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INTHEHIGHCOURTOFJUDICATUREATBOMBAY

CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION

CRIMINALPUBLICINTERESTLITIGATIONNO.3OF2015

SanskarMarathe ..Petitioner

versus

1.TheStateofMaharashtrathroughCommissionerofPolice,Mumbai.

2.TheSeniorPoliceInspector,BandraKurlaComplexPoliceStation,BKC,Mumbai.

3.AssemTrivedi,1/458A,Rishinagar,Shuklaganj,Unnao,UttarPradesh209861. ..Respondents

Mr.SanskarMarathe,petitionerinperson.

Mr.SunilV.Manohar,AdvocateGeneralwithMr.S.K.Shinde,GovernmentPleaderforrespondentnos.1and2.

Mr.MihirDesaiwithMr.VijayHiremathforrespondentno.3.

CORAM:MOHITS.SHAH,C.J.ANDN.M.JAMDAR,J.

DateofReservingthejudgment:19January2015

Dateofpronouncingthejudgment:17March2015

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JUDGMENT(PerChiefJustice):

1. ArrestofoneAssemTrivedion8September2012on

thebasisofregistrationofFirstInformationReport(`FIR')on

30January2012alleging,interalia,commissionofoffenceof

sedition punishable under Section 124A of the Indian Penal

Code,1860,ledtofilingofthepresentPublicInterestLitigation

whichisnowregisteredasCriminalPIL.

2. TheallegationintheFIRistotheeffectthatAssem

Trivedi,whoisapoliticalcartoonistandsocialactivist,through

hiscartoons,notonlydefamedParliament,theConstitutionof

IndiaandtheAshokEmblembutalsotriedtospreadhatredand

disrespect against the Government and published the said

cartoonson`IndiaAgainstCorruption"website,whichnotonly

amounts to insult under the National Emblems Act but also

amountstoseriousactofsedition. AfterthearrestofAssem

Trivedi on 9 September 2012, he was produced before the

learnedMetropolitan Magistrate. Thepetitioner alleged that

AssemTrivedirefusedtomakeanapplicationforbailtill the

chargesofseditionweredropped.Contendingthatpublication

and/or posting such political cartoons on website canby no

stretchofimaginationattractaseriouschargeofseditionand

that AssemTrivedi was languishing in jail onaccount of the

chargeofseditionbeingincludedintheFIR,thepetitioner,a

practicingadvocateinthisCourt,movedthepresentPILon11

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September2012.Thematterwasmentionedforcirculationand

thisCourtpassedthefollowingadinterimorder:

" Inthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase,bythisadinterimorderwedirectthatMr.AssemTrivedi be released on bail on executing apersonalbondinthesumofRs.5,000/.

Registry tocommunicatethisorderto theSuperintendent,ArthurRoadJail."

Accordingly,Mr.AssemTrivediexecutedapersonal

bondandwasreleasedonbail.

Thereafter, on the returnable date, leave was

grantedtoimpleadMr.AssemTrivediasrespondentno.3.

3. Thethirdrespondentclaimedtohaveexercisedhis

fundamentalrighttothefreedomofspeechandexpressionasa

cartoonistandclaimedthathisarrestanddetentionseriously

encroacheduponthe freedomguaranteedtoeverycitizenby

Article19(1)(g)oftheConstitutionofIndia.

4. Affidavitinreplydated12October2012cametobe

filedbyAssistant Commissionerof Police, Kherwadi Division,

Mumbaistatingthatthethirdrespondenthaddisplayedseveral

cartoonsatapublicmeetingheldon27November2011atthe

MMRDAground in Mumbai. The said meeting was held in

connection with the movement launched by Anna Hazare

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againstcorruptioninIndia.Apartfromdisplayingthecartoons,

hehadalsouploadedsomeofhiscartoonsonawebsitecalled

"CartoonsagainstCorruption".Pursuanttotheabovedisplayof

cartoons, several complaints came to be filed against Aseem

Trivedi.

On10January2012,BandraKurlaComplexPolice

Station received a written complaint from Amit Katarnavare

askingthePolicetoregisteranFIR,interalia,underSections

124A,153A,120B,167and109ofIndianPenalCode.When

the said complaints were forwarded to the Directorate of

Prosecutions, Maharashtra State for opinion, the Assistant

Director, Public Prosecution, Brihanmumbai vide his opinion

dated10January2012advisedtoinvokeSection124Aofthe

IPCandprovisions of State Emblemof India (Prohibition of

ImproperUse)Act,2005. On30January2012,BandraKurla

ComplexPoliceStationregisteredanFIRvideCRNo.14of2012

underSection124AofIPC,underSection2ofNationalHonour

Act and under Section 66A of Information Technology Act

basedonstatementofAmitKatarnavare,whichwasrecorded

on30December2011.

