* 232

0 03 00 00 00 0

0 01860 5884239 1081

6099 1669

s - Sor t ies attackinK land tarzets.T - Tons of bombs ex~ended on ~and targets.

#After December 1943 all attacks were on Nauru.* Denotes months during which carrier strikes were made.

NOTES TO TABIE 33

Shown above is the Naval and Marine offensive air effort azainst enemy lend tarzets alonrthe Central Pacific line of advance,

. “ .and against islands fringing the route.

Wake and Marcus are of the least importance. They were used mainly as targets for trainingraids by new carriers and air groups reporting to the Fleet, althou~h most of these missions werealso tim?d for d ivers ionary ef fec t , and in addition succeeded in making the islands militarilyineffect ive as a i r bases . All months of heavy activi~ against these islands involved carrierr a i d s ; T/ake was otherwise attacked only by F’B2Ys from Midway, and PB4Ys and PVs from Eniwetok,and Marcus by a few P84Ys from the Marianas. Some 600 Japanese were killed by air attack onWake during the war, and 1,300 more died of disease or starvation as a result of the enemy!s un -willingness to expose ships to attack by sending in supplies to the garrison.

Against tie Gilberts the bombing campaign was short and heavy, and confined largely to the

(Cont. on next page)

-90-

(Cont. from preceding page)

actual invasion period in November 1943, following a sma1l but effective one-day raid on Tarawain September. All subsequent activity in the Gilberts column represents attacks on Nauru (andOcean Island): a carrier raid in December 1943, and strikes by PVs from Tarawa thereafter, forthe purpose of neutralizing the air base to prevent its use to reconnoiter our activity in theMarshal ls .

The Marshalls air campaign was an extended one. It began witi carrier attacks in November1943 to neutralize the Marshalls air bases during the Gilberts campaign; it continues witha carrier strike on Kwajalein in Eecember; and was followed by heavy poundings from tie entirecarrier force supporting the landings on Kwajalein and Eniwetok in January and February 1944.Thereafter Marine and Navy fighters, dive bombers and patrol bombers took over the job ofcompletely destroying the airfields in the four remaining Jap-held islands, and destroying allremaining enemy installations and supplies. To this task a substantial force, operating fromMajuro and Kwajalein, was devoted during the remainder of the war. The offensive reached itspeak durinG August of 1944 and declined thereafter. About 2,300 of the 13,000 Japanese person-nel on these four islands were killed by air attack; another 4,500 died of disease or starvationas a result of the air blockade maintained.

Against the Eastern Carolines the bulk of the Navy’s offensive consisted of two 2-daycarrier strikes on Truk in February and April 1944, followed by a small carrier attack on Ponape.Marine F4Us from Eniwetok thereafter made occasional attacks on Ponapa, and Navy searchplanesfrom time to time bombed Kusaie, Ponape, the Nomoi Islands and Truk.

The Western Carolines were the victims of a carrier raid on Palau, Yap and Woleai duringthe period 30 March - 1 April 1944, a further heavy raid on Palau and Yap in .Tuly. 1944, andintensiw carrier operations supporting the Marine and Army landings on Fwleliu and Angaur inSeptember 1944. In the latter part of that month Marine fighters and torpedo bombers basedat Peleliu took over the direct support duty from the carriers, and after Peleliu was securedthey maintained a steady volume of neutralizing attacks on the extensi~ enemy forces on theremaining islands of the Palau and Yap groups until the end of the war. Woleai also receivedoccasional attacks from Navy search planes based at Manus and Guam.

The Naml pre-inv=.ion and wnphibious support campaign in the Marianas was the Pacific’sheaviest, except for Okinawa, in terms of close support missions flown and bomb tomage andstraffing delivered with low altitude accuracy. It extended over a period of 8 weeks, from theinitial strikes preceding the landing on Saipan, to tie conclusion of organized resistance onTinian and Guam. Subsequent activity by land-based Marine fighters in the Marianas was con-fined to neutralization missions against the two remaining Japanese airfields on Rota and Pagan.

The carrier campaign against the Bonins was one of the longest of the Pacific war, and wasunusual in that tie first strikes preceded the landings on Iwo Jima by 10 months. The fivestrikes of June-September 1944 were primarily directed toward nullifying the value of Iwo as anair base, as well as driving major shipping from the area and destroying naval base facilitiesat Chichi Jima. These operations succeeded in all these purposes; 418 enemy planes were des-troyed during their course, and relatively few planes or major vessels were found in the areat h e r e a f t e r .

In the following five months Naval aviation left the Bonins strictly alone, except foroccasional search plane at+acks. In Febrwry of 1945 the Marine invasion of Iwo was supportedfor several days by the ent i re fas t carr ier force , and for three weeks by a substantial CVEf o r c e . Its success completed the chain of bases across the Central Pacific.

- 9 1 -

TABLE 34. SORTIES ATTACKING SHIP TARGETS, MONTHLY, 1944.

— ------

MONTH

JanuuryFebruaryMarchAprilmyJuneJulyAugustSeptenberOctoberNovemberDecember

TOTAL

MONTH

JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

TOTAL

By Area, Carrier-Based and Land-Dased (Pacific ~ly)

.—------ —SOLOMONS,BISMARCKS.—— -C L—

91 2631 3163 515

17214055

1268179

23617810

95 2171

MARIANAS—-.—c L

150

1010 587 0

00

1303

1247 21

~? GUINEA,EALMAHERAC L——

152226

305 1577

239

64 21007

369 152

——..

BONINSC L-

110 1378 16621 2

BORNEOCELEBES.—

L

22336323739

169

I EASTERNM4RSHALLSC L—.—626 13389 1521 80

7795

12221516852

110159

736 981

-—FORMOSA ,

PHILIPPINEs RYIJKYUS—C L c

131

41 10 2300 3316 2737 47 152615 1958 5514 501 204

1150 74 7496 343 1526

CARCLINES. — _ _ _C L

1021 170 12

341 4216 9

101611

12145

1378 139.—

GTHERAREL4SC, L

o00

114302

2424754

120

~R~CAROLINES. ——C L

1151 010 60 60 6

279 20 2

563 280 2530 2790 181

2003 763

c - Carr ier-based sor t ies .L - Land-based sorties.

lIOTES TO TABLES 34 AND 35

The bulk of Naval air attack on shipping prior to 1944 is covered by the data for theSolomons-Bismarcks campaign, in Table 32A. Enemy shipping had also been-attacked and drivenfrom the Midway area and Eastern New Guinea in 1942, the Aleutians and the Gilberts in 1943.In 1944 the mobile carrier force, and Navy searchplanes operating from new bases won in cam-paigns spearheaded by tie carriers, extended the area untenable for Japanese shipping to 10additional sectors of the Pacific, including the Philippines, Formosa and the Ryukyus, and theBonins. In 1945 Naval aviation extended the untenable area to include the entire Pacific andits connecting waters, with the sole exceptions of the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japan Sea, and thesouthernmost waters of the N.E.I..

Tables 34 and 35 show the progressive movement of naval air shipping attack across tieFacific. In most areas there is a standard progression : (1) a heavy carrier strike wiping outmost of the major vessels in the area, followed by withdrawal of the reminder by the enemy;(2) the substitution of smaller vessels to run the loose blockade established by Naval searchplanes from new bases bordering the area, and a period of busy attack activi~ by these planes;(3) a steady decrease in patrol plane attacks as all shipping disappears from the area. Varia-tion from the pattern occur. In some cases the searchplanes preceded the carriers, or carrierstrikes were not needed (Korea, China, Borneo) ; in Sme cases fighter bases were established inthe area and used to conduct an intensive campaign against coastal barges and small craft as

(Cont. onn6xt page)

- 9 2 -

—TOTAL

ALL AREAS—c———L———

717 4111261 3701175 633665 31458 258

1120 206744 209621 196

2978 2904263 6661958 693501 626

16061 4872

TABLE 35. SORTI’ES ATTACKING SHIP TARGETS, MONTHLY, 1945By Area, Carrier-Based and Land-Based

MONTHI 1 I

JAPAN RYUKYUS BONINS FORMOSAC L C L C L c L

0 0280 0504 26313 5438 790 91

2604 157481 51

53 80 23

868 37522 10172 2347 1050 620 20

0 32169 924 152 5

7340

961 17262329252617

Januaryl%bruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTAL

387 104107381510

1841459163675

327

594

10

4220 458 1662 288 195 75 961 173 387 274

KOREA,MONTH NO. CHINA

BORNEO,CELEBES

L

January 101012944 [6450 83203

114

19

2345 358449 363

1396 339837 316210 44947 440

2608 429489 159

8381 2853

610214167211312

FebruaryMarchApri1MayJune

02

1384

104

0 2216 5723 468 42

24 28

1811173422

July 60 31 21August 19 4 12

3213

TOTAL 282 106 294 232 645 147 191 50I I

c - Carr ier-based sor t ies .L - Land-based sorties.

(Cont. from preceding page)

well as ocean-going shipping, as in the Solomons, Marshalls, =d Palau a r e a s . B u t t h e e v e n t u a lexhaustion of targats always came.

The Solomons-Bismarcks anti-shipping campaign ran out of ocean-going target vessels inMarch of 1944, and for the rest of that year was directed at barges. The New Guinea campaignwas initially a Black Cat and subsequently a PB4Y enlmrprise, in which the carriers assistadwhile supporting the Hollandia and Morotai landings. In the Marshalls and Western Carolines theland-based attacks were all, after the month of the last carrier attacks, directed against bargesand small boats useful for inter-island transportation of food and supplies for the enemy garri-sons . The same was largely true of the land-based attacks in the Philippines. In the otherareas most of these attacks were by Ptrol planes on ships of ocean-going typss.

The geographical extent of these attacks, and their volae, can be seen from the @bles.At one time or another Navy VPB were nmking at least 20 and up to 100 individual attacks on shipsper month in each of the following areas:. —

New Guinea FormosaBorneo, Celebes JapanEastern Carolines Korea, No. ChinaBonins Central ChinaPhi l ipp ines Indo China, MalayaRyukyus

It can be seen that the effect of these many small, accurate attacks, spread throughouteach area and throughout each month, while different from the crushing blows administered bycarr ier forces agains t concentra t ions of ships , could meet effectively disrupt shipping movemmtsand destroy a large number of vessels. P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n i s i n v i t e d t o the VPB a t t a c k s o nshipping in the waters of Japan, Korea and the entire Asiatic Coast from March 1945 to the end

(Cont. on next page)

700380 0 -46-1 - 9 3 -

(Cont. from preceding page)

Of the war. These attacks, largely byPB4Ys and PBMs, singly and in paire, achieved an averagevolume of 400 per month during this period.

Of the carr ier attacka, particularly important are those in Formosa and the Philippinesduring September-November 1944, which wmpletely broke up enemy reinforcement of the archipelagoand accounted for a rmjor part of the Jap Navy as well as substantial merchant tonnages (SeeAppendix). The progressive eeries of attacks through the Marshalls, Eastern and WesternCarol ines , Marianas and Bonins, from January to August 1944, while theirthan that of the Philippines anti-shipping campai~, were a lso impor tantand in size of ocean area cleared of the enemy.

In 1945 three carrier campaigns are outstanding: the January sweepChina Sea from Formosa to Indo Ch~a, the March strikesheavy July offensive against the last Japanese shippingthe remnants of the enemy!s combat and merchant fleets.

combined volume was lessboth in tonnage sunk

of tie ent i re Southon Kyushu and the Ryukyus, and therefuge - the Inland Sea - which crippled

-94-

4. Attack Data, by Type of Target Attacked

TABLE 36. PERCENTAGE OF CARRIER-BASED AND LAND-EASEDOFFENSIVE AIR EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST EACH MAJOR

TYPE OF TARGET, BY YEARS

TYPR OF TARGET

CARRIER-BASED ATTACKS

LAND TARGETSAirfieldsOther Military TargetsLand TransportationHarbor Area8Other and Unknown Land

SHIPPING TARGETSArmored Warships‘IJnarmored WarshipaMerchant, Over 500 TonsMerchant, Under 500 TonsUnlmown Shipping*

LAND-BASED ATTACKS

LAND TARGETSAirfleldsOther Military TargetsLand TransportationHarbor AreasOther ancl Unlamwn Lend

SHIPPING TARGETSArmored WarshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchant, Over 500 ?onaMerchant, Under 500 TonsUnknown Shipping*

* Including minelaying.

NOTES TO TABLE 36

SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS1942 1943 1944 1945

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0.— — .

52.3 87.3 76.9 86.5mmmm29,6 41.8 48.2 33.40.4 0.0 2.0 2.81.3 2,4 0.7 3.17.0 0.7 2.5 4.7

47.7 12.7 23.1 13.5mmmm3.3 1.4 3.0 2.18.1 4.4 12.1 5.61.3 0.9 4.7 2.81.7 0.0 0.4 0.2

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0— — ——42.2 88.0 91.8 94.1mmmm29.5 46.1 71.8 67.10.6 0.6 3.3 5.64.5 3.7 0.8 4.90.9 1.2 2.7 4.0

17.6 3.7 0.4 0.314.6 2.2 1.9 1.19.1 3.8 5.4 4.40.3 2.1 0.5 0.1

mir

100.0

81.2m41.12.31.83.5

18.8m2.58.93.60.4

100.0

91.6m66.93.92.73.0

8.4m0.91.84.90.5

TONS OF BOMBS ON TARGETS1942 1943 1944 1945 TOTAL

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0— — —— .

38.5 83.1 76.8 84.4 80.0ZZ&mmmm25.5 41.2 53.3 36.4 44.40.6 0.0 1.4 2.7 1.91.1 1.8 0.8 3.3 2.01.5 .8 2.3 4.7 3.4

61.5 16.9 23.2 15.6 20.0mmmmm2.1 2.2 2.6 2.2 2.49.9 5.3 13.9 6.5 10.00,7 0.3 1.6 1.5 1.51.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.5

I

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.O 1OO.O

28.30.02.20.2

65.3m14.920.25.00.6

89.3 94.9 97.1 94.6Wmmm45.9 74.1 70.9 68.80.4 2.5 4.5 3.12.9 0.9 4.2 2.51.4 1.9 2.7 2.2

WliL

This is the first of a series of tables breaking down the Naval air offensive by tvpes oftarget a t tacked, regardless of geographical locat ion of tie target. For the most pa~t ~~isseries contains data only on number of sorties attacking targets, and bomb tonnage expended.Data on types of bmbs, and on rockets, ammunition and torpedoes expended on various types oftargets, will be found in the next section of the report.

