Nepal Joint Government – Donor Evaluation of Basic … · Joint Government – Donor Evaluation of Basic and Primary ... Evaluation Nepal Joint Government – Donor Evaluation of

EvaluationNepal

Joint Government – Donor Evaluation ofBasic and Primary Education Programme II

2004/3

Evaluation

Nepal

Joint Government –

Donor Evaluation of

Basic and Primary

Education Programme II

in association with

Organisation Development Centre

Ref. No. 104.A.1.e.35

July 2004

© Ministry of Foreign AffairsJuly 2004

Production: Evaluation Department, Ministry of Foreign AffairsCover photo: Niels Eilschow Olesen: "Primary School in Damauli, Tanahun District"Graphic production: Phoenix-Print A/S, Aarhus, Denmark

ISBN (report): 87-7667-075-9e-ISBN (report): 87-7667-076-7ISSN: 1399-4972

This report can be obtained free of charge by contacting:

Danish State Information CentrePhone + 45 7010 1881http://danida.netboghandel.dk/

The report can also be downloaded through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ homepage www.um.dk or directly fromthe Evaluation Department’s homepage www.evaluation.dk

This report was prepared by independent consultants with no previous involvement in the activities mentioned.Responsibility for the content and presentation of findings and recommendations rests with the evaluation team.

The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Danish Ministry ofForeign Affairs, the recipient governments, or the implementing organisations.

The report is printed on Multi Fine and the cover is printed on Invercote.

Preface

In most donor countries there is an increasing demand for evaluating the joint fundingfacilities of international development assistance. At the same time Nepal is facingincreased public demand for information on the efficiency of the large-scale investmentsin promoting quality education.

Over the last ten years, development assistance is increasingly designed and implement-ed according to the sector wide support strategy facilitating new modalities and mecha-nisms for joint donor and government planning, management and funding of the devel-opment programmes. Hence, joint planning, management and funding invites for jointevaluation.

The joint evaluation was initiated at meetings in Kathmandu in May 2003 and duringthe following months the Terms of Reference were drafted, commented on, and finallyapproved in November 2003. Reference is made to Annex 1.

In December 2003, after international competitive bidding, three Steering Committeemembers representing Ministry of Education and Sports, Norway and Denmark met inCopenhagen and selected a consortium of COWI/Goss Gilroy/ODC to carry out theevaluation study. The direct costs of the study have been borne by Norway andDenmark.

The draft evaluation report was presented and discussed at a seminar in Kathmandu inearly June 2004. More than seventy participants took part in the seminar and before theconsultants departed from Nepal, a plan for the finalisation of the report was approvedby the Steering Committee on June 4th 2004.

The Steering Committee wishes to express its gratitude to the staff of the Ministry andits agencies, which have shown willingness to make substantial sacrifices in the midst oftheir own very hectic working days in order to supply the essential information andcomments to the Evaluation Team.

The Steering Committee finds that this joint evaluation has been a good example ofhow the ownership of the evaluation process can be shared between donors and partnercountry.

Mr. Ram Sarobar Dubey Mr. Lars ElleChairman of the Evaluation Steering Committee Evaluation DepartmentJoint Secretary Ministry of Foreign AffairsMinistry of Education and Sports Copenhagen Kathmandu

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Preface 3Abbreviations 7Glossary of Terms 9Executive Summary 11

Introduction 20

1 Country Context 231.1 Socio-Cultural & Economic Context 231.2 Political Context 241.3 Educational Context 24

2 Programme Profile 272.1 Goals & Objectives 272.2 Finances & Funding Arrangements 282.3 Management & Administrative Structures 282.4 Programme Components 292.5 Mid-Term Review & Adjustments 29

3 Evaluation Profile 313.1 Focus & Key Issues 313.2 Methodologies Employed 333.3 Methodologies: Challenges & Limitations 36

4 Achievement of Programme Objectives 394.1 Improving Access to Basic and Primary Education 394.2 Improving the Quality of Basic and Primary Education 474.3 Capacity Development 50

5 Programme Implementation 555.1 Planning & Design 555.2 Pilot Testing 575.3 Monitoring & Evaluation 605.4 Involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations 63

6 Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources 676.1 Achieving Transparency and Efficiency 676.2 Strengths and Weakness of Basket Funding 736.3 Direct Funding 75

7 Donor Coordination & Ownership 777.1 Donor Coordination 777.2 Ownership 83

8 Responding to the Insurgency 878.1 Impact on Basic & Primary Education 878.2 Responses to the Conflict 89

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Table of Contents

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9 Conclusions 919.1 The Effectiveness of BPEP II 919.2 Achievement of Programme Objectives 929.3 Programme Implementation 949.4 Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources 959.5 Donor Coordination & Ownership 979.6 Responding to the Insurgency 98

10 Recommendations – Going Forward 9910.1 Achievement of Programme Objectives 10010.2 Programme Implementation 10210.3 Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources 10310.4 Donor Coordination & Ownership 10310.5 Responding to the Insurgency 104

11 Comparison with Global Evaluation 107

Annexes

Annex 1 Evaluation Terms of Reference 109Annex 2 Documents Reviewed 115Annex 3 Key Informant Interviews 122Annex 4 Pilot Processes Reviewed 126Annex 5 Budget Planning Schedule 130Annex 6 Programme and Budget Authorisation Flowchart 132Annex 7 Flow of Funds Flowcharts 133

Map of Nepal Inside of back cover

Volume Two (Provided On Attached CD-ROM): District Case Study Reports

Case 1 JhapaCase 2 TaplejungCase 3 SindhupalchowkCase 4 TanahunCase 5 DhadingCase 6 SurkhetCase 7 Banke

Abbreviations

Abbreviations

ADB Asian Development Bank ANNISU(R) All Nepal National Independent Student Union (Revolutionary) APL Adaptable Programme LoanASIP Annual Strategic Implementation PlanAWPB Annual Work Programme and BudgetBPEDU Basic and Primary Education Development Unit BPEP Basic and Primary Education ProgrammeCAS Continuous Assessment CBO Community-Based OrganisationCDC Curriculum Development CentreCERID Research Centre for Educational Innovation and Development CIP Core Investment Programme DCA Development Credit AgreementDCP Donor Contact PointDCTO District Treasury Comptroller’s OfficeDDC District Development CommitteeDEO District Education OfficeDEP District Education Plan DKK Danish KronorDOE Department of EducationDTO District Treasury officeEC European CommunityECD Early Childhood DevelopmentEDC Education and Developmental Learning CentreEDSC Educational Development Service CentreEFA Education for AllEMIS Educational Management Information SystemESAT Education Sector Advisory TeamEU European UnionFACD Foreign Assistance Coordination DivisionFACS Foreign Assistance Coordination SectionFCGO Financial Comptroller General's OfficeGDP Gross Domestic ProductGE Gender EqualityGPI Gender Parity Index HMG/N His Majesty's Government/NepalHT Head TeacherIDA International Development AssociationIIEP International Institute of Educational Planning INGO International Non-Governmental OrganisationINSEC Informal Sector Service CentreJEBE Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic EducationJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyJLDG Joint Local Donor Group JRM Joint Donor Review MissionLSGA Local Self Governance ActMLD Ministry of Local Development

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MOES Ministry of Education and SportsMOF Ministry of FinanceMTR Mid-Term ReviewNCED National Centre for Education DevelopmentNEC National Education CommissionNER Net Enrolment RateNESP National Education System Plan NFE Non-Formal EducationNFEC Non-Formal Education CentreNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNIEPA National Institute of Educational Planning NPC National Planning Commission NPR Nepalese RupeeOECD/DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/

Development Assistance CommitteeOSP Out of School ProgrammePIP Project Implementation PlanPMIS Periodic Programme Management Information System PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PTA Parent Teacher Association PTTC Primary Teacher Training CentreRC Resource CentreRED Regional Education Directorate RP Resource PersonSA Special Accounts (basket fund)SEDU Secondary Education Development Units SIP School Improvement PlanSMC School Management CommitteeSOE Statement of Expenditure SPS Sector Programme SupportSPSD Sector Programme Support DocumentSS School Supervisor SWAp Sector Wide ApproachTA Technical AssistanceTOR Terms of ReferenceTSAG Technical Support Advisory GroupUSD United States DollarUNICEF United Nations Children's FundVDC Village Development CommitteeVEC Village Education CommitteeWB World Bank

1 USD = 71 NPR (30-06-04)1 USD = 5.9 DKK (30-06-04)

Abbreviations

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Glossary of Terms

Glossary of Terms

Basic education – The Jomtien Conference identified basic education as being the foun-dation for lifelong learning and human development and recognized that "the diversity,complexity, and changing nature of basic learning needs of children, youth and adultsnecessitates broadening and constantly redefining the scope of basic education"(Declaration 5).

Basic education project – A project is a grouping of activities that support one or morebasic education objectives, but which are limited in time and in scope (for example, targeted to one geographic area, addressing only one or two components of basic educa-tion, using only one strategy). A project is typically funded and/or implemented by oneexternal agency.

Basic education programme – A programme is a grouping of activities that support oneor more basic education objectives, but which are broader in scope than a project (forexample, covering all regions of a country, addressing several components of basic educa-tion, using multiple strategies). A programme is usually funded and/or implemented bymore than one external agency.

Basic learning needs – Generally, the terms "basic education" and "basic learning needs"are used interchangeably. Basic learning needs generally include "early child care anddevelopment opportunities, relevant, quality primary schooling or equivalent out-of-school education for children, and literacy, basic knowledge and life skills training foryouth and adults." (Bentall et al, 2000)

Budget support (direct budget support) – This is external financial support that is pro-vided directly to the recipient country’s national government, usually through theMinistry of Finance.

Education for All – Based on the six goals of Education for All defined in the DakarFramework for Action, externally supported efforts to attain Education for All could beexpected to encompass activities in the areas of: • Comprehensive early childhood care and education; • Free and compulsory primary education of good quality; • Addressing the learning needs of all young people and adults through equitable

access to appropriate learning and life skill programmes; • Adult literacy, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing

education for all adults;• Elimination of gender disparities in primary and secondary education, and achieving

gender equality in education; and,• Improving all aspects of the quality of education so that measurable outcomes are

achieved by all.

Education for All – Education for All 2004-09 is designed as a five-year strategic pro-gramme within the framework of the 15 year Nepalese National Plan of Action forEducation for All 2015.

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Macroeconomic budget support – This is support that is provided to the recipientcountry’s national government, through the ministry of finance, and is not earmarkedfor any particular sector.

Project or programme support – This is support that is provided by one or more exter-nal agencies for a specific set of activities that are defined in the project or programmedesign and in which there is limited flexibility to move resources between activities.

Promotion rate – This reflects the number of children promoted in a given year fromone school level to the next, expressed as a percentage of all children in the initial levelin the initial year.

Sector – The operational definition of a sector varies from context to context. In somecountries, basic education is considered to be a sector. In others, it is a sub-sector of theeducation sector.

Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) – Generally a SWAp includes support that: • Is sector-wide in scope,• Is based on a clear sector strategy and framework, • Is based on long-term plans,• Includes host country ownership and strong coordinated partnership with external

agencies, • Is developed and implemented with the involvement of, and partnership with, all

local stakeholders, • Includes the involvement of all main external agencies, • Is based on common implementation arrangements and effective donor coordination• Relies on local capacity, and • Includes provision for results-based monitoring.

Universal Primary Education – The Millennium Development Goal defines universalprimary education as being a state in which children everywhere, boys and girls alike, areable to complete a full course of primary schooling of acceptable quality.

Terai – An ecological classification of districts in Nepal as one of three main classes,mountains, hills and Terai. Terai districts are lowland plains often bordering with India.

Glossary of Terms

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Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Nepal’s "Basic and Primary Education Programme II" (BPEP II) was launched in July1999 to improve the quality of primary education, increase access to basic and primaryeducation, and strengthen institutional capacity. Under the three headings of Access andRetention, Learning Achievement, and Strengthening Capacity, the programme encom-passed 17 distinct components with their own budgets. A Mid-Term Review (MTR),concluded in March 2002, called for BPEP II to be structured around five thematicareas of school physical facilities, access and retention, learning and achievement,management and capacity building, and the development of school improvement pro-gramming.

The planned development budget costs of BPEP II were set out in the ProgrammeImplementation Plan (PIP) at 147.4 million USD. Five external contributors providedbasket funding: Denmark, Norway, Finland, World Bank (WB), and European Union(EU), with His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMG/N) providing counterpart fund-ing. In addition, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the UnitedNations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) provided direct funding outside the basket fundingmechanism, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported teacher training, and mostdonors also maintained some form of direct bilateral assistance (usually technical).

The joint government-donor evaluation of BPEP II was, in part, carried out to supportHMG/N decision-making related to the planning and early implementation of the new"Education for All" (EFA) national programme (2004-09). This report documents thefindings, conclusions and recommendations from the joint evaluation carried out fromJanuary to June 2004.

The Tenth Plan: Nepal’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2002-07 reiteratedprevious plans in making strong commitments to poverty alleviation and to the prioriti-sation of the basic and primary education sub-sector.

The Local Self Governance Act (1999) marked a key step towards creating the admini-strative and legal framework for the promotion of local self-governance and the activeparticipation of stakeholders in the management of key services (such as primary educa-tion).

Evaluation Approach

An integrated team of international and national consultants carried out the evaluation,with the Nepal-based evaluators being actively involved in planning, implementationand reporting activities. Danida served as the contract authority and had direct responsi-bility for managing the evaluation. HMG/N played a key role in the governance of theevaluation, with its representatives being actively involved in the development of theTerms of Reference (TOR) and the selection of the evaluation team. The SteeringCommittee (with representation from HMG/N and all donor/financing agencies con-tributing to BPEP II) constituted the central governing authority and acted as the pri-mary client for the evaluation team.

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The evaluation investigated: 1) critical macro-level issues related to the joint donor-HMG/N planning and implementation of BPEP II, and 2) some key micro-level issueslinked to the involvement of decentralized education authorities and communities inthese activities.

The key evaluation issues addressed:

• The results achieved in improving access to, and the quality and the capacity of thebasic education system in Nepal

• The effectiveness of programme implementation, including planning and design,pilot testing, monitoring/evaluation, the involvement of Non-GovernmentalOrganizations (NGOs)

• The allocation and distribution of financial resources (with an emphasis on trans-parency, efficiency, and the strengths/weaknesses of basket funding, direct fundingand interim arrangements) and,

• The effectiveness of donor coordination, monitoring and ownership mechanisms,processes and practices.

The evaluation methodology comprised: 1) a thorough review of documented evidenceand quantifiable data on programme performance (gleaned from key programme andperformance management documentation), 2) key stakeholder interviews in Kathmanduand in the districts, and 3) seven case studies that allowed for first-hand examinations ofoperations/results at a district level; the review of processes; and interviews and interac-tions with a wide range of officials, administrators, planners, teachers, parents, studentsand NGOs. In all, the evaluation team either interviewed or interacted with over 600persons in Nepal during the course of the evaluation.

Challenges encountered in conducting the evaluation related to the complexities thatcharacterise current realities in Nepal and the difficulties inherent in identifying nationalsolutions, data reliability (especially related to access/quality of education), and con-straints in accessing areas impacted by the insurgency.

Improving Basic Education

Equitable Access: BPEP II contributed to the expansion of the primary school system,and Educational Management Information System (EMIS) enrolment statistics indicatesome improvements in access to basic education over the six years of programming. Forexample, the Net Enrolment Ratio (NER) for grades 1-5 (for both boys and girls) rosefrom 70.5 percent in 1998 to 82.3 percent in 2002 and is projected to be 86 percent in2004. While the enrolment of boys continued at a level higher than girls, there wassome closing of the gender gap in enrolment ratios. Although repetition and dropoutrates in primary school remain high in Nepal, statistics show modest improvementsbeing realized between 1998 and 2000. However, it should be recognized that the poorquality and reliability of enrolment data (at the entry level) raises concerns about thevalidity of results being recorded, and certain factors (e.g. systemic incentives to over-report attendance) would suggest gains in access might be exaggerated (particularly forgirls).

Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

BPEP II has been characterised by efforts (social mobilisation, communications, incen-tives) to encourage and sustain access by marginalised groups, such as girls, disabledchildren, and disadvantaged ethnic, caste and socio-economic groups. Yet, BPEP IIappears to have had less impact on the attendance of some vulnerable groups, especiallygirls.

Quality of Education: One of the most difficult challenges faced by BPEP II was todemonstrate how the programme had resulted in improvements to the quality of basiceducation. Proxies to direct measurements of what results were attributable to invest-ments in early childhood development, and primary schools and non-formal education(including adult literacy) were found in developing ratios of students to teachers, num-bers of trained teachers, and classroom sizes. EMIS statistics indicate a modest butsteady growth rate in the proportion of primary school teachers with some level of train-ing from 1998 to 2000. The measured student/teacher ratio stood at 35.7 in 2002,down only slightly from 39 in 2001 (although this needs to be seen in light of a growingstudent population). Problems such as the inequities in physical infrastructure and over-crowding in many classrooms need to be addressed if the new EFA national plan is tohave a more substantial impact on the quality of education than BPEP II.

For many schools, student/teacher ratios remain very high and have worsened duringthe current period of insurgency and conflict. Very large class sizes were noted in theTerai, including some higher than 100 (with school level averages in the seventies andeighties).

Capacity Development: BPEP II contributed to: 1) the establishment and the integra-tion of programme activities under the new Department of Education (DOE), 2)increases in capacity in key institutions involved with BPEP II implementation, and 3)some improvements in local school capacities. Substantial improvements were noted inthe physical infrastructure for education planning; the systems and processes used toimplement, manage, and monitor the delivery of primary and basic education; and theskills and abilities of staff. Several shortcomings were identified including: uneven capa-city building at the central level, top down and supply driven training activities in seve-ral districts (coupled with weak needs assessment), and a high rate of staff transfers androtations at both central and district levels.

While major investments were made in improving in-service and certification teachertraining, teachers pointed out that the skills and knowledge acquired could not be pro-perly implemented without adequate curriculum, texts, and teaching materials whileworking in overcrowded facilities.

Effectiveness of Programme Implementation

Planning & Design: BPEP II made significant investments in planning processes (andadapting them throughout the life of the programme). However, the rollout of thesetools proved problematic in some cases. Key issues included: 1) many initial SchoolImprovement Plans (SIPs) were ‘wish lists’ for physical and instructional improvementsthat could not be funded, 2) criticism that the SIP and the District Education Plan(DEP) processes represented a significant administrative burden on the schools for limitedgain, and 3) the initial lack of transparency with respect to the role of the DEP versusactual financing. The Annual Work Programme and Budget (AWPB) and the Annual

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Strategic Implementation Plan (ASIP) were seen as a positive planning feature, albeitwith concerns that there was no systematic reference to the original BPEP II plan/budget to track progress.

Pilot Testing: Notwithstanding the fact that some pilots have achieved significantresults, there was no clear indication as to what constitutes a pilot project, the numberof pilots carried out, how they were being coordinated, nor their implementation status.As expressed by one key stakeholder: "I don’t know how the pilots started or where thepilots are going". The fact that most were not being systematically assessed severely limi-ted opportunities for meaningful feedback or the sharing of information. While theMid-Term Review of 2002 recommended that all pilots be reviewed before the end ofBPEP II to inform EFA programming, this has not been completed.

Monitoring & Evaluation: The evaluation team found that considerable progress had beenmade in implementing quantitative monitoring mechanisms, but the poor quality and re-liability of input data requires immediate priority. Also, little emphasis had been given tosystematically and routinely evaluating BPEP II performance. Many schools have relativelypoor record keeping – and often information being processed is based on the recollectionsof individual staff members. The linkage between data collection and informed decision-making needs strengthening. Stakeholders point out the need to computerize data entry,and critique insufficient training; complex, time-consuming processes; incentives to inflatestatistics; and poor quality control. UNESCO has provided support to the development of‘flash reports’ to provide brief information on core BPEP II indicators.

EMIS produces a comprehensive annual statistical yearbook and status reports on educa-tion indicators (including gender-disaggregated data) and BPEP II progress across thecountry.

Involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations: According to key informants, thegovernment became more open to an increased role for civil society organisations duringBPEP II as demonstrated by "tremendous changes" in the levels of networking and part-nership relationships at the national level. Most NGOs stated that they had been con-sulted and that their positions are being reflected in preparations for the new EFAnational plan. The Project Implementation Plan (PIP) identified concerns about the lackof coordination between BPEP II and NGO run programs, specifically in the area ofspecial education, but these were not systematically addressed. Also with respect to theSIP planning, key informants stated that various NGOs were supporting these processesbut often with their own methodological approaches or without coordination withDOE. Overlap/contradiction was found in the provision of scholarships, where someNGO scholarships (especially for girls) were substantially larger than government scholar-ships.

Field visits to Surkhet and Banke provided some examples of NGO policies, program-mes and practices that contradicted BPEP II in the areas of salaries, staffing policies, andplanning processes.

Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources

Transparency & Efficiency: In assessing the procedures for allocating and distributingfinancial resources to the district and local levels, the evaluation team found that: 1) the

Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

flow of funds were well-defined according to the HMG/N system, 2) delays in theauthorisation of funds transfers were still evident, although budget implementationtimes typically showed some improvement over the life of BPEP II, 3) the allocation ofSIP funding had been determined largely by centralised authorities and not by the needsof individual schools, and 4) DEP resource allocations proved to be ‘top down’ and didnot reflect the needs of the district. Other findings included: the lack of data accessibili-ty diminished transparency, financial reporting was burdensome and inefficient, linkagesbetween financial allocations and the quality of interventions were not generally evident,and financial performance information was not related to the achievement of program-me results.

At the district level, the use of set criteria for allocating resources helped to enhancetransparency but, at the same time, tended to limit the adaptability of planning to localneeds.

Basket Funding: The basket fund mechanism allowed for flexibility in making disburse-ments and promoted greater transparency from the national perspective with the fund-ing allocations being subject to audit by HMG/N. However, some evidence indicatesthat the International Development Association procurement rules of international ten-dering used to allocate basket funds may encourage the centralisation of procedures. Thefinancial reporting system was described as very burdensome.

Direct Funding: The evaluation team found that: 1) direct funding arrangements per-mitted donors to provide financial assistance to HMG/N approved pilots without beingconstrained by flows through national accounts, 2) HMG/N does not keep track of therate of implementation and financial implications of direct-funded projects, and 3)direct funding diminishes transparency and accountability (e.g. no submission of auditreports), and enhances the risk of duplicating activities funded by different donors.

Donor Coordination & Ownership

Donor Coordination & Monitoring: The establishment of the BPEP II Local DonorGroup (LDG) at the beginning of 2000 provided for the assignment of a lead donor onan annual, rotational basis. Various analyses and consultations with government anddonor representatives confirmed that, in general, the LDG has helped harmonise donorcoordination, with issues between donors being resolved more constructively. However,there are indications that the annual rotation of the lead/contact donor was disruptivefor HMG/N and negatively impacted institutional memory. The evaluation team alsomade the following observations: 1) the Joint Donor Review Mission (JRM) process wasfound to be labour intensive and costly, 2) no evidence indicates that significant actionwas taken collectively by donors to comply with MTR 2002 recommendations to focusmore on the programmatic level and introduce performance indicators, and 3) a unifiedframework for coordinating technical assistance (TA) would benefit efficiencies and pro-mote greater harmony between donors’ efforts.

Shortly after BPEP II start-up, Nepal initiated the development of a national policy tostrengthen the government's role in the management of foreign aid. This policy encour-ages "…the Nepalese to assume a leadership role in project management", and suggests"…joint chairing of sectoral coordination meetings by the Ministry of Finance (MOF),the concerned line ministries and donors will be encouraged". In the case of BPEP II, by

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August 2003, the Ministry of Education and Sport (MOES) and DOE took over thechairmanship of LDG meetings (and LDG was renamed Joint Local Donor Group(JLDG)).

Ownership: Confirming the primary objective for HMG/N to take charge of imple-menting BPEP II, DOE became increasingly responsible (as capacities developed) forthe planning and implementation of the entire programme. The government now draftsaid memoirs, arranges joint donor monitoring missions, chairs monthly meetings, pro-vides office space for meetings, arranges logistics, etc. – tasks that were previously per-formed by donors and/or consultants. Other observations included: 1) evidence ofmixed results regarding the adoption of common practices/procedures between thedonors and HMG/N, 2) a lack of coordination (and therefore ownership) of directlyprovided TA resources, and 3) the implementation of numerous donor initiated ‘parallel’activities that, in some cases, either counteracted, duplicated and/or did not comple-ment ongoing BPEP II programming.

The EFA National Plan of Action has, reportedly, been almost entirely a Nepali produc-tion and involved the participation of more than 2,000 national stakeholders (represent-ing all levels).

Responding to the Insurgency

Impact: The insurgency has had a profound effect on the delivery of essential services inmany parts of the country. Violence has intensified in the eight years of conflict andnow almost all districts are affected to varying degrees. National bandhs have resulted inwidespread disorder, people have migrated away from affected areas, and state officialshave been unable to function any appreciable distance beyond district headquarters insome areas of the country. The education sector has been explicitly targeted with attackson educational facilities, school strikes, disruptions to daily schooling practices, and theabduction of teachers and students.

Some estimates link the insurgency with the closing over 2,000 schools (including 200that are government-run), impacting over 250,000 students.

Responses to the Conflict: At the district and school level, there is evidence of educa-tion staff responding creatively to maintain the delivery of some services. For example,some resource people have selected schools in safer, roadside areas to conduct meetings;one Primary Teacher Training Centre (PTTC) initiated a mobile training unit, and someschools made scholarship distribution more transparent and accountable to the localcommunity. However, some teachers, district education staff and teacher union officialsmaintain the MOES has not adequately: 1) acknowledged the conflict, 2) responded torequests for support, nor 3) provided guidance on how to respond to the challengesposed by the insurgency.

The MTR 2002 highlighted the need to address the impact of the conflict and to thinkstrategically about how BPEP II should respond. Additional reports have been producedand the issue has been raised at subsequent joint-donor missions.

Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

Conclusions on Programme Effectiveness

The evaluation findings point to the following major conclusions on overall programmeeffectiveness.

1. BPEP II, despite the evaluation’s reservations regarding national school attendancedata, has made a positive contribution to improved access to primary education –mainly through system expansion, social mobilization and incentives. It has had asimilar level of success as other large-scale programmes globally. On the other hand,BPEP II has had less success in extending access to excluded groups, including girls,ethnic minorities, displaced persons, and the poorest.

2. Improvements in the quality of teaching and learning have been very difficult toachieve as measured by national assessments and as observed by key informants.Some gains in the capacity and training of teachers have been offset by operationalproblems in areas such as technical support to teachers, teaching materials, texts,incentives to administrators and teachers, and poor physical infrastructure. In thisarea, the experience of BPEP II has been similar to other large-scale programmes inbasic education. BPEP II has lacked a clear vision and model of how to reform theteaching/learning interface at the classroom level.

3. BPEP II has achieved important results in the area of capacity development. Theestablishment of DOE and its functioning as the operational wing of MOES hascontributed to an increase in the capacity of HMG/N to take responsibility forstrategic and operational planning as well as day-to-day delivery of services in thesub-sector. In addition, administrative capacity has been strengthened at the districtlevel. On the other hand, teacher training has not been well linked to needs at theschool level and has encountered operational problems in linking distance educationand direct instruction. Over-centralization of authority within MOES and the DOEhas also limited the effectiveness of capacity development.

4. In the area of strengthening national ownership, it is clear that HMG/N has becomemore active in donor coordination and in programme design during the course ofBPEP II. The latter stages of BPEP II and the development of the EFA strategy andassociated sub-sector programme have also been based on a wider consultation withstakeholders in Nepal. On the other hand, the very strong donor visibility in BPEPII and the reluctance of some key donors to reduce their visibility and influence(particularly in the area of technical assistance) raises real concerns about their com-mitment to increasing national ownership. This will be a crucial factor in the con-tinued development of programmes to support EFA.

Strategic Recommendations

Moving forward from BPEP II, it is clear that a number of compelling needs should beconsidered for special priority. The recommendations listed here are consistent with thegeneral directions of the Education For All National Plan of Action and with key fea-tures of the programme of external support to the sub-sector which is currently beingfinalised. Nonetheless, the findings and conclusions of the evaluation support placingspecial emphasis on the following actions:

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• Deepening and strengthening efforts of HMG/N to improve access to basic and pri-mary education, especially targeting girls and ethnically, socially, economically andgeographically marginalised groups of learners. In addition, this will require a morefully developed link between formal and non-formal education and a higher priorityfor HMG/N and for donors on providing opportunities for basic and primary edu-cation to those who are out of school.

• Re-examining the incentives used to encourage girls attendance and, as well, deve-loping measures to overcome other barriers to gender equality in basic and primaryeducation such as: 1) infrastructure which does not meet their needs, 2) poor physi-cal security, and 3) local traditions.

• Focussing programming activity much more clearly and directly at the learninginterface between teachers and children. Teachers should play a more central role indialogue and decision-making related to implementing system changes. There is alsoa need for a more structured analysis of whether inclusive education can be the guid-ing principle of classroom practice and can contribute to both access andrelevance/quality in basic and primary education.

• Accelerating the trend to more HMG/N influence and control on critical decision-making during the design, implementation and evaluation of programming in sup-port of EFA. This matches the need to simplify and harmonise external-agencyrequirements for financial, administrative and outcome oriented data gathering,analysis and reporting. This will require more discipline from external agencies in theinitiation, provision, and monitoring of Technical Assistance (and all other inputs)than was evident during BPEP II.

• Developing a clearer, and more defined, disciplined and transparent system ofapproving, testing and adopting ‘pilot’ initiatives.

• Acknowledging that, while the current insurgency is an important factor in the con-text of the EFA, not all problems in providing quality basic education in Nepal arerooted to this phenomenon. This further emphasises the need for programming flexibility and adaptability.

Detailed Recommendations

The evaluation team made a number of more specific recommendations designed toimprove programme planning and implementation. For example: 1) SIP applicationforms should be completed with the participation of School Management Committee(SMC) members, parents and head teachers (HTs) for review by RPs before becoming aworking document at the school level, and 2) guidelines and budget ceilings need to beclearly communicated to the districts for the preparation of DEPs. Most importantly,before finalizing the design of programmes to support EFA, a clear decision should betaken to determine which ongoing ‘pilot’ initiatives should be continued.

The involvement of civil society needs to be broadened, deepened, and institutionalisedwithin a more systematic, permanent framework. Focus should be brought to engagingorganisations in the development/management of basic education at community levels,

Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

and to coordination at the district level to eliminate any duplication, overlap, or contra-diction between NGO programming and government activities.