5. In view of the above complaint, a non bailable

warrant came to be issued by Additional Metropolitan

Magistrate, 9th Court, Bandra, Mumbai on 2 August 2012

againstthethirdrespondent. However,hecouldnotbefound

and when he learnt of issuance of a nonbailable warrant

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against him, he surrendered before BandraKurla Complex

PoliceStationon8September2012.On9September2012the

Metropolitan Magistrate granted police custody of the third

respondentforsevendays. However,on10September2012,

PoliceproducedhimbeforetheMetropolitanMagistrateashe

hadadmittedtohavedrawnthecartoons. However,thethird

respondentdidnotapplyforbail.Thereafter,asaforesaid,this

Courtpassedanorderdated11September2012directingthe

Policetoreleasethethirdrespondentonbailonhisexecuting

personalbond.

6. Thereafter,BandraKurlaPoliceobtainedopinionof

thethenAdvocateGeneralwithregardtoinvocationofSection

124AofIPCtothefactsofpresentcase,amongstotherqueries.

Pursuant to the legal opinion of the then learned Advocate

General,itwasdecidedtodropinvocationofSection124Aof

IPC.ThePoliceDepartment,however,tookaviewthatasfaras

application of Section 2 of Prevention of Insult to National

HonourAct,1971andSection66(A)ofInformationTechnology

Actisconcerned,thesamewillapplyonlytothreeoutofseven

cartoons,whichwillbedealtwithinaccordancewithlaw.

7. Inviewoftheabovedevelopments,thecontroversy

aboutinvocationofSection124AofIPCwouldnotsurviveany

longer in the facts of the present case. However, learned

counsel for petitioner submitted that since the Police had

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arbitrarilyinvokedtheseriouschargeofseditionunderSection

124AofIPCinamatterwherethecartoonistwasentitledto

exercise his fundamental right to the freedomof speechand

expressionunderArticle19(1)(a)oftheConstitutionofIndia,

this Court may examine the legal position so that such

invocation is not resorted to, in future, in an arbitrary and

irresponsiblemanner.We,therefore,heardthelearnedcounsel

forPILpetitioner,learnedAdvocateGeneralfortheStateand

learnedcounselforthirdrespondentMr.AseemTrivedi.

8. At theoutset, wemayreproduceSection124Aof

IPCforreadyreference:

"124ASedition: Whoever, by words, either spoken orwritten,orbysigns,orbyvisiblerepresentation,or otherwise,bringsorattemptstobringintohatredor contempt,orexcitesorattemptstoexcitedisaffection towardstheGovernmentestablishedbylawinIndia, shallbepunishedwithimprisonmentforlife,towhich finemaybeadded,orwithimprisonmentwhichmay extendtothreeyears,towhichfinemaybeadded,or withfine.

Explanation1 The expression "disaffection" includesdisloyaltyandallfeelingsofenmity.

Explanation2 Comments expressing disapprobationofthemeasuresoftheGovernmentwitha view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contemptordisaffection,donotconstituteanoffence underthissection.

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Explanation3 Comments expressing disapprobationoftheadministrativeorotheractionof the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constituteanoffenceunderthissection.

Classificationofoffence: PunishmentImprisonmentforlifeandfine,orimprisonmentfor3yearsandfine, orfineCognizableNonbailableTriablebyCourtof SessionNoncompoundable."

9. Article19(1)(a)conferringthefundamentalrightto

freedomofspeechandexpressionandArticle19(2) readas

under:

"19.(1)Allcitizensshallhavetheright

(a) to freedom of speech and expression..." Thisguaranteedrightissubjecttotherightof the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions,theambitofwhichisindicatedby clause(2),which,initsamendedform,reads asfollows:

"19 (2) Nothing in subclause (a) of clause (1)shallaffecttheoperationofanyexisting law or prevent the State from making any law,insofarassuchlawimposesreasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said subclause in the interestsofthesecurityoftheState,friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decencyormorality,orinrelationtocontempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence."

