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This article was downloaded by: [Unviersité de Fribourg]On: 23 April 2014, At: 06:18Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK
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Is there a Gap in Kant’s BDeduction?Stefanie Grüne aa Universität Potsdam , GermanyPublished online: 07 Sep 2011.
To cite this article: Stefanie Grüne (2011) Is there a Gap in Kant’s BDeduction? , International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 19:3, 465-490, DOI:10.1080/09672559.2011.595196
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Is there a Gap in Kant’s BDeduction?
Stefanie Gr€une
Abstract
In ‘Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-ConceptualContent’, Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptual-ism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has beendeveloped by Kant. But according to ‘Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, RogueObjects and the Gap in the B Deduction’, Kant’s non-conceptualism posesa serious problem for his argument for the objective validity of the catego-ries, namely the problem that there is a gap in the B Deduction. This gapis that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptualism is true, butKant is a non-conceptualist. In this paper, I will argue, contrary to whatHanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduction.
Keywords: Kant; concepts; non-conceptualism; intuition; synthesis
In ‘Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-ConceptualContent’, Robert Hanna argues for a very strong kind of non-conceptu-alism, and claims that this kind of non-conceptualism originally has beendeveloped by Kant. Even though Hanna congratulates Kant for beingthe founding father of non-conceptualism, in ‘Kant’s Non-Conceptual-ism, Rogue Objects, and the Gap in the B Deduction’ he also assertsthat Kant’s non-conceptualism poses a serious problem for Kant’s mostfamous argument, namely the argument for the objective validity of thecategories.1 To prove the objective validity of the categories, i.e. toprove that we are justified in applying the categories to objects of experi-ence, is the aim of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories inthe Critique of Pure Reason. According to Hanna, there is a gap in thesecond version of the Transcendental Deduction, the so-called B Deduc-tion. This gap is that the B Deduction goes through only if conceptual-ism is true, but Kant is a non-conceptualist.2
On the one hand, as I have argued elsewhere, I am very sympatheticto characterising Kant as a non-conceptualist.3 On the other hand, Ithink it is highly unlikely that Kant did not realize that his argument forthe objective reality of the categories is not compatible with his non-con-ceptualism. Perhaps Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Deduction
International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 19(3), 465–490
International Journal of Philosophical StudiesISSN 0967–2559 print 1466–4542 online � 2011 Taylor & Francis
http://www.informaworld.comDOI: 10.1080/09672559.2011.595196
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does not go through, but I cannot believe that it does not go throughbecause of such an obvious mistake. Therefore in this paper, I will argue,contrary to what Hanna claims, that there is not a gap in the B Deduc-tion. I will proceed in four steps. In the first part of my paper, I will tryto state more precisely what exactly this gap consists in. As will turn out,Hanna’s description of the gap can be interpreted in two different ways.Since to me at least it is unclear which of these two interpretations is theone intended by Hanna, in parts three and four of my paper I will arguethat neither according to the first, nor according to the second interpre-tation is there a gap in the B Deduction. Whether the Deduction suffersfrom a gap depends amongst other things on what kind of non-conceptu-alist Kant is. Therefore, in the second part of my paper, I will distinguishbetween different kinds of non-conceptualism.
1. The Gap in the B Deduction
According to Hanna, the main thesis of the B-Deduction is the follow-ing:
TD1: The Categories are necessary a priori conditions of the possi-bility of all objects of experience.4
Since TD1 depends on the truth of Transcendental Idealism,5 but Hannabelieves that unqualified Transcendental Idealism is wrong, he proposesto weaken the main thesis of the B Deduction in the following way:
TD2: The Categories are necessary a priori conditions of the possi-bility of the experience of all objects.6
Later on Hanna writes:
Conceptualism is arguably false and Kant himself is a non-conceptu-alist. If Kant is a non-conceptualist and Kant’s Non-Conceptualism istrue, then there are actual or possible ‘rogue objects’ of human expe-rience . . . that either contingently or necessarily do not fall under anyconcepts whatsoever, including the Categories. So if Kant’s Non-Conceptualism is true, then both TD1 and TD2 are false.7
As I see it, this passage may be understood in two different ways: (i) Thatan object x falls under a concept F usually means that x belongs to theextension of F or that x has the property which is represented by F.According to this interpretation, the second sentence of the passage justquoted has to be read in the following way: if Kant is a non-conceptualist
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and Kant’s Non-Conceptualism is true, then there are actual or possible‘rogue objects’ of human experience that either contingently or necessar-ily do not belong to the extension of any concepts whatsoever, includingthe categories. Obviously, if there were any such rogue objects, the Tran-scendental Deduction would not go through. The aim of the Deduction isto show that we are justified in applying the categories to all actual andpossible objects of experience. But clearly we are not justified in applyingthe categories to objects which do not belong to the extension of any con-cepts. So, if Kant’s Non-Conceptualism implied that there are objectswhich do not belong to the extension of any objects, Hanna would beright in claiming that the B Deduction doesn’t go through. Furthermore,in this case not only the B, but also the A Deduction would fail, sinceboth deductions have the same aim, and this aim cannot be reached, ifthere are objects which do not belong to the extension of any concepts,including the categories.
(ii) Perhaps Hanna uses the phrase ‘object x falls under concept F’not in its usual meaning, but in the same sense as ‘object x is an objectto which F is applied’. In this case, the difference between objects thatnecessarily and objects that contingently do not fall under any conceptsis the difference between objects to which necessarily no concepts areapplied to and objects to which contingently no concepts are applied to.This is the difference between objects to which concepts are not applica-ble and objects to which concepts are applicable, but in fact not applied.This second interpretation is weaker than the first one and it might seemunclear why the fact that there are objects of experience to which con-cepts either are not applicable or not applied should pose a problem forthe Transcendental Deduction. Objects to which no concepts are applica-ble are objects which do not belong to the extension of any concepts. AsI have said above, it is obvious that the Deduction does not go throughif there are such objects of experience. But according to the secondinterpretation, Kant’s Non-Conceptualism does not have the implicationthat such objects exist. Rather, it has the weaker implication that eitherthere are such objects or there are objects which belong to the extensionof concepts but to which no concepts are applied.
Now the question is, why the fact that there are objects of experienceto which no concepts are applied should prevent the success of the Tran-scendental Deduction. Clearly, the fact that hidden in a forest there is atree to which nobody ever has applied and never will apply the conceptof a tree, does not show that we are not justified in applying the conceptof a tree to this object. In the same way, the fact that there are someobjects of experience to which the categories are not applied, does notshow that we are not justified in applying the categories to these objects.Therefore, the fact that there are objects of experience, to which the cat-egories are not applied, might seem to be irrelevant for the question of
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whether the Transcendental Deduction does go through. And if thiswere the case, then according to the second interpretation Kant’s non-conceptualism does not pose a problem for the Deduction. So, why haveI suggested this second interpretation after all?
Let me explain. Even though the fact that there are objects of experi-ence to which the categories are not applied does not have the directconsequence that we are not justified in applying them to such objects, itstill can be shown that this fact prevents the Deduction from being suc-cessful, if one makes two further assumptions which Hanna both makes.The first assumption is that the argument for the objective validity of thecategories has the following structure:
P1: The categories are necessary a priori conditions of the possibil-ity of the experience of all objects. (= TD2)
P2: If a concept F is a necessary a priori condition of the possibilityof the experience of all objects, we are justified in applying F to allobjects of experience.
