New principles for new war

7/24/2019 New principles for new war

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anuary 1, 2009

New principles for new warNow can we meet the new challenges of global terrorism and defend ourselves with the

least cost in blood and treasure? We need to identify the nature of the presentenvironment and how our military should be structured to operate within it. We must

then revise our doctrine and teach these new ideas to soldiers, sailors, airmen and

Marines so they can internalize them before a crisis occurs.

One of the basics for such an educational rebirth is to understand the principles of war.

Unfortunately, these principles formulated nearly a century ago and enshrined in our

doctrine are outdated, insufficient and misleading in a modern era dominated by air

and space assets, real!time intelligence, speed!of!light command!and!control systems,

and ubi"uitous multimedia news sources. #imply put$ %he old principles of war won&twor' in an age calling for new ways of fighting, not (ust more efficient ways of fighting

the old way. )eliance on the old principles of war will have us loo'ing bac'ward and

fighting the last war and doing that badly rather than loo'ing forward to fight the

ne*t.

%he +ersian ulf War of -- was a watershed. /ra" had the fourth!largest army in the

world, hardened during a decade!long war with /ran. %he U.#.!led coalition was

pro(ecting power from around the world in a difficult desert environment. 0ut when the

coalition struc' in 1anuary -- to liberate 2uwait, the /ra"i forces were doomed.

Our strategy was to rely on air power supported by ground forces. %he ground troops

were there to pin the enemy, to fi* him, while air power punched him. /n a remar'able

directive, en. Norman #chwarz'opf told the air commander that he wanted air power

to reduce all frontline /ra"i divisions by at least 34 percent before offensive ground

operations began. %his in fact occurred by !5ay in late 6ebruary, all 78 frontline

/ra"i divisions had been reduced by air power to below 34 percent in strength. %he /ra"i

9rmy was :combat ineffective; before ma(or ground operations even began.

%he conflicts following Operation 5esert #torm buttressed claims that a new paradigm

of war was emerging. /n 0osnia, 2osovo, 9fghanistan and northern /ra" in


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ground troops such as the Northern 9lliance in 9fghanistan and the 2urds in northern

/ra", and robust intelligence and command!and!control systems lin'ed together in a

global array.

%hese conflicts were characterized by new and revolutionary technologies$ stealth,precision!guided munitions >+Ms, massive /#) use and near!real time global @


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#ome devices used have assumed the character of adages$ :%a'e the high ground,; :it

thar fustest with the mostest,; and, for the pilot, :@hec' si*.; Others have ta'en this

sub(ect more seriously. #un!%zu, @arl von @lausewitz, 9ntoine 1omini and others have

suggested rules to guide military leaders, but these efforts were of limited use.

World War /, with its trench warfare and horrendous casualties, showed the ban'ruptcy

of military thought. Bet, despite the carnage and muddle!headed thin'ing of the war&s

commanders, one man offered new ideas. /n --C, 1.6.@. 6uller, a 0ritish soldier,

compiled a list of eight :strategic principles; that were imbued with a pithiness and logic

that has let them stand the test of time$ Ob(ective, offensive, mass, economy of force,

movement, surprise, security and cooperation.

/n -


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Aomeland security. %he terrorist attac's of #ept. -- were the worst assault on the U.#.

mainland in history. 9irpower, in the form of commandeered civilian airliners, 'illed

more than =,444 innocent people in New Bor' @ity, +ennsylvania and at the +entagon.

9 result has been the establishment of a huge apparatus the 5epartment of Aomeland

#ecurity that has responsibility for thwarting future attac's. @ertainly, home defense

has always been a ma(or component of our defense policy, but new terrorist threats

demand a different response. /nternal police forces, border patrols or intelligence

agencies such as the 60/ are no longer ade"uate to defend against the worldwide and

networ'ed terrorist forces arrayed against us. New technologies such as unmanned

aerial vehicles, information warfare and computer self!defense systems have been built

to conduct this new fight. New intelligence!gathering and analysis organizations have

been created to trac' down terrorists and prevent their attac's before they occur.

Unity of command. %he demands of modern, theaterwide warfare necessitate unity of

command because of the increasingly long ranges and responsiveness of the weapons at

a commander&s disposal. 9ircraft can travel hundreds of miles in minutes to deliver

ordnance, and space assets can sense an entire theater during a single pass. When such

systems can see or shoot at continental distances, there must be a guiding hand to

ensure they are operating in a coordinated and seamless fashion to achieve a specific

purpose.

%he demands of unifying and focusing the efforts of several military services and allies

while at the same time controlling and coordinating the efforts of non!military agencies

so as to ensure a holistic strategy and policy, demands that a single individual be in

charge. 9lthough this will not ensure the resulting policy or strategy is the correct one,

such unity of command is a necessary if insufficient condition for success.