Table 36 shows where carrier-based and land-based offensive effort was directed in eachyear of the war. Noteworthy is the concentration of both carrier and land-based offensiveson enemy shipping, particularly heavy warships, during the first year of the war, and +&e in-creased emphasis on land targets thereafter. Enemy airfields came in for heavy attention in1943, received less attention in 1944, but in 1945, to courucer the kamikaze mnace, became thepr incipal carr ier target again . In 1943 mil i tary ins ta l la t ions became the pr imary target oiland-based planes; and except for the attacks by VPB, shipping targets became of continuouslyless importance for land-based planes.

For the carr iers , shipping remained an important target until the end of the war, thoughmost important in 1944 because of dwindling opportunities for major attacks thereafter. Forland-based planes most shipping attacks after 1944 were on small vessels, the only types ordinarilywithin range.

The tible makes clear that Naval aviation’s most important offensive function in terms ofvolume was reduction of enemy ground defenses, in direct support of our own ground forces or be-fore thei r ar r ival in the landing area . Second in importance was destruction or neutralization

(Cont. on next page)

-95-

(Cont. from preceding page)

of enemy air force installations, and planes on the ground. Third was destruction of enemywarships and merchant vessels, par t icular ly of the larger types . Miscel laneous land targets , in-c luding t ranspor ta t ion , htirbor and indust r ia l areas , were attacked in the least volume.

I t maybe noted that airfields (in attacks by carrier planes) and small merchant vesselsgenerally receive a lower share of tie total bomb tonnage than of the attack sorties, mhilemilitary targets and heavy warships received more tonnage. This results from extensive use ofVF rockets and strafing against the first and lighter classes of targets, and maximum bomberforces and heavy bomb loads

IWTES TO TABLE 3?

T h i s t a b l e i l l u s t r a t e sis invi ted to~

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

See

against the heavier targets.

the offens ive uses made of the var ious mcdels of a i rcraf t . Attent ion

The extensive use of the carrier F6Frnerohant shipping. The FM, based onin air-ground support operations.

The heavy use of carrier VSi3 (25% of

and F4U against airfields, and of the F6F againstCVES, was used primarily against military targets

tota l a t tack sor t ies) agains t shipping, andespecially against heavy warships. The use of carrier VTB against shipping, anda g a i n s t a i r f i e l d s , is reduced by inclusion in the figures of CVE VTB which engagedprimarily in air-ground support operations.

The predominant use of land-based VP and VSB against military targets. The land-basedVTB data indicate a hea~ use agains t a i r f ie lds largely because thei r offensiw use wasprincipally in the Solomons campaign of 1943 and early 1944, when airfields were theprincipal target. Note also the extensive use of land-based VF against snwll vessels,la rgely barges in the Solomons and Marshalls areas.

The heavy use of the PBJ and PV against land targets, contrasted with the primary em-ployment of other VPB against merchant shipping.

also Table 38, for more detailed data for 1944 only.

-96-

TABLE 37. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS, BY PLANE MODELAND TYI% OF TARGET ATTACKED, FOR ENTIRE WAR

With Percentages for Each Type of Aircraft, Carrier and Land-Based

BASE,PLANE MODEL

CARRIER-BASEDF6FF4U, FGFMF4FSB2C, SBWSBDTBF, TBMTBD

LAND-BMmF4U , FGF6FF4F, mU/i VFSBDSB2C, SBWSB2UTBF, TBM

PBJPvPB4YPBYPBMPR2YU/i VTB

PERCEI$TAGES,~m ,

CarrierCwrier VSBCarrier VTB

J.and-Based VpLand-Based VSBLand-Based VTB

vpB, 2/E Land~, 2/E SeaW, 4/E

AIR-FIELDS

22,7164,1152,334

1293,9821,7659,750

27

6,0953593939

5,368194

02,695

2,30962141113115508

37.822.927.6

13.112.127.4

27.88.9

14.5

OTHERWILI-rARYTARGETS— .

19,1111,8697,281

2119,0082,33816,842

0

30,9011,482

7612

34,0751,758

05,570

4,8751,303

482484761511

36.745.347.7

65.177.756.6

58.532.915.7

LANDTRANS-PORTA-TION

1,258171559

026720

8590

2,6472200

1,365410

216

25717

1817100

2.61.12.4

5.43.02.2

2.60.55.7

* Including minelaying.

95827518024

28437

7250

1,82094500

484850

385

20956

10246100

1.81.32.1

3.91.23.9

2.52.73.2

OTHER& UN-KNOWNLAND

1,59448953697

76986

1,2720

1,688690

30

68921

P179

26963

10422217

3.53.43.6

4.81.51.3

3.21.83.3

WARSHIPSAr - Unar-mored mored

1,013 1,779263 140203 12220 32

924 638639 157

1,511 638107 0

0 1050 012 870 0

155 4710 017 088 140

0 180 285 132

16 606 340 10 0

1.9 2.76.3 3.24.6 1.8

0.0 0.40.4 1.00.9 1.4

0.0 0.41.3 5.40.2 4.2

?RCHANTMENOver Under500 500ons Tons

5,473 2,965472 195170 52326 12

2,729 490726 77

,.526 77335 0

327 2,97732 24517 350 0

483 7590 960 0

290 78

97 7043 249

492 1,055214 202115 16918 143 3

7.9 4.813.8 2.37.5 2.2

0.8 6.51.1 1.93.0 0.8

1.3 3.019.1 21.516.1 33.8

.—SHIPS,TYPEUN-KNOWN*

18545

124257183

0

19400

4100

250

255291895

138

0.30.40.5

0.00.12.5

0.75.93.3

TOTAL

57,0527,993

11,913563

19,1335,902

35,179169

46,5792,928

31951

43,8902,195

179,841

8,1292,4323,0551,271

42411240

100.0100.0100.0

100.0100.O100.0

100.0100.0100.0

-97-

TABLE 38. SORTIES ATTACKING TARGETS, BY DETAILED TARGET TYPEAND BY PLANE MODEL, CARRIER-EASED AND LAND-BASED, 1944 ONLY

CARRIER-BASEDTYPE OF TARGBT

G

Cefense Installations, Guns 6777Personnel and Bivouac Areas 900Buildings, Storage Areas* 5080

Docks and Waterfront 228Roads, Bridges, Vehicles 398Other and Unknown Land 675

Armored WarshipB 572Unarmored Warships 1153Merchant, Over 500 Tons 3797Merchant, Under 500 Tone 1899Ships, Type Unknown# 126

Total Land Targete 23249Total Ship Targets 7547

TOTAL ALL TARG3’TS 30796

CV-CVL

I

SBDSB2C

10292116

36224903620

81151349

534530

271445054

114584282

15740

TBFTBM

8002101

24596923083

110116303

422290

1654377117

96642860

12524

CVE

7

FMF6F

518392

196711931158

23641214

233105191432

5

6106966

7072

LAND

TBF SBD

87 219 9194 2826 2169

1252 9403 9405664 4823 2066628 6675 4446

17 227 120101 1268 523225 1209 140

250 0 026 78 4769 330 176

114 2078 5671~ 12 38

3168 26650 18878460 2498 828

3628 29148 19706

-BASED‘fBF Il’BM PBJ

7 42944 817

1703 221442 664559 851

18 26115 3625 150

2 022 3

171 2059 3332 17

3813 2807286 73

4099 2880

OtherVPB

65803

790315531

852089

1182

418481184

26981176

3874

TOTAL

8,06116,268

37,59912,24926,631

9353,3693,379

2,0242,3369,5406,490

586

108,49120,976

129,467

* Including airfield buildings and buildings of unidentified types, but excluding barracks.# Including minelaying.

I?OTES TO TABLE 38

This table presents the additiond target detail available for 1944 only, plus a divisionof the carr ier -based offensive between fas t carr iers and CVES, and thus i l lus t ra tes in moredetail the employment of various models of carrier aircraft. Among items worthy of nore are:

( a )

(b)

( c )

(d)

( e )

( f )

(g)

The concentration of fast carrier F6Fs on parked aircraft, while the bombers concen-t ra ted on runways and o ther a i r f ie ld ins ta l la t ions .

The fas t carr ier emphasis m the larger land targets , as contras ted withphasis on personnel, guns and vehicles.

T h e CVES’ concent ra t ion Of 75$ of tieir offensi- effort on land targets

t h e CVS em-

other thana i r f i e l d s , a g a i n s t t h e f a s t carriers! E@.

The fas t carr iers’ 25% on sh ipping ta rge ts , aga ins t the CVES!represent ing the Layte Gulf ba t t le .

T h e f a s t c a r r i e r s ’ 25% on a i r f ie lds , agains t the CVE’S 11%.

The dearth of grounded aircraft, warships, and large merchantattack by land-based planes other than VPB.

13%, much of the latter

vessels avai lable for

The predominant neutralization mature of the employment of land-based VF, VSB, VTB,and PBJs (PVs and PBYs to a lesser extent); in 1944 these plane Qpee were usedprimarily against by-passed enemy bases in the Solomons, Bismaroks, Marshalle andW e s t e r n Carolines. Typical is the concentration on airfield runways, defenses, guns,personnel, t ranspor ta t ion , and smal l craf t .

-98-

TABLE 39. ATTACKS , AND ORDNANCE EXPENDITURESBY ALL CARRIER-BASED AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT.

TYPE OF TARGET

Grounded AiroraftAirfield Runways

Defense Install at ions,, GunsPersonnel and Bivouac AreasBuildings, Storage Areas +

Docks and WaterfrontRoads, Bridges, VehiclesIndustrial FacilitiesUrban AreasOther and Unknown Land

Armored WarshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchant, Over 500 TonsMerchant, Under 500 TonsShips, Type Unknown @

Total Land TarEetsTotal Ship Tar&ts

TUfALALL TARGETS

By Detailed Type of Target

CARRISORTIES

ATTACKINGTARGETS

7,7198,709

16,0773,93913,569

4591,407

681544541

2,0112,1048,4253,272

303

53,64516,115

69,760

,-BASED~TONS OFBOMBS

1,0843,024

5,0141,2625,250

16829924916686

973573

3,011347125

16,602 5,029

21,631

ON TARGETS,1944 ONLY.

.TTACKS~

ROCKETS

3,6991,(X)2

6,4132,9875,380

3091,119452112246

780617

2,80589712

21,719 5,111

26,830 s

n LAND-BASED ATTACKS

M.G.

2,243 3423,135 7,559

6,095 21,5221,523 8,3104,263 13,062

136 476593 1,962209 77152 1,10757 429

454 13642 232

1,805 1,115840 3,21869 283

18,406 54,8463,810 4,861

22,216 59,707

Exl!ONS OFBOMBS

873,809

9,7043,3205,590

21761919

39469

1494

463475232

23,8281,278

25,106

NDIT~

ROCKETS

0136

24072

376

6000

24

08

10212758

854295

1,149

M.G.AMMO.*

1221,282

4,2742,8413,832

9465227

30327

274

45278623

13,4541,337

14,791

* In thousands of rounds expended on targets.#Inc luding a i r f ie ld bui ld ings and buildings of unidentified ties. but exc luding bar racks .@ Including minelaying.

. . . .

NOTES TO TABLE 39

This table sums up the data for 1944 given in Table 38, and provides additional figureson ordnance expenditures on targets.

The oarrier emphasis on strafing and rocket attacks on grounded aircraft may be noted,together with the heavy volumm of bombing attack on other airfield targets (Note that sortiesclassified as attacking primarily aircraft runways may have expended some of their bombs, andthe bulk of the i r rockets and s t raf ing f i re , on grounded aircraft and airfield buildings andins ta l la t ions ) .

It may also be noted that carrier planes expended over 5% of their rockets and strafingf i r e , and land-based p lanes 75%, on military land targets.

The table illustrates the intensity of attack on large merchant vessels during 1944, thecons iderable volume of strafing attacks on small vessele, and the heavy tonnage per sortieagains t armored warships . Also of in teres t a re the a t tacks on land t ranspor ta t ion targets .The urban areas attacked included principally tuwne on Guam and Palau, and the c i t ies of llavaoand Naha. Indust r ia l fac i l i t ies inc luded oi l s torage and manufactur ing fac i l i t ies in thePhilippines and Formosa.

From the table may be calculated average ordnance expenditures per sortie against eachtype of target. Note, however, that rockets were not fully utilized during 1944.

-99-

MONTH

1941- December

1942- JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugueiSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944 -JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945 -JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1941-42 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

TABLE 40. ATTACKS ON SHIPPING, BY ALL NAVAL AND MARINECARRIER-BASED AND IAND-BASED AIRCRAFTBy Type of Ship Attacked, Monthly

ARMOREDWARSHIPS

Sorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs

4

3529

166289

504615012313

1

18

17986

36176642

152

6834

14059010

2911

159253

22

127528

1811

114109

2823767710

1

18

10563

2786243

99

216

653653

153

93189

4

77314

90!) 466284 187

2037 9871759 1091

4985 2731

UNARMOREDWARSHIPS

Sorties TonsAttack- of ing Bombs

23

1

418261

1323

1465135

5472

2215

2221928

4542

123350146567

6376

230419404341120

53097

3751182014

125125

176

48

507

12

2040

104

1342611

2826

678641645

259678

11112720

2013

11458159

5259

341 95501 290

2335 6661404 511

4581 1562

63RCHANT SHIPSOVER 500 TONSSorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs

5

33756

363

224

4316416

4833

148

40424

4764150

67080591843689

500402276

175618951391402

1524264570202155116891293

5

1129

183

129

16706

2669

126

23303

1839

110

1413683134228

13214695

65470976185

67759

176667635

4C6126

389 1 79450 3369540 34744015 1621

14394 5610

i@%CHANT SHIPSJNDER 500 TONSSorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs

2

2

1

11101212

27

241

17

3303587

11012363

167241547409177611471272

10351215751593

617441631580470302608196

517217

51

1

333187

13

1947804812338255

10213614761

7417

107998455

18965

167 32493 45

6489 8223845 690

10994 1589

TOTALALL T&S*Sorties TonsAttack- ofing Bombs

34

373856

220319

199

17436037393

1271069532

12718

3109693

166455345

112816311810979316

1326952867

3268493126511127

2700813

17351153661487

3040648

5

29401

139118

5257

14416335

511109514977

178595

27207217

35260761212593

269255270842

16091103169

96782

490412181186

1495264

1840 7831970 1067

20986 630611237 4077

36033 12233

L.

