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No population-related policy please; we’re British. ‘Population-related’ could embrace most government policy. Modern governments spend about 50% of GDP –affects rationality of union formation, reproduction, death rate and migration incentives. Many (most?) effects of policy are unintended. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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2nd Polish Demographic Congress
Warsaw, 22nd-23rd March
Population-related policy in the United Kingdom: not much to
report.
D.A. Coleman
Oxford Centre for Population Research
University of Oxford
[email protected] http://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/oxpop/
No population-related policy please; we’re British.
‘Population-related’ could embrace most government policy.Modern governments spend about 50% of GDP –affects rationality of
union formation, reproduction, death rate and migration incentives.Many (most?) effects of policy are unintended.Some examples of policies not intended to affect population.
Free state educationFree medical careSubsidised / free housingWelfare incentives for lone parents.Anti-poverty welfare programmes.Foreign policy – e.g. support for EU expansion (migration)
So can be difficult to decide which policies are ‘population-related’.Certainly no ‘pronatalist’ policy in UK.
Population ageingOlder population structures here to stay – an irrevocable,
feature of demographically mature society. A consequence of the demographic transition caused by
beneficial reductions in death and birth rates.A sustainable youthful population would require a return to
high birth and death rates: back to the risk environment of the 18th century and earlier times.
Population age-structures will eventually stabilize, given constant vital rates (i.e. ageing does not get worse and worse).
However longer life does mean even older populations, but changes meaning of ‘old age’.
Given reasonable fertility levels, non-demographic responses should protect the economy and welfare
Earlier history of official policy in UK relating to fertility and population size (a very short story)
National Birth-Rate Commission report 1916 (semi-official) – response to fall in birth rate after 1880s.
Royal Commission on Population 1944 – 1949 Cmd 7695 (low 1930s birth rate and fear of decline)
Select Committee on Science and Technology 1971 (overpopulation following 1960s baby boom)
Overseas Settlement Department 1925 Cmd 4689 1934 and Overseas Migration Board 1936, 1953 – (promoting emigration).
Immigration Acts 1905, 1919, 1962, 1971 and 2010 etc restricting immigration.
Immigration measures 1997 – 2009 facilitating immigration (an innovation with lasting consequences).
Population-related problems in the UKFertility and ageing
Total fertility 1.95 – no action required or contemplated.
Teenage fertility too high – 1998 policy to reduce by 50%. FP, hostels,
Births to immigrant parents – now 30% of total. No policy.
Population ageing - a concern, but less severe than in many countries.
HealthOverall mortality and under-five mortality ‘too high’.
Obesity and Type-2 diabetes (a special UK problem)
Excessive alcohol consumption, liver disease
Poor cancer survival rates (especially breast cancer)
Old-age disability (common to all developed counties)
Immigration / populationReduce net immigration ‘from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands’ as of 2010. Election promise –strong popular support.
Population growth and population density ‘70 million limit’ a focal point but no specific target.
Some popular concern about ‘ethnic replacement’ but no (direct) policy.
Fertility rates – the basic driver of population ageing and its international divergence.TFR trends Major Regions 1950 - 2009
unweighted means. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
CEE unweighted meanSouthern unweighted meanFSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova)Northern EuropeWestern EuropeUSA
TFR trends France, United Kingdom 1945 – 2010. an incomprehensible similarity?
TFR trends in France and the UK 1945 - 2010Sources: ONS, Eurostat and INED.
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
3.0
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
United Kingdom
France
OXPOP
Total fertility trends 1945 - 2010: Czech Republic. France, Poland, UK. Source: Eurostat
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.75
4.00
1945
1947
1949
1951
1953
1955
1957
1959
1961
1963
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
United Kingdom
France
Czech Republic
Poland
Population ageing – an inevitable consequence of demographic transition but
less severe in UK than in many others.Aged potential support ratios 2010, 2060 assuming constant nominal working age 20-64. Source: calculated from UN
2010.
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
Japan Italy Germany France UK Norway Poland Russia SouthKorea
China
Age
d p
oten
tial
su
ppor
t ra
tio
Potential Support Ratio 2010
Potential Support Ratio 2060
The British teenage underclassAlfie Patten, father at 13. Samantha aged 15 and Daniel age 16, parent of twins.
Age-specific fertility rate, ages 15-19, in France, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, UK and EU27, 1960 – 2010. Source: Eurostat
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
0.045
0.050
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
France
Netherlands
Poland
Sweden
United Kingdom
Teenage Pregnancy and Parenthood Strategy and Action Plan 2002-7
Reduce birth-rate to teenage mothers by 20% by 2007.