C1: We are justified in applying the categories to all objects ofexperience.
The first premise of this argument is the same as what Hanna calls theweakened version of the main thesis of the Transcendental Deduction(TD2). So, it is highly likely that he would accept this reconstruction of theargument of the Deduction. The second assumption concerns the questionof the way in which a category could be a necessary condition for the possi-bility of the experience of objects. It says that the only way for a categoryto be a necessary a priori condition of the possibility of the experience ofan object is by being applied to this object in a judgement.8 If we combinethis assumption with the claim that we can have experiences of objects towhich no concepts are applied, we get the following argument:
PI: The only way for a category to be a necessary a priori conditionof the possibility of the experience of an object is by being appliedto this object in a judgement.
PII: It is possible to have an experience of an object to which nocategory is applied.
CI: It is not the case that the categories are necessary a priori con-ditions of the possibility of the experience of all objects.
CI is the negation of P1. So, if it is possible to have an experience of anobject without applying a category to the object and if the only way for
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a category to be a necessary condition for the possibility of theexperience of objects is by being applied to objects in a judgement, thenKant cannot prove that we are justified in applying the categories to allobjects of experience, because the first premise of the argument for theobjective validity of the categories turns out to be wrong. Rather, if Kantaccepts PI, he can only show that the categories are applicable to allobjects of experience, if whenever we have an intuition of an object, wejudge that the object is a substance that causally interacts with other sub-stances and has some extensive and intensive magnitude. By now, itshould be clear why I have proposed to understand the passage quoted atthe beginning of this section in a second way. According to the secondinterpretation, Kant’s non-conceptualism implies that it is possible to haveexperiences of objects to which either no concepts are applicable or towhich no concepts are applied. As I have already said above, it is obviousthat the Deduction does not go through if it is possible to have experiencesof objects to which no concepts are applicable. Now it has turned out thatit also does not go through if it is possible to have experiences of objects towhich no concepts are applied and if the two assumptions mentionedabove are true. Therefore, not only according to the first, but also accord-ing to the second interpretation Kant’s Non-Conceptualism implies thatthe Transcendental Deduction is not successful.
To me, it is rather unclear which of the two interpretations is the oneintended by Hanna. As will turn out in the third part of the paper, thefirst interpretation has the disadvantage that it is somewhat misleadingto describe the reason which according to the first interpretation isresponsible for the failure of the Transcendental Deduction as a gapbetween Kant’s Non-Conceptualism and the Conceptualism of the BDeduction.9 The second interpretation has the disadvantage that thephrase ‘x falls under concept F’ is not used in its usual meaning.10 Fur-thermore, the other passages in which Hanna discusses the gap in the BDeduction do not help to determine which of the two interpretations hehas in mind. Some pages after the passage which I have discussed so far,he writes that if Kant’s Non-Conceptualism is true, then
there might be some “rogue objects” of human intuitional experi-ence11 that are not or cannot12 also be objects of human conceptualand judgemental experience, in the metaphysically robust sense thatall those objects of human intuitional experience turn out to becausally deviant and nomologically ill-behaved, thereby falling out-side the Categories.13
Let us assume that the difference between objects that are not or cannotalso be objects of human conceptual and judgemental experience is the
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same as the difference between objects that either contingently ornecessarily do not fall under any concepts. Objects that are not objectsof conceptual experience are objects to which no concepts are applied.Objects that cannot be objects of conceptual experience are objects towhich no concepts are applicable. This speaks in favour of the secondand against the first interpretation. Still, in the passage just quotedHanna also claims that both kinds of rogue objects (i.e. objects that arenot and objects that cannot be objects of conceptual experience) arecausally deviant and nomologically ill-behaved, that is both kinds ofobjects do not belong to the extension of the (dynamical) categories.This speaks in favour of the first, and against the second interpretation.Why Hanna claims that not only objects that cannot, but also objectsthat are not objects of conceptual experience are causally deviant isunclear to me. That the concept of a cause is not applied to an objectclearly does not imply that the object is not the cause of anything.
Since it is unclear which of the two interpretations Hanna has inmind, I will argue that according to both interpretations Hanna is wrongto claim that there is a gap in the B Deduction. I will call the gap that isstated by the first interpretation gap1 and the gap that is stated by thesecond interpretation gap2. But before I will discuss these two gaps, inthe next section I will give an overview over the different kinds of Non-Conceptualism.
2. Versions of Non-Conceptualism
In the contemporary debate about non-conceptual content people under-stand the thesis of Non-Conceptualism in very different ways. The basicdistinction is the distinction between state and content Non-Conceptual-ism.14 State Non-Conceptualism says that a mental state has non-concep-tual content if and only if it is possible to be in the state withoutpossessing or applying any of the concepts that characterize the con-tent.15 State Conceptualism by contrast claims that a mental state hasconceptual content if and only if in order to be in the state the subjectof the state at least has to possess or to apply one of the concepts thatcharacterize the content. According to a state non-conceptualist, it ispossible to perceive a tomato without possessing the concept of a solana-ceous herb, of a tomato, of a vegetable, of redness, of a substance that iscausally interacting with other substances, or any other concept thatcharacterizes the perception’s content. State Non-Conceptualism is not athesis about the kind or structure of the content of a mental state.Rather, it is a thesis about the conditions under which a subject can bein a mental state with objective representational content.
Content Non-Conceptualism, by contrast, says that a mental state hasnon-conceptual content if and only if that mental state has a different
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kind of content than do beliefs and thoughts, where the content ofbeliefs and thoughts usually16 is understood as consisting of concepts orrather Fregean senses.17 Since Kant didn’t know anything about Fregeansenses, I will just assume that the content of beliefs and thoughts consistsof concepts and will leave open what exactly concepts are. Content Con-ceptualism says that a mental state has conceptual content if and only ifthat mental state has the same kind of content as do beliefs andthoughts, that is if it consists of concepts.
Hanna distinguishes between two different versions of content Non-Conceptualism, namely weak and strong content Non-Conceptualism.18
According to Weak content Non-Conceptualism a mental state has non-conceptual content if and only if that mental state has a contingentlydifferent content than do beliefs and thoughts. Strong content Non-Conceptualism says that a mental state has non-conceptual content ifand only if that mental state has an essentially different content thando beliefs and thoughts. The difference between these two types ofcontent Non-Conceptualism is the following: weak content Non-Con-ceptualism does not deny that non-conceptual content might be concep-tually specified or conceptually presented. The fact that a subject has aperceptual state with contingently non-conceptual content does notexclude the possibility that later on she is in a perceptual state withthe same content and in this situation applies concepts to the object ofthe perceptual state so that the content of the state is conceptually pre-sented. In this case, the non-conceptual content of the perceptual statewould be a part of the content of a whole mental state that also con-tains concepts, which specify the content of the perceptual state. Bycontrast, according to strong content Non-Conceptualism it is impossi-ble to give a conceptual specification of a non-conceptual content.Therefore, insofar as a mental state contains essentially non-conceptualcontent, one cannot make any judgements about the object of the state.(In the published version of ‘Beyond the Myth of the Myth’, Hannadistinguishes between a sense in which essentially non-conceptual con-tents cannot be conceptually specified and a sense in which they canbe conceptually specified. In the version my commentary is based on,he does not make this distinction.)
