No. 82

THE INFORMAL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN EGYPT

Christian Arandel & Manal El Batran July 1997

Working Paper No. 82

THE INFORMAL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN EGYPT

Christian Arandel* & Manal El Batran** July 1997

*Christian Arandel **Manal El Batran Environmental Quality International 7 Abbas Hamza Street 3B, Bahgat Ali Street Nazlet El Batran

Zamalek, Cairo, Egypt El Haram 12111, Giza, Egypt

Tel: + 20 2 341 7879 Fax: + 20 2 341 3331 Fax: + 20 2 360 2800 E­Mail: mbatran@frcu.eun.eg

This Report was prepared for Centre Nacional de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), France, as part of a programme of research co­ordinated by Alain Durand­Lasserve,

7 Rue Sante Garibaldi, 33000 Bordeaux, France

THE INFORMAL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN EGYPT

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

INTRODUCTION 1

SECTION I: LAND MANAGEMENT AND HOUSING IN EGYPT: POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Land Management and Tenure Systems 3 1.2 Urban and Regional Planning in Egypt: Toward Spatial Decentralisation? 3

1.2.1 Housing Policies in Egypt 3 1.2.2 New Towns and New Settlements Policies 5

1.3 Institutional Framework: Toward Policy Decentralisation? 8 1.3.1 Institutions Involved in Urban and Regional Planning 8 1.3.2 Planning Process in Egypt 9 1.3.3 The Nature of the Relation Between the Central and Local

Government 11

SECTION II: INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN EGYPT 13

2.1 Typology of Informal Settlements 14 2.1.1 Squatter Settlements 14 2.1.2 Informal Housing on Legally Owned Land 14

2.2 Main characteristics of Informal Settlements 14 2.3 Informal Housing Development: Constraints and Opportunities 16

2.3.1 The Informal Housing Markets 16 2.3.2 Main Constraints 18 2.3.3 Major Opportunities 18

SECTION III: INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AND STATE INTERVENTION 19

3.1 The Main Causes of State Intervention 19

3.2 Evolution of the Legal Framework for Upgrading and Regularisation 20

3.3 Forms of settlement upgrading 21 3.3.1 Early Attempts at Regularising and Upgrading Informal Settlements 21 3.3.2 Upgrading through the Provision of Infrastructure 22 3.3.3 Rehabitation and Upgrading in El Mounira and Shubra 27

El Kheima

CONCLUSION 29

BIBLIOGRAPHY 33

NOTES 34

List of Tables

Table I: Residential units executed by the public and private sectors 4 Table II: Situation of housing units in the New Towns (1988) 6 Table IV: Average urban land values evolution in Egypt 1960­1983 (L.E./m2) 18 Table V: Average residential unit cost evolution, 1960­1983 (L.E./m2) 18 Table VI: Description of upgrading projects undertaken under the auspices of

bilateral and multilateral donors 23 Table VII: Urban population in the governorate selected for upgrading administration 25 Table VIII: Budget for settlement upgrading by governorate 25 Table IX: Projected clearance of inner­city areas in Cairo and Giza 26

List of Maps

Map I: New Towns in the Greater Cairo region 6 Map II: Location of Cairo's new settlements 7 Map III: Location of informal settlements in Cairo 13 Map IV: Urbanisation of agricultural land in Greater Cairo 17 Map V: Boundaries of Greater Cairo region 26 Map VI: Existing land use in El Munira 27

List of Figures

Figure 1: Urban policy administration: functional structure 10 Figure 2: Schematic organisational structure for Central and Local Government

and urban policy monitoring 12 Figure 3: Proposed policies according to land use 28

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THE INFORMAL HOUSING DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN EGYPT

INTRODUCTION

Cities in developing countries face similar challenges in attempting to cope with the phenomenon of rapid urbanisation. Their ability to cope with such challenges is largely contingent upon their limited resources and the institutional framework in which they operate. Social organisations, cultures, administrative traditions, planning conventions and political dynamics vary considerably from city to city, and country to country, (Stren and White, 1989, and Stren, 1991). Egypt was a pioneer among developing countries in instituting a system of public administration whose changes over the ages reflect the country’s long and complex history. According to Valsan, (1990; p.131): “In modern times, three major events have had considerable impact on the administration inherited by the free officers who came to power in 1952: first The French Invasion under Napoleon; second, the rule of Turkish Viceroy Mohammed Aly; and third, the British occupation of Egypt”.

Before July 1952, Egypt was divided into 14 provinces. Each province was headed by a high central govern­ ment official, responsible to the Minister of Interior. The desert regions were excluded from the civil administration and placed under the control of the Ministry of War. As Cairo did not have the status of a municipality until 1944 (Waterbury 1973) public authorities were ill­equipped to effectively control land development at the city's periphery. This contributed, from an early stage, to the growth and proliferation of uncontrolled urban settlements. Moreover, Abu­Lughod (1980) reports that before 1952 Cairo had no housing policy and that by 1965 the city only had a rudimentary land building code and law governing subdivision of land, and there were neither housing codes nor a general zoning ordinance. There were nonetheless some architectural codes in Cairo proper which dealt with restrictions on buildings heights, setbacks, and health and safety of the occupants.

After the 1952 revolution, Egypt embarked on a phase of decentralisation. The Government established different administrative units called “Moderia” in which the central ministries were represented at the local level. These units had the full responsibility to formulate and implement the local urban policy. In 1960, the "Moderias" were replaced by the governorates which received increased responsibilities for local planning.

The problems that this administration had to face were daunting. Similar to most developing countries, Egypt has been affected by a demographic explosion over the past forty years. Subsequently, its population rose from 24 million in 1952 to nearly 50 million in 1986 and is expected to reach more than 65 million by 2000, and 90 million by 2025. In the 1980's population grew at a

rate of 2.8%, meaning that one million persons were added to the country's population every nine months. Egyptian cities have received the bulk of this increase: the ratio of urban to total population grew from 26.4% in 1937 to 37.5% in 1960, and 43.9% in 1986. Recent trends however indicate a gradual decrease of the urbanisation rate as the percentage of Egypt's population living in urban centres grew only from 43.8% to 43.9% between 1976 and 1986. This figure, which indicates that urbanisation is now more or less increasing at the same rate as the overall population is confirmed by data showing a decrease in rural­urban migration. From 1976 to 1986 growth rates of cities have varied with population size: they have decreased for cities over 100,000 inhabitants, slightly increased for cities between 50 and 99,999 inhabitants, and decreased for smaller cities (El Kadi, 1990). Urbanis­ ation in Egypt is also characterized by very high population densities. This is particularly true in Cairo, the second most dense city in the world after Bombay, where average density is 172.7 persons per hectare.

Two factors compound the effects of urbanisation and population growth in Egypt. First, this growth is occurring on a small portion of the country's territory: of a total area of one million square kilometres no more than 4% is inhabited. Second, population is unevenly distributed between the various urban centres. Approximately 46% of the total urban population is concentrated in 4 cities, Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said and Suez, which cover a total area of 20,806 square kilometres. Meanwhile, the population of four other governorates (the Red Sea, El Wadi El Gedid, Matrouh, Sinai) represent no more than 1.5 % of the total urban population living in an area which is four times as vast (85,016 km2). As population is concen­ trated on a very small, and fertile, part of the country, it is inexorably eating up precious agricultural land.

Informal urbanisation can be seen as a result of the combination of the above factors (rapid and uneven urbanisation, high population densities etc.) with the inability of the formal sectors to provide land and/or housing adapted to the needs of the urban population and particularly to its lower income segments.

As a result of the lack of coordination between concerned agencies and ministries, and of the use of different definitions and techniques in estimating informal building activities it is hard to clearly delineate the scope of the informal housing sector in Egypt. A construction industry study in 1981 (World Bank and GOHBPR) estimated that approximately 77% of all housing units built nationally between 1966­1976 were informal. This estimate reflects the difference between the increase in housing units recorded by the 1966­1976 censuses and the increase in the number of building permits and registrations over the same period. In contrast, a study on informal housing in 1982 (ABT Associates and GOHBPR)

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estimated that informal units represented 84% and 91% of all units built between 1970 ­ 1981 in Cairo and Beni­Suef, respectively.

Moreover, estimates regarding the number of informal settlements also tend to vary according to the source. A 1993 report (GOPP) estimated that there were 23 such settlements in the Greater Cairo Region comprising a total population of about 5.88 million, with an average density of 285 persons per feddan. In contrast, the Ministry of Local Administration estimated that, in Greater Cairo, 4.52 million people live in 171 areas which have an average density of 78,000 persons per square kilometre. Nationwide estimates of population living in informal areas vary from 4.7 to 7 million persons spread in 904 areas with an average density of 50,821 persons per square kilometre. Whereas the development of most of these settlements dates back to the 1960's, the largest growth occurred after the completion of the last census in 1986, which explains the scarcity of reliable data.

The above data are a testimony to the failure of the formal sector, both public and private, to provide land and shelter accessible to all segments of Egyptian society. It is evidence that, if there is indeed a crisis in the housing sector in Egypt, it is specifically a crisis of the formal sectors. Meanwhile the informal private sector is thriving. The structural inadequacies of the formal housing and land production sectors are best illustrated with the following paradox: the spectacular growth of informal settlements took place in a situation of oversupply of formal housing units. The 1986 census revealed that there were 1.8 million vacant housing units in Egypt, representing 17% of the total stock. In Cairo alone, the census uncovered the presence of 523,000 vacant housing units. In the meantime, the number of precarious units was multiplied by 3, from 40,000 to 144,000. The problem is therefore characterized by the inadequacy of the formal housing supply as units provided are not affordable to those who most need them.

The inability of the formal sectors to provide land and housing to the poor is also a direct result of Egypt's administrative and policy framework. The main responsibility for policy making lies with the President and his advisers play a crucial role in influencing the initiation of national urban policy (El­Batran, 1992). A class of managers and technocrats has been responsible for the achievement and the failures of urban development and housing programs targeted to the urban poor. As a result the Egyptian administrative system is characterized by a high degree of centralisation of decision­making and the lack of coordination among various ministries and agencies involved in urban development. These two factors have greatly inhibited the effectiveness and efficiency of urban planning in Egypt.

Proponents of decentralisation argue that it can minimize problems encountered in the implementation of urban development programs for the poor. Many factors lead to an increased demand for decentral­ isation: rapid and complex processes of urban change render the provision of local services and

infrastructure increasingly ineffective and inefficient; the failure of “Sites and Services” approach to reach the target group of the urban poor; and the limited effectiveness of the government's interventions to solve the problems of housing for the urban poor. Such factors impose to rethink approaches to urban management in order to generate solutions adapted to deal with contemporary urban problems. (El­ Batran, 1992)

A major obstacle toward adopting such approaches are the constraints facing local administrative authorities dealing with urban land management. They are operating within the context of national policies over which they have limited influence: for example, priorities; criteria and budgets are set with reference to national development objectives rather than urban development needs. There is therefore no comprehensive approach to public administration that aims at solving the problems of land provision to meet the housing needs of the urban poor.

A paradox of the Egyptian situation is that, in most cities, there is no shortage of land with a potential for urbanisation. In fact, spontaneous urbanisation tends to occur on scarce and precious agricultural land while large stretches of desert land located in the immediate vicinity of urban centres remain mostly unaffected by the phenomenon. This should come as no surprise: private agricultural land was better able to respond to market demand than publicly owned desert land which remained under government control. Government policies aiming at taking advantage of this important land reserve have so far failed to meet the needs of low income urban dwellers.

This study investigates the resourceful ways in which the urban poor cope with their shelter needs; it is an attempt to assess the significance of the informal housing sector in the Egyptian context and the challenges it poses to planners and policy makers. For this purpose, a three­fold methodology was adopted. Section I deals with the issue of land management and housing in Egypt. It exposes the general policy and institutional framework for land management and explores how the decentralisation policy has was developed as part of a strategy for enhancing the implementation of urban development programs. Hence, the aim of Section I is to examine the historical, institutional, and ideological context in which the informal housing development process is occurring. It addresses the main factors leading to an increase in the demand for decentralisation. These factors include the institutions involved in urban and regional planning, the planning process in Egypt, and the nature of the relation between the central and local government.

Sections II and III provide the basis for an understanding of the recent policy shift that took place in Egypt regarding informal settlements. Section II provides insights in the phenomenon of informal housing. For this purpose it investigates the main characteristics of informal settlements and the dynamic and the modes of production of informal

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settlements. Section II, therefore, describes the typology of informal settlements and the different types of tenure, the main characteristics of informal settlements, and the development process of the informal housing sector. Section III examines the main causes of the government’s change of attitude towards informal settlements, and the types of intervention it engages in. This examination will allow us to identify possible new directions for government intervention to provide land and housing to the urban poor.

