CPBRD Policy BriefNo. 2019 - 02

Who is in Charge? envisioned department of disaster resilienCe hopes to provide ansWers moving forWard

Congressional Policy and Budget Research DepartmentHouse of Representatives

Who is in Charge? Envisioned Department of Disaster Resilience

Hopes to Provide Answers Moving Forward

1.0 Background……………………………………………………………….......……………......................... 1

1.1 ThePhilippines’DisasterRiskProfile……………………………………….....................………21.2 EvolutionofPhilippinePublicPolicyonResilience…………………………......................31.3 TrendsinInstitutionalPlatformintheASEANandOtherCountries.......................6

2.0ConstraintsoftheCurrentStructureandtheNeedforAStrongerInstitutionalFramework…………………………………………….................................................................... 7

2.1 InstitutionalFramework……………………………………………………………………....................7 2.1.1 LackofCentralizedLineAuthority,UnclearAccountability,Difficultyin

Coordination,andGapsinPolicyImplementation.......................................8 2.1.2 UnclearPartnershipsandCollaborativeRoleswithLGUsandOther Stakeholders………………...................…………………………………………………..……..12

2.1.3 FinancialConstraintsandotherOperationalLimitations, InadequateyetUnderutilizedCalamityFundsofLGUs…………..................…152.2 ReducingEconomicDiscontinuity……..................………………………………………………..202.3 OtherIssuesandConcerns………………………………………………………………..................…21

3.0MovingForward…………………………………………………………………....................………………22

3.1BridgingtheTransition………………….......................……………………..……………………………..223.3BuildingBeyond………………………………………………….........................…………………………….23

4.0SummaryandConclusion…………………………………………………………….....................……..25

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The views, opinions, and interpretations in this report do not necessarily reflect the perspectives of the House of Representatives as an institution or its individual Members.

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WhoisinCharge?EnvisionedDepartmentofDisasterResilienceHopestoProvideAnswersMovingForward*

“A country’s legislative and governmental systems provide the basis for plans and organization in all areas of disaster risk reduction. An adequate institutional basis as well as good governance, therefore, is an important prerequisite for disaster risk management.”

UN/ISDR-02-2007-Geneva

“…national legislation…will guide which activities can be implemented under what conditions…establish who has overall responsibility in a disaster…outline a monitoring and enforcement regime…(and) set targets for accountability…”

United Nations, 2008 1.0 Background

For a country like the Philippines that is highly vulnerable to risks of disasters with concomitant loss of lives and property, institutional arrangements on preparedness, emergency management, and relief or response are bound to be subject to intense scrutiny especially in terms of responsiveness, effectiveness, and accountability.

While the Hyogo Framework for Action on building resilience to disasters calls for a clearly defined coordination structure with decentralized mechanisms and informed engagement, it likewise seeks to establish who has overall responsibility in a disaster. Observations contained in a Commission on Audit (COA) 2014 report, for example, are telling especially given the complexity of large-scale disasters: “…a multi-sectoral, multi-agency and multi-level approach renders it difficult to come up with an appropriate and immediate response, thus delaying critical disaster response and recovery.” Also, “…whenever authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed and resources are scattered, emergency management, command and control can hardly operate in an expedient manner.” (emphases ours)

Further, although it has been averred as premature to deem Republic Act (RA) 10121 otherwise known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (PDRRM) as ineffective considering that it has been in existence for less than 10 years since enactment (Citizens’ Disaster Response Center Foundation, Inc, 2019), a study of the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) in 2017 pointed out that “…the Philippines cannot continue to have a disaster organization that only has coordinative functions... Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM)-related tasks and responsibilities are passed on to council members that are occupied with different primary mandates”. (emphasis ours)

In view thereof and in spite of the evolution of DRRM in the country, significant gaps and challenges have remained. The hindsight of the Philippine experiences on the adverse impacts

* This paper was prepared by the SPRS-SERB Team (Manuel P. Aquino, Dominador M. Gamboa, Ma. Leni P. Lebrilla, and Cynthia R. Lorenzo) with the over all guidance of Director General Romulo E.M. Miral, Jr., Ph.D.

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of climate change on natural systems do not only offer bleak lessons of death, displacement and destruction to our citizens but opens a unique window to examine the contentious gaps in public policy execution.

In this context, there have been calls for public policy response that is both proactive and comprehensive but opens up the once reserved public space for multiple stakeholders, yet still an institution that is effective and accountable nonetheless.

Central to the success of an updated DRRM policy would be the effectual resolution of the interface between and among key players at the department level, the local government units (LGUs), stakeholders and other concerned entities.

Given that the risks arising from natural hazards have continued to cast a shadow on the lives, property, and livelihood of Filipinos, there is need to explore and assess an institutional strategy—a bold initiative proposed to be called the Department of Disaster Resilience (DDR).

1.1 The Philippines’ Disaster Risk Profile

The Philippines remains highly vulnerable to multiple hazards being geographically located within the typhoon belt and the “Ring of Fire.” Weather disturbances and environmental factors such as earthquakes, flooding, tsunami, volcanic eruption, droughts, landslides pose serious risks. Natural hazards can instantly transform into disasters whenever they cause serious disruption on the lives and livelihoods of people (World Meteorological Organization, 2018). The Philippines has consistently ranked high in terms of vulnerability and its exposure to and the impact of disasters, as assessed by the following organizations:

• INFORM (Index for Risk Management), a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disaster, scored the Philippines 8.8 (out of 10) in 2019 in the dimension exposure to hazards in its Risk Index making the Philippines the 3rd

most exposed country to hazards in the world.

• The United Nations University- Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) likewise ranked the Philippines in the 2017 World Risk Index 3rd among 171 countries in risk of disasters as consequence of extreme natural events. The Philippines even ranked 2nd in 2015.

• Germanwatch, a Bonn-based non-governmental organization (NGO), ranked the Philippines 5th among 10 countries in terms of economic vulnerability with highest weather-related losses from the period 1998-2017 in the 2019 Global Climate Risk Index. Total losses reached US$2.93 Billion in purchasing power parity (PPP) brought about by 307 weather-related disturbances in the said period.

Table 1a and b show the extent, frequency and effects of disasters in the Philippines.