There is a need to both improve efficiencies in the allocation of financial resources (e.g.reduce the burden of detail), and to provide more transparency in financial reporting.Funding allocation mechanisms should be revisited to develop a formula that is morerelevant and equitable. For EFA, a single overall financial reporting system should beadapted for all components and activities, or at the very least for the common invest-ment pool. Also, HMG/N needs to become equally informed about both direct (if any)and pooled funding activities.

Donor coordination would benefit if participants signed on to an overall, programmaticfocus based on simple indicators that would be updated regularly. More standardisationis required to effectively coordinate TA (e.g. a common database). For EFA, externalagencies should be required to provide information to a central location in HMG/N andto all other supporting agencies on the scope, content, location, and timing of TA activi-ties.

EFA partners will need to be realistic in assessing how the insurgency impacts on theeducation sector, and compassionate, open and straightforward in developing a strategicresponse that effectively addresses the needs of practitioners. Currently, there is anabsence of effective guidance from centralized authorities. Efforts should be directedtowards how educational reform could help tackle the root causes of the conflict.

Planning for EFA offers an opportunity for a participatory rethink of how the educa-tional sector needs to be adapted to meet its policy objectives. To this end, the joint government-donor evaluation of BPEP II demonstrates how partnerships with externalagencies can play a useful role in enriching the planning and implementation of effectiveprogramming to achieve sustainable results.

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Introduction

Introduction

BPEP II was launched in July 1999 to improve the quality of primary education inNepal, increase access to basic and primary education, and strengthen management effi-ciency. To this end, the programme supported two key strategies of the Ninth Plan(1997-2002): gradual introduction of universal primary education and a national litera-cy campaign1. A Mid-Term Review (MTR), concluded in March 2002, called for BPEPII to be structured around five thematic areas of school physical facilities, access andretention, learning and achievement, management and capacity building, and the deve-lopment of school improvement programming.

The joint government-donor evaluation of BPEP II has been carried out, in part, tosupport HMG/N decision-making related to the planning and early implementation ofthe new "Education for All" (EFA) National Plan of Action and the support to be pro-vided by external donors. The evaluation team investigated: 1) critical macro-level issuesrelated to the joint donor-HMG/N planning and implementation of BPEP II, and 2)some key micro-level issues linked to the involvement of decentralised education author-ities and communities in these activities. This final evaluation report documents thefindings, conclusions and recommendations from the joint evaluation carried out fromJanuary to June 2004.

HMG/N played a key role in the governance of the evaluation, with its representativesbeing actively involved in the development of the TORs and the selection of the evalua-tion team. The Steering Committee (with representation from HMG/N and all donor/financing agencies contributing to BPEP II) constituted the central governing authorityand acted as the key client for the evaluation team. Danida had direct responsibility formanaging the evaluation. An integrated team of international and national consultantscarried out the evaluation, with the Nepal-based evaluators being actively involved inplanning, implementation and reporting activities.

The evaluation team comprised representatives from COWI A/S of Copenhagen,Denmark; Goss Gilroy Inc. (GGI) of Ottawa, Canada; and the Organisational Develop-ment Centre (ODC) of Kathmandu, Nepal. On behalf of the Evaluation Steering Com-mittee, Danida served as the contract authority, and managed an international competi-tive tendering process that led to the selection of this consortium as the successful candi-date to carry out the evaluation.

Overall, the evaluation team included 12 persons, with core expertise in basic and pri-mary education, institutional and programme evaluation, financial planning and report-ing, and with strong knowledge of the context and evolution of basic and primary edu-cation in Nepal. The field team for evaluation work in Nepal comprised of eight personsincluding three national consultants. As with the overall team, the field group includedexperts in evaluation, primary and basic education, and financial systems.

1) As noted in the BPEP II – Programme Implementation Plan (1999), the Ninth Plan used the termCompulsory Primary Education but the compulsory component was never implemented.

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Organization of the Report

This report is structured as follows:

• Chapter 1 provides historical perspective for BPEP II, highlighting the socio-culturaland economic, political and educational context.

• Chapter 2 profiles BPEP II, describing the programme goals and objectives, fund-ing/coordination arrangements, management/administrative structures, programmecomponents, etc.

• Chapter 3 overviews the BPEP II evaluation, describing the focus and issues, andmethodologies employed (including the challenges and limitations experienced).

• Chapter 4 identifies the results achieved by BPEP II relating to: 1) improved accessto basic education, 2) improvements in the quality of schooling, and 3) capacitydevelopment.

• Chapter 5 presents the evaluation findings on key aspects of programme implemen-tation including planning, pilot testing, monitoring and evaluation, and the involve-ment of non-governmental organisations.

• Chapter 6 reviews the efficiency and transparency of BPEP II mechanisms for allo-cating and distributing financial resources, and profiles basket funding and directfunding strengths and weaknesses.

• Chapter 7 presents what has been learned about BPEP II donor coordination andnational ownership results.

• Chapter 8 describes the impact of the ongoing Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and howthe educational sector has responded.

• Chapter 9 sets out the key conclusions drawn from the joint BPEP II evaluation.

• Chapter 10 presents recommendations for future programming to advance basic andprimary education in Nepal.

• Chapter 11 compares the key conclusions of BPEP II with the recently completedglobal Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic Education.

Introduction

1. Country Context

1. Country Context

It is important to ground the evaluation of BPEP II in an understanding of the longer-term historical context of education in Nepal, recognising the significant historicaldevelopment of the education sector. Over the last 50 years, education in Nepal hasevolved from formal schooling being the exclusive domain of the children of the rulingelite to a network of over 25,000 schools that now span the country, with the vastmajority providing at least a full primary education (grades 1-5). Lower secondaryschooling (grades 6-8) is offered in 7,000 schools, and secondary education (grades 9-10) in 4,000 institutions.

This chapter highlights the socio-cultural and economic, political and educational con-text within which BPEP II was developed and implemented.

1.1 Socio-Cultural & Economic Context

The socio-cultural and economic diversity of Nepal’s population posed particular chal-lenges for the development and implementation of education reform initiatives (such asBPEP II and its predecessor programmes). Cross-cutting inequalities along gender, caste,ethnic and class divisions were, and continue to be, prominent features of Nepali society.While Nepal’s Constitution acknowledges the multilingual, multiethnic nature of theNepali state and prohibits discrimination on these grounds, marginalised groups con-tinue to experience lower levels of human development and lower incomes than the restof the population.

Human development indicators describe a country besieged by poverty and inequality,with approximately 42 percent of the population living at poverty levels. With 86 per-cent of Nepal’s total population of 23.1 million (2001) resident in rural areas, subsis-tence agriculture remains the key productive activity of the majority. Regional disparityis apparent, with the mid and Far-Western Regions of the country having lower levels ofhuman development. Gender disparity is evident among most communities, althoughwomen have relatively higher status in some hill and mountain ethnic groups.

The diversity of the country’s geography further reinforces the need for locally respon-sive development efforts. The three topographical zones of the country – mountain, hilland terai – present particular developmental challenges that require differentiatedresponses. Widespread migration, both seasonal and longer term, comprises both rural-urban relocation and movement from hill and mountain areas to the more industrialand wealthier terai. External labour migration to India continues, and more recentlyincreasing numbers of young men have been travelling to the Gulf States and SoutheastAsia for employment.

The national census identifies 101 different caste / ethnic groups and 92 languages.Nepali is the mother tongue of 49 percent of the population and is recognised as the‘language of the nation’ and official language of government.

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1.2 Political Context

Following the return to multi-party democracy in 1990, there have been increasedopportunities for the government to work in partnership with external agencies to pro-mote development efforts in Nepal. In the education sector, for example, Nepal becamea signatory to the World Declaration on Education For All and the Convention on theRights of the Child in 1990. Through such commitments Nepal has been able tomobilise technical and financial assistance to support development efforts in the country.

Since 1990, HMG/N has undertaken a number of liberal, market-oriented reformsaimed at reducing the state’s role in economic management and promoting greater popu-lar participation and privatisation. The Tenth Plan: Nepal’s Poverty Reduction StrategyPaper (PRSP) 2002-07 reiterated previous plans in making strong commitments topoverty alleviation and to the prioritisation of the basic and primary education sub-sector.

Efforts to strengthen local democratic institutions and good governance through decen-tralisation have been increasingly prioritised since 1990. In 1999, the Local Self Gover-nance Act (LSGA) marked a key step towards creating the administrative and legalframework for the promotion of local self-governance and the active participation ofstakeholders in the management of key services (such as primary education).

The intensity and extent of the ‘People’s War’ launched in 1996 by the CommunistParty of Nepal (Maoist) have significantly increased since 2001, when the army wasdirectly drawn into the conflict. An aggravated security situation has resulted in reloca-tions of police posts and banks to district headquarters, and rural schools enduring diffi-cult operating conditions. While several rounds of peace talks and ceasefires have takenplace, the conflict recently escalated with large-scale assaults on the towns of Bhojpurand Beni.

This insurgency has had wide-reaching implications. Today, with local and national elec-tions cancelled and Parliament dissolved, efforts to promote decentralisation andstrengthen good governance remain stalled. Government bodies are no longer electedbut appointed by the central authorities. In March 2004, political party activists initia-ted an andolan (movement) against what is perceived as ‘regression’ in the politicalprocess.

1.3 Educational Context

The pace and content of changes in the education sector since 1950 can be seen asresulting from the interplay of national political change and international influence andassistance. For example, the National Education Planning Commission established in1953 received considerable help and advice from educational advisors from the Universityof Oregon. The subsequent report and plan for educational reform (1955) reflects boththe enthusiasm for the changed national political structures and the experience and pri-orities of the external advisors.

The National Education System Plan (NESP) was introduced in 1971 to promotenational unity and increase government control over the rapidly growing education sec-tor through the nationalisation of schools and the curriculum. In 1973, primary educa-tion (grades 1-3) was declared free, with government taking on responsibility for teacher

1. Country Context

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1. Country Context

salaries and the provision of textbooks. School Management Committees were abolishedunder the NESP, although later introduced as ‘School Assistance Committees’ in 1976.The NESP proved politically and practically difficult to implement and was abandonedas a flagship policy of the panchayat system in the late 1970s.

Two projects introduced in the 1980s can be considered the antecedents to the BPEPinitiative. The Education for Rural Development Project (the Seti Project), developedand funded by UNICEF, UNESCO and UNDP, was launched in 1981 and the PrimaryEducation Project (PEP), supported by UNICEF and the WB, in 1984. Both were spa-tially bounded initiatives, confined to a limited number of districts. The Seti Projectoperated in six districts in the Far Western Region of the country, and PEP in a furthertwenty districts scattered throughout Nepal. Such initiatives highlight the explicit andhistorical intertwining of approaches to education reform in Nepal with the interests ofthe international donor community.

In these cases, interest focused on the promotion of integrated approaches to rural deve-lopment and the growing concern with the promotion of EFA, with a particular empha-sis placed on primary schooling. Such a focus encouraged a move away from a centristapproach to school administration. A school ‘cluster’ model and the use of ‘resource cen-tres’ were introduced as mechanisms to encourage more decentralised control and man-agement of educational institutions.

Following the restoration of multi-party democracy, a National Education Commission(NEC) was formed to review educational structures in light of the changed politicalenvironment. The 1992 National Education Commission Report recommended a five-year primary curriculum, with the first three years defined as ‘basic education’. It alsorecommended the recruitment of at least one female teacher per primary school, thedevelopment of Resource Centre (RC) structures, provision of educational materials andteachers to facilitate mother-tongue education, and establishment of equivalence of Outof School Programs (OSP) with basic education provision.

In response to the World Conference on Education For All (1990) and in line with theNEC’s interests, Nepal’s Basic and Primary Education Programme (BPEP) was develop-ed to provide a co-ordinated approach to improving education provision on a largerscale than previous initiatives. A Basic and Primary Education Master Plan was preparedin 1991 and the BPEP itself initiated in 1992 with three major objectives to expandaccess to basic and primary education, improve the quality of primary education, andstrengthen management efficiency. While the initial aim had been to gradually extendcoverage to all 75 districts by 1997, by the end of this period only 40 districts fell withinthe programme jurisdiction. The emphasis of BPEP was on school construction and renovation; expanding educational opportunities through early childhood educationclasses, special needs provision and non-formal education; curriculum reform and text-book revision; and the establishment of Resource Centre (RC) structures and mecha-nisms for supervising and supporting teachers.

At the MTR of the project in 1996, discussion turned to the extension of the initiativeand the possibility of introducing new modalities for donor cooperation in the sub-sec-tor. As a result, BPEP Phase II was designated a ‘programme’. This new modality wascharacterised by a ‘basket’ framework for external funding and a more integratedapproach to programme planning and implementation. In addition to changes at thedonor and central government level, the move to BPEP II also marked a change in the

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relationship between the centre and the sub-national layers of the administration withthe introduction of District Education Planning and school-based planning. This decen-tralised approach is presented in the Programme Implementation Plan (PIP) as the cen-tral pillar of BPEP II, the foundation upon which the various other components were tobe built.

1. Country Context

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2. Programme Profile


BPEP II was launched in July 1999 as the successor to the original Basic and PrimaryEducation Programme (1993-98). The overall thrust of the programme was to improvethe quality of primary education, increase access to basic and primary education, andstrengthen management efficiency (See the PIP pages 14-15). Also, BPEP II was expect-ed to enhance national ownership of the education sector, provide for more symmetricalpartnerships with external agencies, and ensure the more effective and efficient use ofboth domestic and external resources in basic and primary education.

2.1 Goals & Objectives

BPEP II set out to achieve a series of specific programme goals (PIP page 14), namely:

a) Enhance the capacity to enrol primary school age children in schools or in alternateschooling programmes as well as to ensure retention and completion, especially ofgirls and other socially disadvantaged groups;

b) Improve learning achievement; and,

c) Build and strengthen institutional capacity at the national, district and communitylevels to plan, monitor and improve the performance of schools.

As noted in the PIP (page 15), the key planned features of BPEP II were as follows:

• Introduction of continuous assessment and liberal promotion policies;

• Support for piloting targeted interventions designed to provide education opportuni-ties for socially disadvantaged groups and girls and expansion of those that areproven to be cost effective;

• Raising the percentage of female primary school teachers from 20 to 30 percent byallocating 50 percent of teacher replacement positions to females;

• Improvement in teaching practices in the classroom through the provision of recur-rent training and professional on-the-job support, timely provision of textbooks andsupplementary materials for multi-grade instruction;

• Strengthening the capacity of national and district levels to design and efficientlydeliver quality education;

• Strengthening community support for, and monitoring of, the delivery of educationservices, including teacher attendance; and,

• Avoiding expenditures on programmes with unproven implementation strategies orunproven benefits.

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2.2 Finances & Funding Arrangements

The PIP sets out the total development budget for BPEP II at 147.4 million USD ofwhich 111.7 million USD was to be provided through the Core Investment Programme(CIP) often referred to as the basket fund. Five external contributors provided basketfunding: Denmark, Norway, Finland, WB, and EU, with HMG/N providing counter-part funding. JICA and UNICEF provided direct funding outside the basket fundingmechanism, the ADB supported teacher training, and most donors also maintainedsome form of direct bilateral assistance (usually technical). As of November 2003, thereported rate of programme expenditure was 82.9 percent of the planned amount as perthe programme budget.

2.3 Management & Administrative Structures

In the transition from BPEP I to BPEP II, the responsibility for programme manage-ment and administration moved from the BPEP project office to MOES, which estab-lished DOE as the Ministry’s technical arm for implementing primary and secondaryeducation programming.

BPEP II is implemented through five regional education offices, 75 District EducationOffices and 1,331 RCs. SMCs are mandated to take a role in school management, plan-ning, monitoring and supervision. At each level in the system below the regional level,there are specialised supervising committees (i.e. District Education Committee,Resource Centre Management Committee, SMCs).

In addition, a Non-Formal Education Centre (NFEC) was created by amalgamating anumber of NFE divisions within HMG/N to take responsibility for this programming.This Centre works as a secretariat to the Non-Formal Education Council that has adirect link to the District Education Offices in the coordination of NFE programmingat the district level.


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2.4 Programme Components

An overview of the 17 budgeted components of BPEP II is provided below:

2.5 Mid-Term Review & Adjustments

A MTR of BPEP II was carried out through several joint activities starting in late 2001and concluding by a JRM in March 2002. The purpose of the MTR was to assess theprogress of BPEP II, revisit the PIP, and put forward adjustments necessary for the suc-cessful continuation of the programme.

The MTR Report acknowledged the results achieved by the programme in terms ofimproved access, but also pointed out that donor agencies and HMG/N needed toaddress a series of problems. For example, BPEP II only had limited impact in improv-ing the quality of education. Many of the ‘quality of instruction’ problems were diag-nosed as being related to the relative isolation of the 14 programme components duringthe early stages of the programme.

Accordingly, it was agreed that BPEP II would be restructured around the following fiveareas:

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Table 2-1 Planned Budgets for BPEP II Components

Area ComponentPlanned Budget

(in millions of USD)

Access and Retention 1. School Physical Facilities 31.640

2. Alternative Schooling 3.536

3. Education of Girls 0.830

4. Education of Focus Groups 0.360

5. Special Education 5.620

6. Early Childhood Development 3.405

7. Community Mobilization 1.219

8. Literacy Programmes 9.978

Sub-total 56.588

Learning Achievement 9. Curriculum and Textbooks 17.734

10. Continuous Assessment 13.572

11 Recurrent Cluster-Based Training 16.432

12. Certificate Teacher Training System 5.768

Sub-total 53.506

Capacity Building 13. Strengthening DOE 6.831

14. Strengthening District Planning 14.513

15. Local Capacity Building 9.972

16. CIP Programme Management (DOE) 3.797

17. Technical Support Advisory

Group (TSAG) 2.240

Sub-Total 37.353

Total Budget 147.447

Source: PIP February 1999

• School Physical Facilities: Rehabilitation and maintenance; new classroom construc-tion; water, toilet and compound walls; RC, DEO, DOE building construction; fur-niture.

• Access and Retention: Alternative schooling; education of girls; education of focusgroups; special needs education; early childhood development; community mobilisa-tion; literacy programme.

• Learning and Achievement: Curriculum and textbooks; continuous assessment(CAS); recurrent cluster-based training; certificate teacher training system.

• Management and Capacity Building: Strengthening DOE, strengthening districtplanning; local capacity building; core investment programme (CIP) management(DOE).

• SIP-Based Programme Development: School development activities and qualityenrichments as per approved SIP programming.


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3. Evaluation Profile


The evaluation of BPEP II was organised and implemented near the end of a crucialperiod in the development of national programming (and external support) in basic andprimary education in Nepal. The evaluation was carried out from January to June 2004,and followed closely on the development of the National Education for All Action Planand the during the later stages of the process of defining the joint programme of exter-nal support to programming in the basic and primary education sub-sector.

The most important of the planning initiatives carried out in Nepal and of direct inter-est to the evaluation included:

• The completion by HMG/N of the Tenth Plan (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper)for 2002-07 in May of 2003.

• Development of a Concept Paper on Education for All by MOES which formed thebasis of consultations on national programming and external support in basic educa-tion for the period 2004-09.

• Development of the Education for All: National Plan of Action (2001-15) byMOES in February 2003.

• Development of the EFA 2004-09 Core Document published by the MOES inNovember 2003, and agreed as the basic planning document for donor support tobasic and primary education after the completion of BPEP II.

• Preparation of the Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (ASIP) for 2004-05 pro-duced by the MOES, DOE (DEO) Planning and Monitoring Section, March 12,2004.

• Ongoing discussions and planning for EFA that were taking place throughout thefall of 2003 and spring of 2004, and were well advanced during the main evaluationmission by the team in March, 2004.

As a result of the strong focus on EFA planning, HMG/N officials and external agencyrepresentatives placed great importance on the preliminary results of the evaluation.These were shared at a joint meeting of the Steering Committee and the Final JointReview Mission of BPEP II on March 19, 2004. Draft versions of this evaluation report(and the final report itself ) were expected to make a contribution to ongoing efforts tofinalize EFA planning, and to informed decision-making by HMG/N and external agen-cies in the early stages of the new strategy.

3.1 Focus & Key Issues

In keeping with the evaluation TOR and discussions with Steering Committee membersat a meeting in Kathmandu held during the fact-finding mission in January 2004, theevaluation focused on the nine major issues set out below. The TOR is attached asAnnex 1.

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Table 3-1: Key Evaluation Issues

Issue Areas Key Evaluation Issues

System of

Primary and Basic Education

1. What are the achievements of BPEP II in securing improved quality

and access and in sustainable improvements in institutional and

financial capacity?

2. Have procedures for allocating and distributing financial resources

to the district and local level been transparent and efficient? Have

School Improvement Plans (SIP), District Education Plans (DEP),

and Annual Strategic Implementation Plans (ASIP) as planning

tools contributed to this efficiency and transparency?

3. What has been the level and effectiveness of NGO involvement in

supporting the implementation and goals achievement of BPEP II?

4. Have the mechanisms developed for supervising, monitoring and

evaluating BPEP II been effective at central and de-central levels,

including mechanisms for community management.

5. Have systems and procedures for pilot testing and disseminating

new design concepts been effective? Are they linked to processes

for programme and system change?

Ownership, partnership and

donor coordination

6. Has the process of developing, approving, implementing and moni-

toring BPEP II contributed to strengthened national ownership?

How has it done so? How has basket funding influenced owner-

ship?

7. Have mechanisms and procedures for coordination between

HMG/N and donors and among donors been effective? Has BPEP II

led to an increased level of coordination among key actors?

8. In the context of a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) such as BPEP II,

what are the comparative strengths and weaknesses of basket

funding, direct funding and interim arrangements?

9. Has the framework and process for donor monitoring of BPEP II

(jointly with HMG/N) been effective? Has it resulted in improved

programme guidance while reducing the administrative burden and

preserving national ownership?

Danida's evaluation policy identifies five general evaluation criteria that are in line withthose of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/DevelopmentAssistance Committee (OECD/DAC) and all major donor agencies. As the table belowillustrates, the focus by the joint evaluation on the nine issues identified in the TORsand endorsed by the Steering Committee allows for application of all five criteria:


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Table 3-2: Evaluation Issues and Criteria

Evaluation Criteria

Evaluation Issues

EfficiencyEffective-

Impact RelevanceSustain-

ness ability

1. Achievements in securing improved quality

and access and sustainable improvements in

institutional and financial capacity?

2. Procedures for allocating and distributing

financial resources to the district and local

level transparent and efficient? SIPs, DEPs,

and ASIPs as planning tools contributed to

efficiency and transparency?

3. Level and effectiveness of NGO involvement

in supporting implementation and goals

achievement?

4. Mechanisms developed for supervising,

monitoring and evaluating BPEP II effective

at central/decentralised levels, including

mechanisms for community management?

5. Systems and procedures for pilot testing and

disseminating new design concepts effective?

Linked to processes for system change?

6. Process of developing, approving, implemen-

ting and monitoring BPEP II contributed to

strengthened national ownership? How?

How has basket funding influenced ownership?

7. Mechanisms and procedures for coordination

between HMG/N and donors and among

donors have been effective? BPEP II led to an

increased level of coordination?

8. Comparative strengths and weaknesses of

basket funding, direct funding and interim

arrangements?

9. Framework and process for donor monitoring

of BPEP (jointly with HMG/N) effective?

Resulted in improved programme guidance,

reduced administrative burden and preserved

national ownership?

3.2 Methodologies Employed

The evaluation of BPEP II relied on the following core methodologies:

Key Document Review

Throughout the course of the evaluation study, evaluation team members gathered keyprogramme planning, design, development, evaluation and review documents from awide variety of sources (including during the field missions to Nepal). Supporting exter-

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nal agencies, all participating HMG/N ministries and departments, and both nationaland international NGOs provided important documentation that enriched the reviewprocess. A comprehensive listing of the documentation reviewed can be found in Annex 2.

These documents were used to:

• Prepare the evaluation inception report and develop background papers on key evaluation issues areas;

• Compile and profile data on the achievement of programme objectives relating toaccess and quality in basic education (see Chapter 5);

• Profile resource flows under the programme;

• Map programme process for planning, allocating and distributing financial resourcesat a central, regional and district level (see Chapter 7);

• Build on the findings and observations of key evaluation documents;

• Develop an assessment of donor coordination mechanisms and processes, and gaugethe level of national ownership of BPEP II (and the effectiveness of joint HMG/Nand donor monitoring missions); and

• Validate the results of key informant interviews and field studies.

Interviews with Key Informants

At each stage of the evaluation (January fact-finding mission, ongoing data collection inFebruary 2004, the main evaluation mission in March and subsequent follow-up meet-ings), evaluation team members carried out issues-focused structured and semi-struc-tured meetings with key stakeholders in Kathmandu and in a sample of districts. A listof the key informants interviewed during these sessions is presented in Annex 3.

In and around Kathmandu, key informants that were interviewed included all relevantdivisions, departments and units of the MOES, including the relevant sections of DOEand key operational units (e.g. Curriculum Development Centre (CDC) and NationalCentre for Education Development (NCED). In addition, team members interviewedstaff of the Foreign Aid Coordination Section of the MOF and of the Research Centrefor Educational Innovation and Development (CERID).

Another important group of key informants included technical advisors (both expatriateand national) funded by external agencies but working in different units of HMG/N onbasic education issues. The evaluation team also conducted several rounds of interviewswith representatives of all external agencies supporting BPEP: Denmark, Norway,Finland, WB, European Commission, UNICEF, JICA and ADB. A wide range of inter-views were carried out at regional and district levels, with individuals representing: 1)Regional Education Directorates (RED), 2) DEOs, 3) District Treasury Offices, 4)Primary Teacher Training Centres (PTTC), 5) Secondary Education Development Units(SEDU), 6) District Development Committee (DDC) Offices, 7) Education RCs, 8)individual schools, and 9) international, national and local NGOs.


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The table below provides an indication of the extent of the interviews conducted atregional and district levels during the main evaluation mission:

Table 3-3: Offices Visited and Persons Interviewed at Regional/District Levels

Institutions Visited Persons Interviewed/Discussions Held

• 25 Schools • Observed 67 classes in grades 1-5 (and interacted

with teachers and students)

• 2 Regional Education Directors Offices • 79 interviews with individual teachers, including HTs,

primary in charge, and permanent and temporary

teachers

• 9 DEOs • 29 individual interviews with parents, 71 met in group

interaction

• 11 RCs • Meeting with 60 SMC members and 26 PTA members

• 10 Early Childhood Development Units • 64 Interviews with District RPs and SSs

• 11 International/National NGOs • Interviews with 13 PTTC instructors

In all, the evaluation team had either structured/semi-structured interviews or groupinteractions with over 600 persons in Nepal during the course of the evaluation.

Case Studies

A key feature of the evaluation was the examination of BPEP operations and results atdistrict level in Nepal. This provided the evaluation team with the opportunity to exam-ine not only the conditions of instruction and learning at the school level, but to reviewthe processes for resource allocation, distribution, management and evaluation from thecapital level, through to the regions and districts and on to the individual schools. It alsoallowed for interaction with district education staff, teachers, parents and students. Asnoted above, the district case studies involved a comprehensive set of interviews andinteractions with a wide range of officials, administrators, planners, teachers, parents,students and NGOs. In addition, team members were able to observe classes, visit EarlyChildhood Development (ECD) centres, gather data on access and quality and developan overview of school, village, and district level process for planning, resource allocationand programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

The evaluation team used the following criteria to select districts for field visits:

• Coverage of as many of the five development regions of Nepal as practical in thetime available and with the resources of the evaluation;

• Coverage of the main topographical regions of Nepal (Mountain, Hills, Terai);

• Coverage of some of the most intensive BPEP I/II districts as well as some districtswith a shorter history of involvement in BPEP;

• The poverty and literacy characteristics of the chosen districts;

• Coverage of key target groups including ethnic minorities, lower castes and peopleaffected by the insurgency; and

• Logistical feasibility in terms of travel times, accessibility and security issues.

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The districts selected are listed below (see map on inside of back cover):

Table 3-4: Districts Selected for Field Visits and Case Studies

District Topographical Development Security ProgrammeRegion Region Classification Experience

Banke Terai Mid-West 2 BPEP I/II

Surkhet Hill Mid-West 3 BPEP I/II

Dhading/Gorkha Mountain Western - TBD

Tanahu Hill Western 2 BPEP I/II

Sindhupalchowk Mountain Central 2 BPEP II

Jhapa Terai Eastern 1 BPEP I/II

Taplejung Mountain Eastern - BPEP II

Note: The Security Phase Classification was provided by ESAT on February 3, 2004. Phases are numbered oneto three with three being the most insecure. The security situation in each district was reviewed immediatelyprior to travel by team members.

Jhapa and Taplejung were subject to pilot missions in February 2004 to further developdata collection and reporting instruments and strategies. Banke, Surkhet, Dhading,Tanahu and Sindhupalchowk were visited by district evaluation teams during the mainfield mission in March. Due to the intensive nature of insurgent activities during theMarch field mission, the team working in the mid-western area concentrated onDhading and Tanahu (and was not able to cover Gorkha due to problems of security).

3.3 Methodologies: Challenges & Limitations

In general terms, the evaluation team can report positively on its ability to access dataand to carry out the evaluation methodologies as planned. Nonetheless, as in all evalua-tions, there are some significant limitations and challenges faced by the evaluationmethodologies employed – some of which were foreseen and some not.

The most important of these would include:

• The basic complexity of the geographic, ecological, socio-economic, cultural, and theprogrammatic reality faced by BPEP II ‘on the ground’ in Nepal. This dynamic com-plicates the identification of national solutions, and limits the use of sweeping gene-ralities on programme results. Given this, the evaluation team focused on systemicfindings that would appear to be validated by different sources, and by experiencesin very different regions and districts. Also, the evaluation findings were formulatedto reflect the diversity of the situations encountered.

• The evaluation confirmed problems with the reliability and quality of EMIS dataduring district level field visits. Other observers (including CERID) also reported ondifficulties in securing accurate data from the school level. This problem is linked to:1) difficulty in accessing remote and insecure locations (due to the insurgency), 2)deficiencies in the training of teachers responsible for completing entry level forms,and 3) incentives to inflate attendance records, etc. The evaluation team, recognizingthis issue, identified data deficiencies where applicable in presenting the evaluationresults. In some cases, team members were able to verify or correct some data at the


36


DEO level and to conduct classroom observations to verify, for example, publisheddata on student/teacher ratios.

• Insurgency activities only exacerbated the usual difficulties experienced in accessingmany of Nepal’s rural areas. Getting to the most remote villages and schools canentail a day’s walk beyond useable roads. Such areas also tend to be victims of highlevels of insurgent activity. In the time available, team members were restricted fromaccessing the more remote schools and villages. However, the team did visit districtsdistant from the Kathmandu Valley, and were able to observe first-hand some of thepressures on relatively accessible schools resulting from the internal movement ofpopulations into the valleys and to locations in and around district capitals in orderto escape violence. Evaluation team members were able to meet with teachers, stu-dents, parents and administrators who had either relocated from more insecure areas,or who had travelled to such locations on an occasional basis.