SECTION I : LAND MANAGEMENT AND HOUSING IN EGYPT: POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Land Management and Tenure Systems

Egypt's contemporary administrative system is the product of the country's long and complex history. Accordingly, legislation regarding the ownership and control over land reflect a diversity of influences, including ancient customs, Islamic laws, as well French and British legal systems. Land in Egypt customarily belonged to the state, and only urban land and houses could remain as private property (Mulch). This tight state control over land was made necessary by the country's dependence on irrigation and the resulting need to strictly regulate land uses.

Land tenure defines the various modes of land ownership and the ensuing rights. In Egypt, five main types of land tenure can be identified:

Leased Land: is owned by the state and leased on a long term basis to its occupants. Squatters may be granted this status, if they make a request to the Governorate. Land which remains permanently under a leasing status and cannot be sold is known as “hekr” land. Other leased lands can be converted from public to private ownership following the end of the lease period.

Trust or Wakf Land: consists of property set aside for charitable or religious purpose and usually administered by the Ministry of Wakf. Patriarchal property is considered Wakf, but is independent of the Wakf Ministry.

Encroachment (Wad Al Ayad): the civil code makes it possible for the possessor or user of a plot of land to gain ownership of that land if it is occupied continuously for 15 years and if the owner does not assert his/her rights.

Private Ownership or Freehold: this land is registered with the local district office of the land registration division (Ministry of Justice) and owned by private persons or companies.

Public Ownership: This land is registered as state property or land owned by the state which serves a

public purpose. It includes governorate Amlak land, land reform, antiquity and military properties.

Ownership of land by the government in its various forms (public, wakf and leased land) is the prominent type of ownership in Egypt as the government owns all desert land. Access to this land can be achieved through three means: buying, leasing, or, most commonly, seizing it. The sale of government land is rather rare and, when it occurs, often amounts to the recognition of an act of dispossession. The regularisation of seizure find its foundation in the principle of Wad Al Ayad which legitimates the transfer of property to the user after 15 years of "absence" of the owner. This principle applies to both private and public land. Since the agrarian reform acts, enacted after the 1952 revolution, ownership of agricultural land has been democratized and inequalities were partially reduced.

Generally, access to urban land is restricted by legislation regarding land subdivision and building regulations. Legal subdivision can occur both on agricultural and non­agricultural land but procedures are time­consuming and costly, and the chances of success are small. The subdivision of agricultural land can legally occur only in a limited number of cases defined by the 1978 agricultural law. For an owner to be able to legally subdivide his land, he must obtain a variance by demonstrating that his land is not cultivable. He can also take advantage of loopholes in the law, such as:

∙ The possibility to subdivide land to accommodate family members: there is little control to verify that the land was subdivided for this purpose rather than to provide parcels for non­related buyers.

∙ The possibility to install a facility which can be considered a contribution to the Food Security Program, i.e. a poultry farm with housing for employees. The owner does not have to prove that the occupants of the housing are indeed employees. This type of subdivision is not considered residential subdivision under existing laws.

Subdivision of non­agricultural land is in practice not much easier than that of agricultural land. Subdivision in urban areas is the responsibility of the housing department of the concerned governorate. The department must reach a decision, positive or negative, within six months following the submission of the plans by the applicant. This delay is however rarely respected and the applicant must often wait for much longer periods. Subdivision can be turned down for a variety of reasons, including subdivision and building regulations.

1.2 Urban and Regional Planning in Egypt: Toward Spatial Decentralisation?

1.2.1 Housing Policies in Egypt

Until the 1952 revolution, the housing market was largely dominated by foreign capital and state intervention was minimal. After World War II, Egypt

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entered a period of economic crisis resulting from the decline of war time industry. As a result of the ensuing social crisis, the first rent control legislation was enacted in 1947; the new law froze rents at their 1941 level and forbade owners from evicting their tenants.

It was only in the last years of colonial domination that the Egyptian government decided to undertake a more active role in the production of social housing, with the construction of two "workers housing projects" in Helwan and Imbaba (Hanna, 1992). Another mode of direct intervention by the state involved the provision of housing units for civil servants. In fact, until the 1950’s state intervention in housing was hardly needed: an overall balance between supply and demand had been achieved both in rural and urban areas. Deficits in housing units came later, as the result of a combination of rapid urbanisation and counter­productive policies. The involvement of the Government of Egypt (GOE), in the process of public housing provision started with the 1952 revolution and the rise to power of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Nasser era was marked by an attempt to reform society while strengthening the political and economic independence of Egypt. The post ­ revolution era can be divided into three distinctive periods ­ 1952­65, 1965­75 and 1975 ­ present, which have been characterized by markedly different housing policies.

During the first period, extending from 1952 to 1965, a socialist government undertook a series of reforms aimed at achieving greater social and economic equity. This led to the redistribution of wealth and major changes in the country’s social stratification. The gap between the upper class, the aristocracy, and the rest of the population was reduced, leading to the emergence of a middle class, and of a large class of workers employed in public factories and firms. The new middle class became the backbone of the regime and its main constituency.

After 1952 a series of laws were passed at 5 year intervals to reduce and control rents of housing units constructed after 1944. The Government became heavily involved in the construction of low­cost public housing built on the outskirts of Cairo, and in cleared slum areas in the centre of the city. As a result, thousands of low cost units were financed and constructed by the Development and Housing Company, a public sector development company. In addition, the Government also built workers housing around newly established industrial centres and public housing units for the middle class. The average target of production in the five year plan of 1960­65 was 14,500 units. This level of intervention was made possible by the availability of important government funds as a result of the nationalisation policy.

During the second period, from 1965 to 1975, the production of public housing dropped to less than a third of the previous decade’s production. This, in part, resulted from a quasi­permanent state of war which forced the state to direct a large share of the national income for military purposes. As the

population continued to increase and urbanisation followed, the gap between demand and the supply, both private and public, greatly widened. In addition, a law passed in 1965 resulted in an additional reduction of 20% of the rental value of all buildings built after 1944. The main effect of this, was the grave deterioration of the rental housing stock as the maintenance costs exceeded the rents collected by the owners.

The third period started after 1975 with the rise of President Sadat to power, who engaged the country in a drastically new direction. This new direction, the infitah, is marked by a greater opening to the west and an emphasis on privatisation. At the end of the 1973 war one of the priorities was the reconstruction of the cities along the Suez canal, to which purpose a new ministry was created: the ministry of reconstruction. In terms of housing, the government announced that it would only be responsible for the construction of low income housing and that the private sector would have the primary responsibility for the provision of housing units for Egyptians. Furthermore, while the state produces rental housing only marginally, it maintains the policy of rent control with only minor modifications aimed at making the construction of rental housing more profitable. Nevertheless, the public production of mass housing did not stop; on the contrary, it increased considerably, to reach a rate of approximately 30,900 units per year, (Kardash, 1993).

In Cairo, the open door economic policy and in flux of Arab and Foreign investment participated in the sudden soar of prices inside the city centre and affected the price of land in the outskirts of the city and outside the urbanisation cordon. As money was invested in real estate speculation, land became a basic commodity and the demand on agricultural land at the city's periphery greatly increased. Due to the soaring prices of the land inside the city, the prominent real estate investors tightened their grip on land, (El Batran, 1994).

The following table shows that the public production of mass housing is continuously increasing. The rate of residential units per year increased from 39,529 in the first five years plan (1982­1987) to 77,375 in the second five years plan (1987­1992), to up 81,796 in the last two years (1992­1994).

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Table I: Residential units executed by the public and private sectors (according to the Ministry of Housing & Public Utilities, 1994)

Period Public Sector Private Sector Total First Five Years Plan 1982 / 1987

197,647 23 %

648,032 77 %

845,679 100 %

Second Five Years Plan 1987 / 1992

386,879 43 %

517,107 57 %

903,986 100 %

1992 / 1994 163,592 66 %

86,013 34 %

249,605 100 %

Total Percent

775,418 36 %

1,375,021 64 %

2,150,439 100 %

Due to the restrictions imposed by rent control laws, the majority of units built by the private sector were owner­occupied, meanwhile, the public sector stopped building for the rental market. In order to evade rent control laws and secure a return on rental units, the practice of key money appeared. Key money is an amount paid by the renter to the owner which is equivalent to the difference between regulated rents and actual costs. This practice enabled the private sector to earn enough return on rental housing to continue supplying it. In effect, rent control and key money greatly undermine social equity objectives both vertically and horizontally. In vertical terms, wealthy people benefit from rent control as much as the poor. Horizontally, two families with similar incomes will experience widely different welfare levels, depending on whether they lived in a rental unit for many years, or whether they have recently arrived and must pay key money, (Saker, 1990).

However, because of the illegal nature of key money, owners were forced to sell units rather than rent. Rental units gradually disappeared from the market and were replaced by condominiums. As a consequence, the formal private market deals almost exclusively with high middle ­ and upper ­ income groups that represent less than 15% of the urban households, (Saker, 1990).

Meanwhile, the government concentrated its efforts on the construction of new towns. Large amounts of public investment in housing were directed towards providing housing units on the desert. However, even with heavy subsidies, the housing units are not affordable by the majority of the population. The failure of public housing to reach the target groups is demonstrated in the new towns where thousands of fully built and equipped low income flats remain unoccupied for many years while the demand for affordable new housing continues to rise. The consequences of forty years of housing policy can be summarized as follows:

∙ The public housing provided in the 60's and the early 70's was unable to satisfy the needs of the low income groups in terms of quality and quantity ­

affordability was only possible when heavy public subsidies were involved.

∙ Units provided since the 70’s are not affordable to the target group and benefit groups that are economically better off. In addition, subsidized cooperative loans which are available only after obtaining a building permit, are absorbed by the middle and higher income groups.

∙ The private capital which had been pouring into the market led to a substantial increase in land prices. The continuous increase in land speculation activities within and around urban centres is an endless spiral of escalating prices which exclude the urban poor. The informal market was the only alternative affordable to urban dwellers with low or middle incomes.

∙ Rent control was conceived as a measure to reduce the cost of housing for lower income people, but has had a major effect in reducing the amount of low and middle income housing built. Under the best circumstances, a large percentage of the lower income urban population have no chance in participating in any of the formal housing programs.

1.2.2 New Towns and New Settlements Policies Policy

The new towns and new settlements policies reflect the general urban policy of the present Egyptian government, their goal is to favour the development of urbanisation in the desert rather that on agricultural lands. One of the objectives of this policy is to act as an alternative to spontaneous urbanisation by attracting the population that would have otherwise settled in informal settlements. The main difference between new towns and new settlements is that the former aim at spatial redistribution at the regional or national levels, and the latter aim at redirecting urban growth within Greater Cairo. New towns can be divided in two categories: independent new towns and satellite new towns. The former are meant to be self­ sufficient communities whereas the latter are located in the proximity of large urban centres and are only partially autonomous. New settlements serve only to

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provide housing are fully integrated into the Greater Cairo Region.

The new towns policy aimed at providing low cost housing for the segments of the population that could not afford to live in the urban centres of Cairo and Alexandria. New towns were also to play an instrumental role in the industrialisation policy of the country as most of the new industrial activity was to be located in the new communities. Map I indicated the location of the main new towns around Cairo. Between 1977 and 1982, a series of decrees established 15 new towns, among which the following received priority status.

∙ 4 are autonomous new towns:

­ Tenth of Ramadan, located 35 miles northeast of Cairo, planned for a total of half million people.

­ Sadat City, located 60 miles northwest of Cairo on the desert road to Alexandria; the city was initially planned for 1 million habitants and was to be a new industrial hub with 158 new industries. Government administrations were also relocated in Sadat city.

­ Al Amiriya al­Gadida, located 40 miles southwest from Alexandria was planned for half a million habitants.

­ Al Amal, located 40 miles east of Cairo with a target population of 250,000 residents.

∙ 4 are satellite cities:

­ 15th of May, located 20 miles south of Cairo, it was supposed to be occupied by 150,000 people, mostly workers from the nearby industrial city of Helwan.

­ 6th of October, located 20 miles west of Cairo was planned as an industrial city of 250,000 habitants.

­ Al Obour, located 20 miles northeast of Cairo's centre, was planned for a population of 240,000 habitant by the year 2004.

