Netwar 2.0: Towards a new military theory of social networks

8/14/2019 Netwar 2.0: Towards a new military theory of social networks

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The term netwar was coined in theearly 1990s1 by John Arquilla and DavidRonfeldt who felt that the informationrevolution was going to have an un-

precedented impact on the way conflictis carried out. Since its inception theconcept of netwar has been confusedwith war waged on or through computer-

ized platforms on the Internet. ThoughInternet and communications technolo-gies (ICT) can be an important ingredientfor netwar, the more profound attributeof netwar is the organizational design ofits protagonists. In netwar one or moresides display a dispersed organization; awidely cast social network without thecentralized command structure found intodays military hierarchies. Althoughthe World Wide Web has acted as a cata-lyst for increased awareness of networksdue to its capabilities for maintainingrelatively cohesive groups on a global

scale, netwar is more about social or-ganization rather than technologicalrevolution.

In 2001, Arquilla and Ronfeldt re-leased a collection of essays that ex-

plored in depth the impact of social net-

works on netwar.2 The book covered awide breadth of topics from terror andcrime to activism and social movements.During that time Albert-Lsl Barabsi, a

physicist from the University of NotreDame, was making immense headway inthe study of networks. His discovery ofthe scale-free quality of real networks

has had resounding impact in the fieldsof computer science, theoretical physicsand biology. Due to the timing, Ba-rabsis findings were not incorporatedinto the updated concept of netwar.

There is great potential for the fieldsof netwar and network theory in a mili-tary context to be revolutionized due tothese recent breakthroughs. A better un-derstanding of the underlying structureof networks will also aid in the discoveryof historical analogues. Though the con-cept of netwar was established in theearly 90s the actual practice of netwar

could possibly date back to the earliestsocial networks of humankind. Recentadvances in social network analysis mayaid historical researchers searching forantecedents to modern-day netwar. In thesame manner, theories about future

forms of netwar may also be con-ceived. Previously unknown types ofnetworked organization are being real-ized that could prove to be the threat oftomorrow.

It is beyond the scope of this paper todefinitively answer these difficult ques-tions. But through examining the present,

past and possible future of social net-work theory in the context of netwar,

paths for future study will be illuminatedin an attempt to provoke a re-examination of the network-based war-fare concept which accounts for recentadvances in other fields.

Historical Antecedents

From the current military perspec-tive netwar is associated with asym-metric threats, pitting non-state ac-tors against a state who holds con-

ventional military dominance. Thusnetworked conflict is not the stuff ofmodern traditional warfare. With theunchallenged dominance of theAmerican military today, the net-works of terrorist groups and insur-gents has come to the forefront ofcurrent military strategic inquiry. In Networks and NetwarsArquilla andRonfeldt list ten examples of recentnetwars since 1994.3 The Americaninvasion of Afghanistan in 2001 sawUS Special Forces deployed in a dis-

tributed network on the ground. Butis netwar truly a newly discoveredform of war?

The advent of the telegraph and therailway was an information revolution initself, allowing commanders far from thefront to exert control over men in thetrenches. In fact the type of total warthat World War I represented requiringthe efforts of the people and industry to

be subordinate to military goals galva-nized the organizational design of thehierarchy for the rest of the 20thcentury.4 Prior to the Great War, limita-tions on communication technology re-quired distant units to act semi-autonomously. The Royal British Navywould receive extremely simple orders(ie. Find French ships and sink them)that they would act on during months at

WS 500 - Netwar 2.0 20 March 06 - Chad KOHALYK

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1 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt first introduced the term netwar in their 1993 article Cyberwar is Coming!

2Networks and Netwars Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001)

3 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) pp. 17

4 In fact, the 20th century corporation, born out of the factories of the industrial revolution, is another example of the dominance of hierarchies in the last century.

Netwar 2.0Towards a new military theory of social networks


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sea between port calls, and their nextmission.