37

4. Achievement of Programme Objectives


This section identifies what results can be attributed to BPEP II in three key areas:

• Improving access to basic and primary education for all (especially girls and excludedor marginalised groups);

• Improving the quality of education in order to enhance learning achievements; and

• Developing sustainable capacity at the central and decentralised levels for efficientand effective policy and programme planning, implementation, management andevaluation in basic and primary education, especially management at the level ofcommunities, schools and districts.

4.1 Improving Access to Basic & Primary Education

Gains in Primary Enrolment

Every reasonably systematic effort to review progress in basic and primary education as sup-ported by BPEP II in Nepal has noted important improvements in achieving more equitableaccess to primary education (at least when measured in terms of EMIS enrolment statistics).

NERs for grades 1-5 over the BPEP II period indicate the emergence of a pattern ofimproved coverage and enrolment. Figure 4-1 below illustrates that overall NERincreased from 70.5 percent in 1998 to a measured 82.3 percent in 2002 (with projec-tion of 86 percent in 2004), and that both girls and boys experienced gains in enrol-ment. While boys enrolment continued at a level higher than girls (88.7 percent forboys in 2002 and 82 percent for girls), there was some closing of the gender gap inenrolment ratios as measured by the Gender Parity Index (GPI) which improved from0.77 in 1998 to 0.87 in 2000 (see Figure 4-2). After that point, girls and boys increasedtheir enrolment at almost exactly the same pace so that the GPI remained at 0.87.

Figure 4-1: Grades 1- 5, Net Enrolment Ratios 1998-2004

Source: School Level Educational Statistics of Nepal, HMG/N, DOE

* Estimate

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Primary School Net

Enrolment Rate (Total)

Girls

Boys

601998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004*

70

80

90

100

Figure 4-2: Gender Parity Index 1998-2004

Source: School Level Educational Statistics of Nepal, HMG/N, DOE

* Estimate

As these figures point out, the major gains in both NERs and the GPI were experiencedfrom 1998 to 2000. This gives some pause to the conclusion that BPEP II (only imple-mented in 1999) can be seen as the main driver to the measured gains. Also, for many districts new to BPEP II (i.e. those that did not participate in BPEP I), DEO staff andteachers report that BPEP II was not a significant presence until later years of the pro-gramme.

From 1998 to 2002, the NER increased by almost 12 percent for an average annual gainof almost 2.4 percent. However, fully 8.3 percentage points of that increase came aboutin the single year between 1999 and 2000. The evaluation team found no specific expla-nation for this one-year jump, which indicates a very rapid increase when compared tosimilar programmes in other developing countries and was considered unique in theexperience of the team. If the one-year jump were eliminated from the data, the annualincrease in NERs would remain a respectable one percent.

The figures below illustrate the difference in promotion, repetition and dropout rates forgrades one to five as measured in 1998 (one year before BPEP II started) and again in2001. Figures are presented for both girls and boys to provide a gender-disaggregatedcomparison.


40

0,76

0,78

0,80

0,82

0,84

0,86

0,88

0,90

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004*


Figure 4-3: Girls Promotion Rates by Grade 1998-2001

Figure 4-4: Boys Promotion Rates by Grade 1998-2001

Figure 4-5: Girls Repetition Rates by Grade 1998-2001

Source (Table 4-3 to 4-5): School Level Educational Statistics of Nepal, HMG/N, DOE.

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0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Grade 1

1998

Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 6 Grade 5

2001

Grade 1

1998


20010

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Grade 1

1998


20010

10

20

30

40

50

Figure 4-6: Boys Repetition Rates by Grade 1998-2001

Figure 4-7: Girls Dropout Rates by Grade 1998-2001

Figure 4-8: Boys Dropout Rates by Grade 1998-2001

Source (Table 4-6 to 4-8): School Level Educational Statistics of Nepal, HMG/N, DOE.


42

Grade 1

1998


20010

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Grade 1

1998


20010

5

10

15

20

25

Grade 1

1998


20010

5

10

15

20


The magnitude and trends for these three measures of "internal efficiency" were largelyidentical for boys and girls across grades 1-5 during the 1998-2001 period. However,differences between girls and boys are more significant in relation to dropout rates. AsFigure 4-7 and 4-8 show, the trend in dropout rates also varies across grades. Mostnotably, both sexes show marked improvement in reductions of dropout rates in gradeone between 1998 and 2001. However, the girls’ rate fell by twice the boys’ rate overthat period (7.5 percent change versus 3.7 percent). Both ended up at similar levels in2001 of 13-14 percent. In grades 2 and 3 however, the dropout rate for girls increasedin contrast to decreases for boys. However, girls’ rates were still lower than boys in 2001despite the increases. The most significant reductions in dropout rates occurred in grades4 and 5 where rates for both sexes fell by approximately 5 percent and 9 percent respec-tively.

In general terms, these figures show modest improvements in promotion, repetition anddropout rates respectively across most primary school grades between 1998 and 2000.However, the size of these gains when compared with the larger increases in NERswould suggest that improvements in access could be mainly representative of new chil-dren brought into the system, rather than an improved capacity to retain students with-in the system.

Reliability of EMIS Statistics

While EMIS statistics indicate some improvements in access, problems with the qualityand reliability of data would suggest the scale of such gains might be significantly moremodest than the data denotes (particularly for girls). The evaluation found evidence of:1) systemic incentives that encourage over-reporting of attendance, 2) deficiencies inchecking the accuracy of school level data, and 3) higher levels of over-crowding thanreported in EMIS data (during classroom observations) that raised concerns about thevalidity of enrolment data.

The case studies revealed that attendance at some private boarding schools was veryheavily weighted in favour of boys (almost to the exclusion of girls) and that efforts atmobilising parents to send girls to school had, in some cases, resulted in a family deci-sion to allow girls to attend public schools and to pay for boys to attend the privateboarding schools (which are perceived to provide a higher quality education).

The ASIP (2004-05) includes an important statement on why enrolment data may notbe an accurate indicator of improved access. School Level Education Informationincludes only the numbers of children who are formally registered as pupils, eventhough it is not certain that they actually attend school. In a good number of schools,pupils may register at the beginning of the year, but not attend school on a regular basis.Information gathered through household surveys or through research study would indi-cate that attendance is usually much lower than the EMIS statistics suggest.

Gender Equality and Gender Parity

BPEP II did include specific measures aimed at reducing gender disparities in enrolmentand attendance as detailed in the section immediately above. Specifically, there has beena significant amount of mobilization at the district and community levels to increase theenrolment and attendance of girls, including the use of scholarships for girls. The inten-sity of these efforts has, however, differed significantly both within and across districts.

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The programme set targets for recruitment of female teachers and made positive move-ment towards those targets – although the levels reached did fall short as identified inthe gender audit and the most recent statistics. BPEP II also recently started to subsidisetraining for female teachers in addition to financially supporting female communityfunded teachers. The programme has also made a positive contribution by improvingthe physical environment of schools, making them more amenable to girls’ participation(improvements which have been tracked through EMIS data).

It is worth noting that the district visits and analysis of data on girls and boys enrolmentillustrate a number of points in the area of the programme’s contribution to genderequality:

• Gender parity remains a difficult goal to achieve, with progress sometimes under-mined by the strong trend towards providing boys access to private schools.

• Many of the female community funded teachers are in temporary positions and arelikely to lose their jobs, although their situation differs across districts. This raises theissue of the level of commitment to increasing the numbers of female teachers.

• Scholarships for girls were found to be too low in value to make a sustained impacton access in addition to there being too few scholarships to address all of those inneed. In addition key informants stated that the timing of scholarship disbursementdid not greatly affect attendance.

• In late 2001 to early 2002 a comprehensive "Gender Audit" was carried out for theBPEP II program that reviewed all of the components. Of the ten recommendedactions to integrate and mainstream gender equality in education, most have notbeen addressed in BPEP II, including a gender equality strategy. A GE focal pointwas not put in place until late in the programme.

• Despite substantial gains in parity in the late 1990s the GPI declined from 2000 to2003 and only returned to 1999 levels in 2004. This would seem to indicate thatBPEP II did not have substantial impact on parity.

• The issue of parity in private schools remains a concern. Key informant interviewsand the one private school that was visited by the evaluation indicate that these edu-cation facilities are dominated by boys. While this is an area for further study, it isquite critical given that private schools are perceived as being of higher quality andthe statistics show students from private schools constitute the majority of schoolleaving certificate holders.

Gender equality has been more explicitly included in the planning for the national EFAstrategy. The analysis of the context of EFA specifically addresses gender equality con-cerns and GE is included as one of the many issues and challenges to be addressed. Aswith BPEP II, the focus in the EFA strategy is on the elimination of sex-based dispari-ties. This is to be achieved by the same measures that were promoted through BPEP II – teachers, curricula, materials, and a school environment that support girls education,coupled with special measures such as scholarships to promote girls enrolment.

Using the Gender Audit as its main point of departure, the EFA document establishesan expected outcome achievement level by using the Literacy Gender Parity Index to


44


measure GE dimensions of programme results. However, the overall thrust of EFA stillconsists of a "development welfare model …used to "help" girls and women, rather thana model of gender equity and empowerment" (Gender Audit of BPEP II, 2002, pg 14.).

Improving Access for Marginalised Groups

BPEP II has been characterised by efforts to use social mobilisation and communica-tions (through SMCs and PTAs) and incentives (e.g. scholarships) to encourage and sustain access by marginalised ethnic/caste groups, by severely disadvantaged socio-economic groups, and by developmentally and otherwise disabled children – and espe-cially by girls. The evaluation, however, found it difficult to validate what results, if any,these efforts had produced in terms of improved accessibility for marginalised groups.The ASIP 2004-05, in sharing this contention, pointed out the need to work hard inorder to find out the actual enrolment ratio of the dalit and Janjati children population.

The evaluation made the following observations regarding marginalised groups (otherthan girls):

• While special education classes are provided for children in specific disability cate-gories (i.e. blind children, deaf children, children with developmental disabilities),the numbers of students participating is very small compared to the needs at the dis-trict level, and sometimes supply problems (e.g. lack of Braille texts beyond gradethree) severely hampered the gains that could be realized.

• Socio-economically disadvantaged populations (and recently internally displacedpopulations) often attend schools that are clearly resourced at a much lower levelthan neighbouring schools serving more advantaged populations.

• Minority language groups are often not accessing the public primary school system.

• Rural and isolated schools have significant problems of intermittent teacher atten-dance (including in those areas not directly affected by the insurgency).

The insurgency has created problemsfor children in rural and isolatedareas since they may not have accessto a school that teachers attend regu-larly. This has contributed to a signi-ficant shift of school-age children todistrict headquarters communitiesand to very significant problems ofovercrowding. The district of Surkhetprovided a striking example of over-crowding of schools in SurkhetValley as families moved down fromthe surrounding hills during theinsurgency.

For districts with a significantMuslim population (e.g. Banke nearthe border with India), district and

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District Perspectives: Scholarships in Dhading

Key informants suggested that scholarshipswere of limited value in retaining students inschool. The amount of 250 NPR was consid-ered of limited use as it could only buy one setof school dress and perhaps a bag. Keyinformants stated that if children were goingto drop out they would do so regardless of thescholarship. In one school it was reported thatout of nine Dalit students, six received schol-arships, but the head teacher reported that thesix were not regular students even after receiv-ing the scholarship. She cited a lack of effec-tiveness in these efforts stating that they hadnot been able to attract Dalits with promo-tion, outreach and scholarships.

local school officials described both the need and opportunity to provide a linkage fromthe national curriculum to the material taught to Muslim students in the Madrassas.This observation does not mean that Muslim students are not able to access the publicschool system. Rather it suggests that District Education Officers in some districts see aneed to work with Madrassas to introduce elements of the national curriculum intotheir teaching methods.

Access to Non-Formal Education

BPEP II included a number of components aimed at strengthening access to non-formaleducation, including alternative schooling (budgeted at 3.5 million USD) and a literacyprogramme (9.978 million USD). In addition, BPEP II provided direct support andtechnical assistance to the Non-Formal Education Centre (NFEC). NFEC has beenresponsible for administering a range of non-formal education programmes including:

• Adult Education (adult literacy)• Women’s Education I and II • Post Literacy Programme• Alternative Schooling Programme

• Out of School Programme (8-14 years old);• School Out-Reach Programme (grades 1-3 outside schools)• Flexible Schooling Programme

• Income Generation Programme (adult literacy)• Community Learning Centres

The evaluation did not encompass a full review of all non-formal education programmes.However, key informant interviews at central and district level and district visits to somenon-formal activities (particularly school outreach and flexible schooling programmes)did provide some insight into the roles that these programmes could play in broadeningaccess outside the formal school system.

At the same time, it is clear that non-formal education has not received the same priori-ty from either HMG/N or the donor agencies as has in-school basic and primary educa-tion (including early-childhood development). The relative lack of priority accordedNFEC by both HMG/N and external agencies has contributed to the institutionalweakness of the NFEC, and to limited gains in access for illiterate youth and adults.

An example of the relatively low priority placed on, for example, adult literacy can befound in the Annual Strategic Implementation Plan 2004-05 which represents the firstannual plan of the Education For All national strategy and programme. The ASIP for2004-05 does set down targets for improving adult literacy (from 48 percent in 2001 to66 percent in 2008/09) but it does not include any effort to summarize progress underBPEP II. In direct contrast, the ASIP includes a fairly extensive discussion of progressmade in the formal schooling system under BPEP II.

On the other hand, some elements of non-formal education, mainly the Out-of-SchoolProgramme (OSP), School Outreach Programme, and Flexible Schooling do receivesome support from donors and do seem to be elements of the national strategy for pro-viding basic education to school-age citizens.


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4.2 Improving the Quality of Basic & Primary Education

The evaluation found that improving the quality of education was one of the most diffi-cult challenges faced by BPEP II. This finding is typically consistent with the experienceof large sector-wide programmes of support to basic education in many countries, andhas been a key finding of the Global Joint Evaluation of External Support to BasicEducation.

BPEP II made significant investments in improving the quality of education in ECDCentres and in primary schools through a range of programming activities, including: 1) curriculum and textbook development and distribution, 2) student assessment, 3)teacher training (in-service and certification), and 3) RC development. Excluding bud-gets for civil works and construction (which could arguably have an impact on quality ifother factors were also provided), 53.5 million USD or 29 percent of the total BPEP IIbudget was directly allocated to ‘quality of education’ programming.

It has always been challenging to demonstrate how development cooperation program-ming has resulted in improvements to the quality of basic education. As an interimmeasure, at least at the primary school level, repetition, dropout and survival rates areoften used as negative measures of quality. When these indicators are abnormally high,they indicate the system is failing to provide basic education at a quality and rate thatwill retain students. The evaluation found that the repetition and dropout rates remainhigh and (with the exception of grade five) did not improve appreciably during the firsthalf of BPEP II.

Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (2004-05): "The national average survival rate of66 percent in 2001 (67.7 percent in 2002) gives a strong indication of the poor healthof education in many districts." (p.32) Note: The ASIP did not define survival rate butit is understood to mean the percentage of students who enter grade one and who arestill enrolled in grade 5"

Other useful proxies for quality in basic and primary education are found in ratios ofstudents to teachers, trained teachers, and classrooms. In this area, EMIS data showssome gains in the numbers and portions of teachers with some training during thecourse of BPEP II, but also provides an indication that a great deal remains to be done.Table 4-1 below presents a number of indicators relating to the supply of teachers inNepal for the years 1998 to 2002:

Table 4-1: Changes in Trained Teachers 1998-2002

Indicator 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Number of teachers 91,878 99,382 97,879 96,659 110,173

Percentage of trained teachers 46.5 44.5 51.8 14.7 16.23

Number of female teachers 20,682 23,608 24,770 24,427 31,549

Percentage of female teachers 22.5 23.8 25.3 25.3 28.64

Percentage of trained female teachers 34.7 35.1 41 12.2 13.49

Student/teacher ratio 39 38 37 39.9 35.7

Student/trained teacher ratio 84.1 85.5 71.5 271.6 219.7

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This table indicates a modest but steady rate of growth in the proportion of primaryschool teachers with some level of training from 1998 to 2000. The slight decrease inthe student/teacher ratio from 39.9 in 2001 to 35.7 in 2002 needs to be seen in light ofa growing student population.

Of course, for many schools, student/teacher ratios remain very high and have worsenedduring the current period of insurgency and conflict. Evaluation team members visitingdistricts in the Terai noted very largeclass sizes in many instances, includ-ing a number with more than 100students. School-wide averages werefound to be in the seventies andeighties.

In 2001, MOES decided that EMISshould begin counting only teacherswho had completed the ten-monthcertification or in-service trainingcourse or a college certification as‘fully trained’. As a result, the por-tion rated as trained dropped from51.8 percent (having completedsome training) to 14.7 percent whowere rated as fully trained. By 2002,this proportion stood at just 16.2percent.

Changes in Learning Achievement

A more direct way to assess quality improvements, at least in primary education, is tomeasure learning achievement at the same grade level at different points in time. In thecase of primary schooling in Nepal this has been done through the regular NationalAssessment of Students carried out by the Educational and Developmental ServiceCentre (EDSC).

The National Assessment of Grade Three Students in 2001 compared test results inNepali, Mathematics and Social Studies for grade three students for the years 2001 and1997. The results are presented in Table 4-2 below.

Table 4-2: Assessment of Performance of Grade Three Students 1997-2001

Subject Mean Test Scores

1997 2001

Nepali 45.65 44.5

Mathematics 43.81 47.0

Social Studies 50.37 63.6

The National Assessment made the following comments on this data:

As can be seen, there was no progress in the achievement level of the students in Nepali.There was a gain of about 3 percent in the achievement level of the students in


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District Perspectives: Overcrowding in Surkhet

Sri Shiva Madyamik School in Latikoli VDCin Surkhet District has experienced a dramaticincrease in students over the past five years.Surkhet District is highly affected by theinsurgency and the increase in students relatesto the escalating numbers of Internally Dis-placed People. High enrolment has not beencoupled with an increase in the number ofteachers resulting in an average of 70-80 chil-dren per class per teacher. Several teachersreported that they had even larger classes of upto 120 students, making effective teaching,learning and student assessment practicallyimpossible.


Mathematics. In Social Studies, there was a reasonable level of progress. It was alsoobserved that some initiatives were taken to reform the system of primary educationbased on the recommendations made by the 1997 study. However, those initiatives werenot adequate for the desired results (p. ix).

Similarly, there have been regular assessments of performance at the grade 5 level. Table4-3 below presents a comparison of the assessment of performance of grade five studentsin 1999 and 2003.

Table 4-3: Assessment of Performance of Grade Five Students 1999-2003

Subject Mean Test Scores

1999 2003

Nepali 51.46 55.80

Mathematics 27.25 33.33

Social Studies 41.79 61.13

This would seem to indicate a moderate gain in performance in Nepali and Mathematicsfor grade 5 students from 1999 to 2003 – and a considerable gain in social studies per-formance. This impression is undercut, however, by some of the findings of the 2003learning assessment as reported in the Annual Strategic Implementation Plan, 2004-05:

• No progress has been made in reducing regional and ecological variations.• Overall achievement in Nepali, Mathematics and English is not satisfactory.• The present level of cut-off point (i.e. 33 percent) does not require the students to

achieve Basic Learning Needs.• Most students have problems in achieving higher order thinking skills (p.15).

These findings are consistent with the reported views of parents, teachers, ResourcePersons, School Supervisors and District Education Officers. Almost all those inter-viewed felt that, while some modest gains have been made in the quality of primaryeducation over the life of BPEP II, the general impact of the programme on quality ofteaching and learning at the classroom level remains a disappointment. This is recog-nized in the EFA core document and the ASIP for 2004-09 mainly through recognitionthat improving teaching and learning at the classroom level remains a central challenge.

Overcoming Critical Constraints

Consultations and school/classroom visits carried out during the district field visitspointed to numerous factors (both programmatic and outside of BPEP II) that continueto constrain the quality of instruction and learning in primary schools and ECDCentres. Overcoming these issues will be critical if EFA is to have a more substantialimpact on the quality of instruction and learning than BPEP II.

The constraining factors identified included:

• A very uneven pattern of quality of physical infrastructure with relatively new andreasonably equipped school blocks (often built under BPEP I or II) in use alongsideolder blocks with poor lighting, inadequate ventilation, no materials and no seating

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• Continued overcrowding in many classes

• Teaching of younger children by students in higher grades when teachers are missing

• Relatively frequent absences of teachers for family or personal reasons

• Inadequate supplies of texts, paper, instructional materials

• Teachers with some improved pedagogical skills frustrated by their inability to imple-ment what they have learned due to lack of materials

• The administrative burden placed on HTs and primaries in charge of compiling,checking and delivering data to feed EMIS

• The burden placed on teachers, RPs and SSs relating to planning and to interfacingwith the SMC

• Lack of accountability on the part of teachers to students and parents, and

• Problems in supervision and oversight by SSs and RPs due to problems of physicalaccess to remote schools and disruptions caused by the insurgency.

To some extent, the emphasis that so many key stakeholders placed on physical andmaterial needs in order to improve the quality of education may be indicative of a lackof programmatic focus (through engagement of teachers/students and through incen-tives) on the student teacher relationship. An example of this can be found in the wayteachers are trained in group work, but are often frustrated by lack of space and appro-priate furniture that facilitates implementation.

4.3 Capacity Development

Developing Institutional Capacity

The BPEP II Programme Implementation Plan (PIP) states that one long-term pro-gramme goal is to "…build and strengthen institutional capacity at the national, district,and community levels to plan, monitor, and improve the performance of primaryschools." (PIP, 1999, p. 14). Ten target areas were identified for capacity buildingimprovements, including: 1) organisations (e.g. DOE, NFEC, MOE), 2) systems (e.g.EMIS), processes (e.g. DEPs, SIPs), and 3) groups and bodies (Village EducationCommittees (VECs), SMCs, Headmasters) (p. 15).

Perhaps the most important capacity building objective of BPEP II was to create andestablish the new DOE and to merge all regular programme activities into the DOE andother MOES institutions such as CDC, NCED, and NFEC. The building of localcapacity to improve school effectiveness was the second most important capacity build-ing priority set out in the BPEP II PIP. At the district level, a focus was brought tostrengthening DEOs, preparing DEPs, and strengthening of EMIS and the ProgrammeManagement Information System (PMIS) (p. 39-40).


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At the central level, the evaluation found that there had been significant increases incapacity in the key institutions involved with BPEP II implementation, including DOE,MOES, and NCED. In addition to the establishment of DOE, improvements werenoted in: 1) the physical infrastructure for education planning, and 2) the systems andprocesses used to implement, manage, and monitor the delivery of primary/basic educa-tion, and the skills and abilities of staff. Specific areas of improvement that were cited byall key informants included the ability of the MOES and DOE to coordinate the workof the development partners and liaise with a range of stakeholders regarding BPEP IIimplementation and planning at the central level.

At the district level, the evaluation found that capacity had increased in a number ofareas (including planning, data collection, reporting), and that programme implementa-tion and financial budgeting/reporting functions had been strengthened.

At district level, evaluation team members noted that capacity building mainly took theform of training for individual District Education Office (DEO) staff, teachers andSMC members. RP and SS training focused on planning and administrative skills ratherthan technical training in providing support to teaching.

Teacher Training

Investing in in-service and certifica-tion teacher training has been a keyBPEP II strategy for building capaci-ty and improving the quality of pri-mary and basic education in Nepal.At an institutional level, fundingfrom the basket fund and from theADB teacher education loans, as wellas TA support, has been employed tohelp strengthen the NCED and theCDC. There has also been institu-tional support provided for the net-work of PTTCs and alternativeproviders (private teacher trainingcentres).

BPEP II provided technical andfinancial support to the developmentof: 1) the ten-month training coursesfor the certification of teachers, and2) short in-services courses for somein-service teachers not qualifying forthe full course.

Data provided by the NCED showed steady increases in the capacity for delivery ofsome aspects of the teacher training certification course. At the same time, as indicatedin Table 4-1, the pace and scale of training does not yet show signs of closing the gapbetween trained and untrained teachers in Nepal. The latest available figures indicatethat while over 50 percent of primary teachers have some form of training, the percent-age of ‘fully-trained teachers’ remains below 20 percent.

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District Perspectives: Teacher Training in Dhading

The Dhading field team found strong evidenceof understanding of the content of training,but only limited application in daily practice.Training of teachers under BPEP II fundinghas only been provided to government fundedteachers and not community funded. This isan essential issue given the relative high per-centage of community funded teachers in pri-mary schools. In one RC area SMC, PTA andthe RP stated while teachers have taken train-ing it was hard for them to implement whatthey had learnt and that were unable toobserved any significant change in the class-room practice over the past five years. Fromdiscussions with students, teachers and class-room observation it is apparent that much ofthe training received by teachers has not beenput into practice.

Many teachers interviewed in the seven districts visited noted that, when they had beenable to take part in teacher training, they had gained skills and knowledge. Some teach-ers claimed, however, that without adequate curriculum, texts, and teaching materials(even though many had learned to use locally available materials in their training) – andin the overcrowded facilities they work in – they are largely unable to implement theirtraining. Problems with the distance education elements of teacher training were alsoidentified, for example: 1) the timing of broadcasts was difficult (often during the din-ner hour), 2) broadcasts were not always in sync with the texts, 3) reductions in thelength of broadcasts reduced their utility, and 4) contact sessions (scheduled weekly)were often too short or overcrowded – or did not even take place).

Other findings/observations included:

• PTTC instructors advised that the absence of a system for assessing teacher-trainingcandidates means that many participants begin the courses without adequate skillsfor completing them successfully.

• There is inadequate tracking to identify which teachers have participated in trainingsessions which, in turn, creates difficulties in targeting training to those with themost need and/or ability to use it effectively.

• When teacher training occurs, HTs often call on the primary in charge and otherexperienced primary level teachers to teach the secondary grades, resulting in animmediate drop in the quality of primary teaching.

• The situation facing community-sponsored teachers with regard to teacher trainingis not clear. In a number of districts, evaluation team members were told that com-munity teachers were not eligible for the certification training courses. If this is thecase, it tends to devalue the community contribution to teacher complements.

In summary, it can be concluded from what was learned during the district field visitsthat the programme investments in teacher training helped in the upgrading of indivi-dual skill levels. However, some operational and training design problems were found tohave limited this impact. Of equal importance, the general situation in many schoolswith regard to texts, teaching aids, materials, supplies and physical infrastructure con-strains the value that is being realized from BPEP II’s training efforts.

Research undertaken in other jurisdictions (notably in Latin America around theEscuelas Nuevas model pioneered in Colombia) indicates that primary schools retainstudents more effectively when the best teachers focus on the youngest grades. In prac-tice, the evaluation team found that the opposite policy used in many public schools inNepal, where the most qualified primary school teachers are used in lower-secondarygrades.


There were a number of issues that were raised through the evaluation process concern-ing capacity building and institutional strengthening. At the central level, capacity build-ing has been uneven and there are still important technical units that require strengthen-ing that have not yet been targeted for improvements. This problem has been com-pounded by a concentration of authority and responsibility in a small number of groups


52


and individuals. At the district level, while capacity has been built within the RP group,typically their involvement pertains to administrative and planning activities. As agroup, RPs across all of the field visit districts report they have not been significantlystrengthened in terms of educational expertise, and their ability to provide effective sup-port to teachers in the classroom.

The evaluation team found that there was concern across all the districts visited that thelevel of capacity building inputs for the School Improvement Plan (SIP) developmentprocess was too low. While capacity had been built and many SIPs had been completed(with varying levels of quality), SMC members, HTs, and DEO staff all reported thatthree days of training was inadequate. In one district, training was being carried outwithout any curriculum being provided from the centre, raising concerns about consis-tency with national standards and quality.

In addition, the evaluation team was informed in a number of districts that the processof capacity building tended to be top-down and supply-driven. For example, in somecases where the evidence indicated that a needs analysis had been completed, there wasconcern at the district level that training was being determined at the ‘centre’ and wasnot being based on their requirements. In addition, district level key informants statedthat selection procedures were centralised and there were fewer opportunities for train-ing being made available at the district level than at the centre.

Transfers and rotations in MOES and DOE have led to situations where staff membersincreased their skills and abilities in areas related to their positions, only to then betransferred to other positions where those skills might not be applicable. In turn, newstaff members were transferred into the newly vacant positions, often creating the needfor the same capacity building interventions.

53

5. Programme Implementation


The joint evaluation identified a series of issues for addressing BPEP II implementation,addressing planning and design, pilot testing, monitoring/evaluation, and the involve-ment of NGOs. The following sections describe the evaluation team’s observations andfindings for each of these foci.

5.1 Planning & Design

School Improvement Plan

The SIP was intended to be a bottom-up process where every school would prepare aplan through a micro-planning exercise. Each SIP would contain improvements for theschool in the form of an action plan, including physical and instructional items. A mini-mum of 15,000 NPR was to be allotted to each school based upon six eligible lineitems. HTs, SMC members, and other community leaders, in addition to RPs, were totake part in formulating the SIP (PIP, 1999, p. 43).

At the time of BPEP II’s start-up in 1998/99, SIPs were piloted at over 100 schools intwo districts. According to key informants at DOE, SIPs were then commenced in 12districts in 2000, supported by training for the relevant actors in SIP preparation. In2001, a new round of SIP training was reported to have been carried out with five dis-tricts trained in "realistic and resource-bound planning" according to key informants.This ‘pilot’ SIP process included comprehensive household surveys and the developmentof baselines.

In 2002, learning from the five ‘pilot’ districts showed that the format was ‘too cumber-some’ and a new, simpler SIP format was then introduced in an additional seven dis-tricts for a total of 12 ‘pilots’. Guaranteed levels of funding were attached to the SIPdepending on the number of school age children and the geographic location of theschool. Key informants state and field visits demonstrate that this new SIP format wasthen expanded to one RC area in each of the remaining 63 districts.

Districts with a long history of involvement in BPEP I and BPEP II tended to reporthigher levels of acceptance and engagement in SIP/DEP processes.

District Education Plans

The DEP was designed to build on the SIP (through a Village Education Plan whereVillage Education Committees exist) and was supposed to be formulated in a participa-tory fashion. The five year DEPs were to include staffing and training needs, a monitor-ing, supervision, and reporting plan, school maps, school capacity building plans includ-ing HTs and SMC members, and decentralisation plans including community mobilisa-tion (PIP, 1999, p. 41). DEPs were intended to be revised annually.

Although the PIP indicated that DEPs were to be phased in with 12 being ‘piloted’ inFY 1998/99 and a further 23 in FY 1999/00, key informants and field visits demon-strated that DEPs were introduced in all districts in 1999. Key informants at DOE stat-

55

ed that a new round of DEPs will be undertaken in five districts in FY 2003/04 and thiswill be expanded to the remaining 70 districts in FY 2004/05.

