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Neoliberalism, Weakening State and Peasant Differentiation in Indian Agriculture: Survey Findings on Panel Data from West Bengal.
199394 – 200405
SUDIPTA BHATTACHARYYA
Based on surveys conducted in 199394 and 200405 on same set of households, this study shows nature of the differentiated economy of West Bengal (WB) against the backdrop of neoliberal reform in India since 1991. The major findings of this study is that during the decade of neoliberal reform, the interventionist economy eroded in rural West Bengal and peasant differentiation was going on. The analysis which follows examines the structure of investment and production taking place in West Bengal, the reference point being the debate between Marxism and populism about peasant differentiation. The process of socioeconomic differentiation has been intensified during neoliberal reform, but methodologically farm size alone fails to register its extent. The main claim advanced by populism Chayanov’s argument concerning demographic differentiation, that rising consumer/worker ratios are accompanied by higher family labour input – was not applicable. The efficiency of small farms in the form of inverse relationship between farm size and productivity suggested by Sen has not been found. Among the effects of state intervention in the agrarian sector have been: a decline in the number of holdings above ten acres, in the extent of sharecropping contracts, and in the incidence of absolute landlessness. Though landlessness increased to limited extent during reform period. The institutional credit provision by the state eroded during neoliberal reform and distress sales (in the form of product marketed) by poorer farmers are still evident.
BACKGROUND
West Bengal is one of the important Indian states that has been ruled by the Left Front
Government over three and half decades (19772009) and makes a record as the longest
staying democratic government in the world. After the Indian independence like other states
the agrarian structure was dominated by retrogressive elements like landlords, moneylenders,
and traders, all of whom had flourished under colonialism. Radical peasant movements
Sudipta Bhattacharyya is the Associate Professor at the Department of Economics and Politics, VisvaBharati, Santiniketan, West Bengal.
mobilized by leftist organisations challenged the ruling Congress Party, which in turn
compromised with the vested interests in what was a de facto unreformed agriculture. As a
result, all land reform legislation passed by the state was shelved, and remained
unimplemented. Consequently the programme of capitalist development remained unfinished.
This was the background to the peasant movements which emerged in postindependence
West Bengal, and played a pivotal role behind the formation of a LeftCentrist Coalition in
1967 and 1969 and ultimately the Left Front government in 1977. In the period since then,
the state in West Bengal has, within the legislative limits imposed by the constitution,
adopted a propoor stance in terms of agricultural policy. However, this propoor
interventionist legacy started to get disturbed since early nineties, when Government of India
adopted IMF styled neoliberalism in 1991 and as a result food, fertilizer and credit subsidies
were largely eliminated in agriculture. Public investment in agriculture was also largely
reduced with the good hope that the private investment would crowd out the public
investment. There was a deregulation of the market, the agricultural trade was also
liberalized. Last but not the least a large area was converted from food crops to export
oriented commercial crops. There was a move from untargeted to targeted PDS and rural
poor was largely eliminated by type 2 error as they could not prove themselves as poor
overcoming government red tapism. The new market oriented contract farming, corporate
retail chain, agribusiness and microfinance institution supposed to replace partly or wholly
the public distribution system, government cooperatives, nationalized rural credit institutions
and government mandis. But the expectation was largely belied. Because these newly
emerged neoliberal institutions could not spread much. As Barbara HsarrissWhite noted
down deregulated markets becomes far more imperfect than regulated market (REF). The
2
impact of market reform in agriculture was disastrous. Private investment did not crowd out
public investment rather opposite happened following the fact that both are complementary in
India. The spread of corporate retail chain and agribusiness was utterly limited in India.
Where they succeeded e.g. Madhya Pradesh they turned out as extremely antipoor (Mehta
2005). In some places there were organized and violent protest against such institutions. On
the other hand microfinance institution in India has become largely a government body which
are refinanced and controlled by commercial bank and NABARD. As a result of there is a
breakdown of old institutions and the new institutions becomes nonfunctional. On the other
hand the cost of production enhanced to a large extent but the selling price remains low. As a
result for the producers investment in agriculture becomes a nonprofit phenomenon. On the
other hand a large proportion of consumers has lost its purchasing power. Most strikingly the
agricultural growth rate (1.66%) had declined below the population growth rate (1.85%)
during liberalization period. The inequality and poverty also significant during this period.
THE PROBLEM.
The analysis which follows examines the changing structure of investment and
production taking place over a decade of neoliberal policy regime of the Government of
India in West Bengal where Left Front Government did not have any choice. The process of
socioeconomic differentiation has been intensified during one decade of neoliberal policy
regime. The main claim advanced by populism Chayanov’s argument concerning
demographic differentiation, that rising consumer/worker ratios are accompanied by higher
family labour input – was not applicable. Of particular interest is the role during the last thirty
two years of the Left Front government in the process of agrarian transformation, and the
3
extent to which its propoor policy interventions have stabilized smallholding peasant
production. Among the effects of state intervention during eighties in the agrarian sector had
been: a decline in the number of holdings above ten acres, in the extent of sharecropping
contracts, and in the incidence of absolute landlessness. However, during the nineties this
process had been halted. Particularly landlessness both in absolute and relative terms
increased. The institutional credit provisions by the state eroded during neoliberal reform
and distress sales (in the form of product marketed) by poorer farmers are still evident.
This analysis is carried out against the backdrop of the debate between Marxism and
populism. The principal Marxist contributions to this debate came from Kautsky [1988] and
more importantly from Lenin [1977]. In his seminal text, ‘The Development of Capitalism
in Russia’ first published in 1899, Lenin outlined his thesis about the socioeconomic
differentiation of the peasantry, and how an emergent capitalism depended on this process.
Challenging the Russian populists (or Narodniks), who maintained that the peasantry was an
homogeneous entity not affected fundamentally by differentiation, Lenin maintained that
capitalist development required creation of a home market, both for labourpower and the
product of labour, each of which would be furnished by different components of what had
hitherto been a selfsufficient (or middle) peasantry.
During the 1960s the populist ideas of the Russian Narodniks reemerged, mainly as a result
of the reengagement by development studies with the economic ideas of A. V. Chayanov
[1966; 1991]. The latter’s newlytranslated work reinstated the concept of an homogenous
Third World peasantry, whereby economically selfsufficient smallholders were recast as a
4
different mode of production; instead of economic differentiation, determined by exogenous
variables (rent, labour and land markets), peasants were subject to an endogenous and
distinctly noneconomic dynamic, a process of cyclicallydetermined demographic
differentiation. This nonMarxist interpretation was taken up with enthusiasm by many in the
field of development studies: for example, Lipton [1977], GeorgescuRoegen [1960] and
Amartya Sen [1966] all extended the interpretation of an homogenous peasantry, in the
process giving it a dynamic character by arguing that family labour farms (nondifferentiated
petty producers) were more ‘efficient’ than capitalist farms which hired labour at the going
wage rate. On the other hand Bhaduri [1993] developed a model of the agrarian economy
where differentiation was linked to peasant indebtedness, with some households escaping
debt via increased thrift and other falling more deeply into debt and becoming poor. Such an
approach to socioeconomic differentiation does not have any immediate relation to the
development of capitalism in agriculture; much rather, its focus is on a process of
differentiation as this occurs in an environment of precapitalist relations. This was in
keeping with his previous work, where Bhaduri [1973] had examined conflict involving a
typical landlord and a typical peasant in a context structured by economically backwards
semifeudal relations. In a similar vein, Easwaran and Kotwal [1989] posited the existence of
classes defined by unequal access to credit on the part of peasant households, without,
however, specifying the basis for this inequality of access. Such an approach is not so very
different from a typical neoclassical model based on the utility maximizing behaviour of the
principal and the agent [Stiglitz, 1987]. Ranajit Guha [1988] also divided the entire rural
population into two communities elite and subaltern. Since class is replaced by
5
‘community’, peasant differentiation arising from unequal possession of assets is thereby
overlooked.
The common thread in each of the above texts is that they have all neglected the role of
ownership of the means of production as the basis on which class differentiation in the rural
economy takes place. In my opinion the classical Marxist analysis, as embodied in the work
of Lenin, is much more nuanced than any of these theoretically simplistic positions, since it
recognises both the existence and at the same time the theoretical complexity of the different
modes of production which combine in any given transitional social formation.
In spite of having a successful experiment of a limited land reform and propoor state
intervention, the agrarian economy of West Bengal had been class differentiated even during
the pick period of state intervention in eighties. The neoliberal reform in 1990s has made this
differentiation more intensified. . A consequence has been a greater ownership concentration
in the upper echelons of the rural class structure, combined with an equally pronounced
tendency towards proletarianization and a loss of ownership of the means of production
affecting those at the lower ends of the same hierarchy. It is important to note, however, that
West Bengal constitutes an unusual case, in that class differentiation has been accompanied
by propoor state intervention particularly during 1980s. By moderating the effects of the
market, the limited agrarian reform in West Bengal has had a positive impact on the
economic condition of the rural poor. Simply put, propoor intervention has helped to
stabilize petty commodity production by smallholding peasants.1 It has also helped to stop the
marketled process of immiseration2, and has made differentiation itself more broad based
giving an upward impetus to more people.3 But even during 1980s these positive changes had
6
not been sufficiently strong to stop the process of differentiation altogether, or to alter the
concentration of means of production in the hands of a few. Since the early 1990s along with
other Indian states West Bengal too was exposed with market reform that dampened the
positive impact of interventionist regime to a great extent. Since the early 1990s agricultural
production, yield, consumption of fertilizer, proportion of HYV area, cropping intensity and
institutional credit experienced a negative trend break (Bhattacharyya and Bhattacharyya
2007). As the neoliberal reforms involved withdrawal of state from propoor interventionist
policies one can expect, therefore, to encounter a familiar and consistent pattern of
maldistribution, whereby economic indicators (assets, irrigation, output, marketed surplus,
etc.) are likely to be biased towards the upper echelons in the agrarian class structure.
Table 1 illustrates the Gini coefficients for the distribution of different variables among size
classes/asset groups that represent productive capacity or the means of production. The
figures are drawn from the various rounds of the National Sample Survey Organization
(NSSO), the reference years for which are 1972 (pre Left Front regime), 1982 (beginning
years of the Left Front rule), 1992 (beginning of market reform) and 200203 (after a decade
of market reform). The major findings are as following:
First of all, the Gini Coefficient of West Bengal for almost all variables are lower than India
in all reference year. This is because of the dual facts that (a) West Bengal experienced
successful land reform under United Front and Left Front Government visàvis other states
in India and (b) West Bengal has significantly high population density among all Indian
states.
7
Secondly, owing to the land reform land based variables like owned land, the concentration
of owned and operated land declined in West Bengal during 197292. At the same time non
land asset registered an increase. However, during the first decade 197282 owned land
increased from 0.572 to 0.593 and the operated land declined from 0.608 to 0.501 and that of
irrigated land also increased from 0.452 to 0.469. In the next decade (198292) land
inequality massively declined in West Bengal from 0.593 to 0.503 for owned land and from
0.501 to 0.434 for operated land. The concentration in nonland asset however increased from
0.547 to 0.570. The concentration in irrigated area and borrowing however remained almost
unchanged in West Bengal during this period. However, during the next decade 1992 2002
03, which was essentially neoliberal era, again land inequality increased (from 0.434 to
0.525 for operated land and 0.503 to 0.517 for operated land) and nonland asset inequality
declined (from 0.570 to 0.438). Also concentration in irrigated area also increased. The
increase in inequality is due to the withdrawal of propoor intervention during neoliberal
reform.
It should be noted that increased inequality in the nonland asset market in West Bengal
during eighties was interconnected with declined inequality in the land market. The land
reform during the eighties apart from lowering land inequality acted as an engine of agrarian
growth and investment. As a result of that an enhanced market for nonland assets, inputs and
implements were created. A bulk of the erstwhile zamindars invested in the market of non
land assets. An inequality developed as a result in the nonland asset market. At the India as a
whole almost similar tendencies were found except the fact that the concentration for owned
8
land declined marginally from 1992 to 200203. Another scenario at the all India level is the
growing concentration of the borrowing during the last decade from 0.392 to 0.474 (we don’t
have data for West Bengal), which may be a reflection of increased unequal access to credit
during the neoliberal era.