MAP I: NEW TOWNS IN THEGREATERCAIRO REGION (Source: CEDEJ, 1987)

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It is already apparent that most of these new towns are planned in the Cairo area and therefore follow the goal of redirecting urban growth in the national capital. So far the results obtained in the development of the new towns have been at best mixed, and in most cases neither population nor industrialisation objectives have been met. Table II shows the results in terms of housing for selected new towns in 1987.

It can be seen that the occupation ratio vary greatly from town to town but are overall quite low. Another phenomenon can be detected in this table: the development of certain towns is behind schedule such as is in Al Amiriya, where construction started in 1980 but only 192 units were built by 1988.

Table II: Situation of Housing Units in the New Towns (1988)

Place Completed Housing Units

Inhabited Units Percent

10th of Ramadan 6,323 4,922 77.8% 15th of May 12,718 10,400 81.8% Sadat City 1,431 240 16.8% Al Amiriya al­Gadida 192 27 14.1% 6th of October 5,783 832 14.4% Total 26,447 16,421 62.1%

Source: Feiler, 1990.

The objectives of the new settlements are to learn from informal settlements and emulate them on desert, and therefore public, land. They therefore rely more heavily on the concept of sites and services than the new towns, and incorporate core­housing. They also try to achieve a balance and define flexible standards providing necessary health and hygiene guarantees. The target are therefore those currently occupying spontaneous settlements: low and middle income dwellers who are excluded from the existing housing market. New Settlements are located in close proximity to Cairo and allow easy access to the city (see map II).

New settlements are to be divided into blocks of 5 to 7 parcels organized around one internal courtyard. Increases in density through vertical extensions of the building, are permitted, provided that public and semi­ public spaces, such as internal court­yards, be respected. In order to preserve the urban fabric, width of streets are limited to 6 meters for the main arterial

and 3.6 meters for secondary or access roads. When core houses are provided, they consist of a two rooms apartments (kitchen and bathroom) connected to sewer and water.

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Whereas this model of urbanisation seems a sound alternative to informal urbanisation, the implementation process led to a widening gap between the original concept and the practice. The Ministry of Housing and New Communities invoked the following reasons for diverting from the original self help scheme to a more conventional approach consisting of 4 to 6 story low income housing buildings (OUCC, 1993):

∙ The failure of previous self­help schemes such as the new community in Helwan. 1

∙ The slowness of the self­help process and the resulting unfinished physical aspect.

∙ The scarcity and resulting high cost of construction materials.

∙ The problems of administration and control of the building process, and of the respect of norms and standards.

Other not so official motives resulted from the links between the Ministry of Housing and the large public construction and public works companies which receive

MAP II: LOCATION OFCAIRO’S NEW SETTLEMENTS (Source: OUCC, 1993)

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the contracts; as well as the unwillingness of the administration to deal with small private subdividers and builders which would have unavoidably played a role in a self help scheme (OUCC, 1993).

So far, the implementation of the new settlements policy has been very slow as it faced a number of obstacle relative to the choice of sites, the status of the land, and water supply. To date, only one settlement is in its population phase which has been advanced in order to relocate the victims of the October 1992 earthquake. However the infrastructure is only partly realized and most units do not have access to running water. Other equipment such as retails, schools, recreation parks are lacking. (Jossifort, 1995).

New settlements and new towns are two sides of a same policy and ultimately pursue the same goal of redirecting urban growth where it does not threaten precious agricultural land. They address the right issues: the problem of urbanisation in Egypt is not one of scarcity of land per se, but one of the control of the housing location and development process. However, the bias of the new settlements and new towns toward owner occupied, fully built housing, means that they are beyond the reach of the urban poor.

Forty years of government policies in housing and regional planning policies years have naturally led to the emergence of informal housing as the only alternative to provide access to land and housing to the majority of Egyptians urban dwellers. While the government produced housing for the middle class, the formal private sector targeted the upper end of the market and only the informal private sector was able to respond to the remaining unmet demand. It is also clear that the contradiction in government policies, such maintaining rent control while stopping the production of rental housing, as well as the alarmist discourse of the 70's and early 80's contributed to the recent situation. Rent control led developers to neglect rental housing for more profitable ventures; and the official discourse encouraged well­to­do families to stock units to provide for the future needs their sons' families (Hanna, 1992).

1.3 Institutional Framework: Toward Policy Decentralisation?

Responding to housing needs is one of the most pressing challenge facing Egyptian cities. The shortage in low­income urban housing has reached a critical point, and is becoming increasingly worse as the government's role in providing housing is limited by the scarcity of funds. The combination of rapid urban growth, inadequate urban housing policies, scarcity of land, the huge rise of construction costs, and building material prices, has created a situation in which a large proportion of urban population are unable to afford basic shelter legally.

Therefore, central and local governments face increasingly complex problems in fulfilling some of their basic responsibilities toward their constituents. As population and Egyptian cities grow rapidly, already large deficits in infrastructure keep increasing

and the problems become more difficult to solve. The shortage of funds and staff, require a more dynamic planning process in which priorities are continuously assessed and reassessed to adapt to available resources and to the macro­economic context (UNCHS, 1989). This occurs in a context in which local services and infrastructure are promoted as means to increase social welfare, enhance productivity, increase opportunities for the labour force and allow markets to work more effectively (World Bank, 1975; World Bank, 1990). The response of the Egyptian government to rapid urbanisation has however been totally inappropriate (Stren, 1991.) In most urban centres, local services and infrastructure are provided for by the central government ineffectively and inefficiently

In this context, decentralisation is increasingly considered as a mean to increase government efficiency in responding to local problems and priorities. Rondinelli and Nelli (1986) define decentralisation as the delegation of administrative functions such as planning, management and distribution of funds from central government to the lower levels of government. Political, economic, spatial and administrative concepts of decentralisation have different meanings and implications and all governments have mixed centralized and decentralisation set­ups (Rondinelli, 1990). However, decentralisation is not a solution to all urban problems, for example, central governments can be more effective in redistributing wealth than local governments. Even proponents of decentralisation acknowledge that centralisation can result in economies of scale and optimisation of resources.

In the case of Egypt, the issues of centralisation versus decentralisation must be understood in a broader context than that of the national framework. Valson (1991, p 150) argued that "In the name of decentral­ isation, a new element of centralisation has emerged, one of depending on decisions made not only by the central government in Cairo, but also by those in USAID headquarters in Washington D.C. assistance bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the massive aid given to local development programme created some awareness among local beneficiaries regarding their problems and potential”.

The movement toward decentralisation in Egypt must also be placed within the complex framework for policy making in which numerous levels of government, different agencies and ministries have sometimes conflicting responsibilities. This has resulted in an ineffective planning process and confused responsibilities between local and central governments, with the latter retaining most of the power for policy design and implementation.

1.3.1 Institutions Involved in Urban and Regional Planning

In Egypt, while a number of agencies are concerned with urban development, few have a clear mandate; overlapping jurisdictions are furthermore common. Three ministries have important responsibilities in designing and implementing national urban

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development strategies: the Ministry of Planning, the State Ministry for the New Urban Communities and the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities. The Ministry of Planning is responsible for approving budgetary appropriations for all central ministries, public authorities and governorates, while also undertaking regional planning studies, and is responsible for reconstruction, new town development, and development of desert land. Within this Ministry the GOPP is responsible for the preparation of urban master plans for each of the major cities and for implementation of the revised master scheme for Cairo. The Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities is responsible for housing and public utilities. A January 1996 Presidential decree integrated the State Ministry for the New Urban Communities with The Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities.

In addition, there are a number of governmental agencies in charge of, the national urban development organisations including the Central Authority for Development (CAD), New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), and the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP), all of which are under the supervision of the Ministry of Reconstruction and New Communities. These national organisations play an important role in urban land management and indirectly influence the scope of land development opportunities available to the governorates. Moreover, the following agencies have the right to modify local development projects without coordination with other concerned agencies: the National Investment Bank, the international agencies, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Development, and the Ministry in Charge of Local Governments. Due to overlapping responsibilities and a lack of effective coordination between ministries and agencies incoherence abounds in the implementation of urban development projects.

1.3.2 The Planning Process in Egypt

The physical planning law of 1981 established the necessary planning framework for development by providing for mandatory preparation of master plans for cities and villages. All subdivisions, and building permit approvals in cities and urban parts of villages must be consistent with adopted master plans. Detailed plans should be prepared by local units (city/village) following the approval of master plans. The development of the master plan should be done with the assistance of the General Organisation for physical Planning (GOPP) and the governorates’ departments of housing and development.

Additional features of the 1981 Physical Planning Law include:

∙ The elimination of some specific subdivision standards and provisions for granting exemptions to these standards for specific areas and buildings which increase development affordability (Articles 65,66).

∙ A broader range of control measures and tightening of existing measures regarding:

­ subdivision advertisement;

­ inclusion of subdivision approval in contracts of sale or rent;

­ conditions in subdivision approval must be included in transfer of property to inheritors;

­ extent of subdivision may be set by the local popular council and include lands expropriated if owners do not voluntarily participate;

­ the Ministry of Development is given authority, after consultation with the governor and approval of the local popular council, to modify previously approved subdivision conditions.

∙ Restrictions may be placed upon subdivision approval by the governor, with city/village approval for up to two years and with a maximum extension for another two years. The governor may exclude parts of towns and villages from subdivision due to capacity limitations of public utilities or to control stages of development according to an approved plan.

∙ Penalties for violations have been strengthened by providing for imprisonment for five to ten years and a fine of no less than L.E.10,000 (and a minimum fine of L.E.50,000 if the violation is intentional). Fines may be collected through administrative procedures and do not require a court order.

Master planning is the primary tool to guide urban development throughout the world. It has proved, however, to be a tool of limited effectiveness particularly in the developing world. The Egyptian experience is no different. Over the past ten years, the General Organisation for Physical Planning (GOPP) prepared master­plans for many Egyptian cities, most of which have yet to be implemented. The Egyptian experience suggests that the main cause for the deficient implementing of master plans is that they greatly exceed the limited resources of the concerned cities.

The difficulties and problems encountered in implementing master­plans result from the gap between planning theory and the reality of practice. In fact, conventional planning tools are inappropriate in managing and guiding the development of urban areas. The planning gap results from the fact that planning policies are designed at the central level without giving enough consideration to the local resources and priorities (El­Batran, 1994, pp.1­3). In fact, “this centralisation has often contributed to enlarge the gap between the planning process and the executive system at the local level with conflicting chains of command, and insufficient coordination, between central and local government department”, (UNCHS, 1989, p.3)

In 1979, a new law was promulgated which reorganized the regional planning process in the country. Egypt was divided into eight economic regions each having a regional planning commission chaired by the Governor of the Governorate where the regional capital lies. The commission consists of all the regions’ Governors, the chairmen of the Local People’s Councils, the Director of the Regional

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Planning Agency (who also serves as Secretary General of the commission) and representatives of the ministers in charge of local governments. Under the law, the Regional Planning Commissions are responsible for:

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FIGURE 1. URBAN POLICY ADMINISTRATION: FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE (Source: PADCO Inc et al, 1982)

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⋅ Coordinating the Governorate plans, and determining priorities as proposed by the Regional Planning Agency.

⋅ Reviewing periodical reports.

∙ Following up the execution of the plan suggested by the Regional Planning Agency.

⋅ Evaluating the development of the region’s capability and resources, for the purpose of proposing appropriate projects.

⋅ Recruiting and training the staff.

Because they are composed of the executive members from authorities concerned with local and regional planning, the regional planning commissions have the potential to be an effective planning vehicle. However, due to the lack of experience, the scarcity of reliable information and data bases, and the weak coordination with concerned professionals, regional planning commissions have yet to become an effective tool to manage the regional planning process. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that 5 of the 8 regions have not yet developed regional plans.

Although they are not yet functioning up to the standards intended by the law, the Regional Planning Commission may play a leading role in the decentralisation process. Their good functioning requires that considerable power be given to the regional level. However, Law 50/1981 de­emphasized the formal role of these economic regions by eliminating the need for draft annual governorate budgets, and draft annual financial statements as parts of the draft regional level budgets, before final budgets are submitted to the proper central ministries. The provision of the 1979 law allowing employees of governorate directorates working within an economic region or in two or more governorates to be considered as one unit with respect to promotions and transfers was also eliminated. However, the basic provisions regarding economic regions remained unchanged, indicating more realism with regard to the pace at which regionalism can be adopted. Effective regional planning will require that all ministries adopt uniform regional boundaries which is not true at present.

