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Bicameral politicsat the EU level

How the votes of MEPscompare with those ofMember States

VoteWatch EuropeSpecial ReportJanuary 2013


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Bicameral politics at the EU level

Legislation backed by a centre-rightmajority in the Parliament is almost alwaysadopted by the Council.

Sometimes legislation backed by the centre-right in the Parliament is also supported bycentre-left governments that disagree withtheir own MEPs. This has been the case notablyin the areas of economic and monetary affairs,industry, research and energy, and internationaltrade.

Conversely, legislation backed by a centre-leftmajority in the Parliament faces strongeropposition in the Council. This can result inmore complex negotiations both within theCouncil and between the Council and theParliament. It can even lead to a failure to agreea compromise. This dynamic has been mostevident in the areas of environment and publichealth, civil liberties and gender equality.

The left versus right dimension is not the onlydeterminant of bicameral politics in the EU. Forexample, on EU spending policies (regionaldevelopment, agriculture, and budgetary policies),national interests tend to dominate legislativebargaining. When strong national interests comeinto play, there tends to be more conflict withinthe Council and between the Council and theParliament, even though within the Parliamentthe two main groups, the centre-right EuropeanPeoples Party Group (EPP) and the centre-leftSocialists & Democrats Group (S&D) are oftenable to reach an agreement.

The MEPs who disagree most with their res-pective national governments sit in theEuropean Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)group (representing the Czech Civic Democratic

Party (ODS) and the British Conservatives). They

are followed by some of the parties in the EPPGroup (Swedish Moderate Party, German CDU),the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats forEurope (ALDE) Group (Dutch VVD) and the S&D

Group (Austrian SP). All these parties form partof coalition governments, and their coalitionpartners often support their respectivegovernments positions.

The policy areas where MEPs and theirgovernments have disagreed most since2009 are budgetary issues and economic andmonetary affairs. While the voting data suggestclose coordination between the positions ofMEPs and governments on the annual EU bud-get as a whole, splits between MEPs and theirgovernments often occurred on amendments tothe budget, as well as on the mobilisation of theEU solidarity fund.

Other key items of legislation that generateddivergent views between the same political

parties in the Parliament and Council werethose aimed at granting more powers to the EUinstitutions to supervise national budgetarydiscipline (the six-pack) and the creation ofnew EU authorities to supervise the banksand financial markets. In both cases, all 27governments voted in favour, including thosebelonging to the Socialist and Conservativepolitical party families, while in the Parliamentmembers of the these families political groups(S&D and ECR respectively) opposed theEconomic Governance Package. ECR Group MEPsalso opposed the creation of new supervisoryauthorities.

All Council and Parliament voting data isavailable on: www.votewatch.eu.

2013 VoteWatch Europe AISBL and VoteWatch CIC

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy ofthis license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0

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Since 2009 VoteWatch Europe has reported every six months onvoting trends in the European Parliament. In July 2012 we publishedour first report on voting trends in the Council of the EuropeanUnion. This report looks at the dynamics of voting behaviourbetween the two institutions.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCONTENTS

02 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

02 ABOUT VOTEWATCH EUROPE

05 POLICY FOCUS: VOTING BEHAVIOURIN THE COUNCIL VERSUS VOTINGBEHAVIOUR IN THE EUROPEANPARLIAMENT

What is the balance of power inthe Council and in the Parliament?What were the majordisagreements betweenthe Council and the Parliament?

Which MEPs disagreed most withthe national governments of theircountries?

05 CONCLUSIONS

01How the votes of MEPs comparewith those of Member States

Photos cover, p. 1, 2, 10, 15, 16, back cover European Union, 2004-2011The Council of the European Union

Photos cover, p. 1, 10, 16 European Union, 2004-2011except EU Parliament shot (cover)


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02 Bicameral politics at the EU level 03How the votes of MEPs compare

with those of Member States

ABOUT VOTEWATCH EUROPE

BOARD

STAFF

VoteWatch Europe is an independentorganisation set up to promote betterdebates and greater transparency in EUdecision-making by providing easy access

to, and analysis of, the political decisionsand activities of the European Parliamentand the Council of the European Union.VoteWatch uses the EU institutions' ownattendance, voting and activity data to givea full overview of the activities of MEPs andmember state governments.

VoteWatch publishes regular reports andnewsletters showing how MEPs and ministersvoted on key items of EU legislation andorganises regular debriefings on the plenarysessions of the European Parliament.

