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Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvar d.edu

Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte [email protected]

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Page 1: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Network Intrusion Detection

David LaPorte

[email protected]

Page 2: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Topics What is IDS? HIDS v. NIDS Signatures Active Response / IPS NIDS on the Cheap Additional Resources

Page 3: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

What is IDS?

the art of detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activity. ID systems that operate on a host to detect malicious activity on that host are called host-based ID systems, and ID systems that operate on network data flows are called network-based ID systems.

http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/what_is_ID.htm

Page 4: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

HIDS v. NIDSDefense in depth, layered securityHIDS

Typically software installed on a system Agent-based

Monitors multiple data sources, including file system meta-data, log files

Wrapper-based Acts like a firewall – denies or accepts

connections or logins based on defined policy

Page 5: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

HIDS v. NIDSNIDS

Monitors traffic on a network Reports on traffic not considered “normal”

Anomaly-based Packet sizes, destinations, protocol distributions, etc Hard to determine what “normal” traffic looks like

Signature-based Most products use signature-based technologies

Page 6: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Signature-based NIDS Signature-based

Matches header fields, port numbers, content Network “grep”

Advantages No learning curve Works out-of-box for well known attacks

Snort has ~1900 signatures Dragon has ~1700 signatures

Disadvantages New attacks cannot be detected False positives Maintenance/tweaking Not very hard to evade Stateless, lacks thresholding

Page 7: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

SignaturesT A A S 10 20 6668 IRC:XDCC /5Bxdcc/5Dslt| | | | | | | | || | | | | | | | SEARCH STRING| | | | | | | EVENT NAME| | | | | | PORT| | | | | || | | | | COMPARE BYTES | | | | || | | | DYNAMIC LOG| | | || | | BINARY OR STRING| | || | PROTECTED NETWORKS| || DIRECTION|PROTOCOL

Page 8: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

SignaturesOn the console…Time Dir Source Destination Proto Event Name Group Sensor Session Raw Data 11:02 02Nov04 from 128.103.a.b:4295 207.44.x.y:6667 tcp IRC:XDCC UNKNOWN ids5 11:01 02Nov04 from 128.103.a.b:1141 207.44.x.y:6667 tcp IRC:XDCC UNKNOWN ids5 10:59 02Nov04 from 128.103.a.b:2582 207.44.x.y:6667 tcp IRC:XDCC UNKNOWN ids5 10:57 02Nov04 from 128.103.a.b:3341 207.44.x.y:6667 tcp IRC:XDCC UNKNOWN ids5

Page 9: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

NICK [XDCC]SLT-L482{A}USER b0b 32 . :XDCC{A}MODE [XDCC]SLT-L482 +i{A}NICK [XDCC]SLT-L482{A}USER b0b 32 . :XDCC{A}MODE [XDCC]SLT-L482 +i{A}NICK [XDCC]SLT-L482{A}USER b0b 32 . :XDCC{A}MODE [XDCC]SLT-L482 +i{A}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Looking up your hostname...{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Found your hostname, cached{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Checking Ident{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 001 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Welcome to the Criten IRC Network [XDCC][email protected]{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 002 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Your host is snagged.wi.us.criten.net[@0.0.0.0], running version bahamut-1.4(34){D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 003 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :This server was created Fri Oct 18 2002 at 12:49:34 CDT{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 004 [XDCC]SLT-L482 snagged.wi.us.criten.net bahamut-1.4(34) oiwscrknfydaAbghe biklLmMnoprRstvc{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 005 [XDCC]SLT-L482 NOQUIT WATCH=128 SAFELIST MODES=13 MAXCHANNELS=15 MAXBANS=100 NICKLEN=30 TOPICLEN=307 KICKLEN=307 CHANTYPES=&# PREFIX=(ov)@+ NETWORK=Criten SILENCE=10 CASEMAPPING=ascii :are available on this server{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 251 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :There are 59 users and 6470 invisible on 17 servers{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 252 [XDCC]SLT-L482 30 :IRC Operators online{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 253 [XDCC]SLT-L482 84 :unknown connection(s){D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 254 [XDCC]SLT-L482 738 :channels formed{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 255 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :I have 705 clients and 1 servers{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 265 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Current local users: 705 Max: 3506{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 266 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Current global users: 6529 Max: 13238{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE [XD:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Found your hostname, cached{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE AUTH :*** Checking Ident{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 001 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Welcome to the Criten IRC Network [XDCC][email protected]{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 002 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Your host is snagged.wi.us.criten.net[@0.0.0.0], running version bahamut-1.4(34){D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 003 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :This server was created Fri Oct 18 2002 at 12:49:34 CDT{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 004 [XDCC]SLT-L482 snagged.wi.us.criten.net bahamut-1.4(34) oiwscrknfydaAbghe biklLmMnoprRstvc{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 005 [XDCC]SLT-L482 NOQUIT WATCH=128 SAFELIST MODES=13 MAXCHANNELS=15 MAXBANS=100 NICKLEN=30 TOPICLEN=307 KICKLEN=307 CHANTYPES=&# PREFIX=(ov)@+ NETWORK=Criten SILENCE=10 CASEMAPPING=ascii :are available on this server{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 251 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :There are 59 users and 6470 invisible on 17 servers{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 252 [XDCC]SLT-L482 30 :IRC Operators online{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 253 [XDCC]SLT-L482 84 :unknown connection(s){D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 254 [XDCC]SLT-L482 738 :channels formed{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 255 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :I have 705 clients and 1 servers{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 265 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Current local users: 705 Max: 3506{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net 266 [XDCC]SLT-L482 :Current global users: 6529 Max: 13238{D}{A}:snagged.wi.us.criten.net NOTICE [XD{A}