Reduce birth-rate of teenage mothers under 17 by 40%
75% of teenagers should not have had sexual intercourse by age 16
100% teenage mothers complete formal education
50% teenage mothers in post-16 education.
The development of UK ‘family policy’No coherent explicit family policy even today. Term little used. (no explicit co-ordinated
public programme with clear ‘family’ aims, despite ‘Minister for the Family’ in 1994, ‘Minister of State for Children’ 2003). Balancing work and family a private matter.
Objectives of social policy affect family but not directed at it. Aimed at vulnerable, alleviation of poverty.
Originally based on ‘breadwinner’ model of family and welfare state, entitlement to welfare and security, employment central. A ‘liberal welfare regime’
Policy responds to changes in family patterns: one-parent families, more welfare (and v-v?)
Policies against ‘dependency culture’ created by welfare: Child Support Agency 1993 making absent fathers responsible. ‘obligations more than rights’ Treasury function.
Implicit family policy from ‘New Labour’ 1997.
Employment for all including single mothers. Work/family balance : more childcare services, childcare leave, right to request flexible work time. Redress paid / unpaid work balance.
Target (1999) to abolish child poverty by 2020.
Home Office Family Policy Unit 1999, now DES sure Start etc., Baby Bonds, Education Maintenance Allowances. Early Years Education, parental leave and flexible working. 12 months paid maternity leave 2010
Child Tax credit designed to promote employment and reduce poverty
New Tory policy post 2010
Have recent family policy measures affected the birth rate? (Brewer, Ratcliffe and Smith 2007)
Post-1999 policies focused on benefits for poor families.Working Families Tax Credit (wage supplement for poor).Means-tested Income Support for workless households with
children.50% increase in expenditure on children 1999-2003,
unprecedented in 30 years. increased net income of bottom quintile 10-12%
10% increased probability of birth among couples (especially first births).
Increased employment of lone mothers, fertility effect unclear but may have depressed it (opportunity cost).
No ‘pro-natalist’ intention.
Male expectation of life at birth, selected European
countries, 1945- 2010. Source: Eurostat, Council of Europe, national statistical offices.
Expectation of life at birth, males, selected European countries 1945 - 2010
55
60
65
70
75
80
1945
1948
1951
1954
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1975
1978
1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
Switzerland
United Kingdom
France
Poland
Hungary
Russia
Ukraine
OXPOP
Obesity rates in UK and selected European
countries, and projection to 2050. Sources OECD. Foresight Tackling Obesity Future Choices
Obesity rates among adults, selected European populations around 1990
and 2000. Source: data from OECD 2004 Figure 7
0
5
10
15
20
25
Fran
ce 9
0,00
Net
herl
ands
90,0
1
Swed
en 8
9, 0
1
Ital
y 94
, 00
Aus
tria
91,
99
Den
mar
k 87
,00
Finl
and
90, 0
1
Icel
and
90, 0
2
Spai
n 87
, 01
Cze
ch re
publ
ic93
, 02
Uni
ted
Kin
gdom
91, 0
1
Per
cent
of a
dult
s w
ith
Bod
y M
ass
Inde
x ov
er 3
0.
1990
2000
Future forecast of the proportion of adults and children overweight and obese, UK to 2050.
Recent UK migration situation
Uneasy consensus on restriction since 1960s broken in 1997.Public dislike of large inflows contributed to Labour election
defeat in 2010.Labour government policy 1997-2010: easier entry for labour
and non-labour migration, family, students.New government 2010 promised to reduce net inflow to ‘tens
of thousands’.Net inflow 2009 198,000; foreign +242k net, UK -44k. Net
inflow since late 1990s historically high. Most net immigration not work related.Consequent inflow of 3 million immigrants since 1997; 2
million additional immigrant population. Fastest population growth since 1962. 16 million additional population projected up to 2051.
Claims made in favour of more immigration
Demographic benefits - workforce, ageing.‘Essential for economic growth’.Entrepreneurial benefits.Fiscal benefits.Fill skills shortages, keeps NHS going, IT needs.Perform ‘dirty jobs’.‘London / UK / NHS would collapse without them’.Cultural, social benefits of ‘diversity’.All with no damage to ‘native’ interests.And England always a ‘country of immigration’.
Three related demographic problems behind argument for more immigrants.
End of growth of population, possible decline.End of growth and possible decline in labour force
and of young labour force entrants; failure of economic growth.
Population ageing leads to crises in pensions and old-age care.