/ntegration. %his refers to the coordinated use of all levers of power$ military, political,

economic, psychological and cultural. 9lthough in the old era it was wise to use a

combination of the levers of power, today it is essential.

6or e*ample, at the conclusion of military hostilities in --, #chwarz'opf went to thetent at #afwan to negotiate a cease!fire with the defeated /ra"i commander. #chwarz'opf

received virtually no guidance from the U.#. #tate 5epartment on this critical meeting.

Ae was not prepared, and serious trouble resulted. War and its aftermath must be

addressed by a coalition of agencies, not simply the military and they must plan

before the war for the conditions desired after the war. %oday, a concerted effort


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emphasizing e*perts and e*pertise from 5efense, #tate, %reasury, Aomeland #ecurity,

the intelligence community and, perhaps, nongovernmental agencies, will be needed to

confront successfully the varied challenges now facing us.

1ointness. 6or centuries, the need for cooperation among the services was considered asometimes desirable but seldom necessary occurrence. Until World War //, the 9rmy

and Navy could largely ignore each other with few ill effects. %hat changed during the

war, but the problem was not completely eradicated. 9 main problem leading to defeat

in Dietnam was the parochialism and sometimes childish rivalry that e*isted among the

services. /t was only further difficulties in war that forced reform and a move towards

(ointness. /t is now difficult to understand what the problem was. 1ointness wor's.

/ntelligence. %he demand for intelligence is greater than ever yet more difficult to fulfill.

9s our intelligence!gathering sensors and techni"ues have become better, so too haveadversaries& tric's at hiding, camouflaging or distorting the ob(ects we try to e*amine. 9t

times, this can lead to disaster as with :%he @ase of the Missing WM5; in /ra". %he

type of intelligence has changed. 1ust as the advent of air power re"uired a new type of

economic intelligence, so now insurgency and terrorism re"uire cultural intelligence

that our present system is not e"uipped to collect. We simply do not 'now or

understand the motivations of the /slamic radicals who see' to destroy us.

/n addition, although we now have sensors that can detect ob(ects, moving and

stationary, as well as intercept all types of electronic emissions, there are certain targetsthat still confound us. We need to detect the presence of all types of WM5 where they

are made, stored and transported. Until we can do so, accurately and continuously, we

will be unable to hold at ris' rogue states that defy international sanctions and continue

to pursue such weapons.

Net!centricity. We must lin', on a global basis and in real time, the various intelligence!

gathering sensors and @< lin's that are deployed around the world. %his lin'age is now

beginning. /n 9fghanistan and /ra", for e*ample, U9Ds are being :flown; by pilots at

consoles at air bases in the U.#. %hat is world war, in real time.

%here is, however, an intrinsic tension between the principles of net!centricity and unity

of command. %he latter can be seen as fostering a more centralized view of command

and control, whereas net!centricity can often be viewed as an attempt to decentralize

to flow information downward to the tactical level, allowing local commanders on the

scene to ma'e more timely decisions. %his seeming parado* is not insoluble.


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Mobility. %he U.#. believes that its interests are best defended as far from its shores as

possible, so power pro(ection is essential. #ignificantly, there are slightly more than

-,-44 large cargo aircraft in the world, and more than E44 of them belong to the U.#. >all

in the 9ir 6orce, which is nearly C3 percent of the world total. %here are also 8


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+urpose. Dirtually everything a human being does is guided by a sense of purpose, even

if that purpose is obscure, ill!advised, self!destructive or made under pressure. War is

no e*ception. /t has become an article of faith that in Western countries this purpose

used to (ustify the use of military force must be based on policy. /n other words, the

use of force is determined by politicians, not those in uniform, and the politicians should

base their decision to use force on rational reasons of state policy. Moreover, this

political purpose should be logical, ethical and en(oy a large measure of support among

the people. %his is not only a peculiarly Western notion that lac's universality, but in

practice it is often twisted and distorted so as to become meaningless.

Bet purpose is a crucial component of military action there must be a point to it all.

iven the landmines surrounding such a principle, however, perhaps it merely can be

said that these purposes should be well!conceived, clear and non!trivialG that the use of

military force should not be considered as an end in itselfG that the gains to be achieved

should be commensurate to the resources e*pendedG and that all those involved should

understand what is e*pected of them individually and as a nation before employing the

military tool. 0ut saying that says a very great deal indeed. Whether the purpose

invo'ed is a sound one is usually not 'nown until the war has already been launched.

%his is my effort at proposing new principles of war for a new era of warfare. %hey

reflect the new conditions, new enemies and new technologies that now dominate war.

Warfare has changedG we must change with it. %hese new principles of war can help usunderstand this new era and also shape the doctrine and force structure we will need to

confront that new era. 96

+hillip #. Meilinger is a retired 9ir 6orce colonel and former defense analyst with a

doctorate in military history.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/new-principles-for-new-war/

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New principles for new war