* Including chips of unknown types, and minelaying, not shown separately (total 1079 sorties,741 tons).

-100-

NOTES TO TABLE 40

This table is the monthly summary of all Naval air attackis invited between the attack effort expended, as shown above,plished, as shcwn in the Appendix.

It may be no+ad that merchant shipping received its first

on enemy shipping. Comparisonand the monthly results accom-

heavy weight of attack inF6bruary-h&rch 1944, and was next attacked in the greatest force in tie Phi l ippines-China Seacampaigns of September 1944 - January 1945. Thereafter, only in July 1945 was enough shippingfound to prmit repet i t ion of th is scale of a t tack. I t i s a lso in teres t ing to note tha t abouthalf of the total Naval air offensive against armored warships was expended in three briefcampaigns: the Imyt-e Gulf Battle of 24-26 Octcber 1944, the yamato attack on 7 April 1945, andthe Inland Sea strikes of 18 July and 24-28 July 1945.

5. Ordnance Data

This section of the report consists of three separate groups of tables:

Tables 41-42, providing summary data on ordnance expenditures of all types, and average crdnanceexpended per attack.

Tables 43 to 49, giving data ont a r g e t type, and operation.

Tables 50 to 54, giving data on%&r get type, and month.

NOTES TO TABLE 41a .-

bomb expenditures by type of bomb, with detail by plane type,

rocket and ammunition expenditures, with detail by plane @pe,

Ordnance Expenditures, in General

Naval and Marine aircraft during the war expended against the enemy nearly 103,000 tone ofbombs, over 210,000 aircraft rockets, and about 85 million rounds of annnunition.

45$ of the bomb tonnage, 87$ of the rockets, and 60$ of the ammunition were expended byc a r r i e r a i r c r a f t . A p p r o x i m a t e l y 95% of the totals for carrier and land-based aircraft combinedwere expended in dive, glide or masthead bombing, rocket or strafin~ attack from altitudes of50 to 5000 feet, usually 3500 feet or less. Thus the amounts expended are hardly comparablein tonnage terms with ordnance expenditures for air forces employing less accurate methods ofattack. They may, however, generally be compared between types of Naval aircraft, since nor-mally only the PBJ, of all Naval aircraft, employed horizontal bombing from altitudes of over5000 feet as more than an occasional me+kod of attack.

(Cont. on next page)

- 101 -

BASE,PLANE MODEL

CARRIRR-BASED

F6FF4U, FGFMF4FSB2C, SHIVSBDTBI’, TBMTBD

LAND-BASED

F4U, FGF6FF’4F, FMU/i VF

SBDSB2C, SBWSB2UTBF, TBM

PB4YPVP!3JPBYPBldPB2YU/i VPB

TOTAL

TABLE 41. ATTACK SORTIES, AND ORDNANCE EXPENDED,ON LAND AND SHIPPING TARGETS, FOR ENTIRE WARBy Plane Model, Carrier-Based and Land-Based

L4ND TARGETSExpenditures on TarcetsSorties

Attack-ingTargets

111,938

45,6376,919

10,890461

14,3104,246

29,44827

111,22843,1512,647

16851

41,9812,099

08,995

1,2802,0607,919

690956626

223,166

Tonsof

Bombs

36,542

5,0931,112

1436

8,2691,888

20,01120

54,130

14,107504

014

19,7331,178

07,454

6891,8027,966

544575626

90,672

Rockets

165,532

59,42021,27227,287

04,383

053,170

0

25,477

14,80S892144

0

144917

04,486

02,2191,866

0000

191,009

imii=-nition(1000)

42,529

25,8954,0756,376

1,72;41O*

4,051*

27,512

14,60063831*0

6,58i*332

*1,087*

898733

2,47175*54120

70,041

SortiesAttack-

ingTargets

25,966

11,4151,0741,023

1024,8231,6565,731

142

10,0553,428

281151

0

1,9099617

846

1,7753722105813294614

36,021

SHIPPINGExpendTonsof

Bombs

9,117

901200

50

2,725636

4,536114

3,1142041100

685124

726

71411235

4061474117

12,231

TARGETSitures on

Rockets

17,037

10,9972,3971,050

0195

02,398

0

QIQ

3902800

88470

122

0250

1,0850000

19,047

TargetsAmmu -nition(1000)

~

5,257571611

*51493*

619*

4,791

94485*0

123*22*

43*

2,91017828

175*268150

12,456

NOTE: Ammunition expenditure data do not cover the period vrior to Aurust 1943 in the case C?c a r r i e r - b a s e d pla~es,

.or prior to October 1943 in the case of land-based planes. Expendi-

tures were not genera l ly given in action reports prior to these da+ms (nor were they complete-ly r e p o r t e d t h e r e a f t e r Particularly W l a n d - b a s e d VSB and VTB in the Solomons). I t i s e s t i -mated that between 2 and 3 million additione.1 rounds were expended in str~fing but not re-ported, of which approximately 8% was by land-based planes, and 8% against land targets.The lack of data for the early part of tie war affects mater ia l ly (5% or more) only thef igures indica ted by an as ter isk (*) . For other plane models the ammunition expendituredata are believed to be 9% or more complete.

The table above indicates that the TBF-TBM torpedo bomker, accounting for a total ofover 32$ of total bomb expenditures, a n d 2% of a l l rocket expendi tures , was the Navyls p r i n c i -pal carrier of heavy ordnance. All types of fi@ters combined carried less than 22% of thetotal bomb tonnage to target, IAough they flew half the attack sorties; however, they expendednear ly 2 /3 of a l l rockets , and 7% of all ammunition.

Dive bombers of all types combined carried a total of 34‰ of all Navy bomb tonnage, butwere re la t ively negl igible factors as rocket carr iers . Patrol bombers (aside from tie MarinePBJs, which carried 8% of to~l bomb tonnage) accounted for less than ~. of total bomb tonnage,and about 7% of the ammunition expenditures.

Most ammunition was expended against non-airborne ta~ets. Data distinguishing such targetexpenditures from those in air combat are not available, but only 14,308 Naval planes engaged inai r combat , som but br ie f ly , or only 5~ of a total of 284,073 action sorties involving 259,187attacks on targets. It is estimated that not over 2@ of a l l ammuni t ion expendi tures were in a i rcombat, leaving a minimum of perhaps 70 million rounds expended on other targets.

- 102 -

TABIJi 42. SWY OF BOMB, ROCKET, AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES,By Model of Aircraft, Land-Based, and Carrier-Based by Type of Carrier,

BASE ,PLANE MODEL

CV-BASED~

F4USB2C!Lm

CVL-BASEDF6F~M

CVE-BASEDFMFeF4uTBM

LANDJ3ASEDF4UF&mSBDSB2Cm).!

PB4YPBSPvPBMPB2YFBY

CA3RIER TOTALLAND-BASllC TOTALGRAND TOTAL

ACTIONSORTIES

# All calibers combined.

SORTIESATTACKINGTARGRTS

13,L1307,5916,5557,243

5,4142,97Q

7,6512,721402

7,574

18,0471,191

2717,0132,1951,530

1,7695,249

569y373655

~

110,019

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

2,0691,2314,0365,736

1,0132,399

6;;

4,3;;

6,39130;

g,1251,1901,033

gbz5*93g

304191M2g

21,598— 24,373 45,971

1945 ONLY

ROCKETSON

MllGETS

——

29,13622,1074,5353,395

15,y321,869

28,27710,4021,562

y3,t37t3

15,199920144

0

4,;;

2, 53;2,240

000

=

&&,

ROUNDS OFAMMUNITIONEXPENDED

.30-.50 20 LMM.(1000) (1000)

8,891 74, 6i?g 135

326 474820 -

3,905 -3&j -

4,616 -1,654

275 6l,2g4 -

6,653 297192 --1 -?02,9 -

164 225299 -

3,299 71,672 -409 -332 -19 -9 -

26,844 622

AVERAGE EXlPER ATTACK

SORTIEBombJ!ons Rockets

.15

.16

.62

.79

.19

. a

,01.22.20.57

.35

.25

.;

.54

.68

.@1.13.53.49**

2.12.90.7Q*5

::2

3.73.&33.95.1

O.gO.gl

0.00.42.g

0.0Q.53.90.0**

.34 2.5

.51 5

.42 1:7

TDITUIWS

LOOO RoundsPer Action

Sortie#

.51l 53.12.11

.60

.13

.9+

.59

.63

.16

l 35.15*.17.17.19

1.57.31.66.:2

*

.39

--++

* Not computed; less than 100 sor t ies .

ITOTES TO TAME 4 2

Because of the varying periods, conditions, and plane types involved, and the incomplete-ness of ammuni tion expenditure data for 1942-43, it has not been thought desirable to preparedata on average ordnance expenditures per attack covering the entire -r as a whole. The abovetable provides such data for 1945 only. For the most part the 1945 performance in respect toordnance expenditure per plane is believed superior to that for previous years.

Most significant item in the above table is the relatively low average bomb and rocketload expended by car r ie r VP per sortie attacking targets. It is a l s o i n t e r e s t i n g to n o t e t h a tboth the average bomb load and the average rocket load were greatest for CVE-based VF, least forCV-based VF. It would not appear from these data that maximum advantage wee taken of the offen-sive ordnance-carrying capabilities of carrier VF, or that the fighter-bomberpeted with the dive and torpedowas concerned.

The table indicates that

bombers it displaced, so far as of fens ive use

credi t amfit be awarded to the CVE forces , for(Cont. on

- 103 -

successful ly dom-of heavy ordnance

placing 750 lbs. ofnext page)

(Cont. from preceding page)

bombs and rookets on target per F6F attick, agains t less than 600 lbs. per CV F6F; for put t ingan average of 3 3/4 rockets on target per attacking fighter (against a per-plane capacity of 6,and a fast carrier average of Z+); for placing over 5 rockets on target per TBM attacking, anda total bomb-and-rocket load per TBM nearly equal to the CV-CVL average; and for out-strafingCV and CVL planes of the sam types.

The table indica tes tha t land-based f ighters , though free from the take-off limitations ofthe carrier VF, and less burdened by air combat, also did not average in practice the rccket andbomb carrying capabilities urged in behalf of VBF by advocates of the fighter-bomber; they carriedm o r e bombs but far fewer rockets than carrier fighters.

Carrier VSB and VTB in general averaged 8% or better of their standard maximum loadingsof 1,500 lbs. and 2,000 lbs, respect ively . CVE VTB carried less weight of bombs but made up forit with the largest average rocket loadings of any plane.

Land-based SBDs repcrted excellent loadings relative to their normal loadings; land-basedSB2CS and TBMs carried less ordnance than the sam types on carr iers .

PBJs, performing largely short-range bombing missions, general ly carr ied thei r maxim.ncloads of l-l% tons, depending on type of bomb carried. Other types of VF’B, usually flying long-range search, rarely tried to carry or expend full bomb loads on the targets of opportunity en-countered, and often destroyed them with only a part of the load carried.

In ammuni t ion expendi ture the carrier fighter excelled, averaging 500 to over 600 roundsper ac t ion sor t ie , exceeded among major types only by the PB4Yst 1,570 rounds - PB4Y strafinghas set afire and destroyed many a small vessel and silenced many an A/A gun. The PV and PBMaveraged less than half as many rounds per sortie , and single-engine bomber expenditures wereconsistently under 200 rounds. Land-based VP averaged only 6% as high a rate of expenditure asc a r r i e r W, largely because the types of targets generally encountered were less vulnerable tos t r a f i n g .

A n interestin~ inquiry in the field of ordnance expenditures is the total weight of or-dnance of all types expended on target per plane lost to anti-aircraft. This provides a roughmeasure of a t tack effect iveness against targets , although the limitations are obvious. Thedi f fer ing nature of the targets , and of the defenses of these targets, attacked by fast carrier,CVE, and land-based planes affect the figures. Also, tonnage measurements, while they may re-flect with fair accuracy the effectiveness of rockets, probably do not do justice to the valueo f s t r a f i n g f i r e . S u b j e c t t o t h e s e l i m i t a t i o n s , the following figures are presented:

TONS OF ORDNANCE EXF’ZNDED ON TARGET, PERAIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE, 1945 ONLY

Tons ofCarrier Type, Ordnance Land-BasedPlane Model Per A/A Loss Plane Model

CV F6F 32.4 F4UF4U 25.6 F6FSB2C 43.1 SBDTBM 72.1 SB2C

TBM

Tons ofOrdnance

Fwr A/A Loss

99.656.0

647.6440.3151.9

CVL F6F 46.3 PB4Y 29.4TBM 71.4 PV 46.6

PBJ 903.6CVE FM 44.9 PBM 21.2

F6F 77.2TBM 130.6

NO1’ES Rockets and ammunition added to bomb tonnage on basis of approximate weight of completaround (1000 .50 cal. rounds equal 250 lbs etc.) Plane models expending less than200 tons of ordnance in 1945 are excluded from the table.

(Cont. on next page)

- 1 0 4 -

(Cont. fr~mpreoeding page)

The relatively higher efficiency of the TBM over the SB2C is apparent above; the extent towhich a lesser bcrnbing accuracy may reduce its super iori~ is not known. The apparent relativeineffect iveness of w is conditioned by the consideration that 5% or more of the total weightof ordnance carried by carrier VP was rockets or ammunition (2% to 3% was ammunition) whichmay have been more effective, ton for ton, than bombs.

T h e a p p a r e n t CVE superiority over fast carriers of course reflects the use of their planesagains t ta rgets previously par t ia l ly neutra l ized by fas t carr ier p lanes and surface gunf i re .The apparent superiority of land-based W, VSB and VTB and PBJs reflects their use againstthoroughly neutralized by-passed bases, and targets with light defenses, and in the case of PBJsreflects the effect of mdium a l t i tude bombing in addi t ion . Yet the superior performance of theSBDS, operating largely in the Philippines, may well be noted.