T A B L E –1VALUE OF GINICOEFFICIENTS FOR VARIABLES REPRESENTING
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY : WEST BENGAL AND INDIA*
Variables 1972 1982 1992 200203
WestBengal
India WestBengal
India WestBengal
India WestBengal
India
Asset (Nonland)Owned LandOperated LandIrrigationOutstanding Credit Borrowing
0.660**0.5720.6080.452NANA
0.5850.6650.6710.5010.387NA
0.5470.5930.5010.4690.3610.353
0.5850.6650.5880.5080.4060.396
0.5700.5030.4340.4720.4030.352
0.6210.6520.5880.5430.3980.392
0.4380.5170.5250.5400.377NA
0.5610.6360.6940.6590.3810.474
*Cultivator Households where otherwise not mentioned. **Value for All Rural Households.NA = Not Available.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis which follows is based on a field survey conducted among 210 sample
households in two parts of Bankura district, West Bengal, over 1993/94 and 200405. As a
matter of fact we had initially surveyed these households in 199394. In 200405 we have re
9
surveyed same households once more. In some particular cases where we found an original
household surveyed in 199394 got bifurcated into two or three in 200405 as a result of
inheritance, we selected the dominant household that inherited most of the property belong to
the original household. Where the property had been equally distributed among multiple
inheritor, we randomly selected any one of them.
Bankura district was selected in order to capture the diversity in the topography and
population distribution.4 It also possessed a relative advantage over other districts in West
Bengal, since it is purely agricultural and not close to the state capital or an international
border.5
Two sample areas in Bankura district were selected, the most advanced and the most
backward block respectively; various developmental indicators were used in order to identify
these blocks.6 The eight sample villages, consisting of four from each block, were chosen on
the basis of the size and ethnic distribution of population, the extent of land reform, and other
development indicators. The 210 sample households (of which 100 households belong to the
backward region) were classified on the basis of land owned/controlled and of Patnaik’s
[1976] Ecriterion (see Appendix 1 below). The latter is particularly relevant to an
understanding of changes occurring in West Bengal agriculture, where there is a tremendous
concentration of households below 2.5 acres. If we consider NSSO classification7 we find an
increase in the concentration of households from 138 to 153 out of 210 total households (66%
and 73% of total respectively) during 199394 to 200405 in the ‘marginal holding’ or 0.01
2.5 acres. However, as we will see later the households belong to this category are internally
10
differentiated among different economic classes. Patnaik’s Ecriteria would like to explore
this dynamics.
HOUSEHOLD AND CLASS
The distribution of sample households in each region, as well the combined figure for both, is
presented in Table 2. As expected, while a close link exists between farm size and labour use,
this is not absolute. The number of landless households is relatively small: only five percent
of the sample was wholly landless in 199394, neither owning nor operating any holdings,
which appears to reflect the low incidence of immizeration in the villages concerned.
However in 200405, the total number of landless households increased from 10 to 13.
However, regional distribution of the data reveals that the in the backward region the number
of landless households rather declined from 5 to 2. But in the advanced region the same
doubled, from 5 to 11during the same decade. We have to note that the advanced region is
more exposed to capitalist agriculture, and therefore, by neoliberal reform. The swelling of
the number of the landless households are owing to the many factors. The erstwhile five
landless households in 199394remained landless in 200405 as well and six households have
added as new. Among the six new landless households, three households sold their land in
distress and shifted to low paid nonfarm activities, but they earn a major income from selling
their labour as agricultural labour, particularly in the busy agricultural season. The non
agricultural works are not at all remunerative (Ghosh 2006). In fact the wage rate for such
nonagricultural work is less than the agricultural work in busy season. Such a conversion
from agriculture to nonagriculture is primarily due to nonavailability of agricultural job
apart from busy season. The increase in nonagricultural job is therefore nothing but a
11
situation of disguised proletarianization (Murray 2006, Kay 2008). Two households
mortgaged their land and become landless at least temporarily. One household lost its land in
family feud. In general it might be presumed that in the post liberalization period these
households lost their land due to deterioration in the living condition and nonavailability of
the formal credit, for which they are compelled to mortgage or sell their land, which in effect
reflects the process of the intense differentiation of the peasantry.
Table2: Cross Classification of the Number of Households and Average and Total Area (Acre) by Economic Class and Acreage Groups
LLS PP SP MP RP LLDPd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1
All Rgn0.00 10 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.012.5 0 0
71[0.74](51.77)
69[0.65](44.54)
27[1.33](35.81)
27[1.26](34.08)
13[1.69](22)
14[1.46](20.45)
12[1.37](16.44)
16[1.32](21.13)
15[1.45](21.78)
2.550 0 1[2.64]
(2.64)1[3.83](3.83)
11[3.96](43.51)
5[3.43](17.18)
6[3.14](18.84)
3[2.89](8.67)
10[3.73](37.26)
12[4.02](48.28)
8[3.38](27.06)
510 0 0 1[4.32](4.32)
0 4[7.30] (29.21)
2[7.33](14.66)
5[7.99](39.93)
2[6.67](13.33)
2[7.02](14.03)
5[7.06](35.34)
9[7.11](64.02)
10150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1[13.86](13.86)
02[12.38](24.75)
15&Ab0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2[29.87](59.73)
0 0
Total 10 13 73[0.80 70[0.69 42[2.58 34[1.94 24[3.37 19[2.23 27[5.23 33[3.17 34[4.05
12
](58.73)
](48.37)
](108.53)
](65.92)
](80.77)
](42.45)
](141.32)
](104.75)
](137.61)
AdvRegion0.00 5 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.012.5 0 0
44[0.44](19.18)
35[0.29](10.21)
12[0.99](11.84)
8[0.74](5.92)
4[0.89](3.56)
5[1.16](5.78)
10[1.40](13.96)
10[1.12](11.17)
12[1.57](18.81)
2.55 0 0 0 0 1[3.96](3.96)
2[3.59](7.17)
1[1.84](1.84)
3[2.89](8.67)
5[3.82](19.10)
4[3.74](14.95)
6[3.03](18.15)
510 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2[7.02](14.03)
4[6.92](27.67)
6[6.93](41.58)
10150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1[13.86](13.86)
01[10.89](10.89)
15&Ab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Total
5 1144[0.44](19.18)
35[0.29](10.21)
13[1.22](15.18)
10[1.31](13.09)
5[1.08](5.40)
8[1.81](14.45)
18[3.39](60.96)
18[2.99](53.79)
25[3.58](89.43)
Backward Rgn0.00 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.012.5 0 0
27[1.25](32.59)
34[1.01](34.33)
15[1.60](23.97)
19[1.48](28.16)
9[0.05](18.44)
9[1.63](14.67)
2[1.24](2.47)
6[1.66](9.96)
3[0.99](2.97)
2.550 0
1[2.64](2.64)
1[3.83](3.83)
10[3.96](39.55)
3[3.34](10.01)
5[3.40](17.00) 0
5[3.63](18.16)
8[4.17](33.33)
2[4.46](8.91)
510 0 0 1[4.32](4.35) 0 4[7.30]
(29.21)2[7.33](14.66)
5[7.99](39.93)
2[6.67](13.33) 0 1[7.67]
(7.67)3[7.48](22.44)
10150 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1[13.86](13.86)
15&Abv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2[29.87](59.73)
0 0
Total5 2
29[1.36](39.55)
35[1.09](38.16)
29[3.19](92.73)
24[2.20](32.83)
19[3.02](75.37)
11[2.55](28)
9[8.92](80.36)
15[3.98](50.96)
9[5.35](44.18)
Secondly, Around 73% of total households in both advanced and backward (and
therefore in the combined) region belong to the size group0.012.5 acre. In the advanced
region the households in this size group marginally declined from 82 to 80. Given the
13
increased landlessness in this region a process of depeasantization is very clear in this region.
However, in the backward region the households belong to this group actually increased from
56 to 73 and as a result in the combined region the households in the same size group
increased from 138 to 153. The backward region was dominated previously by landlord class
who occupied a very large size landed property. However, over the decade households belong
to the landlord class had lost its character and adopted the same pattern of labour process, i.e.
they cultivate purely on the basis of hired in labour. At the same time their land size declined
drastically primarily because of govt measure of land reform and natural inheritance rule.
There are also changing composition of the households belonging to this size group.
First of all, the proportion of small peasant belonging to this size group declined both in the
advanced and the backward region. The proportion of the middle peasant either increased
marginally (from 4 to 5) in the advanced region, or remained stagnant (at 9) in the backward
region. The selfemployed classes as a whole witnessed almost a stagnation for this size
group. On the other hand poor peasant within this size group increased from 27 to 34 in the
backward region and declined from 44 to 35 in the advanced region. The exploiting classes
(particularly landlords) actually swelled from 27 to 43. The increasing concentration of
landlord households in this size group reveals the fact that the erstwhile owners of big sizes
of land is losing their land either following the inheritance rule or the legal implementation of
the land reform, but they maintain the same labour process by alienating themselves from all
kinds of direct production on tiny plots of land. In other words, they remain the exploiting
classes – though their ownership of land holding declined.
In 200405 the farms below 2.5 acres in the advanced as well as in the backward
region is around 73%. However, the households belonging to the exploited classes still higher
14
in the advanced region (41.82%) as compared to the backward one (36%). The most
significant aspect is that the rich peasant and the landlords’ dependence on hired labour
increased from 18% to 28% in the backward region during 199394 to 200405. At the same
time the proportion of the self employed classes remained unaltered in the advanced region,
but the same declined from 48% to 35% during the same period. Therefore, the backward
region is now on the path of transition towards agrarian capitalism.
On the other hand the numbers of households belong to the higher size categories
above 2.5 acres declined over the decade 199394 and 200405. There are a decline for all
size groups in the combined region and almost in both the regions separately. However with
regard to the large farms above 10 acres there is a varying picture in the two regions. In 1993
94 in the backward region a mere 3 households operate 24.5 percent or almost a quarter of the
total area though constituting only 3 percent of the farms. In the advanced region the 2 farms
operating above 10 acres have only 10.6 percent of the area. Over the decade the land
concentration reduced significantly, so that we find in 200405 only one farm prevails in the
backward region whose land is above 10 acres (14.99 acres). In the advanced region no farm
is left with the operated area above 10 acres.
It is clear, moreover, that the above considerations have had a differential impact in terms of
the two regions studied. In the more advanced region, therefore, both landholding and class
structure are more polarized: three quarters of all holdings are less than 2.5 acres in size, and
44 percent of cultivators are landless, compared with the respective figures of 56 percent of
holdings and 34 per cent of cultivators in the backward region. The same holds true of the
relative importance of rich peasants and landlords: the latter account for 39 per cent of all
15
land in the advanced region, compared with only 18 per cent in the backward one. Petty
commodity producers, or middle peasants, are less common in the advanced region than in
the backward one: in the latter context they account for nearly half of all farms, while in the
former they constitute only 16 per cent.
One seeming anomaly requires explanation. It concerns the jump from 13 to 30 acres in farm
size between the highest and secondhighest category, which is due to the presence in the
backward area of two relatively large landholding groups. Having been members of the
landlord class, the owners of these holdings lost their power when the Left Front assumed
government, declared a large portion of their land surplus and redistributed it among landless
households. Under the active supervision of the Krishak Sabha and the Panchayat, these
landless households then formed a collective farm known as ‘Bangopalpur Chatanibad
Jouthakhamar’.8 For their part, the two households from which the land had been confiscated
were able to retain a considerable amount of their property by means of benami transfers.
Since they were households with large families, the per capita land distribution shows a
decline when the remaining property is adjusted to take account of family size.