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Date Name Affected AreaRegistered

No. of Deaths

AffectedDamages in Php(agriculture and Infrastructure)

1 Dec. 22, 2017 Tembin (Vinta) Mindanao 129 184,278 families/

871,575 persons 2.1B

2 Dec. 13, 2017 Kai-Tak (Urduja)

Visayas,Luzon 47 435,220 families/

1,852,900 persons 3.7B

3 Oct. 19, 2016 Haima (Lawin) Luzon 14 31,751 families/ 158,736 persons 3.7B

4 Jan 20, 2015 Mekkhala (Amang) Samar 2 25,201 families/

106,808 persons 30.3M

5 May 7-12, 2015

Noul (Dodong)

Cagayan & Isabela 2 1,279 families/

106,808 persons 16.2M

6 July 2-7,2015 Infa (Egay) Northern Luzon 0 13,280 families/55,567 persons 214.6M

7 July 15, 2014 Rammasun (Glenda) Luzon 160 1,024,251 families/

4,653,716 persons, 33.8B

8 Sep 12, 2014 Kalmaegi (Luis)

Cagayan, Isabela 5 116,735 families /

508,367 persons 1.1B

9 Nov. 7-8, 2013 Haiyan (Yolanda) Leyte 6,300 3,434,593 families/

16,078,181 persons 89.5B

10 Dec.2- 9, 2012 Bopha (Pablo) 1,901 42.2B

Impact of Disasters In The Philippines

Table 1A - Cyclones

Table 1B - Earthquakes

Date Location MagnitudeRegistered

No. of Deaths

Injured Damages in Php

1 July 6, 2017 Leyte 6.5 3 448 271M

2 February 10,2017

Surigao del Norte 6.7 4 202 5M

3 October 15, 2013 Bohol & Cebu 7.3 222 796 4B

4 February 6, 2012 Negros Oriental 6.7 51 112 383M

Source: NDRRMC

Source: NDRRMC

1.2 Evolution of Philippine Public Policy on Disaster Resilience

The Philippine experiences on natural hazards and disaster risks have served as strong impetus and backdrop to the evolution of public policy on disaster preparedness and resilience.

• Executive Order (EO) No. 335 in 1941. This EO established the National Emergency Commission and implemented measures to control and coordinate civilian participation to meet serious crises. The Provincial Emergency Committee was created, in charge of the supervision and control over the Municipal Emergency Committees and City Emergency Committees.

• Republic Act (RA) 1190 or the Civil Defense Act of 1954. This law created the National Civil Defense Administration tasked to provide protection to civilians

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during war or other national emergencies of equally grave character. It was later replaced by the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) per Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1. OCD leads in continuous development of measures to reduce risks to communities and to manage the consequences of disasters. OCD was also replaced by NDRRMC in 2010.

• Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1566. This PD aimed to strengthen the Philippine disaster control capability and established the National Program of Community Disaster Prevention. It also created the National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC) as the highest policy-making body, coordinating and supervisory body in disaster response. This was also replaced by NDRRMC in 2010.

• RA 10121 otherwise known as the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (PDRRM) Act of 2010. This RA acknowledged the need to adopt DRRM approach that is holistic, comprehensive, integrated, and proactive in lessening the socio-economic ad environmental impacts of disasters including climate change. It aimed to promote the involvement and participation of all sectors and all shareholders concerned, at all levels, especially the local community.

It transformed the NDCC into the NDRRMC as the highest policy-making body on matters of disasters in the country. The NDRRMC is replicated at the regional and local levels, and these bodies function like the NDRRMC, operating and utilizing resources at their respective levels.

Also, it supported the modified use and appropriation of the Local Calamity Fund that established the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF). Section 21 of the RA 10121 provides that the LDRRMF amounting to not less than 5% of the estimated revenue from regular sources will be set aside to support disaster risk management activities such as, but not limited to the pre-disaster preparedness programs including training, purchase of disaster response and rescue equipment, supplies and medicines, for post-disaster activities, and payment of premiums on calamity insurance. Further, the LDRRMF will cover 30% lump-sum allocation for Quick Response Fund (QRF) and the 70% allocation for disaster prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response, rehabilitation and recovery.

The NDRMMC is headed by the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) as Chairperson with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Preparedness, the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Response, the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, and the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery.

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Under this law, the following are the members of the NDRRMC:

Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (DA) Secretary of the Department of Education (DepEd) Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), now Department of Transportation (DOTR) Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT) The Executive Secretary Secretary of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) Chairman of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) The Press Secretary Secretary General of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Commissioner of the National Anti-Poverty Commission-Victims of Disasters and Calamities Sector (NAPC-VDC) Chairperson of the National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW), now PCW Chairperson of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) Executive Director of the Climate Change Office of the Climate Change Commission

(CCC) President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) President of the Social Security System (SSS) President of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) President of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) President of the League of Provinces of the Philippines (LPP) President of the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) President of the League of Municipalities of the Philippines (LMP) President of the Liga ng mga Barangay (LMB) Four (4) Representatives from the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Administrator of the Office of the Civil Defense (OCD) Representatives from the Civil Society Organizations and the private sector

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• RA 9729, otherwise known as the Climate Change Act of 2009. The law recognized that climate change and disaster risk reduction are closely interrelated and an effective disaster risk reduction will enhance climate change adaptive capacity. It also integrated disaster risk deduction into climate change programs and initiatives. It also established a Climate Change Commission (CCC) which is independent and autonomous body and have the same status as that of the national government agency. The Commission is the lead policy-making body of the government, tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government in order to ensure the mainstreaming of climate change into the national, sectoral and local development plans and programs.

• RA 10174. This RA established the People’s Survival Fund (PSF) to provide for long-term finance streams for the government to effectively address the problem of climate change, amending for the purpose RA 9729. The PSF is a special fund in the National Treasury which specifically aims to finance the adaptation programs and projects based on the National Strategic Framework. It has an opening balance of P1 Billion pesos allotted under the General Appropriations Act (GAA).

• On the global setting, the Philippines is signatory to the Hyogo Framework of Action, a UN initiative that provided a global blueprint for DRRM to substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015. This was succeeded by the Sendai Framework that runs from 2016 to 2030. Most recently, the country ratified the Paris Agreement on Climate Change which frames the goal to reduce the global temperature.

1.3 Trends in Institutional Platform in the ASEAN and other countries

In the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), most of the framework models for disaster prevention and management are governed by a central focal point by either a national agency in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Vietnam or a committee or council in Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Philippines, Thailand (CFE-DM, 2019). Singapore, in particular, has its Civil Defense Force handling disaster response. However, it has a whole of government Integrated Risk Management (WOG-IRM) Policy Framework. In Malaysia, the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA), in the Office of the Prime Minister, was created in 2015 as a separate body, having been part of the National Security Division of the Prime Minister’s Department for many years. The Malaysia Civil Defense Force (MCDF) is one of the responders besides the Royal Malaysian Police & Fire and Rescue Department (RMPFRD). This includes the implementation of Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) to pursue public involvement in DRR effort. In Vietnam, inter-sectoral cooperation is the commanding system for natural disaster prevention and control. Depending on the crisis, there are checks and balances, and collaborations among many of the government agencies. In Japan, disaster management is governed by a three-tiered administration: the national government, prefectures, and municipalities. The head of each level takes full responsibility for

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that jurisdiction in a structure similar to that of a nation. Comprehensive disaster prevention plans are developed in accordance with the roles to be performed at each stage. In the event of a disaster, or where there is a risk of a disaster, the Cabinet Office, with the cooperation of relevant ministries and agencies, takes the lead in countermeasures, corresponding to each level of disaster with level 1 at normal times up to level 5 when a devastating disaster occurs (ADRC, n.d.).

2.0 Constraints of the Current Structure and the Need for a Stronger Institutional Framework

Inspite of the enactment in 2010 of RA 10121 with its scope and intent as the institutional initiative that paved the way for various development processes both at the national and at the local levels, a number of critical challenges remain. The 2014 DRRM Assessment Report by the COA affirmed that “[t]he aftermath of Typhoon Yolanda led us to search for the most appropriate and effective organizational framework for disaster response.” (emphasis ours) The COA noted that in spite of the government’s efforts on DRRM and assistance from the international community, much can still be done especially in the aspects of information sharing, efficient and effective response, recovery and rehabilitation, accountability, and collaboration with various sectors.