.

The PB4Y and PBM averages reflect use of only partial bomb loads, coupled with heavy strafing,in masthead attack.

- 105 -

b. Bomb and Torpedo lkpenditures

TABLE 43. ANNUAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES BY ALL CARRIER-BASEDAND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT

By Type of Ortinance

TYPE OF ORDNANCE

100-lb . GP?50-lb. GP500-lb. GP

looo-lb. GP2000-lb. GP

500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP

Armor-Piercing

Napalim (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentationDepth Bombs

TorpedoesMinesType Unknown

TOTAL

1942

400

192279

0

00

0

0288

1310

52

CARRIER-BASITONNAGES

=13

712

1150

639426223

0113

10

0262

50

11600

1,720

2,0361,2817,9143,9441,119

6241,401

264

118480335668

7725046

--m-45

3,59f3927

12,8781,336

558

160209

29

56068

95736

29200

PERCENT OF TOTAL*1942-3 19 44 19 54

6.5 9.7 16.70.0 6.1 4.334.9 37.6 59.629.6 18.8 6.29.4 5.3 2.6

0.0 3.0 0.74.8 6.6 1.0

0.4 1.3 0.1

0.0 0.6 2.61.2 2.3 0.30.4 1.6 4.42.4 3.2 0.2

10.4 3.7 1.30.0 0.2 0.0

* * *

100.0 100.0 100.0

m

310

101182

0

00

0

0006

830

156

565

LAND-BASEDTONNAGES 1 % OF TOTAL*194T-47583

1,3472,5552,192

00

0

0114819

27212320

7,289

19 54 1942-3 1945

815 6.9 3.42,982 1.1 12.37,482 19.6 30.97,652 37.1 31.6

815 29.7 3.4

93 0.0 0.4294 0.0 1.2

7 0.0 0.0

2,062 0.0 8.5264 0.2 1.1

1,257 0.7 5.2368 0.3 1.5

30 1.5 0.187 2.9 0.40 * *

4,208 100.0 100.0

*Percentages are based on totals of ordnance of known types only.

N(WIS : 1944 ordnance expenditures, by type of ordnance, are not available from OP-23-V machine=rds because of deficiencies in the coding sysbm. ‘The carr ier-based expendi~ures for 1944

given herewith are from data compiled by ComAirPac OpIntel, and are believed reasonably completeand comparable. Similar lsnd-baoed figures for 1944 are not available.

NOTBS TO TABLE 43

This table, the first of seven on the subject of bomb expenditures by type and size of bombs,shows trends from year to year during the war.

Outstanding in the carrier data are ihe following trends from 1942 to 1945:

( a )

(b)

( c )

(d)

( e )

Substantial increase in use of 100-lb. GP bombs , used largely in TBMs to secure maximumarea coverage against targets susceptible mainly to fragmentation damage and small de-molition charges.

Increasing use of 250-lb. GP bombs, largely on SB2C wing racks, particularly in 1944.

A trend toward concentration on use of the 500-lb. GP bomb as an all-purpose weapon, re-sulting partly from its heavy use by tie increased VF complement.

Substantial decrease in the use Of heavy GP, SAP and AP bombs, from 44$ of the totalin 1942-43 to 11% in 1945.

Increasing use of Napalm fire bombs and fragmentation bombs (particularly after intro-duction of the 260-lb. frag. bomb in 1945), amd decreasing use of other special ordnance,such as torpedoes, incendiary clusters, and depth bombs.

In the data for land-based planes, though 1944 figures are not available, the same trendscan be seen. The heavy 1945 use of depth bombs, SAP bombs, and incendiary clusters, representslargely a c leaning Out of surplus stocks in the Solomons area.

-106-

TABLE 44. TOYS OF BOMBS, CLUSTERS, TORPEDOES AND MINESEXPENDED BY VARIOUS MODELS OF NAVAL AND M4R1NE AIRCRAFT, 1945 ONLY

By Type of Ordnance

LAND-TYPE OF ORDNANOE

BASED#~SW?

6747

2344573

0

25202

28

00

1020

00

ARRIERFG,F4U

312

893226

0

00

0

1193

551

00

C

F6F

3397

2402455

0

127

1

3732

3007

00

BASED

PB4Y

1792363753210

00

0

03743

587

F4U,F6F

6924

2008236822

22119

2

1794344425

00

SBD

86134523473667

o

00

0

100

6100

00

—

PV

126663110

00

0

1111606

00

285

SB2C,SBW

23 I92 ~

563600

5837

0

147188796

00

— -1181

1.97.847.75.10.0

8.0

12.51.57.4

8.10.0

7PBJ

1791179145~1466717

7138

5

0140429183

00

5893

3.020.024.624.912.2

2.5

0.02.47.3

3.10.0

bmmVPB *

49409200

00

0

0166

16

250

l’BM

354863

723582

558

1230

0

063

50028

2920

l’BM

2180

5844866

60

0

93

7739

00

TONS EXPENDED100-lb. Gp250-lb. W @500-lb. W

1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP

500-lb. SAPlooo-lb. SAP

Armor-Piercing

Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentationDepth Bombs

TorpedoesMines

TOTAL TONNAGE

PERCENT OFTOTAL T6NNAGE

3689 1312 4027 12492

28.40.5

57.90.74.5

1.0

0.00.54.0

0.22.3

6531 8065 1041

20.90.0

56.14.66.3

0.6

0.00.37.4

3.80.0

968 244

0.92.665.112.30.0

0.5

10.20.18.1

0.20.0

0.20.968.117.20.0

0.0

9.10.24.2

0.10.0

0.118.658:214.30.0

6.3

0.00.02.5

0.00.0

1.00.430.736.30.3

2.2

27.50.50.7

0.40.0

1.116.729.145.50.0

0.0

0.10.07.5

0.00.0

20.116.437.70.00.0

0.0

0.06.62.5

6.510.2

100-lb. GP250-lb. GP500-lb. GP

looo-lb. GP2000-lb. 5P

SAP-AP

Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentation

Depth BombsTorpedoes, Mines

18.524.438.83.31.0

O.0

0.03.80.4

0.39.5

4.23.22.13.90.0

0.0

38.95.60.0

2.10.0

#Carrier FMS, not shown here, expended 88 tons, as follows: 68 tons of Napalm, 8- - tons of100-lb. GP, 8 tons of 250-lb. GP, 4 tons of 500-lb. GP.

* Largely PBM@ Including a small quantity of 300-lb. Army GP bombs.

NOT5S TO TABLE 44

This table illustrates the ordnance-carrvinz advantages and l imi ta t ions of indiv idual modelsof aircraft, and shows howof the war.

The principal fighterloads, were bombs of three

. -each model was used as an ordnance carrier during the last 7-& months

bomb loadings, accounting for 87 to 94 percent of their total bombtypes: the 500-lb. and 1000-lb. GP, and the fire bomb. The 500-pounderVP, because of range and weight considerations, while the three typespredominated among carrier

were nearly evenly matchedmentation (usually withfast carr ier at tacks on

among land-based VP. Only one other type of bomb, the 260-lb. frag-fuzing) enjoyed substantial use on fi~hbrs: this was lar~elv in the

Japanese a i r f ie ldsVT . . “ .

in the last few months of the war.

bombs of 250 to 1000 pounds size, carrying no ZOOO-VSB, in turn, were l a r g e l y limi’~d to

- 107 -

pounders and few small bombs or clusters. Land-based SB2CS were used to carry fire bombs,however, and both types of VSB carried 260-pound frag bombs on wing racks at the end of thewar .

The TBM carried most of the Navy's 100-pounders, though that type constituted only 28$ ofi t s t o t a l l o a d . Unable to carry effective loads of bombs of the 250 and 1000-lb. sizes, theTBM could carry any items of 100, 500 or 2000-lb. size, yet it was rarely used for such specialitems as 100-lb. or 500-lb. incendiary, f ragmenta t ion or but ter f ly c lus ters , and was insuff i -ciently used to carry 100-pounders.

The versatility of the PB4Y and PBJ is well illustrated by the table. The PB4Y loadingsof small bombs reflect the predominance of small vessels among its targets. The heavy fire-bomb loadings on PVs should be noted. These were largely used in strikes on isolated enemypositions in the Borneo area.

NOTES TO TABLE 45

This table analyzes bomb expenditures by type of target, for 1945 only. Inspection of thistable permits the general statemmt that while bomb selection did vwy somewhat with the varyingrequirements of d i f ferent targets , the outstanding characteristic of the table is the samenessof the bulk of the loadings from column to column.

The la t ter character is t ic resul ts in large par t f rom the re la t ive inf lexibi l i ty of loadingarrangements on fighter and dive bomber aircraft. The former were limited to one or two bombsper plane, and clustere were generally excluded by safety considerations; the VSB were limitedto 3 or 4 bombs per plane and here again clusters were excluded and other types of bombs limitad.Only the TBM, PB4Y and PBJ were widely flexible as to variety of ordnance which could be carriedwith minimum sacrifice of their total load. Under these circumstances, the fact that bomb ex-penditures varied between types of targets as much as they did, i s evidence that se lec t ion ofattacking aircraft and type of bomb was to some extant consciously directed toward the require-ments of the targets. That selection was not perfectly adapted to target requirement goes with-out saying; specific cases have been covered at length in analytical reports by Op-23-v and Com-AirPac . I t i s impor tant to note , however , tha t even the c loses t a t tent ion paid to sc ient i f icselection of ordnance will be of little value if plane design seriously limits the variety ofuseful ordnance that can be carried.

Attacks on airfield targets show evidence of conscious planning in the high use of 100-lb.GP bombs and fragmentation bombs reported, and the comparatively small use of bombs larger than500 pounds. The first two types are recommended for attacks on parked aircraft, and GP bombs of100 or 500 pound size are recommended for runway cratering and destruction of buildings. Theheavy reported use of 1000-lb., 2000-lb., and SAP bombs probably largely reflecte deficienciesin operational planning and in bomb supply; the use of over 5% 500-pounders may reflect in addi-tion the plane loading problem referred to above.

The ca tegory of o ther mi l i ta ry land targets i s so large and in ternal ly d iverse tha t l i t t lecomment can be made, other than to point out the extensive use of fire bombs, and the relativelylight use of small bombs against targets which are frequently small and difficult to hit, yetvulnerable to f ragmenta t ion ef fec t .

Likewise little comment can be made with respect to the miscellaneous categories of landtargets, other than to point out the small variation between the three COlumnS, and to suggestthat industr ia l targets ( included in “other land”) frequently require a large proportion of heavybombs.

The record with respect to armored warships shows a commendable restraint with respect tothe use of ineffective small bombs, but a rather inadequate use of the 2000-lb. GP bombs, whichhave been adjudged superior to SAP and AP bombs for glide and dive attack on most types of armoredvessels. The 500-pounders, which made up over one-third of the tonnage, were probably largelyi n e f f e c t i v e . The heavy use of fragmentation bombs to neutralize A/A may be noted. The light useof torpedoes results from the fact that most attacks in 1945 were made on ships in harbor.

Attacks on unarmored warships were distinguished by a ccncmndable concentration on 500-lb.GP bombs. The use of heavier GPs was permissible, but SAP and AP bombs are wasteful against thesetargets, and torpedoes have a rather small chance of hitting fast maneuvering small vessels ofthese types . (Cont. on next page)

- 108 -

TABLE 45. NUMBER OF BOMBS, CLUSTERS, TORPEDOES AND MINES, ANDTHEIR PROPORTION TO TOTAL TONNAGE, I+XPENDEII ON TARGET

BY ALL lJAVAL AND MARINE CARRIER AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, 1945 ONLYBy Type of Ordnance and Type of Target

UN-KNOWNSHIPS

rO’lXL

LANDYTHER

TARGETSLANDTRANS-PORTA-ION

2,2611,4243,126

78889

434

9

7181

2645300

8,213

AIRFIELDS

37,4834,29124,2052,915

379

69205

6

3561,0667,090452

00

78,517

HARBORAREAS

OTHEROR UN-KNOWNLAND

2,8701,1363,538

58779

t0

0

1464-444898820

TiARSHIPSBB, CA, CVE, DDCL,CV, DE, PC,CVL ETC.

TYPE OFORDNANCE MILI-

TARYTARGETS

38,43920,92738,61811,953

620

61S395

0

5,0512,22210,6171,127

00

130,588

500 Tons orTons Under

NUMBER OF BOMBS100-lb. GP 2,388

7373,405

49378

7266

10

267222589252

00

8,599

157 29860 314

1,575 1,281704 6739 39

1,240 3,1231,046 1,1733,959 1,463432 2816 34

00

26060

011

0

01

1303

96

88,25931,10881,43017,9731,373

250-lb. GP*500-lb. GP

1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP

500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP

26 1O8143 51

61 0108 0

1,0061,003

Armor-Piercing # 21 15 9 0 70

5,9224,85819,9202,106

32296

Napalm BombsOther IncendiaryFragmentationDepth BombsTorpedoesMines

0 00 2

623 lCo c

110 590 c

3,458 2,244

1,070 566

0 31152 69811A 11114 120

138 100 0

7,289 6,791

1,650 810

TOTAL BOMBS @ 9,357

1,707

390

165

O.w0.0

39.41.80.0

0.03.6

0.0

0.00.00.60.01.8

52.8

255,446

45,81611,577 24,912 1,657 1,702TOTAL TONNAGE

PERCENT OFTOTAL TONh1A GE

100-lb. GP250-lb. GP*500-lb. GP

1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP

16.2‰4.752.3l2.63.4

0.10.9

0.0

1.30.76.81.00.00.0

00.%

8.5$8.4

51.817.24.6

0.10.0

0.0

3.41.83.20.90.10.0

Oo.q

0.8‰0.7

36.832.93.6

2.6‰6.9

56.66.06.9

3.8‰7.960.013.01.0

19.3%18.145.21.74.2

9.7$8.5

44.419.63.0

7.7$10.538.824.02.5

0.60.8

0.0

9.00.64.70.80.00.0

6.9$10.747.223.85.4

0.70.1

0.3

2.10.61.70.50.00.0

Oo.q

1100 bo

~.w5.550.014.54.6

1.12.5

0.3

7.40.83.82.50.00.0

,Oo.q

0.76.7

0.93.3

0.61.1

500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP

4.84.4

0.00.0

Armor-Piercing # 1.0 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.1

0.00.06.50.0

10.30.0

0.00.00.20.0

10.40.0

0.00.40.80.28.40.0

1.94.31.52.61.20.0

5.70.74.80.90.70.2

Napalm BombsOther IncendiaryFragmentationDepth BombsTorpedoesMines

loo.ojz Oo.oj!z loo.q Oo.cyz 100.% ,00.$ 100.*TOTALS

number (about# Largely 1000-lb.@ Counting clusters as one bomb each. It is estimated that the 4,858 “other incendiary” units

* Includes a small of Army 300-pound GP bombs.

were a lmost ent i re ly c lus ters , averaging 25 individual incendiary bombs apiece, or a total ofabout 120,000 bombs. possibly 1/3 of the fragmentation units were 6 - bomb clusters, raisingthe total of frag bombs to over 50,000.