Annual Work Programme and Budget

Inputs for the AWPB are derived in part from the ASIP and are focused on basket fundsonly. Districts are provided with a budget ceiling from DOE to identify AWPB limits.

The AWPB is a planning tool intended for use at both the district and national level. Ata district level, it has tended to reflect central resource allocation decisions and formulasthat constrain the flexibility of local planners. At a national level, a review of the minut-es of joint donor/government monitoring missions indicates that the AWPB is seen as acrucial annual tool for monitoring the progress of HMG/N in implementing BPEP II.

One downside noted by some external agencies has come in the shifting of attentiontoward the ASIP/AWPB and away from outcome indicators originally specified for theprogramme.


The evaluation team found that the rollout of processes and tools used for planning anddesign proved to be problematic in some cases:

• Many initial SIPs were ‘wish lists’ for physical and instructional improvements thatcould not be funded. According to the PIP, SIPs were to be "cost-constrained invest-ment plans" where proposals from schools would be funded according to well-defined criteria (PIP, 1999, p. 43). However, planning experts at DOE stated thatthere was an issue with many schools preparing unrealistic ‘wish lists’ of physical andinstructional improvements. Key informants stated that SIPs were not been reviewedproperly by RPs, in part because their technical capacity was low.

• There is a need to make the SIP a functional ‘working’ document at the school level,rather than something that was simply passed on from the school to the DEO andthen basically forgotten at the school level. However, key informants reported thatsome schools have been able to analyse and diagnose their own situations, and havebeen able to use the plans to seek out additional funding sources.

• Many participants in the SIP process noted strongly that the actor requirements,steps and procedures in the SIP/DEP process represent a significant administrativeburden on the schools for limited gain. In addition, key informants stated that par-ticipation levels needed to be improved, as it was proving difficult to engage the fullrange of stakeholders (especially parents).

• The key issue related to district education planning was the lack of transparencywith respect to the role of the DEP versus actual financing. It was widely reportedthat the first attempt at DEP was undertaken at the district level with varying, butgenerally high levels of participation, to find out following submission that therewere pre-existing budget ceilings determined at the centre. As the DEPs had to beredone to meet the budget ceilings, this lack of transparency has lead to problems ofmorale and disengagement from the process.


56


• While AWPBs was seen as a positive planning instrument, there were concerns thatthere was no systematic reference to the original BPEP II plan and budget to trackprogress.

Key informants at DOE stated that while the end product is now meeting the criteria,the DEPs have not been completed in the manner that was originally intended.

5.2 Pilot Testing

Some of the BPEP II activities were launched nation-wide, while others were limitedpilots in a few districts. The objective of the pilot projects was to test targeted interven-tions and new methodologies designed to provide education opportunities for sociallydisadvantaged groups and girls, as well as develop a sound planning process. Based onthe outcomes of the pilot testing, decisions would then be made to expand those thatproved cost-effective and relevant for implementation.

The idea of supplementing the core programme with pilot initiatives is a useful strategy,because it provides a platform for supplementing experimental and flexible activitiesalongside pre-designed core activities.

While it is clear that a wide array of pilot projects was carried out during BPEP II, theevaluation found that it was difficult to obtain a full overview of the number/type ofpilot projects initiated. The original plan to have one unit coordinating all pilot activi-ties (BPEDU) was never realised. The absence of effective coordination and firm man-agement of pilots resulted in different implementing agencies/institutions, as well as arange of external agencies, getting involved in the planning, implementing and evaluat-ing of pilot projects, often in a random manner.

A systematic and standardised monitoring mechanism for pilots does not seem to havebeen applied. The evaluation had to rely extensively on initial programme documenta-tion (e.g. PIP) and individuals who could recall the history of the BPEP I/II as the pri-mary sources of information on pilot programmes. Due to the high staff turn over inmost DOE institutions, however, institutional memory in some cases proved to be limit-ed.

Despite difficulties in obtaining reliable information on pilot activities, Table 5-1 belowwas prepared to provide an overview of active pilot projects in BPEP II (based on avail-able information as reported by the DOE). Interviews with national stakeholders, keyinformants at the district level and donors assisted in clarifying the implementation sta-tus and follow-up efforts for some of the pilot projects.

Clearly some initiatives referred to as "pilot projects" by key stakeholders were initiatednot to test whether a given concept or practice was likely to be effective. Rather, theyrepresent a staged implementation of a practice intended from the beginning to bescaled up at a national level. One example of this would be the practice of continuousassessment which was identified as one of the 17 components of BPEP II. Nonetheless,continuous assessment has proceeded only in a small number of districts and seems tobe undergoing serious modifications given the difficulties it has encountered. Very nearto the end of BPEP II’s programme life it was being referred to by many as a pilot initia-tive.

57

Table 5-1: Pilot Programme Overview

Flexible

Schooling

Programme

School

outreach

Programme

Non-Formal

Education

Early Childhood

Development

Programme

Continuous

Assessment of

Each Student

Incentive

Programme

for Special Focus

Groups (incl. ‘inno-

vation fund’)

Inclusive

Education

Revised Classroom

Design

School Physical

Improvement Plan

Compulsory

Education

Programme

and Lead Resource

Centres

SIP/DEP Planning

(in twelve districts)

Durable Text books

Source: DOE, 2004.

Some of the pilots started during BPEP I have been carried forward to BPEP II.

BPEP I

(under the

ASP)

BPEP I

(under the

ASP)

BPEP I

BPEP I

BPEP II

BPEP II

BPEP II

BPEP II

BPEP II

BPEP II

BPEP II

BPEP II

Title Start Funding Status/Comments Evaluationsource

Basket fund

Basket fund

Basket fund

Basket fund

Basket, with

TA from

Finnish Aid

Basket fund

Basket fund

with TA from

Danida

Basket fund

with direct

TA from

Danida

Direct

funding from

Danida

Ongoing in 12-14 dis-

tricts. Concerns on suc-

cess raised in key

informant interviews.

Ongoing in 12-14 dis-

tricts. Similar concerns

as flexible schooling.

Ongoing as regular pro-

gramme. Success ques-

tioned, however high

demand reported.

Ongoing as national

programme

Policy on ECD was

developed on the basis

of pilots.

Carried out in five dis-

tricts from 2000 follow-

ing testing in two dis-

tricts during BPEP I.

Disappointing results

reported by some

stakeholders.

Carried out in 22 Village

Development

Committees (VDCs) –

scholarships to girls,

dalits, school uniforms

etc. Reported as insuffi-

cient, however high

demand.

Ongoing in four districts

with somewhat differ-

ent approaches in each

district. Relation to spe-

cial education not clear.

TA has not functioned

as envisaged.

No information.

A sub-component of the

SIP planning process

(see below).

Five Pilot districts.

Overlap with pilot dis-

tricts in the SIP

Programme.

See description above

for status and progress.

Key informants indicate

pilot has not proven

sufficiently cost-effi-

cient and sustainable.

Future unclear.

Continuous evaluation and

monitoring of both program-

mes was planned to feed into

the MTR but was not complet-

ed: to be carried out in 2004.

MTR recommended alterna-

tive schooling programmes be

integrated into NFE.

Evaluation study conducted in

2001, looking at ten commu-

nity based ECD programmes

in five districts.

Review carried out in 2001

and a technical report of the

pilot in 2003. Efforts at refo-

cusing and making more prac-

tical are reported.

No evaluation carried out.

MTR pointed out that incen-

tives might be seen as reward

to those already enrolled

rather than attracting new

attendees.

Some evaluation being car-

ried out. Reviewed in a work-

ing seminar in Kathmandu on

March 1-2, 2004.

No information.

No information.

Being monitored closely by

planning section in DOE. No

comprehensive evaluation

yet.

No final evaluation available

as of March 2004.


58



Planning, coordinating and managing pilotsThe evaluation found that there was no clear indication as to what constitutes a pilotproject, the number of pilots carried out, how they were being coordinated, nor theirimplementation status. As expressed by one key stakeholder: "I don’t know how thepilots started or where the pilots are going". There does not seem to be a standard guidefor what characterises a pilot (time-frame, contents, financial input, monitoring require-ments, management, rollout etc.).

Some initiatives that apparently initiated as ‘pilots’, started off almost as regular pro-grammes, rolling out in up to 20 districts (examples include the SIP/DEP planningprocess and the NFE programme).

During BPEP II, new pilots and tests (which were not listed in the original PIP) haveemerged both through the Basket Fund, and via direct donor funding. Some of theactivities are relatively substantial in terms of scope and subject (e.g. testing direct donorfunding to schools in four districts, funded by ESAT), while other interventions can besmall.

There is limited coordination and sharing of knowledge on new pilots, within MOESand DOE (perhaps as a result of some of the concentration of authority and responsibil-ity noted). Similarly, the pattern of openness and sharing of information on directly-funded pilot activities among external agencies is very mixed, with some agencies failingto share evaluative information, etc. While the Programme Education Board of MOESis charged with making decisions on ‘going to scale’, it does not act as a central point forapproving, monitoring and reporting on pilot activities. This leaves unclear the extent towhich different pilots overlap or duplicate activities. The Board or any other unit desig-nated with coordination and information sharing on pilot activities would need to beguaranteed access to all relevant information from external agencies and could thenmake the information readily available to all key stakeholders.

Contributing to informed decision-makingA common feature for all BPEP II pilot (or pilot-like) activities was that they were to bemonitored and evaluated regularly over a period of two and a half years to gain knowl-edge and experience for implementation and/or modification of activities. The fact thatmost pilots were not being systematically assessed limited opportunities for meaningfulfeedback or the sharing of information (see Table 5-1). With regular monitoring, theMTR would have been able to provide advice on whether the pilots should be scaled upor down – or terminated.

While the MTR recommended that all pilots be reviewed before the end of BPEP II toinform EFA programming, this has not been completed. The evaluation found no over-all system was in place to perform this assessment, or any comprehensive plan for fol-lowing up and/or providing feedback on existing pilots (or for new pilots implementedbeyond PIP).

The final decision on whether a project should be scaled up or down is formally takenby the Programme Education Board (MOES). So far, the Board apparently has nottaken any final decisions – not even for the most ‘obvious’ cases.

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The findings noted above are further supported by detailed evaluation information gath-ered during the district visits (see Annex 4: Pilot Programmes Reviewed). The districtvisits included reviews of pilot activities in the areas of continuous assessment of studentprogress2, inclusive education (examined along with ongoing activities in special needseducation), and the SIP/DEP process.

5.3 Monitoring & Evaluation

Ongoing performance monitoring/evaluation of BPEP II is carried out though theemployment of the following key mechanisms: 1) PMIS and EMIS, 2) reports to dis-tricts and national level authorities, 3) annual reviews of district AWPB by DOE, 4)qualitative monitoring by schools and districts through assessments and by the supervi-sion of classroom practices by RPs and SSs, and 5) the system of joint donor-govern-ment monitoring and review missions.

School data collection efforts have resulted in Nepal being able to produce a compre-hensive annual statistical yearbook (including gender disaggregated data) and pro-gramme status reports to inform decision-makers about education indicators and BPEPprogress across the country.

Monitoring

Assigned Responsibilities Table 5-2 below identifies the monitoring specific responsibilities assigned to the statis-tics sections in MOES and DOE, the DEOs, the schools and the RCs.

Table 5-2: Monitoring Responsibilities

Body Main Responsibilities

MOES The planning and monitoring division focuses on the performance of national institu-

tions/programmes, with responsibilities that include:

• Providing input to the MOF budget preparation and to the National Planning

Commission (NPC).

• Monitoring in connection with HMG/N’s anti-corruption action plan and acts as a

complaints office and deals with complaints from all levels.

• Trimester review meetings with DOE, District Education Offices, NFEC NCED, etc.

on activity performance as well as budget/expenditure status, recurrent funds and

development funds (loans, grants and government funds).

• Periodic supervisory visits to regions/districts/schools (recently).

(to be continued)


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2) As noted above, continuous assessment of students cannot, strictly speaking, be termed a pilot project sinceit features in the PIP for BPEP II as a core component of the programme. At the same time, it provides aninsight into the way that major initiatives were further tested under the programme.


(continued)

Body Main Responsibilities

DOE • Producing BPEP Status Reports

• Compiling information from all 75 districts for EMIS (e.g. students, teachers,

administrative personnel, school facilities, attendance, retention of students).

• Collecting district status reports. Districts compile data on programme implemen-

tation status, performance, progress and financial disbursements once a year.

This provides financial and physical indicators to facilitate a quarterly review of

the programme (for PMIS).

• Reviewing AWPBs.

Note: Actual data collection take places at school and district-levels, with the key participants being HTs, RPs, District Statistic Staff and the DEO.

District and School • Quantitative monitoring, through collection of school data and submission of

level bodies EMIS forms.

• DEO compiling of district profiles.

• Qualitative monitoring and evaluation of progress and performance carried out by

RPs and SSs.

• At school level, SMCs and parents are involved in qualitative performance moni-

toring of teachers.

Quantitative data collection The introduction of EMIS signalled the beginning of harmonised data collection for theeducational sector in Nepal. At present, there are four layers of educational data flow:school, district, region and DEO. The Head Teacher (HT) of each school is responsiblefor completing a comprehensive and detailed 17-page form (manual data entry) on edu-cational information every year. The information covers NER, GER, number of schools,ECDs, teachers, trained teachers, etc. The forms for EMIS are to be verified by the RPs.Once the verification process is complete the forms are submitted to the DEO who isresponsible for collecting data for the entire district before submitting this to the DOE.Regional summaries are prepared by the Regional Education Directorate (RED), who isauthorised to undertake sample verifications of district data. Once DOE has compileddata from all 75 districts, the verification and analysis of the data begins and the statis-tics complied are used to produce the Annual Education Statistics Reports, AnnualBPEP II Status Reports, etc.

HTs and DEO staff receive a three-day training course in data collection and the use ofEMIS forms.

Qualitative monitoring Qualitative monitoring is undertaken by the RPs and SSs, who, amongst others, areresponsible for visiting schools in their catchment areas to monitor student and teacherperformance. RPs and SSs conduct regular meetings with the HTs in their districts andmonthly meetings are held with the DEO. SMC members are trained to take up therole of monitoring attendance and regularity of teachers in schools.

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Monitoring and evaluation processes face a number of challenges and constraints,including the following:

• Accuracy and Reliability of Data: The problems with accuracy and reliability ofEMIS statistics, and shortcomings being experienced at the data entry level, are welldocumented in Chapter 4. The evaluation team was advised that DOE has a futureplan to computerise those districts with adequate capacity (approximately 62 districtshave reliable electricity, 42 have computers) and to create a data network to promotedata reliability. Validation of data is a task that should be undertaken by the REDand DOE, although the vast volume of data and the remoteness of many districtswill complicate such efforts. Now, the statistics department of DOE can ‘call to veri-fy data’ (if districts have telephone lines), and this is done where figures show dra-matic year-to-year discrepancies. This verification process, however, does not reach alarge number of schools in remote areas, and in some cases districts cannot even sub-mit data.

• Capacity Issues: With only twopeople in the Statistics Depart-ment of DOE responsible forcompiling, verifying, analysingand disseminating national edu-cational data on behalf of 75 dis-tricts, the task was daunting andhad consequences for the efficien-cy of data processing. The evalua-tion team found that DOE wasstruggling with a two-year back-log of basic school statistics anddata reports, and as one officialsaid: "…the system is running inan ad-hoc situation". For exam-ple, budget allocations made in2004 are at present based on fig-ures from 2002. In response, pro-cessing of the annual EMIS datacollected from 25,000 schools is now being outsourced to a private company. Theevaluation noted that: 1) the National School Statistics report for 2002 was to bemade available in April 2004, 2) the Statistics Report for 2003 was scheduled forrelease in June 2004, and 3) only 35 out of 75 districts have submitted their districtdata.

• Burdensome Demands: Schools and districts are also expected to collect data uponrequests from NGOs/INGOs, centrally funded research studies and independentsurveys. This naturally adds to the burden of the school and district management.There is evidence that some NGOs have introduced new, more comprehensivemethodologies of data collection that are time-consuming.

• Duplication/Overlap: Most NGOs claim to coordinate their efforts with the DEO,however in some cases there are examples of direct overlap between the data collect-


62

A district perspective: Conflicting data collection models in Surkhet

The household surveys and the CommunityManagement Information System (CMIS) pro-moted by Save the Children UK/Norway inSurkhet are very detailed, micro level data col-lection methods, which consume a great dealof teacher time and at the same time add tothe data collection activities related to EMIS,SIP and other requests. The data, which isobtained from these household surveys andCMIS systems, is supposed to feed into thework of the District statistics officer, but therewas no confirmation of this – indicating over-lap and duplication of work for teachers.


ed for NGO purposes and regular monitoring purposes. As one district official putit: "There are often too many ‘data roads’ and the sources are not the same… thisresults in different figures ‘floating around’ in the system."

• Feedback and evaluation: At district level, key informants wanted to be reassuredthat their data collection efforts were justified through informed decision-making.Some expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of adequate feedback being receivedfrom the central level, describing their communications as being ‘one-way’. Althoughthe Monitoring and Planning Divisions of MOES and DOE perceive themselves as‘a bridge between the districts and decision-makers’, it is not clear how the presentmonitoring system supports effective decision-making. According to the PIP, a num-ber of evaluation studies were to be carried out during BPEP II. For example: 1) theeffect and impact of major interventions (such as the appointment of female teach-ers, automatic promotion, establishment of RCs, and recurrent teacher training)were to be assessed, and 2) changes in the classroom practices and revisions to strate-gies relating to teacher training, curriculum and textbooks development were to beevaluated in the second and fourth year of the programme. Despite these explicitplans, the use of evaluation does not seem to have been mainstreamed into the oper-ational culture of BPEP II.

The MTR of 2002 produced two valuable reports (Third Party Review Report, Tech-nical Panel Review Report) that examined programme performance at a macro level andreported on how BPEP II could be better focused during its remaining two years.Unfortunately, in the period since, both HMG/N and the external agencies have tendedto focus their attention on EFA development, rather than on following up on theactions recommended in the Review.

5.4 Involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations

Key informants in civil society revealed that there are some 195 major NGOs andINGOs working in Nepal, along with thousands of community or district-based organi-sations (CBOs). The evaluation was also advised that the majority of major NGOs areinvolved in education-related activities.

The relationship between NGOs and the government has changed considerably over thelife of BPEP II. According to key informants there were large differences in opinionbetween government and NGOs in the five years preceding the start of BPEP II. Thegovernment’s view of civil society organisations during BPEP II has been characterisedby more openness towards an increased role, but the ‘third sector’ still does not seem tobe considered as a partner. The ASIP 2003/04 refers to ‘making’ civil society effective, ina directive rather than collaborative fashion.

In the context of EFA preparation, there appears to be more openness within the gov-ernment to consult with civil society and include them at the front end of the planningprocess. Key informants in the civil society sector stated that there was a marked differ-ence between the level of participation at the beginning of BPEP II as opposed to theEFA preparation process. They pointed out that there was a ‘tremendous change’ in thelevels of networking and partnership at the national level. With respect to the EFA doc-ument, NGOs advised that they had been consulted and that their positions had beenincluded, to differing degrees, in the final document.

63

The evaluation team noted that there was evidence of NGOs being involved in coordi-nated approaches to BPEP II programming. Key informants at DOE and in civil societystated that ECD had formed a steering committee at the national level, which includesINGOs/NGOs in order to establish a common approach to ECD. At the field level inTaplejung and Dhading, the team members found that there was some coordinationbetween NGOs and DDCs (but less with the DEOs). It is worth noting that, in Taple-jung, both the DEO and local NGOs did not view each other favourably.

The evaluation also made the following observations about the involvement of NGOs inBPEP II programming:

• NGOs, especially INGOs often operate their own programs outside of, but affiliatedwith BPEP II in areas such as teacher training, SIP preparation, provision of teach-ing materials, scholarships, uniforms, materials for students, teacher salary support,classroom construction and furniture.

• There were not many cases of NGOs operating in an advocacy mode outside ofBPEP II structures. One example that was cited by a number of key informants wasthe role of ethnic activist, with language groups being involved in demanding moth-er tongue learning and textbooks.

• The BPEP II PIP includes a statement of government recognition that one of its pri-mary roles vis-à-vis civil society is the provision of an enabling environment. It alsostates that democracy, rights, and the inclusion of disadvantaged groups are linked toan active, empowered third sector. However, in the preparation of BPEP II it wasgenerally and widely assumed that the role of NGOs and CBOs would be limited tofacilitating community mobilisation and to initiating and supporting NFE activities.

• The PIP outlines some of the existing and expected roles for NGOs including organ-ising programs such as OSPs, school outreach, flexible schooling, special educationprograms, adult literacy, and ECD. In many cases, funds were planned to be chan-neled directly through NGOs who would take part in implementation.

• In the case of ECD, the PIP specifically refers to NGO involvement in the monitor-ing and supervision of ECD programmes (PIP, 1999, p. 28). DEOs (via the RCs)were also expected to initiate school-based innovations, and to work with NGOs andCBOs in mobilizing communities to participate in NFE activities.

• External agencies have directly involved NGOs in their programmes. Key informantsat JICA stated that they involve NGOs in social mobilisation activities related totheir programme implementation. Others, such as Norway, saw NGOs as a means ofaddressing issues raised by the insurgency in areas where the government representa-tives have difficulty in gaining access.

NGOs see their role as complementary to government – largely working to enhancecapacity and strengthen the system.


The BPEP II PIP underscored the lack of coordination between BPEP I and NGO runprograms, specifically in the area of special education (PIP, 1999, p. 25). While raising


64


the issue, the PIP did not offer any specifics on how this issue was to be addressed, oftenstating that coordination "has been developed" (PIP, 1999, p. 26). The field visits toboth Surkhet and Banke provided examples of NGO policies, programmes and practicesthat were in contradiction with BPEP II. These contradictions were in the areas of sala-ries, staffing polices, and planning processes.

With respect to the SIP planning in particular, key informants stated that various NGOswere supporting these processes but with their own methodological approaches or with-out DOE coordination. Another area of observed and reported overlap/contradictionwas the provision of scholarships. In some cases, NGO scholarships, especially for girls,were substantially larger than government scholarships. DOE informants stated thattheir monitoring of these activities was weak and that they were not aware of the differ-ent NGO programs giving scholarships and uniforms.

65

6. Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources


This chapter identifies evaluation findings and observations as they related to two mainevaluation issues:

• Have procedures for allocating and distributing financial resources to the district andlocal levels, been both transparent and efficient? and

• What are the comparative strengths and weaknesses of basket funding, direct fund-ing and interim arrangements?

The first step in the analysis was to map the financial processes related to resource allo-cation and budgeting for BPEP II.

The analysis in this chapter draws on: 1) the reviews and studies carried out in thecourse of BPEP II, 2) the studies carried out in connection with the preparation of thecoming EFA programme, and 3) the data collected during the evaluation mission.

6.1 Achieving Transparency and Efficiency

The global overall costs of the BPE sub-sector programme have been estimated at 427million USD3 for the period 1999/00 to 2003/04, and are comprised of the regular(mainly salaries and recurrent costs) and the development budgets (investment). Thedevelopment part of the budget is composed of several programmes, the largest of whichis CIP accounting for 112 million USD.

The financing modality of CIP is a pooled basket fund with five external contributors;they are Denmark, Norway, Finland, IDA, and the EC (with HMG/N providing 4.1percent counterpart funding). In parallel, ADB, UNICEF and JICA provide financingoutside the basket fund, usually in terms of well-defined projects. In addition, most ofthe agencies (basket and non-basket) provide direct funding, usually for TA. Directfunding from external agencies is mostly tracked outside the government financial sys-tem, and is, in most cases, managed by the agency concerned (following each’s respectivefinancial management procedures and rules).

The annual budget of the CIP is recorded in the Government’s budget (i.e. the Redbook), and is managed as a ‘nationally executed externally-funded project’.

Planning and Resource Allocation Instruments

In theory, resource allocation within BPEP II is a result over an overall planning andbudgeting process which should be iterative and involve all the levels in the sector.Needs assessment, plans and budgets are to move from school to central level via the district level. In other words, not only is the resource allocation a result of inter-sectoral

67

3) See the Programme Implementation Plan (p. 51).

arbitration (between say health and education), but it is also an intra-sectoral arbitration(which goes from schools to the central level).

The Budget Planning Schedule, which initiates the planning process from the first weekof October, must ensure that: 1) the budget is presented to the Parliament by the secondweek of May, 2) the budget bill is approved by the Parliament by the fourth week ofJune, and 3) the authorisation to spend the budget allocation is communicated by thefirst week of the financial year. Annex 5 sets out the Budget Planning Schedule.

The BPEP II budget planning process builds on several planning/budgeting instrumentsand mechanisms. At the lowest level, SIPs are prepared in districts where BPEP II isbeing implemented (see also Section 5.1). In the most advanced districts, the SIP is pre-pared with the concurrence of the SMCs, HTs and teachers with the active supervisionand guidance of RPs. The SIP is based on a household level survey, which is conductedwithin the catchments area of the schools. The outcome of the survey is fed into a SIP,which each school prepares for a five-year period. Each SIP is to provide with tentativeannual breakdowns for the five-year period, and a detailed activity/fund breakdown forthe first year. The SIP is prepared in response to access and quality considerations high-lighted by the household survey and the specific improvement requirements of therespective schools.

For the districts, the resource allocation is made according to the DEP. The DistrictEducation Committee (DEC) exercises an oversight on the district level educationalactivities and the production of DEP. On the one hand, the district budget ceiling istheoretically provided at the central level (DOE), but on the other the district SIPs allconcur to define the DEP (with the involvement of active SMC members, RPs, andDEO staff members).

The DEPs and the central level plans are used to develop the ASIP and AWPB. A work-shop is held at the DEO level where all the DEPs are consolidated by DOE and areadjusted to the budget ceiling as enunciated by the National Planning Commission(NPC). Discussion on the regular budget is conducted between MOF and MOES,while the discussions on the development programmes and budget is carried out byNPC, MOES and MOF. Finally, at a national level, the programmes and budgets areapproved on the basis of NPC’s rolling five-year plan, the PRSP, and the DevelopmentCredit Agreement (DCA).

Although the SIP process was intended to be highly participatory, key stakeholderspointed out that resource allocation to the districts remains to a large extent a centrally-driven process which is not very interactive – and dictated predominantly by the district/central level allocation priorities rather than the specific local needs of the schools.

The evaluation made the following observations about how SIP is functioning at theschool level:

• The development of the SIP is, up to now at least, very much externally driven by,for example, Resource Persons and Head Teachers.

• The relevance of the SIP seems to fall short, since the SIP is not used for manage-ment purposes, and only covers a fraction of the budget managed at school level.


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• Some SMC and PTA members alike questioned the amount of work required todevelop SIPs versus the benefits (resources) gained.

• Budget ceilings should underpin prioritisation and planning at school level, SIPsshould not allow for exaggerated ‘wish lists" of investment activities.

At district level, however, the overall budget is elaborated with respect to a budget ceil-ing and standards.

An example of the relative inflexibility of this budgeting system can be seen in districtswhere there has been a significant shift in school age populations from areas of insecuri-ty to more stable ones, usually near the district headquarters. When that happens, thereseems to be no way to adjust teacher allocations which are based on district-wide schoolage population data, which is itself estimated by projecting annual growth from the dateof the most recent census. The result is that schools which may have severe overcrowd-ing do not receive increased budget allocations.

Resource Allocation Criteria

The BPEP II status report 2002/03 stated: "DOE in consultation with local level stake-holders developed a set of objective, transparent and intelligible criteria for allocatingresources to districts and SIP funding".

These criteria are set out in the inset below:

Criteria for Budget Allocation

Total BPEP II budget for particular fiscal year is allocated to the centre and the districts on the basis of the

following criteria:

1. Total Central Budget 20 percent

2. Total District Budget 80 percent

3. Physical facility improvement programme as decided by the centre

4. Lump sum amount of 2.5 million NPR for each district

5. SIP based development programme

a. Per correct age child NPR 150, 170, 200 for terai, hill and mountain

b. Partnership with VDC/Municipality at NPR 20,000 per VDC/Municipality

c. Grade 1 reform at NPR 9,000 per class

Remaining budget

6. Access and retention (30 percent) components: divided by the total net girl’s enrolment of the country

and multiplied by the net girl’s enrolment of the district

7. Learning achievement (40 percent) components: divided by the total children of the country and multi-

plied by the total gross children of the district

8. Capacity building and management components: divided by the population of between 6-10 age group

children of the country and multiplied by the population of the children between 6-10 age group of the

district

Total District Budget = (3+4+5+6+7+8)

Source: DOE, Status Report, November 2003

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This list of criteria demonstrates that while the budget allocation is transparent, it is alsovery mechanical, diminishing the room for manoeuvre at district and school levels (e.g.ruling out a decision to conduct training rather than building classrooms). However,going down from the district level to school levels, the transparency in budget allocationdiminishes considerably since there is: 1) no obvious link between budget allocation andplan (with the plan not made according to a budget ceiling), and 2) no evidence thatthe resources are prioritised according to the quality, or urgency of the interventions.

Budget Implementation

The first step in budget implementation is authorisation, the second is the release offunds, and the third is spending on activities.

Authorisation Once the programme and budget are approved by the Parliament (or Cabinet, if Parlia-ment is not in place), the authorisation process is triggered. In the initial stage in theauthorisation process, the MOF budget and planning section works out the breakdownof the budget according to Government’s chart of account line items. This authorisationprocess is entirely top-down, starting from the MOF and ending at each cost centre. Theprocess followed for budget and programme authorisation is charted in Annex 6.

If an authorisation comes just before the Dasain festival (September/October), it candelay programme implementation to the second trimester.

In practice, the programme and budget authorisation process can encounter delays thatimpact on when funds are released and activities commenced. Such delays can seriouslyimpede programme implementation. The evaluation team found indications that suchdelays were mainly caused at central/line ministry level, since the authorisation processrequires a breakdown of the approved budget which they control. This situation can beexacerbated in remote districts with no electricity, where it is difficult to inquire to thecentre as to why authorisations are delayed. The release of funds (advance payment) isalso dependent on the priority of the programme in the national budget.

It is important to remember that without authorisation from the MOF, the DistrictTreasury cannot and will not release funds to the DEO for specific activities fundedunder BPEP II.

Flow of fundsThe flow of funds is quite well defined in accordance with the HMG/N system. It startswith the release of funds that takes place from MOF to MOES to DOE and on downto concerned spending cost centres through subsequent authority letters.