Among the notable issues and concerns in regard DRRM are as follows:

2.1 Institutional Framework

The PDRRM Act of 2010 provides for a comprehensive, all-hazard, multi-sectoral, inter-agency, and community-based approach to disaster risk management.

However, studies point to the inability of the current law to establish “an institution that is in a sufficiently high position to oversee the implementation of streamlined DRRM policies nationwide, an institution that has the necessary authority, mandate and resources to lead and coordinate the efforts of different stakeholders towards a more resilient nation” (Domingo, 2016).

The unfinished business in the aftermath of Yolanda is revelation of the inadequacy of the present institutional arrangement to the detriment of those affected by the calamities.

The constraints and challenges of the prevailing institutional arrangements and possible resolutions thereof through certain provisions in proposed legislations are as follows:

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2.1.1 Lack of Centralized Line Authority, Unclear Accountability, Difficulty in Coordination, and Gaps in Policy Implementation

The NDRRM System created a provisional pool of government agencies tasked to collaborate with multi-stakeholders over the enormous task of disaster risk preparation, response, and recovery.

There are roughly forty two (42) agencies involved in DRRM. However, there is no central agency with a clear mandate to lead and coordinate the efforts of different stakeholders. In addition, there is the United Nations Humanitarian Country Team (UN-HCT)1, which is chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and is the highest decision-making body and leads primary coordination for the international system of humanitarian response. The UN-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) acts as the HCT’s secretariat (United Nations, 2016).

Multiple, multi-layered, and overlapping DRRM structure has made coordination much more difficult. Coordination is influenced by several factors including governance structure, local capacity, availability of resources, stakeholders, partnership and information management system (Commission on Audit, 2014). The NDRRMC serves as the backbone of disaster management in the Philippines, as supported by national agencies and LGUs down to barangay level, but based on COA experience, emergency management, command and control can hardly operate expediently in such a structure where the authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed and resources are scattered (Commission on Audit, 2014).

According to Domingo (2016), the guiding role in directing institutional DRRM initiatives becomes questionable without leadership from NDRRMC and OCD at the top, and the thematic pillar leads.

Further, the NDRRMC is only mandated to coordinate the identification, monitoring, and evaluation of DRRM programs, projects and activities; the Council is not empowered with implementing functions (PIDS 2017).

The COA (2014) asserts that even in times of catastrophic disaster, one cannot discount the crucial role of controls and other accountability mechanisms for they ensure the proper use of much needed resources. However, with so many stakeholders involved, decision makers often find themselves trapped in a struggle between implementing controls and accountability mechanism and the demand for rapid response and recovery assistance. On one hand, COA documented many examples wherein action was not possible due to longstanding policies/procedures that required extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital supplies and other assistance.

1 It is comprised of the heads of the national operational UN agencies that deliver aid and assistance, the Red Cross, the business sector representative, the international Non-Government Organization (NGO) community represented by the Philippine International Non-Government Organization Network (PINGON), and other members of the national NGO community.

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The Philippines has one of the most elaborate frameworks for DRRM. However, the gaps that persist related to policy implementation become evident whenever disasters affect the country.

The scope and complexity of large-scale disasters usually undermines existing policies and structures. An ad-hoc organizational structure dependent on multi-sectoral, multi-agency and multi-level approach renders it difficult to deliver appropriate and immediate response, thus delaying critical disaster response and recovery. RA 10121 and other laws passed by the government have provided solid plans, but there have been significant question marks about its implementation, both in terms of the funding made available to support implementation and the consistency in approach throughout all levels of government. The present administrative setup consists of a multi-sectoral, multi-agency council assisted by a Secretariat with multi-level engagement. While RA 10121 provides for vertical coordination between the regional, national and local levels, it is difficult to ensure smooth coordination among these government agencies given the complexity of large-scale disasters when following regular disaster response procedures do not always work. Maintaining effective interaction with various government officials within and outside of the council (national and local) and ensuring uniform goals and strategies given an extremely limited communication system and damaged infrastructures, are indeed huge challenges. “Leadership in the form of legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.” In this context, DRRM leadership is clearly defined in RA 10121, the regulatory framework that promotes and supports dialogue, exchange of information and coordination among all government agencies. In other words, the institutional framework for DRRM as embodied in RA 10121 is already in place and operational. But the government’s response and recovery efforts in Yolanda-ravaged areas clearly showed that its implementation of RA 10121 still leaves a lot to be desired. Given the multi-sectoral, multi-organizational structure of the NDRRMC and the complexity and magnitude of the disaster, the Council’s key players and stakeholders had difficulty coordinating, collaborating and making timely decisions, which came across as unreadiness and ineptitude to respond to a host of emergencies and crippling crisis. It is evident that whenever authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed and resources are scattered, emergency management, command and control can hardly operate in an expedient manner.

(http://www.coa.gov.ph/disasteraudit/doc/National.pdf).

Domingo also contends that while the “establishment of an independent agency or authority is good … the creation of a new Department, if it has the support of the current administration, would be functionally superior.” Further, he stressed that such Department “would answer with conclusiveness questions about institutional capacity and leadership, and delineation of responsibilities”.

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President Rodrigo Duterte, in his 3rd State of the Nation Address on July 22, 2019 appealed to Congress to pass necessary legislation that would address the gaps and to strengthen and further institutionalize the country’s DRRM efforts, and to develop the country’s resilience from the impact of disasters.

“To help safeguard the present and the future generations, we have to earnestly undertake initiative to reduce our vulnerabilities to natural hazards, and bolster our resilience to the impact of natural disasters and climate change. An inter-agency crafted and a high-priority measure aimed at genuinely strengthening our country’s capacity for [resilience] to natural disasters. I fervently appeal to Congress to pass these bills with utmost urgency. Our people’s safety requirements cannot wait.”

President Rodrigo Duterte SONA, July 22, 2019

In the House of Representatives, at least 23 bills have been filed within the two

months of the 18th Congress calling for the creation of the Department of Disaster Resilience (DDR). Specific provisions in the proposed legislative measures pertain to authority and responsibility.

Main Features of the Proposed Legislative Measures

House Bill (HB) Numbers 04 (authored by Speaker Cayetano and Rep. Duterte), 30 (authored by Rep. Salceda, et.al.), and other similar bills, and 4844 (authored by Rep. Lim) calls for the creation of the DDR as the principal government institution responsible for leading, organizing and managing and coordinating the national effort to reduce disaster risk, prepare for and respond to disasters, recover and rehabilitate and rebuild forward after the occurrence of disasters, to ensure safe, adaptive, and disaster-resilient communities.