1.3.3 The Nature of the Rrelation Between the Central and Local Governments

Power in Egypt is highly centralized and most large scale urban projects are carried out by central agencies. Nevertheless considerable effort has been made in recent years to devolve power to the local level. There currently exist five distinct levels of local government: governorates,urban quarters, rural districts, towns and villages. Each local unit has an executive committee and a popularly elected council. Local Executive Councils are responsible for implementing the plans and programs of the National Program; supervising the work and activities of public utilities and services; and preparing the annual plan and budget.. In practice, however, the central Government has the power to veto any decision made

by the local units that might interfere with its own policy. In addition, budgetary commitments and allocation are decided at the central level and central grants represent about 80 % of local financial resources. This evidently precludes any meaningful system of autonomy or local initiative (World Bank. 1982) In the 70s and early 80's, a series of laws were passed to define the respective powers of the various levels of government, particularly that of the Local Councils and the Governor.

Law No. 43/1979 established that governors have the right to cancel any decision of Local Popular Councils if it is found to be against the general policy of the state. This means that not all the decisions taken by the Local Popular Councils will be discussed in the Higher Council of Local Government as a result of government control.

Local Elected Councils obtained the right to interrogate the governor and all other local government executives on their work and hold them accountable. This prerogative was seriously weakened in the 1979 law and was confined to the right to draw attention to specific issues. A new law in 1981 reinstated the Local Councils' right of interrogation, but on a more restricted basis than in 1975; the law states that an absolute majority of the members is required for the interrogation of an executive head, and a two­thirds majority in the case of Governor. The Council's claim of wrongdoing is then to be submitted to the President, who can either replace the Governor or dissolve the local council.

In 1981, the Board of the Governors, headed by the Prime Minister, composed of ministers concerned with local governments and the Governors, was replaced by the Higher Council for Local Government. The new structure retains the same composition as the Board of Governors with the noteworthy addition of the chairmen of the governorates' local popular councils. The local popular council have thereby gained access to the decisions making process regarding the local matters. This however does not represent a major increase in the local council's influence over local matters and the fact is that little has changed since 1981 regarding local government organisational structure.

The Greater Cairo Region, (GCR) is good example of the difficulty and complexity of the decentralisation process in facing the consequences of rapid urbanisation. The GCR is composed of three governorates, Cairo, Giza and Qaliubiah, 15 urban quarters (12 in Cairo and three in Giza), eight rural districts, eight towns and about 300 villages. Governors are appointed by the Head of State and oversee the presidents of each of the local executive committees. Cairo Governorate, which employs a staff of some 140,000 persons, is responsible for housing, public utilities, land development, slum upgrading, conservation and many aspects of urban planning, design and project implementation.

Cairo is somewhat unusual among developing country mega­cities in that it does not have a metropolitan

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region development authority. A Higher Commission for the Planning of Cairo, whose membership consists of the three Governors of the governorates in GCR plus seven ministers, was established within the Prime FIGURE 2: SCHEMATIC ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN

POLICY MONITORING FUNCTION (SOURCE: PADCO INC. ETAL, 1982)

Minister's office but is not considered a major force in urban planning, (UNCHS, 1990).

Municipalities in GCR face many difficulties in implementing urban plans and enforcing regulations. For example, despite the fact that municipalities consider land located within city boundaries to be part of their jurisdiction, ownership conflicts between different governmental authorities help perpetuate the phenomenon of seizure (Wad Al' Ayad). In addition,

the leniency in dealing with violations of the law contributed to the ill­management of land and the creation of an imbalance in the urban: land is used for the purpose that validates the highest profitability with no consideration to problems arising from this particular use (El­Batran, 1993). This demonstrates that legislation, master­plans, and other planning tools are not capable or sufficient to deal with existing problems in Egyptian cities.

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A review of the current status of Egyptian local governments reveals that they have endured a number of problems namely: the ineffectiveness of regional planning commissions, the weakness of the regional planning agencies, the absence of communication between the authorities responsible for development, the control of the governor on the local popular councils, and the control of the ministry of land reclamation on the lands around the governorates. Despite the numerous improvements that occurred since 1960 in local government capacity, much remains to be done to achieve real decentralisation of power. In fact, what happened in Egypt under the name of decentralisation could be more appropriately be termed as deconcentration: the governors, who are the chiefs beneficiaries of the reforms, are no more than direct representatives of the central government in the country's regions.

SECTION II: INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS IN EGYPT

A wide range of terminology exist that qualify settlements occurring outside the bounds of planning and legality: unplanned, informal, spontaneous,

popular, irregular.... In Arabic, the term Ashawayat is used to refer to them, its literal meaning is "disorganized" and by extension "unplanned." This study will use essentially the term informal as it seems to best convey the idea that these settlements do not follow formal or legal procedures and escape the control of governmental authorities. Unplanned and spontaneous express well the fact that their existence is a challenge to planners's plans and to their "raison d'être", but fails to evoke that these can result from "planned" land speculation schemes essentially capitalistic in nature (El Kadi 1982 and Deboulet, 1994).

MAP III: LOCATION OF INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS INCAIRO

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2.1 Typology of Informal Settlements

Whereas several criteria can be used to differentiate between the different types of Ashawayats, land tenure appears to be the most potent criteria in explaining the different forms and manifestations of these settlements. We can therefore distinguish between settlements occurring on public land and settlements occurring on private land. The former are squatter settlements and the latter occur on legally owned land.

2.1.1 Squatter Settlements

Most squatter housing in Egypt occurs on land owned by the government. Whereas illegal occupation of governmental land has remained a marginal phenomenon, it is now rising in spite of the high level of insecurity associated with such settlements. This is a result from the increased attractiveness of publicly owned desert land located on the urban fringe and the rising costs of agricultural land.

A study conducted in 1981 on "Informal Housing in Egypt" (ABT Associates and GOHBPR, 1982) identifies several degrees of housing informality. It distinguishes between two types of squatter settlements:

A)Dwellings constructed on illegally­occupied land not included in a legal subdivision. Examples of this are temporary or permanent structures situated on public land abutting a canal or right­of­way or private land (vacant land comprising part of a building site slated for non­residential construction).

B) Dwellings constructed on illegally­occupied land included in a legal subdivision. Examples of this are temporary or permanent structures situated on private residential building lots where the land owner is absent, or on rights­of­way, or in public open spaces.

2.1.2 Informal Housing on Legally Owned Land

The large majority of informal settlements take place on private agricultural land; and have developed around existing villages or as extensions of the official city. These settlements benefit from a high security of tenure and, so far, never had to face expulsion or relocation. The above mentioned ABT/GOHBPR (1982) study distinguishes between two levels of informality in these settlements

C)Dwellings constructed on legally­owned land not included in a legal subdivision. Examples include temporary and permanent structures part of a parcel which has been subdivided and sold without either obtaining any permit nor complying to zoning regulations.

D)Dwellings constructed on legally­owned land included in a legal subdivision. These are permanent dwellings situated on private land zoned for residential use and included in a legal subdivision conforming to zoning regulations, but have been built without a building permit or without respecting building codes.

This study is concerned only with the three first types: A to C, of informal settlements which present the highest levels of irregularities and have developed outside the bounds of planning and land use regulations.

2.2 Main Characteristics of Informal Settlements

It is important to note that informal settlements are not synonymous with shantytowns or bidonvilles. The two latter refer to highly precarious housing units often made of tin sheets or other low quality material and that are highly insalubrious. In fact, shantytowns are relatively rare in Egypt, and most studies on informal settlements highlight the fact that the quality of construction of informal dwellings does not vary significantly from that of legal private or public dwellings. Slums, defined as "conditions forming part of an unhealthy quarter and therefore detrimental to health" is neither typical of, nor limited to informal settlements (UNCHS, 1993). They can be found in many poor areas of Cairo, and particularly older and decaying areas. Common characteristics among informal settlements include:

∙ The progressive and incremental construction of housing by small contractors and owners themselves.

∙ The non­compliance with standards for street width and public open space and the absence of architects. The urban features of informal developments are therefore determined by existing street patterns and buildings, topography, and natural and man­made features.

∙ The lack of facilities, basic sewerage, amenities and infrastructure which leads to a very low standard of living and to environmental deterioration.

∙ Residents of these areas belong to the poorer segments of the population and are affected by unemployment, low level of professional skills, low educational level and spreading illiteracy especially among girls and women.

There exist significant differences between settlements built on private land and those built on public desert land. Dwellings built on desert land tend to be of lower quality and rarely rise above 2 stories (compared to 3­5 for dwellings on private land); residents of informal settlements built on agricultural land represent a wider socioeconomic spectrum than on desert land who are the poorest among the poor. The latter cannot afford legally owned housing and are "willing" to take the risk of being evicted from their homes. In contrast, informal housing occurring on private land meets the needs of a larger clientele particularly that of the lower middle class which does not have access to an apartment with rent control and cannot afford the upscale end of the private sector production (El Kadi, 1982). A study carried out by the Higher Institute of Social Services (HISS, 1989) in Al Munira and Imbaba, two informal zones located on agricultural land, found that these neighbourhood are multifunctional and gather numerous service activities as well as professional workshops. We will see in the

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next section that differences in tenure status also lead to drastically different attitudes regarding state authorities.

Table III: Summary of informal settlements characteristics

Main Charac­ teristics

Desert/Collective invasion

Desert/ Subdivision

Village Core Urban Fringe

Settlement history

Occurred in the 50s: collective invasion by tribal groups or results from the eviction of a previous settlement

Since the 1980’s, settlement from several groups from a limited number of locations.

Develop prior to their incorporation into the city

Results from the extension of the city

Physical pattern

Houses are huddled together; core settlement is rapidly built and consolidated to avoid risks of eviction; space is provided for streets and common facilities

Urban fabric results from the subdivision of plots on an individual basis. Little or no space is provided for common space and streets.

Street layout and urban fabric follow field boundaries and natural or man made features (i.e., canals). Buildings built to reach at least 4 floors.

Streets are very narrow and follow field boundaries and natural or man made features

Social organisation

Strong leadership, relies on tribal/community links

Weak, no unified leadership

Original village leadership cannot always cope with new developments. New leadership emerges

Weak leadership as settlements develop rapidly and are made up of a great variety of persons. No sense of community.

Growth pattern

Growth is rapid at first, but size remains relatively restricted

Growth is rapid and settlements can be fairly large

Urbanisation slow at first, increases as village becomes more attractive to city dwellers

Growth is very rapid

Employment Little opportunity within the settlement. Socio­ economic level is low.

Little opportunity within the settlement. Socio­ economic level is low.

Different between rural and new urban population. The latter tend to be better paid and have higher levels of skills

Diverse economic base, skills and educational levels

Community services

Communities are well organized and make up for the lack of government services

Few community services unless provided by the government.

Vacant land makes the creation of community centres possible

High densities leave little space for community facilities

The 1982 study of informal housing by ABT Associates and GOHBPR distinguishes between four categories of households living in informal settlements: the nuclear family (83.3% of all households); integrated family which includes married children (6.3%); the extended family which includes relatives but no married children (7.6%); and the integrated­extended family which comprises both married children and close relative (1.8%). These figures are very similar to those of population residing in regulated housing units which have only slightly lower levels of integrated and extended families, respectively 4.8% and 6.3%. The social cohesion of the informal settlements tend to vary according to the types of settlements; it tends to be highest in squatter

settlements which resulted from a collective invasion and lowest in the fast developing peripheral settlements located on private land.

In 1986, Environmental Quality International (EQI) conducted a study on the various types of informal settlements in Egypt. It detailed the characteristics of three main types of settlements: those developing on desert or mountainous land, those that are the extension of existing villages and settlements located on the urban fringe. The first type occurs on public land and the two last on private agricultural land. The main characteristics for each settlements are summarized in table III and completed by findings

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from other studies when possible. An additional category was created to discern between desert settlements resulting from collective invasion and those from a process in which informal subdividers played a dominant role. (Deboulet, 1990 and 1994)

During the 60's and the beginning of 70's, the rate of informal growth was moderate and most of informal areas were characterized by homogeneity and strong community relations. During the last two decades a great change took place in the social structure due to the very rapid growth rate which followed the open door economic policy. The informal settlements became attractive for different categories of unrelated new settlers from different origins, leading to weak social cohesion and the lack of accepted leadership.