The authorised programme and budget is released in instalments (advance payments) ona trimester basis and subsequently follows the reimbursement principle. Therefore, afterreceiving the authorisation letter, DOE sends a budget release request to the FinancialComptroller General’s Office (FCGO) for the 1st trimester. The FCGO checks whetherall necessary procedures have been completed (i.e. clearance of all monthly reimburse-ments of the trimester before the previous trimester), and whether the reimbursementhas been received from the basket donors. The FCGO then issues an order (authorisa-tion of funds release) to the concerned District Treasury Comptroller’s Office (DCTO)to release the trimester advance payment to DEO and other cost centres.


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In order to release the advance payment, DTCO checks at district level for authorisa-tion, irregularities, work plans and trimester progress report (the requirement is that 80percent of the planned activities each trimester should be completed and spent). Andeach month (except for the last month), the DTCO reimburses the DEOs after the sub-mission of statements of expenditures (SOEs). A chart depicting the process followed isprovided as Annex 7.

Rate of budget implementationThe BPEP II budget is drawn down according to HMG/N norms and procedures asintegrated with IDA (World Bank) rules for international procurement. Table 6.1 pro-vides an overview of the rate of budget execution from 1999/00 to 2002/03.

Table 6-1: Implementation of Budgets

Fiscal Year BPEP II Total Central Expenditures District Expenditures

Budget Execution Budget Execution Budget Execution

(NPR) percent (NPR) percent (NPR) percent

1999/00 992,800,000 53 percent N/A N/A N/A N/A

2000/01 1,108,729,000 64 percent N/A N/A N/A N/A

2001/02 1,273,345,000 72 percent 246,348,000 67 percent 1,026,997,000 73 percent

2002/03 2,347,066,000 70 percent 250,977,000 91 percent 2,096,089,000 68 percent

Source: DOE status report 2003, separate tables for the years 2001/02 and 2002/03 (provided by DOE).

The table clearly shows that since the beginning of BPEP II there has been a progressiveimprovement in the budget execution rate. However, information on budget implemen-tation at the central and districts was not accessible for all years, making it difficult toprovide a central versus local assessment for budget implementation.

Lack of knowledge of procurement procedures by HMG/N staff has been mentioned asthe main reason for the slow disbursement in the beginning of the programme (years 1and 2). These delays in the procurement of centrally purchased items such as steel forschool construction negatively influenced the beginning of a significant amount of con-struction work in the districts at that time.

The budget implementation figures are, understandably, available according to the gov-ernment chart of account expenditure categories, making very difficult to develop afinancial profile of the implementation of BPEP II by components/activity. The evalua-tion team did not encounter evidence that a regular monitoring of the budget imple-mentation by component is being performed.

At district level, component specific financial data exists, but no systematic consolida-tion is made on a regular basis regarding the centrally spent budget (65-4-411). Thismakes it very difficult to link expenditures under the budget to outputs/outcomes ofBPEP II.

Local involvement in budget implementation As stated in the BPEP II status report 2003: "the resource allocation and programmeintervention is based on the principle of subsidiarity underlying the necessity of allocat-ing resources to the site of implementation". This implies the devolution of the manage-ment of funds to the local level, including schools.

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Currently 96 cost centres are involved in the budget implementation of BPEP II: five atthe district level (DEOs) and five at the regional level (plus nine training centres) withthe remaining centres functioning at the central level. Individual schools are not costcentres – but are placed under the DEO cost centres.

Delegation of resources to districtsThe Government aims at a spending distribution between districts and central level of80 percent to 20 percent in favour of the districts. During the course of the missionhowever, it was made clear that some line items under the district budgets were spent bythe central level (on behalf of the districts). This, could, for example, involve the pur-chase of steel, vehicles and machinery and equipment and constitutes up to 22 percentof the district budgets.

Table 6-2: Distribution of budget – Central and Districts

Fiscal Proportion of district budget Actual Distribution (corrected)*

Year executed centrally Central Districts

1999/00 No data No data No data

2000/01 No data No data No data

2001/02 16 percent 31 percent 69 percent

2002/03 22 percent 33 percent 67 percent

Source: Calculations based on expenditure data provided by DOE

* For the correct actual distribution, the centrally spent identified line items have been removed from the district budgets and

included in the central budget.

In keeping with the planning and budgeting system, acquisitions and investments tendto follow a top down approach. For example, for all the planned classrooms, standardconstruction norms have been set, including for standard materials (such as steel) whichcan only be purchased centrally and in bulk (subjected to the IDA procurement rules ofinternational tendering) – tasks which could not be managed at the district or regionallevels.

However, there is a risk in the standardisation and the search for economy of scale sincethe centrally procured items may not be accompanied by necessary financial budgets forutilization in the districts. As an example, the Surkhet District Education Office servesas a depot to store items such as structural steel for use in adjoining districts. Unfortuna-tely, neither Surkhet, nor the surrounding districts have a budget allocation to transportthe steel to the sites.

Funds managed by the schools Based on key informant interviews, the proportion of the development budget managedby the schools is relatively low, with most of the budget being implemented at districtlevel (if not the central level). For BPEP II, what mainly goes to the schools will be theblock grant of NPR 166,000 (excluding the supply of steel) and scholarship schemesfinanced by the development budget. However, it is difficult to assess the funds mana-ged at school level since there is no consolidated statement at this level, and despite theallocation to the school level based on the SIPs, the management of funds is not entirelygiven to the schools.


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Accessibility of Data

The accessibility of reliable data is a problem in itself. Financial information varies con-siderably from report to report (with different formats). Historical financial data (bycomponent) from the beginning of BPEP II are not available. Given the lack of accessi-ble data, it is not surprising that regular financial monitoring by component and activityhas not been a clear part of the management cycle. However, poor data accessibility con-tributes to the lack of transparency.

While the annual status reports for BPEP II, at least in recent years, do present a finan-cial breakdown by component, it is unclear how this is linked to the financial reportingsystem.

6.2 Strengths and Weakness of Basket Funding

External Agency Contribution

The BPEP II budget planning process builds on input from the Joint Government-Donor Review Missions. The regular mission in November assesses progress made in thecurrent year and makes its observations/recommendations for the remaining period ofthe year. A joint government-donor planning mission is held in March to follow-up onthe observations/recommendations made by the review mission. It also prepares thedevelopment programme plan for the coming year, taking into account the observations/recommendations made by the review mission and the progress achieved thereafter. Thecriteria for the specific annual contributions to the programme are somewhat unclear.

Basket Fund Management

Once the annual contribution is announced, the funds can be transferred to the SpecialAccounts (SA) in the National Bank. There are three systems relating to the procedurefor transferring money to the SAs maintained by DOE: one related to the bilateraldevelopment agencies and two related to the WB.

For bilateral agencies, funds are transferred once the DOE has made requests to eachspecific agency. The request and replenishment is only made when the balance in theSAs is low. Thereafter, DOE draws down from the SAs the agreed share of each basketdonor. After the draw down, the SOEs are submitted to the WB, which verifies the eli-gibility. The eligibility of the funds is made in accordance to the IDA classification ofexpenditures (this has made it necessary to develop a cross linkage between the HGM/Nclassification of expenditures and IDA classification) and other in-place procedures. As aresult, the submission of the SOE does not automatically imply a detailed check of eligi-bility at the component level.

In the case of non-eligibility of items in the Statement of Expenditure (SOE), and nocorrective measures having been taken, the World Bank (on behalf of all the CIP partici-pants) will ask the HGM/N to return the money used for non-eligible expenses.

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For the WB two separate systems exist:

• The replenishment system entails the maintenance of a balance in the SA of 1.2 mil-lion USD (and the WB SA covers expenditures below that amount). Funds aretransferred (replenished) automatically from the WB. The draws on the SA are sub-jected to the same procedures as for bilateral funds.

• The reimbursement system entails a transfer directly from WB to DOE’s account inthe Treasury if the expenditures exceed 1.2 million USD (in order not to draw onthe SA). Prior to this transfer, the WB requires receipt of the consolidated SOEs.

The incentive built into the replenishment system is that the HGM/N is highly moti-vated to submit consolidated SOEs on a regular basis, given that the WB maintains abalance of 1.2 million USD to cover its allotment of total expenditures. The WB shareof the basket in the beginning was 22.5 percent (over four years), and currently it is2.59 percent.

The SAs are all open in the name of DOE. Therefore, DOE does not need the authori-sation of the FCGO to draw down on the SAs. The draw down will result in a depositin the treasury; here the FCGO will make the reconciliation in order to check whetherthe advance payment (made by HGM/N) is fully reimbursed.

In theory, a basket fund system, when working, provides a smooth way for HMG/N tofinance the expenditure plan. As already reported, however, at the beginning of the pro-gramme expenditure estimates were overly optimistic and HMG/N was not able to useall the funds provided in the basket (see Table 6-3 below). This resulted in a reactionfrom the external agencies so that replenishment of the basket proceeded at a slowerpace. During 2002/03, a temporary lack of financing in the basket fund was reported asthe pace of expenditures picked up.

By 2003/04, some external agencies reported that the accelerated pace of programmeexecution coupled with their inability to bring forward expenditures not made in previ-ous years (the problem of lapsing) had created a shortfall in the overall budget. Thisseems to have become less of a risk by the spring of 2004 as expenditure rates eased andcompensatory mechanisms were found.

In overall terms, the experience with the basket fund financing modality indicates that,after a somewhat difficult start, it was flexible enough to allow for a reasonably efficientand timely flow of resources. It was, however, characterized by rather heavy reportingrequirements and by complexities in such mundane areas as coding of expenditure lineitems.

Table 6-3 below identifies the financial resource flow from donors (and special accounts)for the years 1998/99 to 2003/04:


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Table 6-3: Flow of Financial Resources (Basket Fund) from Donors and Special Accounts

(USD millions)

Donor 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004

Financial Resource Flows by Donor

World Bank n/a 0.60 1.42 1.95 n/a n/a

Denmark 3.40 3.20 2.50 3.20 2.70 12.00

Finland n/a 0.29 0.82 0.60 n/a n/a

Norway n/a 1.76 1.66 2.11 2.15 3.78

EC n/a 2.06 - 2.12 1.68 6.90

Total n/a 7.85 6.40 9.98 n/a n/a

Draw down from special accounts

World Bank - 1.55 2.13 n/a n/a

Denmark 0.0041 2.65 2.20 n/a n/a

Finland 0.0005 0.51 0.42 n/a n/a

Norway 0.0015 1.62 1.32 n/a n/a

EC - 1.53 1.27 n/a n/a

Total 0.0061 7.86 7.34 n/a n/a

Notes: Source for figures on financial resource flows by donor: For Denmark, EC and Norway data providedduring the field visit in March 2004 (for the years 1999/00 and 2001/02 the data is the evaluation team’s ownconversion to USD). Otherwise source is MTR 2002, joint Aide-Memoire. The source for figures on draw downfrom special accounts is the MTR 2002, joint Aide-Memoire.

6.3 Direct Funding

Direct funding initiatives are managed directly by the donor itself and are subjected toits own norms and rules (which do not necessarily follow those of HMG/N). Most ofthe basket donors and the other BPEP II donors provide direct funding, either in termsof projects or TA. According to the list of donor assisted current projects in the educa-tion sector provided by FACS/MOES, there are in total 38 bilateral agreements in theeducation sector.

Most of the direct funding resources except for the JICA and ADB support are notrecorded in the national accounts or the Red Book4, and therefore are not subjected toany budget implementation monitoring from HMG/N. As a result, the governmentdoes not/cannot keep track of the rate of implementation and the financial implicationsof direct funded projects. This has ownership implications.

The most common reason mentioned for providing direct funding by agencies partici-pating in the CIP (basket) is to provide a flexible funding source for piloting activitiesapproved by HMG/N but which cannot be planned and budgeted for in advance andapproved through the Red Book system. Key stakeholders interviewed from bothHMG/N and external agencies conceded that some specific forms of TA such as trainingin third countries (e.g. India) would be difficult to fund through the Red Book for policyreasons. They also pointed out that direct funded activities tended not to be subject tothe same kind of joint coordination and discussion and, hence were at risk of duplica-tion, overlap or simply being rushed into place without adequate consideration of theneeds of HMG/N or local communities. One example pointed out to the team was the

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4) JICA reports that its contributions began to be recorded in the Red Book from the current fiscal year.

development of two different systems of teacher certification training funded by two dif-ferent external agencies in a short period of time.

From the Nepalese perspective, the use of the direct funding modality contributes to thelack of transparency and accountability (e.g. the audit reports of the project are not sub-mitted to the Auditor General). In addition, this causes the risk of duplication of activi-ties within the sector.

In any given year the volume of direct funding can be substantial. It was not possible tocompile a complete profile of direct funding given the very different ways that donorsaccount for direct funding flows (and gaps in the information provided by donors to theevaluation). Nonetheless, it is illustrative to note that in 2000/01 the total of directfunding reported by Denmark, Norway, the EC, JICA and UNICEF was USD 11.34million. Indeed, Table 6-4 below indicates that direct funding has exceeded resourcesprovided under the basket fund for any given year.

Table 6-4: Flow of Direct Funding from Donors (USD millions)

Donor 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004

Basket Fund donors

World Bank n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Denmark5 2.10 2.60 2.50 2.20 4.10

Finland n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Norway - 0.11 0.12 0.25 0.29

EC - 0.29 0.60 0.50 0.35

Direct funding donors

JICA6 6.84 7.65 6.37 - 5.70

UNICEF 0.60 0.70 0.55 0.57 0.72

ADB n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Total n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Total direct funding without

WB, Finland and ADB 9.54 11.34 10.13 3.52 11.16

Basket funding 7.91 6.40 9.98 n/a n/a

Source: Data provided during the field visit in March 2004 and data for EC and UNICEF have been provided after the field visit.

Except for Denmark and UNICEF, the figures have been provided in national currencies (i.e. NOK, EUR and YEN). Conversion to USD

has been made as of 1 July in any given year.


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5) The figures are per calendar year i.e. 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and include TA such asinternational contracts (not advisors).

6) The figures cover major construction materials to the Government (material grant aid project).

7. Donor Coordination & Ownership


In responding to a number of key evaluation issues, this evaluation set out to measurethe effectiveness of donor coordination, monitoring and ownership mechanisms, proces-ses and practices. In addition, it was to address whether BPEP II had helped to improveon donor coordination activities. The findings and observations of the evaluation foreach of these foci are presented in the following sections. The chapter also identifies howBPEP II may have contributed to the strengthening or weakening of the national owner-ship of educational sector programming in Nepal.

7.1 Donor Coordination

Not long after the commencement of BPEP II, HMG/N initiated the development of anational policy to strengthen the government's role in the management of foreign aid.The underlying analysis was finalised at the beginning of 2000, and the MOF’s subse-quent policy paper was entitled "Foreign Aid Policy, 2002".

To strengthen the government's role in aid coordination, the new Policy encouraged"…the Nepalese to assume a leadership role in project management", and suggested"…joint chairing of sector coordination meetings by the Ministry of Finance, the con-cerned line ministries and donors will be encouraged". It was expected that this Policywould lead to more effective partnerships among the involved parties (including govern-ment, private sector, civil society and donors), with HMG/N taking on a stronger rolein coordinating the actions of the external agencies – and in asserting ownership.

Donor coordination as it relates to the delivery of BPEP II is primarily carried outthrough three key mechanisms: 1) the BPEP II Local Donor Group, 2) Joint HMG/N-Donor Monitoring and Supervision, and 3) Thematic Group. Elaboration on each ofthese mechanisms is provided below.

It should be recognised that, to a degree, financial donor coordination also takes placethrough the joint mechanism managed by HMG/N and the WB to disburse the basketfund.

Local Donor Group

In the design and approval phase of BPEP II, there was no commonly agreed uponframework (i.e. Code of Conduct, Letter of Intent or Memorandum of Understanding)to regulate roles and responsibilities among the participating donors. Instead the PIPstresses that one donor will take the lead in each JRM, and that the subsequent Aide-Memoire would constitute the official channel of communication between the govern-ment and the donors. After a few missions, it became apparent that there was a need formore information sharing and coordination in the period between JRMs. This realisa-tion led to the establishment of the BPEP II LDG at the beginning of 2000. Also, thedecision was made to have a lead donor assigned on an annual, rotational basis to giveeach donor an equal role and voice in the coordination process over time.

From an HMG/N point-of-view, the LDG mechanism established a single point ofentry vis-à-vis the donor group.

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Danida was assigned the role of lead donor in 1999, Norad in 2000, WB in 2001,Finland in 2002, the European Community in 2003, and Danida again in 2004. Thedonors not involved in CIP funding have not played a role in the chairmanship of theLDG (although they remain members of the group). The donors participating in CIPmay occasionally meet as a group (without the others) when the topic of discussion con-cerns the specific financial mechanisms of the basket fund.

To formalise the role of the lead donor, a document entitled "Role of the DonorCoordinating Agency" was finalised in May 2001, setting out the following responsibili-ties for the position:

• Manage monthly LDG meetings (i.e. chair meetings, draft minutes etc.)

• Manage collaboration and communication with the government (except IDA relatedprocurement and financial management which is the responsibility of the WB)

• Monitor the context in which BPEP II is operating and share relevant informationwith the other donor partners

• Organise and lead the half-yearly JRM (including preparation and negotiation ofterms of reference, preparation of the mission programme etc.) and prepare Aide-Memoires, and

• Support the government in taking more responsibility for donor coordination.

In addition, the document emphasises the need for "…a strong coordination of thetechnical assistance available for the Programme outside the CIP".

In some cases, external consultants have been retained to lead the coordination process.For example, Finland in 2002 hired external staff to lead the coordination process,developing TOR for the external coordinator that were not significantly different fromthe responsibilities identified above.

In August 2003, the LDG was renamed the JLDG (Joint Local Donor Group) whenMOES and DOE took over chairmanship of the group. When Danida took over therole of lead donor in 2004, the lead donor position was re-labelled the ‘donor contactpoint’ (DCP), and a commitment was made to embrace the new donor harmonisationprinciples of the Rome Declaration. Instead of organising donor coordination, theDCP’s role is to support the HMG/N in its donor coordination efforts. The DCP, how-ever, is still responsible for organising meetings internally among the CIP and non-CIPdonors.

Overall, the management of the meetings of the JLDG have been undertaken in aneffective manner and have been well documented with minutes of each of the meetingsand, from 2003, with clear indications of who is responsible for action on the differentissues.

Officials of HMG/N interviewed during the evaluation noted that their role in thedirection of the JLDG has increased over time. As an example, they pointed to theirinvolvement in developing the Terms of Reference for this evaluation.


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Coordination of Technical Assistance In general, most if not all TA under BPEP II has been provided through some type ofumbrella agreement or Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between HMG and thecontributing partner. Hence, the evaluation found that the need for planning and coor-dination of TA with the government is well understood among the different partners.

During the implementation of BPEP II several practical attempts have been made tocoordinate TA in a more effective manner. Examples include the Gender Audit and theHIV/AIDS study. Both of these studies were co-financed by the EC/UNICEF andDenmark, and the international consultants used were selected by MOES/DOE – onthe basis of their technical expertise and experience – from a pool put forward by thedonors.

However, on the whole, and irrespective of this, the government and most of the donorsemphasised that long and short-term TA has been an area where very few concrete andmeasurable results have been achieved.

The inset below provides an indication of how donors are contributing.

Box 7-1: Overview of Selected TA Provided by Donors

Danida provides a TA Team: the Educational Sector Advisory Team (ESAT) with

specialists in general education and management, special needs education,

and physical infrastructure (and planning).

The European Community has an EC fund managed by Long-term TA specialised in Education and

Aid Management. They also provide a TA arm to the EC for Donor Coordination.

Finland provides a specialist long-term advisor to technical capacity development in the CDC.

Activities of this TA are funded through the basket fund.

DFID directly funds a technical advisor located in the FACS to assist both policy

and capacity development.

JICA provides a technical advisor working in the NFE Centre.

A Korean volunteer is working in ECED.

Norad funds an institutional linkage programme between Tribhuvan University and the

Ministry of Education and Research in Norway. The programme is implemented as a formative

research programme by CERID.

Danida funds an institutional linkage programme between MOES, the Danish University of Education,

the County of Copenhagen, the International Institute of Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris and

the National Institute of Educational Planning (NIEPA) in Delhi to develop MOES capacity for

educational planning and management.

Source: Aid Harmonisation, Report to His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and Donors by Jens Claussen and Kevin M. Lillis

(December 2003) and discussions with donor representatives.

While it is generally recognised that there are advantages to TA resources being managedas a "TA sub-basket", the current arrangements also would appear to be widely accepted(this is with TA resources being provided individually by donors in different frame-works, under individual bilateral agreements with the government and to selected insti-tutions, districts, and individuals).

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To assist the HMG/N in attaining an overview of TA resources, a TA Profile Form wasdeveloped by the LDG, and each donor was requested to fill-in information on their TAresources. The form included information on the formal framework for the TA, spend-ing authority, area of assistance etc. It was proposed that the LDG should be "a clearinghouse on the donor side of TA to the Programme".

A one-page explanatory note from the March 2001 mission elaborated on the purposeof strong TA coordination. The key message was the need for careful planning of TAbetween the donors and with the Government, so that TA can be coordinated andlinked closely to government planning and budgeting processes.

Based on the evaluation interviews with donors and DOE alike, the coordination of TAresources has clearly been more difficult than envisaged. Irrespective of good intentionsand the existence of formal agreements between the TA partner and the government, relevant government officials and particularly other donors have often not been fullyinformed about TA provisions by individual agencies. Initially a major part of the TAresources made available were channelled outside of regular government budgets andplanning processes. This means that they are not captured/recorded in the GovernmentRed Book system. However, increasingly donor partners ensure that resources providedoutside the basket fund are reported as part of the Government Red Book.

The lack of effective TA coordination has had occasional negative impacts on BPEP II,including occasional duplication of efforts in areas such as development of teacher train-ing curriculum. TA provided outside the CIP is sometimes suspected by donors inter-viewed to represent the pursuit of a special interest by a particular donor. When, asoccasionally happens, donors appear reluctant to share important project design andevaluation documents on directly funded TA with their peers (either directly or throughHMG/N), these suspicions are made even stronger.

Joint HMG/N-Donor Monitoring and Supervision

The framework to enable joint government-donor monitoring of the programme is pri-marily the process of JRM (described in the PIP as the key forum for communicationbetween the government and the donors).

JRM have been conducted twice a year – one mission in March and one mission inNovember – with participation of the five CIP donors as well as the three non-CIPdonors. On occasions other donors have been invited along as observers. Important fea-tures of the JRM are documented in the PIP, the Aide-Memoires of the JRM in 1998and Aide-Memoires of the regular JRM.

The JRMs in 1998 indicated the following on the timing of the coordination process:

• The joint programme review and supervision will take place in early May andNovember of each year and be timed to provide donors with adequate evidence ofcompliance and funds required. The timing of the missions will be linked to thebudget cycle. In the March mission, the donors will signal their position on the pro-posed work plan and budget before the government's development budget is final-ized. The Terms of Reference for each joint donor supervision mission will be drawnup and agreed to collectively in advance by the donors.


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• The November mission will review annual reports and budgets giving attention tothe progress being made. The mission will check key indicators against performanceand review studies completed. This mission will focus more on confirming progress,resolution of bottlenecks, field visiting and specific areas of review resulting from theprogramming mission.

A detailed schedule for the JRM process was presented in the PIP for the entire durationof the programme. Although the donors initiate the JRM process, the role of the gov-ernment was made very clear: "…MOE is responsible for coordinating with otherGovernment institutions and non-government agencies…The government will oversee,coordinate and facilitate management and monitoring of the programme". Nevertheless,key stakeholders confirmed that donors assumed a very dominant role in the initialphase of BPEP II. This is also evidenced by the fact that the Terms of Reference ofJRMs and subsequent Aide-Memoires clearly are seen as "donor documents", drafted bythe lead donor, and with phrases such as: "the donors recommend…", "donors expect…"etc. In the Terms of Reference for the Second Joint Review Mission (November 17-29,1999) it is, in fact, stated that as an outcome of the mission "an Aide Memoire [will be]prepared by the donors on the proceedings of the joint missions", and further "The AideMemoire will be prepared for use in the debriefing of the Nepalese authorities".

At the end of 2001, the Aide Memoire of the JRM recommended that the next JRM (tobe held in March 2002) consider "…the possibility of transforming the Joint ReviewMissions into Joint Donor Government Missions". Through this invitation, the donorside recognised the insignificant role that the HMG/N so far had played in the JRP, andthe need to get it more actively engaged. A similar recommendation was made in thereport of the Technical Panel in November 2001, which also considered how to improvedonor coordination in BPEP II (Section 4.9).

In the Aide-Memoire of the March 2002, JRM it is emphasised in the introduction that:"this Aide-Memoire is the first to be produced as a joint HMG/N-Donor Aide Memoirefor the programme". And since the Aide Memoire is written with more explicit refer-ences to common views and assessments rather than only referring to "donor views", itappears that the government was taking a more active part in the JRP. This becamemore apparent from the second half of 2002 and into 2003.

In the annex to the Aide-Memoire of March 2003 JRM, the WB assessed the "Status ofCompliance with Triggers for Graduation from Adaptable Program Loan (APL) I toAPL II". One of the triggers is whether donor coordination is effective. The assessmentof the Bank included: "The Foreign Aid Coordination Section, MOES and the DonorFocal Point are working together for effective donor coordination. The Local DonorGroup is meeting on a regular basis to facilitate donor coordination. EducationThematic Group, which includes all donors working in the education sector, is also con-tributing to enhance donor coordination. The continued strengthening of MOES/DOEleadership has greatly facilitated donor coordination".

Based on interviews with all CIP and non-CIP donors, there is a general agreement thatcoordination efforts by the government are much more significant today than when theprogramme was initiated.

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Focus of meetingsThe focus of the discussions amongst donors and with the government during the JRMs(and also in the LDG meetings) has been mostly on concrete implementation issues,finances, AWPB, ASIP and individual activities. Hence, in the initial years of the pro-gramme there appears to be very limited annual follow-up on overall programmaticissues.

This was addressed in the MTR Report that made recommendations to: 1) "work outan implementation schedule, indicators and benchmarks" for the programme, 2) get itapproved by the LDG, 3) repackage the 17 programme components into five, and 4)present annual targets of BPEP II as a basis for comparing these against programme levelindicators.

After the MTR it seems that much of the programmatic focus of the JRM and LDGmeetings has been on the EFA successor programme. In the evaluation interviews anddiscussions with donor partners and government officials, few wanted to discuss the pastfrom a programmatic view while most were eager to talk about what would be the focusof EFA and how programme preparations were proceeding.

Thematic Group

The concept of thematic donor groups was originally launched by UNDP in an attemptto improve overall coordination efforts within sectors. An Education Thematic Groupwas formed in Nepal in 1999 under joint WB/Danida chairmanship with the intensionof handing over the chairmanship to the government as soon as it was deemed feasible.The Group met twice a year and served as a forum for exchange of information at amore general level in the educational sector (not specifically for individual programmesor projects). The Group included all key stakeholders in the sector, and all relevant part-ners in the sector participated.

A recent report prepared for HMG/N summarized the achievements of the ThematicGroup:7

• Establishment of an Agenda Formulation Committee (October 2001)

• Inclusion of all relevant donors in the meetings

• Sector coordination between sub-sector programmes such as BPEP II

• Running debate on SWAps and their application in Nepal, PRSP, the Education Act,and wider strategic issues

• The DOE chaired the meeting for the first time in August 2001

The Thematic Group has not been active since the middle of 2003.


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7) Aid Harmonisation, Report to His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and Donors by Jens Claussen andKevin M. Lillis, December 2003


7.2 Ownership

The development of national ownership of large and complex sub-sector programmes ineducation supported by both national and externally mobilised resources is a multifac-eted task. A key determinant is the national government's ability and interest in: 1) pro-gressively taking on ownership of the various steps in the programme cycle, and 2)determining the instruments and modalities used to channel financial and technical sup-port.

Factors Increasing National Ownership

The evaluation addressed how BPEP II had contributed over time to five key factorslinked to increasing national ownership:

• Increase in national control of policy agenda (accompanied by a wider national dia-logue on policy, inside and outside of government)

• Setting targets and indicators which are realistic in relation to the needs and capaci-ties of national and local stakeholders

• Harmonisation of donor practices and procedures with those of national and localactors

• A reduction of involvement of donors in management areas which are properly anational or local responsibility

• A reduction of donor visibility or donor association with key national programmesover time.

In the shift from BPEP I to BPEP II one of the primary objectives was to ensure thatHMG/N was more firmly established in the driver's seat. As mentioned previously,DOE was successfully established as part of BPEP II to take charge of the task of imple-menting BPEP through regular government structures and mechanisms. Thus, theprocess of developing the capacity of DOE to increasingly be responsible for planningand implementation of the entire programme has enabled the government to take morecontrol and be less dependent on project units, which in the end (and with some impor-tant reservations) has contributed to increased national ownership.

The primary illustration of an increase in control of the national policy agendas hasbeen the engagement of HMG/N in the formulation of EFA. The EFA National Plan isa Nepali production with more than 2,000 national stakeholders, representing all levelsof government involved in the formulation of the document. In addition, CBOs, NGOsand INGOs were involved in consultations for the new programme in contrast to theirinvolvement in the planning of BPEP II. Given the high interests among central govern-ment stakeholders to discuss the EFA programme during the evaluation process, it isclear that the government has a significant element of control of this policy agenda.

On the other hand, one cannot jump to the conclusion that external agencies havetransferred full control of the policy agenda to HMG/N based on the EFA experience. Areview of the core document and of the ASIP for 2004-05 indicates that Nepal will haveextreme difficulties in meeting some of the targets specified in the plan. It is also clear

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that some of the core strategies in the plan (though grounded in the Tenth Plan PRSPand the 7th Amendment to the Education Act) show a strong external agency influence.

The issue concerning targets and indicators realistic to government capacity and reflec-tion of national interest can be seen as reflected in, for example, the plan to integrate theBPEP II-funded women teachers into the government system. Some 3,000 out of 5,000of these posts have been regularised (i.e. created and made permanent). Only thosefemale teachers, who have passed permanent teacher exams (from the teacher servicecommission), can apply for these posts. It should be noted, however, that very few arecertified and only a few will apply. If this happens, one of the stronger gains from BPEPII in gender terms may be lost.

The area of community managed schools still requires considerable strengthening in themove forward to EFA. Under a WB Education Innovation Loan (outside BPEP II) andthrough a smaller UNDP funded pilot, Nepal has been experimenting with the transferof management responsibilities for schools to local communities (including responsibili-ties for hiring and dismissing teachers). Those schools choosing to become communityschools receive an initial block grant of 100,000 NPR.

In the district visits, the evaluation encountered a great deal of fear and resistance amongteachers and parents to the idea of community managed schools as foreseen in the accel-erated programme supported by the WB and called for under EFA. There is a strongbelief that only the poorest and least well-supported schools will opt for this status, andthat once management has been transferred, the level of support from the national sys-tem will drop dramatically. There is also a widespread perception that SMCs are not yetable to take on the responsibilities inherent in the concept.