Specific functions of the proposed Department, include among others: crafting policies and leading the implementation of programs, activities, and projects (PAPs) to reduce the country’s vulnerabilities to natural hazards and climate change; reviewing and building upon the existing disaster resilience framework, plans and strategies in the crafting of National Disaster Resilience Framework (NDRF) and the corresponding National Disaster Resilience Plan and Investment Program (NDRPIP); communicating and disseminating critical information; and receiving, managing and administering the Disaster Resilience Fund, The Disaster Contingency Fund, donations and other funds, assets and/or properties received by the Department.

The Department is also provided with emergency powers to implement immediate measures necessary to ensure the safety of life, property and livelihood, for the responsive, efficient and effective governance and those that are essential for the promotion of general welfare.

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HBs 30 and 4844 authorize the Department to establish operation and command centers, and research, education and training institute as venue and platform for the monitoring, managing and responding to disasters and for the training, knowledge and information sharing to improve and enhance capacity and disaster resilience.

The creation of a line department not only reflects the highest priority of the present dispensation accorded this essential public service but offers a practical solution to the challenge of fragmentation that has impaired the performance of the mandate of DRRM.

Other Salient Features of the Proposed Legislative Measures

On Accountability, Transparency and Access to Information. Among the proposed measures, HBs 04 and 4844 prescribe that all information shall be made available to the public for scrutiny, reproduction and dissemination. Such information pertains to: a) records of financial transactions, including, but not limited to, donations received, funds allocated, and amounts disbursed; b) official acts, transactions or decisions; and c) relevant and timely research data used as basis for policy development.

On Coordination. The bill makes the connection of multiple interventions from the government, private sector, NGOs, academe and other stakeholders through different levels of government, in different areas at varying scope of operations in a synergistic manner crucial in delivering immediate disaster response towards faster disaster recovery.

HB 04 mandates that the Department’s bureaus shall coordinate with the relevant government departments, agencies, offices and instrumentalities. In addition, the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAG-ASA) and the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHILVOCS) shall be placed under the supervision of the Department. However, they will continue to perform their respective functions under the law.

HB 4844 espouses the “whole of government and whole of nation approach” where the Department will ensure seamless synergy and coordination with stakeholders, including national government agencies (NGAs), LGUs, government-owned or –controlled corporations (GOCCs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), the academe, and the private sector, in relation to disaster resilience programs and projects and the development and promotion of research, education, and training mechanisms. The Department will establish a platform, paradigm, and mechanisms for convergence and coordination with stakeholders. In addition, the Multi-Stakeholders Convergence Unit (MSCU) will closely engage the private sector, CSOs, academe, and other non-government stakeholders and strengthen public-private collaboration towards disaster resilience.

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HB 30 similarly seeks the adoption of the “whole of government and whole of nation approach” and the creation of the National Disaster Resilience Council (NDRC) which shall serve as the policy advisory body to the Department on DRRM and climate change adaptation (CCA). This proposed advisory group adds an additional focal body to the original four pillars organized under the NDRRMC.

The NDRC will be chaired by the Secretary of Disaster Resilience and will comprise all the heads of 47 concerned government agencies. The Council is organized into five clusters: Disaster Prevention and Mitigation to be led by the DOST; Disaster Preparedness to be led by the DILG; Disaster Response by the DSWD; Recovery and Sustainable Development by the NEDA; and Logistics led by the DND, formerly the OCD which functions as the NDRRMC Secretariat.

Four additional government offices will be subsumed under the Department. This in effect will broaden the state engagement to include the geological and hydrometeorological agencies the Philippine Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOCS), the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Administration (PAG-ASA), which are both attached to the DOST, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), and the CCC.

As the need arises, the Department may constitute a technical management advisory group from different stakeholders that will coordinate and convene with the Department to effectively manage and sustain national efforts on disaster risk and vulnerability reduction and emergency management, and climate change adaptation and mitigation (CCAM). Further, the Department will provide the necessary guidelines and procedures on the DDR Fund and Local Disaster Resilience Fund (LDRF) releases as well as utilization, accounting and auditing.

2.1.2 Unclear Partnerships and Collaborative Roles with LGUs and Other Stakeholders

Kusumasari et. al (2010) stressed that the Yolanda case magnifies the constraints on LGU disaster response especially the ineffective planning and implementation, overlapping responsibilities with various institutions, ambiguous methods of communication and dissemination, weak inter-organizational coordination, and ignorance of established disaster plans (Domingo & Manejar, 2018). In the case of Typhoon Yolanda, it was the Executive Secretary who presided over DRRMC meetings. From there onwards, the command responsibility was blurry, and no one knew who was calling the shots. Even the Defense Chief was relegated to a support role when supposedly he should be able to make decisions (Domingo & Manejar, 2018). It becomes apparent that leadership vacuum exists from the absence of clear authority for DRRM.

On the participation of CSOs, a study by Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government on the Typhoon Haiyan Response noted that the government failed to adequately partner with civil society groups resulting in missed collaboration (Philip

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Dy and Tori Stephens, 2016). It pointed out that most CSOs did not have formal partnership with local government as they tended to view government as out of touch with civil society. The study recommends that the government should ensure the engagement of local civil society before, during and after the disaster response.

As mandated by the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, LGUs shall be at the forefront of DRRM. Solay (2004) outlined the basic roles of the local government in facilitating the community during a disaster. The LGU must be able to (1) assess the vulnerabilities of the area and its constituents; (2) instill basic knowledge of natural disasters and the possible impacts; (3) conduct an information and education campaign (IEC) on disaster mitigation; (4) coordinate with officials in charge of planning, construction, health, and wealth; (5) conduct first-aid trainings; (6) partner with educational institutions to broaden awareness and support existing knowledge; and (7) build evacuation centers and determine safe locations for those affected (Domingo & Manejar, 2018).

As identified in the NDRRMC framework, every LGU should be able to establish a

Local Disaster Risk Management Plan aligned with NDRRM Plan (NDRRMP). RA 10121 delineated the jurisdiction of responsibilities ─ NDRRMC will be the lead agency if two or more regions are affected; regional DRRMC if two provinces or more; provincial DRRMC if two or more cities and/or municipalities, city/municipal if two or more barangays; and barangay development council (BDC) if only one barangay is affected. Functions of the Local DRRMC (LDRRMC) are specified in RA 10121.

HB 4844 of the proposed DDR clearly provides for the synergy with stakeholders in promotion of the “whole of government and whole of nation” approach to disaster.

Under HB 30, a framework similar to NDRRMC is retained and renamed as the National Disaster Resilience Council (NDRC). It is where representation of national and local government entities and CSOs, and the private sector is ensured. It shall serve as the policy advisory body to the DDR on DRRM and climate change adaptation (CCA). It shall be chaired by the Department Secretary. Regional Disaster Resiliency Councils (RDRC) shall also be created which shall be headed by DDR Regional Directors. For the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the Chief Minister shall be the chairperson of RDRC. For the National Capital Region (NCR), the Municipal DRC (MDRC) shall be headed by the chairperson of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).

RDRCs shall be composed of concerned regional agencies, offices, LGUs and multiple stakeholders. The Personnel Services (PS), Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures (MOOE) and Capital Outlay (CO) for the Local Disaster Resilience Office (LDRO) shall be sourced from the General Fund of LGU subject to pertinent provisions of the LGC. The MOOEs and CO shall be charged to local climate and disaster resilience fund of LGUs. Multi-Stakeholders Convergence Units (MSCU)

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shall be also be established to align the disaster resilience efforts of the private sector, the CSOs, academe, and other stakeholders with the Department.