This is not to say that there were noforms of netwar after the invention ofmodern industrial warfare. Even duringthe heydey of hierarchy militaries ex-

perimented with decentralized forms ofcontrol. The German concept ofAuftrag-

staktik, or "mission tactics", allowedeach officer and NCO to do what theythought needed to be done in order toachieve the mission goal. Decision-making was devolved to the lowest lev-els. The Israeli Defense Force utilizedoptional control allowing field com-manders to make their own tactical deci-sions regardless of whether or not theyhad orders. Furthermore, during WorldWar I, T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) master-fully navigated tribal politics to organizea network of irregulars with a single mis-sion: harass Turkish lines of communica-

tion.Yet not all guerilla movements are

equal in the eyes of netwar. Both MaoTse Tungs and Roger Trinquiers influ-ential tracts in guerilla warfare outlineextremely hierarchical forms of organi-zation. Maos On Guerilla Warfare con-tains very specific personnel and armsrequirements in a strict hierarchy divid-ing divisions into regiments, battalionsand companies. Trinquiers diagrams ofthe military organization of the NationalLiberation Army (ALN) in Algiers dur-ing the 1950s show a hierarchical com-

mand and control structure sitting atopisolated three-man cells: each discretearmed group consisted of thirty-fivearmed men. Trinquier charted the ALNs

bomb-throwing network as well, whichwas kept apart from other elements ofthe organization ... broken down into anumber of quite distinct and compart-mented branches, in communication onlywith the network chief through a systemof letter boxes.5

The guerilla networks of revolution-ary wars during the middle of the 20th

century exhibit a surprising rigid hierar-chical structure from the perspective oftodays current challenges in fightinginsurgency and terrorism worldwide.Despite a community of prominent theo-reticians trying to come to terms with

post-colonial peoples wars, the notionof a resistance movement divorcing itself

from hierarchy and organizing along thelines of a distributed network seems tohave remained unexplored. This could bedue to culture. Maos revolution wassteeped in Leninist doctrine, which re-quired strict socialization. Yet he did saythat command must be centralized forstrategical purposes and decentralized fortactical purposes.6

There are also possibilities for inves-tigating primitive netwar from an ageeven earlier than Westphalia. In fact,Arquilla and Ronfeldt themselves use theMongols of the 12th and 13th centuries

as an example of cyberwar and netwar.7Ancient tribes, one of the earliest form ofhuman organization, display many char-acteristics similar to the kind of distrib-uted networks current militaries face.Tribes are relatively horizontal organiza-tions, with each member roughly equal.Clans represent the various segments oftribes, and can operate autonomously.Lastly, tribes are leaderless in that eld-ers are advisors or facilitators, and theirroles change due to circumstances. Oneof the most important netwar-like charac-teristic of tribes is their mastery over the

tactic of swarming.8 Ancient tribes repre-sent amazing potential for discoveringhistorical analogues to netwar.

Possible historical examples of net-war seem to be plentiful throughout his-tory. Upon further investigation a patternmight emerge, such as the ostensiblecorrelation between the rise of industrialwarfare and de-emphasis on de-centralized, networked organizationaldesigns. But in order to search out pre-cise analogues we need an accuratemodel of when an organization is a net-

work. Until recently, no such modelexisted.

Network theory todayThe study of social networks in con-

flict was pioneered by John Arquilla andDavid Ronfeldt in a number of essaysduring the 1990s.9 The information

age provided a new paradigm for con-flict, particularly in the face of militarydominance by the post-Cold War victor,America. Arquilla and Ronfeldt proposedthree different types of networks thechain, the star or hub network, and theall-channel network that could be usedto categorize network-based threats.These three topologies could also beused together, or form a hybrid with ahierarchical organization. For example,some actors have a hierarchical organi-zation overall but use network designsfor tactical operations; or other actors

may have an all-channel network designoverall but use hierarchical teams fortactical operations.10 Needless to say,the possible configurations are numer-ous, which represents a challenge to ana-lysts seeking to map a particular net-work.