NOTE : Total tonnages in this table differ somewhat from those in other sections of this report,in which tonnages were based on total bomb-tonnage of all types, rounded to a whole number of

tons for each separate mission.(Continued from preceding page)

The selection of bombs ‘against merchant vessels appears to have been excellent. However,more 1000-lb. GP bombs and torpedoes could well have been used against large vessels, and SAPbombs eliminated. The excellent selection of small GP bombs, incendiary and fragmentation clusters(largely by VPB) against small vessels, should be especially noted.

700380 O-46- 8 - 109 -

TABLE 46. REPORTED ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES OF NAVAL AND MARINESBDs AND TBFs, 1942-1943 *

TYPE OF ORDNANCE

100-lb. GP250-lb. GP500-lb. GP

1000-lb, GP2000-lb. GP

SAP and AP

FragmentationIncendiaryDepth Bombs

TorpedoesMines

TOTALS

CARRIER-SBD

% ofTons Total

380

167640

0

91

30

16

00

4.0%0.0

17.567.00.0

9.5

0.30.01.7

0.00.0

955 100.0%

BASEDTBF

‰ ofTons Total

105 9.0%o 0.0

622 53.418 1.5

223 19.2

0 0.0

2 0.219 1.632 2.7

144 12.40 0.0

1,165 100.0%

* Figures for these two planes given in this table accountNaval and Marine aircraft during these two years.

NOTES TO TABLE 46

Tons Total

177 5.9‰38 1.3

216 7.12,588 85.6

0 0.0

0 0.0

0 0.00 0.03 0.1

0 0.00 0.0

3,022 100.0%

-BASEDTBF

% ofTons Total300 8.0%32 0.9

920 24.418 0.5

2,184 58.1

0 0.0

0 0.04 0.10 0.0

102 2.7200 5.3

3,760 100.0%

for 87% of all tonnage expended by

The above figures for the Navy’s two principal bomb carrying planes of 1942-43 present aninteresting contrast with the data for 1945. The overwhelming concentration on the heaviesttypes of bombs in 1942-43 is not believed to have had any especial justification in the natureof the targets attacked, which were principally airfields and lightly constructed military landtargets. This concentration may have resulted in part from the difficulties of bomb supply toforward areas, or from operating conditions which favored the loading of the smallest possiblenumber of bombs. It is believed, however, that the primary factor was the absence of any scienceof ordnance selection, or of any standard doctrine in the field; the first steps by the Navy toorganize the study of bomb damage and to produce a doctrine for ordnance selection were taken inlate 1943 and were not effective until 1944. Thus field commanders in the South Pacific andelsewhere were free to follow the path of least resistance - loading the fewest bombs - and thethen current “blast” theory of bomb damage (which favored the largest bomb available, and ignoredthe desirability of using a larger number of smaller bombs to increase the probability of gettinghits, on such targets as were susceptible to damage by smaller bombs).

I t wi l l be noted that the carr ier forces , although they had among their targets a largerpercentage of armored warships and others requiring larger bombs, were less inclined to emphasizelarge bombs than the land-based airforces. Neither made much use of fragmentation or incendiaryordnance. By contrast with 1942-43 the ordnance selection in 1945 exhibited exceptional improve-ment, for which credit may be assigned to an increasing awareness of the importance of correctordnance, and an increasing volume of information concerning the science of ordnance selection.

- 110 -

TABLE 47. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES OF ALL CARRIER-BASEDAIRCRAFT, BY TYPE OF ORDNANCE AND BY OPERATION, 1944

TYPE OFORDNANCE

100-lb. GP250-lb. GP500-lb. GP

1000-lb. GP2000-lb. GP

500-lb. SAPlc)c)o-lb. SAP

Armor-Piercing

Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragmentationDepth Bombs

TorpedoesMines

TOTAL

MAR-SHALLS

Jan.-Feb.

24385

741218144

**

0

00

39106

00

1576

PALAU,YAP,WOLEAI

March-April

4927

20313318

*79

51

014100

3550

669

(Figures are in tons)

HOL-LAN-DIA

April

12351

35215425

232

0

0343322

00

819

SECONDTRUK,PONAPE

April-May

5726

18516192

53158

5

0341024

00

805

MARI-ANAS,BONINS,PALAUJune -August

664337

26071479367

193524

51

0247153347

610

7030

PALAU,YAP

Sept

23815269828155

50119

0

70c

2477

cc

1764

PHIL- RYUKYUSIP- FORMOSA,PINES, PHILIP-BONINS PINES

Sept. Oct.

192 288140 260878 1070565 462170 100

36 17974 223

0 106

0 046 5821 1318 22

72 3540 0

2212 3135

PHIL-IP-PINES

Nov.-Dec.

144185762281115

5186

13

2171516

1360

1823

TOTALMINOROPERA-TIONS1944

234

2219320

3912

7

46140

36

480

609#

* Included with 500-lb. GP. or 1000-lb. GP. respectively: amounts are believed to be small.# T o t a l i n c l u d e s 4 6 t o n s o f u n k n o w n t y p e s .

NOTE: These data are from compilations prepared by ComAirPac OpIntel, with miner adjustments,and are believed reasonably complete and accurate.

NOTES TO TABIX 47

The above table, taken from AirPac sources, shows the carrier ordnance expenditures for in-dividual operations and groups of operations during 1944.

The most significant characteristic of the ordnance data, when so arranged, is the relative-ly high expenditure of small bombs during short operation , and the greater expenditure of heavybombs during extended operations or the later phases thereof (including (a) the Truk and Marianasstrikes which were the second phase of the Marshalls operation, (b) the Second Truk strikes whichwere the second phase of the Hollandia operation, (c) the Marianas operation as a whole, and (d)the Philippines strikes of September which succeeded the Palau operations). The reason for thiswas principally early exhaustion by some carriers of the limited allowances of small bombs; thisrequi red subs t i tu t ion , in the la t te r phases of the opera t ion , of the large bombs which werecarried in excess of reasonable needs, and these were then used regardless of the requirementsof the targets. This situation was corrected in 1945 by altering the carrier allowances infavor of small bombs, and by replenishing bombs at sea during extended operations.

- 111 -

TABLE 48. ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES OF ALL CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT,BY TYPE OF ORDNANCE, MONTHLY, 1945

TYPE OF ORDIT.4NCE

100-lb. Gp250-lb. GP500-lb. GP1000-lb. GP2000-lb. Gp

500-lb. SAP1000-lb. SAP

Armor-Piercing

Napalm (Tank)Other IncendiaryFragnentatio~Depth Bombs

Torpedoes

TOTAL

JanuaryTons ~

331 14101 41318 57249 1135 2

72 342 2

17 1

0 02

28 ;8 *

109 5

2312 100

FebruaryTons %

252 20106 8696 5557 516 1

0 00 0

0 0

109 90 0

19 20 0

0 0

1255 100

March~

856 27236 71692 5362 212 *

23 18Q 3

2 *

85 316 142 11 *

72 2

3179 100

April~

887 18244 53066 61209 4211 4

13 *56 1

10 *

193 44 *42 112 *

111 2

5058 100

MayTons ‰

665 19132 42401 68

85 218 1

30 10 0

0 0

87 244 153 25 *

0 0

3520 100

JuneTons ‰

523 2816 1

1058 5739 28 *

23 10 0

0 0

97 51 *

104 67 l

0 0

1876 100

July-Augustrolls g

85 290 2

2649 60636 14260 6

0 032 1

0 0

2 *1

689 1;4 *

0 0

4448 100

* Less than & of one percent,

NOTES TO TABIE 48

The principal trend to h noted in the 1945 carrier ordnance expenditures is the shift from100-lb. and 250-lb. GP bombs to the 260-lb. fragmentation bomb in the last tiree months of thewar. These bombs, with the new fl fuzing, were used by all types of planes against such primarytargets as grounded aircraft and A/A guns. Heavy bombs received scant use in 1945, except in theheavy anti-shipping strikes of January and July. In the latter month armored warships were thep r i n c i p a l t a r g e t s , and 21% of total timage consistad of 1000 or 2000-lb. bombs.

NOTES TO TABLE 49: (use next page).

Torpedoes accounted for 12% of the total weight of bombs, torpedces and mines expended byNaval and Marine aircraft against enemy shipping during the war. In carr ier-based at tacks theyaccountad for 14%, in land-based a t tacks only 5%.

In shipping attacks by carrier VTB torpedoes represented 29% of the total weight of heavyordnance carried, and in shipping attacks by land-based VTB only 15%. The proportion of torpedosto total weight of ordnance carried by VTB against shipping declined throughout the war, as indi-cated by the following figures :

$ of Torpedoes to Total OrdnanceExpended on Shipping, by Weight

Year C a r r i e r VTB Land-Based ~

1942 73$ 94‰1943 68 51944 32 31945 16 0

Torpedoes constituted over one quarter of the tatal weight of ordnance expended against armor-ed warships, slightly over 10 percent of expenditures against unarmored warships, and slightlyless than 10 percent of expenditures against large merchant vvssels. Nearly half of the totaltorpedo expenditures were directed against armored warships.

The table shows, monthly, tie targets against which torpedoes were expended, and the typesof planes carrying them. All but 3% of total aticraft torpedo expenditures were by VTB, largelyTBFs or T?!@.

- 112 -

TABLE 49. AERIAL TORPEDOES EXPENDED ON TARGETS, MONTHLY

MONTH

1942 - FebruaryMarchMayJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943 - JanuaryFebruaryJulyNovemberDecember

1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovember

1945 - JanuaryMarchAprilMayJuneJuly

TOTALS

TOTALNo. OF

TORPEDOESEXPENDED

9136424125

32487

1534

7744

566735223972

354136

10973

1141286

1,460

NUMBER

CarrierVTB

9136417120880

000

7343

486635223972

354136

10972

111000

DROPPEDLand-BasedVTB

o00405

24407

153400

6

108

BY

VPB

3

41

21

013

1286

NUMBER DROPPWARSHIPS

Ar- Unar-mored mored

90

6421115

23397

000

5935

16140

2040

23934

30

103400

000000500

630

140

1616161

110

1313

28109480

710 173

ED, BY TARGE

MERCHANTVESSELS

0130310490

90449

636161

19707489

78602206

515

T TYPE

DATA NOTAVAILABLE

1813052

280

030200

62

NOTE : 1944 totals are from AirPac data, and 1944 breakdowns by type of target are approximateonly . No torpedo expendi tures were repor ted for months not l i s ted above .

- 113 -

MONTH

19~-JanuawFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTALS

c. Rocket and Ammunition Expenditures

TABLE 5O. NUMBER OF ROCKETS EXPENDED ON TARGETS, MONTHLY.By Model of Aircraft, For Land-Based and Carrier-Based Aircraft,

and by Type of Carrier

A. CARRIER-BASED

MONTH

19~ebruaryMarchAprilMayHovemberDecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TO!l?ALS

41,012 22,107 4578 7208

F4U.FG

025

3,27;3,334~,5233,099

941

_m.uE_

F6F

00

1220

227~lg5:

z

CVL-BASED

F6F TBM—

00

1,2387al354

335

1,601 0693 330

2,955 6934,01s 5021,936 190

5313 412,210 1131,631 0

18,290 1869_

B. LAND-BA

FM SBD

232

FASTCARRIERTOTAL

00

i;134525

2,97325

3,7724,7842,bgl3,267

7,4217,147

16,06314,16gg,16g1,849

13,464g,jo+

XL@!

CVE-BASEDF4U,

FM F6F FG TBM22g142140

64;56 1,3730 7134 0 3,9060 0 1,3040 0 0

TOTAL--Ez

142140

64;1,429

713 3,9101,304

00 0 4 4

2,4752,&?715,9659,0381,6036,230

9;1

28,337 11,115 1562 46,b91!a7,@cj

TBM

154942g000

295261195346

2,12792412064

4,608

EBJ

0000

2/33129

19440

g716425

z

2,951

PQ

0006

la

39175261219

1,022477470

A!i69--

TOWL.L

1$942g

2r3 2293

52g501590

4,3137,5187,1014,3291,458

?L!E.z_No rockets were expended during months not listed above.

- 114 -

‘TABLE 51. ROCKRT EXPENDITURES ON TARGETS, 1945By Plane Model, Carrier-Eased and Land-Based, and by Target Type

TARGET TYPE

AirfieldsOther Military TargetsHarbor and WaterfrontLand TransportationIndustrialOther and unknown land

Armored WarshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchemt, over 500 tons$lerchant, under 500 tonsShips, Type urdmown

TOTAL

CARRIER-RASEDF6F F4U FM SB2C TBM

295501S462174611281167698

295134037591818157

119446472738595

1227296

154368

117868116

759416871

6881186108780

0114195741

0

1210274521796740

3210031320

1491424525

8271678227

1056

083

21759124

55120 23669 28277 4535 44142

LAND-RASEDF4U, TEIJ. PBJ PVF6F* 5B2~

3539 123 141 410803 3973 1128 17881004 768 154 77410 265 66 48

0 24 88 7889 24 21 8

0 0 0 00 0 114 92

96 0 563 30322 119 204 115

0 0 60 0

16263 5296 2539 2240

TOTAL

69,01981,7656,2195,4722,9932,972

4812,2116,0694,623

257

182,081

— ,

* Includes 144 by FM

NOTES TO TABIX 50

T h e rzradual increase in the use of rockets. as their combat use suread to more squadrons and.more types of plaues, is c lear ly indica ted above. The f i rs t substanti~l use of rocke& by fas tcarriers, CVES, and land-based aircraft, came in each case with the appearance of rocket-equippedf ighter squadrons , an CVs and CVLs during the Guam and Palau campaigns of July and September 1944,on CVZS during the Lingayen opera t ion . Rocket-equipped land-based Wrine fighters did not appearuntil the beginning of the Okinawa campaign. Fighters accounted for 65% of the aircraft rocketsfired at the enemy; CVE TBMs fired 60j% of those expended by bombers.