On Levels of Responsibility and Coordination during Emergencies. During emergencies, the LDRRMCs take the lead in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the effects of any disaster based on the criteria set by RA 10121:

The BDC, if a barangay is affected; The city/municipal DRRMCs, if two (2) or more barangays are affected; The provincial DRRMC, if two (2) or more cities/municipalities are affected; The regional DRRMC, if two (2) or more provinces are affected; and The NDRRMC, if two (2) or more regions are affected.

The NDRRMC and intermediary LDRRMCs act as support to LGUs which have the primary responsibility as first disaster responders. Private sector and civil society groups work in accordance with the coordination mechanism and policies set by the NDRRMC and concerned LDRRMCs.

As mentioned earlier, coordination is influenced by several factors. Thus, the degree of collaboration and decision-making depend on the extent of damage brought by a disaster. For example, Typhoon Yolanda makes it difficult to achieve the degree of collaboration and level of decision making needed in a multi-sectoral, multi-organizational structure (Commission on Audit, 2014).

As pointed out by COA (2014) there are recurring issues that affect coordination and collaboration among (DRRM agencies in the country such as:

Lack of emergency management system to cope with a catastrophic disaster such as Typhoon Yolanda;

Limited capacity in terms of staff, equipment and other logistics such as warehouses, delivery vehicles;

Lack of a systematic distribution system;Inadequately trained and equipped team.

In HB 4844, the primary responsibility for disaster preparedness and response shall be exercised at the local or national level, as applicable, in close and seamless collaboration with the relevant national government instrumentalities, non-government stakeholders, and international partners. It provides for a clear categorization of levels of responsibility based on the territorial coverage of disaster, and identification of key persons and officials who should take the lead and those who are expected to provide necessary support (see Table 2).

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Level of Responsibility Responsible Official Conditions Level 1: City or Municipality Lead Official: Mayor of the affected

city or municipality Support: City or Municipal Disaster Resilience Officer

If a disaster affects a single city or municipality

Level 2: Province Lead Official: Provincial Governor of the affected province Support: Provincial Disaster Resilience Officer; Municipal and/City Mayor concerned; and Municipal/City Disaster Resilience Officers

If a disaster affects two or more municipalities and/or cities within a province

Level 3: Region Lead Official: Regional Director , DDR Support: Governors of affected provinces; concerned Provincial Disaster Resilience Officers

If a disaster affects two or more provinces within a region (Except for NCR)

Level 4: National Lead Official: Secretary of Disaster Resilience (SDR) Support: Governors of affected provinces; Disaster Resilience Officers concerned

a.If a disaster affects at least two (2) regions; b.When LGU is unable to effectively cope with the risk and/or impact of a hazard; or c. When the President directs a Level 4 response or declares a state of calamity.

Under HBs 30, 04 and 4844, the Department is authorized to declare a cluster of barangay, municipalities, cities, provinces and regions under state of calamity and the lifting thereof based on the criteria set by the Department or by the NDRC. In times of disasters, and whenever warranted by the circumstances, the Department Secretary may call upon other instrumentalities or entities of the government and non-government and civic organizations for assistance in terms of the use of their facilities and resources for the protection and preservation of life and properties in the whole range of disaster reduction and management. This authority includes the power to call on the reserve force as defined in RA 7077 or the Citizen Armed Forces of the Philippines Reservist Act to assist in relief and rescue during disasters or calamities.

2.1.3 Financial Constraints and other Operational Limitations, Inadequate yet Underutilized Calamity Funds of LGUs

While there are several sources of funds intended for DRRM, and which by Domingo and Olaguera’s (2017) reckoning are substantive, financial constraints and other

Table 2HB 4844 - Primary Responsibility for Disaster Preparedness and Response

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Operational limitations hamper resource allocation. This observation is worsened by inadequare yet underutilized calamity funds of LGUs.

Sources of Funding and Resource Allocation

There are several funds intended for DRRM, such as:

National Disaster Funds

• Calamity Fund or National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund. According to the DBM, the Calamity Fund is a lump sum fund appropriated under the GAA to cover aid, relief, and rehabilitation services to communities/areas affected by man-made and natural calamities, repair and reconstruction of permanent structures, including capital expenditures for pre-disaster operations, rehabilitation and other related activities. Of the amount appropriated for the NDRRM Fund, 30% will be allocated as Quick Response Fund (QRF) or stand-by fund for relief and recovery programs in order that situation and living conditions of people in communities or areas stricken disasters, calamities, epidemics, or complex emergencies, will be normalized as quickly as possible.

• Quick Response Fund (QRF) are built-in budgetary allocations that represent pre-disaster or stand-by funds for agencies in order to immediately assist areas stricken by catastrophes and crises (www.dbm.gov.ph).

The following agencies have built-in QRFs to ensure immediate action during calamities:

DPWH DND – Office of the Secretary (OSEC)/ Office of the Civil Defense (OCD) DepEd DSWD DA

Unlike the Calamity Fund, the QRF does not require the recommendation of the NDRRMC or the approval of Office of the President (OP) to trigger the use and release of funds. When the QRF gets depleted, the agency may request for replenishment through DBM to be approved by the OP.

• People’s Survival Fund. (PSF) is a special fund in the National Treasury which

specifically aims to finance the adaptation programs and projects based on the National Strategic Framework. It has an opening balance of P1 Billion appropriated under the GAA.

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Sources of Funding and Resource Allocation (Continued)

Table 2 presents the yearly general appropriations for the calamity funding. From 2010 to 2016, NDRRM Fund steadily increased, indicating government shifted its fiscal priority in response to the immediate need brought about by calamities that hit the country. A huge increased was in 2016 after the devastating effects of Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, where P18.9 Billion was allotted for Yolanda rehabilitation. The P19.6 Billion appropriation in 2018 may be used for reconstruction, rehabilitation, repair, aid, relief and other works or services, including pre-disaster activities such as: conduct of risk assessment and vulnerability analysis; community-based monitoring system (CBMS); capacity building on mainstreaming DRRM/Climate Change Adaptation ; conduct of trainings on disaster preparedness and response; conduct of simulation exercises; development and institutionalization of early warning system; and stockpiling of basic emergency supplies, in connection with the occurrence of natural calamities, epidemics as declared by DOH, crises resulting from armed conflicts, insurgency, terrorism, and other catastrophes occurring in the current or two preceding years (General Appropriations Act 2018).

Table 2. NDRRM Fund

(in Billion Pesos) Particulars NDRRM Fund

Year GAA Augmentation Total QRF (actual share of QRF to Total NDRRM

Fund)) 2018 19.600 19.600 7.600

2017 15.755 15.755 4.100

2016 38.896 38.896 6.216

2015 14.000 14.000 6.708

2014 13.000 13.000 7.850

2013 7.500 7.500 3.695

2012 7.500 7.500 2.645

2011 5.000 1.000 6.000 1.788

2010 2.000 1.750 3.750 0.645

Source: GAA A local disaster risk reduction and management fund (LDRRMF) is established mainly for the LGUs. However, it has been observed that 3rd to 6th class municipalities experienced inequitable fund distribution hence the LGUs were forced to take care of themselves and rehabilitative on their own (Domingo & Manejar, 2018).