In addition to our regular, free-to-the-publicwork we also offer a number of paid services,such as trainings and tailor-made analyses ofvoting behaviour. The revenue from these

activities helps us maintain our core services.If you are interested in any of our services, orif you are interested in supporting our work,please contact the VoteWatch team [email protected].

We are an international not-for-profit association(AISBL/IVZW) registered in Belgium and aCommunity Interest Company (CIC) registeredin the UK.

Doru Frantescu (co-founder)Policy director. Has worked extensively incivil society in Bucharest and Brussels.Expert in e-democracy tools.

Michiel van HultenManaging director. Former Council official,former Member of the European Parliament(the Netherlands, S&D).

Joan Manuel Lanfranco PariPolicy and events assistant,former MEP assistant.

CHAIR:

Dr Simon Hix (co-founder)Professor of European and ComparativePolitics at the London School of Economicsand Political Science. Fellow of theBritish Academy.

VICE CHAIR:

Dr Sara Hagemann (co-founder)Lecturer in EU politics at the London Schoolof Economics and Political Science.

MEMBERS:

Dr Abdul G. Noury (co-founder)Associate Professor of Political Economyat New York University (NYU-AD).

Sir Julian PriestleyChairman of the Board of Directors of EPPA(European Public Policy Advisers), formerSecretary-General of the European Parliament.

Ignasi GuardansCEO and co-founder of CUMEDIAE - Culture& Media Agency Europe AISBL, former Memberof the European Parliament (Spain, ALDE).

What is the balance of power inthe Council and in the Parliament?

The European Peoples Party (EPP) is currently themost powerful political force in both of the EUs

legislative institutions, as measured by voting

weight (see Figure 1). In this chapter we examinewhat this means in practice for the Council andthe Parliament.

Fig 1

(NUMERICAL) BALANCE OF POWER IN THE COUNCILAND THE PARLIAMENT (%)

The Council

In the Council, all votes for a Member State areattributed to the party which holds the officeof prime minister, even if the countrysgovernment is a coalition government.National parties that are members of theEuropean Peoples Party (EPP) govern solely orlead coalitions 15 of the 27 national governments.Together the EPP accounts for 171 votes in the

Council (50.7% of the total voting rights underqualified majority voting, which applies to theadoption of most EU legislation). That fallswell short of the 245 votes (74%) required topass legislation. However, it is more thanenough to block legislation it does not agreewith, such as legislation supported by a centre-left coalition in the European Parliament. Theother main party family in the Council, theParty of European Socialists (PES), holds only79 votes, which is not enough to reach ablocking minority (91 votes), let alone securethe adoption of legislation.

The least controversial policy areas in the Council- international trade, industry, research andenergy, and economic and monetary affairs - arealso the ones in which the EPP Group has oftenbeen able to secure a majority in the Parliamentwith the support of the Alliance of Liberalsand Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Group andthe European Conservatives and Reformists(ECR) Group.

As Figure 2 shows, governments led by nationalparties that are members of the EPP are less likelyto be on the losing side in the Council thangovernments led by national parties from any ofthe other political groups in the Parliament.EPP-led governments were in the minority inless than two per cent of all Council votes. Thelikelihood of being in a losing minority in Councilis slightly higher if the prime ministers partybelongs to Alliance of Liberals and Democrats forEurope (ALDE) Party or the PES, while governmentsfrom the Alliance of European Conservatives andReformists (AECR) are most likely to be on thelosing side in the Council.

POLICY FOCUS: VOTING BEHAVIOURIN THE COUNCIL VERSUS VOTING BEHAVIOUR

IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

250 75 100

EU Council

EU Parliament

50

EPP

AECR / ECR

ALDE

PES / S&D

EFD

NI

GREENS / EFA

PEL / GUE-NGL


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What were the majordisagreements between theParliament and the Council?

There have been three major issues that have split

the Parliament and the Council since thebeginning of the 2009-2014 EuropeanParliament: the maternity leave directive, afinancial transaction tax, and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).

The maternity leave directive

On 20 October 2010 the Parliament adopted theDirective on Improvements in the safety andhealth at work of pregnant workers and workerswho have recently given birth or are breast-feeding, informally known as the maternityleave directive. The text was adopted by 390votes to 192, with 59 abstentions.