Noteworthy are the expenditures for April 1945, when carriers alone fired nearly 41,000 HSrockets at enemy targets, largely on Okinawa. 116 ,000 , o r 55% af all rocket expenditures for thewar, were a=minst targets in the Ryukyus area; all but 5,600 of these were fired at land targets.Other areas heavily attacked with rockets were Japan (31,000), the Philippines (19,000), and theBonins, principally Iwo Jima (15,000).

NOTES TO TABLE 51

1945 aircraft racket expenditures accounted for over 85$ of the Naval total for the war.Thus the above table, for 1945 only, gives a nearly complete picture of the use of rockets byNaval p lanes . 45% of all rocket expenditures were against military land targets, such as guns,defenses , personnel , s tores , e tc . Another 38$were expended against parked aircraft, hangars,and other a i r f ie ld targets . About 7%were expended against shipping, l@ against miscellaneousland targets .

Fast carrier fighters made the bulk of the rocket attacks on airfields and shipping; CVE FMsand TBMs made most of the attacks an other milita~ land targets, though CVE planes also heavilyattacbd air f ie lds (par t icular ly in June 1945) and fas t carr ier F6Fs were qui te ac t ive agains tmil i tary targets . SB2CS made few rocket a t tacks , in comparison with other plane models. Bombersin general made relatively few rocket attacks on sh ipp ing , reserving thei r pr imary ef for t forbomb-carr~ng.

Land-based planes used rockets primrily against military installations in the Okinawaarea, though fighters in the later stages of that campaign made rocket attacks on airfields inKyushu and the Southern Ryukyus.

- 115 -

TABLE 52. MONTHLY EXPENDITURE OF ROCKETS, BY ALL NAVAL ANDMARINE CARRIER AND LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT, BY TYPE OF TARGET, 1945

BASE ,MONTH

CARRIER-BASED

JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

LAND-BASED

JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTAL

AIR-FIELDS

65,224

4,3883,2369,06612,2969,94113,5607,1475,590

3,823

02518

206557

1,0321,651

334

69,047

OTHERMILI-TARYTARGETS

64,077

2,7167,957

11,47324,33110,5094,5721,983

536

17,683

100153112

3,7475,9664,8411,934

830

81,760

HARBORAREAS

4,223

489180

1,47393737512

430327

2,000

250243297

012764935876

6,223

LANDTRANS-PORTA-TION

4,684

1,115208522

1,229360184726340

788

000

32140154120

5,472

OTHER& UN-KNOWNLAND

5,608

443265

1319642552455

1,128804

327

82400

18380248

5,935

WARSHIPSAr- Unar -mored mored—481 2,005—

0 7048 1024 727

112 530 00 0

297 15960 260

0 206

0 460 160 920 60 00 140 320 0

481 2,211

MERCHANTMENOver Under500 500Tons Tons

5,382

1,587239

1,265438100160

1,158435

69112424221096

138166111

3,864

775150

1,00883233990

534136

804

0164923

18829313699

6,073 4,668

SHIPS,UN-KNOWNTYPE

197—0000

210

1760

16

000000

160

213

TOTAL

155,745

12,21712,34526,85740,87022,19719,03313,7388,488

26,338

528501590

4,3137,5187,1014,3291,458

182,083

NOTES TO TABLE 52

This table traces the pattern of rocket attacks in 1945. Pr imary carr ier rocket targetsin January were the airfields of the Philippines, Formosa, China and Indo China, though landtargets in the Lingayen area ware also heavily hit by the CVEs and shipping in the China Sea byt h e f a s t c a r r i e r s . In February the emphasis in rocket attacks shifted to land targets at Iwo,with the Tokyo airfields a good second. In March a considerably stepped up attack was directedat airfields in Kyushu and the Ryukyus, at Okinawa defenses before the invasion, and at shippingin Kyushu ports.

April witnessed the greatest rocket offensive, mostly in support of ground forces onOkinawa, but with heavy attacks on Kyushu and Ryukyus airfields also. In May the close supportrequirements relaxed, and land-based planes took over the major share of this duty, but air-f ie ld a t tacks cont inued. In late May and June, after withdrawal of the British Task Forcecovering the Southern Ryukyus, and of the U.S. fast carrier force, the CVE force diverted itsmajor attention to airfields, while the Marine planes ashore provided the bulk of the airsuppor t .

July and August were devoted almost entirely to attacks on Japan, in which airfields andshipping were the primary rocket targets.

- 116 -

TABLE 53. AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES ON TARGETS (IN THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS) 1945

BASE,MONTH

CARRIER-BASED

.TanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

LAND-BASEDJanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTAIS

COMPARATIVETOTALS, 1944

Carrier-Based and Land-Based, by Target Type, Monthly

AIR-FIELDS

12,471

1,5801,0772,3742,3491,2421,5001,1081,241

1,43817429413518211123624066

13,909

6,782

OTHERMILI-TARYTARGETS

7,378

342992

2,0082,606

67633836749

El&J240

1,4801,5962,0901,8451,018

643243

16,533

22,824

HARBORAREAS

842—11025

2941913512

12352

844G162114917097

17926

1,686

230

LANDTRANS-PORTA-TION

826—17672

1081642427

19263

1,14920513613926115887

1585

1,975

1,241

5Tm%-% uN-KNOWNLAND

868—58

1172511265325

16276

259x148132

2321220

1,127

863

RARSRIPSAr- Unar -mored mored

376—115

852700

23414

1T

o000100

656—25190

1693320

5358

1057

7351934

292

377 761

456 715

WERCHM?I’M5N%mr Under500 500rons Tons

1708 992

688 z131 102414 292110 18627 4816 18

227 12295 19

~ 2&7J14 13956 16390 22761 287

217 397124 402113 56032 202

2415 3,369

2253 1,627

, .

SHIPSTYPEUN-KNOWN

8

00001070

1243

0000

12400

132

0

TOTAL

26,125

3,4212,6115,9955,7922,1081,9362,5951,667

16,159913

2,4462,3492,9932,8242,1141,944

576

42,284

36,991

NOTES TO TABLE 53

The pattern of ammunition expenditure differed fron that for rocket expenditure. as a.comparison of the above table with Table 52 will illustrate. Airf ie ld targets consu&ed a h igherpropor t ion of the s t raf ing ef for ts of car r ier a i rcraf t than of the i r rocket expendi tures . Therewerse appeared to be true in the case of land-based a i rcraf t . In the case of shipping targetsa lso , carr ier a i rcraf t appeared to re ly more on s t raf ing than rocket f i re , whi le for mil i taryland targets rockets were used more heavily. These tendencies probably reflect the largerrocket loadings generally carried b

A?WE planes agains t mi l i tary targets , p lus extenaiw straf-

ing of parked aircraf t , a i r f ie ld A and ship ~A by fast carrier VP. The heavy use of r0Cket8agains t harbor areas , versus s t raf ing agains t t ranspor ta t ion targets , by land-based planes , mayalso be noted.

Carr ier p lanes devoted thei r pr incipal s t raf ing to a i r f ie ld targets , wi th other mi l i tarytargets second. Land-based planes put military targets first, merchent shipping second, andairfields a poor third. The remarkable strafing record of land-based planes against smallmerchant vessels reflects principally the work of PB4Ys , which during 1945 expended 1,679,000rounds in missions against merchant vessels of under 500 tons, including 436,000 rounds inJu ly 1945 a lone .

The comparative data in the bottom lines of the table show trends in strafing between 1944and 1945. Major increases from 1944 to 1945 may be noted with respect to airfields, harbor areas,and small vessels, and a decrease with respect to military targets. Part of this decrease, andpar t of the a i r f ie lds increase , msY have resul ted f rom differences in c lass i f icat ion, s ince in1944 airfield buildings and guns were someti~s classified under military targets. The growingimportance of harbor areas reflects the movement of the war to sectors where substantial portsand facilities were found.

- 117 -

TABIJ3 54. AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES ON TARGETS(IN THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS), DURING 1944

Carrier-Based and Land-Based, by Type of Carrier, and by Type of Target

TYPB OF TARGET

Grounded AircraftAirfield Runways

Defense Installations, GunsPersonnel, Bivouac AreasBuildings, Storage Areas*

Docks and WaterfrontRoads, Bridges, VehiclesIndustrial FacilitiesUrban AreasOther and Unknown Ixmd

Armored ‘~rshipsUnarmored WarshipsMerchant, over 500 toneMerchant, under 500 tons

TOTAL LAND TARGETSTOTAL SHIP TARGETS

TOTAL, ALL TARGETS

F6F

17862463

3897464

2707

951381329479

2515071330660

118552648

14503

CV-CVLSBD,SB2C

104258

42264

403

83353102

3654

23444

1357368

1725

CARRIER

TBF,TBM

79230

304118376

1919192112

2945

15958

1197291

1488

-BASED

FM

11998

848619386

35558

27

96244483

E247

2415

CVE

F6F

G66

420158273

11323

063

207

3283

G142

1546

TBF,TBM

z16

203100115

0250

133

2256

11

z44

530

F4U,F6F

81679

295020162368

6241019

1994

02398

404

8788525

9313

LAND-SBD,TBF

2432

1071407993

17216

41213

01

5069

3167140

3,307

-BAS

PB4Y

4140

558

32

0423

21

242213149

ZX406

612

IOtherVPB

2131

198410439

15182

8512

07

87146

1312240

1552

TOTAL

2,3694,413

10,3684,3648,092

2301,241

236451176

456715

2,2531,627

31,9405,051

36,991

* Including airfield buildings and buildings of unidentified types, but excluding barracks.

NOTES TO TABLE 54

Herein is shown, for 1944 only, a more detailed breakdown of the types of targets strafed,plus data on the amount of strafing by each type of plane.

- 118 -

6. NIGHT AIR OPERATIONS

TABLE 55. SORTIES, BOMB TONNAGE. AND LOSSES IN NIGHT ATTACKS

BASE,PLANE MODEL

LAND-BASED

PB4YPBJPV

PBYPBMPB2Y

F6FF4USBDTBF, TBM

CARRIBR-BASEDF6FF4UFMSBDTBF, TBM

GRAND TOTAL

PLANESTAKINGOFF

5164

E1306449

99716564

132774

121559

636K174

23291

5800

BY NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCR&, FOR ENTIRE WARBy Plane Model, Land-Based and Carrier-Based

PLANES ATTACK-

INGTARGETS

4973

921278377

105814256

130070

110490

582?%?164

23272

5555

TONS OFBOMBSON

TARGETS

2796

x747310

8705874

2689

31351

2047

00

12173

3000

OWN LOSSES OliACTION SORTIES

%%% %%,,-

37

142

690

3129

12—40017

3

z00

100

0101

0E0000

32

-z36

510

2119

1270004

49 3 44

PLANES LOSTFER 100SORTIES

Enemy Oper.

0.8G0.30.4

0.75.5

*

0.2

1.;1.8

1.9E

***

0.6

G0.21.3

0.50.6

*

0.2*

0.81.6

1.9n

***

2.4 1.4

0.9 0.8

PERCENT OFNIGHT SORTIESTO TOTALSORTIES

3.8

z15.616.7

72.232.645.1

32.00.10.35.3

0.4n0.2#

0.40.8

2.0

* Not computed; less than 100 sor t ies .#Le88 +JWIQ.05.

(a) Night Attack

Tables 55 and 56 give brief statistical data on Navy and Marine night attacks on targets.While the number of sorties attacking targets at night was only 2 percent of total attack-sortiesby Naval aircraft, the total volume is more impressive than might ordinarily be thought, amount-ing ta 5,800 sorties and 3,000 tons of bombs, IarCely by land-based planes. For some types ofa i rcraf t , mainly the f ly ing boats , land-based F6F night fighters, and to a lesser extant PVs a n dPBJs, night a t tacks cons t i tu ted a major por t ion of the i r offensiw a c t i v i t y .

For the PBY, too slow and vulnerable for day attack on defended targets, night work con-stituted a profitable and principal employment. The 1,058 attacks made by PBYs on 997 sortieswere divided between ship and shore targets. Black Cats from New Guinea flew low level nightbombing missions against Jap ships in the Bismarck Sea area in the winter of 194344, and BlackCats in the Solomons cooperated with PT-boats in spotting and attacking Jap barges and shoreinstallations. PEWS were also used for night heckling raids on Jap bases throughout the Southand Southwest Pacific, and for minelaying, and were still pursuing Jap shipping as far west asCelebes in late 1944.

PBMs and PB2Ys made a number of night attacks, largely on shipping (plus two PB2Y long-range night raids on Wake), but these two plane types ware largely used for anti-sub patrol andsector search in quie t areas , and thus flew far fewer night attack missions.

PBJ n ight miss ions fell into +-o pr incipal c lasses : night heckling missions over Rabaula n d Kavieng, constituting the bulk of the sorties, and night rocket attacks on shipping, princi-pally in the Bonins area. PV night missions were principally attacks on the Northern Kuriles,flown over the 600 miles from Attu under difficult weather conditions. PB4Ys flew few nightmissions: a few heckling sorties over Rabaul, and some minelaying flights.

The number of night missions by single-engine land-based planes is surprisingly large. Thoseby TBFs were predominantly for minelaying in the Solomons area, but included also night hecklingattacks and shipping attacks there, and in 1945 some heckling missions at Okinawa.

The F6F night missions were flown almost entirely by Marine night fighter squadrons. Thosefrom November 1944 b March 1945 were flown against Palau and Yap, in preparation for those insubsequent months in the Okinawa area, where substantial support was given our ground forces byregular heckling missions over enemy lines.