PSF will fund adaptation projects such as, but not limited to the following: Adaptation activities in areas of water resources management, land

management, agriculture and fisheries, health, infrastructure development, natural ecosystems including mountainous and coastal ecosystems;

Monitoring, control, and prevention of vector-borne diseases triggered by climate change;

Forecasting and early warning systems; Supporting institutional development, for local governments, in partnership with

local communities and civil society groups; Strengthening existing, and where needed, establish regional centers and

information networks; Serving as a guarantee for risk insurance needs for farmers, agricultural workers

and other stakeholders; and Community adaptation support programs by local organizations accredited by the

Commission.

LGUs and accredited Local Community Organizations (LCOs) can access the PSF by submitting a project proposal, subject to the criteria set by the CCC Advisory Board. While RA 10174 provides for an annual replenishment of the fund, record shows that the CCC is operating PSF on the initial P1 Billion since 2016 to present. As of this date, the PSF has a remaining balance of P683.66 Million with 29 project proposals in the pipeline. From 2016-2018, six projects were approved for funding (CCC, 2019).

Local Disaster Funds • Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF). Section 21 of RA 10121

mandates the local governments to set aside not less than 5% of their estimated revenue from regular sources as LDRRM Fund to support DRRM. Of the amount appropriated for LDRRM Fund, 30% will be allocated to QRF for relief and recovery programs. Any unexpended LDRRM Fund will accrue to a special trust fund solely for the purpose of supporting DRRM activities for the LDRRMCs within the next five years. Any amount still not fully utilized after 5 years will revert back to the general fund and will be available for other social services to be identified by the local sanggunian.

Table 3 presents the yearly general appropriations for the calamity funding. From

2010 to 2016, NDRRM Fund steadily increased, indicating that government shifted its fiscal priority in response to the immediate need brought about by calamities that hit the country. There was a huge increase in 2016 after the devastating effects of Typhoon Yolanda in 2013, where P18.9 Billion was allotted for rehabilitation. The P19.6 BIllion appropriation in 2018 may be used for reconstruction, rehabilitation, repair, aid, relief and other works or services, including pre-disaster activities such as: conduct of risk assessment and vulnerability analysis; community-based monitoring system (CBMS); capacity building on mainstreaming DRRM/CCA; conduct of

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trainings on disaster preparedness and response; conduct of simulation exercises; development and institutionalization of early warning system; and stockpiling of basic emergency supplies, in connection with the occurrence of natural calamities, epidemics as declared by DOH, crises resulting from armed conflicts, insurgency, terrorism, and other catastrophes occurring in the current or two preceding years (2018 General Appropriations Act).

Table 3NDRRM Fund

(In Billion Pesos)

Particulars NDRRM Fund

Year GAA Augmentation Total QRF (actual share of QRF to Total NDRRM Fund))

2018 19.600 19.600 7.600 2017 15.755 15.755 4.100

2016 38.896 38.896 6.216 2015 14.000 14.000 6.708

2014 13.000 13.000 7.850 2013 7.500 7.500 3.695 2012 7.500 7.500 2.645 2011 5.000 1.000 6.000 1.788

2010 2.000 1.750 3.750 0.645

Source: GAA

A local disaster risk reduction and management fund (LDRRMF) is established mainly for the LGUs. However, it has been observed that 3rd to 6th class municipalities experienced inequitable fund distribution hence the LGUs were forced to take care of themselves and rehabilitate on their own (Domingo & Manejar, 2018).

Financial Constraints and Other Operational Limitations. As disasters strike more frequently, the cost of disaster response and mitigation also increases and the national budget continues to lag behind—unable to meet the country’s many competing needs (Commission on Audit, 2014). The composition of government expenditures, particularly the share of non-mandatory expenses, leaves little room for flexibility to allow a bigger impact on disaster spending. In the case of LGUs, they have varying disaster-related expenditure demands and revenue–raising capabilities which have both affected by the incidence of disaster and severity of calamities that strike them. However, these differences are not taken into account in the allocation of resources for disaster management, thus creating an imbalance between available resources and risk exposure (Commission on Audit, 2014).

Under a normal situation, total disbursements must not exceed actual total collection plus 50% of the uncollected estimated revenue for that year. However, disbursements can only be made for purposes and amounts included in the approved annual budget (disaster plan), implying little flexibility in the reallocation of resources to reflect changes in expenditure priorities brought about by the disaster. Moreover, any

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overdraft outstanding at the end of the year must be met from the first collections of the following year’s revenue. This implies that revenue will decrease due to loss and damage to properties and livelihood as an after effect of the disaster. Thus, the impact of the disaster drastically reduces revenues but at the same time expands expenditure due to response and recovery efforts.

Opening up to international donors to alleviate the shortage of resources remains crucial for sustainable disaster response. Whereby line departments benefit from autonomy to independently access this type of financial support, the standards for government accounting on the fund acquisition and utilization of these donations will have to be strictly implemented by the COA.

Inadequate yet underutilized calamity funds of LGUs. A World Bank (WB)-NDCC study (2004) estimated that 50% of the Local Calamity Fund is unused every year. COA affirmed that despite the inadequate resources of some LGUs due to their small budget, LDRRMFs are usually unutilized or underutilized. Despite this, some LGUs cut back on spending the LDRRMF on the basis that such spending may not be allowed by COA and DBM.

On Financing for Disaster Resilience. Ensuring the availability of funding support systems to various stakeholders and LGUs before, during and after the disaster is a building block for sustaining disaster resilience.

In particular, recovering and rebuilding after disasters are comparably difficult for the poor, who whenever displaced, are oftentimes the last to be able to do so. With diminished capacity, they rely heavily on quick fixes which tend to further aggravate their situation.

LGUs, ironically in hazard prone areas, lack the internal capacity to generate funds for rehabilitation and recovery from disasters. This is a concern fit for policy intervention.

Other than the means already available through the consolidation of specific funds related to disaster resilience, the policy guidance on the aspects of finance and administration including humanitarian assistance from international donors form part of the proposed law.

HB 4844 proposes that the amount needed for the initial implementation will be taken from the current fiscal year’s unused appropriation of all agencies absorbed, transferred, and attached to the Department. Thereafter, the amount needed for the operation and maintenance will be included in the GAA. In addition the utilization and allocation of the entire Calamity Fund and its quick response fund component will be managed by the Department.

The Local Disaster Resilience Fund (LDRF) of not less than 7% of the estimated revenue from regular sources will be set aside to support risk and vulnerability reduction and CCA and mitigation (CCAM) PAPs. Of the amount appropriated for LDRF, 20%

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will be allocated as QRF or stand-by fund for prepositioning of goods and relief and early recovery programs. The remaining 80% will be allocated for CCA, disaster risk and vulnerability reduction, prevention, adaptation and mitigation programs, projects and activities focusing on both institutional capacity building of vulnerable communities and risk-reducing infrastructure.