Page 10: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

NIDS – ManagementCorrelation is key

Multiple sensors Single data repository

Syslog DBMS Text files

Page 11: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

NIDS – Placement Inside firewall

Limits false positives – “cleaner” data Outside firewall

Shows overall interest Need to collect all traffic

Switch port won’t cut it Hub Switch SPAN port Passive tap

Difficult on high-bandwidth links (>300Mbps) Distribution devices (TopLayer, etc) Hardware

Page 12: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

NIDS – DrawbacksFalse Positives

LOTS of data We generate 3-4GB of logs each day on a

~250Mbps sustained link Makes alerting difficult

Interoperability ESM – Intellitactics, PentaSafe, etc.

Page 13: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

NIDS - DrawbacksEvasion

Packet fragmentation Out of order, overlapping Fragroute

Character encodings / padding Unicode, mixed case, ../..’s, \0’s

OS stack behavior A simple “grep” of a packet won’t work

Page 14: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Active ResponseNIDS is primarily a passive technology

Only monitors traffic Doesn’t sit in the data stream Active response

aka “sniping”, flex response

Page 15: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Active ResponseSeveral issues

Timing By the time filters are applied, attack is complete

False alarms / spoofed traffic Self-inflicted DOS

Lack of formatting standards CVE, OPSEC

Page 16: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Intrusion PreventionPlace system in-line

Hardware Redundancy

Acts as an IDS/Firewall hybrid Hogwash

Page 17: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

NIDS on the Cheap So you want a NIDS?

Snort Open-source NIDS Quickly becoming the “Apache” of IDS Runs on Windows and most Unix variants

MySQL Open-source DBMS

ACID Great web-based front-end for Snort/Mysql

A place to collect traffic Your NIC is fine if you have only one machine Use a hub if you’ve got a LAN

Page 18: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Additional Resources Fragroute

http://monkey.org/~dugsong/fragroute/ Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection

http://secinf.net/info/ids/idspaper/idspaper.html HIDS Products PortSentry

http://www.psionic.com/products/portsentry.html Tripwire

http://www.tripwire.com/ AIDE

http://www.cs.tut.fi/~rammer/aide.html

Page 19: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Additional Resources NIDS Products

Snort http://www.snort.org

Dragon http://www.enterasys.com/ids/

CiscoSecure IDS ISS RealSecure

http://www.iss.net/products_services/enterprise_protection/rsnetwork/index.php ACID

http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/~rdanyliw/snort/snortacid.html Hogwash

http://hogwash.sourceforge.net/

Page 20: Network Intrusion Detection David LaPorte david_laporte@harvard.edu

Questions?