Strong content Non-Conceptualism can come in two forms. Astrong content non-conceptualist might either claim that (i) perceptualstates contain essentially non-conceptual content amongst other thingsor that (ii) perceptual states contain nothing but essentially non-concep-tual content.19 Whereas according to the second option perceptualstates have only non-conceptual content, according to the first option,they have essentially non-conceptual content and also other kinds ofcontent, namely either contingently non-conceptual content or concep-tual content.
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Hanna himself believes that strong content Non-Conceptualism istrue. More specifically, he claims that all perceptual states containessentially non-conceptual content amongst other things20 and that thereare at least some perceptual states which contain nothing but essentiallynon-conceptual content.21
3. The B Deduction and Gap1
As I have said in the first part of my paper, Hanna claims that Kant’sNon-Conceptualism implies the existence of actual or possible rogueobjects. According to the first interpretation, rogue objects are objects ofexperience that do not belong to the extension of any concepts, includ-ing the categories. Obviously, if there were any such objects, the Deduc-tion wouldn’t go through, because the aim of the Deduction is to showthat we are justified in applying the categories to all objects of experi-ence, but we would not be justified in doing this, if there were objects ofexperience that do not belong to the extension of the categories.
Now, the question is, which kind of Non-Conceptualism implies thatthere are objects of experience that do not belong to the extension ofany concepts. State Non-Conceptualism doesn’t have this implication.That we can have experiences of objects without possessing any of theconcepts (if there are any) that characterize the experience’s contentclearly does not imply that the object of the experience does not belongto the extension of any concepts. That I can perceive a tomato withoutpossessing the concept of a vegetable for example does not show thatthe tomato does not belong to the extension of the concept of a vegeta-ble. Neither has weak content Non-Conceptualism the required implica-tion. Weak Non-Conceptualism denies that the content of a perceptualstate consist of concepts, but it does not deny that this content can beconceptualised. It allows for the possibility that the object of such a statebelongs to the extension of one or several concepts. Not even every formof strong Non-Conceptualism implies that there are objects of experi-ence that do not belong to the extension of any concepts. A strong con-tent non-conceptualist who believes that perceptual states contain notonly essentially non-conceptual content, but also contingently non-con-ceptual or conceptual content, does not deny that concepts are applica-ble to objects of such states. Only a strong content non-conceptualistaccording to whom a perceptual state contains nothing but essentiallynon-conceptual content claims that there are objects of perceptual statesthat do not belong to the extension of any concepts. So, Hanna is onlyjustified in claiming that there is a gap1, if Kant is a strong content non-conceptualist, who believes that there are at least some perceptual stateswhich contain nothing but essentially non-conceptual content.22 For thisreason, it is somewhat misleading to characterize gap1 as a gap between
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Kant’s Non-Conceptualism and the Conceptualism that according toHanna is presupposed by the B Deduction. It is misleading, because ifKant were a strong content non-conceptualist, this would undermine theB Deduction irrespective of whether it implies Conceptualism. If Kantbelieved that some intuitions contain nothing but essentially non-concep-tual content, the B Deduction would not go through even if it presup-posed weak content Non-Conceptualism or state Non-Conceptualism.Therefore, if Hanna were right in claiming that Kant is a strong contentnon-conceptualist, the question of whether the B Deduction impliesConceptualism would be irrelevant for diagnosing its failure.23
In ‘Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects and the Gap in the BDeduction’, Hanna distinguishes between different kinds of non-conceptu-alism only after having discussed the gap in the B Deduction. He beginsthis paper by arguing that Kant is a non-conceptualist without specifyingwhat kind of non-conceptualist Kant is. Likewise, he claims that becauseof Kant’s non-conceptualism there is a gap in the B Deduction, but doesnot indicate what kind of non-conceptualism it is that threatens the BDeduction. Let us now see whether anything of what Hanna says in hispaper shows that Kant is a strong content non-conceptualist. Two passagesare relevant here: in the third part of his paper, Hanna argues that Kant isa non-conceptualist, in the fifth part he tries to show that insofar as we arespontaneous beings, we are rogue objects to which no concepts are appli-cable.24 I will discuss these two passages in turn. In order to show thatKant is a non-conceptualist, Hanna examines Kant’s famous slogan thatintuitions without concepts are blind. At the beginning of the Transcen-dental Analytic from the Critique of Pure Reason Kant writes:
Thoughts without content (Inhalt) are empty (leer), intuitions with-out concepts are blind (blind). It is, therefore, just as necessary tomake the mind’s concepts sensible – that is, to add an object tothem in intuition – as to make our intuitions understandable – thatis, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities,cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit noth-ing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification cancognition arise. (CPR A 50f. / B 74ff.)
This passage is usually interpreted as showing that Kant is a conceptual-ist.25 Hanna by contrasts believes that it is perfectly consistent with charac-terising Kant as a non-conceptualist. According to him, in the secondsentence, Kant uses ‘cognition’ not in a broad sense, in which it means thesame as ‘objective conscious representation’, but in a narrower sense, inwhich ‘cognition’ means ‘objectively valid judgement’. Therefore, whenKant says that intuitions have to be combined with concepts in order toconstitute cognitions, he just means that intuitions have to be combined
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with concepts in order to constitute objectively valid judgements. He doesnot mean that intuitions have to be combined with concepts in order toconstitute mental states with objective representational content. Blindintuitions are mental states that represent the world even though they arenot combined with concepts. That they are blind just means that they donot generate objectively valid judgements, it does not mean that they areno objective representations.26
I completely agree with this interpretation. Hanna is right in claimingthat Kant uses ‘cognition’ in a broad and in a narrow sense and he isalso right in saying that in the passage just quoted ‘cognition’ is under-stood in the narrow sense.27 But I am not so sure whether I agree withone conclusion Hanna draws from these considerations. He writes:
[T]o the extent that intuitions are cognitively and semanticallyindependent of concepts, and also objectively valid, they containnon-conceptual objective representational mental contents.28
According to A 50f/B 74ff., a blind intuition is an intuition that is notbrought under a concept. To bring an intuition under a concept meansto apply a concept to the intuition’s object. So, what Kant says is thatwe can have intuitions or intuitional experience without applying anyconcepts to the objects of those states. This shows that he is a state non-conceptualist. By contrast, Kant’s remarks leave open whether he is alsoa content non-conceptualist. That one can have an intuition withoutapplying any concepts to the object of the intuition, does not have anyimplications for the question what kind of content the intuition has.29
The content could be composed of concepts, it could not be composedof concepts, but be conceptualizable or it could be unconceptualizable.In other words: Kant’s remarks on blind intuitions are consistent withcontent conceptualism, weak content non-conceptualism and strong con-tent non-conceptualism. Therefore, if in the passage quoted aboveHanna wants to say that Kant is a content non-conceptualist, this conclu-sion is not warranted. If instead he just wants to say that Kant is a statenon-conceptualist, then he is completely right. Since Kant’s remarks onblind intuitions do not show that Kant is a content non-conceptualist ofany kind, they a fortiori do not show that he is a strong content non-con-ceptualist. Therefore the passage on blind intuitions cannot be used toshow that the B Deduction is undermined by gap1.