The Parliaments text proposed, among otherthings, that the minimum length of maternity

leave should be increased from 14 to 20 weekson full pay. The text as a whole was passed by acentre-left majority, while the EPP Group wassplit, as Figure 7 shows. Its provisions were evenmore socially-oriented than those put forward bythe European Commission (which had proposed

a minimum maternity leave of 18 weeks).

A significant minority of EPP Group MEPs(mainly from Germany, France and Sweden,whose parties were all in power at national levelat that time) voted against the proposal.Opposition also came from MEPs in othergroups who belonged to governing parties intheir home countries, such as the British andCzech ECR Group members and Austrian MEPsin the S&D Group.

The divided vote in the Parliament, in whichthe centre-left narrowly secured a majority,foreshadowed tough negotiations in the centre-right Council, which has so far failed to reach acommon position on this legislation.

2. Both legislative and non-legislative votes,based on roll-callvotes data only.

Nevertheless, as our voting data shows (Figure 5),the EPP Group has been on the winning side in

89%2 of all roll call votes during the first three-and-a-half years of the 2009-2014 term.

As we revealed in our 2012 annual report, thepolicy area which has proved to be the mostcontroversial in the Council between 2009 and2012 is environment and public health.Interestingly, this is also one of the policy areaswhere the EPP Group has lost most roll call votesin the Parliament. As Figure 6 shows, the EPP

Group comes third in this area in terms of thepercentage of votes won, after the ALDE Groupand the S&D Group, who are often joined by theGreens/EFA and GUE-NGL groups to make up awinning coalition against the centre-right.

Fig 5

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ROLL-CALL VOTES IN WHICH EACH OF THE SEVENPARLIAMENT POLITICAL GROUPS HAS BEEN ON THE WINNING SIDE

(July 2009-January 2013)

100

90

80

70

60

50

GUE / NGL

GREENS / EFA

S&D

ALDE

EPP

ECR

EFD

100

90

80

70

60

50

GUE / NGL

GREENS / EFA

S&D

ALDE

EPP

ECR

EFD

Fig 6

PERCENTAGE OF ALL ROLL-CALL VOTES ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN WHICHEACH PARLIAMENT POLITICAL GROUP HAS BEEN ON THE WINNING SIDE(July 2009-January 2013)

Fig 7

BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENT VOTE ON THE MATERNITY LEAVE DIRECTIVE,BY POLITICAL GROUP

200

150

100

50

-50

-100

-150

-200

GUE / NGL Greens / EFA S&D ALDE EPP ECR EFD NI

For

Against

Abstentions

Non voters


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ECR EFD NIEPPALDE / ADLE



Financial transaction tax (FTT)

A similar conflict emerged on the financialtransaction tax (FTT). This issue has often beenon the Parliaments agenda, but before theoutbreak of the financial crisis only a minority ofMEPs, mainly on the centre-left, supported thisidea. However, on 23 May 2012, following a shiftin both public opinion and Member Stategovernment positions, the Parliament adopteda legislative proposal for an FTT (also known asthe Tobin tax or Robin Hood tax) to be leviedby EU member states. The key vote in theParliament on this issue is shown in Figure 8.

152 MEPs voted against the proposal, includingmany from governing parties: British and CzechECR Group MEPs, Swedish EPP Group MEPs, andDutch ALDE Group MEPs. Since decisions ontaxation require unanimity in the Council,one would not expect such a controversial

proposal to be adopted without a fight.Indeed, following fierce opposition primarilyfrom the UK government, the proposal wasblocked in the Council, and the member stateswho insisted on an FTT decided to proceed viathe enhanced cooperation procedure, whichallows a sub-group of Member States to forgeahead with deeper integration.

ACTA

The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement(ACTA) was rejected by the Parliament on 4 July2012. The Council, dominated by the centre-right, had approved a mandate for the EuropeanCommission to conduct the treaty negotiationson the EUs behalf, and looked likely to ratify theagreement signed by the Commission, since 22

out of 27 Member State governments hadalready signed up to ACTA themselves.

However, against a backdrop of mass publicprotests on a scale rarely witnessed in the EUpolicy process, the Parliament, which hadpreviously been supportive of ACTA, graduallychanged its position. After an attempt by theEPP Group to postpone the vote had failed,

defections from the EPP Group helped thecentre-left secure a majority to reject the treaty.Most EPP Group MEPs abstained, while some

voted in favour of the Agreement. The breakdownof the vote in the Parliament is shown in Figure 9.