Real world examples, such as the 19hijackers involved in the 11 Septemberattacks of 2001, dont fall neatly into thecategories described by Arquilla andRonfeldt. A simple visual comparisonshows that the 9-11 terrorist networkfalls somewhere in between a star net-work and and all-channel network (referto next page).11 An all-channel networkof 19 nodes would render 361 links, witheach hijacker linked with all 18 otherhijackers. Only 112 total connectionsexist, less than a third of the predictedamount. And yet there is no central hub,maintaining links with all other nodes.The best connected node has only 11links, the least connected only 2. Thefour best connected nodes (with 9, 10 or11 links) account for nearly half of the


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5 Roger Trinquiers Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency is available online at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp

6 Mao, pp. 114.

7 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (1997) pp. 34-37

8 See David Ronfeldt, Al Qaeda and its affiliates: A global tribe waging segmental warfare?

9 SeeIn Athenas Camp andNetworks and Netwars for many of Arquilla and Ronfeldts articles.

10 Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2003) pp. 8-9

11 Chain, star or hub, and all-channel network diagrams reproduced from Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) pp. 8. Social Network Analysis of the 9-11 Terrorist Net-work by Valdis Krebs is available online at http://orgnet.com/hijackers.html
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp%06http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp%06http://orgnet.com/hijackers.html%06http://orgnet.com/hijackers.html%06http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp%06http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp%06


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total links (51, or 46%). The three basicnetwork models do not capture thesprawling complexity of the 9-11 hijack-ers. The reason is that Arquilla and Ron-feldt based their models on an idealizedform of social network, one that is notevidenced in the real world.

The roots of network theory12 date

back to the mid 18th century and thework of the Swiss mathematician Leon-hard Euler who solved the problem ofthe Seven Bridges of Knigsberg in1736. This was one of the first publica-tions to use graph theory, a sub-field ofmathematics, and the ancestor of modernday network theory.

Knigsberg, modern day Kaliningrad,is located on the Pregolya River whichcontains two large islands connected toeach other and the mainland by seven

bridges. The people of Knigsberg passed the time trying to solve the puz-zle: Was it possible to walk a path acrossthe seven bridges never crossing the

same one twice? Such a path was neverfound, and in 1736 Euler devised amathematical solution proving that it wasimpossible. He did so through abstrac-tion, replacing each of the land masseswith a node, and each bridge with a link.By doing this he realized that the prob-lem could be solved by looking at the

degree of each node, or number oflinks each node possessed. Euler dis-covered the only way a path could becompleted without crossing a node twicewas for each node to have an even num-

ber of degrees. This became known as anEulerian path. Since the Knigsberg puz-zle had three nodes with three links, and

one node with five links, it was mathe-matically impossible to complete a cir-cuit crossing each bridge only once.

150 years later, in 1875, a new bridgewas built in Knigsberg making such a

path possible. The importance of Euler'sdiscovery is that graphs, or networks,have certain properties "that limit or en-hance our ability to do things withthem."13

More than two hundred years latertwo Hungarian mathematicians, PaulErds and Alfrd Rnyi, made the nextleap in graph theory by asking the ques-tion: how do networks form? Erds andRnyi argued that the simplest solutionnature could follow was to connect eachnode randomly. Take for instance theexample of a cocktail party with onehundred strangers, where each guest is anode and each encounter is a social link.As each guest moves around the room,randomly mingling and collecting sociallinks, small clusters of 2 and 3 guestswill form. Soon these clusters will con-nect with one another. Inevitably, atsome point, each guest will have at leastone link. This is the turning point: wenow have one massive cluster. Startingfrom any node, one can reach any othernode within the network. To sociologists,this is a community. To physicists, this iscalled phase transition (like when waterforms ice). Erds and Rnyi calculatedthat it would take only thirty minutes forthe entire room of guests to become con-nected in an all-ecompasing social web.14

This is known as the theory of ran-dom networks, which dominatedthoughts on networks since 1959. Butthis theory did not accurately explain


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12 The following outline of network theory history comes from BarabsisLinked, unless otherwise noted.

