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Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate by David A. Baldwin Review by: James F. Keeley The International History Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 213-215 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106971 . Accessed: 29/09/2013 21:50 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The International History Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 205.133.226.104 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 21:50:56 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debateby David A. Baldwin

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Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate by David A. BaldwinReview by: James F. KeeleyThe International History Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), pp. 213-215Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40106971 .

Accessed: 29/09/2013 21:50

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The InternationalHistory Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 205.133.226.104 on Sun, 29 Sep 2013 21:50:56 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Reviews of Books 213

the Baltic states between 1990 and 1992, he brought to this post not only his

training as an historian but a deep interest in the area deriving from the Baltic German background of his family. His book defies easy categorization, being part history, part description of recent events, part evocation of the distinctive land- and town-scapes of the Baltic region, and part analysis of social and ethnic features of the modern Baltic states. Although its organization and structure are unsystematic, not to say eccentric, the book is a treasure-trove of

ideas, insights, oral history, and lucidly presented information on the

contemporary Baltic world. It is the first book to interest this reader at least in Baltic folklore and to offer a persuasive account of its significance.

Lieven offers several useful chapters on Baltic history in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including a chilling account of Soviet rule, entitled 'The Troglodyte International'. He also provides, for newcomers to the

subject, a reliable guide to recent events. The real strength of his book, however, lies in the fascinating and well-informed discussions of the different ethnic groups comprising the populations of the Baltic countries. Lieven is

right to avoid commenting from a monoethnic nationalist perspective (there are enough Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians to do that), but instead to

portray the ethnic complexity and richness of the eastern Baltic shore. From this point of view, the questions of citizenship and the human rights of

Russian-speakers do not seem as unproblematic as they are often portrayed by the Baits and their western sympathizers. However just and legally correct restitutionism may be, the establishment of long-term peace and security demands a degree of political imagination and generosity from the Baits to their colonial masters which, given their experience at the hands of the

Soviets, we have no right to expect. Lieven, with his deep understanding of Baltic nationalism, knows better than most how difficult this process will be. His book makes an indispensable contribution, not only to the analysis of past events, but also to the solution of current problems.

University of Bradford Thomas Lane

David A. Baldwin, ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Pp. xii, 377. $17.50 (us), paper.

This volume collects a number of key articles in the dispute over co-

operation and conflict between neo-liberals and neo-realists, including pieces by Stein, Lipson, Axelrod and Keohane, Grieco, Krasner, Milner, Snidal, Powell, and Mastanduno. An introduction by David Baldwin sets out some initial terms of the debate. The next four pieces, dating from the 1980s, give initial neo-liberal positions and Joseph Grieco's neo-realist counter-attack.

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214 TTze International History Review

Five additional pieces then review the debate (Milner) and examine the issue

particularly of relative versus absolute gains. The book closes not with the usual summary piece, but rather with reflections by Robert Keohane and

Joseph Grieco, representing the neo-liberal and neo-realist sides. There is also an extensive bibliography. Given that most of these pieces were earlier

published elsewhere, it is in Baldwin's introduction and the closing pieces by Keohane and Grieco that we have an opportunity to assess the results of the debate.

In his introduction, Baldwin notes the agreement over 'the nature and

purpose of social scientific inquiry' (that is, the general reliance on more or less detailed rational action models) and argues that this results 'in a more focused and productive debate'. The argument over relative versus absolute

gains dominates the later selections. It is interesting, however, that this debate seems to grow both more complex and conditional, and less conclusive. In

this, as in the other dimensions of the debate noted by Baldwin (the nature and consequences of anarchy, international co-operation, security and welfare as state goals, intentions versus capabilities, and institutions and regimes), one finds enough in common (permitting the debate to occur in such a focused

form) that the resulting arguments have an air of 'more or less' about them, but with little sense of how one would measure whether the extent of co-

operation in a given case is more or less than one should expect according to either school. Does this debate increasingly tend to be over whether cups are

half-empty or half-full? Rational action may serve as one common vehicle or

language for the debate, but it has not resolved it. The absence of pieces operating outside of such models is an interesting commentary on the

narrowing turn of the debate which, together with the failure to reach a resolution by these means, should serve as a warning.

Both Keohane and Grieco defend their ground in their closing chapters, with much dispute over details. Keohane, interestingly, tends to identify himself here as an 'institutionalist' attempting to bridge the gap between realist and liberal. The possibility that institutionalist approaches can do this is

intriguing, and may point to a profitable line of further development, but how much can neo-realists concede to the need to examine institutions without effectively conceding everything of importance? Another line of

possibility - increased attention to the effects of domestic politics - would also raise problems for neo-realists. Even more, it could suggest the need of a shift from the 'substantive' rationality assumed in the models to a more 'bounded' rationality. The limits of the former were noted by Herbert Simon in 1985 (American Political Science Review, lxxix, 293-304). Taken seriously, it could even broaden the argument to other approaches, such as those of the so-called 'reflectivist' camp.

By its nature, this collection is largely backward- and inward-looking. The

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Reviews of Books 215

former arises from the mere fact of being a collection largely of previously published material, and the latter particularly from the narrow methodological focus. In terms of leading to greater nuance and detail in the application of rational action models to international relations, the debate has had some benefits. The neo-liberals, however they might be challengeable on detail, are

forcing the neo-realists to become more nuanced and less absolute. In the

closing chapters, Keohane seems to yield a bit more and Grieco scores a number of specific points, yet it is clearly the neo-liberals setting the theoretical pace, and the neo-realists reacting in ways that qualify both their

opponents' position and their own.

Overall, this is a useful collection of significant pieces, but one is left with the feeling of a debate which, however highly developed in its own terms, is also very constricted.

University of Calgary James F. Keeley

David Armstrong. Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society. New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. vii, 328. $84.50 (cdn).

The idea of state sovereignty has long been a key feature of international law. In theory, states are viewed legally as 'persons' equal to each other and as

supreme within their own territory. In practice, sovereignty bestows a measure of authority to leaders who act in the name of the state and allows them access to international institutions. An important question for students of global politics is whether there is enough co-operation among states,

jealous of their relative autonomy, to make the world they populate resemble a society. In this book, David Armstrong answers a resounding yes.

The book is weak theoretically: it is intended to be a series of observations about the international consequences of revolution rather than a systematic approach to the problem. What the book does not contain, therefore, is a

straightforward line of reasoning about the relations between new revolution-

ary states and old established states in the international system. Yet the material in this book should be of great interest to students of international

politics who want to know more about the possible effects of global social norms on state behaviour.

Armstrong endeavours to show that an international society exists based on certain norms accepted widely by states. These norms, given legal weight in

1648 with the Westphalian settlement ending the Thirty Years War, revolve around the idea of sovereignty. To Armstrong, the peace of Westphalia represented a social contract: the signatories consented to common practices in the pursuit of their independence. This conception of a loose association of

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