Fig 8

BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENT VOTE ON THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTION TAX,BY POLITICAL GROUP

250

200

150

100

50

-50

-100

-150

-200

GUE / NGL G re en s / EFA S& D

For

Against

Abstentions

Non voters

Fig 9

BREAKDOWN OF PARLIAMENT VOTE ON ACTA, BY POLITICAL GROUP

100

50

-50

-100

-150

-200

-250

GUE / NGL Greens / EFA S&D ALDE / ADLE EPP ECR EFD

For

Against

Abstentions

Non voters

Which MEPs disagreedmost with their nationalgovernments?

To what extent do governments and MEPs fromgoverning parties vote the same way in the twobranches of the EU legislature? To answer thisquestion we compared the votes of nationaldelegations of governing parties in theParliament to those of their governments onthe same issues in the Council between July2009 and October 2012.3

The results, presented inTable 1

, show that onlegislative issues, most MEPs from governingparties vote the same way in the Parliament astheir governments do in the Council. The mostfrequent disagreements between governmentsand their MEPs have been within the AECRParty and ECR Group. Czech Conservative MEPsvoted against the position of their governmentin the Council (mainly on economic and monetaryaffairs and civil liberties) 25 times; the BritishConservatives voted against the position of

their government in the Council (mainly on thebudget and economic and monetary affairs) 23times. Among the other MEPs, Swedish EPPGroup MEPs and Austrian S&D Group MEPsfound themselves in disagreement with their owngovernments on ten items of EU legislation each.German EPP Group MEPs had a different positionfrom their government on eight occasions,while Spanish S&D Group MEPs disagreed withtheir government on seven occasions beforethe Socialists (PSOE) lost power in Spain inNovember 2011.

Amongst the other big Member States, there

was no disagreement between French EPPGroup MEPs and their government. EPPGroup MEPs from Italy and Poland dissentedfrom their governments positions once andfive times respectively.

3. The analysis was run only on votes in which the text voted wasidentical in the Parliament and the Council.Also,we excluded fromthe analysis those situations in which the party in Government atnational level changed between the moment of the vote in theParliament and that in the Council,as this might have influencedvoting behaviour. The data refers also to governments who are nolonger in power (such as the Spanish Socialists,PSOE).

NI


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Table 1

NUMBER OF VOTES IN WHICH A GOVERNING PARTY DELEGATION IN THEPARLIAMENT VOTED DIFFERENTLY FROM ITS GOVERNMENT IN THE COUNCIL

Table 2

NUMBER OF VOTES IN WHICH A GOVERNING PARTY DELEGATION IN THEPARLIAMENT VOTED DIFFERENTLY FROM ITS GOVERNMENT, WHEN THEGOVERNMENT VOTED AGAINST OR ABSTAINED IN THE COUNCIL

Party European Country Total votes inParliament Group disagreement

Obc?anska?demokraticka?strana ECR Czech Republic 25

Conservative Party ECR United Kingdom 23

Sozialdemokratische Partei O?sterreichs S&D Austria 10

Socialni demokrati S&D Slovenia 10

Moderata Samlingspartiet EPP Sweden 10

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands EPP Germany 8

Partido Socialista Obrero Espan?ol S&D Spain 7

C it iz en s fo r E ur ope an De ve lo pme nt of B ul gar ia E PP Bu lg ar ia 6

V ol ks pa rt ij v oo r V ri jh ei d e n De mo cr at ie A LD E Ne th er lan ds 6

Platforma Obywatelska EPP Poland 5

Partido Socialista S&D Portugal 4

Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams EPP Belgium 3

Parti chre?tien social luxembourgeois EPP Luxembourg 3

Suomen Keskusta ALDE Finland 2

Partidul Democrat-Liberal EPP Romania 2

Ve nstre, Danmar ks Libe rale Parti ALDE Denmark 1

Eesti Reformierakond ALDE Estonia 1

Fidesz-Magyar Polga?ri Szo?vetse?g-Kereszte?ny EPP Hungary 1Demokrata Ne?ppa?rt

Fine Gael Party EPP Ireland 1

Il Popolo della Liberta? EPP Italy 1

Te?vyne?s sa?junga - Lietuvos kriks?c?ionys demokratai EPP Lithuania 1

Partit Nazzjonalista EPP Malta 1

SMER-Socia?lna demokracia S&D Slovakia 1

Party European Country Total votes inParliament Group disagreement

(only whenGovernmentsvoted Againstor Abstention)