The evaluation did not develop a position on the ultimate suitability or effectiveness ofcommunity managed schools. The evidence, however, clearly indicates that manyschools and communities do not understand the implications of the choices they arebeing asked to make and there is widespread trepidation and resentment. In light ofthese facts, there is a concern that some elements of the new EFA programme might notadequately reflect local needs/capacities, and in turn this could ultimately undercutnational ownership.

The issue concerning donor practices and procedures matching those of government alsopresents a mixed experience. On the positive side, the five CIP donors agreed on com-mon procedures for support to the core programme. CIP is recorded in the Government’sbudget (i.e. the Red Book), and is managed as a ‘nationally executed externally-fundedproject’ with MOF, MOES and DOE in key roles responsible for managing the fivedonors’ contribution. One deviation concerning the government's procurement systemwas, however, required as the WB’s procurement regime should be followed. It is alsoimportant to point out that the direct funding modality used by basket and non-basketdonors (and financing and technical agencies) are much less harmonised with HMG/Nprocedures and that they lack transparency.

Donors are strongly of the opinion that HMG/N’s increased role in donor coordinationreflects a declining level of donor involvement in programme management. The govern-ment now drafts Aide-Memoires, arranges joint donor monitoring missions, chairsmonthly meetings, provides office space to meetings, arranges logistics, drafts necessarydocuments, etc. – tasks that were earlier undertaken by either donors or consultants.


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This means that donors have become less visible in the direct management of donorcoordination.

At the school level, several stakeholders talked of increased ownership through moreinvolvement in SMCs and the planning process, with parents and teachers being able toexpress increased influence and ownership of decision-making processes. However, thisstance was somewhat mitigated by developments such as the aggressive push to transferschools to community management.

In a scenario of increasing national ownership over time, one would reasonably expect tosee a continuing reduction in the visibility of external agencies in the capital, but moreimportantly in the districts – and indeed perhaps a decline in the visibility of BPEP II asa separate programme within the ongoing process of attaining education for all. Theevaluation found no evidence that this is actually occurring. In fact, the extent to whichBPEP II (and the external agencies which support it) remains a highly visible, ‘branded’entity at the district level is remarkable. For example, teachers, parents and administra-tors alike refer to UNICEF ECDs, Danish technical assistants and JICA school blockswith convincing knowledge and regularity. Materials, buildings and vehicles are oftenclearly marked as BPEP and with very apparent identification of the agencies that sup-port them. At one level, this creates momentum and pride in the programme, but atanother it reinforces a wide-spread national view that BPEP II is externally driven – and,unfairly, that all the good things in the basic education system are a result of externalinitiatives. On the positive side, the EFA Plan is much more broadly sectoral in natureand should, hopefully, avoid the kind of specific branding that has been associated withBPEP I/II.

Limitations on National Ownership

As previously noted, donors have not been able to ensure that a common modusoperandi is agreed to for the direct provision of TA under BPEP II. It is only in thecoming EFA programme that a ‘code of conduct’ has been agreed to among donors.This Code also deals with direct TA, which should improve on the ownership situationexperienced for BPEP II where a significant amount of TA was channelled outside ofnational planning processes and not managed in any coordinated fashion.

The evaluation was advised by stakeholders that, during the implementation of theBPEP II, there were numerous cases of donors (both CIP and non-CIP) initiating theirown missions and review processes irrespective of those of the government. Sometimesthese processes resulted from instructions by headquarters to initiate activities, or speedup disbursement, or even scale back resources due to political and financial interests.Such ‘parallel’ activities are perceived as being detrimental to national ownership objec-tives and are also counterproductive to ongoing activities. Sometimes this behaviourforces HMG/N to change direction in planning and implementation in order to fulfildonor wishes.

The evaluation found that, in some cases, the agencies providing assistance to developthe capacity of national systems and structures, expected to greatly accelerate the resultsachieved by "working outside the envelope". Normally, integrating a programme intonational structures implies following a national pace (and to some extent also nationalstandards) until capacity has been built.

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8. Responding to the Insurgency


Over the period of BPEP II, there has been a dramatic increase in the intensity of thesocial disruption and violence associated with Maoist insurgency. It is estimated that10,000 people have been killed as a result of the eight years of conflict. The delivery ofessential services has been disrupted in many parts of the country as a result of directtargeting by the Maoists or as a consequence of the general deterioration in the securitysituation of the country.

The education sector has been the subject of explicit targeting in terms of attacks oneducational facilities (including DEOs), school strikes (bandhs), challenges to the dailypractices of schooling, and the abduction of teachers and students. Schooling has alsobeen affected as a result of: 1) more widespread disruption (such as national bandhs), 2) the migration of people out from insurgency-affected areas, and 3) the lack of mobi-lity of state officials beyond district headquarters in many areas of the country.

This Chapter highlights the impact of the insurgency on BPEP II and how educationpersonnel at various levels have responded to the challenges this has presented. It drawson studies8 prepared by BPEP II partners and on field data collected during the districtvisits carried out for the evaluation.

Note: It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to investigate the educational situationin the seriously conflict-affected areas of the country.

8.1 Impact on Basic & Primary Education

In February 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) initiated a ‘People’s War’aimed at establishing a republic and initiating constitutional reform. Initially, the con-flict was confined to particular areas of the country, mainly in the mid-western hill areas.However, over the course of the eight years of the insurgency, the violence has intensi-fied and the geographical spread of the conflict has extended. Now almost all districts ofthe country are affected by the conflict to varying degrees.

Key targets of the Maoists have included symbols of state power (e.g. police posts andgovernment offices), and economic infrastructure such as rural banks, telecommunica-tion structures, and bridges. Development activities in many of the most affected areashave been severely constrained or halted. Most development organisations are unable tooperate in the rural areas under Maoist control and have pulled back to district head-quarters or to Kathmandu. Government institutions such as banks and police posts havealso been pulled out from rural areas and relocated in larger towns and district head-quarters.

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8) European Commission Education Coordination Office (2002), Education in Difficult Circumstances: ADiscussion Paper. Prepared for the Review Meeting of BPEP II, December 2002; Male, C. (2002) AReview of Recent Work in Progress on Issues of Education in Conflict in the Context of Nepal. Preparedfor ECECO, April 2002; ODC (2003) Challenges and Opportunities to Service Delivery in Nepal in theCurrent Conflict Situation. Report prepared for NORAD / Royal Norwegian Embassy. November 2003.

Schools appear to be continuing to operate throughout the country. However, concernsover education policy and the everyday practices of schools have been a key element ofthe Maoists’ demands. There is no systematic data on the impact of the conflict onschooling. However, from the information available, it is clear that educational institu-tions have been adversely affected by the conflict in a number of ways:

• Direct demands on education institutions: School staff interviewed as part of theevaluation reported that Maoists have made direct demands on them to alter theeveryday practices of the school. These have included calls to: 1) remove photo-graphs of the King and Queen from the school office, 2) stop the singing of thenational anthem during assembly, 3) cease collecting fees from students, and 4) dis-play Maoist posters in the school premises. Such claims are supported by evidencefrom secondary source material. It has also been reported by education officers thatMaoist groups have taken particular interest in scholarship distribution, forcing HTsin some areas to distribute funds in ways that the insurgents felt were more equitable.

• School Closure: A significant number of school days have been lost as a result offorced closures – either as a result of education-specific strikes or general shutdowns.Between 1996 and 2002, the Maoists called for 56 national strikes (in addition tonumerous education specific and local closures). Private schools have been forciblyclosed in a number of districts, resulting in increased enrolment in government insti-tutions. According to an Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) report of 2001,over 2,000 schools (including 200 government schools) have been closed, affectingover 250,000 students. Overcrowding in some school has been exacerbated by theinflux of children to the towns from the surrounding insurgency-affected rural areas.The speed at which central level authorities can respond to this shifting demand forschooling is limited due to the lag time in collecting and collating educational data.Closure of educational institutions has also impacted on teacher training provided atPTTCs and through the RC system.

• Impact on Teachers: Teachers in many areas are ‘caught in the middle’ between thesecurity forces and the Maoists – and are fearful of being targeted or victimised byboth sides. It appears that teach-ers who have previously beenpolitically active for the main-stream parties have been subjectto particular scrutiny by theMaoists. Teachers’ Associationsestimate that over 150 teachershave been killed during the con-flict and many hundreds more areno longer in post (whether as aresult of forced migration or as aresult of abduction). Teachersthroughout the country are beingforced to make ‘donations’ to theMaoists, further adding to theclimate of fear. The lack of sup-port for teachers and the uncer-tainty they experience over howto respond to the situation was


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A District Perspective: Caught in the Conflict in Sindhupalchowk

Teachers and Resource Persons reported thatboth the Maoists and army came to the schoolto ask the teachers questions about what theother group was doing. Maoist slogans wereevident on the walls of the school and nearbybuildings. A red banner had been hung on theschool balcony with a list of Maoist demandsand slogans relating to the need for a republic,to follow the ‘Prachanda Path’, to releaseMaoist prisoners and to change the existingeducation policy and make sure education isfree to class 10. Teachers stated that the armywould request them to remove slogans andbanners, but that the Maoists would put themback again.


evident in discussions at school, district and central level. Teachers’ Association offi-cials reported that they no longer know what to tell teachers who ask for advice,except that they should try to maintain some neutrality. As one official noted, he canonly tell teachers "Please brother, think that you are in a jungle. At any time peoplecan attack you".

• Impact on Children: Without systematic data, it is difficult to know the exactimpact of the conflict on children. What is clear is that the Maoists and the Maoist-affiliated All Nepal National Independent Student Union (ANNISU) have targetedolder students (grades 8-10) as potential supporters, and have given speeches anddelivered leaflets in schools across the country. There is also evidence that students –even in younger classes – have not attended school for extended periods of time dueto fears of being kidnapped on the way to or from their classrooms. The psychologi-cal impact of the conflict on children has not been investigated.

• Supervision and Monitoring: The deteriorating security situation has resulted inmany RPs and SSs being unable to visit schools or to hold meetings in RCs. RPs andSSs have reported that they could only visit those schools near to the road. RPs alsoreported that training events have been disrupted by strikes. In a number of areas,RPs reported that when schools held events (such as cultural shows or EducationDay celebrations) then Maoist cadre had attended the events and used them to makepolitical statements.

It has been reported by some officials – and supported by reports from BPEP II partners– that in areas where the Maoists operate they have been closely monitoring the func-tioning of the school and the attendance of teachers. Whilst this may result in schoolsbeing open and functioning, questions can be raised about the standard of teaching andlearning that is delivered under a climate of fear.

The Maoist insurgency has also an impact at the district, regional and national levels, forexample:

• Impact on Education Administration: DEOs and Regional Education Offices havebeen bombed and partially damaged – and in some cases destroyed. Often, this hasimpacted record keeping, with reports and records destroyed or damaged. Theattacks have also contributed to the general sense of insecurity among educationalpersonnel at the district level.

• Weakening of Local Government Structures: The lack of local elections as a resultof the security situation has a direct impact on the ability to implement BPEP IIreforms. More specifically, members of elected local government bodies are requiredto be involved in processes such as school planning. Similarly, without functioningVDCs in many areas, it has not been possible to appoint VECs.

8.2 Responses to the Conflict

At the district and school level, there is some evidence of education staff responding cre-atively to the conflict in order to ensure that they are able to continue to provide someservices. Some schools have been making scholarship distribution more transparent andaccountable to the local community. RPs unable to visit their RCs have selected schools

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located in safer, roadside areas to conduct meetings and training sessions. One PTTCvisited had initiated a mobile training unit to allow training to continue in areas whereit was difficult for teachers to attend training in the official centre.

However, teachers, district education staff and teacher union officials expressed disap-pointment at the response they have received from central government to their requestsfor support. It is strongly felt by these groups that the MOES has neither adequatelyacknowledged the conflict, nor provided adequate guidance on how to respond to thechallenges posed by the insurgency.

The impact of the conflict on the education sector and on BPEP II activities hasreceived only limited recognition in the policy and practice of the MOES and BPEP IIpartners. The MTR and supporting documents highlighted the need to address theimpact of the conflict and to think strategically about how BPEP II should respond.Additional reports have been produced and the issue has been raised at subsequent joint-donor missions.

A report funded by UNICEF and conducted by HMG/N in 33 districts was intendedto provide baseline data to assist assessment of the impact of conflict. It appears, howev-er, that the opportunity presented by this study was not fully utilized, and no clear datahas been collated about the impact of the insurgency on the education sector.


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9. Conclusions

9. Conclusions

9.1 The Effectiveness of BPEP II

The evaluation analysed the overall effectiveness of BPEP II in terms of its contributionto progress towards the achievement of objectives and its role in strengthening owner-ship of programming in the basic and primary education sub-sector by HMG/N. Ineach case, the standard applied was the relative performance of BPEP II when comparedto similar sized programmes in basic education in other countries. The evidence for theglobal benchmark was supplied by the recently completed Joint Evaluation of ExternalSupport to Basic Education (see Chapter 10 below). The following higher level conclu-sions on programme effectiveness are supported by the evidence gathered during theevaluation.

1. BPEP II, despite the evaluation’s reservations regarding national school attendancedata, has made a positive contribution to improved access to primary education –mainly through system expansion, social mobilization and incentives. It has had asimilar level of success as other large-scale programmes globally. On the other hand,BPEP II has had less success in extending access to excluded groups, including girls,ethnic minorities, displaced persons, and the poorest.

2. Improvements in the quality of teaching and learning have been very difficult toachieve as measured by national assessments and as observed by key informants.Some gains in the capacity and training of teachers have been offset by operationalproblems in areas such as technical support to teachers, teaching materials, texts,incentives to administrators and teachers, and poor physical infrastructure. In thisarea, the experience of BPEP II has been similar to other large-scale programmes inbasic education. BPEP II has lacked a clear vision and model of how to reform theteaching/learning interface at the classroom level.

3. BPEP II has achieved important results in the area of capacity development. Theestablishment of DOE and its functioning as the operational wing of MOES hascontributed to an increase in the capacity of HMG/N to take responsibility forstrategic and operational planning as well as day-to-day delivery of services in thesub-sector. In addition, administrative capacity has been strengthened at the districtlevel. On the other hand, teacher training has not been well linked to needs at theschool level and has encountered operational problems in linking distance educationand direct instruction. Over-centralization of authority within MOES and the DOEhas also limited the effectiveness of capacity development.

4. In the area of strengthening national ownership, it is clear that HMG/N has becomemore active in donor coordination and in programme design during the course ofBPEP II. The latter stages of BPEP II and the development of the EFA Plan andassociated sub-sector programme have also been based on a wider consultation withstakeholders in Nepal. On the other hand, the very strong donor visibility in BPEPII and the reluctance of some key donors to reduce their visibility and influence(particularly in the area of technical assistance) raises real concerns about their com-mitment to increasing national ownership. This will be a crucial factor in the con-tinued development of programmes to support EFA.

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9.2 Achievement of Programme Objectives

Improving Access to Basic and Primary Education

• Based on national schools level data, BPEP II (and BPEP I as well) have coincidedwith a period of sustained improvements in the level of access to primary schoolingin Nepal. There is reasonable evidence that BPEP II activities in facilities construc-tion, teacher training, and incentives has contributed to improving enrolment (but,as noted below, it is more difficult to show improvements in attendance over time).

• At the same time and notwithstanding the above, there are serious deficiencies andproblems in national school enrolment/attendance data which suggest the actual gainin access (when measured in terms of attendance rather than enrolment) is moremodest than the figures would indicate. Further, the most significant increases inenrolment occurred very early in the programme (i.e. the year 2000) before many ofthe ‘new’ BPEP II supported districts report much activity from the programme.

• The measured improvement in overall access has not demonstrated that BPEP II hashad a strong impact on the attendance of vulnerable groups, including dalits andgirls. The one time increase in the ratio of girls’ attendance in comparison to boys in2000 does not seem to have been part of a continuing trend.

• Gender equality issues have not been substantially addressed through BPEP II,although there have been a number of significant efforts to increase girls enrolment.

• Despite efforts to bring disabled children into the primary school system throughspecial education (resource classes), the small numbers covered in comparison to theneeds at local level and some significant operational problems and deficiencies limitthe impact of these measures. Efforts to pilot Inclusive Education as one solution toexclusion have not yet had a major impact on the problems of special needs educa-tion.

• It is difficult to determine with any accuracy how many school age children havebeen denied access to schooling in areas especially affected by the insurgency. Theapparent influx of children to relatively secure areas (and consequent overcrowdingin schools in or near district capitals as observed in the district case studies) suggeststhat the insurgency has had a significant, negative impact on access.

Improving the Quality of Basic and Primary Education

• Efforts to measure improvements in learning outcomes have shown that progress inthis area has been quite modest and that learning achievements for grade 3 and grade5 students remain very low in Nepali and Mathematics. Key stakeholder interviewsand visits to schools support the conclusion that improving the quality of teachingand learning remains a critical challenge for the basic and primary education sub-sector in Nepal.

• Efforts to improve teacher training in BPEP II have helped to provide teachers withan understanding of the need to improve the quality of teaching and learning, andknowledge of key element of classroom techniques.

9. Conclusions

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9. Conclusions

• The programme of facilities construction carried out under BPEP II (and BPEP I)helped to contribute to a better learning environment and better conditions formany primary age students.

• In at least one pilot district, aspects of inclusive education have had a positive gener-al impact on classroom practices. It has encouraged more group work and the use oflocal materials for instruction, as well as, allowing for more accomplished students toassist others in the classroom.

• Improving the quality of instruction and learning remains the primary challenge forbasic and primary education in Nepal. It must be recognized, however, that pro-grammes in basic and primary education face similar challenges at a global level.

• Notwithstanding the difficulty in improving the quality of teaching and learning,BPEP II has had some successes (such as efforts to demonstrate the importance andeffectiveness of ECD centres).

Capacity Development

• Capacity building has been a central focus of BPEP II, with significant results beingachieved in a relatively short timeframe. The most significant of these has been thecreation and successful functioning of the DOE. This capacity building result has setthe foundation for those access programme successes that BPEP II has achieved.Without a fully functional DOE, BPEP II implementation would have been severelyhampered.

• Key areas of capacity strengthening for HMG/N during BPEP II included: 1) donorcoordination and liaison, 2) planning at central, district and local levels, 3) basic datacollection and analysis, 4) reporting of education statistics, and 5) financial reportingand budgeting.

• Within both MOES and DOE, BPEP II has contributed to advances in key unitssuch as the Foreign Aid Coordination Section of MOES and the monitoring andpolicy units for both. In addition, it has contributed to infrastructure developmentsfor other units associated with basic education, including for example, the NFEC.

• At the same time, a number of factors have tended to limit the impact of capacitydevelopment activities support by BPEP II. At the central level these have includedstaff rotation of MOES and DOE staff, as well as a concentration of authority andresponsibility among a small number of key staff members. This dilutes the impactof training those who are not included in this small number and makes it difficult toimplement some of the improvements in processes which have been supported bythe programme.

• At the district level, the impact of capacity building has also been limited by a rangeof factors, including weaknesses in needs analysis, a focus on developing administra-tive and management skills as opposed to technical capacity in basic education. Inaddition, the incentives for key persons charged with improving quality in basic edu-cation (RPs and SSs) often do not promote the application of new skills at theschool level.

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• Some ongoing initiatives supported by BPEP II such as increased involvement ofSchool Management Committees and the related introduction different versions ofthe School Improvement Plan have not been accompanies by sufficient sustainedcapacity development efforts.

9.3 Programme Implementation

Planning & Design

• BPEP II has made a large investment in planning process and has improved andmodified its planning tools through the life of the programme.

• On the other hand, the rollout of planning tools has sometimes been problematic.While the SIP process shows a staged approach with learning being incorporated asthe tool is extended across districts, the DEP process suffered from a quick rolloutwith insufficient support and direction, hampering future efforts for DEP prepara-tion.

• The SIP is an important document for school level planning and has been simplifiedover the course of the programme to make it more useful at the local level and lesstime-consuming and intensive to complete. While some schools are able to use theSIP as a planning tool and a means for accessing new sources of funds, many simplypass it on the DEO and do not refer to it on a regular basis. The fact that resourceallocation is done on a formula basis also undercuts efforts to infuse the SIP processwith more meaning from the perspective of the local community.

Pilot Testing

• BPEP II has lacked a clear and comprehensive overview of the number of pilot ini-tiatives and their implementation status. More importantly, the effects of the activepilot projects are not specified in advance and clearly measured. Further, the effectsof some pilot initiatives are limited due to unclear management responsibility andinsufficient coordination.

• Pilot initiatives are often implemented without a clear timeframe or testing strategyso that they may persist (indeed some survive today from BPEP I). Despite anapparent lack of success some pilot initiatives continue without a structured plan formodifying or terminating them.

• Most pilots have not yet been systematically assessed and lack a clear decision point.This means that vital learning and feedback from the pilots, as envisaged in the orig-inal project plans, are not incorporated into programme design and development.Moreover it also means that pilots continue ineffectively for long periods of time –up to eight years.

Monitoring & Evaluation

• The system and structure for quantitative monitoring of school level data is in place,but the quality of input data has been given limited priority. This has resulted inlarge amounts of data being collected of questionable accuracy and reliability.

9. Conclusions

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9. Conclusions

Nevertheless the data is utilised for management and decision-making purposes atnational and international levels.

• Monitoring units at national as well as district levels require significant strengtheningin terms of staff, computerized data analysis, and reporting.

• The administrative burden associated with monitoring has increased over the years,particularly in relation to education data collection. There are too many ‘roads andsources’ being used by different stakeholders – contributing to overlaps and weaken-ing the reliability of data collected.

• The education monitoring system lacks clear link between data collection and deci-sion-making – at present leading to inefficient data collection. The use of evaluationis not mainstreamed into the operational culture of BPEP II.

• District mechanisms and data collection processes are in place and functioning, espe-cially through RPs, but face important constraints relating to training, access toschools and incentives for supervisory visits. SMCs, parents and PTA members playa role in monitoring at an informal and qualitative level.

Involvement of NGOs

• The role of NGOs in BPEP II was more limited than necessary and useful at theoutset of the programme, especially including the design stage. This was due in partto government – NGO relations in the years preceding BPEP II.

• NGO/INGO involvement in implementation of BPEP II has generally limited toservice delivery and social mobilisation, with intensity varying by district. Servicedelivery is mainly focused on non-formal education. NGOs have undertaken theirown education programs, sometimes linked in to BPEP II and donors channel fundsfor education programming directly to NGOs.

• Coordination with INGOS/NGOS has improved at the national level in the contextof EFA, but remains challenging in many districts where tension between the DEOand NGOs persist. Some NGO programmes do work in synergy, however there weremany examples of duplication or contradiction between BPEP II and NGO pro-gramme activities.

• NGOs and INGOs have taken a stronger role in consultations leading up to thedevelopment of the EFA Core Document in November 2003.

9.4 Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources

Transparency and efficiency of procedures for allocating and distributing financial resources

• Over the life of BPEP II there has been a steady improvement in the rate of budgetimplementation. However, delays in the authorisation of the programmes are stillobserved. These may then cause further delays the start-up of spending on pro-gramme activities (e.g. if it comes just before the Dasain festival, it delays the pro-gramme implementation to the second trimester).

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• The objective of allocating resources based on local or district needs does not seemto have been met. The devolution of responsibility for the management of funds hasnot been implemented at local level: not only is a quarter of the district budget managed centrally, but also a minor part of the school development budget is managed by the schools themselves (difficult to gather information easily since thereis no consolidated statement at school level).

• National resources are not prioritised according to the quality of the intervention,since there is no link between financial performance information and the output/outcomes of programmes. Some component/activity-wise follow up is made but notin a systematic manner (i.e. there is no clear picture over the programme lifetime ofoverall financial performance per component).

• The prioritisation of activities at the school level is dictated predominantly by thecentral/macro-level allocation priorities rather than the specific local needs of theschools. Despite the introduction of the SIP, resource allocation at the local level iscentralised based on a predefined formula. Thus, the SIP is not a ‘mechanism forresource allocation’. At the most, the SIP may serve to identify some limited localresources that can be sought.

• At the district level, resource allocation becomes ‘clearer’, since the criteria for budgetallocation are transparent. However, at district level the budget ceiling does notreflect the districts needs, as expressed in the DEP so that the resource allocationprocess is still top down and centrally driven.

• Financial reporting remains unnecessarily burdensome and includes requirements forirrelevant information, which does not serve the needs of programme managers at acentral or district level.

Comparative strengths and weaknesses funding arrangements

• The basket funding mechanism has been an effective and efficient way of channel-ling resources to a sub-sector within the educational system. From a national per-spective, a major strength of the basket funding modality has been its transparencysubject to audit by HMG/N.

• The basket fund resources are managed as ‘nationally executed externally-fundedprojects’, where the management of the funds is a mix of Government and IDAfinancial management procedures. While the disbursement mechanisms set in placehave been relatively flexible, there is some indication, that IDA procurement rulesencourage the centralisation of procedures, especially if procurement of goods orservices involves international tendering.

• The financial reporting system for the basket funding mechanism under BPEP IIremains burdensome. Currently three financial reporting formats are requiredtogether with a breakdown by financing sources, even though some of the informa-tion is irrelevant from a programme management perspective.

• Direct funding has acted as a very flexible funding source for piloting selected activi-ties approved by HMG/N but which would be facing practical constraints if theyhad to flow through the national accounts. On the other hand, the government does

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9. Conclusions

not/cannot keep track of the rate of implementation and financial implications ofdirectly funded projects. Moreover, from a sub-sector point of view it generatesproblems concerning transparency, accountability (e.g. no submission of auditreports) and raised the risk of duplicating activities funded by different donors.

9.5 Donor Coordination & Ownership

Donor Coordination & Joint Monitoring

• The continuous development of the local donor group has contributed to a moreharmonized coordination approach where issues between donors have been resolvedin a skilful and constructive manner.

• The process whereby the central contact point for donor coordination has rotatedamong the CIP partners may be democratic in sharing effort but appears to the government as a lack of continuity. With frequent turnover of donor staff and shift-ing roles among donors, there is a corresponding lack of institutional memory.

• The JRMs is a very labour intensive process, involving significant staff resources forpreparation and implementation of missions – both form the government and thedonors (HQs and local offices). It is not clear why an annual mission would nothave been sufficient during the second half of the programme, particularly when taking into account the increase in capacity of the government and the existence ofan active LDG. This would have saved valuable time and resources, particularly for agovernment with few staff resources.

• There is no evidence in the documentation from the donor coordination meetingsand JRMs suggesting that significant action was taken to follow up on the MTR rec-ommendation to focus more on the programmatic level and follow-up up on educa-tional indicators.

• The lack of a unified framework beyond the formal government-agency agreements(e.g. MoU) for coordination of technical assistance has resulted in a lack of know-ledge among donors concerning the TA activities of other donors. It also means thatHMG/N staff must spend additional time with individual agencies providing TAdiscussing and approving activities and expenses.

Ownership

• In its basic design, BPEP II featured few measures (other than the basic structure ofbasket funding and the rolling of the programme implementation unit into theMOES in the form of the DEO) that were specifically designed to improve nationalownership. On the other hand, some significant shifts in the direction of improvednational ownership did occur during the life of the programme: principally in thatHMG/N became much more central to the process of aid coordination and alsotook a much more central role in the preparation and negotiation of the externalsupport for the EFA plan.

• In addition, by showing more strength in aid coordination and policy and pro-gramme development, HMG/N was able by the end of BPEP II to broaden the

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national dialogue on programming in EFA to include more meaningful representa-tion from national and international NGOs.

• At the same time, it remains to be seen how much the EFA will be able to overcomesome of the aspects of the programme structure in BPEP II, which still seem to haveplaced limits on national ownership, including:

• External agency unwillingness to effectively coordinate technical assistance and tosubject the initiatives they promote to collective scrutiny and review (and to giveHMG/N the clear authority and responsibility to terminate activities which areeither not successful or not sustainable)

• The apparent unwillingness of some external agencies to moderate outcome targetsin view of capacity constraints (and local needs), and

• The continued high visibility of external agencies, their resources and the activitiesthey support.

9.6 Responding to the Insurgency

• Overall, there is little evidence of change in practice or adaptation of the BPEP IIimplementation modalities or of any comprehensive risk assessment or scenario plan-ning being undertaken as a result of the MTR recommendations regarding how theprogramme might have responded to conditions created by the emergency.

• One factor which has limited the capacity of the basic and primary education systemto respond to conditions created by the insurgency has been restrictions on the rede-ployment of teachers to less affected areas which are experiencing severe crowdingdue to an influx in displaced students. According to interviews carried out at districtlevel, teachers are allocated to schools based on the population of students in themost recent census with annual increments based on the estimated national growthin population. In times of significant population movements, this results in a seriousunderestimate of students in some areas and a consequent misallocation of teachers.

9. Conclusions

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10. Recommendations - Going Forward

10. Recommendations – Going Forward

Often large and complex joint evaluations concentrate on a discussion of the implica-tions of the main conclusions of the evaluation, rather than on the development of recommendations. In the case of the evaluation of BPEP II, however, the detailed evalu-ation conclusions can support specific recommendations on changes which can be madeto the operational set-up – not only to the follow-on EFA Plan – but also to the opera-tions of the system of basic and primary education in Nepal.

For that reason, this chapter includes recommendations specified at two different levels.The first section deals with strategic recommendations regarding the overall direction ofprogramming in basic and primary education in Nepal (including external support).The later sections deal with recommendations rising from the specific issues addressedduring the evaluation.

It is important to note that, because of the overlap between the completion of the eva-luation of BPEP II and the continuing development of the EFA national plan (and ofexternal support to EFA), some of the recommendations listed below either have recent-ly been acted on independently of the evaluation – or would be in any case as program-ming evolves in the sub-sector.

Since the evolution of the sub-sector is ongoing, the BPEP II evaluation was not able toconduct a detailed operational review of EFA. Recommendations in this chapter whichhave already been acted on in the recent development of basic and primary education inNepal should be seen as evidence of the convergence of perspectives between the evalua-tion and those charged with ongoing planning and management in the sub-sector.

Part One: Strategic Recommendations

Moving forward from BPEP II, it is clear that a number of compelling needs should beconsidered for special priority. The recommendations listed here are consistent with thegeneral directions of the Education for All National Plan of Action and with key featuresof the programme of external support to the sub-sector which is currently being final-ized. Nonetheless, the findings and conclusions of the evaluation support placing specialemphasis on the following actions:

• Deepening and strengthening efforts of HMG/N to improve access to basic and pri-mary education, especially targeting girls and ethnically, socially, economically andgeographically marginalised groups of learners. In addition, this will require a morefully developed link between formal and non-formal education and a higher priorityfor HMG/N and for donors on providing opportunities for basic and primary edu-cation to those who are out of school.