13 Barabsi, pp. 14

14 Barabsi, pp. 16

Chain network Star or hub network All-channel network

Social Network Analysis of the 9-11 Terrorist Network


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networks in the real world. Nodes innature tend to have many more than theone link necessary to be part of thewhole. It is estimated that we know be-tween 200 and 5000 people by name.Also, random network theory says thatthe more links added to a network, themore difficult it is to find a node that is

relatively isolated. Most nodes will haveapproximately the same number of links.The result is a distribution of links repre-sented by a bell curve. Yet in nature it isentirely possible to find nodes that haveonly a very few links, and other nodeswith a massive number of links.

Erds and Rnyi could not explainthis complexity, and substituted it withrandomness. This concept of randomnetworks has dominated thought oncomplex networks until the late 1990's. Itis evident in Arquilla and Ronfeldt'sthree models of networks, each with per-

fectly symmetrical distribution of links.In 1998 physicist Albert-Lszl Ba-

rabsi and Eric Bonabeau with HawoongJeong and Rka Albert of the Universityof Notre Dame used a web crawler totrawl the World Wide Web and map thelinks between webpages.15 They weresurprised to find that the World WideWeb is not very democratic in its place-ment of links, in fact a few highly con-nected webpages were holding the entirenetwork of the web together. Most of thewebpages, 80 percent, had fewer thanfour links, while a tiny minority of 0.01

percent of nodes had over one thousandlinks. This distribution of links is not

explained by a bell curve, but by a powerlaw.

A power law predicts that most nodeshave only a few links, and a few nodeshave a great many number of links.These nodes with an anomalously largenumber of links are the hubs that keepthe network from flying apart into

smaller, isolated mini-networks. In arandom network the peak of distributionrepresents the "average node" in a sys-tem, which retains the same number oflinks as a majority of nodes within thesystem. Thus a random network is said tohave a scale. Networks with a power lawdistribution don't have a peak, and there-fore there is no "average node." Thesetypes of networks are called "scale-free."

Examples of scale-free networks arefound throughout nature, includingmolecules involved in burning food forenergy; the router connections that make

up the Internet; and collaborations andsexual relations between people.16 Theyare represented by a topology some-where in between the all-channel and staror hub network of Arquilla and Ronfeldt.

Barabsi and his team have continuedtheir study of scale-free networks andhave made some intriguing discoveries

beneficial to the field of military studies.For example, scale-free networks areextremely robust against accidental fail-ures. The number of nodes with fewlinks far outweighs the number of hubs,so any random attack against a network

is far more likely to hit a relatively iso-lated node, without any serious repercus-sions to the entire system. Barabsi et al

found that up to 80 percent of ran-domly selected routers could fail andthe Internet would still be able to func-tion. But a networks reliance on hubsmeans that it is highly vulnerable to co-ordinated attacks on the relatively fewhubs. The question remains: how manyhubs need to be neutralized to crash a

system? Recent research suggests thatsomewhere between 5 to 15 percent ofall hubs need to be eliminated to destroya network.17

In the case of the War on Terror, ran-domly stopping individual terrorists atthe border will have little negative im-

pact on a terrorist network. But, as hubsin a social network are the relay pointsfor many communications, we should beable to identify and destroy these leader-hubs and inflict real damage on thenetwork.18

Barabsi's work on the way scale-free

networks form could also be a boon tocurrent link analysis techniques. As eachnew node enters a system, it prefers toattach to an existing node that alreadyhas many other connections. As timegoes on, the system becomes dominated

by hubs with a massive number of links.Applying these principles to social net-work analysis used in mapping terroristor insurgent networks may help to iden-tify nodes where preferential attachmentis high, where recruitment and growthoccur.

Netwar 3.0?In an attempt to deduce the next type

of netwar we can extrapolate from acombination of John Boyds concept ofthe OODA loop and William Lindsmodel of generational warfare.19

US Air Force Colonel John Boydconceived a decision cycle made up offour elementary processes: observe, ori-ent, decide and act. Boyd was a fighter

pilot, and argues that in a dogfight thefirst combatant to make it to the end ofhis decision cycle would be victorious.The pilot observes his opponent, orientshimself, makes a decision and then acts.The ideal process is to skip the decision


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15 See Barabsi and Bonabeau, Scale-free networks, Scientific American 288, 50-59 (2003).