Conservative Party ECR United Kingdom 10

Christlic h Demokratische Union Deutschland s EPP Germany 8

Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie ALDE Netherlands 5

Platforma Obywatelska EPP Poland 5

Moderata Samlingspartiet EPP Sweden 5

Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria EPP Bulgaria 4

Socialni demokrati S&D Slovenia 4

Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams EPP Belgium 3

Partido Socialista S&D Portugal 3

Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol S&D Spain 3

Obcanska demokraticka strana ECR Czech Republic 2

Suomen Keskusta ALDE Finland 2

Fine Gael Party EPP Ireland 2

Parti chretien soc ial luxembourgeois EPP Luxembourg 2

Sozialdemokratische Partei sterreichs S&D Austria 1

Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti ALDE Denmark 1

Partit Nazzjonalista EPP Malta 1

Partidul Democrat-Liberal EPP Romania 1

SMER-Socialna demokracia S&D Slovakia 1

If we focus on only those votes where agovernment voted against or abstained in theCouncil in other words where a governmentwas not in the majority in the Council - theresults are more nuanced, as Table 2 shows.Again, British Conservative MEPs are most

likely to vote in a different way to the UK

government when it is on the losing side in theCouncil, but this time they are followed byGerman CDU MEPs. In contrast, the Czech ODSand Austrian SPMEPs are less likely to disagreewith their governments when they are on thelosing side in the Council.


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As Table 3 shows, MEPs and their governmentsdisagreed most often in two policy areas: onbudgetary issues, and on economic andmonetary affairs.

The annual EU budget process has often led todisputes between the Parliament and theCouncil, with MEPs pushing for greater spendingand national governments for less. The evidencefrom roll-call votes taken in the Parliamentsuggests that the voting positions of gover-ning party MEPs and their governments onbudgetary issues are closely coordinated mostof the time. For example, the strong stance

taken by the United Kingdom and Sweden inthe Council when voting on the EUs 2013budget was mirrored by votes against thebudget by the British Conservatives andSwedish EPP Group MEPs. (This was not thecase for Dutch VVD and Austrian SPO?MEPs, whodisagreed with their respective governmentsposition on this issue.)

Nonetheless, disagreements between governingparty MEPs and their governments have emerged

in respect of a number of decisions to amendor implement the budget, such as on themobilisation of the EU solidarity fund (aninstrument through which money is grantedto countries affected by natural catastrophes).On this issue, many MEPs from governing partiesvoted in favour while their governments votedagainst or abstained. For example, Figure 10shows that on the mobilisation of the EUsolidarity fund for the floods in Poland,Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatiaand Romania in 2010, MEPs overwhelminglysupported the initiative while the Swedish,

Finnish, Latvian, Belgian and Austriangovernments voted against, and the British,Portuguese, and Slovenian governmentsabstained. This may be because less mediaand public attention is focused on theParliament when it takes interim decisions onthe budget than when it adopts the annualbudget.

Disagreements between MEPs and theirgovernments in the area of economic andmonetary affairs emerged mainly in respectof the rules governing national budgetarydiscipline (the six-pack) and the creation ofnew EU authorities to supervise the banksand the financial markets. In both cases all 27

governments voted in favour in the Council, inspite of the fact that there had been oppositionin the Parliament against both the economicgovernance package (from the S&D and ECRgroups) and the creation of new supervisoryauthorities (from the ECR).

Table 3

NUMBER OF VOTES IN WHICH GOVERNING PARTY DELEGATIONSIN THE PARLIAMENT VOTED DIFFERENTLY FROMTHEIR GOVERNMENT, BY POLICY AREA

Policy area Number of

disagreements

Budget ? 40

Economic & monetary affairs 29

Environment & public health 11

Regional development 11

Agriculture ? 10

Civil liberties, justice & home affairs 8

Legal affairs 7

Constitutional and inter-instit utional affairs 4

Fisheries? 4

Internal market & consumer protection 4

Transport & tourism 3

Industry, research & energy 2

Employment & social affairs 1

International trade 1

Votes of 27 Member States

representatives

Votes of 662 MEPs

Votes of 669 MEPs

Fig 10

VOTES IN THE PARLIAMENT AND IN THE COUNCIL ON MOBILISATIONOF THE EU SOLIDARITY FUND FOR POLAND, SLOVAKIA, HUNGARY,THE CZECH REPUBLIC, CROATIA AND ROMANIA

Fig 11

VOTES IN THE PARLIAMENT AND IN THE COUNCIL ON MOBILISATION OF THE EUSOLIDARITY FUND FOR POLAND, SLOVAKIA, HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC,CROATIA AND ROMANIA

AGAINST3%

ABSTENTION4%

FOR100%

FOR96%

AGAINST46%

FOR50%

ABSTENTION1%


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CONCLUSIONS

14 Bicameral politics at the EU level

In policy areas where the EPP commands aclear majority in both the Parliament andCouncil (such as economic and monetary

affairs and international trade), legislationtends to sail relatively easily through the EUsbicameral legislative process.