16
TABLE 3: CROSS CLASSIFICATION OF THE NET LABOUR DAYS HI/HO PER HOLDING BY ECONOMIC CLASSES AND ACREAGE GROUPS (ACRES)
Landless Poor Peasant Small Peasant Middle Peasant Rich Peasant Landlord Total Acres 199304 200405 199304 200405 199304 200405 199304 200405 199304 200405 199304 200405 199304 200405
All Region0.00 111.63 83.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 111.63 83.69
0.01 to 2.5 0.00 0.00 240.07 157.22 17.91 25.96 28.80 35.64 159.66 81.75 265.96 127.93 81.51 41.102.5 to 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 180.00 7.20 35.60 62.02 90.00 327.96 220.58 512.84 366.13 213.20 189.245 to 10 0.00 0.00 187.75 0.00 41.70 7.50 147.64 96.50 662.19 487.20 1198.19 611.40 594.85 405.07
10 to 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1200.00 0.00 1495.51 880.00 1397.00 880.0015 & abv. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1150.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1150.00 0.00
Total 111.63 83.69 236.06 157.54 17.37 26.29 61.87 50.63 371.11 193.67 643.14 251.71 68.06 22.20Advanced Region
0.00 103.00 79.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 103.00 79.910.01 to 2.5 0.00 0.00 317.26 189.89 28.50 22.88 42.00 41.20 184.28 96.00 320.89 140.86 102.93 32.05
2.5 to 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 46.00 135.00 90.00 435.50 310.50 583.17 461.00 447.81 279.215 to 10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 662.19 551.50 1556.67 1651.00 1333.05 771.40
10 to 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1200.00 0.00 1165.38 0.00 1182.69 0.0015 & abv. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 103.00 79.91 317.26 189.89 25.54 9.10 60.60 59.50 363.59 244.89 714.20 251.96 89.96 39.30Backward Region
0.00 120.25 104.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 120.25 104.500.01 to 2.5 0.00 0.00 114.26 123.59 9.45 27.26 22.94 32.56 36.57 58.00 46.25 71.00 50.15 51.01
2.5 to 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 180.00 8.92 90.00 47.43 0.00 220.43 175.63 301.88 208.00 80.60 105.275 to 10 0.00 0.00 187.75 0.00 41.70 7.50 147.64 96.50 0.00 230.00 481.25 351.50 140.57 201.56
10 to 15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1825.63 880.00 1825.63 880.0015 & abv. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1150.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1150.00 0.00
Total 120.25 104.50 112.86 125.20 13.71 33.46 62.20 44.18 386.14 132.20 445.76 251.15 43.97 3.40
Table 3 on the net labour days hired in or out per holding reveal the variation in the
economic status of households within each acreage group. It is quite clear from the table that
the class categories isolate successfully holdings of different types with respect to the
variables of labour hiring, and therefore show consistently and significantly different mean
values for holdings in the different economic classes, regardless of the acreage group into
which they fall. As one would expect, the highest proportion of labourpurchasing holdings
by acreage group is found in farms above 2.5 acres. Thus in 199394 rich peasants purchase
from 160 to 1150 days of labour annually per holding over the acreage groups across both
regions, while for the middle peasant class it ranges from 29 to 148 days over the acreage
groups. By contrast, smallpeasants sell between 7 and 48 days per annum, while in the case
17
of poor peasants the figure varies from 188 to 240 days per year. The figures of 200405 also
support this trend, however the magnitude of variation had been narrowing.
HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE AND WORKFORCE
Chayanov [1966] argued that the ratio of consumers to workers in the farming household is a
crucial variable, because it is this which determines the amount of labour effort that family
workers will put into production. Accordingly, the higher the consumer/worker ratio, the
higher will be the number of days of work performed by family workers. Our findings, which
employ a householdmemberstoworker ratio that is the same as Chayanov’s concept of a
consumer/worker ratio, indicate a broad relation between the latter, farm size and economic
class. However, the relationship that Chayanov identified namely, rising consumer/worker
ratios accompanied by a higher family labour input was not found. We have not found
Chayanov proposed inverse relationship between farm size and economic well being.
The distribution of the numbers of the household members, and household workers, are
depicted in Tables 4 by size and class groups. As in the Farm Management Studies, a clear
direct relationship (as opposed to Chayanovian inverse one) connects farm size and family
size, and more broadly the latter and economic status. The work participation rate (WPR)
is substantially higher in the backward region when compared to the advanced region, a not
unexpected finding since rural families in the former context are likely to have a lower
income per worker, and more family members must work to obtain a minimum family
income.
18
TABLE 4: Family Members and Workers by Economic Class and Acreage GroupEcClasses Member per worker Worker per Holding Member perHolding Participation RateAll Region 199394 200405 199394 200405 199394 200405 199394 200405Landless 2.28 2.04 1.8 2.15 4.1 4.38 43.9 49.12Poor Peasant 1.96 1.95 3.01 2.97 5.92 5.79 50.93 51.36Small Peasant 1.81 2.04 3.4 3.26 6.17 6.65 55.21 49.12Middle Peasant 2.36 2.23 3 3.16 7.08 7.05 42.35 44.78Rich Peasant 3.88 2.51 2.15 2.85 8.33 7.15 25.78 39.83Landlord 4.37 2.63 1.53 2.66 6.68 7.00 22.91 37.98 Total 2.4 2.20 2.68 2.90 6.45 6.40 41.58 45.35Advanced RegionLandless 2 2.27 1.4 2.00 2.8 4.55 50 44.00Poor Peasant 2.41 2.31 2.3 2.43 5.52 5.60 41.56 43.37Small Peasant 2.45 2.37 2.92 3.00 7.15 7.10 40.86 42.25Middle Peasant 3.38 3.00 1.6 2.25 5.4 6.75 29.63 33.33Rich Peasant 4 2.89 1.94 2.56 7.78 7.39 25 34.59Landlord 4.33 2.60 1.6 2.57 6.92 6.68 23.12 38.50 Total 3.01 2.53 2.08 2.48 6.27 6.28 33.19 39.51Backward RegionLandless 2.45 1.17 2.2 3.00 5.4 3.50 40.74 85.71Poor Peasant 1.59 1.70 4.1 3.51 6.52 5.97 62.96 58.85Small Peasant 1.58 1.91 3.62 3.38 5.72 6.46 63.25 52.26Middle Peasant 2.23 1.90 3.37 3.82 7.53 7.27 44.76 52.50Rich Peasant 3.7 2.15 2.56 3.20 9.44 6.87 27.06 46.60Landlord 4.5 2.70 1.33 2.85 6 7.69 22.22 37.00 Total 1.99 1.94 3.34 3.37 6.64 6.54 50.3 51.53Acreage Gp All Region '0.00 2.28 2.04 1.8 2.15 4.1 4.38 43.9 49.12 0.01 to 2.5 2.23 2.16 2.51 2.73 5.6 5.90 44.76 46.23 2.5 to 5 2.23 2.31 3.08 3.41 6.89 7.90 44.76 43.23 5 to 10 2.97 2.29 3.43 4.21 10.19 9.64 33.64 43.70 10 to 15 7.4 3.14 1.67 7.00 12.33 22.00 13.51 31.82 15 & Abv 3.73 0.00 5.5 0.00 20.5 0.00 26.83 0.00Total 2.4 2.20 2.68 2.90 6.45 6.40 41.58 45.35Advanced Region '0.00 2 2.27 1.4 2.00 2.8 4.55 50 44.00 0.01 to 2.5 2.78 2.48 2.05 2.40 5.7 5.96 35.97 40.25 2.5 to 5 3.13 2.97 2.38 2.43 7.46 7.21 31.96 33.66 5 to 10 4.74 2.52 2.38 5.00 11.25 12.60 21.11 39.68 10 to 15 5.5 0.00 2 0.00 11 0.00 18.18 0.00 15 & Abv 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00Total 3.01 2.53 2.08 2.48 6.27 6.28 33.19 39.51Backward Region '0.00 2.45 1.17 2.2 3.00 5.4 3.50 40.74 85.71 0.01 to 2.5 1.72 1.89 3.18 3.08 5.46 5.82 58.17 52.94 2.5 to 5 1.89 1.97 3.48 4.33 6.57 8.53 52.98 50.78 5 to 10 2.34 2.12 4.08 3.78 9.54 8.00 42.74 47.22 10 to 15 15 3.14 1 7.00 15 22.00 6.67 31.82 15 & Abv 3.73 0.00 5.5 0.00 20.5 0.00 26.83 0.00Total 1.99 1.94 3.34 3.37 6.64 6.54 50.3 51.53Note: Participation rate is calculated as the workers to members ratio, multiplied by 100.
This is confirmed when the members to workers ratio is linked to economic class and
land size. As the economic position of the household improves, therefore, it becomes possible
even for adult members of working age to withdraw from work, a factor reflected in lower
participation rates. By farm size, too, a higher than average participation rate occurs for
holdings below 5 acres, and a lower than average rate on holdings above 5 acres. The only
deviation from this pattern is the case of landless households in the backward region in 1993
19
94, which have a below average workparticipation ratio,though in 200405 it was more than
doubled; magnitude for which was far above the average.
Table 5 has summarised the family labour, hired in labour and hired out labour. It is observed
that landlords hire in all the labour they use per farm, not working a single day in the fields.
The rich peasant on the other hand rely on hiring in for 77% (199394) / 68% (200405) of
their labour input with the remaining share contributed by family labour. The middle peasants
hire in 30.25% (199394) / 38.60% (200405) and the small peasant hire in a meagre
proportion 5% 6% in both years. Poor peasants hire out 84% to 82% of total labour days
and only 16% to 18% of total labour days they work on their own farm. These households are
better thought as agricultural labourer with some land. We have seen in Table 2 that these
households belong largely to the lowest landed size group (0.012.5 acres). In ChayanovSen
formulation, however, these farms are projected as ‘family labour farm’ as if these farms
survive on ‘selfexploitation’ and devoid from any kind of off farm activities. The acreage
grouping also shows a broad direct association between the size of farms and percentage of
total labour hired in and a broad inverse relation between size of farm and the proportion of
family labour days hired out on wage.
The impact of liberalization is very clear. Agricultural investment massively declined during
period of neoliberal reform. As a result labour absorption in agriculture declined far more
following the logic of Keynesian investment multiplier. In our survey all the variables related
to labour absorption largely declined during 199394 and 200405. These variables include
family labour days per holding, hired in labour days per holding and hired out labour days
per holding.