Made salient by UN Report of 2000 on ‘Replacement migration’.
UK net immigration trends 1962 – 2010 (thousands)
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
30019
63
1965
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
thou
san
ds
UK Net Immigration 1962-2010(thousands). Source: ONS.
Net balance corrected
Post-2001 Census
more
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Spouse migration by sex , UK 1973-2006Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.
All husbands All wives
UK net immigration by citizenship 1967 – 2010.
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1967
1969
1971
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
UK net migration by citizenship 1967 - 2010(thousands).
Note: there are discontinuities in this series from 1991. Source: ONS International Migration Statistics Series MN, ONS Statistical Bulletin, Migration Statistics 2009.
Foreign citizens
Foreign citizens (post 1991)
UK citizens
UK Citizens (post 1991)
Projection of UK population, 2011 – 2061. Sources: ONS and OXPOP.
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061
UK population 2010 - 2061. Principal projection and high and low migration variants
ONS high migration variant
ONS low migration variant
ONS Principal projection. TFR = 1.84, net migation = 200k
OXPOP TFR 1.95, net migration 240k
OXPOP
Polish-born population UK 2001-2010 (thousands). Source: ONS Annual Population Survey.
0
100
200
300
400
500
60020
01
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Projection of UK population 2006 – 2056, three major ethnic categories. Assumptions: overall population total, net
immigration and mortality trends as in ONS 2008-based Principal Projection
Standard scenario, percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2006 - 2056
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056
British, Scottish, Irish
Non-white ethnic minorities
Other White
Obstacles to achieving aim of reducing net immigration to the UK
Hostility of Liberal Democrat coalition partners to basic policy of reduction of immigration.
Hostility of Liberal Democrat partners to reform of Human Rights legislation, EU arrangements.
Incompatibility with other strands of government policy: cutting expenditure on police and border controls, enthusiasm for EU membership of Balkan countries, Turkey, increase in foreign aid.
EU immigration (Eastern Europe) cannot be stopped.Economic dependency and distortion from 13 years of high immigration.Opposition from business interests – ‘risking the recovery’.Opposition from universities made dependent upon non-EU students.Strength of well-funded immigrant pressure groups.Electoral pressure from immigrants, including non-UK citizens.Likely long-term increase of asylum claims, forced climate migration.Instability of ‘net’ migration (little control over emigration element).
New policies to reduce immigration
Restriction on labour migration - temporary quota, raising of points requirements, abolition of unskilled non-EU labour migration
Raising minimum age of spouses to 21Enhanced English-language requirementMore rigorous checking of colleges taking overseas
students, and tight visa requirementsEnforcement of evidence of entitlement to work in
UK(No effect on EU migration)
Current explicit population-related policies
Reduction of teenage childbearing by 50% by 2010 (only fertility target ever proposed - 1998)
Reduction of net immigration from ‘hundreds of thousands’ to ‘tens of thousands’ 2010
Population distribution (?)
NO POLICY on overall birth-rate
England and Wales 1990 – 2009, percent of births to immigrant parents. Source: ONS.
England and Wales 1990 - 2009, percent of births by birthplace of parents (cases where both parents' birthplaces recorded only).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Per
cen
t of
bir
ths
by
birt
hpla
ce o
f pa
ren
ts
Neither parent UK-born
UK born father, non-UK born mother
UK born mother, non-UK born father
Mother born outside UK
One or both parents born outside UK
Social Justice Strategy White Paper ‘Social Justice: Transforming Lives’ (CM 8314). 13 March
2012
The government says it wants to see "more stable families - an increase in the number of families staying together, and conversely a reduction in divorce and separation rates, especially where children are involved".
• 28% of children in lone-parent families live in relative poverty, compared with 17% for those for "couple families".
• It adds: "The government believes that investing in support to stabilise vulnerable families is the best starting point for tackling disadvantage and poverty.
• "It has cloaked neglect of the family under the veil of neutrality, failing to invest in the prevention of breakdown and introducing rules and institutions - such as the couple penalty in the tax credit system - that made it more worthwhile for couples to live apart than to stay together.
• research consistently shows that, wherever possible, it is better for children to be raised within the context of a loving family with two parents who are married to one another." Mark molden
I.D. Smith: Work and Pensions Secretary
Results of policy?
Overall fertility –increased through immigration and welfare changes and ‘recuperation’
Teenage fertility only slight reduction, Young People’s Development Programme no results
Obesity – contradictory evidence3 programmes aimed at diet and exercise in children, increase in knowledge and activity, no change in overweight prevalence.(WHO 2007).