16 Barabsi & Bonabeau, pp. 54

17 Barabsi & Bonabeau, pp. 56

18 Sageman, pp. 140-141

19 I would like to credit my colleague Dan Abbot of the University of Nebraska - Lincoln for this exercise in theoretical amalgamation.


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process, to be able to act on reflex, fromthe gut. This is what the Germans callfingertip feeling orfingerspitzengefuhl.Thus the decision process is ideally asecondary process.

William Linds framework of genera-tional warfare is not without controversy,

but when combined with Boyds OODAloop, we can extrapolate a type of war-fare that has yet to be defined. The fourgenerations of war are generally consid-ered to begin at the dawn of the modernstate. The first generation was that of lineand column, fought by massing infantryat a focal point, or schwerpunkt inClausewitzs terms. This was war during

Napoleons time. The second generationdeveloped as improvements were madein weapons and massed firepower in-cluding the rifled musket, breechloaders,the machine gun and indirect fire. World

War I is an example of 2nd generationwarfare. The third generation, as evincedin the blitzkriegtactics of World War II,is that of maneuver warfare. 20 Fourthgeneration warfare, commonly referredto as 4GW, is a departure from the firstthree generations in that it is not relianton technology. In fact, it is in a way aregression, to a style of warfare from

before the age of the modern state.

... what changes in the Fourth Genera-tion is who fights and what they fightfor. ... Fourth Generation war focuses

on the moral level, where it works toconvince all parties, neutrals as wellas belligerents, that the cause forwhich a Fourth Generation entity isfighting is morally superior. It turnsits state enemies inward against them-selves on the moral level, making the

political calculations of the mentallevel irrelevant.21

4GW is fought on a moral level, withoutregard to the nation-state, and usuallythrough asymmetric means. It is muchlike our concept of netwar.

First generation warfare is character-ized by massed armies, which movedwherever their feet would take them, and

fought with commanders on the battle-field. The objective was to destroy theenemys army, hopefully gaining advan-tage by deciding which battlefield tofight on. Thus, 1GW was centeredaround the enemys ability to DECIDEand ACT. Thanks to the telegraph, rail-way and other modern communicationsthe second generation of warfare saw theinflux of massive amounts of informa-tion to commanders far behind the line of

battle. Decisions had to be made basedon this information about where andwhen to make the big push. 2GW moves

further into the OODA loop and centersaround the ability to ORIENT and DE-CIDE. 3GW moves further in still, at-tacking an enemys ability to ORIENThimself by unleashing lightning maneu-ver attacks at unexpected points. Finally,4GW, which is an asymmetrical battleover the moral superiority of the popula-

tion, attacks the enemys civil society,and his ability to OBSERVE and ORI-ENT himself towards his enemy, whichhe himself becomes. Each generationmoves deeper and deeper into the OODAloop. Thus we must ask, what will 5GWlook like?

By extrapolating from generationalwarfares progression deeper into theOODA loop we can deduce that 5GWwill attack an enemys ability to OB-SERVE. The enemy could be blind, un-aware to the true identity of the adver-sary he is engaging with, or maybeoblivious to the fact he is fighting a warat all. But assuming that a war requirestwo or more sides to actually be aware ofengagement, let us explore the puzzle of

being unable to observe ones enemy.The distributed networks of both

4GW and netwar have proven resilient to

the identification of a center of gravitythat may be attacked, destroying the en-emy. But what if even those nebulousleader-hubs were to disappear? In 1992former Grand Dragon of the Knights ofthe Ku Klux Klan Louis Beam penned anarticle entitled Leaderless Resistancewhich attempted to outline a new organ-izational design to fight against statetyranny. Beam calls for the abolition of a

pyramid-style organization becausenothing is more desirable for federalagencies than opposing groups who areunified in their command structure. He

advises using a cell structure, but to de-fend against attacks by the federal gov-ernment the structure must be deeplydecentralized with no headquarters giv-ing command or direction. He dubbedthese Phantom cells. Arguing that inany movement, all persons involved have