- 119 -

(Cont. on next page)

TABLE 56. NUMSER OF NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRA~ ATTACKING

MONTH

1942 - MayJuneAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1943 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSwp+&mberOctoberNovemberDecember

1944 - JanufiryFebruaryMurchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

1942 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

TARGETS AT NIGRTBy Plane Model, Carrier-Based and Land-Based, Monthly

931000

010

200

271211

124

31

54

246118420—o

40109118—267

ARRIERTBFTBM—

18306

240

013000000040

17

158

3338474

150—o

7834160—272—

-BASED

Other

1112000

000103000400

000

120000

0238

12

43

)

Total

38736

240

0140

210

301211

204

48

201257

111658

170

0131151290

582

F6F

6028

13259

7

24202147115181241 950

oo

295005

1300

200404

37900

120

02000000—o0

682—

70

—

SBD—o03

173077

04

366

—644

420—

110—

mTBM—

o001300

01

12948

10529

2500

370

629271000000000

000

1741000—4

3567258—

490.

LAND-

p~y

3500000

297006

165

10284353

1356083177455638393695136

3117210100

817981952

1058

BASED

PBJ

00

568092

10511710868267036

47102328177867421

00

758520

1278

—

PV—

139

1418

25224335905010170

23160

00000001—o

45311—

377—

OtherPB*

o0

11203702024

191636

1598

21003

18

21

2947371753

031

118141

290

TOTAL

353

183377

214

14750

10511323115379675

18712721215230723523524016913141197

10432421026133634517425

76615

25031779

4973

GRANDTOTAL

353

183377

214

14750

1 C51132698843

12075

187141212173307265247241170151415145

12433626737240135319125

76746

26542069

5555

* Including 92 by PB4Y, 142 by PBM, 56 by PB2Y.

Carrier night offensive missions were flown largely by VF(N) and VTB(N), which came aboardin early 1944 and in September 1944 respectively. although pre-dawn attacks accounted for a numberof sor t ies f lown ear l ier . The number of night attacks flown increased greatly in the Okinawa oper-ation, as a night CV and a night CVE made available full night air groups for regular neutraliza-tion attacks on enemy airfields and attacks on shipping.

Surprisingly low 1oss rates were reported for night Operations by lend-based F6Fs end PBJs.PBYs, considering their vulnerability in minimum altitude attacks, and PVs, considering the diffi-cult conditions of the North Pacific, also reported remarkably low losses. Carrier loss rates,though higher than the day rates, were not excessive considering the hazards involved and thevalue of the work done.

- 120 -

TABLE 57. NIGHT AERIAL COMBAT RECORD FOR LAND-BASEDAND CARRIER-BASED NAVAL AND MARINE AIRCRAFT, MONTHLY

MONTH

1943 - July

NovemberDecember

1944 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberDecember

1945 - JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTAL

LAND-BASED CARRIEROwnOwn

AircraftOnMission

1867

1271

16172030203

000

2131 23 93

181

(b) Night Air Combat

OwnAircraftEngagingIn Combat

867

771732030103

0007

202093

114

Enemy Aircraft

DestroyedEngaged In Combat

158

10

671633040104

0007

262310

287

351210010103

0005

25239

3 3

137 99

Own AircraftOnMission—

030

010207922

172

18

439

552000

10

164

AircraftEngagingIn Combat

030

010105511

1215

327

3312003

95

-BASED

Enemy Aircraft

DestroyedEngaged In Combat

0 04 20 0

0 01 00 03 10 07 74 41 01 1

10 101 16 5

4 42 2

12 1136 3317 160 00 08 6—

117 103

U.S. Naval and Marine aircraft during World War II shot down a total of 202 enemy aircraftat night and lost only 7 planes in night aerial combat, or 1/29 of the enemy losses in the sameactions. If operational losses on missions involving night combat are included, 15 enemy planeswere destroyed per own plane lost. It should be noted that the chance of over-optimistic claimsof enemy aircraft destroyed in night combat is negligible, since most enemy planes crash inf lames vis ible for mi les , and usually only one or two aircraft are engaged at a time.

103 of the enemy planes were shot down by carrier night fighters, or planes acting as nightfighters, 90 by land-based night fighters, and 9 by patrol bombers.

Of the 7 losses to enemy aircraft, only one involved a carrier-based F6F(N), and only 2 in-volved land-based F6F(N)s, which became the standard night fighters for land and carrier use, andaccounted for three-fourths of the enemy planes destroyed in night combat.

The first night fighters consisted of a small Marine squadron of PVs converted to nightfighters, sent to the Solomons in late 1943 to discourage the nightly "Washing Machine Charlie”r a i d s . This squadron accounted for 11 enemy planes between November 1943 and May 1944, including7 float planes and 4 bombers, and lost one plane in air combat. It was supplemented by a Navysquadron of F4Us equipped with intercept radar gear. This squadron accounted for 4 floatplanesand 4 bombers, with no air combat losses. Another F4U (N) squadron (Marine) brought down twoBettys in the Marshalls, with one loss.

After these three squadrons all land-based night fighters were the new F6Fs with AI inter-cept gear , and all were in Marine squadrons. Their first night air combat was in October 1944,when they knocked down a float plane in the Palau area, and in December, when they destroyed 3Jap f ighters in the Phi l ippines . They had no further night combat until April 1945, when the threeMarine VP(N) squadrons sent to Okinawa began their campaign which resulted in the destruction, ina 4-month period , of 64 enemy aircraft, against 2 air combat losses and 1 operational loss sus-

(Cont. on next page)

- 121 -

BASE, PLANEMODEL

CARRIER-BASED

F6FF4UFMTBF, TBM

LAND-BASED

F6FF4UTBFPV(N)PB4YPBJPBYPBM

TOTAL

TABLE 58. NIGHT AERIAL COMHAT RECORD. BY PLANE MODEL,

‘~AIRCRAFTON

MISSION

164—149

546

181—87179

15143081

345

mLIRCRAFTENGAGINGIN COMBAT—

95—85442

114

61133

1310851

209

FOR ENTIRE WAR

BNEw PLANESENGAGED

FightersBombers and F/P

79 38— —70 367 00 12 1

63 74— .39 327 51 2

10 74 161 80 41 0

142 112

ENEMY PL4NESDESTROYED

Fighter8Bombers and F/P

69— 34—62 335 00 12 0

51 48

386052000

305066010

120 82

CViN LOSSBSON MISSION

i?nemy Opera-A/C tional

2 4

2:0 00 00 0

5 2

z T1 10 01 01 00 00 00 0

7 6

tained in these engagements.

The first carrier night fighters to engage in combat were a pair of standard F6Fs, guidedby a radar-equipped TBM, which intercepted a Jap bomber attack in the Gilberts area in November1943. One of the F6Fs (piloted by Cdr. O’Hare) was shot down by the Japs, and the TBM reversedthe concept of the team by shooting down two of the Japs.

In early 1944 these makeshift teams were replaced by 4-plane teams of AI-equipped F6FS ( a n dfor a few months some AI-equipped F4Us) assigned to each CV. These planes accomplished little innight combat until the Marianas campaign, when they shot down 11 Jap planes. In September a nightair group equipped with F6F(N)s was placed aboard the CVL INDEPENDENCE, and during the five monthsof its service its planes shot down 15 Jap planes at night, while the CV teems accounted for 5more. This group was succeeded by a CV night group aboard ENTERPRISE, which in its 5 months ofintermittent service made 18 night killsAugust brought down 6 Jap planes.

, and was in turn succeeded by a third group which in

During the Okinawa campaign the brunt of the night-fighting was borne by the CV night fight-er teams, which brought down 11 Japs in March, 27 in April, and 6 in May. I n a l l , c a r r i e r - b a s e dsingle-engine VF(N) destroyed 60 Jap planes in night combat during the Okinawa campaign, andland-based night fighters an additional 64. These 124 planes were brought down at a cost of fourl o s s e s , combat and operational.

Attention is invited to the large proportion of enemy planes destroyed to enemy planes en-gaged, especially in actions involving the F6F and F4U. Once our night fighters came withinshooting range of the enemy planes, few escaped.

As would be expected, over half of the total enemy planes destroyed were twin-engine fight-ers or bombers, or flying boats. Of the single-engine types destroyed at night, half were floatplanes (See Table 59).

- 122 -

TABLE 59. TYPES OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYEDBY NAVAL AND MARINR AIRCRAFT IN NIGHT AERIAL COMBAT,

FOR ENTIRE WAR

PLANE MODEL,RASE

F6F, CarrierF6F, Land-Based

F4U, CarrierF4U, Land-Based

FM, CarrierTBF, CarrierPV(N)pB4yPBY

TOTAL

SINGLB-ENGINEFIGHTERS

1212

00

00010

25

SINGLE-ENGINEBOMBERS

75

02

00100

15

FLOATPLANES

1112

04

00741

39

TWIN-ENGINFfBOMSERS ORFIGHTERS

4837

55

12310

102

==r=13 40

I2

0 00 0

0 00 00 01 10 0

14 7

TcY1’AL

9568

511

12

1181

202

- 123 -

7. LONG RANGE SEARCH PLANE OPERATIONS

TABLE 60. MONTHLY RECORD OF PB4Y AND PBM PATROL AIRCRAFT, 1945

MONTH

JanuaryFebruaryMarchAprilMayJuneJulyAugust

TOTALMonthlyAverage*

SQUADRONS INNo. Planes

99

18202122

.s-

130124260281296302284&

17 239

ACTION

TOTALFL'TS

1,4911,167;:s;;

3,32343, 91

3,7332,593

22,245

2,781

TOTALACTIONSORTIES

56175;g

541443472

188

2,568

342_

SORTIES ATTACKING SHIPSMerchant Ships

War- over Underships 500 Tons 500 Tons

4 5 204 25

6559

1716 39 J{

82 21712 17516 f% 2024 14 92

84 340 1,002

11 45 134

* On 8 months basis for non-action items, 7% months for action items.

OWN LOSSES#Total,

54 9 198

7.2 1.2 25

# Total losses include 56 on ground, 11 operational on action sorties, and68 operational on non-action flights, in addition to the losses to enemy action listed.

Attention has been paid, in previous sections of this report, to the air combat record ofPB4Y patrol planes, and to the substantial proportion of their attack effort which was directedagains t sh ipping . Unfor tunate ly , in those analyses the PB4Y record was somewhat smothered underthe much larger figures covering action by carrier planes and by the large number of land-baseds ingle-engine p lanes . Thus th is br ief addi t ional sec t ion i s provided to g ive fu l l c redi t to thelong range search planes for their combat achievements.

Emphasis herein is placed on 1945, and on PB4Ys. PBMs, included in onein many noteworthy performances during 1945, and in 1944 PB4Ys performed, oneven greater individual brilliance then in 1945. The 1945 figures, however,press ive se t of data , and fuller detail can be provided.

of the tables , turneda smaller scale, withpresent a more im-

Table 60 above gives 1945 monthly data for all PB4Y and PBM squadrons which reported actionduring the respective months. Not all squadrons in the Pacific are included, since during eachmonth there were some which flew only negative patrols. The squadrons included were based in thePhilippines, the Marianas, and ultimately at Iwo and Okinawa.

Average squadron strength was 14 aircraft, and each plane on the average made 11 or 12 flights,largely sector searches of 600 to 1000 miles, per month. A squadron normally flew 2 to 5 sectorsdaily, each covered usually by single planes , sometimes by 2-plane teams. Occasionally additionalanti-shipping search and attack teams were sent out; rarely were larger strike missions flown.

As the table indicates , 7 out of 8 flights were negative with respect to action with theenemy, but the average plane attacked targets or engaged enemy aircraft once or twice a month.The majority of their attacks were on enemy shipping - large merchant vessels and warships whenthey were sighted, small vessels when nothing larger was available - and land targets were nor-mally attacked only in sectors where shipping had entirely disappeared.

Starting with attacks in the Philippines and the Bonins area in January, the planes worked upto the Ryukyus, the Formosan coast, the North China Coast, the Yellow Sea and the Coasts of Korea,and the shores of Kyushu, Shikoku and Southern Honshu, as new forward bases became available.From the Philippines they also worked down the South China coast, to Indo China, Malaya, and Borneo.Initially in each area a substantial residue of large vessels remained, but as attacks mounted thosewhich were not sunk were withdrawn, or kept in harbor by day, so that the bulk of the vessels re-maining at sea were the small coastal types of 50 to 300 tons on which the Japs had in the end tore ly for supplying the i r d is tant forces and re turning v i ta l mater ia ls to Japan.

These were the vessels the search planes attacked, usually in single plane bombing and straf-ing attacks at 50 to 200 feet altitude. When such tactics are used, accuracy is such that bombtonnages dropped are no measure of the results obtained. In a study of reports on 870 PB4Y mast-

- 124 -

[

head attacks on ships of all sizes, it was found that 370 attacks, or over 4@, resul ted in h i t s ,and that over 18% of all bombs dropped were hits. These figures do not include any measure ofthe hits by small incendiary bombs normally dropped in clusters on the smaller vessels, or ofthe effect of strafing. Dozens of snmll vessels were destroyed by fires caused by incendiary hitsor s t raf ing a lone , and most of the smaller vessels attacked could be sunk by a direct or under-water hit by one 100-lb. or 250-lb. bomb.

During 1945 PB4Ys alone dropped over 4,000 bombs, plus over 500 incendiary clusters, inattacks on probably 600-800 different vessels, and expended over 2,000,000 rounds of ammunitionin strafing these vessels. It is probable that as a result of the 1945 PB4Y and PBM attacks somm300-500 of these vessels were sunk. (No final evaluation or assessment of the claims regardingsrtstll vessels has yet been made). The effect was to cripple the remaining Japanese sea transportin most areas, and to cause withdrawal of many vessels not yet sunk, because of the danger ofattack, and because of fuel shortage resulting from the sinking of tankers.

Table 60 shows the steady building up of anti-shipping attacks in 1945, to the peak operationsof May, June and July, largely in the Yellow Sea and off Korea and Japan itself. In June and. Julyan average of 8 or 9 attacks on ships were made daily.

PB4Y ATTACK RECORD, 1945, BY TARGET TYFE

Number of Bombs ExpendedS o r t i e s I~ “cen-

RoundsAttacking diary Other of Am-Targets 2000# Clusters Types mo. Ex-

TARGETS pended— — . _ .— ——.