20
Table 5: Distribution of Labour DaysFL per Holding HI per Holding FL+HIper Holding % of HI to Total HO per Holding FL+HO per Holding %of HO to Total
Class/Group Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2ALL REGIO NLandless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 208.33 83.69 208.33 83.69 100.00 100.00Poor Peasant 57.68 35.67 2.82 1.81 60.50 37.49 4.66 4.84 296.35 159.36 354.04 195.03 83.71 81.71Small Peasant 204.71 112.12 11.39 7.32 216.10 119.44 5.27 6.13 56.97 33.62 261.68 145.74 21.77 23.07Middle Peasant 147.50 98.37 63.96 61.84 211.46 160.21 30.25 38.60 2.10 11.21 149.60 109.58 1.40 10.23Rich Peasant 110.81 91.30 371.11 194.67 481.92 285.97 77.01 68.07 0.00 1.00 110.81 92.30 0.00 1.08Landlord 0.00 0.49 643.16 254.29 643.16 254.78 100.00 99.81 0.00 2.56 0.00 3.05 0.00 84.00 Total 92.10 53.39 162.41 87.62 254.51 141.01 63.81 62.14 124.57 65.41 216.67 118.80 57.49 55.06ADVANCED REGIO NLandless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 127.00 79.91 127.00 79.91 100.00 100.00Poor Peasant 44.24 19.14 4.59 2.34 48.84 21.48 9.40 10.89 295.72 192.23 339.96 211.37 86.99 90.94Small Peasant 280.21 102.20 8.77 12.10 288.98 114.30 3.03 10.59 30.08 21.20 310.29 123.40 9.69 17.18Middle Peasant 113.00 110.50 60.60 62.00 173.60 172.50 34.91 35.94 0.00 2.50 113.00 113.00 0.00 2.21Rich Peasant 73.56 125.38 363.59 244.88 437.15 370.26 83.17 66.14 0.00 0.00 73.56 125.38 0.00 0.00Landlord 0.00 0.72 714.22 255.75 714.22 256.47 100.00 99.72 0.00 3.75 0.00 4.47 0.00 83.89 Total 67.99 44.12 227.45 115.53 295.43 159.65 76.99 72.36 127.61 72.21 195.60 116.33 65.24 62.07BACKWARD REGIO NLandless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 289.65 104.50 289.65 104.50 100.00 100.00Poor Peasant 78.07 52.20 0.13 1.28 78.20 53.48 0.17 2.39 297.32 126.48 375.39 178.68 79.20 70.79Small Peasant 170.86 116.25 12.56 5.33 183.42 121.58 6.85 4.38 69.03 38.93 239.89 155.04 28.78 25.02Middle Peasant 156.58 89.54 64.85 61.72 221.42 151.26 29.29 40.80 2.65 17.54 159.23 107.08 1.66 16.38Rich Peasant 185.33 50.40 386.14 134.40 571.47 184.80 67.57 72.73 0.00 2.20 185.33 52.60 0.00 4.18Landlord 0.00 0.00 445.76 251.15 445.76 251.15 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 118.62 63.58 90.87 61.33 209.49 124.91 43.38 49.10 121.23 57.23 239.85 120.81 50.54 47.37ALL REGIO N 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 208.33 83.69 208.33 83.69 100.00 100.00 0.01 2.5 66.91 38.74 48.33 37.54 115.25 76.27 41.94 49.21 161.02 78.63 227.93 117.37 70.64 67.00 2.5 5 140.01 97.93 223.52 206.10 363.53 304.03 61.49 67.79 32.16 16.83 172.18 114.76 18.68 14.66 5 10 173.14 174.57 614.21 414.36 787.36 588.93 78.01 70.36 33.27 9.29 206.42 183.86 16.12 5.05 10 15 43.33 0.00 1397.00 880.00 1440.33 880.00 96.99 100.00 0.00 0.00 43.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 15 & Abv 650.00 0.00 1150.00 0.00 1800.00 0.00 63.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 650.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 92.10 53.39 162.41 87.62 254.51 141.01 63.81 62.14 124.57 65.41 216.67 118.80 57.49 55.06Advanced Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 127.00 79.90 127.00 127.00 100.00 100.00 0.01 2.5 60.93 24.08 75.21 56.20 136.14 192.34 55.25 70.00 163.45 88.25 224.37 279.62 72.85 78.56 2.5 5 142.50 120.71 447.85 279.64 590.35 869.99 75.86 69.85 0.00 0.36 142.50 218.36 0.00 0.30 5 10 62.50 247.20 1333.05 771.40 1395.55 2166.95 95.52 75.73 0.00 0.00 62.50 158.02 0.00 0.00 10 15 65.00 0.00 1182.69 0.00 1247.69 1247.69 94.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.00 159.79 0.00 0.00 15 & Abv 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 67.99 44.12 227.45 115.53 295.43 410.96 76.99 72.36 127.61 72.21 195.60 272.59 65.24 62.07Backward Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 289.65 104.50 289.65 289.65 100.00 100.00 0.01 2.5 75.68 54.79 8.98 17.08 84.66 101.74 10.60 23.77 157.46 68.09 233.14 243.74 67.54 55.41 2.5 5 138.61 16.66 96.73 137.46 235.34 372.80 41.10 89.19 50.35 32.20 188.95 230.06 26.64 65.90 5 10 241.23 76.66 171.86 216.00 413.09 629.09 41.60 73.81 53.75 14.44 294.98 336.58 18.22 15.85 10 15 0.00 134.22 1825.63 880.00 1825.63 2705.63 100.00 86.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 15 & Abv 650.00 0.00 1150.00 0.00 1800.00 1800.00 63.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 650.00 713.89 0.00 0.00 Total 118.62 63.58 90.87 61.33 209.49 270.82 43.38 49.10 121.23 57.23 239.85 283.22 50.54 47.37
Note: Pd1 = Period 1, i .e . 199394; Pd2 = Period 2, i.e . 200405. FL = Family Labour, HI = Hired In, HO = Hired O ut.
21
LAND AND OTHER MEANS OF PRODUCTION
Data on land tenure owned/operated, as well as that leased in and leased out by economic
class and farm size are presented in Table 6. Nearly three quarters of all rural households in
the two regions compared own/operate holdings under 2.5 acres, which account for only 28
per cent of total land; by contrast, only two percent of households own/operate land of ten
acres and above, holdings which account for some 17 percent of total land. This element of
inequality is more pronounced in the advanced region, where labourpurchasing households
comprise 39 per cent of households owning/controlling 82 per cent of the total area.
Table 6: Distribution of ownership, operated and irrigated land by Ec. Class & size group Per holding Per holding % of Leased % of Leased Per holding % of irrigated
Economic Class owned area operatedin to operated
out to area to total ope
& Acreage Group (acre) area (acre) area owned area irrigated rated area
93940405
9394
0405
9394
0405
9394
0405
9394
0405 9394
0405
Economic Class All Region Landless 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Poor Peasant 0.93 0.68 0.73 0.63 9.19 8.60 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.12 42.18 17.68Small Peasant 2.75 2.20 2.47 1.78 8.81 8.21 4.00 0.00 0.80 0.34 31.05 17.84Middle Peasant 4.34 2.36 3.22 2.09 4.21 6.27 0.00 0.00 1.53 0.74 45.54 33.05Rich Peasant 5.20 3.32 4.79 3.14 8.92 1.43 0.01 0.95 3.51 1.36 67.15 43.00
Landlord 5.09 3.57 4.72 3.30 2.67 1.8515.25
21.96 2.38 0.95 58.91 34.17
TOTAL 2.86 2.01 2.50 1.83 6.57 4.23 5.27 6.89 1.29 0.56 51.47 31.53Advanced Region Landless 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poor Peasant 0.42 0.25 0.36 0.23 1.61 22.8
2 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.19 60.82 64.25
Small Peasant 1.23 1.21 1.16 1.1031.77
15.90
28.95 0.00 0.66 0.83 89.43 63.69
Middle Peasant 0.77 1.81 0.72 1.5133.70
16.12 0.00 0.00 1.66 1.40 61.31 77.51
Rich Peasant 2.94 3.04 2.85 2.9217.91 2.79 1.25 0.61 2.60 2.34 48.95 78.16
Landlord 4.63 3.00 4.49 0.37 4.11 3.3022.81
45.14 1.06 72.76 54.71
TOTAL 1.88 1.57 1.81 1.4512.53 6.90
15.31
16.86 1.13 0.88 65.01 67.17
Backward Region Landless 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00Poor Peasant 1.71 1.09 1.28 1.04 5.84 4.80 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.06 33.15 5.21Small Peasant 3.43 2.60 3.04 2.06 4.90 6.30 0.00 0.00 1.76 0.14 21.10 6.38Middle Peasant 5.27 2.75 3.88 2.51 2.10 1.18 0.00 0.00 7.23 0.26 44.40 10.11Rich Peasant 9.72 3.66 8.67 3.40 2.87 0.00 0.00 1.31 1.78 0.20 80.96 5.89Landlord 6.38 4.74 5.35 4.60 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.13 0.72 33.22 15.71TOTAL 3.94 2.48 3.25 2.25 3.19 2.54 0.00 0.58 1.47 0.20 43.79 8.95Acreage Group All Region
22
0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.5 2.21 1.13 1.01 0.96 9.05 4.01 2.76 0.00 0.57 0.33 53.29 33.11
2.5 – 5 4.31 4.46 3.80 4.3112.11 6.00
14.89
24.45 1.43 1.23 39.87 34.15
5 – 10 8.35 7.37 7.21 6.93 2.18 3.32 1.88 0.00 3.10 2.10 42.91 29.39
10 15 14.55 15.0
212.98
14.99 0.01 0.00 1.51 0.00 5.39 1.66 41.88 11.07
15 & Abv 29.79 0.0028.88 0.00 3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
29.87 0.00
100.00 0.00
TOTAL 2.86 2.01 2.50 1.83 6.57 4.23 5.27 6.89 1.29 0.56 51.47 31.53Advanced Region 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.01 2.5 0.82 0.81 0.76 0.6914.58 7.54 6.89 0.00 0.58 0.54 70.38 72.08
2.5 – 5 4.36 4.90 4.28 4.7524.27
11.56
40.74
51.33 1.98 2.31 59.91 68.65
5 – 10 7.14 7.85 6.95 7.53 5.93 0.00 5.78 0.00 4.58 4.33 65.87 57.53
10 15 12.96 0.0012.54 0.00 1.33 0.00 2.55 0.00 7.10 0.00 57.33 0.00
15 & Abv 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 1.88 1.57 1.81 1.4512.53 6.90
15.31
16.86 1.13 0.88 65.01 67.17
Backward Region 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.5 1.79 1.49 1.37 1.26 4.41 1.77 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.11 38.99 8.34 2.5 – 5 4.28 4.06 3.52 3.89 6.04 1.44 0.00 2.32 1.12 0.22 29.86 5.76 5 – 10 9.10 7.09 7.38 6.59 0.00 5.31 0.00 0.00 2.18 0.85 29.59 12.34
10 15 17.75 15.0
213.86
14.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.98 1.66 14.29 11.07
15 & Abv 28.79 0.0028.88 0.00 3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
29.87 0.00
100.00 0.00
TOTAL 3.94 2.48 3.25 2.25 3.19 2.54 0.00 0.58 1.47 0.20 43.79 8.95
There was a decline in per holding owned (from 2.86 acres to 2.01 acres) and operated area
(from 2.5 acres to 1.83 acres) over decade of neoliberal reform. The decline was sharp in the
backward region and also prominent in the advanced region. There was a decline of land
holding in all classes but the same was sharp for the higher classes as revealed by the lower
value of Gini Coefficient for ownership and operated area.
Taking both regions together, the extent of leasing in and leasing out is small: only seven to
four per cent of operated area is leased in and five to seven per cent of owned area is leased
out. The single digit low percentage figure for leasing in / out have suggested that share
tenancy is on the decline following the impementation of Operation Barga in West Bengal
(Dasgupta 1984).9 In the advanced region, however, there was decline in operated area leased
23
in from 13% to 7% though there was a marginal increase in owned area is leased out from
15% to 17%. The latter was primarily based on seasonal leave for boro cultivation and not
true sense of the classical tenancy. The backward regionhas low incidence of tenancy than the
advanced region even where the percentage of leased in land declined from 3.19% to 2.54%.
The classspecific patterns of leasingin and leasingout reveal that the rural poor enter
sharecropping arrangements to augment the meagre income from their own holdings.
Although rich peasants lease in some amount of land, they do so for different reasons: the
lure of higher profits from extending cultivation. It remains the case, however, that in the
wake of Operation Barga, no new tenancy contracts have been signed and after the
liberalization the incidence of tenancy declined.
Turning to a consideration of productive assets other than land, these consist of
machinery, irrigation, livestock, storage and transportation. As a much earlier study by Sen
and Sengupta [1969] of three villages in Burdwan district carried out over a five year period
(1957/58 to 61/62) showed, access to irrigation has for a long time been an important factor
in the productive capacity of holdings in the five acre category. Significantly, that same study
confirmed that, even at this earlier conjuncture, all farmers of 46 acre holdings employed
hired labour for cultivation. In our study we have seen that both in the advanced and in the
backward region the irrigated area per holding and percentage of irrigated total area declined
during the decade of liberalization.
The data presented in Tables 7 indicate that, across both regions, about two thirds
(199394) and over 60% (200405) of total nonland assets and owned/controlled by rich
peasants and landlords. Categorized in terms of farm size, however, no consistent pattern of
24
nonland assets emerges. Thus ownership/control of machinery and irrigation is concentrated
in farms belonging to the 510 acre category, which account for 35% (199394) and 46%
(200405) of these particular means of production; by contrast, holdings below five acres and
above ten account for a much smaller amount of such productive assets. Much the same is
true of livestock, ownership of which is concentrated both among the landless, marginal
(0.012.5 acres) and also among holdings in excess of fifteen acres. The reason why farm size
cannot explain the way means of production are distributed is that the majority among the
total holdings in the 510 acre category, of which two (199394) and five (200405) holdings
belong to rich peasants and nine (199394) and five (200405) to landlords, are cultivated
intensively (see Table 2). No other farm size group contains such a high proportion of
capitalist farms purchasing labourpower.