2.2 Reducing Economic Discontinuity

An important consideration in disaster resilience concerns the time required to recover from the disaster. In reality, other than the general population which suffers from damage or loss of property and assets, local businesses are likewise adversely affected.

The lessons of the past calamities clearly suggest that micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) are among the vulnerable which can fail in their attempt to recover from the disruption brought about by disasters. The prolonged inability to restart business operations tend to impair economic development particularly in the areas affected by the calamities.

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has a program on MSME Disaster Resilience which aims to build disaster-resilient businesses in the country by providing technical assistance in strengthening resilience of MSMEs on a demand-driven basis and by supporting the government in strengthening the enabling environment that promotes risk-sensitive and informed investments by MSMEs. To complement this, other measures and plans should be put in place to ensure business continuity and supply chain resilience post-disaster, most especially those enterprises in identified disaster-prone areas.

HBs 4844, HB 4301 (by Reps. Suarez, A., and Suarez, D.), and 4313 (by Rep. Hernandez) all advocate that the LGUs may access foreign financing, through the DOF, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and other relevant agencies to implement disaster prevention, mitigation, early recovery, and rehabilitation measures at the provincial, city or municipal level. These bills also recommend that the accessing of foreign financing and inflow of funds as well as utilization thereof should be subject to regular reporting, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms under DRR.

In addition, exemptions from taxes and import duties, donor’s tax, Value Added Tax (VAT) shall be granted in special cases as provided in the proposed measure, and tax incentives shall be extended to encourage the private sector to render and/or provide disaster assistance, and/or invest in disaster resilience and CCAM measures for their residences, communities and/or business. The LGU may implement local tax rules that would grant disaster victims reasonable reduction, exemption, or deferment of local taxes.

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2.3 Other Issues and Concerns

2.3.1 Utilization of Geo-hazard Maps and other Existing Tools to pre-determine possible hazards

Vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change vary depending on context. Comprehensive geo-hazard mapping is necessary to determine the likelihood of any upcoming disaster and potential gravity of the exposure to disaster effects. Consequently, effective utilization of information obtained from geo-hazard maps would aid in identifying vulnerable groups that will need urgent assistance in times of calamity and disaster.

The MGB of the DENR has comprehensive geo-hazard maps and the DOST has a nationwide operational assessment of hazards (Project NOAH). Both of these agencies are urging LGUs to use these tools in preparation for calamities (Cimatu/DENR, Lagmay/Project NOAH, 2019).

2.3.2 Baselining Disaster Resilience

For CCA and disaster preparedness, the proposed Department should develop a baseline on hazard risks and use geo-hazard mapping from both DOST and DENR to reasonably determine the susceptibility of any imminent disaster and the potential gravity of the effects from exposure.

The data obtained from the geo-hazard mapping can be used as input for a Proxy Means Test (PMT) to identify and target vulnerable households and individuals that are most likely to become poor in the event of natural disaster. Learning from the experience of Kenya2 on pre-targeting, a combination of geo-hazard mapping and pre-targeting, which are triggered or set in motion once a calamity or disaster area is declared could provide real time assistance, such as unconditional cash transfer, especially to the pre-identified poor and vulnerable households.

Under HBs 30 and 4844, a National and Regional Information Management System for Disaster Resilience will be established that will serve as a database of all DRR and climate change data, including a geographic information system on geo-hazard assessments and climate risk. It will also serve as the repository of current and multi-temporal information for wide-scale disaster risk analysis. Data in itself will have to be transformed into information that should be accessible to those who stand to benefit from it.

2 Video conference on End of Poverty Day, World Bank, October 17, 2019

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3.0 Moving Forward

3.1 Bridging the Transition

The organizational structure, which underpins the creation of the predecessor NDRRMC, will be replicated. Other than the 5 identified line agencies in the policy advisory council, there will be 4 additional line agencies involved in geological, hydrometeorological and climate change services which will be integrated with the department. The geographically dispersed 17 Regional DRRMC and those in 1,488 municipalities and 146 cities will form part of the support network for disaster resilience.

The Department, as envisioned, is a centralized authority with decentralized responsibilities. The sheer size, complexity and variability of the functions of the Department that operates in the context of an inter-office and intra-department wide bureaucracy operating under separate multi-layered hierarchies require innovative engagement. Information technology-based systems constitute the desired platform for improved accessibility. In the end, information gained should reveal practical lessons from both sides of its spectrum, the enablers/enabled. Knowledge learned should be shared to amplify its value to stakeholders.

Reliance on such broad-based coalition from the both public sector and private enterprises is part of the grand strategy for holistic disaster resilience. Not to be overlooked is that lag in the implementation is a consequence of an overextended span of control where information and communication trickle down and across different organizational units, from the national to the local levels, entailing considerable time before any course of action can be promptly undertaken.

During the period of transition prior to the organization of the proposed department there should not be any form of interruption in disaster risk response and management. Thus, the creation of the Multi-Stakeholder Convergence Units (MSCU) is a step in the right direction to attain seamless alignment of all disaster resilience related efforts from relevant government agencies, the private sector, CSOs, academe and other stakeholders with the Department promoting public-private partnership. Slow onset disasters, for instance, opens up a window of opportunity for community-based early warning system for disaster preparedness, a collaborative platform between LGUs and communities. Here, government should engage the widest audience to create awareness. Scenario planning, to simulate the highest risk to the least case disaster situations, will be helpful to better prepare for even the severest form of natural disaster.

HB 4844 proposes that the function, assets, funds, equipment, properties, transactions, and personnel of the affected and transferred agencies, and the formulation of the internal organic structure, staffing pattern, operating system, and revised budget of the Department will be completed within 1 year from the effectivity of the Act. The Department, in collaboration with the DBM, will come up with its Organizational

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Structure and Staffing Pattern both of which will be approved within 30 days from the effectivity of the Act.

3.2 Building Beyond

The conventional strategies for disaster recovery begin from “recover,” to “bounce back” up to “bounce back better.” These terms denote progressive standards for disaster recovery. In a broader context, they are descriptive of the extent of commitment to the cause from simple rehabilitation to full restoration and even beyond by offering significant improvements from the original conditions prior to disaster.

Recent literature suggests the presence of a 4th way which acknowledges the

contextual limitations: “building beyond.” In extreme cases, natural disasters cause land erosion, disappearance of natural boundaries and rearrangement of physical landscapes. Whenever it is not practicable to reclaim the original location due to the force of nature, the reasonable alternative is to resettle in another suitable location and thus, build beyond (ANGOC/VGGT 2018).

Two major calamities in the country namely “Yolanda” and “Sendong” highlighted the enormity of the challenges entailed by rehabilitation and resettlement of victims of natural disaster. Affected communities, particularly the informal settlers and lessees, in the provinces of Eastern Samar, Misamis Oriental and Bukidnon experienced terrific challenges in relocating or reclaiming their original properties. Turned down for their inability to comply with eligibility criteria regarding long-term land ownership, they build even when it is not safe or permissible making them even more vulnerable to shocks and stress.

Even as informal settlers cannot regain their domicile, LGUs can ill-afford the cost of private lands for their resettlement. This brings to fore the necessity of providing financial and related support especially for LGUs in high hazard risk areas for this purpose.