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10. Intheleadingcaseof KedarNathSinghVs.State

ofBihar1,aConstitutionBenchoftheSupremeCourtexamined

thequestionhowfartheoffence,asdefinedinSection124Aof

IPC, is consistent with the fundamental right guaranteed by

Article19(1)(a)oftheConstitution,andobserved,interalia,as

under:

"24. ...... It has not beenquestionedbefore us that the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a)ofthefreedomofspeechandexpressionis notanabsoluteright.Itiscommongroundthatthe right is subject to such reasonable restrictions as wouldcomewithinthepurviewofclause(2),which comprises (a) security of the State, (b) friendly relations withforeignStates, (c) public order, (d) decencyormorality,etc.,etc.Withreferencetothe constitutionalityofs. 124Aors. 505oftheIndianPenalCode,astohowfartheyareconsistentwith the requirements of clause (2) of Art. 19 withparticular reference to security of the State and publicorder,thesection,itmustbenoted,penalises any spoken or written words or signs or visible representations, etc., which have the effect of bringing,orwhichattempttobringintohatredor contemptorexcitesorattemptstoexcitedisaffection towards theGovernmentestablishedby law. Now, theexpression "the Government establishedbylaw"hastobedistinguishedfromthepersons forthetimebeingengagedincarryingonthe administration. "Government established by law"isthevisiblesymboloftheState.Theveryexistence of the State will be in jeopardy if the Governmentestablishedbylawissubverted.Hence the continued existence of the Government establishedbylawisanessentialconditionofthe

1 AIR-1962-SC-955

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stabilityoftheState.Thatiswhy'sedition',asthe offence in s. 124A has been characterised, comes under Chapter VI relating to offences against the State.Henceanyactswithinthemeaningofs.124AwhichhavetheeffectofsubvertingtheGovernment by bringing that Government into contempt or hatred,orcreatingdisaffectionagainstit,wouldbe within the penal statute because the feeling of disloyaltytotheGovernmentestablishedbylawor enmitytoitimportstheideaoftendencytopublic disorderbytheuseofactualviolenceorincitement toviolence.Inotherwords,anywrittenorspoken words,etc.,whichhaveimplicitinthemtheideaof subvertingGovernmentbyviolentmeans,whichare compendiously included in the term 'revolution', havebeenmadepenal by thesection inquestion. But the sectionhas takencare to indicate clearly that strong words used to express disapprobationofthemeasuresofGovernment withaviewtotheirimprovementoralteration by lawful means would not come within the section.Similarly,comments,howeverstrongly worded,expressingdisapprobationofactionsof theGovernment,withoutexcitingthosefeelings whichgeneratethe inclinationtocausepublic disorderbyactsofviolence,wouldnotbepenal. Inotherwords,disloyaltytoGovernmentestablished by law is not the same thing as commenting in strong terms upon the measures or acts of Government,oritsagencies,soastoamelioratethe conditionofthepeopleortosecurethecancellation or alteration of those acts or measures by lawful means,thatistosay,withoutexcitingthosefeelings ofenmityanddisloyaltywhichimplyexcitementto publicdisorderortheuseofviolence.

25. Ithasnotbeencontendedbeforeusthatifa speechorawritingexcitespeopletoviolenceorhave thetendencytocreatepublicdisorder,itwouldnot come within the definition of 'sedition'. What has beencontendedisthatapersonwhomakesavery

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strong speech or uses very vigorous words in a writing directed to a very strong criticism of measuresofGovernmentoractsofpublicofficials, might also come within the ambit of the penal section.But,inouropinion,suchwordswrittenor spokewouldbeoutsidethescopeofthesection.In this connection, it is pertinent to observe that the security of the State, which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is the very basic considerationuponwhichlegislation,withviewto punishingoffencesagainsttheState,isundertaken. Such a legislation has, on the one hand, fully to protect and guarantee the freedomof speech and expression,whichisthesinequononofademocratic form of Government that our Constitution has established. This Court, as the custodian and guarantorofthefundamentalrightsofthecitizens, hasthedutycastuponitofstrikingdownanylaw which unduly restricts the freedomof speech and expressionwithwhichweareconcernedinthiscase. Butthefreedomhastobeguardedagainstbecoming a licence for vilification and condemnation of the Government established by law, in words, which inciteviolenceorhavethetendencytocreatepublic disorder. Acitizen has a right to say or write whateverhelikesabouttheGovernment,orits measures, by wayof criticismorcomment, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by lawor with the intentionof creating public disorder. TheCourt,has,therefore,thedutycastuponitof drawing a clear line of demarcation between the ambit of a citizen's fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictionsonthatguaranteedrightintheinterest of,interalia,securityoftheStateandpublicorder.