25
Table 7: Distribution of Majoar Assets by Economic Classes and Acreage Groups Mechanical & Irrigational Storage & Transport Livestock TotalPer Acre (Rs) P.Holding[Rs]\ Percentage PerAcre(Rs) P.Holding[Rs] Percentage Per Acre (Rs) P.Holding[Rs]\ Percentage Per Acre (Rs) P. Holding [Rs] Percentage
Class/Group Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2ALL REGIO NLandless 0 0 183 60 (0) [0] (0) [4] 0 0 250 692 (0) [16] (2) [45] 0 0 1354 788 (1) [75] (0) [51] 0 0 1787 1540 (0) [100] (1) [100]Poor Peasant 680 472 510 326 (0) [1] (3) [5] 1737 1238 1304 855 (4) [17] (11) [14] 12463 7176 9356 4958 (20) [75] (16) [81] 14879 8886 11170 6139 (9) [100] (12) [100]Small Peasant 2119 410 5354 795 (13) [20] (3) [5] 899 968 2270 1876 (5) [16] (12) [11] 6140 7383 15512 14313 (24) [61] (23) [84] 9158 8762 23136 16985 (14) [100] (16) [100]Middle Peasant 545 395 1788 881 (5) [8] (2) [5] 789 1546 2589 3453 (3) [12] (12) [18] 7044 6526 23096 14576 (23) [76] (13) [77] 8379 8466 27473 18910 (11) [100] (10) [100]Rich Peasant 2163 6818 11283 21641 (13) [22] (81) [52] 1034 1742 5393 5530 (6) [24] (34) [13] 3996 4677 20846 14846 (16) [49] (23) [35] 7193 13238 37521 42017 (11) [100] (39) [100]Landlord 8176 917 32225 2523 (69) [25] (12) [13] 6422 1320 25312 3632 (82) [64] (28) [19] 4814 4567 18975 12566 (16) [10] (24) [67] 19412 6804 76512 18720 (55) [100] (22) [100] Total 3318 2365 8129 4214 (100) [20] (100) [25] 2452 1415 6006 2522 (100) [43] (100) [15] 6046 5681 14811 10124 (100) [43] (100) [60] 11816 9460 28947 16860 (100)[100] (100)[100]ADVANCED REGIO NLandless 0 0 95 53 (0) [0] (0) [3] 0 0 500 782 (0) [77] (3) [46] 0 0 848 867 (0) [12] (1) [51] 0 0 1443 1702 (0) [100] (1) [100]Poor Peasant 1227 852 518 248 (1) [3] (1) [5] 3793 3351 1600 977 (3) [38] (14) [18] 16156 13910 6815 4058 (17) [49] (16) [77] 21176 18112 8933 5284 (5) [100] (9) [100]Small Peasant 10996 1193 14335 1561 (12) [44] (2) [14] 3269 1139 4262 1490 (3) [23] (6) [13] 12579 6342 16398 8295 (15) [29] (9) [73] 26844 8674 34995 11346 (7) [100] (6) [100]Middle Peasant 1109 683 1595 1234 (0) [7] (1) [8] 2852 2332 4100 4213 (1) [37] (13) [28] 10847 5346 15596 9656 (6) [50] (9) [64] 14808 8361 21291 15103 (2) [100] (6) [100]Rich Peasant 4683 13016 15819 38897 (12) [29] (85) [67] 1852 1352 6256 4042 (5) [29] (29) [7] 5980 5138 20201 15355 (27) [36] (31) [26] 12515 19507 42276 58294 (10) [100] (53) [100]Landlord 12149 1715 43638 3271 (75) [26] (11) [19] 9256 1646 33244 3139 (88) [67] (35) [18] 5417 5722 19457 10911 (35) [6] (34) [63] 26822 9084 96339 17321 (76) [100] (25) [100] Total 8243 5703 14484 7513 (100) [26] (100) [42] 5652 1739 9932 2291 (100) [58] (100) [13] 7477 6167 13139 8124 (100) [14] (100) [45] 21372 13609 37555 17929 (100)[100] (100)[100]BACKWARD REGIO NLandless 0 0 271 100 (0) [0] (0) [15] 0 0 0 200 (0) [0] (0) [31] 0 0 1860 350 (1) [91] (0) [54] 0 0 2131 650 (1) [100] (0) [100]Poor Peasant 399 370 499 404 (0) [0] (24) [6] 683 673 854 733 (10) [6] (9) [10] 10572 5374 13212 5858 (21) [89] (17) [84] 11654 6417 14566 6995 (19) [100] (16) [100]Small Peasant 432 216 1328 477 (26) [6] (20) [2] 448 926 1378 2038 (27) [11] (18) [11] 4916 7641 15115 16821 (27) [79] (33) [87] 5796 8783 17821 19335 (27) [100] (30) [100]Middle Peasant 489 246 1839 625 (44) [9] (12) [3] 582 1140 2191 2900 (26) [10] (11) [13] 6661 7135 25069 18155 (30) [80] (16) [84] 7732 8520 29099 21680 (30) [100] (15) [100]Rich Peasant 248 275 2209 933 (20) [9] (24) [4] 412 2154 3667 7317 (20) [16] (40) [33] 2489 4191 22136 14235 (12) [71] (17) [63] 3150 6620 28012 22485 (13) [100] (22) [100]Landlord 106 200 523 912 (10) [5] (20) [4] 667 1027 3278 4693 (17) [19] (22) [22] 3590 3529 17638 16130 (9) [73] (17) [74] 4363 4755 21438 21735 (10) [100] (18) [100] Total 355 255 1139 585 (100) [6] (100) [4] 526 1211 1688 2776 (100) [11] (100) [18] 5185 5373 16651 12323 (100) [80] (100) [79] 6065 6839 19478 15685 (100)[100] (100)[100]ALL REGIO N 0.00 0 0 183 60 (0) [0] (0) [4] 0 0 250 692 (0) [16] (2) [45] 0 0 1354 788 (1) [75] (0) [51] 0 0 1787 1540 (0) [100] (0) [100] 0.01 2.5 5845 901 6059 904 (53) [16] (16) [9] 6801 1655 7049 1660 (85) [58] (48) [16] 10100 8015 10469 8042 (42) [23] (58) [76] 22747 10571 23576 10607 (63) [100] (46) [100] 2.5 5 1478 3095 5333 11145 (10) [15] (37) [36] 1054 1439 3806 5183 (7) [22] (28) [17] 5332 4039 19246 14545 (22) [58] (20) [47] 7864 8574 28385 30873 (13) [100] (25) [100] 5 10 4027 4160 28084 30109 (34) [35] (48) [46] 779 1036 5435 7495 (5) [12] (20) [11] 5075 3913 35389 28319 (28) [51] (19) [43] 9881 9108 68907 65923 (19) [100] (26) [100] 10 15 2004 75 23590 1120 (1) [11] (0) [1] 581 761 6833 11400 (1) [28] (2) [14] 3184 4470 37480 67000 (3) [53] (3) [84] 5769 5305 67903 79520 (2) [100] (2) [100] 15 & Abv 280 0 8350 0 (2) [18] (0) [0] 243 0 7250 0 (1) [16] (0) [0] 1736 0 51860 0 (4) [62] (0) [0] 2259 0 67460 0 (2) [100] (0) [100] Total 3318 2365 8129 4214 (100) [20] (100) [25] 2452 1415 6006 2522 (100) [43] (100) [15] 6046 5681 14811 10124 (100) [35] (100) [60] 11816 9460 28947 16860 (100)[100] (100)[100]ADVANCED REGIO N 0.00 0 0 95 53 (0) [0] (0) [3] 0 0 500 782 (0) [77] (3) [46] 0 0 848 867 (0) [12] (1) [51] 0 0 1443 1702 (0) [100] (1) [100] 0.01 2.5 11297 1712 9735 1277 (56) [19] (12) [13] 13133 2552 11317 1903 (91) [69] (60) [20] 11278 8758 9719 6531 (55) [10] (58) [67] 35708 13022 30771 9711 (76) [100] (39) [100] 2.5 5 3460 6772 11933 22537 (7) [24] (38) [55] 1773 1135 6115 3779 (5) [34] (21) [9] 6148 4337 21206 14434 (19) [36] (23) [35] 11381 12245 39254 40749 (7) [100] (29) [100] 5 10 10607 10557 71206 81646 (36) [65] (49) [67] 1294 990 8688 7660 (3) [13] (15) [6] 5433 4126 36475 31910 (20) [19] (18) [26] 17335 15673 116369 121216 (15) [100] (31) [100] 10 15 2895 0 34875 0 (1) [17] (0) [0] 540 0 6500 0 (1) [34] (0) [0] 3181 0 38320 0 (6) [40] (0) [0] 6616 0 79695 0 (2) [100] (0) [100] 15 & Abv 0 0 0 0 (0) [0] (0) [0] 0 0 0 0 (0) [0] (0) [0] 0 0 0 (0) [0] (0) [0] 0 0 0 0 (0) [100] (0) [100] Total 8243 5703 14484 7513 (100) [26] (100) [42] 5652 1739 9932 2291 (100) [58] (100) [13] 7477 6167 13139 8124 (100) [14] (100) [45] 21372 13609 37555 17929 (100)[100] (100)[100]BACKWARD REGIO N 0.00 0 0 271 100 (0) [0] (0) [15] 0 0 0 200 (0) [0] (0) [31] 0 0 1860 350 (0) [91] (0) [54] 0 0 2131 650 (1) [100] (0) [100] 0.01 2.5 522 386 675 496 (21) [3] (62) [4] 618 1084 799 1394 (26) [8] (37) [12] 8951 7543 11566 9699 (38) [84] (57) [84] 10091 9013 13040 11589 (35) [100] (54) [100] 2.5 5 433 133 1603 512 (44) [10] 13) [2] 676 1684 2500 6494 (33) [14] (35) [30] 4902 3800 18138 14649 (23) [72] (18) [68] 6011 5617 22242 21655 (26) [100] (21) [100] 5 10 217 212 1547 1477 (14) [3] (23) [4] 481 1063 3433 7404 (28) [10] (24) [21] 4867 3781 34720 26323 (31) [84] (19) [75] 5566 5056 39700 35204 (29) [100] (20) [100] 10 15 91 75 1020 1120 (0) [0] (2) [1] 668 761 7500 11400 (4) [18] (4) [14] 3191 4470 35800 67000 (2) [79] (5) [84] 3950 5305 44320 79520 (2) [100] (5) [100] 15 & Abv 280 0 8350 0 (21) [18] (0) [0] 243 0 7250 0 (10) [16] (0) [0] 1736 0 51860 0 (5) [62] (0) [0] 2259 0 67460 0 (7) [100] (0) [100] Total 355 255 1139 585 (100) [6] (100) [4] 526 1211 1688 2776 (100) [11] (100) [18] 5185 5373 16651 12323 (100) [80] (100) [79] 6065 6839 19478 15685 (100)[100] (100)[100]
Note: Note:The percentages of different assets do not add upto total,as we exclude`other'asset here.
26
CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND CREDIT
One of the big impacts of neoliberal reform was to remove fertilizer subsidies and as a result
we have witnessed unprecedented increase in fertilizer price. At the same time there was
increased prevalence of monetization and market dependence. As a result purchased input as
a percentage of total cost increased from 26% to 72% for all classesduring the decades of
neoliberal reform (Table 8). The increase was phenomenal in the backward region from
8.84% to 70% in comparison to the advanced (from 33% to 73%), which marks the increased
dependence on market in the backward region. The interesting aspect is that in spite of this
steep increase in the purchased inputs, the total inputs declined drastically both in per holding
and per acre terms in the backward region. The decline in total cost in the backward region is
a reflection of decline in total capital investment as a result of growing market dependence
and enhanced cost of purchased inputs. Particularly, there was a drastic decline of livestock
maintenance cost from 81% to 30% during the decade of neoliberal reform in the backward
region. During the decade of neoliberal reform the backward region witnessed the trend
towards more capistalist development side by side the advanced region. The most important
feature was that all classes uniformly performed in the increase in purchased inputs and a
decline in the livestock maintenance. The farmsize criterion again failed to register the
unequal extent of inputs purchased by the different categories of peasant.