School Food, Child Measurement, Healthy Towns, Food labelling and diet change. recent flat-lining in prevalence in adults and children.
Immigration – net immigration substantially increased
An example: Potential Support Ratio (a measure of population ageing), UK 1980-2100 GAD Principal Projection 1998-based. Population Trends 103
Figure 7 Ratio of persons aged 15-64 to those aged 65 and over, United Kingdom, 1980-2100
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
Rat
io
HF - HM
PP
HF - PMHF - LMPF - HM
LF - HMPF - LM
LF - PMLF - LM
See Box 4 for key
Projected
How to restore UK PSR to about 4 by 2056 (i) TFR of 5.5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2006
2016
2026
2036
2046
2056
2066
2076
2086
UK population 2006-86. Major age-groups (percent of total)
.
0-14
15-64
65 and over
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
450,000
500,000
2006
2016
2026
2036
2046
2056
2066
2076
2086
United Kingdom. Population projection 2006-2086 (thousands).
OXPOP projection
ONS Principal Projection
1.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.0
10.0
2006
2016
2026
2036
2046
2056
2066
2076
2086
United Kingdom 2006-86. Aged potential support ratio
4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
100+
UK population distribution by age and sex 2006 (percent)
females males
-10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
100+
UK Population distribution by age and sex 2086 (percent)
females males
8.007.006.005.004.003.002.001.000.001.002.003.004.005.006.007.008.00
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
100+
UK population distribution by age and sex 2026 (percent )
females males
How to restore UK PSR to 4 by 2056. (ii) increase net annual immigration to 800,000.
50,000
70,000
90,000
110,000
130,000
150,000
170,000
190,0002
00
6
20
16
20
26
20
36
20
46
20
56
20
66
20
76
20
86
United Kingdom. Population projection 2006-2086 (thousands).
OXPOP projection
ONS Principal Projection
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
20
06
20
16
20
26
20
36
20
46
20
56
20
66
20
76
20
86
UK population 2006-86. Major age-groups (percent of total)
.
0-14
15-64
65 and over
4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
100+
UK population distribution by age and sex 2006 (percent)
females males
-4.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
100+
UK Population distribution by age and sex 2086 (percent)
females males5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
0-4
10-14
20-24
30-34
40-44
50-54
60-64
70-74
80-84
90-94
100+
UK population distribution by age and sex 2026 (percent )
females males
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
2006
2016
2026
2036
2046
2056
2066
2076
2086
United Kingdom 2006-86. Aged potential support ratio
UK 2056. Projected population according to age, sex and minority status.
Assumptions: overall fertility, net migration and mortality as for ONS 2008 Principal Projection. Ethnic distribution of TFR and immigration according to Coleman (2010).
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0 500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-84
85-89
90-94
95-99
100+
UK population 2056, major ethnic groups by age and sex. Source: OXPOP baseline projection.
Minority male population
White British male population
Minority female population
White British female population
Managing population ageing – non-demographic approaches.
Improve the actual support ratio.(a) increase the average age of retirement
increase pension entitlement age remove tax and other disincentives for working pensionersend of ‘cliff-edge’ retirement.
(b) increase workforce participationretraining unemployed, discouraging early retirement and perpetual students, more flexible labour market arrangements family policy to help women to combine work with childcare
Moderate the financial burdenimprovements to pension systems.
Increase labour productivity
Keeping retirement in line with longer life. The effect of expanding nominal working age limits from ages 20-64 to ages 20-69: potential support ratios in 2060 by comparison
with potential support ratios in 2010. Source: calculated from UN 2010.
PSR 2060 as a fraction of 2010 PSR20-64 working 20-69 working increase in 2060
age in 2060 age in 2060 PSR percent.China 0.22 0.34 52.5
France 0.59 0.81 38.3Germany 0.54 0.75 38.0
Italy 0.52 0.71 35.9Japan 0.51 0.68 34.1
Norway 0.53 0.76 43.7Poland 0.34 0.49 43.9
South Korea 0.24 0.35 45.1Russia 0.41 0.58 41.0
UK 0.58 0.83 44.9
Effects on UK PSR of higher retirement ages Shaw 2001, Population Trends 103
Figure 8 Support ratio under alternative assumptions, United Kingdom, 1980-2100(a) alternative migration assumptions
(b) alternative fertility assumptions
(c) alternative upper boundaries for working age
0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.55.05.5
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year
Rat
io
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year
Rat
io
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100Year
Rat
io 65
69686766
70
71
72Long-term TFR: 1.8Long-term annual net inward migration: 95,000