2.3 Informal Housing Development: Constraints and Opportunities

2.3.1 The Informal Housing Markets

In order to describe the process of informal urbanisation, it is important to distinguish between the two main types of settlements: those occurring on private land, and those on public land. Whereas the two processes are different, Deboulet (1990 and 1994) argues that they are becoming increasingly similar. It is therefore important to compare her work with that of Galila El Kadi (1982) who focused primarily on developments occurring on private land.

a) Formation of informal settlements on private land

El Kadi distinguishes three processes of urbanisation of agricultural lands based on three different actors: the owner­subdivider, the subdivider and the subdivision societies. These differences in the process also result in marked differences in the end product, i.e., the type of housing provided.

The owner­subdivider is typically a small farmer who owns a small parcel of land, usually less than an acre, subdivides his parcel and sells it while keeping a portion for himself. This process does not imply any capital investment nor does it lead to the formation of capital surplus. The owner only gets the price for the land and in some cases the rent from a room or apartment added to his own unit. This added income is however rarely sufficient to provide for livelihood and the owner, who in the process has lost his means of production, must look for a new job.

The subdivider is formerly a small land owner who sub­divides part of his land and with the added income buys new parcels for further subdivision. In this case there is a process of accumulation of capital, and the activities of the subdividers can extend to different areas of the city. The subdividers keep their overall costs low by selling the parcels, without site preparation, and relying on word of mouth to find their customers.

The subdivision society represent a step beyond the subdivider and sometimes results directly from the process described above. In 1982, El Kadi counted 39 subdivision societies in Cairo, of which 30 had at least another activity. They operate at a larger scale than the subdividers, perform some site preparation and ­ even though the subdivisions have not been approved ­ advertise through newspapers.

Of these three modes, El Kadi, found the first to be dominant mainly due to reasons of greater competitiveness. The owner­subdividers, who offer the smallest and cheapest parcels as well as the best credit conditions, constitute 80% of all the actors of spontaneous housing. On the other hand, the subdivision societies address their products to a better off clientele, mainly emigrants returning from the Gulf countries. More recent work by Deboulet (1994) confirms that popular housing production in which the owner subdivides and builds the structure remains the dominant mode of production.

b) Formation of informal settlements on public land

The informal land delivery systems on public land have been described in detail by Deboulet in her 1994 dissertation. She identified the same overall categories as El Kadi; however, she distinguishes between two markedly different ways to seize government land. Collective invasion and a more capitalistic system in which the subdivider plays an important role. She notes that the latter form is now preponderant.

Collective invasion of public land dates back to the 1940's and was the dominant mode well into the 60s. In the 1940's Bedouin or Nubian communities invaded fringe desert land in the Cairo area and divided it among themselves. In this mode of appropriation, there is no room for a subdivider as he/she would not be able to have legitimacy against a well established community.

In the 1960's, however the seizure of public land with the aim of subdividing it and selling the parcels emerged as a major phenomenon. This mode of appropriation rests on "rapport de force" between the settlers and subdividers. As described below it is often profoundly exploitative in nature. The phenomenon of the subdivider is very diverse and Deboulet was able to identify several sharply contrasted profiles of subdividers in the area of her study: Istabl'antar, a desert area in the eastern periphery of Cairo. In the early 60s two individuals, a man and a woman, seized portions of Istabl'Antar for themselves and started selling individual parcels. The legitimacy of these subdividers resides either in a "clan" or in the charismatic personality of the subdivider who is considered as a founder of settlement. In the early 80's, however a phase of massive urbanisation of the area started which was marked by the apparition of "professional subdividers." This urbanisation is made by large groups who move from area to area, and seize subdivide and sell the land. Their legitimacy is based on sheer force and number and, according residents accounts, on physical threats. The price paid for the

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parcel is assimilated to a "protection" from other potential subdividers.

What happened in Istabl' Antar is the result of a large scale land speculation scheme: large areas of public land were seized, divided, further subdivided, and finally sold without any site preparation. The incoming populations were ill prepared to face the subdividers and negotiate a favourable arrangement with them. The distinction between the two modes of development led to different urban spaces: one in which the space was divided by the community based on their needs and MAP IV: URBANISATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND INGREATERCAIRO

(Source: Greater Cairo Region Master Plan)

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which made provision for community life such as common spaces and streets; and the other in which only the attribution of individual parcels is negotiated, with little regard for community needs.

2.3.2 Major Constraints

A major constraints to the access to land is the continuous escalation of prices. The cost of land has risen from approximately 8% of the building construction cost in the 1950's to more than 100% today (Allam, 1992). The price of land for low income housing was multiplied by 23 between 1960 and 1993, i.e. from 4 L.E./sqm to 93 L.E./sqm in 1983 while the average unit building cost increased sevenfold from 12 L.E./sqm in 1960 to 91 L.E./m2 in 1983.

Due to the high rates of growth in urban land prices, the occupiers of low­income settlements are very likely to be forced to move to more peripheral sectors of the city, especially if such settlements are located close to the city centre. The original land uses of these areas would be replaced by higher types of investments to match the price of the land. This process of pushing out the poorer land uses to the outskirts has already started in Cairo in areas such as Boulak and Imbaba since the 1960s. However, the rate with which this process has developed has increased substantially since the start of the last decade.

Land speculation plays an influential role in the increase of land prices, both in free land market during the process of subdivision of land or even in the state owned plots of land which have been connected to

basic infrastructure networks (site and services schemes), as in the case of the Ismailia Site and Service Demonstration project, where the land purchased from the project agency witnessed a dramatic increase in value when it was illegally transferred to other owners. The formal land prices as purchased from the Project Agency at the outset of the project ranged from L.E. 2.00 per sq. meter to L.E. 10.00. Some years later, in 1986, it was found that land prices had increased in the range from L.E. 80.00 per sq. meter to L.E 200.00 when transferring ownership, (Metwally, 1987).

Government intervention to limit the rapid increase in the value of urban land is urgently needed. This policy will aim at restoring market balance, taking into account the main constraints affecting the quantity and price of land, in order to enable low income groups to re­enter the formal land market. Here, we stress the importance of reviewing the existing land laws so that low­income dwellers may acquire land formally, and limit the spread of informal settlements, (El Batran, 1994).

2.3.3 Major Opportunities

The dynamic growth of informal settlements in Egypt can be explained by a variety of factors:

∙ As land prices increase in the urban peripheries, selling land piece by piece, becomes increasingly attractive compared with agricultural returns. The heavy pollution resulting in decreasing productivity further compounds this phenomenon.

Table IV: Average urban land values evolution in Egypt 1960­1983 (L.E./m2)

Year Quality

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983

Moderate 4 6 12 21 47 93 Good 6 9 16 29 80 154 Distinguished 12 16 33 67 136 266

Table V: Average residential unit cost evolution, 1960­1983 (L.E./m2)

Level / Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 Moderate 12 16 24 37 61 91 Good 16 22 31 48 73 106 Distinguished 22 29 38 58 85 128

Source : CAPMAS, (Allam, 1992)

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∙ The savings accumulated by Egyptians who worked in the Gulf countries during the last decade have been invested in land and housing both for self use and in the search of high investment returns. Culturally based motives which valued the possession of a piece of land and of a house as an important form of social security and prestige largely contributed to this trend.

∙ The formal approval of land is a time­consuming, and costly process with a low probability of success when dealing with agricultural lands.

∙ The high costs associated with formal development standards, both for land subdivisions and building construction. For example, law 52/1980 limits plot coverage to 60% of the total area, compared to nearly 100% in informal settlements where only the space necessary for ventilation and light is left undeveloped. Land subdivision laws further require that 33% of the land be set aside for public uses when such spaces never exceed 15 ­ 20% in informal settlements, if present at all. The building codes (law 106/1976) impose high construction standards which increase building costs while informal builders modulate the standards according to their needs and financial constraints. (Steinberg, 1987). Finally, land use standards (Law 28/1948)provide for spatial separation of residential, commercial and industrial areas, and are not adapted to the economic structure of informal settlements where these uses are integrated.

∙ The unavailability of formal affordable housing units. Neither private nor public housing are affordable to lower income groups.

∙ A high level of security of tenure in the case of informal settlements developed on agricultural land. The National Assembly contributed to this feeling by regularly legalizing already established and partially consolidated informal settlements from 1966 onwards.

Whereas the rapid development of informal settlements does not result in the urban nightmare feared by planners and government officials, it poses a number of real problems which need to be addressed.

The most positive features of informal housing benefit the individual. From the perspective of owner builders, it provides an incentive for saving and investment, allows gradual expansion, growth, changes, is adapted to family needs and resources, and provides an opportunity to incorporate income earning support in the residential environment, such as shops, workshops, and rental units. The size of construction procedures also permit the entry of small and medium size investors and contractors into the housing market who are otherwise discriminated against by the high­capital requirement operating in the formal housing market.

From a planning perspective, informal settlements constitute a rather rational use of limited space as high density guarantee that land is used to its full potential. It is a system which adds more units to the national housing stock than all public housing efforts combined, and is occurring without any government

support. Informal housing therefore contributes to maintaining a balanced supply/demand equilibrium in the land and housing market. The range of plots, house and apartment sizes offered by the informal system, as well as location and service characteristics of the settlements, represent a much greater variety of options and prices than formal sector projects.

It is better able to meet the demand of low­income urban dwellers than government housing and to provide a greater number of options.

Despite these advantages, informal settlements are no panacea. They allow only partial access to the city for their residents, little or no space is provided for public uses such as schools and or green areas, infrastructure is nonexistent or inadequate, access to the settlements is difficult, and they are pockets of poverty and overcrowding. Informal settlements constitute obstacles to the harmonious growth of cities and can render destruction necessary. Providing infrastructure to these areas is significantly more costly than on vacant land. They are major contributors to the gradual erosion of agricultural production. Finally, they lie beyond the reach of government's control and represent thereby a threat to its sovereignty.

SECTION III: INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS AND STATE INTERVENTION

3.1 Main Causes of State Intervention

The main factor that led to an evolution in the government’s attitude toward the Ashawayats, was pressure from international donors which led to the first attempts at upgrading informal settlements (see section 3.2). Other contributing factors include structural adjustment policies, the need to regain control over large urban areas, the increased sensitisation to some of the most negative aspects of uncontrolled urbanisation, and the need to limit urbanisation on agricultural land

Since the beginning of the 1980's Egypt, as most developing countries, is going through a phase of structural adjustments of its economy characterized by a disengagement of the state, the cutting of public deficits, large scale privatisation of public sector companies and a focus on productive investments. In the context of structural adjustment the provision of infrastructure is considered as a form of productive investment which contributes to economic growth. Urban productivity was identified as priority in the World bank's New Urban Agenda for the 1990s. Deficient infrastructure is among main constraints which the World Bank perceived to be restricting the growth of productivity (Cohen, 1992). The impact of poor infrastructure is particularly felt by poor people in urban areas as it increases the cost of doing business or affects the efficiency of both public and private investment. In addition, as market logic becomes the main basis for service provision, decisions to connect areas to basic infrastructure are no longer contingent upon specific policy objectives but rather on the ability of the concerned populations to pay for the service.

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The increased sensitisation of government authorities to the needs of residents of informal settlements can also be traced to its willingness to regain control over large areas the country's cities, especially in Cairo. In the absence of any government intervention informal communities have organized themselves for the provision of the most basic services such as health care, water, mosques...This effort has been led by organisations with a strong religious affiliation: in Istabl'Antar for example, such an organisation was created from a mosque which offers classes and social services to the areas' inhabitants (Deboulet, 1994). While these associations do not necessarily pursue any political objectives, they are a fertile ground for the dissemination of ideology and the recruitment of new converts for the fundamentalist movement. This a clear challenge to the government’s authority that it could not tolerate much longer. In December 1992, 18,000 security agents raided Imbaba, an informal area north­west of Cairo, in search of fundamentalists (Denis, 1994). This indicated without ambiguity that the government intended to reassert its sovereignty over informal areas. However, it was also clear that exerting political control without meeting the population’s basic needs would prove illusory. As a result, in his 1993 May 1st, speech, President Mubarak stressed the importance for the country's stability to upgrade all informal areas in Egypt.

The raid in Imbaba, along with a few well publicized catastrophes involving informal settlements, have helped reviving the debate on the role and responsibility of the government toward these areas. For instance, the 1994 catastrophe in Durunka, Upper Egypt, which resulted in 500 hundred deaths and hundreds of displaced persons, served to dramatize the challenges posed by uncontrolled urbanisation. The victims of this catastrophe were the inhabitants of an informal settlement that had developed in close proximity to an oil depot and was located on land prone to flash flooding. During the night of November 2, 1994, heavy rains caused a series of accidents which led to the explosion of the oil depot. The burning oil was carried by flood water and reached the settlement while residents were sleeping. This tragedy was a direct result of the inability of the government to control urbanisation, even when the most basic safety rules are at stake. The press largely blamed the informal settlers for the accident but did not fail to reveal the government's responsibility, noting that the concerned settlement had been connected with water and electricity (Ayed, 1995).