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20 This overview of the first three generations of war is from Hammes, pp. 12-13

21 See Linds review ofThe Sling and the Stone online at http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_11_05_04.htm


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the same general outlook, are acquaintedwith the same philosophy, and generallyreact to given situations in similar waysBeam put the onus on the individual toacquire the necessary skills and intelli-gence to carry out missions for thecause. Coordinating attacks will be

possible because:

Organs of information distributionsuch as newspapers, leaflets, comput-ers, etc., which are widely availableto all, keep each person informed ofevents, allowing for a planned re-sponse that will take many variations.

No one need issue an order to anyone.Those idealist (sic) truly committed tothe cause of freedom will act whenthey feel the time is ripe, or will taketheir cue from others who precedethem.

Beam credits the idea of the phantom

cells to one Col. Ulius Louis Amoss,who apparently first wrote of leaderlessresistance in 1962, thirty years beforeArquilla and Ronfeldt conceived of net-war.

The type of organization described byBeam is known as an emergent network.Emergence is a phenomenon that is evi-denced in many places, from multicellu-lar biological organisms, to metropolitanzoning to no-limit poker. Emergence is adynamic process of self-organizationwhere nodes behave individually under aset of simple rules, and yet as a whole

render a complex pattern. Steven John-son, author of Emergence (2001) ex-

plains:

Emergence is what happens when thewhole is smarter than the sum of its

parts. It's what happens when youhave a system of relatively simple-minded component parts often thereare thousands or millions of them and they interact in relatively simpleways. And yet somehow out of allthis interaction some higher levelstructure or intelligence appears, usu-ally without any master planner call-

ing the shots. These kinds of systemstend to evolve from the ground up.22

Emergence is unpredictable at thelowest levels of operations. Thus it is a

very difficult to define phenomenon.Further research is currently being con-ducted into the properties of emergingnetworks.

How this could affect security can beseen in todays headlines. Pre-2001 AlQaeda was a network with numeroushubs able to give commands and direc-

tions to sprawling regional networks. Itsmost famous leader-hub, Osama binLaden, was readily identifiable, as wellas his closest advisors. After the October2001 invasion, Operation EnduringFreedom, smashed the physical head-quarters of Al Qaeda the amount of di-rect control held by bin Laden dimin-ished greatly. Direct interaction throughtraining camps was replaced by globallydistributed passive communication thatoutlined the groups objectives. Al Qaedawas forced into becoming an even moredistributed network. This development

gave rise to the disappearance of AlQaeda the terrorist organization, andthe appearance of Al Qaeda the move-ment.

A core organization of Al Qaeda stilltheoretically exists, but there seems to bea much more loose global communitysurrounding Al Qaedas cause. Manyregional groups, heretofore unknown tohave any direct contact with bin Ladenor his cadre, have stood up to claimmembership to the greater network of AlQaeda, forming regional franchises ofthe organization. Abu Musab al-

Zarqawis Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad(JTJ) announced their alleigance to AlQaeda in in October 2004 changing theirname to Al Qaeda in Iraq.23 Othercopycats, small distinct groups with nodirect contact with Al Qaeda cells butlooking to contribute to the overall goalsof Al Qaeda, are a possibility.

Small cells, with no links to one an-other forming a larger network, operatingindividually under a very simple set ofrules (e.g. kill Americans, disrupt gov-ernment activities, hack a certain targetscomputer) can give the impression of

higher level coordination and a sense oforganization even where there is none.Thus, 5GW could be characterized not

by our inability to observe an opponent, but by perceiving an opponent wherethere is none. This formless enemy, re-

garded as having a form, would strikedeep into our OODA loop and couldcause massive expenditures as state lead-ers try to protect their citizens from athreat constructed by the leaders them-selves.