• Re-examining the incentives used to encourage girls attendance and, as well, devel-oping measures to overcome other barriers to gender equality in basic and primaryeducation such as: 1) infrastructure which does not meet their needs, 2) poor physi-cal security, and 3) local traditions.

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• Focussing programming activity much more clearly and directly at the learninginterface between teachers and children. Teachers should play a more central role indialogue and decision-making related to implementing system changes. There is alsoa need for a more structured analysis of whether inclusive education can be the guid-ing principle of classroom practice and can contribute to both access andrelevance/quality in basic and primary education.

• Accelerating the trend to more HMG/N influence and control on critical decision-making during the design, implementation and evaluation of programming in sup-port of EFA. This matches the need to simplify and harmonise external-agencyrequirements for financial, administrative and outcome oriented data gathering,analysis and reporting. This will require more discipline from external agencies in theinitiation, provision, and monitoring of Technical Assistance than (and all otherinputs) than was evident during BPEP II.

• Developing a clearer, and more defined, disciplined and transparent system ofapproving, testing and adopting ‘pilot’ initiatives.

• Acknowledging that, while the current insurgency is an important factor in the con-text of the EFA, not all problems in providing quality basic education in Nepal arerooted to this phenomenon. This further emphasises the need for programming flexibility and adaptability.

Part Two: Detailed Recommendations

10.1 Achievement of Programme Objectives

Improving Access to Basic & Primary Education

• There is an urgent need to simplify the school level data collected for EMIS and toimprove the capacity of teachers to collect, and RPs and SSs, to verify the data col-lected. At the same time there is a need to improve the capacity of the StatisticsSection of DOE to collate and analyze the data collected in a timely manner so thatboth the reliability and timeliness of information on access to primary education isgreatly improved.

• One possibility to establish a baseline for the EFA programme would be to investi-gate the practicality of repeating the school-wise data set exercise carried out forBPEP I.

Improving the Quality of Basic & Primary Education

It is important to continue and strengthen support to teacher training during the EFAprogramme, both in-service and certification. However, there is also a need to makesome specific improvements in teacher training activities to address the following defi-ciencies:

• Needs assessments need to be improved given that many teacher trainees beginningthe ten-month, in-service course lacked basic skills required to understand the mate-rial (according to primary teacher training centre instructors interviewed).


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• There is a need to make operational improvements in the distance-learning compo-nent of teacher training courses around issues of scheduling, frequency and qualityof contact sessions, and the fit between the radio programmes and course materialsused by teachers.

• BPEP II’s successor programme should make more of an effort to open and/or deepen the dialogue with teachers (including teacher’s unions) on the goals, content,and direction of desired system change and their role in it.

• There is an urgent need to clarify and rationalize the relationship between pilotefforts in inclusive education and strategies/practices in special needs education. Forexample:

• the ongoing practice of opening and supporting residential resource classes needsto be modified if the basic principles of inclusive education (providing basic edu-cation to all children in their own communities) are to be realized;

• a solution needs to be found to the problem of re-integrating blind, deaf andmentally disabled children to their communities following their periods of residen-cy in resource classes;

• a much stronger system of decentralized technical support to teachers in the areasof inclusive and special needs education is required if inclusive education is toevolve into a means of providing for full participation by excluded groups.

• Continuing support to school construction will, of course, be necessary during EFAbut care needs to be taken to consolidate construction standards and to providemore control by HMG/N over decisions about the allocation of resources and thelocation of newly constructed blocks.

Capacity Development

• There is a need for specific, targeted capacity building for district level RPs in tech-nical areas such as advances in pedagogy. It is also important to review their actualworkload to ensure that they have a reasonable time allotment to work with teachersin technical areas relating to pedagogy and not just on administrative matters.

• There is a need to adjust capacity building interventions focused on strengtheningthe SIP process based on a review of results in the ‘pilot’ districts. There is also aneed to ensure that centrally developed curricula and training guides are distributedto all districts with training of trainers interventions for RPs as appropriate.

• Channels of communication should be strengthened between the central and districtlevels so that districts can develop and forward their own training needs and require-ments. DEO staff need to be more involved in decision making around selection oftraining courses to be undertaken and personnel to receive training.

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10.2 Programme Implementation

Planning & Design

• More capacity building with SMC members, parents, HTs, and RPs is required toensure that SIPs are completed in a truly participatory fashion, are reviewed appro-priately by RPs, and become a working document at the school level.

• Guidelines and budget ceilings need to be clearly communicated to the districts forthe preparation of DEPs.

Pilot Testing

• Ongoing pilot initiatives should be evaluated as near to the end of the BPEP II as pos-sible and a clear decision on termination, modification or taking to scale of each pilotshould be included in the ongoing development of programmes in support of EFA.

• Based on detailed findings on CAS as presented in Annex 4, it should be eitherseverely curtailed or terminated. It seems unlikely that the current resource con-straints undermining implementation of CAS in its pilot district can be overcome ata national level.

• Clearer guidelines for defining, designing, managing and monitoring pilot initiativesshould be included in the design of EFA. In particular, the code of conduct fordonor support to EFA should prohibit external agencies from promoting andlaunching pilot initiatives outside of the programme planning and approval processesmanaged by HMG/N and including a pre-approval review process which allows allsupporting agencies to present their views.

Monitoring & Evaluation

• There is an ongoing need to strengthen the capacity of the Planning and MonitoringSection and the Statistics Section of the DOE.

• As is the case for financial data entry at District Treasury Offices, the development ofa computerized system for data entry into EMIS at the district level, complete withrange checks and other aids to accuracy could improve the reliability and validity ofeducation data. It would need to be accompanied by sufficient training and a rise inthe importance given to this task at district and national level.

• The quantity of information required by the EMIS forms needs to be reduced andthe forms themselves simplified. There also needs to be a clear policy restricting thenumber of ad-hoc requests for additional data that can be passed on to the DEOsduring the school year. In general terms, if the volume of data required can berationalized and reduced there can be a strong increase in the validity and reliabilityof data on basic and primary education in Nepal.

Involvement of Non-Governmental Organisations

• The positive movement to more engagement and dialogue with civil society at thenational level should be deepened and extended through the education system. This


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should be institutionalized in a permanent systematic fashion, possibly through thecreation of a civil society – government panel or network for information sharingand coordination.

• More effort needs to be made to engage the participation of civil society organiza-tions and NGOs, in assisting in the development and management of basic educa-tion at community levels.

• More coordination and networking needs to be undertaken at the district level toensure that there is no duplication, overlap, or contradiction between the programsof NGOs and the government activities.

10.3 Allocation & Distribution of Financial Resources

• There is a need to clarify the extent to which SIPs are to serve as resource allocationmechanisms given the current situation in which resources are distributed to schools(and districts) through a formula based on student numbers (which are themselvesbased on census data which is often outdated or based on projections from a baselineyear and ignore significant shifts in school age populations within a district oramong districts).

• Urgent steps are needed to both reduce the burden of detail (through the provisionof irrelevant information and maintenance of duplicating reporting systems) and toprovide more transparency in financial reporting.

• A single overall financial reporting format and system should be adapted for all com-ponents and activities funded under EFA (at the very least for those funded from acommon investment pool).

• To the extent possible, financial reporting on direct funding (should it continueunder EFA) should be harmonised with the system adapted for pooled funding.That is, HMG/N should be assured of equivalent levels of information on directfunded activities as on those which travel through the investment pool and are sub-sequently subject to national audit.

10.4 Donor Coordination & Ownership

Donor Coordination

• During aid coordination meetings and joint review missions it is necessary to main-tain an overall, programmatic focus based on simple indicators that are updated regularly. One way of doing this could be standardise a set of review questions at thegeneral programmatic level and repeat discussion on these at regular intervals.

• There is a strong need for agreement on a set of simple and effective procedures forcoordination of TA. If a single basket fund for TA is not possible for administrativeefficiency reasons, a possibility would be to establish a common TA database for allTA requests and offers of assistance. Data elements would include: districts involved,professional subject matter, likely candidates, location of activities (in Nepal or

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abroad), costs etc. With or without a single comprehensive database on TA in pri-mary and basic education, a common decision making procedure for approving TArequests and TA offers is required. It should be open and transparent for all support-ing agencies as well as for HMG/N. It would be administratively more efficient toplan and approve technical assistance as one pool of resources managed from a singlepoint of entry in the government system.

• External agencies providing support to the EFA programme (whether inside or out-side any common funding arrangements) should, at a minimum, be requiredthrough a code of conduct to provide information to all other supporting agenciesand to a central location in HMG/N on the scope, content, location, and timing oftechnical assistance activities.

• It would be useful to limit the joint monitoring missions to a maximum of one peryear.

Ownership

• In the further development and refining of the programme’s in support of thenational EFA plan, HMG/N and external agencies should agree on a realistic pacingof targets for significant programme outcomes (especially at the level of specific com-munities and schools).

• As seems likely, external agencies should be required, and be willing, in EFA togreatly reduce their visibility and the visibility of the activities they finance, especiallyat the district level if HMG/N is to be seen to be the primary actor responsible forEFA, both nationally and locally.

• HMG/N needs to take a much more visible role in the coordinated requesting,approval and evaluation of TA, including assistance to pilot initiatives and projects.

10.5 Responding to the Insurgency

It is strongly recommended that the impact of the conflict on the education sector isacknowledged and responded to by the EFA partners. Responses to this should be con-sidered from both an operational and strategic perspective. Some useful steps wouldinclude:

• Learning from the experiences of other sectors and other projects facing similar diffi-culties (e.g. health sector).

• Acknowledging the security concerns of educational personnel. Where possible, pro-vide guidance and support on how to respond, recognising the reality of the difficul-ties faced by school and district staff.

• Ensuring the transparency of project implementation. For example, informationabout scholarship availability and distribution should be widely publicised locally toensure public accountability.


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• Allowing for flexibility in responses and supporting education personnel who makethese difficult decisions. For example, if the army demand to use a school as a bar-racks, supporting staff to find alternative premises for the purpose of schooling andto adapt flexible schooling to ensure all students continue to receive some education-al provision.

• All partners (external support agencies and government) with staff or consultantsengaged in field activities/visits require a clear policy on security. Briefings and con-structive discussion of the security challenges should be undertaken regularly.

• Encouraging honest reporting of problems faced at all levels. Monitor and documentthe impact of the conflict on the education sector. Work with those who alreadyhave significant databases of insurgency-related material to develop a clearer pictureof the impact of the insurgency on the education sector.

• Engaging in scenario planning to ensure appropriate programming and flexibleimplementation in a range of contexts.

• Focusing on flexibility and adaptability to ensure continued service delivery. Thismay mean adopting different modalities (e.g. working with and through NGOs,implementing education-related ‘quick impact’ projects).

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11. Comparison with Global Evaluation


The final evaluation issue in the TOR concerns the fit between the key results of theBPEP II joint evaluation and those of the recently completed Joint Evaluation ofExternal Support to Basic Education (JEBE). Before comparing, it is important to pointout that the latter, which was global in scope, focused specifically and directly on exter-nal support and the partnership relationship. Where these are important elements in theBPEP II evaluation, this evaluation was also required to directly examine issues of theadministrative, financial, and operational effectiveness of the system of delivering pri-mary and basic education in Nepal.

With those caveats in mind, Table 11-1 below presents a brief overview of the similari-ties and contrasts between the key conclusions of both studies:

Table 11-1: Comparing BPEP II with Findings of JEBE

JEBE Global Evaluation: BPEP II Evaluation: Key Conclusions Similarities and Differences

1 There has been a strong tendency for external

agencies to place increasing emphasis on the use

of external support for accelerating progress in

basic education, especially in relation to the edu-

cation goals of the MDG and to the EFA goals. This

tendency has been accompanied, at times, by a

reliance on blueprints, templates and prescribed

solutions that has been detrimental to a commit-

ment to partnership, has been inconsistent with

the capacities of partners and has sometimes lim-

ited the relevance of programmes and projects.

There is a need to place greater emphasis on the

relevance of external support to local needs and

capacities – for more tailored local solutions with-

in a global consensus on goals.

2 The movement to programme support and SWAps

is one of the most significant trends in the provi-

sion and use of external support to basic educa-

tion. It has been intended, at least in part, to con-

tribute to strengthened national ownership and to

improve partnership (and thereby improve the

effectiveness of the provision and use of external

support). In a real sense, the shift to programme

support is an indication of the commitment of

external agencies to strengthen partnership.

However, this form of support does not necessari-

ly improve partnerships if implemented as a blue-

print rather than a process. It has, in some cases,

contributed to increased tensions and divisions

among distinct groups of external agencies. On

the positive side, it has led to some improvements

in the sense of national ownership and to better

coordination of external assistance.

• The evidence for BPEP II is mixed on this account;

on one hand it did combine difficult goals in

capacity development (including establishing

many critical organisational elements) with fairly

aggressive goals in education access and quality.

But on the other, BPEP II did allow for an expand-

ing role in coordination, design and development

for HMG/N and for national and international

NGOs.

• It is essential that the goals and targets of the

new EFA programme be suited to capacities at

both a national and local level.

• BPEP II illustrates the main thrust of this finding

rather well. By moving to a basket fund and sub-

sector approach with BPEP II, HMG/N and exter-

nal agencies did provide for a better integration of

the programme management unit into the MOES

and did set the stage for some evolutionary move-

ment toward more national ownership but the

way that BPEP II was designed, developed and

implemented in its early years (as evaluators were

frequently told by key informants from virtually all

agencies interviewed) clearly was not participato-

ry, inclusive and wide ranging.

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JEBE Global Evaluation: BPEP II Evaluation: Key Conclusions Similarities and Differences

3 The movement to supporting basic education

through SWAps and other forms of programme

support needs to be accompanied by an under-

standing of the positive role of project assistance,

especially in supporting innovations and in pro-

viding targeted support to marginalised groups.

There is considerable evidence that project forms

of support can be more effectively integrated into

programme approaches with the consequent

effect of strengthening the positive aspects of

both modalities.

4 The movement to programme approaches in sup-

porting basic education has not always been

accompanied, at least in the short term, by a

reduction in the administrative burden for host

governments. A very heavy burden of planning,

coordination and monitoring has been made more

difficult by uneven progress in the development of

common administrative procedures among exter-

nal agencies and reluctance to accept local

processes as adequate.

5 Although there is agreement on the broad range

of components included in basic education, in

reality the focus of most activities of both external

agencies and national partners has been placed

on formal primary schooling with negative effects

on other areas of basic education. Further, while

progress has been made in providing access to

primary schooling, there are serious persistent

problems in improving the quality of basic educa-

tion.

6 There has been a sustained agreement within the

international community, including external agen-

cies and national partners, on the priority of basic

education, but funding levels from the external

agencies have not kept pace with expectations or

implied commitments. This is, at least in part, a

reflection of the complexity of planning and

resource allocation processes surrounding the

provision of external support and to problems in

the absorptive capacity of partner governments.

• This has been an ongoing debate within and

around BPEP II. Not so much in terms of project

versus programme assistance, but more in terms

of basket funding versus direct financing (which

some associate with fast-moving, innovative, and

project-like activities). The evidence for BPEP II is

mixed but the evaluation team feels strongly that,

at this point in time, the need in Nepal is for activ-

ities to be more integrated rather than more inde-

pendent.

• This conclusion is clearly borne out in the case of

BPEP II, which saw the early years of the pro-

gramme accompanied by a slowdown in the pace

of programme activities as HMG/N personnel

mastered the complexities of the basket fund. In

addition, the evaluation team was able to view

firsthand the intensity, duration, complexity and

delicacy of the ongoing negotiations for the EFA

programme.

• Once again this is strongly born out in the case of

BPEP II. While there are some initiatives in non-

formal education, the agency responsible (NFEC)

receives support at a much lower level than other

elements of the system and remains bureaucrati-

cally, financially, and technically weaker than

other units.

• On the other hand, the EFA programme planned

for 2004-09 includes a much higher profile for

NFE.

• In this area at least, BPEP II seems quite different

from the programmes studied in the Global evalu-

ation since Nepal seems to be able to count on

sustained and, perhaps, increasing support from

external agencies, at least in the short and medi-

um term.

Annex 1 Terms of Reference


Copenhagen, 10 November 2003Eval.j.nr.104.A.1e.35

JOINT GOVERNMENT-DONOR EVALUATION OF BPEP II

1. Background

His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (HMG/N) recognizes that basic and primary educa-tion is key to poverty alleviation and sustainable development. In order to attain thesenational goals, the second phase of the Basic and Primary Education Programme (BPEPII) was designed, and has remained under implementation since July 1999. TheProgramme is due to complete its five-year cycle in July 2004. The BPEP II has threemain goals: (a) to improve access to basic and primary education, especially of girls andchildren belonging to disadvantaged communities; (b) to improve learning achievementof children; and (c) to build and strengthen institutional capacity at all levels to plan,implement and monitor basic and primary education programme.

A Programme Implementation Plan (PIP) has been prepared to guide the planning,implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The PIP envisaged achieving increasedaccess through school construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of classrooms andother school facilities, operation of alternative schools, community mobilization, distri-bution of incentives, literacy programs and early childhood education. Learning achieve-ment of children is to be raised through improved curriculum and textbooks, continuousassessment, provision of learning materials, recurrent and certification training of teach-ers, and pedagogical support and supervision of teachers. Institutional capacity of thesystem as a whole is to be achieved through structural reorganization, training of educa-tional personnel including head teachers and School Management Committee (SMC)members, programme monitoring and evaluation, Education Management InformationSystem (EMIS), Personnel Management Information System (PMIS) etc.

The Programme is being implemented nationwide covering all 75 districts of the coun-try. A sector wide approach was adopted in the design and implementation encompass-ing a more comprehensive approach to educational reform and development. UnlikeBPEP I, BPEP II was placed within the government’s basic and primary education sub-sector program. The sector wide approach was believed to tackle the implementation ofdevelopment programmes holistically rather than in a piecemeal manner. BPEP IIbrought the often independently working donors together, all agreeing to work withincommon implementation arrangements.

The total cost for the five-year period of the programme was USD 106 million. Denmark,Finland, Norway, European Union and World Bank provide financial support in theform of basket funding, defined as the Core Investment Programme (CIP). JICA andUNICEF are direct-funding supporters of BPEP II outside the basket, and AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) supports teachers training activities also outside the basketfunding mechanism. The basket allows the use of a unified financing approach to chan-

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nel donor support to the agreed CIP within the basic and primary education sub-sector.In order to harmonise reporting, monitoring, procurement and financial management asingle set of monitoring, reporting and financial tracking instruments and procurementprocedures are used in order to reduce the burden on the government. In addition tothe CIP, the donors provide technical assistance (TA) through direct funding which wasto be used for reform and innovative practices and to supplement the basket funds.

The BPEP II turned the previous project approach into a national educational pro-gramme. In line with the programme approach, the responsibility of management andimplementation shifted to the Ministry of Education and Sports (MOES) and its con-stituent bodies from the earlier BPEP Project Office. Department of Education (DOE)was established to serve as the Ministry’s technical arm for implementing both primaryand secondary education programmes. A foreign aid coordination section was estab-lished within the MOES, which serves as the focal point for external assistance. TheProgramme is implemented through five Regional Education Directorates, 75 DistrictEducation Offices, and 1,331 resource centres. The decentralization of basic and pri-mary education is a major strategy of BPEP II. It seeks the devolution of greater rolesand responsibilities to districts, local bodies and schools in school management. Anamendment of the Education Act provides legal mandate to the School ManagementCommittees in school management, planning, monitoring, and supervision.

In November 2001, a technical panel was fielded to assess the progress and achievementmade by BPEP during two years of its implementation and to review the Programme inview of recent developments and new policy initiatives. The panel noted some improve-ments in access of children to education with some gains in enrolment rates. However, itnoted that overall impact on improving the institutional functioning, instructionalprocess and raising students’ achievement level was minimal. According to the report,BPEP II planning was too component-driven which led to piecemeal delivery of inputsand this eventually hindered a synergistic impact on improving school atmosphere andcreating a classroom culture that promotes active child learning. In view of these, thepanel recommended to overhaul the Programme with primary focus on child develop-ment and learning with active participation of parents and local community. Consistentwith the panel’s recommendations, the Joint Government-Donor Mid-Term Reviewheld in March 2002 recommended MOES to make necessary revisions in theProgramme.

Most recently, HMG/N is preparing a national programme of Education for All (EFA)2004-2009 as a follow-on to BPEP II. It is a five-year strategic plan structured on the sixfundamental EFA goals, which together form the concept of basic education. Withinthis context particular attention is given to provision of primary education for childrento: (a) ensure access and equity in primary education, (b) enhance quality and relevanceof primary education, and (c) improve efficiency and institutional capacity. The imple-mentation of the new programme is to commence from July 2004.

While preparations are underway for EFA 2004-2009, the overall performance andimpact of BPEP II in terms of providing access, enhancing learning achievement of chil-dren, and strengthening institutional capacity has to be assessed so as to draw lessons forthe future. Most particularly, it is essential to critically examine the past efforts, interven-tions and strategies to see if they can lead to the realization of the Programme goals andobjectives.


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2. Rationale of the Joint Evaluation of BPEP II

The joint evaluation of the BPEP II is initiated on the basis of the following arguments:

• In most donor countries there is an increasing demand for evaluating the joint fund-ing facilities of international development assistance.

• Nepal is facing increased public demand for information on the efficiency of thelarge- scale investments in promoting quality education.

• Over the last five to six years, development assistance is increasingly designed andimplemented according to the sector wide support strategy facilitating new modali-ties and mechanisms for joint donor and government planning, management andfunding of the development programmes. Hence, joint planning, management andfunding invites for joint evaluation.

• BPEP II largely represents the efforts to organise development assistance within thesector wide approach. BPEP II was planned and is being implemented throughextensive donor and donor-government collaboration. BPEP II implementation isguided by the joint donor-government PIP, which is continuously monitored andadjusted on the basis of bi-annual joint review missions. The funding for BPEP IIcombines the modalities of basket funding representing the main share of the totalbudget for the BPEP II and other mechanisms such as earmarked and direct fund-ing.

• BPEP II is entering its last year of implementation and the preparations for the thirddevelopment phase, i.e. EFA 2004-2009, is well underway. An evaluation of BPEP IIwould provide useful insights and inputs to facilitate the further implementation ofdevelopment assistance to the basic and primary education sub-sector in Nepal.

• The joint evaluation of the BPEP II would both complement and benefit from thelarge scale ‘Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic Education in DevelopingCountries’ initiated by nine bilateral and four multilateral donor agencies.

The BPEP II has been subject to numerous studies, formative research projects, reviewsand other types of investigations. As one of the BPEP II partners, the World Bank willin collaboration with HMG/N and other donors draft its Implementation CompletionReport (ICR). The joint evaluation of BPEP II should thus avoid duplication of previ-ous studies and of the ICR. Rather it should address issues not thoroughly and exten-sively examined in other studies and reports.

The joint evaluation would primarily investigate macro-level critical issues related to theoverall joint donor-HMG/N planning and implementation of the BPEP II and somekey micro-level issues related to the involvement of decentral education authorities andcommunities in the planning and implementation of BPEP II.

BPEP II represents a development from the former project mode to the sector wideapproach (SWAp). Certain basic assumptions were implied, for example:

• SWAp would strengthen government ownership and facilitate efficient government-donor collaboration and improve cooperation among the donors providing assistanceto BPEP II.

• SWAp would facilitate greater effectiveness and flexibility in the implementation ofthe development assistance.

• SWAp facilitated the establishment of basket funding under the Core InvestmentProgramme (CIP), which in turn was assumed to facilitate greater effectiveness, flexi-

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bility and transparency in funding management and disbursement with the ultimategoal to ensure high efficiency in distributing funds also to district, community andschool levels.

• As different planning and funding requirements and interests exist among the donorsready to assist BPEP II, basket funding was complemented by other modalitiesallowing all interested donors to support the programme. Nevertheless, the sectorwide approach assumed that donors providing assistance outside the CIP would par-ticipate in joint planning and reviews of the BPEP II facilitating efficient coordina-tion and maintaining government ownership also to non-basket funded activitieswithin the BPEP II overall objectives.

• SWAp required institutional reorganisation at central levels leading to the establish-ment of the Department of Education to be the national entity with overall respon-sibility for programme implementation.

• Efficient distribution of funds to decentral levels required new planning mechanismsreflecting the particular needs and interests of schools, communities and districtsleading to the establishment of interconnected planning tools, i.e. SchoolImprovement Plans (SIP), District Education Plans (DEP) and Annual StrategicImplementation Plan (ASIP).

• SWAp was further assumed to facilitate greater involvement of NGOs and overallstrategic coordination of their contributions to achieving the BPEP II programmeobjectives.

3. Objectives

The main objectives of the joint evaluation are:

• Assess the achievements of BPEP II in terms of meeting the quality, access andcapacity building goals with focus on sustainability (institutional and financial).

• Explore the process of developing government ownership to BPEP II among the relevant central and decentralised government authorities and among the donors –those engaged in the basket funding and those providing direct funding.

• Assess the effectiveness of collaboration and coordination between the governmentand the donors and among the donors.

• Examine the efficiency, flexibility and transparency of funding and distribution offunds and the relevance of and efficiency in using SIP, DEP and ASIP as planningand funding tools.

• Assess the involvement of the NGO community in supporting the implementationof BPEP II and the achievement of BPEP II objectives.

• Review and validate the main findings of the ‘Joint Evaluation of External Supportto Basic Education in Developing Countries’ in relation to the Nepalese context.

• Assess the effectiveness of supervision, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.• Assess the mechanism for reviewing and testing new design concepts.• Evaluate the suitability of basket funding approach for sector-wide programs.• Assess effectiveness of the framework for donor monitoring of the Programme. • Present recommendations for the development of collaboration between the

HMG/N and the donors regarding basic education, in particular recommendationsregarding the funding mechanism.


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4. Evaluation Approach

The evaluation must be carried out in accordance with the Danida "EvaluationGuidelines" (February 1999, revised 2001). The evaluation should focus on activitiesthat are sufficiently advanced to allow for significant and relevant documentation ofprocesses and results. To this end, various programme documentation: project docu-ments, review reports, progress reports, etc. will be put at the consultant’s disposal. Theevaluation should build on and not repeat the technical reviews of these projects.

The main activities are:

• An initial fact finding trip where donors and government officials are interviewed bythe consultants.

• An extensive and comprehensive desk study including a thorough process mappingexercise.

• Field studies in Nepal enabling the evaluation team through interviews, focus groupdiscussions and workshops with all relevant stakeholders to cross-examine and furtherqualify observations, findings and recommendations emerging from the desk study.It is important that there are opportunities where children’s and women’s voices beheard.

• The Nepalese team members will undertake extensive evaluation exercises at district,community and schools levels prior to the international evaluation team’s arrival inNepal.

• Consultations with MOES staff, donor representatives and the donors’ technicaladvisers engaged in the earlier phases of the BPEP II and not currently involved inBPEP II activities.

5. Composition of the Evaluation Team

International consulting company fielding a combined international and Nepalese team.

6. Timing

January 2004: Initial fact finding trip to Nepal. Start of desk study.

February 2004: Desk study continues. Inception report presented to SteeringCommittee. Field studies by Nepalese team members.

February 2004: Field study in Nepal by the international evaluation team (approximately three weeks).

March-May 2004: Writing of first draft of the joint evaluation report.

May-June 2004: Distribution of first draft of report and submission of comments.

August 2004: Completion and distribution of the final report.

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7. Reporting

Subsequent to the desk study and prior to the field work by the international team theEvaluation Team shall produce a brief Inception Report highlighting the team’s initialfindings on available information, the process to be followed, foreseeable obstacles to itswork and proposed solutions, etc.. The report shall be presented to and commented onby the Steering Committee.

A draft report of the joint evaluation would be presented to and discussed with theSteering Committee in May 2004.

Based on the comments from the joint evaluation partners the final report would beready by July-August 2004. Danida – being the lead donor in the process – will be readyto publish the final report including annexes compiled on CD-ROM as a report in itsseries of evaluation studies.

8. Documents provided

The following reports and publications provide background information:

• Evaluation Guidelines, Danida February 1999, Revised 2001. (Available on-line:http://www.um.dk/danida/evalueringsrapporter/eval-gui/index.asp).

• Sector Programme Support Document, BPEP II, Danida, September 1997.• BPEP II, Programme Implementation Plan (Main Report) MOES, February 1999.• BPEP II, Mid Term Review Mission March 17-22, 2002, Joint Aide Memoire.• BPEP II, Ninth Joint Review Mission, 23-28 March 2003, Joint Aide Memoire.• Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic Education in Developing Countries.

Final Report, September 2003. (pre-print version).


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Annex 2 Documents Reviewed


A Gender Audit of BPEP II Nepal, Koirala, Basnet, and McCaffery, May 2002

A Model for Formative Research, Report 2003, Kristin Tornes

A Report on A Third Party Review of BPEP II, Kathmandu, Ch. 1-10, Executive Summary, October 16, 2001

A Study on Teaching Materials and Subject-wise Classroom Observation, MITRA, Kathmandu, September

30, 2001

A Study on Students Regularity in Primary Education, Research Centre for Educational Innovation and

Development, Nepal, 2001

A Rapid Appraisal of Status of Transfer of Management of Public Schools to Communities, Submitted to

World Bank, Badri Dev Pande, Min Bahadur Bista, July 2003.

A Study of child from disadvantaged groups and their access to education (draft), Rai, Feb 2000

A Study on Devolution on Primary Education in Nepal (Report of the Consultant), UNDP, 2002

A Study on the Implementation of the Seventh Amendment of Education Act 1971 on School Management

and Its Constitution and Functions (Final Draft Report), Nepal, 2003

A Study on Improvement of Internal Efficiency of Primary Education, CERID, Nepal, 2001

Abstracts of research studies for the use of MTR mission only: Preliminary Report, Mar 2002

Aide-Memoire, Loan 1840-NEP Teacher Education Project, Loan Review Mission, Asian Development Bank,

December 23, 2003

Aide-Memoire, Loan: Teacher Education Project, Loan Inception Mission, (10-15 June 2002)

Aide-Memoire, Joint Donor Review Mission – BPEP II (10-19 May 2000)

Aide-Memoire, DRAFT, Joint Donor Mission – BPEP II (13-24 November 2000)

Aide-Memoire, DRAFT, Joint Mid-term Review Mission (03-14 December, 2001), BPEP II, Nepal

Aide-Memoire, Joint Donor Review Mission – BPEP II (26 March-6 April 2001)

Aide-Memoire, Nepal Education for All Program, Preparation Mission, June 3-18, 2003

Aide-Memoire, BPEP II, Nepal, Joint Review Mission 17-29, November 1999

Aide-Memoire, SESP Joint Review Mission, 2, April 2003

Aide-Memoire, Secondary Education Support Programme (SESP), Joint Review Mission, 20-21 March 2003

Alternative Schooling Programme (A pilot programme implementing since 1999/00 to till 2003/04) Non-

Formal Education Centre, 2004

An assessment of the impact of HIV/AIDS on the education sector in Nepal: Executive Summary, MOES,

Kathmandu, February 2003

115

Annual Strategic Implementation Plan for School Level Education (2003/4), DOE, March 2003

Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (2004/05) DOE, Planning and Monitoring Section, March, 2004

Annual Strategic Implementation Plan, 2001/02, Strategic Overview, March 7, 2001

Annual Strategic Implementation Plan, 2001/02, Strategic Overview, March 7, 2001, Preliminary Draft

Annual Work plan and Budget for BPEP District Level, 2003/04

A Review of Recent Work in Progress on Issues of Education in Conflict in the Context of Nepal, Male, C.