Finally, the need to protect agricultural land from rapid urbanisation has long been an obstacle to the regularisation of informal settlements as it was perceived as condoning a practice detrimental to agricultural production. It is estimated that 12 to 16,000 hectares of agricultural land are sacrificed to urbanisation every year. This means that by the year 2000, 9.5% of agricultural land will have been converted to urban land (Deboulet, 1994). It is however becoming increasingly clear that ignoring this phenomenon only contributes to strengthening it,

and amounts to renouncing any commitment to exert control over urbanisation patterns.

3.2 Evolution of the legal framework for upgrading and regularisation

Whereas the recognition of the significance of the urban challenge posed by informal areas is recent, attempts at regulating and regularizing them date back to the 1960's. Since 1960, an impressive body of laws, decrees and regulations has been enacted covering every aspect of urban development from master planning and land subdivision to building codes and standards of infrastructure. However, despite wide powers to remove violations and impose sanctions on violators, local authorities have been largely impotent in the face of widespread disregard of planning and building regulations.

However, it is not until 1980 that the regularisation of informal land development, in Egypt, was identified as an official policy which should go beyond periodic and highly controversial blanket regularisation of past violations. Regularisation laws have legalized subdivisions and structures that violated codes and have granted municipalities discretionary power to service these areas while specifically prohibiting future violations (Serageldin, 1991). The first legalisation of informal settlements located on agricultural land took place in 1956 and was followed by similar acts in 1966, 1981 and 1984. These acts have greatly contributed to increase the feeling of security of informal settlers residing on private land but did not address the more serious tenure issues faced by squatters. Furthermore, since the underlying causes fostering informal land development had not been addressed, it was necessary to issue laws at regular intervals to legalize continuing informal land development.

In the late 70’s and early 80’s, a series of laws and decrees were passed aiming at creating a framework for the regularisation and upgrading of informal land. A first step was taken in 1976 with the adoption of a law authorizing governorates to sell public land to public companies and private developers. The same year, a presidential decree was promulgated which authorized the sale of government land to illegal occupants upon payment of the full market value prevailing at the time of the transaction. In 1981 a law was passed which gave the governorates the main responsibility for the upgrading of informal settlements. Finally, in 1984, a law provided a framework for allowing the settlers to regularize their situation by buying back their parcel. The implementation of this legislation suffered due to great discrepancies between and among governorates. This evolution is in part the result of upgrading projects sponsored by USAID and the World Bank in Cairo in 1978. These projects raised the issue of tenure regularisation in squatter zones along the desert’s edge and on illegally subdivided agricultural land. The institutionalisation of legal procedures to regularize tenure in upgrading sites was therefore required for these projects.

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The 1976 law for the sale of public land proved difficult to implement due to the conflict of ownership between ministries, and Defense Ministry reluctance to forego land it considers strategic. In 1984, Cairo governorate identified 30,000 ha. of vacant desert land, one third of which were the sites of military installations. Only one third were devoid of conflicts of ownership. (Simms quoted by Deboulet, 1994). As a result of the lack of cooperation and conflicts between ministries, large amounts of urbanizable land remain frozen, leaving squatting as the only mode of access to land for urban dwellers who can afford neither formal housing nor informal housing located on private land. Serageldin, (1991) has noted that Law 135/1981 was the first to mention procedures for the regularisation of informal developments in Egypt. It mandated governorate authorities to prepare upgrading plans for settlements located within their administrative boundaries, but did not specifically address issues related to land tenure. Following enactment of the law, local authorities turned to the national legislature for the definition of the rules governing the transfer of state land to their occupants. As a result, the main effect of Law 135/1981 was essentially to put on hold any decisions regarding the demolition, destruction, or adjustments of buildings erected prior to 1981 for a period of 5 years. Penalties under the law where also put on hold.

Law 31/1984 empowered governorates to dispose of land through negotiated sales on the condition that the recipient would utilize and develop the land in accordance with the terms specified in the sales agreement. A year later, executive regulations to implement law 31 had still not been issued, although governorates felt pressured to develop interim regulations to outline procedures for filing requests to purchase land plots, paying fees to cover survey costs, and depositing a down payment related to the size of the parcel pending appraisal of the property.

Executive regulations were finally issued in 1985 the ministerial decree referred to procedures for the transfer of wastelands to occupants who had brought the land into use prior to the enactment of Law 31 and allowed governorates to define their own operational protocol implement the law. The decentralisation of responsibilities entailed a sequence of incremental adjustments in the central/ local interface. National laws have increasingly been enacted in the form of enabling legislation, which sets a framework of broad powers and areas of responsibility. Local authorities have been given wide discretion to formulate land policy and disposal strategies and define the rules, regulations, and procedures governing transactions, including the regularisation of informal tenure, (Serageldin, 1991).

As a result, the law's implementation suffered great discrepancies from governorates to governorates. It was successfully implemented in Alexandria, Ismailia and Aswan but faced greater difficulties in Cairo (Deboulet, 1994). In the latter city, a deliberation was issued by a special committee after one year, its recommendations were adopted by local councils in

Cairo and a decree was issued by the governor in 1986 that spelled out the policies and procedures for the regularisation of land titles. By the end of 1987, fewer than 30,000 requests had been filed, representing about 5 percent of the estimated number of eligible illegal occupants in the governorate. No more than 750 had actually made the required down payment. In Helwan, an industrial suburb southeast of Cairo, the price of land was set between L.E. 100 and 120 and then reduced to L.E. 80­100. This price, corres­ ponding to the market level was too high for the settlers and few were in a position to take advantage of this opportunity to increase their security of tenure. In Aswan and Ismailia, on the other hand, low land prices negotiated with the inhabitants, combined with attractive payment conditions, resulted in high rates of application for land regularisation. In Ismailia, the program included cross­subsidizing scheme giving a more favourable price for dwellers already installed in the settlement. (Deboulet, 1994).

3.3 Forms of Settlement Upgrading

3.3.1 Early attempts at regularizing and upgrading Informal settlements

In the late 1970s, the Egyptian government was interested to renew slum areas in the Old Districts of Cairo city. A general strategy was established for replanning these Old Districts to improve the living conditions of the urban poor. A decree by the minister of Housing, Reconstruction, and Public Utilities in 1977 issued to form a committee concerning renewal and replanning of these old districts of Cairo. The study involved the physical survey of old deterioration of districts in different areas in Cairo. There was found on obvious low standard of building quality. Lack of infrastructure and urban services due to informal housing arrangements together with high population density and general low standard of living.

The GOE first enacted strategic policies to renew slum areas in the old districts of Cairo in 1978. To achieve the goals set in this strategy, the replanning policies recommended the clearance of selected areas, “Eshash El­Torgoman” and “Arab El­Mohamedy”, and the relocation of their inhabitants. The program intended to relocate inhabitants who lived in “Eshash El­ Torgoman” and “Arab E­Mohamedy” to three new areas on the periphery of Cairo, “El­Zawia El­Hamra”, “Ain Shams”, and “Madinat El­Salam”. These correspond to three public housing projects which had been designed by the Ministry of New Communities, Housing and Public Utilities, in 1978, in order to relocate people who illegally occupied state lands in two areas needed for investment at the national levels, and particularly the state lands are located in the Central Business District, (CBD), of Cairo. Moreover, the Egyptian experience in clearance and rehousing approach is still limited, and its actual application has not exceeded the experience of Eshash El­Torgoman and Arab El­Mohamedy in Cairo city, (El­Batran & El­Shahed, 1995).

In the late 1970's, the World Bank and USAID initiated the first attempts at upgrading informal

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settlements in Egypt, the former institution initiated the Egyptian Urban Development project in 1977 and the latter the Community Upgrading for low­income Egyptians project. These projects were the first attempts to introduce the concepts defined by John Turner (1976) stressing the positive aspects of informal housing and the value of self­help. They combined the upgrading of existing settlements with the provision of serviced plots and/or core housing. This represented a drastic shift in governmental housing policy which had so far focused on the supply of finished high standards housing units mostly to middle income groups. It consequently met with great resistance from government officials who resented the reduction of the government's role as well as the length of the self­help process and the unattractive (i.e., unfinished) aspect of sites and services settlements. A major concern of government authorities was that upgrading informal settlements would be actually condoning an illegal act and would encourage the development of more informal areas. Moreover, the lower standards implied by site and services schemes were assimilated to creating slum areas with government consent. Four major projects initiated under the leadership of foreign/multilateral agencies are summarized in Table VI on the next page.

These four projects met with various levels of success. Where the participation of local population and government was actively sought they greatly contributed to the integration of residents into the urban network by providing basic infrastructure and social services, and regularizing land tenure. Where a reluctant central government was the main project overseer (Mansheyet Nasser) they achieved at best the provision of infrastructure. Indeed, one of the major weakness of the projects was that they represented a top down approach and that the local stakeholders were at best involved in the implementation, but not in the design of the projects. For the local population in desert areas, obtaining land title was a prerequisite to improving their living environment and even to the installation of basic infrastructures. This issue was the main conflict between government and local populations and caused delays or even failures to complete these projects.

Overall, upgrading and site and services projects conducted in the 80's failed to reach their main objective: to fundamentally alter Egypt's housing policy. The Egyptian government did not replicate the approach at the national level and resumed its policy of building finished housing units, particularly in the New Towns. In the late 80s a team of French planners belonging to IAURIF and working with the GOPP, proposed the creation of new settlements to meet the housing needs of the lowest socio­economic segments of Cairo. Their original approach, which was based on sites and services, was quickly abandoned for a more traditional approach including modern housing units (Jossifort, 1995). This was compounded by the fact that sites and services schemes had for the most part failed to meet the needs of the poorest households due to stringent payment conditions (Soliman, 1988). Furthermore, reaching

the poor and achieving cost recovery proved to be two irreconcilable objectives and often neither goal could be reached. In Ismailia, the combination of well below­market land prices with the high cost of services meant that the poorest households could not afford the improvements and had to sell their land and move elsewhere (Soliman, 1988). The resale of plots was also often performed to pocket the difference between subsidized land cost and its market value which rose as a result of the upgrading project (see box 1).

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It is only in 1993 that a systematic approach to the upgrading of informal settlements was initiated. It was formally launched in President Mubarak in May 1993 Labour Day speech, when he announced the beginning of the intensification of national effort for the upgrading of informal settlements all over Egypt. This shift in attitude toward informal settlements is largely the result of a shift in the overall approach of the government toward the provision of housing. As it is retreating from its role as a housing provider it can no longer ignore the fact that the informal sector is contributing close to 80% of all new housing units. The provision of infrastructure and the regularisation of the status of existing settlements remain its two main instruments to retain some control over urbanisation. The government has therefore abandoned its role as a regulator and as a planner in the commonly understood sense of the terms.

3.3.2 Upgrading through the provision of infrastructure

The first large­scale effort to improve infrastructure in Egypt and particularly in urban centres, started in 1981 when the Decade of Potable Water and Sanitation was declared. This effort at improving the country's infrastructure was spearheaded by USAID which, until now, sets aside nearly 25% of its development aid to Egypt for this particular sector (Deboulet, 1994). The overriding guiding principle for these projects is that: whoever can pay should have access to water. Projects are based on the principle of full cost­recovery and costs can vary greatly according to one's location and size of the dwelling: the further one lives from the house connected to water, and the smaller the building, the higher the price. This results from the fact that the price of the connection is based on its cost per meter. (Deboulet, 1994).

A direct consequence of this market­based approach to infrastructure provision is that the legality of settlements and overall planning objectives and regulations are put aside. As such squatter settlements will ultimately be connected to water, provided that their residents can pay the high costs involved for connecting settlements located at a distance from all existing infrastructure. This does not mean,. however that government attitude toward informal settlements has become indifferent to land status and that settlements resulting from the invasion of public land are treated on an equal basis.

In early 1981, for example, Cairo governorate issued a decree allowing access to water and sanitation for informal settlements. However, Deboulet (1994) notes that settlements located on public land were not included in the infrastructure layout. She further asserts that even when water connection is provided on a market basis, the government uses access to sewer to exert pressures on squatters. As sewer is provided on a non­market basis it retains all latitude to connect or not certain areas.