27
Table 8: Distribution of Purchased and Total Cost by Economic Classes and Acreage Groups Percentage of Total Cost Chemical Livestock Purchased Purchased Inputs Total Inputs Fertilizer Maintenance Input Per Hold. Per Acre Per Hold. Per AcreClass/Group Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1ALL REGION Landless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poor Peasant16.6
126.6
855.1
631.9
4 18.7074.6
9 632.78 1682.75 787.742435.7
4 3384.34 2253.034213.1
2
Small Peasant13.6
932.4
261.9
321.5
5 16.5173.1
0 1502.57 4662.57 581.482405.2
1 9100.40 6378.453521.7
6
Middle Peasant 9.9033.6
270.5
714.9
7 14.7866.5
0 1703.21 7016.37 506.153141.1
6 11521.2710551.6
43423.8
5
Rich Peasant23.0
635.7
049.3
410.0
0 28.3271.3
3 7014.7415094.7
41340.2
14754.9
3 24770.6321161.0
54732.5
7
Landlord28.6
334.6
735.1
214.3
3 36.5674.6
3 8211.9411414.7
92028.9
74149.3
6 22460.8015295.6
05549.5
0
Total21.1
134.0
249.8
815.0
9 26.4672.3
9 2946.58 6551.251174.4
73675.9
6 11134.57 9049.984438.1
0ADVANCED REGION Landless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poor Peasant25.4
226.8
233.1
532.8
1 28.7778.4
8 953.82 2369.902188.1
18124.0
6 3315.51 3019.737605.9
7
Small Peasant28.4
939.0
830.6
012.9
2 34.3674.7
4 3976.54 8262.253271.8
46316.7
0 11572.7711055.1
09521.9
0
Middle Peasant23.7
339.2
833.6
5 7.22 27.4564.8
7 2568.0011064.6
32377.7
86125.7
4 9356.0017057.2
88662.9
6
Rich Peasant31.6
937.4
928.9
0 7.63 39.7272.0
0 8646.2824652.5
32553.0
38249.5
9 21770.1734241.8
26428.2
0
Landlord33.1
736.3
925.4
510.7
5 42.5474.7
810852.3
614279.8
83033.7
67488.9
8 25512.4019095.7
77131.9
5
Total31.0
936.6
328.1
011.0
6 38.8673.0
0 4849.50 9978.802796.2
77574.3
0 12479.8313670.3
17196.0
0BACKWARD REGION Landless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poor Peasant 3.9026.3
886.9
024.4
0 4.1866.9
8 145.69 995.59 106.83 913.38 3488.78 1486.332558.1
4
Small Peasant 4.0825.4
982.2
630.5
3 4.9271.4
0 393.55 3162.70 123.081436.7
8 7992.10 4429.852499.4
2
Middle Peasant 7.0821.5
778.0
931.5
0 12.2069.9
7 1475.63 4072.18 371.991600.3
6 12091.08 5820.273048.0
4
Rich Peasant10.8
622.1
978.2
527.8
3 12.1966.3
5 3751.67 3625.40 420.171066.9
2 30771.56 5464.133446.2
9
Landlord 5.6724.7
184.1
434.9
9 6.2773.7
5 877.44 5243.85 163.911147.6
4 13984.12 7110.622612.2
3
Total 6.9324.1
180.8
530.3
6 8.8470.0
9 853.37 2780.95 253.841212.5
9 9654.77 3967.612871.8
2ALL REGION 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.01 2.522.1
631.7
042.6
617.9
5 27.2475.5
9 1698.82 4730.381587.2
54714.3
6 6236.54 6257.705826.9
7
2.5 516.7
135.3
355.7
910.9
0 21.7069.2
3 3179.4211881.2
6 885.153268.4
2 14653.9917163.2
14079.6
8
5 1023.8
137.4
447.6
212.1
3 30.5168.4
6 8821.9020942.0
71222.7
62922.3
3 28911.7130590.3
24007.3
0
10 1532.5
939.5
441.3
334.0
9 40.5583.6
018273.0
014270.0
01419.8
1 951.97 45067.9817070.0
03501.7
9
15 & Abv12.5
8 0.0076.9
4 0.00 14.35 0.0014903.5
0 0.00 499.03 0.00 103861.13 0.003477.6
9
28
Total21.1
134.0
249.8
814.9
3 26.4672.3
9 2946.58 6551.251174.4
73675.9
9 11134.57 9049.984438.1
0ADVANCED REGION 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.01 2.528.3
433.9
628.9
714.0
4 34.5176.7
7 2660.79 7266.913239.0
99744.4
4 7709.81 9465.719385.4
6
2.5 527.3
638.2
231.4
3 7.01 34.1669.4
7 7069.2320462.8
62134.7
36019.7
5 20694.9229455.9
06249.3
4
5 1035.5
040.7
124.5
8 8.42 46.0168.7
921205.6
345967.0
03050.6
26101.2
7 46091.3866818.9
06630.6
6
10 1541.8
5 0.0026.6
3 0.00 52.25 0.0026857.5
0 0.002170.3
0 0.00 51406.00 0.004154.0
2 15 & Abv 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total31.0
936.6
328.1
010.8
6 38.8673.0
0 4849.50 9978.802796.2
77574.3
0 12479.8313670.3
17196.0
0BACKWARD REGION 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.01 2.5 5.0623.1
780.5
432.7
4 7.1171.1
4 290.21 1950.61 202.041517.1
0 4079.26 2742.062839.8
6
2.5 5 5.6121.3
781.1
529.6
7 8.7368.0
4 980.83 3871.77 261.521004.2
6 11239.55 5690.032996.8
7
5 10 5.7325.8
183.2
425.2
7 6.5567.2
8 1201.15 7039.33 162.831011.1
2 18339.6110463.3
32486.0
8
10 15 3.2139.5
488.0
134.0
9 3.4183.6
0 1104.0014270.0
0 79.65 951.97 32391.9317070.0
02337.0
8
15 & Abv12.5
8 0.0076.9
4 0.00 14.35 0.0014903.5
0 0.00 499.03 0.00 103861.13 0.003477.6
9
Total 6.9324.1
180.8
530.3
6 8.8470.0
9 853.37 2780.95 253.841212.6
1 9654.77 3967.612871.8
2
Note: Pd1 = 199394, Pd2 = 200405
Table 9: Distribution of Institutional and Noninstitutional Credit by Economic Classes and Acreage Groups Total Institutional Total Noninstitutional Total Inst + Noninst
Classes/Groups PerHolding(Rs) PerAcre(Rs)
Percentage PerHolding(Rs) PerAcre(Rs)
Percentage PerHolding(Rs) PerAcre(Rs)
All Region Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1Landless 2030 1246 0 0 78 26 567 3509 0 0 22 74 2597 4755 0Poor Peasant 1390 1515 1731 2192 41 31 2031 3402 2528 4924 59 69 3421 4917 4259 7117Small Peasant 2744 1903 1062 982 60 34 1851 3643 716 1879 40 66 4595 5546 1778 2861Middle Peasant 1313 2263 390 1013 32 30 2764 5291 821 2369 68 70 4077 7554 1212 3382Rich Peasant 2519 6612 481 2083 28 57 6320 4952 1207 1560 72 43 8838 11564 1689 3643Landlord 3224 3717 796 1351 29 23 7928 12362 1959 4494 71 77 11151 16080 2755 5845 Total 2125 2860 847 1605 38 34 3515 5612 1401 3149 62 66 5640 8471 2248 4753Advanced Region Landless 3800 1200 0 0 91 23 380 4096 0 0 9 77 4180 5296 0Poor Peasant 1715 1758 3934 6026 40 27 2603 4767 5971 16342 60 73 4318 6525 9905 22368Small Peasant 2149 3600 1768 2752 35 42 3946 5040 3247 3853 65 58 6095 8640 5015 6606Middle Peasant 893 3375 827 1869 13 25 5920 10000 5481 5536 87 75 6813 13375 6309 7405Rich Peasant 3611 10483 1066 3508 30 71 8533 4240 2520 1419 70 29 12144 14724 3586 4927Landlord 4064 4418 1136 2317 30 25 9548 12930 2669 6781 70 75 13612 17348 3805 9098 Total 2668 4092 1538 3106 33 37 5360 7097 3091 5387 67 63 8028 11189 4629 8493Backward Region Landless 260 1500 0 0 26 84 754 280 0 0 74 16 1014 1780 0Poor Peasant 898 1271 659 1166 44 38 1163 2037 853 1869 56 62 2061 3308 1512 3035
29
Small Peasant 3010 1196 941 543 77 28 912 3061 285 1390 23 72 3922 4257 1227 1934Middle Peasant 1424 1455 359 572 42 44 1934 1865 487 733 58 56 3357 3320 846 1305Rich Peasant 333 1967 37 579 15 25 1892 5807 212 1709 85 75 2226 7773 249 2288Landlord 889 2208 166 483 21 17 3427 11139 640 2438 79 83 4316 13347 806 2921 Total 1527 1504 454 656 51 27 1486 3977 442 1734 49 73 3013 5481 896 2390All Region 0.00 2030 1246 0 0 78 26 567 3509 0 0 22 74 2597 4755 0 0.01 2.5 1569 2483 1466 2474 32 36 3387 4442 3164 4427 68 64 4956 6924 4630 6901 2.5 5 2022 2259 563 621 30 18 4712 10045 1312 2763 70 82 6734 12304 1875 3385 5 10 5833 9929 809 1385 66 53 3044 8707 422 1215 34 47 8877 18636 1230 2600 10 15 4667 0 363 0 34 0 9033 40000 702 2668 66 100 13700 40000 1064 2668 15 & Abv 0 0 0 0 0 0 2250 0 75 0 100 0 2250 0 75 Total 2125 2860 847 1605 38 34 3515 5612 1401 3149 62 66 5640 8471 2248 4753Advanced Region 0.00 3800 1200 0 0 91 23 380 4096 0 0 9 77 4180 5296 0 0.01 2.5 1986 3524 2418 4726 29 35 4827 6541 5876 8771 71 65 2027 10065 2468 13496 2.5 5 1315 2786 397 819 10 17 11473 13825 3465 4067 90 83 9115 16611 2753 4887
5 101056
3 23200 1520 3079 71 86 4250 3760 611 499 29 14 2350 26960 338 3578 10 15 5000 0 404 0 53 0 4400 0 356 0 47 0 0 0 0 15 & Abv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Total 2668 4092 1538 3106 33 37 5360 7097 3091 5387 67 63 8028 11189 4629 8493Backward Region 0.00 260 1500 0 0 26 84 754 280 0 0 74 16 1014 1780 0 0.01 2.5 959 1341 668 1043 43 39 1278 2141 890 1665 57 61 2237 3482 1558 2709 2.5 5 2422 1767 646 458 73 21 890 6517 237 1690 27 79 3312 8284 883 2149 5 10 2923 2556 396 367 56 18 2302 11456 312 1645 44 82 5225 14011 708 2013 10 15 4000 0 289 0 18 0 18300 40000 1320 2668 82 100 22300 40000 1609 2668 15 & Abv 0 0 0 0 0 0 2250 0 75 0 100 0 2250 0 75 Total 1527 1504 454 656 51 27 1486 3977 442 1734 49 73 3013 5481 896 2390
The above data must be linked in turn to the availability and source of agricultural credit as
shown in Table 9. That noninstitutional credit increased from 62% to 66% of borrowing over
the decade of neoliberal reform underlines the degree to which moneylenders and traders
tightened their domination over agricultural production in West Bengal. By contrast,
institutional credit had been more and more insignificant, owing to the state withdrawal
policy of reform. The impact was disastrous for the backward region. Earlier this region was
the big beneficiary of the IRDP policies that contributed to the ratio of institutional credit was
30
as high as 51% in 199394. Over the decade the percentage drastically declined to 27. There
was a broadly negative association between ascending class status and the proportion of
institutional credit received during 199394 which has benn vanished in 200405. Rather the
association became positive after a decade. Accordingly in 199394 the landless class had
the highest access to this source of borrowing (78 per cent), while the rich peasant had the
lowest (around 28%). However, over the decade of neoliberal reform the corresponding
percentages were 26% and 23%. Both the regions also broadly follow this transformation,
though it was much sharp in the advanced region. The farm size wise distribution showed that
advanced and combined region strictly follow this trend.