2002.

Background Paper for the 2003 Country Portfolio Review Mission (24-28 November 2003), Asian

Development Bank, DRAFT, November 7, 2003

Basic and Primary Education Sub-Sector Programme 1998-2002, Vol. II Component Plan, MOES, Aug 1997

BPEP (1992-1998) A synthesis of experiences, MOES-BPEP I, Oct 1999

BPEP District Level Progress Report for 2001/02, MOES, Dept of Education, Planning and Monitoring

Section

BPEP II – Activities under TA Sub-basket, Direct Funding, October 2000-December 2001, PAT, January 2002

BPEP II – Programme Implementation Plan (Main Report), HMG/N, February 1999

BPEP II – Sector Programme Support Document (Summary), Danida, September 1997

BPEP II Third Party Review, TORs, May 3, 2001

BPEP II Third Party Review, TORs, Annex

BPEP II (1999-2004) Programme Implement Plan (Main Report), HMG/MOE, Nepal, February 1999

BPEP II 10th Joint Review Mission, Joint Aid Memoire, Nov 2003

BPEP II 9th Joint Review Mission, Joint Aid Memoire, Mar 2003

BPEP II Appraisal Mission Report: Proposed Second Basic and Primary Education Project, Joint Appraisal

Mission, European Union, IDA, NORAD, September 8-25, 1998

BPEP II Joint HMG/N – Donor Technical Review Meeting (11-13 Dec 2002) Joint Aide Memoire, Dec 2002

BPEP II Mid-Term Review – Draft Report, The World Bank, February 4, 2004

BPEP II Mid-Term Review Mission (March 17-22, 2002), Background Documents

BPEP II Mid-Term Review Mission (March 17-22, 2002), Joint Aide Memoire Mid-term review report & other

relevant documents presented during the mission, Mar 2002

BPEP II Mid-Term Review: Terms of Reference for Technical Panel, Version 4, September 14, 2001

BPEP II Performance Indicators, monitoring indicators, monitoring plan, MOES – DOE – Sanothimi

BPEP II Programme Advisory Team (PAT/DANIDA) Office, Annual Work Plan and Budget, January 2002 –

June 2004, Nepal (June 2002)


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BPEP II Report on Joint Field Monitoring Visits, Nepal, March 10-22, 2003

BPEP II, Report of Technical Panel, HMG/MOES, November 24, 2001

Bringing Education to Girls in Remote areas of Nepal: Report of the Field Research conducted in the 5

development regions of Nepal, UNESCO, Mar 2000

Capacity Building for Educational Improvement: An Institutional Analysis of the Ministry of Education and

Sports of Nepal, DUE & International Programme for Education and Development Study and Resource

Centre, Jul 2002

Central Level Progress for FY 002.03

Challenges and Opportunities to Service Delivery in Nepal in the Current Conflict Situation, ODC for Norad

and the Royal Norwegian Embassy, 2003.

Civil Service Regulation, 2050(1994)

Curriculum Development and Revision Training, Consultants’ Report, 13-31 May 2002, Kathmandu

Dissemination of the Findings of National Assessment of Grade 5 Students, 2003

Education Act, 2028(1971)

Education for All 2004-2009: Core Document, MOES, November 2003

Education for All 2004-2009: A concept policy framework for Basic and Primary Education in Nepal, FINAL

DRAFT, MOES, Nepal, February 20, 2003

Education for All: Japan’s Action, Ministry of Foreign Affairs/MOES

Education for All: National Plan of Action, Nepal (2001 – 2015), MOES, 2003

Education in Difficult Circumstances: A Discussion Paper Prepared for the Review Meeting of BPEP II,

European Commission Education Coordination Office, December 2002

Education Regulations, 2002

Effect of CAS on Students’ Achievement, Dropouts and Attendance (FINAL REPORT), MOES/Curriculum

Development Centre, Bhakatapur, 2003

Effectiveness of Teacher Training (A Study Report), NCED, 2003

Evaluation of Finnish Education Sector Development Cooperation (Draft) – Nepal, J. Moulton, Jan 2004

Executive Summary of Internal Efficiency Studies

Follow-up Study of Teacher Training Programme (A Study Report), NCED, 2003

HIV/AIDS Assessment, Nepal, May 2002

HRD Report, pp. 1 – 79, MOES

Human Resource Development Plan (Volume I), HMG/MOES, August 2003

Implementation Completion Report (CR-23570) On A Credit In the Amount of SDR 21.8 Million (US$30.6

Million Equivalent) to the Kingdom of Nepal for BPEP. The World Bank. May 10, 2000

117

Inclusive Education: A Pilot Project in Nepal, County of Copenhagen and Danida, 2004.

Inclusive Education: Recommendations of a Working Seminar on Inclusive Education, Kathmandu, 1-2

March 2004.

JICA Country Programme for Nepal 2003 (Draft), JICA, May 2003

Joint MOES Local Donor Group meeting, Aug 2003

Joint MOES Local Donor Group meeting, Feb 2003

Joint MOES Local Donor Group meeting, May 2003

Joint Government – Donor Mid-term Review, MTR Report Nepal – BPEP II, March 2002

Literacy Situation in Nepal: A Thematic Presentation, Non-Formal Education Centre, MOES October 2002

Literature Review: Studies on Girls and Women Education in Nepal, Sept 28, 2001

Local Self-governance Act, 2055(1999): An Act Made to Provide for Local Self-governance

Major Activities of Japan in the Education Sector, JICA, 2004

Map of Nepal: Survey Districts

Medium-term Expenditure Framework, Fiscal Year 2002/03 – 04/05, Main Volume, National Planning

Commission, Kathmandu, January 2003

National Achievement Level of Grade 3 Students, Educational and Development Service Centre, 1997

National Assessment of Grade 3 Students, Educational and Development Service Centre, 2001

National Assessment of Grade 5 Students, Education and Development Service Centre 1995

National Centre for Educational Development (NCED): Prospectus 2003. MOES. Nepal. December 2003

Non-Formal Education Centre: An Introduction, NFEC, 2002

Organizational Chart of Ministry of Education and Sports, Nepal, 2003

PAT Comments and Recommendations to Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (ASIP) for FY 1999-2000

Programme Implementation Plan (Main Report), Ministry of Education, HMG/N, February 2002

Policy Framework for Basic and Primary Education Programme, Annex 1

Project Logical Framework, Assistance for an expanded Rights-based Approach to the Concentrated

HIV/AIDS Epidemic Among Sex Workers, Clients, and Injecting Drug Users in Nepal

Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 9.0 Million to the Kingdom of

Nepal for BPEP I, WORLD BANK, March 3, 1999

Project Completion Report on the Primary Education Development Project (Loan 1141-NEP[SF]) in Nepal,

Asian Development Bank, September 2001

Quality and Accuracy of School Reported Data, Tribhuvan University, CERID Formative Research Project, July

2002


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Report on Activities under TA Funding Direct, July – September 2001

Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the Kingdom

of Nepal for the Teacher Education Project, Asian Development Bank, August 2001

Report of Expenditure Tracking Survey of Primary, Lower Secondary and Secondary Schools, HMG/Min. of

Fin, Nepal, June 4, 2003

Report of Response Analysis on HIV/AIDS in Nepal, HMG/Min. of Health, Dept. of Health Services, Nat’l Ctr.

For AIDS and STD Control, October 31, 2000

School Based Assessment in Nepali Primary Schools: Finnish Support to the Basic and Primary Education

Sub-sector Development Programme (BPEP II) in Nepal, Mohan Gopal Nyachhyon, Richard Webber,

HMG/MOES

School Level Education Statistics of Nepal 2001, DOE, Apr 2003

Secondary Education Support Programme : Core Document, HMG/N – ADB – Danida, Jul 2002

Sector Wide Approaches in Education. Institute for Health Sector Development. August 2003

A Study on Bilingual Education

Status Report: BPEP II, MOES, November 2001

Status Report: BPEP II, MOES Dec 2002

Status Report: BPEP II, MOES Nov 2003

Structure for ASIP 02/03, slide

Study Report on Reaching the Unreached: Social Assessment for Inclusive Education, MOES, by TEAM

Consult Pvt. Ltd., November 7, 2001

Study of Implementation of Status Seventh Amendment of Education Act, Schools, Seventh Amm Study Vol.

1

Study of Implementation of Status Seventh Amendment of Education Act, Schools, Seventh Amm Study Vol.

2

Terms of Reference for International Consultant on the Gender Audit, The World Bank, July 16, 2001

The Civil Service Act, 2049(1993)

The Tenth Plan (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2002-2007): Summary, HMG/N May 2003

Work plan 03-04: Activities related to Outputs, January 2002-June 2008

What’s the Difference: The Impact of Early Childhood Development Programs, Save the Children – Norway,

Mar 2003

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Annex 3 Key Informant Interviews: Kathmandu Area

This annex presents an overview of the persons interviewed in the Kathmandu area ontwo separate occasions. First during the Fact Finding Mission in January 2004, and sec-ond during and after the Main Evaluation Mission from March 1 to March 19, 2004.The list does not include those persons interviewed in the seven districts visited by theevaluation team during the second field mission. Persons interviewed at district level arelisted in the reports for each district which are presented as Volume 2 to this report:

Part One: Persons Interviewed During the Fact-Finding Mission (January 2004)

HMG/N

Name Position Institution

Mr. Ram Sarobar Dubey Joint Secretary Planning and Monitoring Division, MOES

Mr. Diwakar Dhungel Under Secretary Monitoring and Evaluation Section, MOES

Mr. Lava Dev Awasthi Under Secretary Foreign Aid Coordination Section (FACS), MOES

Mr. Satya Bahadur Shrestha Director General Department of Education

Mr. Janardhan Nepal Director Department of Education

Ms. Shanti Basnyat Director Department of Education, Planning Division

Mr. Ram Balak Singh Deputy Director Department of Education, Planning Division

Ms. Neera Shakya Training Officer Department of Education

Mr. Chuman Singh Basnyat Director General Curriculum Development Centre

Mr. Jaganath Awa Director Curriculum Development Centre

Mr. Arjun Bahadur Bhandari Director National Centre for Education Development

Mr. Tulasi Thapaliya Sr. Research Officer National Centre for Education Development

Mr. Iswhor Gyawali Training Officer National Centre for Education Development

Ms. Rajya Laxmi Nakarmi Ministry of Education and Sports,

Foreign Assistance Coordination section

Mr. Dhami Ministry of Education and Sports,


Dr. Mark Waltham Ministry of Education and Sports,


Mr. Lal Shankar Ghimire Under Secretary Foreign Aid Co-ordination Division,

Ministry of Finance

Mr. Narendra Phuyal Researcher, Research Centre for Educational Innovation

Formative Research and development (CERID)

Project

Mr. Rom Prasad Bhattarai Research Assistant Research Centre for Educational Innovation

and development (CERID)

Ms. Dibya Kala Shrestha District Education District Education Office, Kavre District

Learners at Sharada Officer Panauti Municipality, Kavre District

Secondary School,

Sunthan - 10


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Financial and Technical Partners


Ms. Else Møller Nielsen Counsellor Royal Danish Embassy

Mr. Kishore K.C. Senior Programme Royal Danish Embassy

Officer

Mr. Karsten Jensen CTA ESAT/Danida

Mr. Rasmus Gedde-Dahl Second Secretary Royal Norwegian Embassy

Mr. Asko Lukkainen Ambassador Finnish Embassy in KTM

Mr. Andrew Hall Economic Advisor DFID

Mr. Alex Harper Deputy Head DFID

Mr. Rajendra Joshi World Bank, Nepal

Dr. Giap Dang Advisor EC Delegation

Mr. Bimal L. Shrestha National EC Delegation

Coordinator

Ms. Susan Durston Education EU Education Coordination Office

Programme

Coordinator

(BPEP II)

Mr. Samphe Lhanlungpa Chief, Education UNICEF

& child Protection

Section

Mr. Valter Tinderholt Resident Save the Children/Norway

Representative

Ms. Haruko Kamei Assistant Resident JICA

Representative

Mr. Krishna Prasad Lamsal Programme Officer JICA

Mr. Krishna Ram Pandey Director ADB

Mr. Grayson Clarke Consultant Bannock Consulting

Mr. Jens Claussen Senior Economist Nordic Consulting Group

Mr. Ko-Chih R. Tung UIS Regional UNESCO Bangkok

Advisor

Part Two: Persons Interviewed During the Main Field Mission

(March 1- March 19 2004 and Excluding District


Mr. Lal Shankar Ghimire Under Secretary Foreign Aid Coordination Division, MOF

Mr. Kailash Pokhreal Section Officer Programme & Budget Section, MOF

Mr. Bal Gopal Sigdel Controller General Financial Controller General's Office

Mr. Lava Dev Awasti Under Secretary Foreign Aid Coordination Section, MOES

Mr. Satya Bahadur Shrestha Director General DOE

Mr. Prahlad Aryal Section Officer Planning Division, DOE

Mr. Ram Balak Singh Deputy Director

Mr. Punya Neupane Director Admin. & Finance Division, DOE

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Mr. S.R. Bista Deputy Director Admin. Section, DOE

Mr. Rajendra Nepal Finance Controller

Mr. B.N. Sharma Deputy Directory

Mr. Shambu Upreti Sr. Divisional Engineer Physical Service Section

Ms. Neera Shakya Training Chief Training Section, DOE

Ms. Shanti Basnet Director Planning Division, DOE

Mr. Hari Lamsal Section Officer Statistics Section, DOE

Ms. Rita Tisdal Adviser Special Needs Education Section, DOE

Mr. Diwakar Awasthi Section Chief

Mr. Surendra Neupane Section Officer

Mr. Hari Panta

Mr. Bhim K.C. Kharel Section Officer

Mr. Mukti Singh Thakuri Section Officer ECD Section, Education Management Division, DOE

Mr. Narayan Timilsina Section Officer

Mr. Diwakar Dhungel Under Secretary Planning Division, MOES

Ms. Ram Pyari Shrestha Section Chief Education Management Division,

Women Education Section

Ms. Sunita Malakar Acting Director Distance Education Centre

Mr. Chuman Singh Basnyat Director General Curriculum Development Centre

Mr. Jaganath Awa Director

Mr. Sharad Upadhaya Deputy Director Janak Education Material Centre

Mr. Shuvadarshan Acharaya Deputy Director

Non-Formal Education Centre

Mr. Ram Prasad Pandey Section Officer

Mr. Kedar Chandra Khanal

Dr. Ken Ohashi Country Director World Bank

Mr. Rajendra Joshi Programme Officer

Mr. Laxmi Bhatta Basukala Education Director Educate the Children

Ms. Haruko Kamai Assistant Resident JICA

Representative

Mr. Krishna Prasad Lamsal Programme Officer

Ms. Else Møller Nielsen Counsellor Royal Danish Embassy

Mr. Kishore KC Senior Programme

Officer

Mr. Sadananda Kandel Education Officer PLAN International

Ms. Ingrid Ofstad Ambassador Royal Norwegian Embassy

Mr. Rasmus Gedde-Dahl Second Secretary

Mr. Karsten Jensen CTA ESAT

Mr. Jeet Bahadur Thapa Sr. Programme Officer


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Dr. Min Bahadur Bista National Coordinator

Mr. Keshab Prasad Bhattairai President Nepal Teachers Association

Mr. Madav Prasad Adhikari President Nepal National Teachers Association

Mr. R.R. Bajracharya Chief CERID

Mr. Krishna Pandey Sr. Programme Officer Asian Development Bank

Mr. Samphe Lhanlungpa Chief, Education & UNICEF

Child Protection

Section

Mr. Ishwor Gyanwali Trainer Teacher Training Section, NCED

Mr. Indra Bahadur Shrestha Instructor

Mr. Bhoj Bahadur Balayar Research Officer Research and Monitoring Section, NCED

Mr. Deepak Sharma Research & Research & Planning Section, NCED

Planning Officer

Mr. Subadarshan Acharaya Deputy Director NFEC

Mr. Ram Pd. Pandey Section Officer

Mr. Kedar Chandra Khanal Deputy Director

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Annex 4 Pilot Processes Reviewed

Pilot projects visited in the field included: Continuous Assessment (CAS), Inclusive edu-cation and SIP/DEP planning activities. The following gives an overview of the mainfindings of the Evaluation Team.

CAS

Continuous Assessment (CAS) has been implemented in five districts (strictly speakingthis is not a pilot activity but a phased roll-out). The team visited Surkhet District. Theobjective of CAS has been to introduce a routine assessment of student learning achieve-ment as a key element to improve quality. CAS strategies included an integrative set ofteaching techniques, so teachers are enabled to study children’s learning and moreimportantly know how to change the teaching strategy to help children learn based onthe assessment. Teachers reported positively about the concept of continuous assessmentand the fundamental idea seemed to be reasonably understood and somewhat inter-nalised. The teachers highlighted in particular the CAS training and orientation, whichthey had received. All the Teachers consulted said that they would implement CAS pro-vided that the student teacher ratios conform to the guideline of 1 to 30.

However with class sizes often over 50 pupils, CAS has reportedly proven unworkable,and generally very time consuming. The high enrolment in most classes, means thatteachers must handle five classes per day instead of three, which impacts negatively onCAS and, seen in this context, all teachers reported that CAS was too ambitious andunrealistic, to the extent that in all schools visited CAS has either been severely compro-mised or abandoned in practice. Surkhet is a district, which is highly affected by theconflict, resulting in dramatically high student/teacher ratios (e.g. 170 students in someclasses). In such a situation CAS in its present form is impossible to implement. And itshould be noted that teachers reported that as a system CAS has been viewed as in-appropriate both before and during the current phase of the emergency.

Teachers interviewed have tended to focus on the complexity of the CAS monitoringforms and the necessity for frequent updating of complex forms. This raises the issue ofwhether CAS is sufficiently flexible, or if it is, whether teachers have not understood itsflexibility.

Despite the reported negative experience with CAS, the initiative has been pursuedthroughout the life of BEP II with support from technical assistance (supplied byFinnish Aid) in DOE. A critical review was made in 2001, which recommended sub-stantial changes in the project. The latest MTR also had critical remarks about the CASon linking the continuous assessment to teaching methods. Despite the reported limitedoutcomes of the initiative, no official decision has been made by the ProgrammeEducation Board on downscaling of the activities.

Inclusive Education

In discussing Inclusive Education as a pilot project, it is very important to distinguishbetween the formal pilot project in inclusive education carried out in four districts inNepal (Banke, Kavre, Sindhupalchowk and Udaypur) with support from Danida, and


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ongoing efforts to support special needs education across the country (usually throughspecial classes termed resource classes – for blind, deaf and mentally disabled children).

Inclusive Education as a concept implies the integration of all groups facing exclusionfrom education into the schooling process in their own communities. This furtherimplies a child-centred approach to teaching/learning and one that is grounded in thelocal realities of all participants. Thus, while inclusive education encompasses blind, deafand mentally disabled children, it has a much wider focus and purpose.

In some ways, a fully implemented inclusive education approach would be in direct con-trast to the activities supported by BPEP II in special needs education. These have main-ly been in the form of resource classes and assessment centres, most often based on resi-dences attached to the schools and with special needs students moved from their homecommunities and families.

An example of special needs education9 (the core method for dealing with disabled chil-dren in BPEP II) was observed with mentally disabled children in Surkhet. The resourceclasses appeared to be as under funded as ongoing regular classes, the resource classteachers were unmotivated, the physical environment of the children residence was poorand there was very little integration of children in classes. The teachers indicated thatspecial needs education was not functioning properly. They attributed this in part tolack of a system for classifying children by their developmental capacities, but also toweaknesses in training and technical assistance to implement the approach.

The meagre results seemed demoralising for teachers. After the maximum five-year period of residency, children in these residences will face a difficult problem on return-ing to their families. The teachers expressed their concerns and felt that it would havebeen better to provide the disabled children practical skills training rather than trying tointegrate them into regular classes. In some ways, the Surkhet resource classes are illus-trative of a national challenge in how to deal with some of the negative consequences ofresidential schooling for disabled children.

In the case of special needs education for the blind there is also a general problem oflack of Braille texts since the DOE only provides texts to the third grade level in coresubjects (Nepali, mathematics and local environment). It was reported that while teach-ers are able to teach core subjects to special needs students, teachers find it particularlydifficult to deal with subjects such as mathematics and sciences. They lacked specialisedtraining in this area.

In contrast in Banke, the team also visited schools which were considered by teachers tobe among the very best for practicing inclusive education10. These schools had benefitedfrom continuous international technical assistance, which monitored and followed upon progress and constraints. In the schools visited blind as well as mentally disabled stu-dents seemed well integrated. It was clear that the methods used for inclusive educationhad an impact, not only, on the targeted special group but, on the general teachingmethods and thus children throughout the school. An indicator of this was the intro-

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9) District visit to Surkhet.10) District visit to Banke

duction of ‘work in groups’ by students at different skills levels to encourage bright tostudents to help others. Teachers reported how the new teaching methods of the inclu-sive education methodology improved discipline and the general working atmosphere.

In Banke it seems that the schools visited were implementing a kind of "hybrid" versionof the old and new systems with a school-wide emphasis on inclusion, working ingroups and child centred activities and with special needs children (blind, deaf and men-tally disabled) more integrated into regular classroom work.

Key stakeholder interviews in Kathmandu raised the issue that, under the InclusiveEducation Pilot, different agencies in Denmark are providing technical assistance to thedifferent districts in Nepal without a strong and cohesive model of inclusive educationor a strong operational plan of how it should be implemented. They also raise questionsof how open the Danish TA agencies have been to genuine partnership with their coun-terparts in the Special Education Section.

One of the most important issues facing inclusive education in Nepal is how the basicprinciple of participation by all excluded groups in education in their own communitiescan be reconciled with the older model of resource classes for special needs childrenwhich for the most part depend on removing children from their families and commu-nities with an attendant host of problems and dangers (including lack of supervision,physical neglect, opportunities for abuse, alienation from their parents, etc.).

The reportedly somewhat disjointed nature of the inclusive pilot and its overlap with theongoing strategy of resource centre based special education, has contributed to an on-going conceptual confusion between inclusive education, special education, integratededucation, alternative education, flexible schooling, non-formal education etc. The con-cepts and methodologies are many.

A number of positive and less positive lessons have clearly been learned in the respectiveschools (with resource classes and in he inclusive education pilot), however lessons donot seem to be systematically consolidated and incorporated into programme planningor to improving weak spots in the field – i.e. through sharing of knowledge and compar-ing experiences across the country.

SIP/DEP

In 1999 the local level SIP/DEP planning process started in 75 districts. However resultsafter one year suggested that local levels should be involved more substantially in plan-ning. It was decided to backtrack and commence the planning again from the lowestlevel – but this time in a gradual way in order to introduce this new habit slowly.Subsequently in 2000 local level planning commenced on a pilot basis in 12 districts.Relevant actors were trained in the preparing the SIP. All schools in the 12 selected dis-tricts prepared SIPs, however there was no "funding guarantee", so schools preparedunrealistic planning wish lists, which were rejected in the budget allocation process.DOE monitored the activities closely and learnt as a main lesson to link planning withbudget ceilings.

As a result of the review, in 2001 a new pilot model was introduced, where fundingguaranteed planning was introduced in five districts. From the pilot district activities itwas soon learnt that the funding modality had to be adjusted, as was the case with the


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SIP format (simplifying the household survey format). A funding modality of 170 NPRper child etc. was established and a new SIP format was introduced. In 2003, seven dis-tricts were added to the pilot/gradual expansion. Today all 12 districts are preparingfunding guaranteed SIPs. A plan for gradual roll out to the entire country has beenmade.

Despite the initial cumbersome exercise of rolling out the SIP/DEP pilot to all 75 dis-tricts, only to realise that this was too hasty a decision, and therefore had to be calledoff, the subsequent pilot of SIP/DEP planning in 5+7 districts appears to have taken asound piloting approach. Periodic reviews and systematic revisions in approach andmethodology undertaken by DOE have assisted the process.

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Annex 5 Budget Planning Schedule

S. No. Particulars Responsible To be completed

Agency by the end of the

week of

1 Send District Level Development Budget Planning Guidelines and Ceiling

1.1 Ask for particulars from concerned line ministries to National Planning October 1st week

determine the budget ceilings for the coming fiscal year Commission (NPC)

1.2 Line ministries to submit district level preliminary Line ministries October 4th week

budget proposal to NPC

1.3 NPC to discuss/consult with the line ministries and NPC November 2nd week

send budget ceilings and integrated guidelines to

District Development Committees (DDCs)

1.4 Line ministries to prepare a detailed programmatic Line ministry November 3rd week

budget allocation staying within the ceilings/limits and

guidelines stated above under 1.3 and issue a circular

to the DDC along with area specific guidelines

2 Prepare the structure of the entire budget

2.1 NPC to receive the estimates of the preliminary NPC December 1st week

programmatic budget from concerned line ministries

to make an estimate of the development budget

2.2 Prepare the ceiling/limit for development budget NPC December 3rd week

(ministry wise and region wise) and present it the

Resource Committee

2.3 Make an estimate of the ceilings/limits of regular MoF December 3rd week

budget and present it to the Resource Committee

2.4 Resource Committee to determine the size and Resource December 4th week

ceilings/limits of the total budget Committee

3 Send Budget Planning Guidelines and Ceilings

3.1 Send the regular budget ceilings and instructions Ministry of December 4th week

Finance (MoF)

3.2 Send the development budget ceilings and NPC December 4th week

guidelines (ministry wise and region wise) to

respective line ministries

3.3 Send the budget ceilings and guidelines received Line Ministries December 4th week

under sections 3.1 and 3.2 (see above) to departments,

offices and projects under its jurisdiction

4 Prepare and Submit Regular and Development Programme & Budget

4.1 Fill and submit the regular budget form that is

consistent with the ceilings/limits and guidelines stated

under section 3.1

4.1.1 Prepare the regular budget form that facilitates District level January 3rd week

the realization of the annual targets and send it Office

to their line department

4.1.2 Prepare a consolidated regular budget form based Line Department February 2nd week

on the budget forms submitted by district level

office and send it to their line ministry


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4.1.3 Prepare the regular budget form for the Line Department February 2nd week

Department that facilitates the realization of

its annual targets and send it to their line ministry

4.1.4 Prepare the regular budget form for the Ministry Line Ministry February 3nd week

that facilitates the realization of its annual targets

and send it to Ministry of Finance

4.1.5 Send the consolidated regular budget form Line Ministry February 3nd week

received from the line department for its district

level offices and the regular budget form for

the line department to Ministry of Finance

4.2 Fill and submit the development budget form that is

consistent with the ceilings/limits and guidelines stated

under section 3.2

4.2.1 Prepare budget and programme for approved Line Ministry March 1st week

central level projects and send it to Ministry of

Finance and National Planning Commission

4.2.2 Send district level programme and budget District March 2nd week

passed by the District Council to their Development

line ministry Committee (DDC)

4.2.3 Prepare budget and programme for approved Line Ministry April 1st week

district level projects and send it to Ministry

of Finance and National Planning Commission

5 Conduct Discussion on Regular Budget and Development Programme/Budget

5.1 Conduct discussion on the regular budget of Offices Ministry of Finance March 2nd week

that do not have development budget

5.2 Conduct discussion on the regular budget Ministry of Finance March 3rd week

(Departments with development budget along

with Offices)

5.3 Conduct discussion on central level developmental NPC, MoF, March 3rd week

projects Line Ministry

5.4 Conduct discussion on district level developmental NPC, MoF, April 2nd week

projects Line Ministry

5.5 Prepare first draft of Budget MoF April 3rd week

5.6 Prepare final draft of Budget MoF May 1st week

6 Present Budget and Approve it by Parliament

6.1 Present the Budget (Budget Speech) Finance Minister May 2nd week

6.2 Parliament to pass the Budget Bill and have it approved Parliament June 4th week

7 Authorisation to spend the budget expenditure and approval of Programme

7.1 Approve programme with trimester breakdown Line Ministry July 1st week

7.2 Present authorization for budget expenditure Secretary, MoF July 1st week

7.3 Present authorization to agencies responsible for Secretary, July 2nd week

budget expenditure Line Ministry

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Annex 6 Programme and Budget Authorisation Flowchart

Programme and Budget Authorisation

Annex 6 Programme and Budget Authorisation Flowchart

130

FCGO

DTCO

DOE

Director General

75 DEOs

Schools, RCs

5 regional

education

directorates

9 training

centers

Central

agencies

MOF

Secratary

MOES

Secratary

Legend

Authorisation

Information

Auth: 65-4-411

65-5-411

Auth:

break down

65-'5-411

Auth:

break down

65-'4-411

Auth:

break down

65-'4-411

Auth:

break down

65-'4-411

Authorisation

Information

Information

Information

Information

Annex 7 Flow of Funds Flowcharts

Annex 7 Flow of Funds Flowcharts

Flow of Funds

131

FCGO

DTCOs (75)

Trimester:

Instruction of

fund release

Request for release funds based clearance of

advance payments (of the Treasury)

Monthly: Submisssion of SoEs

DOE

DEOs and

other cost

centres (96)

Monthly:

Submission

of SoEs

Flows of funds from the Basket Fund

Flows of funds from the Basket Fund

132

World

Bank

DoE FCGO

Special accounts:

• World Bank

• Danida

• Finida

• Norad

• EU

Reimbursement System:Direct reimb. expenditures >

US$ 1.2 millions

Replenishment System:WB: Maintenance of balance at US$ 1.2 million

Bilaterials: Transfer upon the request of DoE

Draw down:World Bank share of the Reimb. of

SoEs < US$ 1.2 million and total

minum treshold beeing US$ 1.5 millions)

World Bank check ex-post

Reimbursement

Doncillation of SoE

with advances

Central Cost Centres (DoE and 4

other central cost centrets (5)

Regional Education Directorates

(5) and Training Centres (9)

DEOs (75)

Map

of N

epal

2 Asiatisk Plads

DK-1448 Copenhagen K

Denmark

Phone: +45 33 92 00 00

Fax: +45 32 54 05 33

E-mail: [email protected]

Internet: www.um.dk

ISBN (report): 87-7667-075-9

ISSN: 1399-4972