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Box 1: Ismailia: the failure of site and services and upgrading projects to serve the target group

In the late 1970's, Ismailia governorate initiated a program to upgrade informal settlements using the concept of Aided­Self Help in "El­ Haker" presently known as "Hai El­Salam", one of the largest informal settlements north of Ismailia city. The main objective of the upgrading and development projects was to help the very low­income residents of informal settlements. As part of a cross­subsidisation scheme higher incomes individuals were given the opportunity to acquire parcels. The project was two pronged: upgrading in the settlements' old area and sites and services in a new area. The government's role was limited to providing the appropriate infrastructure meeting the demand of the beneficiaries.

In 1985, a survey of the population indicated that the number of habitants (70,000) had largely exceeded projections for that year; and that the area encompassed a great variety of social groups. (GOHBPR, 1985). The study further noted the increase of commercial activities in the area. The most drastic change occurred in the new area where housing standards had improved, indicating that the purchasing power of present inhabitants was much greater than before the upgrading process. One of two things had happened: either the poor who had acquired most of the land had greatly increased their income, or the people living in the new Hai El­Salam are not the same who officially bought the land. In fact, official estimates indicate that 75% from the land sold was purchased by second buyers in an informal manner. The poor who managed to obtain money for building from relatives working in Arab countries, were able to stay while those who did not succeed sold their right to purchase the land and cashed the difference between the actual and subsidized price of land (Metwalley, 1993). The latter moved to reside in other area matching their income, i.e., new informal settlements.

In short, the project was successful in transforming an area from a settlement where only the poor would live to an area modern enough to attract high and middle income groups. In the end this means that the poor were excluded from the benefits of the project

A number of reasons explain the failure of the project to serve the targeted groups. First the prevailing concept was that the new project should not end up as a similar informal project. Inhabitants were directed to build with higher construction specifications using skeleton structures instead than bearing walls type. The subsidies provided by a number of bodies encouraged a higher building standards anticipation in price increase. Second important changes occurred in the layout of the sites and services section. The original plan was to allot the plot of lands overlooking the main streets to middle income group at market prices. Meanwhile, narrower subsidiary streets were allotted for the poor. The design included a number of spaces for common use. However, the inhabitants pressured project officials to cancel the narrow streets and common urban spaces, and to have modern streets instead. This led to:

⋅An increase in land prices beyond low income families financial abilities.

⋅Increases in land prices created a black market for selling and purchasing the land. The price of square meter ranged from EL 2.5 to EL 10 by the Project Agency in 1985. A majority of low­income dwellers sold their land despite the prohibition of such transaction.

⋅Increases in rent values. It is worth noting that the rent of the housing unit in average L.E. 10 for 3 rooms in the old area has become L.E. 120­150 in addition to a key money amounting to L.E. 5000.

Source: El­Batran, (1994), ” Transforming the Role of Private Sector in Managing and Developing of Urban Land for the Poor, with special reference to Ismailia, Egypt”. 2nd Symposium Housing for the Urban Poor, International Convention Centre, Birmingham, U.K.

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In the field of local administration, an important development took place as result of specific funds from USAID to the Egyptian government as part of the American agency’s decentralisation support programme. For instance, sums of US $ 455.2 millions, and approximately 125,000 Egyptian pounds were allocated to sectors being decentralized between the years 1981 and 1986. It is significant that these sums were allocated for local infrastructure projects and were to be spent mainly by the local bureaucracies., The main aim of the USAID grants was therefore to decentralize policies and the provision of infrastructure to the local level. As was the case in the Helwan project, however, popular participation in decision­making and project development exists mainly in theory and has yet to be practised during project implementation. (Gardner & Van Huyck, 1990)

In the meantime, and as mentioned earlier, President Mubarak initiated, in his 1993 labour day speech, a massive programme for upgrading of informal settlements all over Egypt. This program was seen as a social response to the spread of fundamentalist religious ideology in informal settlements and

accompanied the intensification of the repression against terrorism (Shoubra Council Report, 1994). A national plan was established for upgrading these informal settlements to improve the living conditions of the urban poor. The upgrading policies recommended the provision of infrastructure and urban services for all informal settlements.

During the period May ­ June 1993, 106 millions L.E was allocated for upgrading programme; the budget was allocated mainly for infrastructure provision such as; electricity, water supply, sewerage, street pavement, paving rivers and canals banks, trees planting and landscaping. The most significant amounts were allocated for electricity, and special consideration was given street width, lighting and pavement in informal settlements mainly as security measures meant ensure easier control over the concerned areas. However, policy implementation does not leave any scope for community participation in decision making nor does it include tenurial security, except when required to justify investment for public budget, (Shoura Council Report, 1994).

Table VII: Urban population in the governorate selected for upgrading (Source: Ministry of Local Administration, Egypt, 1993)

Governate Informal Settlements Total Urban % Informal Area Population Density Pop. No Population Area Pop. to Urban Area Population 1000/KM2

Cairo 79 2,437,988 6,774,000 35.9% 79 Giza 32 1,398,000 2,332,000 62.0% 31 Qualiubiah 60 686,350 1,494,071 46.0% 34 Alexandria 40 1,162,750 3,284,668 34.0% 33 Fayoum 28 99,853 425,400 23.5% 22 Beny Suef 46 144,660 548,225 31.0% 15 Menya 30 273,000 558,366 49.0% 36 Assyout 49 401,000 1,590,451 25.0% 65 Sohag 34 381,180 675,983 56.4% 125 Quena 8 22,700 72,311 31.4% 39 Total 434

Table VIII: Budget for settlement upgrading by governorate 2 (Source: Ministry of Local Administration, Egypt, 1993

Governorate Budget in L.E 1,000 Percentage Cairo 79,800 22% Giza 41,078 11% Qalyubiah 37,500 10% Alexandria 28,960 8% Beni­Suef 12,827 4% Menia 16,700 5% Fayoum 32,400 9%

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Assiut 38,000 11% Suhag 32,654 9% Qena 39,131 11% Total 359,050 100%

Table IX: Projected clearance of inner­city areas in Cairo and Giza Source: Ministry of Local Administration, Egypt, 1993

City Informal Settlements Total area(km2) Average Density No. Population (Person/km2)

Cairo A B

1267

112,987 2,080,600

0.464 27.298

243,626 76,217

Giza AB

428

77,000 1,321,000

0.16 43.9

481,250 30,091

­ A: Clearance ­ B: Upgrading ­ Residential densities’ average in Cairo Governorate is 4313­person/ km2. ­ Residential densities’ average in Giza Governorate is 4927­person/ km2.

Because of political priorities the program was only implemented in ten governorates, (Table VIII) where it was most urgent to regain political control. Out of a total number of 904 informal settlements, 434 were selected for the implementation of the first stage of this national programme. Governmental budget for upgrading programme for the year 1993­1994 was increased up to 401 millions L.E., and it is expected to reach more than 600 million L.E., (Cabinet Information Centre, 1994). Clearance was recommended for 25 deteriorating inner city areas located in Greater Cairo and Alexandria. This program is financed in its entirety by the Egyptian Government without provision for cost recovery and implementation is carried out by local

Map V: Boundaries of Greater Cairo Region

authorities.

It is clear from Table VIII that the Greater Cairo Region is benefiting from the bulk of this effort as Cairo, Giza, and Qalyubiah receive 43% of this investment. This is justified by the fact that Greater Cairo contains over 63% of the informal settlement population of the 10 governorates and Giza has the highest proportion of informal population in the country. Accordingly, the first national plan for 1993­ 2000 recommended the upgrading of 171 areas in the Greater Cairo Region. Included in this figure are 16 squatter areas located on valuable state which will be cleared.

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3.3.3 Rehabilitation and upgrading in El Munira and Shubra El Kheima

Whereas most of the recent effort at upgrading informal settlements focuses heavily on the provision of infrastructure, projects developed recently in Giza and Qalyubiah, two governorates which are part Greater Cairo, adopt a more integrated approach and offer alternatives to current practices. The proposals jointly developed by the GOPP and IAURIF represent a significant evolution both as it relates to informal settlements and more generally in their planning approaches to the Greater Cairo Region. This approach combines the upgrading of informal settlements with the planned developments in desert areas, which are "reserved" for middle income populations. (Denis, 1995). It also represents the recognition of the fact the city is developing outside of traditional planning. Considering that Giza is over 60% informal, this is a welcome news. Two main projects were proposed by the IAURIF: Shubra El Kheima in Qalyubiah and El Munira in Giza.

Shubra El Kheima is a largely informal settlement which is located on agricultural land north of Cairo.

Its population grew from 410,000 inhabitants in 1971 to 1,330,000 in 1995 (GOPP­IAURI1F 1995 estimate). In the meantime, the area covered by agricultural land was divided by two, from 1,550 to 800 hectares. Growth was spurred by the industrialisation of the area, the presence of a railway station and the Ismailia canal. Despite its informal nature, a number of facilities are available, albeit in insufficient numbers, in the area, including a university, a research centre, hospitals markets and schools. The GOPP and IAURIF identified a variety of problems and needs in the area: difficult access by road and public transportation, insufficient social infrastructure and public facilities as well as continuing encroachment on arable land. Three main objectives were identified for the upgrading of the area: 1) limit encroachment upon arable land; 2) improve transportation conditions and 3) increase the self sufficiency of the area. The first objective is to be achieved by limiting urbanisation to the southern section of the new ring road; the second by improving the road network and public trans­ portation; and the third objective will be met by creating city centres, public facilities, open spaces and strengthening the employment base.

MAPVI: EXISTING LAND USE INELMUNIRA (Source: GOPP­IAURIF 1995)

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FIGURE 3: PROPOSED POLICIES ACCORDING TO LAND USE (Source: GOPP­IAURIF 1995)

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El Munira is a mostly informal area located north­west of Cairo on agricultural land which dates back to the 1950's. The period from 1957 to 1966 witnessed a growth of over 16% per year of the built area corresponding to 10 hectares per year. The expansion has now slowed down with a rate of 2.14% between 1989 and 1993, corresponding to the urbanisation of 7.5 hectares annually (GOPP­IAURIF, 1995). Densities in El Munira vary according to the duration of urbanisation; older areas have densities of 1000­ 15000 persons per hectares, more recent areas have densities of 500 to 1000 persons per hectare and the peripheral areas which are still under construction have much lower densities. The settlement suffers from the chronic inadequacy of most urban services: main utilities are implemented on an ex post basis and large areas remain unserved; public facilities, particularly schools and hospitals are lacking and only 29% of children go to school (HISS, 1989 quoted by GOPP­IAURIF 1995).

The strategy proposed by GOPP and IAURIF is differentiated according to the various degrees of density observed in the settlement. For the old and dense areas it proposes a long term policy combining the strict enforcement of land use regulations to avoid further densification of the area and the upgrading of the area including housing rehabilitation and demolition when necessary and the widening of existing roads (which implies some level of demolition). For areas with medium densities a two pronged strategy is proposed: strict enforcement of land use regulations to avoid further densification and use of vacant areas for the provision of social facilities. In the case of low density areas the plan proposes to provide necessary road infrastructure and to set aside large areas of vacant land for main public facilities for all the inhabitants of El Munira. Finally, an important opportunity presents itself as the nearby airport provides a 42 ha. area which is likely to be available in a not so distant future.

It is certainly too early to assess projects which have not yet been implemented but a few remarks can made about the two above proposals. Their main objectives are to integrate into the urban network settlements which have developed in an ad hoc fashion over the last 40 years. For this purpose they propose to remedy the most undesirable consequences of this planning deficiency, mainly the physical segregation of these areas and the lack of infrastructure, to limit further densification, and to take advantage of present opportunities. Transformation of these areas is possible at this stage since the areas are not entirely built up. It is however urgent to act immediately before the area becomes too densely built and action is impossible or very costly. In itself, this an important shift in the role of the planner who acknowledges that the city is being built and whose objective is limited to accompanying this growth so as to limit its negative consequences. As such, these projects represent a difficult balancing act between the acceptation of popular city buildings and the reassertion of planning principles and land use regulations.

The success of these projects is contingent on two factors: first, the ability of the government to enforce land use regulations and, second, its capacity to act swiftly, before the area is entirely built up. On both accounts, its track record is rather dismal. Finally, even though the projects sanction a new and more humble conception of the planner's role, it is still essentially based on traditional physical planning and top­down approaches: roads, district boundaries, social infrastructures are proposed based solely on the existing urban fabrics and communication networks. No in­depth social studies have been conducted to assess the social and economic fabric of the areas and no provision is made in the plan for any participatory processes. There is clearly a need to be more modest about what one can learn from a map.