CROPPING PATTERNS OUTPUT AND MARKETED SURPLUS
In terms of aggregate sown area and yield in the sample villages, paddy grown in different
seasons (aman and boro) constitutes the main crop in each region, occupying some 73% and
61% of the gross output in 199394 and 200405 respectively. Although a substantial
difference exists between the two regions in terms of the overall share of paddy cultivated – it
accounts for nearly ninety per cent of total output in the backward region in both years,
compared with only 56%(199394) and 41% (200405) in the advanced one. When output per
holding and per acre is considered, this difference is not so acute. In this connection is should
be noted that evidence of increased output in a backward region is not specific to our village
level findings: other economically backward areas of West Bengal, such as Purulia, registered
a very high level growth rate during the past [Saha and Swaminathan, 1994; Sen and
Sengupta, 1995]. The relatively high level of production in our sample villages in Bankura
district even by the poorer categories of farmer was due mainly to the expansion both of
31
irrigation facilities and thus also of boro cultivation, an effect again of the land reforms
carried out in West Bengal.
In overall terms, average per holding output is positively associated with ascending
class status up to the rich peasant category, but declines for the landlord group for both in
199394 and 200405 (Table 10). Because of higher cropping intensity on labour hiring
farms, however, output per acre sown shows a less positive variation with ascending class
status than output per acre operated. Accordingly, those units which purchase labourpower
have a significantly higher yield than holdings belonging to pettycommodity producers or
sellers of labourpower. Up to the ten acre limit, farm size is inversely related to yield in
199394 (defined as output per acre operated as well as sown), but units of ten acres and
above possess a high value output. However, in 200405 no such inverse relationship was
found. In fact there was no clear tendency. Compared with holdings owned/operated by
sellers of labourpower and petty commodity producers, therefore, those owned/operated by
labourpurchasing categories register nearly double the yield level in both the year.
TABLE 11 DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRODUCT MARKETED:ALL REGION Food Potato Oilseed Other % Mktd To Total % Mktd To Total % Mktd To Total % Mktd Class/Group Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1 Pd2 Pd1Landless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Poor Peasant 14.50 3.32 76.34 87.77 9.16 5.89 0.00Small Peasant 45.58 22.75 45.21 75.55 8.95 1.70 0.26Middle Peasant 74.79 23.54 21.57 73.79 3.33 2.67 0.31
32
Rich Peasant 77.29 35.79 19.35 59.36 2.91 4.78 0.45Landlord 43.51 34.62 49.42 63.73 7.07 1.65 0.00 Total 61.98 31.82 32.82 64.77 4.93 3.26 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.5 24.87 12.54 65.45 84.06 9.43 3.04 0.24 2.5 5 52.53 34.97 42.87 61.43 4.60 3.61 0.00 5 10 50.02 56.52 42.69 39.98 6.73 3.50 0.55 10 15 62.65 100.00 29.44 0.00 6.97 0.00 0.94 15 & Abv 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 61.98 31.82 32.82 64.77 4.93 3.26 0.28 ADVANCED REGIONLandless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Poor Peasant 10.17 0.00 80.21 90.79 9.62 6.10 0.00Small Peasant 18.41 7.50 69.02 90.70 12.56 1.80 0.00Middle Peasant 5.38 12.19 87.19 84.75 7.42 3.06 0.00Rich Peasant 39.45 32.31 51.84 62.65 7.78 5.04 0.93Landlord 43.02 24.05 49.85 74.03 7.13 1.92 0.00 Total 36.77 24.57 54.92 71.66 8.00 3.62 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.5 20.86 10.71 69.43 85.87 9.71 3.12 0.00 2.5 5 36.48 30.39 57.37 65.75 6.16 3.86 0.00 5 10 41.16 45.84 50.81 49.79 7.57 4.36 0.45 10 15 62.65 0.00 29.44 0.00 6.97 0.00 0.94 15 & Abv 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 36.77 24.57 54.92 71.66 8.00 3.62 0.30 BACKWARD REGIONLandless 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Poor Peasant 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Small Peasant 97.16 52.92 0.00 45.58 2.07 1.50 0.76Middle Peasant 97.60 100.00 0.00 0.00 1.98 0.00 0.41Rich Peasant 99.83 98.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17Landlord 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 99.40 90.61 0.00 8.81 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.5 90.93 50.12 0.00 46.80 4.81 1.54 4.26 2.5 5 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5 10 96.63 100.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 0.00 1.07 10 15 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15 & Abv 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total 99.40 90.61 0.00 8.81 0.37 0.29 0.24__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
A crucial indicator of the extent to which agriculture is commercialized, marketed surplus is
linked to the purchase both of inputs and of manufactured consumption goods. Table 11 show
marketed product per acre and per holding for different crops, and also the percentage of the
latter marketed by each class. Up to the rich peasant category, total output sold per holding
33
and per acre for both period increases with economic class, after which it declines. The
exceptions in 199394are the cash crops (potatoes, oilseed), which register a decline from the
small to the middle peasant categories. In 199394 the percentage of foodcrops marketed
increase by ascending size groups, while the main cash crop (potatoes) declines the
exception being the landlordclass. However, in 200405 potato also followed the same
tendency as paddy. Though oilseed maintained some fluctuations. This is explained with the
fact that over the decade of neoliberal reform the upper classes has been able to take control
of product marketed. Higher the ascending classes, greater is the control over product
marketed.
A regional comparison of marketed surplus confirms that producers in the advanced
area sell both cash crops and foodcrops, whereas only the latter are sold in the backward area.
With regard to the respective share of each class/category in the total marketed surplus, there
is a high degree of concentration among economic classes: for both regions, separately and
combined, therefore, the top two economic classes account about eighty percent of the total
product sold for both time periods. This domination is relatively less in the backward region
(66%) in 200405. This element of concentration is not reflected for both periods when farm
size is considered, the maximum concentration happened for the size group 0.01 – 2.5 acres.
CONCLUSION
Based on surveys conducted in 199394 and 200405 on same set of households, this study
shows nature of the differentiated economy of West Bengal against the backdrop of
34
neoliberal reform in India since 1991. The major findings of this study is that during the
decade of neoliberal reform, the interventionist economy eroded in rural West Bengal and
peasant differentiation was going on.
West Bengal is an eastern regional state of India. It experienced land reform under Left
centrist government during late sixties and under Left Front govt since 1977. The land reform
programme is famous as ‘Operation Barga’. Also West Bengal experienced successful
implementation of grass root level local selfgovenance (Panchayat Raj) during this regime.
As a result WB witnessed highest agricultural growth and significant level of poverty
reduction during eighties (SahaSwaminathan 1994, SenSengupta 1995). Since 1991
agricultural growth declined and West Bengal moved in reverse gear (Bhattacharyya and
Bhattacharyya 2007). Since 1991 govt of India implemented IMF directed market economic
reform reflected in: reduction of subsidy in food, fertilizer and credit; trade liberalization and
a move from foodgrain to export oriented agriculture.; promotion of microcredit institution,
agribusiness and corporate retail chain. Since early nineties Indian agriculture showed worst
performance after independence and its growth was below the population growth rate. The
inequality and poverty also significant. West Bengal had to accept neoliberal reform as a state
in India. Land inequality in West Bengal is less than India as a whole because of the radical
reform in late sixties. Land inequality reduced in WB during eighties due to operation barga,
while the nonland inequality increased. During nineties land inequality increased again
owing to neoliberal reform though land reform never stopped in WB (Bhattacharyya and
Bhattacharyya 2007).
35
This paper is written in the context of long debate between Marxism and Populism. Started
from 19th Century Russia by Narodniks that Russian peasantry was a homogeneous /
unddifferentiated entity. Any kind of capitalist development would be self defeating as it
would impoverish the peasantry and the home market for capitalism would collapse. Lenin
(1899): Capitalism had already developed and brought differentiation of peasantry. The latter
created home market for Capitalism. Kautsky (1899) supported Lenin’s argument. There
was a revival of Populism in 1920s Russia in the hands of Chayanov (1966) who proposed
demographic and cyclic differentiation among peasant community. This populist view was
also adopted by Sen (1966) who showed family Labour farms are more efficient visàvis
Capitalist Farm and this efficiency was the major explanation behind the inverse relationship
between Farm Size and Productivity. GeogescuRogen (1960) & Lipton (1977, 2004)
supported this point. According to the Marxist critiques Sen’s argument is fallacious based on
identical production function and coexistence of Family Farms and Capitalist Farms.
(Patnaik 1979). The socalled family labour farms are in reality the impoverished agricultural
labourer with tiny land. (Patnaik 1979, Bhattacharyya 2001). The socalled ‘efficiency’ is their
desperation and vulnerability. Thus ‘efficiency’ measured in output per unit of labour gives
opposite result.
The neopopulism, is however, is a part of neoliberalist views. World Bank adopts the
policy of participation of a homogenous/ undifferentiated group of depoliticized people in an
inactive state. (WDR 2001, Bhattacharyya 2007). This participation is important to eradicate
poverty (WDR 2001). Following this model nationalized rural banking was replaced by
Microfinance institutions. PDS system / Mandis were replaced by Agribusiness and
Corporate Retail Chain.
36
As mentioned before this study is based on two phases of survey 199394 and 200405 on
same set of households. Two blocks of Bankura district, West Bengal chosen. Kotulpur as
the advanced and Hirbandh as the backward one. 210 households were surveyed in villages
purposively selected. 110 households surveyed from the advanced and 100 from backward.
Households are classified on the basis of usual acreage group and Patnaik’s Ecriteria. The
question is that why should we adopt a second criteria when NSSO has prescribed a
particular one. NSSO gives classification on the basis of acreage group. These are marginal
peasant: 0.012.5 acres, small peasant: 2.55 acres, semimedium: 510 acres, medium: 1025
acres, large: 25 and above. However, according to NSSO 48th round there is no holdings
above 10 acres in West Bengal since 1991. We have also seen a huge concentration of
households in 0.012.5 acres. However, this does not indicate a halt of differentiation. Land
under ownership or operation is no more an indicator of household’s economic strength in
West Bengal. NSSO data showed that inequality in the basic means of production in West
Bengal shifted from land to nonland asset. We need a second criterion for classification side
by side acreage groups. Patnaik’s Ecriteria is helpful here. Marxian class criteria defined as
(a) resource endowment, (b) nature of labour use, (c ) Production of a retained surplus. The
vector of all three criteria is impossible to measure empirically. We use second one as the
empirical approximation.
This study gets important findings regarding household structure and participation. Landness
increased and distress selling of land has happened. After losing job the households are
compelled to move to nonremunerative non farm jobs; the phenomena which is called
37
disguised proletarianization (Murray 2006, Kay 2008). Though the tendency is not
widespread. Households belong to 02.5 acres increased from 138 to 153 during decade.
Partly due to land reform and partly due to inheritance rule. This is reflected in swelling of
landlord households from 15 to 27 and rich peasant from 12 to 16 during the decade. In spite
of land loss, these labour hiring classes maintained the erstwhile labour process.
This study made important findings on participation of households. In Chayanov, ascending
farm size is inversely related to well being. In contradiction to this in our study the ascending
class / size status is related to lower participation rate, and therefore, greater well being. It is
interesting to note that participation rate increased for upper classes during neoliberal
reforms. This means the well being of higher peasant classes have also been curbed during
neoliberal reforms. The poor classes / lower size groups are predominantly agricultural
labour reflected in lower hired in and higher hired out land and vice versa. The socalled
family labour farms do not belong to selfsufficient ‘peasant economy’.