Caution in progressRecent technological advances have

brought the organizational concept ofnetworks to the forefront of thought in

business, sociology, science and security.The simple network topologies presented

by Arquilla and Ronfeldt prove a goodinitial step in bringing a more scientificunderstanding of network theory to thefield of security studies. Even with therudimentary comprehension of networkstructure in military circles, there is nodoubt that the power of network-basedorganization is felt at all levels.

Yet caution is to be advised, and a

better understanding of how networksform and act in the real world will helpto avoid pitfalls. The power of an all-channel network would be devastating,

but John Arquilla made abrilliant obser-vation in a 2003 inteview:

"On the other hand, this great connec-tivity is an inducement to overcontrol.The people at very high levels cannow be looking at what the fellow inthe field is looking at, and the tempta-tion [to micromanage] is almost toomuch to resist. We have to be very,very careful about this."24

A more accurate model of real worldnetworks will give us the advantages notonly of understanding our enemies, andforesight into alternative organizationalstructures of future enemies, but also onhow to move away from the rigid hierar-chical structure of our current militarysystem, and in what areas it is appropri-ate or even possible. This has been al-ready suggested by others including re-tired Colonel Thomas X. Hammes whoadvocates becoming "organizationallynetworked to overcome the inertia and

restriction of information flow character-i s t i c o f o u r 1 9 t h - c e n t u r y

bureaucracies."25 Note that Hammessuggestions for re-organization are lim-ited. Information-sharing benefits from a


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22 Steven Johnson interview (2002) online at http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html

23 Information on the JTJ can be found at the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base online at http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4338

24 Interview with John Arquilla, Conversations with History: Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley available online athttp://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Arquilla/arquilla-con0.html

25 Hammes, pp. 226
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html%06http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4338%06http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html%06http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4338%06http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html%06http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4338%06http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4338%06http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html%06http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html%06


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flat organizational structure, where in-formation can pass from one side of thenetwork to the other in just a few short

jumps. Hierarchical approaches toinformation-sharing, particularly thosethat prioritize security over informationdispersion, tend to trap information inso-called "stovepipes." Steward Brand

once said, "Information wants to befree." This statement represents the prob-lems facing both the military and thestate in the information age.

Arquilla and Ronfeldt contend that ittakes a network to fight a network, yetthis still requires investigation. Oncecritical hubs of a network have beenidentified, it is conceivable that on a tac-tical level, a traditional hierarchical mili-tary organization could eliminate thesenodes and collapse the network. A morenetwork-based approach should help inridding our systems of waste, but should

not discard that which is worth keeping.


ReferencesJohn Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,In Athenas Camp: Preparing for conflict in the informa-tion age, RAND, Santa Monica (1997).

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,Networks and Netwars, RAND, Santa Monica (2001).

Albert-Lsl Barabsi,Linked, Plume, London (2003).

Albert-Lsl Barabsi, Eric Bonabeau, Scale-free networks, Scientific American 288, 50-59 (2003).

Albert-Lsl Barabsi, Network Theory-The emergence of creative enterprise, Science308, 639 (2005).

Louis Beam, Leaderless Resistance (1992) available online athttp://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm

Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War, Free Press, New York (2003).

Col. Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN (2004)

Steven Johnson interview, Steven Johnson on Emergence (2002) available online athttp://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.html

William Lind, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation, Marine CorpsGazette, 22-26 (Oct 1989).

David Ronfeldt, Al Qaeda and its affiliates: A global tribe waging segmental warfare?,First Monday available online at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/ronfeldt/(Feb 2005)

Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsylvania Press, Phila-delphia (2004).

Zedong Mao trans. Samuel Griffith, On Guerilla Warfare, Praeger, New York (1961)
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/ronfeldt/http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue10_3/ronfeldt/http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.htmlhttp://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2002/02/22/johnson.htmlhttp://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htmhttp://www.louisbeam.com/leaderless.htm

Documents

Netwar 2.0: Towards a new military theory of social networks