In order to show that one should not understand the passage on blindintuitions as implying that Kant is a conceptualist, Hanna presents sev-eral quotations from Kant’s work which according to him prove thatKant is a non-conceptualist. Let us see whether any of them speak infavour of Kant being a strong content non-conceptualist. Hanna cites thefollowing passages:
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Objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to berelated to functions of the understanding. (CPR A89/B122, emphasisadded by Hanna)
Appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functionsof the understanding. (CPR A90/B122, emphasis added by Hanna)
Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understand-ing would not find them in accordance with the conditions of itsunity. . . [and] in the series of appearances nothing would presentitself that would yield a rule of synthesis and so correspond to theconcept of cause and effect, so that this concept would be entirelyempty, null, and meaningless. Appearances would none the lesspresent objects to our intuition, since intuition by no means requiresthe functions of thought. (CPR A90-91/B122f., emphasis added byHanna)
That representation which can be given prior to all thinking iscalled intuition. (CPR B132)
The manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the syn-thesis of the understanding and independently from it. (CPR B145,emphasis added by Hanna)
Concept differs from intuition by virtue of the fact that all intuitionis singular. He who sees his first tree does not know what it is thathe sees. (VL 24: 905)
I would like to say several things about these texts. As I see it, the firstthree do not express Kant’s own opinion, but rather have only a didacticfunction. They are to be found at the very beginning of the Transcen-dental Deduction, where Kant tries to motivate why there is a need fora Transcendental Deduction of the categories, but no need for a Tran-scendental Deduction of the pure intuitions of space and time. Kant’sidea very roughly is the following: space and time are forms of our sensi-bility. Whenever sensibility is affected by objects (which are neither spa-tially nor temporally structured), it delivers representations of spatio-temporally structured objects. The fact that space and time are forms ofsensibility therefore guaranties that every object of intuition anda fortiori every object of experience is spatio-temporally structured. So,the objective validity of space and time is shown by proving that spaceand time are forms of sensibility. The categories, by contrast, are notforms of sensibility, but concepts of the understanding. And the functionof understanding is not to deliver intuitions, but to think or to makejudgements. Furthermore, the categories are a priori concepts, that is
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concepts which we possess, but which we have not acquired by compar-ing objects of experience. Since the understanding does not play any rolein the formation of intuitions, it might very well be the case that theobjects of our intuitions do not fall under the understanding’s a prioriconcepts, namely the categories. Because of this possibility, there has tobe a Transcendental Deduction of the categories, which proves that weare justified in applying the categories to all objects of experience.
Now, in the A Deduction as well as in the B Deduction Kant provesthe objective validity of the categories by showing that contrary to whatone first might think it is not the case that the understanding does notplay any role in the formation of an intuition. In both deductions Kantstates two things: (i) sensible representations have to be processed orrather synthesized in order for intuitions to be formed,30 (ii) the synthe-sis of sensible representations only results in the formation of intuitionsif concepts function as rules for synthesis.31 That is, once one has readthe deductions and bears in mind that concepts are representations ofthe understanding, it turns out that contrary to what he writes in A 89ff./B 122ff., Kant believes that objects cannot ‘appear to us without neces-sarily having to be related to functions of the understanding’, appear-ances cannot ‘be given in intuition without functions of theunderstanding’ and intuition requires ‘the functions of thought’. The rea-son why at the beginning of the Transcendental Deduction he states theopposite is just that he wants to motivate why there has to be a deduc-tion of the categories. So, the first three quotations are not of any helpfor showing that Kant is a non-conceptualist.
The same is true – but for other reasons – of the fifth quotation,which says that the manifold for intuition must be given prior to the syn-thesis of the understanding. According to Kant the manifold for an intui-tion is not the same as an intuition. An intuition is an objectiveconscious representation.32 As I have said above, an intuition is notdirectly delivered by sensibility, but is the outcome of an activity of men-tal processing which Kant calls synthesis of the understanding. The mani-fold for intuition by contrast is the material that is delivered bysensibility and is not yet synthesized or processed by the understanding.This manifold, as long as it is not synthesized, is neither object-directednor conscious. Therefore, what Kant says in B 145 is that in order forthe understanding to synthesize representations, these representationshave to be given to it by sensibility. As Kant points out in B 145, in thisrespect our understanding is different from a divine understanding,which does not have to combine representations, which are given to itelsewhere, but can produce representations itself. Since the quoted sen-tence from B 145 does not say that intuitions must be given prior to thesynthesis of the understanding, but only says that the manifold for intui-tion must be given in such a way, it shows neither that Kant is a state,
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nor that he is a content non-conceptualist. A state non-conceptualistclaims that it is possible to be in a perceptual state without possessingconcepts. A content non-conceptualist says that the content of perceptualstates is different than the content of beliefs and thoughts. Perceptualstates are objective and conscious mental states. But in B 145 Kant doesnot say that we can have objective and conscious mental states prior tothe synthesis of the understanding. Instead he just talks about subjective,subconscious mental states. Therefore, this passage is irrelevant for thequestion of whether Kant is a non-conceptualist of any kind.
What about the fourth and the sixth quotations? In the fourth, Kantsays that intuitions can be given prior to thinking. According to thesixth, it is possible to have an intuition of an object without knowingwhat kind of object it is. Since in both texts Kant claims that it is possi-ble to have intuitions (i.e. objective conscious mental states) withoutapplying or possessing concepts, they show that Kant is a state non-con-ceptualist. As I have already said above, the fact that one can have anintuition without possessing concepts does not have any implications forthe question what kind of content the intuition has. Therefore, thefourth and the fifth quotation do not show that Kant is a content non-conceptualist. In particular, they do not show that according to Kant,there are some intuitions which contain nothing but essentially non-con-ceptual content.
After having discussed the passage on blind intuitions and the fivequotations cited on p. 474f. Hanna declares that Kant is a non-conceptu-alist and that there is a gap in the B Deduction. But since neither thepassage on blind intuitions nor the five quotations imply that Kant is astrong content non-conceptualist, Hanna has not shown that there is agap, if the gap he has in mind is gap1.
Still, after having discussed the gap in the B Deduction, Hannaclaims that we ourselves, insofar as we are spontaneous beings, are rogueobjects of experience, which do not belong to the extension of any con-cepts. According to Hanna, we have intuitions of ourselves as transcen-dentally free beings. To be transcendentally free means to be able to actwithout being caused by anything. Therefore, a transcendentally freeaction does fall under the schematized category of (cause and) effect.Furthermore, because the categories belong to the content of all empiri-cal concepts, transcendentally free actions neither fall under any empiri-cal concepts. So, if we could have intuitions or perceptual states ofourselves as transcendentally free beings, Kant would be a strong con-tent non-conceptualist who accepts at least one kind of perceptual statesor intuitions that contain nothing but essentially non-conceptual content,namely the intuitions of ourselves, insofar as we are spontaneousbeings.33 In this case Hanna would be right in claiming that the BDeduction suffers from gap1.