Looking into land structure the average area declined during decade. Declining area with
rising cost gives a question on farm viability in India (Naryanmoorthy 2007). Tenancy as an
institution declined in West Bengal following Operation Barga (Bhattacharyya 2007). This
goes against the hypothesis that through oepration barga Left Front gave tenancy a permanent
status, which is a precapitalist institution. (Khasnabis 1981, Rudra 1981). A big decline of
irrigated area particularly in the backward region in WB owing to neoliberal policy of state
withdrawal may give birth to ‘ultra Left terrorism’. The households belong to selfemployed
declined, exploited classes remained same and that for exploiter increased. The control of
38
land by exploiter classes increased in liberalization period (from around 50 to 60 %). The
selfemployed are major land loser. The condition of exploited remains more or less
unchanged who continue to own around 11 12% of total land area. The percentage of
irrigated land increased for the exploiter increased from 60 to 70%. The same for other
classes declined. Let us look at the differentiated nonland asset market, market for capital
investment and credit. The exploiter classes hold 60% of asset while the exploited classes are
around 12%. The cost of production increased largely for the exploiter and selfemployed
classes, declined for exploited. For exploiter classes the access to institutional credit jumped
to a large extent from 40 to 62 % and the same declined for the rest.
The output and product marketed showed extreme kind of differentiation. Particularly the
product marketed showed a huge inequality, where the exploiter classes occupy 78% and the
exploited 4%. The pattern of inequality remains same between pre and post liberalization
which reminds us HarrissWhite’s note that deregulated markets may become more or less
imperfect than regulated market (HarrissWhite 1996). Left Front preoccupied with the
reforms in the structures of production, and nothing for market (HarrissWhite 2008). No
inverse relationship between farm size / economic class and productivity is found. This
thoroughly refutes populist proposition of Chayanov and Sen.
39
NOTES
1. West Bengal economy may be characterised as a small farm economy where average operated area is much less than that at the national level. This peasant economy experienced an overall rate of agricultural output growth of 1.74 per cent per annum during the period 19491980 that was below the rates of rural (2.31 per cent) and total population (2.42 per cent) increase in the same period [Boyce, 1984]. Using an index number series on aggregate agricultural production, Saha and Swaminathan [1994] claimed that ‘the exponential growth rate of all West Bengal for the period 198182 to 199091 was an impressive 6.4 per cent per annum. Though some doubt has been cast regarding the validity of official data [Dattaray, 1994] from which this conclusion was derived, no effective challenge was made against the findings about the high growth performance of West Bengal. Sen and Sengupta [1995], by contrast, used an alternative source of data (Comprehensive Cost of Production Studies by the Central Government, Ministry of Agriculture), and reaffirmed a significant trendbreak in the growth rate during the eighties.
2. When compared with all the other Indian states, the magnitude of the decline in the percentage of people living below the poverty line was largest in West Bengal. On the basis of the following indicators, it can be argued that the process of immiserisation has actually been stopped in West Bengal. (i) The percentage of male and female agricultural labour population to main workers marked an increase for India, but experienced a decline for West Bengal during 198191 (Census of India 1981 and 1991). (ii) casualisation of rural workers, which increased steadily for all India from 197273 to 1983, fell in West Bengal during 198788 [Chandrasekhar, 1993]. (iii) It is evident from NSSO Surveys that, between 1983 and 198788, unemployment rates of all kinds (Usual Status Unemployment Rate, Current Weekly Status Unemployment Rate and Current Daily Status Unemployment Rate, etc.) for male workers declined in West Bengal, while they rose on an AllIndia basis [Chandrasekhar, 1993]. (iv) Agricultural wages tripled in West Bengal from 197778 to 198788, and the real wage increase in West Bengal was also among the highest in India [Sen and Sengupta, 1995]. (v) The AllIndia percentage of agricultural labour households with land declined during 197778 to 1983, but increased in West Bengal over the same period [Government of India, Ministry of Labour, 1991].
3. It may be noted that a radical redistribution of land did take place immediately after the 1917 October Revolution. In Lenin’s analysis, however, this simply laid the basis for a democratic and widebased process of peasant class differentiation, rather than the narrowly based process of landlord oppression [Lenin, 1970: 9798].
4. Topographically the district forms an intermediate tract lying between rice producing alluvial plains of Bengal to the east and Chotanagpur plateau on the West. Compared to other districts in West Bengal, it represents a very high degree of regional variation. The entire subdivision of Bishnupur and also some of the eastern thanas of Sadar subdivision, are agriculturally productive, and not materially different from the flat plains in the adjoining districts of Burdwan and Hoogly. But the west and north west of the district are part of the agriculturally nonfertile Chotanagpur plateau, where the terrain consists of undulating lateritic ridges covered with sparse forest. There is also a variation in the distribution of
40
population between the eastern and the western part of Bankura district: the population density is much higher in the eastern part than in the west. While the Bengali Hindu population is predominant in the eastern plain, the western thanas contain a large proportion of tribal (mainly Santal) population. Moreover, the literacy rate is much higher in the former than in the latter.
5. It is a common phenomenon that a district nearer to the state capital (particularly when the state capital is a metropolitan city) will have a higher level of economic development. Proximity to the state capital also draws the attention of the policy makers, so much so that instead of being located in distant, faroff districts the new branch offices of the Gramin Bank and the fresh inflow of agricultural credit therefrom, are actually disbursed in the districts closest to the cities. This implies that any survey conducted in districts nearer to a state capital may give a biased and overoptimistic view of the credit distribution in the state. On the other hand, Bankura is not a bordering district of West Bengal, like West Dinajpur, Murshidabad or Nadia. Generally there is alleged to be a continuous and illicit international flow of produce and labour in regions close to the border, as a result of which the survey population may also undergo constant change.
6. Two sample blocks were selected, on the basis of their levels of economic development. One block was Kotulpur, which seemed to be the most advanced and most prosperous in the district; the other was Khatra2, the most backward. The following developmental variables were used in order to identify blocks with high and low level of development: percentage of irrigated area to total cultivated area; percentage of villages having one or more educational institutions; percentage of rural population served by medical amenities; percentage of rural population served by a pukka road; percentage of rural population served by power supply; percentage of cultivated area to total area; and the percentage of rural population served by a local market or hat.
7. NSSO gives classification on the basis of acreage group. These are marginal peasant: 0.012.5 acres, small peasant: 2.55 acres, semimedium: 510 acres, medium: 1025 acres, large 25 acres and above. 8. The Bangopalpur Chatanibad Jouthakhamar is a large cooperative farm formed in 1984 with 84 poor households belonging to a scheduled tribe and/or a scheduled caste. This cooperative was formed after the acquisition by the state of an unfragmented 35 acres of ceiling surplus land from erstwhile zamindars. The cooperative farm has in its possession nine wells, one tractor, two pump sets, three oxen, poultry, 4 ponds used for fish production; about 27 acres of land have been brought under cultivation: foodcrops cultivated in 1993/94 amounted to 600 quintals. One of the main conditions governing cooperative production is that a quarter of all output has to be deposited in the community store on the farm, for use partly as seed and partly for contingencies like drought. A portion of what is produced by the cooperative is sold in order to purchase additional inputs for or enhance the capital base of the unit.
9. Before the Left Front Government came to power, all the tenancy contracts were verbal ones. It was consequently impossible for a poor peasant to establish his identity as a tenant,
41
let alone claim other legal rights that a tenant is supposed to have. In addition to such disadvantages, a poor peasant was unable to meet the legal expenses that would be incurred in the event of a dispute with the landlord. Given this background, the Left Front’s Operation Barga was revolutionary in two respects. First, every tenant now has a barga certificate, as a result of which he cannot be evicted, or deprived of legal rights guaranteed under the constitution. Second, in the event of a dispute with the owner, all legal costs of going to court are now borne by the landlord. In this way, Operation Barga has swung the balance of power where land is concerned firmly in the direction of tenants. Under the existing legislative situation, therefore, a landlord can expect to obtain from leased out land nothing more than a legally stipulated share; the only way to change this is through a lengthy and costly legal confrontation. This is the main reason why the owners of land in rural West Bengal have stopped leasing out land; furthermore, owners of sublet land frequently dispose of this at a nominal amount to the existing tenant. All these factors have led to descriptions of tenancy as a dying institution.
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Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1987, ‘The Principal and Agent (ii)’ in John Eatwell et. al (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Volume 3, London: Macmillan
World Bank 2001, World Development Report 2000/2001, Washington, DC: World Bank.
APPENDIX 1PATNAIK’S ECRITERION
The Marxist concept of class differentiation is simply stated: under a regime of commodity production, rich peasants increasingly employ the labour of others, thereby appropriating surplus that contributes in turn to the accumulation process. The latter development is itself premised on the sale of labourpower by poor peasants who, required to work for others, are thereby increasingly subjected to exploitation. The selfemployed petty commodity producers, the middle peasants of Lenin, are in a vulnerable position. While a few of them succeed in transforming themselves into rich peasants, the majority are always under the constant threat of ‘depeasantization’, or being pushed down into the ranks of the semiproletariat. At the top end of the rural class structure, and more or less distinct from the peasantry, stands the landlord, defined by ‘possession of substantial means of production and noninvolvement in any manual labour, living entirely by appropriating surplus labour of others’. At the bottom end is the landless labourer who, since he posses no means of production, is obliged to live entirely by selling his labourpower.
The labourexploitation index seeks to give an empirical approximation to the analytical concept of the class status of the household. The latter is determined by the extent of the use of outside labour, or the degree to which the peasant family works for others, relative to selfemployment on its own holdings. Under certain simplifying assumptions, the labourexploitation index identifies the extent to which surplus labour is appropriated from the workers concerned. E = X/Y = {(HiHo) + (LoLi)}/F where Hi = Labourdays hired on the operational holding of the household Ho = Family labour days hired out to others
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Li = Labour days worked on leased in land (whether by family or hired labour) Lo = Labour days similarly worked on land leased out by the household F = Labour days worked by household workers on the operational holding.
In Patnaik’s [1988: 305] words: ‘The index is a ratio, or a pure number, which can have positive or negative values depending on whether the household is a net employer of outside labour or is itself on balance working for others (as labourer or tenant). The range of values of E is from plus infinity to minus infinity, for at the two poles of the rural class structure, there will be diametrically opposite types of households for whom F will be zero or near zero: first, the big landlords have such a large resource endowment that they perform no manual labour themselves, but rely entirely on employing others' labour; and the landless labourers, with zero resource endowment, hence zero selfemployment, who are entirely dependent on working for others’.
Within the ranks of the peasantry, class is identified in the following terms: the degree to which work is done for oneself (selfemployment on holdings owned/controlled) in relation to that undertaken for others (employed on holdings owned/controlled by others) or, conversely, that undertaken by others for oneself (the employment of others on one’s own holdings). For this purpose, certain limits are set upon the values of the Eratio, which are given in the following Table. All subsequent use of class categories in this paper refer to the definitions given in TableA1, based on Patnaik [1976, 1987].
TABLE – A.1
The following limits are specified to the value of E in order to classify households into a set of mutually exclusive and allexhaustive categories (subcategories not specified here are not ruled out).
Class Category Defining Characteristics Value ofE = X/ F
Reason
1. Landless labourers No selfemployment; working entirely for others
( E → − ∞ ) F = 0 X < 0 and large
2. Poor peasants (te Tenants and labourers
with smallholdings)
Working for others exceeds selfemployment
( E ≤ − 1)
F > 0 , X < 0, X ≥ F
3. Small peasants No employment of or working for others; self ( 0 ≥ E > − 1 )
F > 0 ,
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employment exceeds working for others
X ≤ 0 , X < F
4. Middle peasants Selfemployment predominates, combined with the employment of a small amount of others’ labour
( 1 > E > 0 ) F > 0 , X > 0 , X < F
5. Rich peasants Selfemployment equalled by the amount of labourpower purchased
( E ≥ 1 ) F > 0 , X > 0 , X ≥ F
6. Landlords No manual labour expended in the form of selfemployment; large amounts of outside labour employed
( E → ∞ ) F = 0 , X > 0, and large
Source: Patnaik [1987].
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