HBs 4844, 4301, and 4313 provide for the economic recovery and development of disaster-prone areas, as the Department in coordination with DTI and other agencies will craft policies, and implement necessary programs and projects to stimulate economic activities and encourage investments to assist affected areas develop or recover faster.

An important component of building beyond recovery is the institutionalization of risk sharing and risk transfer. In 2017, the Government Security and Insurance Service (GSIS) established an insurance program for risks against typhoons and earthquakes for the national government and 25 selected provinces. This complements the allocation prescribed under the DRRM Law as well as the People’s Support Fund.

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In the past, large scale recovery efforts from loss of property and livelihood have been primarily dependent upon the support of the national government and generosity of international donors. To move away from the culture of dependency, institutionalizing mechanisms for sharing risks should be considered by the Department.

Specialized types of insurance can safeguard against the risks resulting from weather-related disasters. Climate risk insurance is gaining popularity in developing countries as a mechanism for managing the risk from climate change from individuals to groups, at the community, local, regional, national and international levels. The Climate Insurance Fund is an example of Global Fund intended to insure and re-insure companies in developing countries against climate change related risks. In the Philippines, crop insurance program is a form of climate risk insurance specific for the agriculture sector and available for affected farmers to promote rice productivity in the wake of hydrometeorological disturbances.

Socialized insurance can be targeted for poverty stricken and other vulnerable groups who are likely to bear the gravest impact of climate change. To recover from loss of property in case of natural and man-made calamities or to provide for livelihood support to minimize business discontinuity, the insurance options should be fit for the risk management objectives for intended beneficiaries. A major area of consideration concerns the source of funding for the payment of premiums for the insurance other than the authority to administer the special fund where the payout shall be derived.

By introducing Climate and Disaster Risk Insurance and Incentives, the proposed Law recognizes the importance of risk sharing and risk transfer mechanisms to improve the capacity of those who become victims to recover from disasters. Social welfare support should not only cover health and livelihood for individuals but also be broadened to include shelter assistance for families trying to rebuild their houses.

HBs 30 and 4844 mandate the Department to oversee all disaster risk-sharing and risk transfer instruments and other related initiatives to ensure the protection of property and livelihood, both public and private. The Department, in collaboration with DOF, BSP, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), GSIS and the Insurance Commission will create, establish and implement, among others, disaster insurance pools, revolving funds, insurance risk-transfer schemes and other facilities and/or facilities and other financial disaster resilience measures. The Department will also be tasked with the establishment of recognition and incentives program for outstanding performance of Local DRC (LDRC), NGOs, CSOs, private sectors, schools, hospitals and other stakeholders in promoting and implementing significant disaster risk and vulnerability reduction management.

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4.0 Summary and Conclusion

As signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action and its successor, the Sendai Framework, the Philippines continues to match its international commitments with concrete policy actions. Ahead of its neighbors in introducing policy interventions related to Disaster Management, the present NDRRM Policy, implemented through an ad-hoc body composed of several government agencies, while pro-active and actively focused on DRRM has proven to be inadequate in addressing the complex and evolving governance challenges presented by worsening climate change, natural and man-made disasters.

The frequency and severity of disasters demand an urgent and creative policy response that not only encourages broad based participation from non-government organizations, people’s organizations and communities in disaster response but also clearly establishes the key role of the national government in leading the transformation of its compelling vision of disaster resilience into realizable action.

The proposed creation of the Department of Disaster Resilience rightfully reflects the highest level of priority that should be reserved for a complicated existential issue which has single handedly unified the agenda of a growing number of nation-states.

Because of its geographic location, the Philippines will remain prone to calamities and disasters. Post-disaster rehabilitation and resettlement have been severely hampered in the past due to indirect displacement caused by massive land erosion, disappearance of natural boundaries and instant materialization of unsafe no-build zones. Resisting the common urge to build back, government should instead understand the power of context as it draws the line forward to building beyond wherever accessible and habitable.

Any highly specialized government agency to promote disaster resiliency cannot simply

overlook the past events in order to discover the evidence and gain the invaluable insights to better prepare, better respond, better recover and ultimately to become better resilient in the face of climate change, natural and man-made disasters.

For a country like the Philippines that is vulnerable to risks of disasters, it is crucial to establish an independent agency that could address the challenges in a DRRM in a “whole of government and whole of nation approach” covering the whole cycle of disaster prevention, response, recovery and building beyond.

At present, the disaster risk management is governed by multiple agencies that lead to difficult collaboration and policy implementation. This situation is exacerbated by financial constraints and other operational limitations, including among others the differences in the level of capacity of various agencies and stakeholders involved to manage disaster risks.

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In response, there are 23 bills filled seeking the Creation of the DDR. The proposed Department will have a clear mandate, authority and accountability to lead in the coordination, monitoring, implementation and oversight of disaster risk management and vulnerability reduction. The so-called Department will be equipped with the necessary competency and resources which will serve as game changer in disaster management.

The paradox that is inherent in a highly specialized government agency that acts as the sole and central authority for disaster resilience refers to its principal reliance on the dispersal of the very same authority in order to respond with dispatch and coherence for fast and optimal results.

By effectively delegating the authority, decentralizing responsibility on selected fronts at multiple levels of engagement through a vast number of cohorts mobilized in unison from the public sector, to private enterprises, CSOs, LGUs and international partners across geographic boundaries will it be able to truly realize the “whole of government and whole of nation” approach that it aims to achieve.

References

ADRC. (n.d.). Asian Disaster Reduction Council https://www.adrc.asia/nationinformation. Retrieved from https://www.adrc.asia/nationinformation: https://www.adrc.asia/nationinformation

Associations of Foundations. (2016). A Study on Selected DRRM Organizations and CSO Coordination. PEF.

CFE-DM. (2019, March). ASEAN Disaster Management Handbook.Citizens’ Disaster Response Center Foundation, Inc. (2019, October 10). Go’s proposal to create

disaster dept rejected.Commission on Audit. (2014). Disaster Management Practices in the Philippines: An Assessment.

Quezon City.Domingo, S. N. (2016). An Assessment of the Sectoral and Institutional Implementation of the NDRRMP.

Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Domingo, S. N. (2017). Institutional issues on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management. Quezon City,

Philippines: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Domingo, S. N., & Manejar, A. A. (2018). Disaster Preparedness and Local Governance in the

Philippines. Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies.Philip Dy and Tori Stephens. (2016, March). The Typhoon Haiyan Response: Strenthening Coordination

among Philippine Government, Civil Society and Internal Actors.Philippine Institute for Development Studies. (2017). DRRM’s design and implementation need to be

beefed up. Development Research News, 1- 4.United Nations. (2008). Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package

for Impelmenting Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework. United Nations. (2016). United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Annual

Report 2016. World Meteorological Organization. (2018). Natural Hazards and Risk Reduction.

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N o t e s

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Congressional Policy and Budget Research Department3/F Main Building, House of Representatives

Batasan Hills, Quezon City, Metro Manila, PhilippinesTel. No. (DL) 931-60-32 (Fax) 931-65-19

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