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Why does Hanna think that we can have intuitions of our transcen-dental freedom? His main reason is a passage from the TranscendentalDoctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant writes:
Practical freedom can be proved through experience. . . . We thuscognise practical freedom through experience, as one of the naturalcauses. (CPR A 802f./B 830f.)
Still, if one reads the passage left out, it turns out that Kant’s claim thatwe ‘cognize practical freedom through experience’ does not show thatwe have intuitions of ourselves as beings that do not fall under the cate-gories:
Practical freedom can be proved through experience. We thus cognisepractical freedom through experience, as one of the natural causes.Since . . . we have a capacity to overcome impressions on our sensoryfaculty of desire by representations of that which is useful or injuriouseven in a more remote way; but these considerations about that whichin regard to our whole condition is desirable, i.e., good and useful,depend on reason. Hence this also yields laws that are imperatives, i.e., objective laws of freedom . . . But whether in these actions, throughwhich it prescribes laws, reason is not itself determined by furtherinfluences, and whether that which with respect to sensory impulses iscalled freedom might not in turn with regard to higher and moreremote efficient causes be nature – in the practical sphere this doesnot concern us, since in the first instance we ask of reason only aprecept for conduct; it is rather as merely speculative question, whichwe can set aside as long as our aim is directed to our action or omis-sion. We thus cognise practical freedom through experience, as one ofthe natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determinationof the will, whereas transcendental freedom requires an independenceof this reason itself (with regard to its causality for initiating a seriesof appearances) from all determining causes of the world of thesenses, and to this extent seems to be contrary to the law of nature,and so remains a problem. (CPR A 802f./ B 830f.)
In this passage, Kant distinguishes between transcendental and practicalfreedom and only claims that we have experience of our practical, butdoes not claim that we have experience of our transcendental freedom.Furthermore, he says that the fact that an action is practically free doesnot rule out that it is caused by something else. Since practical freedomdoes not imply transcendental freedom, Hanna’s thesis that we haveintuitional experience of ourselves as transcendentally free and abso-
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lutely spontaneous beings cannot be proven by Kant’s claim that we cog-nise practical freedom through experience.
Whereas in the passage quoted above Kant only says that transcen-dental freedom seems to be contrary to all possible experience,elsewhere he makes the stronger claim that even though we can think ofourselves as transcendentally free beings, we cannot intuit our transcen-dental freedom. According to Kant, one can show that the causal deter-mination of all events and the possibility of free actions are compatiblewith each other if one distinguishes between appearances and things inthemselves. Whereas considered as things in themselves we are transcen-dentally free, as appearances, that is insofar as we have intuitions of our-selves, we have to regard ourselves as causally determined. In theCritique of Practical Reason Kant writes:
[The]conflict between freedom and natural necessity . . . is no realcontradiction . . . since one and the same acting being, as anappearance (even to his own inner sense), has a causality in theworld of sense that always conforms to the mechanism of nature,but with respect to the same events, so far as the acting personregards himself at the same time as a noumenon (as pure intelli-gence in an existence not dependent on the condition of time), hecan contain a principle by which that causality acting according tolaws of nature is determined, but which is itself free from all lawsof nature. (AA V 114)
According to this quotation, we can think of ourselves as free beings onlyif we regard ourselves as noumena, that is as objects, insofar as they arenot objects of sensible intuition. By contrast, insofar as we have intuitionsof ourselves we conform to the mechanisms of nature. We do not haveintuitional experience of ourselves as transcendentally free beings but asbeings that fall under the categories.34 Therefore, we ourselves, insofar aswe are spontaneous beings, are not rogue objects of experience.
To recapitulate, neither the passage on blind intuitions nor the quota-tions cited on p. 474f. Kant’s remarks on transcendental freedom implythat Kant is a strong content non-conceptualist and that there is a gap1in the B Deduction. Let us now see whether the B Deduction insteadsuffers from gap2.
4. The B Deduction and Gap2
Gap2 can be characterized as follows: in the B Deduction, Kant aims toprove that we are justified in applying the categories to all objects ofexperience by showing that the categories are necessary conditions of
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the experience of objects. The only way in which categories can be suchnecessary conditions is by being applied in judgements to objects. There-fore, the B Deduction implies that it is not possible to have an experi-ence of an object without applying the categories to it. But as I havepointed out in the second part of this paper, Kant’s remarks on blindintuitions show that we can have (intuitional) experience of objects with-out applying any concepts to those objects. That is, whereas the BDeduction implies state conceptualism,35 the passage on blind intuitionsimplies state Non-Conceptualism.
Even though I agree with Hanna that Kant is a (state) non-conceptu-alist,36 I do not think that the B Deduction suffers from gap2. This isbecause contrary to what Hanna says, the B Deduction does not imply(state) Conceptualism.37 I agree with Hanna that Kant tries to prove theobjective validity of the categories by showing that they are necessaryconditions for the experience of objects. But I do not think that the onlyway for the categories to be necessary conditions for experience ofobjects is by being applied to such objects in judgements. This is what Iwant to show in this section. I will start by explaining why Kant believesthat the categories are necessary conditions of experience at all. As Ihave already pointed out in the third part of this paper, when our sensi-bility is affected by objects, this does not directly lead to the formationof intuitions or intuitional experience. Rather, sensibility only yieldsmental states that are neither conscious nor objective. In order for thesemental states to be transformed into conscious and objective states, thatis into intuitions, they have to be processed or synthesized by the under-standing. As Kant points out most prominently in the A Deduction, thesynthesis of sensible representations into intuitions only takes place ifconcepts, especially the categories, function as rules for this synthesis.Since no intuitions are formed without the categories functioning as rulesfor synthesis, Kant is justified in characterizing the categories as neces-sary conditions of the possibility of intuitions or intuitional experience.38
Now we should be in a better position to evaluate the claim that thecategories are necessary conditions of experience by being applied injudgements. If this claim were true, to function as a rule for synthesiswould be the same as being applied in a judgement and to synthesizesensible representations into intuitions would involve making judge-ments.39 Still, there are many passages which show that according toKant synthesizing does not imply judging.40 I will not discuss these pas-sages here, because I assume that Hanna would wholeheartedly agreewith me in this respect. Hanna and I agree that in many passages Kantdenies that the formation of an intuition involves making judgements.We only differ when it comes to the B Deduction. Whereas Hannabelieves that the B Deduction presupposes conceptualism, I think it is
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highly unlikely that Kant would have built the Deduction on a doctrinethat he rejects in so many places.
What are the reasons for assuming that the B Deduction impliesConceptualism? In x19 of the B Deduction Kant writes:
[A] judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cogni-tions to the objective unity of apperception. (CPR B 141)
As Kant points out in x16 and x17, representations are brought to theunity of apperception by being combined or synthesized. In x18 hecharacterizes the unity of apperception, insofar as it is the outcome ofa pure synthesis, as an objective unity. But if Kant on the one handsays that representations are brought to the objective unity of apper-ception by being synthesized, and on the other hand describes judge-ment as the way to bring cognitions to the objective unity ofapperception, it seems to be obvious that according to the B Deductionto synthesize is nothing else than to judge. Therefore, Hanna seems tobe absolutely right in claiming that the B Deduction presupposes(state) Conceptualism.