CONCLUSION

Informal growth of urban settlements have become a phenomenon characteristic of developing countries where planning and law implementation are deficient and governmental agencies are unequipped to deal with rapid urbanisation. The purpose of this study is to resituate the phenomenon of informal settlements within its broader policy and institutional context, in order to begin determining its nature, its influence in shaping cities, and its impact on planning practices and land management. Special attention was therefore given to the causes and forms of informal housing and to the government's responses.

We have attempted to demonstrate that the rapid growth of informal settlements is a direct consequence of high rates of urban growth and rural­urban migration, but its magnitude is also the direct result of failed approaches to housing and spatial planning policies.

Over the past forty years the government of Egypt has strived to modernize and industrialize the country in order to attain greater productivity for the economy and to improve the quality of life for the urban poor. Therefore, since the mid 1970s the Egyptian government has initiated policies designed to address the problems resulting from the spread of informal settlements. In retrospect, however, one has to recognize that little was done for the urban poor who inhabit these settlements (El Batran, 1992; p57). Housing policies and urban planning practices have evolved from a state controlled and centralized approach to greater decentralisation and reliance on private market forces. National planning policies aimed at redirecting urban growth to the desert and at providing housing for the urban poor. These policies have largely failed in reaching their objectives: uncontrolled urbanisation on private land continues, and the surest means of access to land and housing for the poorest of the urban poor are squatter settlements. Three main reasons can be cited for this failure.

Firstly, rent control legislation is the main cause for the limited supply of rental housing units and the advanced state of deterioration of the housing stock in

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many parts of Egyptian cities. Investors have been reluctant to build and provide houses for rent.

Secondly, of the Egyptian government have focused on the supply of low­cost and subsidized housing units which never seemed to be low­cost or subsidized enough for the poor to acquire. As a consequence, developers are now proposing developments located in new settlements which are geared to the upper middle income categories of the population (Jossifort, 1995). It becomes increasingly accepted that new towns and new settlements will address the needs of segments of the population which are relatively well off and can afford to buy a finished housing unit.

The third reason an offspring of the two first: the withdrawal of the government from the rental market in favour of owner occupied units resulted in the disappearance of this market. Whereas poor households maybe able to afford a subsidized rent, they cannot buy a subsidized flat, especially when high down payments are required. As the formal private market was scared away from the rental market by stringent rent control laws it has become impossible to find rental units in the formal market. The informal housing market on private land appeared to fill this gap and meet the poor’s needs.

It is therefore not quite accurate to say that the Egyptian government has disengaged itself from the provision of housing, rather it could be argued that it has withdrawn from the provision of housing to the poor. Implicitly, it is a recognition that the poor has to use their own resources to provide a shelter for themselves and their families. As the land that was meant to meet the urban poor's shelter needs is beyond their reach, self help processes are bound to happen outside of the planning and legal framework. As a result, government policy options become limited to post facto actions focusing on the supply of basic services and infrastructure. This implies a recognition of informal settlements and of their role in pursuing national housing objectives.

An additional cause for informal settlement development results from the fact that almost no subdivision approvals have been granted over the last 20 years in most Egyptian cities. In the absence of planning, city officials have been unable to make decisions about the location of specific developments. The absence of such planning has also meant that few efforts have been made to control new subdivisions, either those of formal development or those constructed for housing cooperatives. What little controlled development has been done has largely been in Cairo and Alexandria areas through the public sector housing and development. The most important component of an attractive system of land development controls and the ordering of future urban development is an effective housing location policy.

In order to improve local government's ability to control urbanisation patterns and enforce regulations it is imperative that master plans be designed to match local resources, realities and the existing housing development process. In addition, the allocation of

serviced urban land for housing should be controlled by a land development agency.

Government interventions for the upgrading and regularisation of informal settlements followed three different approaches. The first approach was carried out in the late 1970's in cooperation with ODA the World Bank, USAID, and GTZ. It combined the upgrading of informal settlements and the provision of sites and services in order to limit the rapid growth of these settlements. This approach was implemented in several parts of Egypt, including Ismailia, Cairo, and Aswan. In 1981, the USAID sponsored Helwan project led to the first law concerning the regularisation of informal settlements in Egypt. The second approach was initiated in 1978, as a result of the recommendations of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) master plan, according to which, a general strategy was formulated for the renewal of old slum areas located in Cairo's Central Business District (CBD). Renewal was achieved by means of clearance and relocation of illegal settlers residing on state land. Finally, the third approach, initiated in 1992, as a result of the fundamentalist crisis, represents a shift from clearance to upgrading approach. The Egyptian government instigated a nationwide upgrading program which was in fact implemented only in ten governorates, where it was most urgent to reassert state sovereignty.

The first national plan for 1993­2000 recommended the upgrading of 434 informal settlements. However, included in this figure are 25 inner city areas, all located on valuable state land needed for investment. The government has, therefore, adopted two distinct approaches to deal with the problem of informal settlements in Egypt: clearance for state land and upgrading for private land. However, as a result of political and social pressures, not a single area has been cleared to date. By contrast, the provision of infrastructure to informal settlements is well on its way in all governorates

To summarize, the government of Egypt has adopted three distinct and often contradictory approaches to deal with the problem of informal settlements in Egypt:

1. regularisation of informal settlements/state land and upgrading for state land;

2. clearance for state land and relocate the inhabitants on state land suited on the outskirts of Cairo;

3. upgrading for private land, and clearance for state land.

The government's focus on infrastructure provision means that the root causes of the development of informal settlements have yet to be adequately addressed. Despite the existence of vast public land reserves, often located in attractive locations at the periphery of cities, the Egyptian government has not been able to provide land for housing the urban poor. Conflicts of property and contradictory claims between

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various ministries have resulted in the de­facto freezing of these lands. The Defense Ministry’s reluctance in giving away land it considers strategic and its habit of installing facilities wherever it pleases are good examples of this trend (Deboulet, 1994).

One is hard pressed to find coherence in the Egyptian policy toward informal settlements: infrastructure is provided on a market basis in some places and freely in others, settlements located in areas posing a threat to their residents are connected to water and sewer, de facto recognition is rarely followed by de­jure recognition by granting land titles; and official attitude is more complaisant with settlements located on agricultural land, where they poses a real threat to food security, than on desert land when urbanisation of the desert is considered a national priority.

Contradictions in policies toward informal settlements and housing for the poor find their roots in the administrative structure and the decision making processes of the government.

Between 1975 and 1982, the Egyptian executive authority was transferred from central ministries to units of local government. Policy guidelines, development standards, capital investment programmes, and operational budgets continued to be the responsibility of central ministries. Programme implementation and construction, operation and maintenance were delegated to the governorates through hierarchies headed by undersecretaries attached to the central level but working for and in the governorates. It has been argued that without direct links and coordinating mechanisms between decision makers at the central and local levels, it is impossible to implement land policy. In addition to the regular responsibilities of municipal authorities regarding the delineation of public rights of way, the enforcement of building codes and subdivision regulations, and the provision of community service, the extensive functions in the field of land management and development were delegated to municipal authorities as well. Legally, the governorates were empowered to manage and dispose of state lands within their jurisdiction.

However, in spite of the various reforms, a fundamental reality of housing policies in Egypt is that they are not determined by technical planner on the basis of actual needs but by elite politicians who have control over urban development programs for the urban poor. Policy decisions are influenced by the nature of the state, its core constituency, and its social and economic objectives. In case of conflict between general social objectives and the interest of key constituencies decisions and policies almost always favour the elite over the poor. This is why, in the absence of high level government support, urban development plans, no matter how well designed, have little chance of being carried out successfully.

The debate around decentralisation must be understood in the Egyptian context which is marked by a bureaucracy which serves the interest of the elite and a political atmosphere characterized by the

existence of groups pursuing the radical transformation of the state, often by violent means. Centralisation is therefore an essential tool to ensure political stability and pursue the housing and urban development process. The decision to decentralize is a political decision and its actual implementation and unless it is backed by strong political will, it will exist only in theory.

Decentralisation is not a solution for all urban problems and centralisation can be more effective in solving them. There is a no clear evidence favouring decentralisation over centralisation to solve the problems of the urban poor. It is therefore important to define the different forms of decentralisation and the different factors which affect the need for decentralisation such as the relationship between the individual citizen and officials, technological innovations in communication, cultural differences, and different levels of economic development and political conditions.

Upgrading projects carried out in the late 1970's illustrates some of the problems associated with high levels of centralisation. The first problem was the inadequacy of the program to the needs and priorities of the concerned population. The local residents saw the regularisation of their situation as an indispensable prerequisite to upgrading the settlement. This issue was the main cause of conflict between all levels of government and resulted in delays or even the failure to complete these projects. Manal El­Batran (1992) noted that the centralisation of managerial and administrative responsibilities leads to great inefficiencies in implementing urban upgrading policies in Cairo metropolitan area. She further suggests that policies towards informal housing settlements should not be under the control of central government, but rather that the process of policy formation, and implementation should come under the control of urban municipalities. Decentralisation and the increased power at the local level should therefore be a means to increase the effectiveness of planning.

Many laws and regulations were elaborated by the government to encourage the upgrading of informal settlements, land use and controlling subdivision of land. None of these laws managed to integrate informal developments into the formal sector. The effectiveness of planning and regulatory measures has been greatly hampered by difficulties in formulating and in enforcing urban land policies. The majority of violators have little incentive to engage in registration and appraisal processes which are bound to prove costly and time consuming. The lure of substantial profits to be gained from speculative transfers at the urban fringe easily offset the deterrence of official pronouncements, particularly when adjustment of municipal boundaries will no doubt soon follow, de facto regularizing the situation.

Local government capacity should therefore be strengthened if they are to carry out their roles of planning, execution and enforcement of land development regulations and projects. To this end it is particularly important to:

35

∙ strengthen the power of the governor and the governorate’s physical planning capacity;

∙ increase the participation of the Local Popular Council;

∙ increase the financial resources at each level of local government through; local government block grants;

∙ create a significant local role in the budgeting process;

∙ increase the attractiveness of government services at the local government level.

In addition, metropolitan areas and informal settlements require special administrative attention. Proper attention must be given to attract skilled staff, promotions need to be related to merit, and a more flexible structure established which allows local administrators to change staffing patterns to meet the demands of rapidly growing populations. It is clear, that at least in the particular circumstances of Cairo, policies towards informal settlements should not be under the total control of central government. The process of policy formation and implementation should be decentralized to come under the control of urban municipalities. In any case, housing policies, whether they operate within a centralized or decentralized set­up, need to be adapted to local needs and should be realistic in their expectations.

Informal settlements, in Egypt, have become the dominating factor in the urbanisation process and in the provision of housing for the urban poor. These settlements should not be looked at as part of the country's housing crisis, but rather as the urban poor's contribution to its solution. It is a particularly remarkable contribution as, under the prevailing conditions of scarce economic resources and bureaucratic control, neither the government nor the private sector could provide the urban poor with basic shelter.

The Egyptian government seems to have finally acknowledged this simple and obvious truth and is now conducting a large­scale effort to provide infrastructure to the country's informal settlements.

Infrastructure provision however, provides only a small part of the answer to the challenges posed by informal settlements in Egypt. In the current socio­ economic and policy context there is no doubt that the Ashawayats will continue to proliferate throughout the country in the foreseeable future. There is nothing that the government can do to stop this phenomenon, but there is much it can do to limit its magnitude and its negative consequences. One of the main lessons of informal settlements is that the poor can build their housing without state help, what they cannot do, however is "creating" the land they use for their shelters. As long as the only available land will be private agricultural land, the informal housing development process, and urbanisation, will happen at the expense of the country's agricultural production. The main tool at the disposition of the government is therefore the vast areas of desert land located at the periphery of Egyptian cities. Putting this land at the disposal of the urban poor would go a long way in limiting the growth of informal settlements.

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NOTES 1. The USAID supported Helwan upgrading project, consisted originally of two components an

Upgrading Scheme and a New Community Programme of expandable housing units with infrastructure and community facilities. However, later the core housing programme was replaced by a site and services programme. The project is an illustration of how the centralization of managerial and administrative responsibilities leads to great inefficiencies in the implementing urban upgrading policies in Cairo Metropolitan areas, (El Batran, 1992). Since then USAID has withdrawn from the low­income housing sector in Egypt.

2. Total budget is inferior to 401,050 because Aswan governorate is not included in the table. The governorate was at first included among those benefiting from the project but was later withdrawn from the list. Its budget (L.E. 42,000) was redistributed to the other governorates.