Warships 53 129 52 15 7 0 0 85,000Merchant Ships, over 500 Tons 238 296 302 402 13 45 6 566,000Merchant Ships, Under 500 Tons 840 1,953 813 160 7 503 25 1,676,000Minelaying 49 0 0 0 0 0 96 124,000

TOTAL SHIPPING 1,180 2,378 1,167 577 27 548 127 2,451,000

Land Transportation 170 92 448 93 16 42 3 322,000A i r f i e l d s 125 273 36 421 19 25 13 85,000Other Military Targets 161 363 155 278 4 67 3 214,000Other Land Targets 133 477 79 131 8 65 5 126,000

TOTALS 1,769 3,583 1,885 1,500 74 747 151 3,198,000

The above table shows the ordnance expended in the attacks by PB4Ys alone, and illustratesthe predominance of small bombs, incendiary clusters and strafing which were all that were re-quired agains t the smal ler targets , though, as will be noted, heavier bombs were used againstthe larger vessels. Normally, mixed bomb loads were carried, to prmit a choice of bombs depend-ing on the type of target met. Despite the 3 to 4 ton bomb capacity of the PB4Y, rarely wereloads of more than 2 tons carried, and the normal load was usually about 2,500 pounds, becauseof the extra fuel required for long-range searches.

In the minority of attacks which were directed against land targets (in the absence of ships),land t ranspor ta t ion ( inc luding ra i l roads ,t a r g e t .

bridges, trains, and trucks) was the favorite type ofAirf ie ld ins ta l la t ions , miscel laneous mi l i ta ry bui ld ings , and harbor areas of smal l

c o a s t a l v i l l a g e s , were the o ther pr incipal targets a t tacked.

Table 60 also shows the monthly air combat record of PB4Ys and PBMs. The 292 patrol planeswhich engaged in combat met 541 ene~ aircraft, and shot down 150, or nearly 3% of them. Lossesin air combat were 9 planes , only 6$ of the number of eneq planes destroyed, and only 3% of thenumber of our VPB engaging in combat. The best records were in February and March, when 51 enemyplanes were shot down with only 1 combat loss.

Losses to antiaircraft fire in these low level attacks were slightly over 2% of the planesa t t a c k i n g . Operational losses were 1/3 of one percent of the total number of flights.

700380 O-46-9 - 125 -

TYPE OF VESSEL

BattleshipsCarriers, LargeCarriers, MediumCarriers, Escort

Cruisers, HeavyCruisers, Light

TOTAL ARMORED 7UiRSHIPS

DestroyersSmall Warships*

TOTAL WARSHIPS

APPENDIX

JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY

TABLE A. TOTALS FOR WAR,

SHIPS SUNK BYU.S. NAVALCARRIER-BASEDAIRCRAFT ALONENo. Tons

5 184,0005 136,6005 59,1501 17,000

6 72,0006 33,535

28 502,285

28 45,415 103 125,928

TOTAL MERCHANT SHIPS,1000 Gross Tons or Over

TOTALS

159 673,628

275 1,293,875

434 1,967,503

NAVAL AIRCRAFT

BY TYPE OF SHIP

SHIPS SUNK BYU.S. NAVALLAND-BASED

AIRCRAFT ALONENo. Tons

1 14,000

1 14,000

5 8,115 2 2,300

8 24,415

50 182,583

58 206,998

SHIPS SUNK BYNAVAL AIRCRAFTIN COMBINATIONWITH OTHER FORCESNo. Tons

1 30,000

2 22,050

3 41,0002 10,340

8 103,390

8 10,450

TOTAL SHIPSSUNK BY, OR WITHAID OF, U. S. NAVAL

AIRCRAFTNo. Tons

6 214,0005 136,6007 81,2001 17,000

10 127,0007 43,875

37 619,675

41 63,980 119 146,090

197 829,745

41 229,061

71 360,763

* Including a few large auxi l iar ies .

These data, though no t compi led by OP-23-V, are inserted because of their interest in con-nection with the tables covering carrier attacks on shipping.

The data on ships eunk have been compiled by the Statistical Section of the Foreign Branchof ONI (op-23-F44). They are based on a careful study of shipping reported sunk by Japanesesources , correlated with action reports from all Allied forces as evidence of the cause of sink-i n g . Most of the figures included represent final assessments by a joint Army-Navy board; assess-ments have not been completed, however, and the data must thus be regarded as preliminary andsubject to change: For th is reason re lease of the deta i led f igures in a c lass i f ica t ion lowerthan CONFIDENTIAL is not authorized, though the totals may be quoted in round numbere as approxi-mations, if an indication of their preliminary m=is given and they are not attributed to ONIor the joint assessment board.

Ships credited sunk by Naval aircraft alone represent largely inetances where no other agentcould have been responsible for the sinking. Ships credited sunk in attacks involving any combi-nation of Naval aircraft with Army aircraft, Naval surface ships, or submarines, have generallybeen credited as effected by combined efforts, unless unequivocal evidence exists (as in the caseof the Midway Battle) that Naval aircraft were the only agents inflicting damaging hits on theships sunk. The data, in view of their compilation for intelligence purposes by a non-aviationo f f i c e , and with Army representation in the assessment of the bulk of them, can be consideredcompletely conservative with reference to sinkings by Naval aircraft.

It should be noted *at merci=nt vessels of under 1000 gross tons are not included in theset a b u l a t i o n s ; assessments of such sinkings are not known to have been made on any comprehensivebasis by any agency.

Rough but interesting measures of the effectiveness of Naval aircraft in sinking ships, in‘firms of tons sunk per sortie attacking, and per ton of bombs expended, can be obtained by com-paring these data with attack data in the body of this report. A few of the overall figures

- 126 -

MONTH

1941-December

1942 -MarchMayJuneAugustootobrNovember

1943-JanuaryFebruaryMayJulyOctoberNovemberDecember

1944-JanuaryFebruaryIdarohAprilMayJuneJulyAugustSeptemberOctoberNovemberEecember

1945-JanuaryFebruaryMarchApri1MayJuneJulyAugust

~4142 Total1943 Total1944 Total1945 Total

GRAND TOTAL

TABLE B. MONTHLY TOTALS OF JAPANESE SHIPS SUNK BY

ARMOREDWARSHIPS

No. Tons

1 15,0005 87,900 1 7,1001 5,1702 39,000

1 5,195

1 28,000

12 185,1403 30,670

2 51,000

8 165,500

10 lb4,170

17 249,00510 216,500

37 619,675

include full to

U.S. NAVAL AIRCRAFT

2

3

11

24111

7671

594

1114195

2115721

155

1,892

1,915

1,8001,800

3,30014,2001,3152,000

492

73011,72011,210

100

2,3956,2635,000

17,66020,01025,9755,300

21,840440

3,10410,250

880100

36,3343,445

7 7,4079 21,307

88 106,36357 76,393

161 211,470

NOTE : Above data nnage of ships sunk byagents. No sinkings were reported in months not

MERCHANT SHIPS,1000 GROSS TOYS

OR OVERNo. Tons

4

13

11

121

110

16332011

1566

44323010

522

19

113

29

15214118

28,780

9,31025,547

. 77,608

6,73210,3861,917

5,82442,300

60,552 203,291

97,8152,7246,500

66,23520,61729,576

204,918129,961138,75442,289

293,60911,10538,843

42,0596,400

91,937

67,1591,003,232

493,883

366 1,705,519

Naval aircraft in combl i s t e d .

TOTALSNo. Tons2

44535

13

123412

11

23402721

21151055585215

733

249

134

527

1,892

28,78016,91587,90018,210 32,517

116,608

6,73210,3865,217

14,2001,3157,824

42,792

61,282220,206 ,109,025

2,8246,50096,63026,88034,576

222,578335,111195,39947,589

315,44911,54541,94761,25042,9396,500

293,77113,375

36 302,822.24 88,466

319 1,358,600185 786,776

564 2,536,664

ination with other

are givmn h e r e w i t h: Tons SunkType of Ene

Tons Sunkmy Vessel Per Sortie Attacking# Per Ton of Bombs#

Armored Warships 114 208Unarmored Warships 43 125Merchant Vessels* 111 284

TOTAL, all three types#Tons sunk includes half the tonnage of ships credited to Naval aircraft in combination with

other agents .* Sorties and Tons of Bombs are for attacks on vessels of 500 tons or over. Tons Sunk are vessels

of 1000 gross tons or over.

Monthly comparisons maybe made with Table 40, but inTable B includes at their full tonnage ships sunk by Navala g e n t s .

- 127 -

making comparisons noteaircraf t in combinat ion

that Appendixwith other

A . GENERAL DATA

SUBJECT INDEX TO TABLES(All tables cover entire war period unless otherwise noted)

ON FLIGHTS, ACTION SORTIES, OWN AIRCRAFT LOSSES, BOMB TONNAGE EXPENDED,PLANES DESTROYED

1 . GENERAL SUMMARIES OF CARRIER AND LAND-BASED OPERATIONSBy Plane Mod el, and Totals for WarNavy and MarineMonthlyBy Theater, YearlyBy Mission of Own Aircraft

2 . CARRIER OPERATIONS, GENERAL DATABy Plane Model, Navy and MarineMonthlyBy Theater, YearlyBy Plane Model and Type CarrierBy Type of Carrier, MonthlyAnalysis, for Selected PeriodsFor Individual Operations, Raids and CampaignsMarine Carrier OperationsOperational Loss Rates, 1944-45By Mission of Own AircraftOperating Ratios, for various periods

TABLES1 - 71, 2, 513,546,7,23

8 - 15

:,548,91011,12,13141,8,9,1596,7,239,11,12,13,42

3 . LAND-BASED OPERATIONS, GENERAL DATABy Plane Model, Navy and Marine wMonthly 3,5By Theater, Yearly 4Operational Loss Rates and Operating Ratios, 1944-45 16Navy and Marine, by Plane Type, Monthly 17By Theater and by Plane Type, Monthly 18By Mission of Own Aircraft 6,7,23

B. SPECIALIZED DATA, BY SUBJECT MATTER

1. AERIAL COMBAT DATA IN DETAIL (OWN AND ENEMY PLANES ENGAGED AND DESTROYED, LOSS RATESAND COMBAT RATIOS) .By Plane Model, Navy and Marine, Carrier and Land-Based 19By Plane Type and Model, Carrier and Land-Based, Yearly 20,21Carrier and Land-Based, Monthly 22By Mission of Own Aircraft 23,24By Geographical Area 25For Major Area Campaigns, Monthly 26Japanese Planes Destroyed, by Model, Monthly 27Air Combat Ratios, by Model of Own and Japanese Aircraft,

Sept. 1944 -Aug. 1945 28

NOTE: Less detailed air combat data are also given in tables— 1,2,3,4,8,10,14,15,17, and 18. Night air combat data are

in tables 57-59.

2. ANTIAIRCRAFT LOSS AND DAMAGE, IN DETAIL

NOTE: Own aircraft losses to enemy A/A are also given in tables— 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 8 , 1 0 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 2 3 , 2 5 , a n d 2 6 .

A/A losses in night action are in table 55.

29

- 129 -

3 .

4 .

5 .

DATA BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREACarrier Camaigns and RaidsAerial Combat Data, in DetailAttack Sorties and Bomb Tonnage, by Target Types AttackedAttack Sort ies , YearlyAttack Sorties and Bomb Tonnage, for Major Area Campaigns, MonthlyAttacks on Land Targets, Central Pacific, MonthlyAttacks on Ships, Monthly, 1944-45

ATTACK DATA, BY TYPE OF TARGET ATTACKED

(a) Totals for all Land Targets and for all Ship TargetsTota l Sorties, Bomb Tons, Rockets, Ammunition by Plane Model.

Carrier and Land-BasedBy Area, Yearly (sorties only)Major Area Campaigns, Monthly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Land Targets, Central Pacific, Monthly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Ship Targets, by Area, Monthly 194445 (Sorties only)Ship Targets, by Type of Ship, Monthly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)

(b) Target Types in DetailBy Geographical Area (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Carrier and Land-Based, Yearly (Sorties and Bomb Tons)Carrier and Land-Based, 1944 only (Sorties, Bomb Tons,

Rockets and Ammunition)By Plane Model, Carrier and Land-Based (Sorties only)By Plane Model, 1944 only (Sorties only)Shipping Targets, by Type of Ship, Monthly (Sorties and

Bomb Tons)By Types of Bombs used, 1945 onlyRocket Expenditures, by Plane Model, 1945Rocket Expenditures, Carrier and Land-Based, Monthly, 1945Ammunition Expenditures, Carrier and Land-Based, Monthly 1945Ammunition Expenditures, by Plane Model, 1944

ORDNANCE DATA

(a) Bomb Expenditures, by Type of BombCarrier and Land-Based, YearlyBy Plane Model, 1945By Target Type, 1945For SBDs and TBFs, 1942-43By Carriers, by Operations, 1944By Carriers, Monthly, 1945

Land Targets and Ship-Targets, by Plane ModelBy Plane Model, 1945 (expenditures per attack sortie)By Plane Model, MonthlyBy Detailed Target Type, by Plane Model, 1945By Detailed Target Type, Monthly. 1945

TABLES14 25,263031323334-35

4131323334,3540

3036

393738

404551525354

43-48434445464748

394142505152

Carrier Expenditures, by Periods (expenditures per attack sortie) 11

(c) Ammunition ExpendituresLand and ShipTargets, by Plane ModelBy Detailed Target Type, 1944 39By Detailed Target Type, by plane Model, 1944 54By Detailed Target Type, Monthly, 1945 53Expenditures per sortie, by Plane Model, 1945 42

(d) Torpedo Expenditures 49See also tables 43-48

- 130 -

6.

7.

8 .

TABLES(e) Bomb and Rocket Operating Ratios 11,12,13,42

NIGHT AIR OPERATIONSNight Attacks 55,56Night Air Combat 57,58,59

LONG-RANGE SEARCH PLANE OPERATIONS 60

JAPANESE SHIPPING SUNK BY NAVAL AIRCRAFT APPENDIX

NOTE: For enemy aircraft destroyed in air combat, see Aerial Combat Datasection of index, and note thereto. — — .

For enemy aircraft destroyed on ground, see Tables 3,4,14,25,26.

- 131 -U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICS 0--1946