In order to show that contrary to the first impression, the B Deduc-tion does not imply state Conceptualism, I will proceed in two steps.First, I will argue that in the B Deduction itself there are many passageswhich entail that synthesizing neither is a kind of judging nor involvesmaking judgements. Therefore, if the argumentation of the B Deductionpresupposed state conceptualism there would not be only a gap betweenthe B Deduction and those passages which show that Kant is a statenon-conceptualist, but there would also be a gap in the B Deductionitself. Secondly, I will argue that Kant’s definition of ‘judgement’ in x19does not imply state Conceptualism.
The first of the passages from the B Deduction, which show that syn-thesizing is not a form of judging, is a passage from x15:
All combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whetherit is the combination of the manifold of intuition or of severalconcepts . . . is an action of the understanding, which we woulddesignate with the general title synthesis ... One can here easilysee that this action [synthesis] must originally be unitary andequally valid for all combination, and that the dissolution (analy-sis) that seems to be its opposite, in fact always presupposes it;for where the understanding has not previously combined any-thing, neither can it dissolve anything, for only through it cansomething be given to the power of representation as combined.(CPR B 130)
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This quotation is interesting for two reasons. (1) In the first sentenceKant distinguishes between two kinds of combination or synthesis,namely between synthesis of ‘the manifold of intuition’ and synthesis of‘several concepts’. Synthesizing several concepts is nothing else thanjudging. Now, if Kant believed that synthesizing the manifold of intuitionis a kind of judging, he would not distinguish between synthesis of themanifold of intuition and synthesis of concepts. (2) In the last sentenceof the quotation Kant claims that there is a genetic primacy of synthesisvis-a-vis analysis or concept formation. Only if the understanding previ-ously has combined sensible representations and thereby has formedintuitions, is it capable to analyse these intuitions and thereby to formconcepts. But if the formation of concepts is genetically posterior to thegeneration of intuitions, then synthesis of sensible representations canneither be nor involve making a judgement.
Furthermore, at the beginning of x16, Kant writes:
That representation which can be given prior to all thinking iscalled intuition. (CPR B132)
Since Kant usually does not distinguish between thinking and judging,41
this passage implies that we can have intuitions without and prior tomaking judgements. Interestingly, it is one of the passages Hanna him-self quotes in order to show that Kant is a non-conceptualist.42 So,Hanna at least has to admit that the B Deduction hovers between pre-supposing state conceptualism and presupposing state non-conceptual-ism.
The last passage I want to discuss also stems from x 16:
Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, isthus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which pre-cedes a priori all my determinate thinking. (CPR B 134f.)
In this quotation Kant describes two dependency relations: (1) The unitythat is the outcome of a synthesis of sensible representations is theground of the identity of apperception. From what Kant has written inthe first two paragraphs of x16 it is evident that he uses ‘ground’ in thesense of ‘necessary condition’. So in B 134f. he claims that the capacityto synthesize sensible representations is a necessary condition for thecapacity to conceive of oneself as an identical subject of these represen-tations. (2) The capacity to conceive of oneself as an identical subject ofdifferent representations precedes all determinate thinking. As I havesaid above, thinking or determinate thinking is the same as judging. Isuggest to understand the phrase ‘x precedes y’ as meaning ‘x is a
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necessary condition of y, but y is not a necessary condition of x’. So, thesecond dependency relation is the following: The capacity to conceive ofoneself as an identical subject of different representations is a necessarycondition for the capacity to judge, but the capacity to judge is nonecessary condition for the capacity to conceive of oneself as an identi-cal subject of representations. If we combine these two dependency rela-tions, we get the following result: the capacity to synthesize sensiblerepresentations is a necessary condition for the capacity to judge, butthe capacity to judge is not a necessary condition for the capacity to syn-thesize sensible representations. Therefore, synthesizing sensible repre-sentations can neither be the same as nor involve judging.
Since there are at least three passages in the B Deduction whichimply that synthesizing is something else than judging, in x19 Kantshould not claim the opposite. So, why does he write that ‘a judgment isnothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objectiveunity of apperception’? Here one has to note that Kant characterizesjudgement as the way to bring given cognitions to the unity of appercep-tion not as the way to bring given representations to the unity of apper-ception. As I have mentioned above, cognitions in the broad sense areobjective conscious representations. Intuitions and concepts are suchcognitions. But sensible representations that are not yet synthesized arenot cognitions in the broad sense. Therefore, in x19 Kant does not claimthat the activity of synthesis of sensible representations that results inthe formation of an intuition is a form of judging. That a judgement isthe way to bring cognitions to the unity of apperception, is compatiblewith the fact that unsynthesized sensible representations are brought tothe unity of apperception in another way. Furthermore, Kant apparentlydoes not even believe that every synthesis of cognitions consists in orinvolves judging. x19 has the following title:
The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity ofapperception of the concepts contained therein. (CPR B 140)
According to this title, a judgement is only the way to bring givenconcepts to the objective unity of apperception. But if Kant’s defini-tion of a judgement in x19 does not imply that the synthesis of sen-sible representations which results in the formation of an intuitionconsists in judging, it is compatible with Kant being a state non-conceptualist.
To substantiate my claim that Kant’s definition of a judgement doesnot imply state conceptualism, I will conclude this section by examininga further passage from x19:
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[T]his word [the copula “is”] designates the relation of the repre-sentations to the original apperception and its necessary unity,even if the judgment itself is empirical, hence contingent, e.g.,“Bodies are heavy.” By that, to be sure, I do not mean to saythat these representations necessarily belong to one another inthe empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one anotherin virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthe-sis of intuitions, i.e. in accordance with principles of the objectivedetermination of all representations . . . Only in this way doesthere arise from this relation a judgment, i.e. a relation that isobjectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from therelation of these same representations in which there would beonly subjective validity, i.e., in accordance with laws of associa-tion.. In accordance with the latter I could only say “If I carry abody, I feel a pressure of weight,” but not “It, the body, is heavy. . .” (CPR B 142)
According to the second sentence of this quotation, when I judge thatbodies are heavy I thereby say that the sensible representations of abody and of heaviness belong together, because they are synthesized insuch a way that they belong to the necessary unity of apperception. Inthe third sentence Kant claims that only because the sensible represen-tations of a body and of heaviness are synthesized in such a way, canthe relation of these representations be transformed into a judgement.If the sensible representations of a body and of heaviness were not syn-thesized or brought to the unity of apperception, I would not be justi-fied in combining the concepts of a body and of heaviness in thecategorical judgement ‘Bodies are heavy’. But if the reason why I amjustified in making a judgement about an object x is that I bring thesensible representations of x to the necessary or objective unity ofapperception, it cannot be also the case that the way in which I bringthe sensible representations of x to the necessary or objective unity ofapperception is by making a (justified) judgement. So, the passage justquoted speaks against understanding Kant’s definition of a judgementat the beginning of x19 as implying that sensible representations arebrought to the objective unity of apperception by judging. Therefore, itshows that the B Deduction does not imply Conceptualism. Since theB Deduction neither suffers from gap1 nor from gap2, the good newsfor all non-conceptualists is that characterizing Kant as the founder ofNon-Conceptualism is not incompatible with believing in the success ofthe Transcendental Deduction.