By contrast, in policy areas where a centre-left majority sometimes forms in theParliament (such as environment, civil liberties),disagreements between the Council and theParliament are more frequent, often resultingin legislative gridlock. On policy issues wherenational economic interests tend to dominate(regional development, agriculture, and thebudget), conflict is less likely within theParliament (where the EPP and S&D groupsusually reach an agreement) but more likely inthe Council as a result of national rather thanparty political splits (for example, between EUbudget net contributors and net beneficiaries).

There have been three major issues whichhave split the Parliament and the Councilsince the beginning of the 2009-2014European Parliament: the maternity leavedirective, a financial transaction tax (FTT), andthe Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

(ACTA). In the case of both the FTT and ACTA,the shifts in the position of many MemberStates and MEPs which took place in the

months leading up to the final votes were atleast partly the result of public pressure broughtto bear on both institutions, suggesting that

usual patterns of institutional voting behaviourapply to a lesser extent when an EU policyissue is also debated beyond the Brusselsbeltway.

The most frequent disagreements betweengovernments and their MEPs have been

within the AECR Party and the ECR Group,where the Czech Conservative MEPs votedagainst the position of their government inthe Council (mainly on economic and monetaryaffairs and civil liberties). French EPP Group

MEPs (from the UMP) were most supportive oftheir government. The evidence from roll-call

votes taken in the Parliament suggests thatthe voting positions of governing party MEPsand their governments on budgetary issuesare closely coordinated most of the time inparticular with regard to the annual budget

vote and other high-profile and nationally-sensitive budgetary decisions.

ANNEX

15How the votes of MEPs comparewith those of Member States


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16 Bicameral Politics at the EU Level

How the ordinary legislative(co-decision) procedure works

The co-decision procedure, or the ordinary legis-lative procedure as it is formally known, is themain EU legislative procedure.

Under this procedure, the EuropeanCommission, using its right of initiative, firstmakes a legislative proposal to the EuropeanParliament and to the Council. The Commissionproposal is also sent to the 27 national parlia-ments, to allow them to monitor the principle ofsubsidiarity, and if necessary raise objections.

The European Parliament and the Council thenproceed with a first reading (the adoption of aformal position), during which each institutioncan amend the proposal. If both institutionsadopt the same text during first reading (by asimple majority vote in the Parliament, and by aqualified or weighted majority in theCouncil) then the text is adopted. (This situationarises when the Commissions text is unchan-

ged or because the amendments the Parliamentand Council have adopted are identical.) This isnow the normal route, with 90% of legislationadopted after only one reading in each institu-tion, usually following extensive, informalbehind-the-scenes contacts.

In the rare cases where the two institutions failto reach agreement at first reading, the propo-

sal returns for a second reading. It is more diffi-cult for the Parliament to adopt amendments tothe text: at this stage an absolute rather than asimple majority of MEPs is required. In practicethis forces the two largest political groups in theParliament (the EPP and S&D groups) to work

together. While there is no time limit at first rea-ding, if a proposal reaches second reading theParliament must act within three months(which may be extended to four months).

If the Parliament and the Council fail to reachagreement after two readings, a conciliationcommittee is convened, comprising 27 MEPs andone representative from each Member Stategovernment. If the conciliation committeereaches agreement, the agreement must thenbe ratified in a third reading in each of the twoinstitutions. If the Conciliation Committee failsto agree, the legislation falls.

The ordinary legislative procedure applies in 80policy areas, including regulation of the singlemarket, agriculture, anti-discrimination andmeasures to facilitate the free movement of

capitals and persons, social and cohesion poli-cies, and justice and home affairs issues such asimmigration and police cooperation. However,on some highly sensitive issues, such as tax andforeign policy, different procedures apply, underwhich the Council has more power than theEuropean Parliament.

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