Universit€at Potsdam, Germany
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Notes
1 Hanna, 2011b: pp. 400 and 402.2 See also Hanna, 2004, section 4.1.3 See Gr€une, 2009: pp. 251–4. As will turn out in the second part of this paper,there are different kinds of Non-Conceptualism. In Gr€une, 2009 I only arguethat Kant is a state non-conceptualist, but don’t say anything concerning thequestion of whether Kant is also a content non-conceptualist.
4 Hanna, 2011b: p. 401.5 Hanna, 2011b: p. 401f.6 Hanna, 2011b: p. 402.7 Hanna, 2011b: p. 402.8 That Hanna accepts the second assumption follows from his claim that conceptscan only be used by being taken up in judgements. See Hanna, 2001: p. 59.
9 See p. 472f.10 For a second disadvantage see the end of fn. 22.11 Kant characterizes experience as empirical cognition. Therefore, correspond-
ing to the distinction between a broad and a narrow concept of cognition (seep. 473f.), Kant also distinguishes between experience in a broad and experi-ence in a narrow sense. Experiences in the narrow sense are objectively validempirical judgements, experiences in the broad sense are empirical represen-tations that are objective and conscious. Whereas all empirical concepts andall empirical intuitions are experiences in the broad sense, in order for thereto be experiences in the narrow sense, empirical concepts and empirical intu-itions have to be combined. When Hanna talks of ‘intuitional experience’ heuses the term ‘experience’ in the broad sense.
12 Bold emphasis added.13 Hanna, 2011b: pp. 407.14 See Byrne 2004 and Speaks 2005. Speaks does not distinguish between
state and content Non-Conceptualism, but between relative and absoluteNon-Conceptualism. Still, these two distinctions roughly amount to the same.
15 There are many slightly different characterizations of state Non-Conceptualism.According to Byrne, ‘[m]ental state M has non-conceptual content p iff it ispossible to be in M without possessing all the concepts that characterize p’(Byrne, 2004: p. 233. This characterization is weaker than the one I havechosen. Hanna writes: ‘What is nowadays called “state” Non-Conceptualismsays that the representational content of a given mental state is non-concep-tual if and only if the subject of that state does not possess concepts for thespecification of that state’ (Hanna, 2011a: p. 328.). Speaks characterizesrelatively non-conceptual content in the following way: ‘A mental state of anagent A (at a time t) has relatively non-conceptual content if and only if thecontent of that mental state includes contents not grasped (possessed) by Aat t’ (Speaks, 2005: p. 360). Whereas according to Byrne’s and my character-ization a mental state that has non-conceptual content always will have non-conceptual content, according to Speaks and Hanna, a mental state stopshaving non-conceptual content when the subject of the state acquiresconcepts that characterize the state’s content.
16 One exemption is Stalnaker, who believes that the contents of beliefs andthoughts are unstructured propositions or sets of possible worlds. If oneunderstands the content of beliefs and thoughts in this way, then having thesame content as a belief or a thought does not imply consisting of concepts
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or Fregean senses and having a different content than a belief or a thoughtdoes not imply not consisting of concepts. See Stalnaker 1998.
17 Hanna does not believe that concepts are Fregean senses. Instead he defendsa theory of concepts which he calls Logical Cognitivist Theory of Concepts.See Hanna, 2011a: pp. 345–8.
18 Since Hanna uses different terminology in different papers, I have modifiedhis terminology slightly. In Hanna, 2008 he uses the term ‘relativist Non-Conceptualism’ instead of ‘state Conceptualism’ and ‘absolutist Non-Conceptualism’ instead of ‘content Non-Conceptualism’. Accordingly, he doesnot distinguish between weak and strong content Non-Conceptualism, butbetween weak and strong absolutist Non-Conceptualism. What I call ‘strongcontent Non-Conceptualism’ Hanna in Hanna, 2011a calls ‘essentialist contentNon-Conceptualism’ (Hanna, 2011a: p. 331f.). In earlier papers and books hegives a different classification of kinds of Non-Conceptualism than in Hanna2008 and Hanna 2011a. See Hanna 2005 and Hanna 2006 ch. 2.
19 The same is true of weak content Non-Conceptualism. A weak content Non-Conceptualist might either claim that perceptual states contain contingentlynon-conceptual content amongst other things or that perceptual states containnothing but contingently non-conceptual content. For the purpose of mypaper this distinction is not relevant.
20 See Hanna, 2008: p. 40 and Hanna, 2011a: p. 332.21 See Hanna, 2008: p. 40 and Hanna, 2011a: p. 331f.22 I am not sure whether Hanna would agree with me in this respect. In a pas-
sage that I have already quoted in part, he writes:
[A]ccording to Kant the spatiotemporal intuitional unity of the contentof our conscious perceptual representations is necessarily also a fullylogico-conceptual unity. If this claim were not true, then the unity ofconscious perceptions of objects in space and time might be distinctfrom the unity of judgments, and, . . . there might then still be some spa-tiotemporal objects of conscious perception to which the categorieseither do not necessarily apply or necessarily do not apply: that is, theremight be some “rogue objects” of human intuitional experience that arenot or cannot also be objects of human conceptual and judgementalexperience, in the metaphysically robust sense that all those objects ofhuman intuitional experience turn out to be causally deviant and nomo-logically ill-behaved, thereby falling outside the Categories. . . . This lastpoint about rogue or elusive objects fully reveals the Gap in the BDeduction (Hanna, 2011b: p. 407f.).
Let us assume that to say that the intuitional unity of the content of percep-tual representations is necessarily also a logico-conceptual unity means thesame as to say that the content of perceptual representations necessarily is alogico-conceptual content. In this case, Hanna would claim that in the BDeduction Kant is a content conceptualist and that the B Deduction wouldnot go through, if content Conceptualism were false. The reasoning for thelast claim seems to be the following:
P1: If the content of perceptual representations is not necessarily a conceptualcontent, there might be rogue objects of experience to which the categoriesare not applicable.P2: If there might be rogue objects to which the categories are not applicable,the Transcendental Deduction does not go through.
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C: If the content of perceptual representations is not necessarily a conceptualcontent, the Transcendental Deduction does not go through.
According to this reasoning, both kinds of content Non-Conceptualism implythat there might be objects to which the categories are not applicable. There-fore, according to this reasoning, also weak, not only strong content Non-Conceptualism lead to gap1. So, what is wrong with this argument? Theproblem with the argument is that whereas the term ‘might’ in the firstpremise expresses an epistemic possibility, the ‘might’ in the second premiseexpresses a metaphysical possibility. Given that we know of the contents ofperceptual representations only that they are not conceptual contents, it isnot ruled out that there are objects of experience to which the categories arenot applicable. This is what the first premise says. According to the anteced-ent of second premise, it is true in some metaphysically possible world thatthere are objects of experience to which the categories are not applicable.But the fact that given our knowledge about the contents of perceptual repre-sentations, it is not ruled out that there are rogue objects, is compatible withthe fact that there is not a metaphysically possible world in which there aresuch objects. Let us assume that the contents of perceptual representationsare contingently non-conceptual contents and that the categories belong tothe concepts which are applicable to the objects of such representations. Inthis case it is not metaphysically possible that there are rogue objects. Still, itcould very well be true that we know of the contents of perceptual represen-tations only that they are not conceptual contents.
One further remark: the passage that I have quoted in this footnote speaks infavour of my first and against my second interpretation of Hanna’s claim thatthere is a gap in the B Deduction. In this passage, Hanna says that if Kantwere a content non-conceptualist, there might be rogue objects of experience.According to the first interpretation, rogue objects are objects to which noconcepts are applicable. According to the second interpretation, rogue objectsare objects to which either no concepts are applicable or no concepts areapplied. Now, it is somewhat misleading to say that if Kant were a contentnon-conceptualist, there might be objects to which either no concepts areapplicable or no concepts are applied. It is misleading because if Kant is acontent non-conceptualist, then there are objects to which either no conceptsare applicable or no concepts are applied. By contrast, it is correct to say thatif Kant were a content non-conceptualist, then there might be objects towhich no concepts are applicable. (It is correct, if ‘there might be’ is used inthe sense of ‘it is epistemically possible’).
23 By contrast, the Transcendental Deduction suffers from gap2 only if it presup-poses Conceptualism. If the gap Hanna has in mind is gap2, this could be anexplanation for why he only claims that there is a gap in the B Deduction,but doesn’t say anything about the A Deduction. Whereas Kant’s character-ization of a judgement in x19 of the B Deduction as ‘the way to bring givencognitions to the objective unity of apperception’ (CPR B 141) is usuallyunderstood as implying Conceptualism, it is much more controversial whetherthe A Deduction presupposes Conceptualism. I myself believe that neitherthe B nor the A Deduction entails Conceptualism.
24 See Hanna, 2011b: pp. 403ff. and 408–13.
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25 See for example Gunther 2003: p. 1; McDowell 1994: pp. 3–10; and Strawson1966: p. 20.
26 See Hanna 2001: pp. 45–54 and 198–203 Hanna 2005: pp. 253–7, and Hanna2011b: pp. 403ff.
27 Still, I think that things are a little more complicated. Firstly, Hanna onlyclaims that in the passage on blind intuitions Kant uses ‘cognition’ in thebroad sense, but he doesn’t argue for this claim. For an argumentation forthis claim see Gr€une 2009: pp. 27–33. Secondly, even though in the passageon blind intuitions, Kant doesn’t say that intuitions have to be combined withconcepts in order to constitute objective conscious representations, it followsfrom the B and especially from the A Deduction that this is exactly whatKant thinks. In both versions of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant claimsthat in order for sensible representations to be synthesized in such a way thatintuitions are formed, concepts have to function as rules for synthesis. InGr€une 2009 I argue that even though Kant believes that intuitions are formedonly if concepts function as rules for synthesis, he should be regarded not asthe founder of Conceptualism, but as the founder of Non-Conceptualism.
28 Hanna, 2011b: p. 405.29 Byrne and Speaks both point out that state Non-Conceptualism doesn’t imply
content Non-Conceptualism. See Byrne 2004: p. 235 and Speaks 2005: p. 361.30 See CPR A 77ff. / B 104f., CPR A 97–110, CPR B 129f., CPR B 134f., and
CPR B 144.31 See CPR A 77ff. / B 104f., CPR A 103–110, and CPR B 144.32 See CPR A 320 / B376f.33 This is not completely true, because it could be the case that transcendentally
free actions fall under the remaining categories.34 Similarly, Kant writes: ‘The consciousness of myself in the representation I is
no intuition at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-activityof a thinking subject’ (CPR B 278).
35 Since state Conceptualism implies content Conceptualism, the B Deductionalso presupposes content Conceptualism. Concerning the relation betweenstate and content Conceptualism see Byrne, 2004: pp. 234f.
36 As I have said above, in the first part of his paper Hanna only claims that Kantis a non-conceptualist without specifying what kind of Non-Conceptualism hehas in mind. But since the only two versions of Non-Conceptualism are stateand content Non-Conceptualism and since content Non-Conceptualism impliesstate Non-Conceptualism, I assume that Hanna would not object to character-izing Kant as a state non-conceptualist.
37 Hanna only claims that the B Deduction presupposes Conceptualism, but doesnot specify which kind of Conceptualism he has in mind. The passage in hispaper which I have discussed in footnote ⁄⁄⁄ (20) shows that according toHanna, the B Deduction entails content Conceptualism. I assume that Hannabelieves that the B Deduction presupposes both state and content Conceptu-alism.
38 Hanna would not accept this account. At least concerning the A Deductionhe denies that concepts play any role in the formation of intuitions. In the ADeduction, Kant claims that the synthesis of sensible representations thatleads to the formation of intuitions consists of three different elements, whichhe calls synthesis of apprehension, synthesis of reproduction and synthesis ofrecognition. He states that the synthesis of recognition only takes place ifconcepts function as rules for synthesis. Synthesis of apprehension andsynthesis of reproduction by contrast do not involve the use of concepts. As I
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see it, all three elements have to take place in order for intuitions to beformed. Hanna by contrast believes that synthesis of apprehension and syn-thesis of reproduction are sufficient for the formation of intuitions (see Hanna2001: pp. 31–54). I think there are two difficulties with this interpretation:(i) Kant states that the synthesis of apprehension is ‘inseparably combinedwith the synthesis of reproduction’ (CPR A 102) and that ‘all reproduction inthe series of representations would be in vain’ (CPR A 103), if the synthesisof recognition would not take place (see Gr€une 2009 ch. 3). (ii) Kant cannotshow that the categories are necessary a priori conditions of the possibility ofthe experience of all objects (=TD1) if they do not play any role in the for-mation of intuitions or intuitional experience.
39 This position is held for example by Abela 2002; Carl 1992; Ginsborg 1997;Ginsborg 2006; Pippin 1982; and Strawson 1982. I, by contrast, believe thataccording to Kant there are two different kinds of concepts, which are usedin different ways. ‘Clear’ concepts are applied in judgements. ‘Dark’ conceptsfunction as rules for synthesis. Since there are these two different kinds ofconcepts, Kant can deny that the synthesis of sensible representationsinvolves making judgements, but nevertheless affirm that concepts play a rolein the formation of intuitions (see Gr€une 2009). For a similar interpretationof Kant see Longuenesse 1998. According to Longuenesse, the relevant dis-tinction between two kinds of concepts is not the distinction between darkand clear concepts, but between concepts as schemata and clear or reflectedconcepts.
40 See for example CPR A 293f. / B 350, Anthropology AA VII 142, Eberhard-Controversy AA VIII 217, CJ AA XX 227 and PC AA XI 311.
41 See for example CPR A 126.42 See Hanna, 2011b: p. 405 and p. 475 of this paper.
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