26. .......Therecanbenodoubtthatapartfrom theprovisionsofclause(2)ofArt.19,Sections124Aand505areclearlyviolativeofArt.19(1)(a)ofthe

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Constitution.Butthenwehavetoseehowfarthe savingclause,namely,clause(2)ofArt.19protects thesectionsaforesaid.Now,asalreadypointedout, intermsoftheamendedclause(2),quotedabove, theexpression"intheinterestof....publicorder"are words of great amplitude and are much more comprehensive than the expression "for the maintenance of", as observed by this Court in the caseofVirendrav.TheStateofPunjab:1958SCR308atP.317:[(S)AIR1957SC896atP.899].Any lawwhichisenactedintheinterestofpublicorder may be saved from the vice of constitutional invalidity.If,ontheotherhand,weweretoholdthat evenwithoutanytendencytodisorderorintentionto createdisturbanceof lawandorder, bytheuseof words written or spoke which merely create disaffection or feelings of enmity against the Government,theoffenceofseditioniscomplete,then suchan interpretationof thesections wouldmake themunconstitutionalinviewofArt.19(1)(a)readwith clause (2). It is well settled that if certain provisionsoflawconstruedinonewaywouldmake themconsistentwiththeConstitution,andanother interpretationwouldrender themunconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction.Theprovisionsofthesectionsreadasa whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonablyclearthatthesectionsaimatrendering penalonlysuchactivitiesaswouldbeintended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbanceofpublicpeacebyresorttoviolence. Asalreadypointedout,theexplanationsappendedto the main body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded, wouldbewithinreasonablelimitsandwouldbe consistentwiththefundamentalrightoffreedomof speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating publicdisorderordisturbanceoflawandorder

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thatthelawstepsintopreventsuchactivitiesin the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct balancebetween individual fundamental rights andtheinterestofpublicorder."

(emphasissupplied)

11. Thereafter, SupremeCourt examined this question

againinBalwantSinghandanotherVs.StateofPunjab2.On

thedateofassassinationofformerPrimeMinisterSmt.Indira

Gandhi,considerabletensionhadbeengeneratedintheStateof

Punjab. The appellants raised three slogans and they were

chargedwiththeoffencespunishableunderSections124Aand

153Bof IPC. In that context, the SupremeCourt made the

followingobservations:

"Aplain reading of the above Sectionwould show thatitsapplicationwouldbeattractedonlywhenthe accused brings or attempts to bring into hatredor contemptorexcitesorattemptstoexcitedisaffection towardstheGovernmentestablishedbylawinIndia, bywordseitherwrittenorspokenorvisiblesignsor representationsetc. Keepinginviewtheprosecution evidencethattheslogansasnoticedabovewereraised a couple of times only by the appellant and that neithertheslogansevokedaresponsefromanyother personoftheSikhcommunityorreactionfrompeople ofothercommunities,wefinditdifficulttoholdthat upontheraisingofsuchcasualslogans,acoupleof timeswithoutanyotheractwhatsoever,thechargeof seditioncanbefounded.Itisnottheprosecutioncase thattheappellantswereeitherleadingaprocession or were otherwise raising the slogans with the intentiontoincitepeopletocreatedisorderorthat

2 AIR-1995-SC-1785

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the slogans in fact created any law and order problem. It does not appear to us that thepolice shouldhaveattachedmuchsignificancetothecasual slogansraisedbytwoappellants, acoupleof times andreadtoomuchintothem. Theprosecutionhas admittedthatnodisturbance,whatsoever,wascaused bytheraisingoftheslogansbytheappellantsand thatinspiteofthefactthattheappellantsraisedthe slogansacoupleoftimes,thepeople,ingeneral,were unaffected and carried on with their normal activities. Thecasualraisingoftheslogans,onceor twicebytwoindividualsalonecannotbesaidtobe aimed at exciting or attempt to excite hatred or disaffection towards the Government as established bylawinIndia.Section124AIPC,wouldinthefacts and circumstances of the case have no application whatsoeverandwouldnotbeattractedtothefacts andcircumstancesofthecase."

12. In Nazir Khan vs. State of Delhi3, the Supreme

Courtexplainedseditionasdefinedinsection124AIPCinthe

followingwords:

37. Section124Adealswith'Sedition'.Seditionisa crimeagainstsocietynearlyalliedtothatoftreason, anditfrequentlyprecedestreasonbyashortinterval. Sedition in itself is a comprehensive term, and it embracesallthosepractices,whetherbyword,deed,or writing,whicharecalculatedtodisturbthetranquility oftheState,andleadignorantpersonstoendeavourto subverttheGovernmentandlawsofthecountry. The objects of seditiongenerally are to induce discontent and insurrection, and stir up opposition to the Government, and bring the administration of justice intocontempt;andtheverytendencyofseditionisto incitethepeopletoinsurrectionandrebellion."Sedition

3 (2003) 8 SCC 461

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hasbeendescribedasdisloyaltyinaction,andthelaw considersasseditionallthosepracticeswhichhavefor their object to excite discontent or dissatisfaction, to create public disturbance, or to lead to civil war; to bring into hatred or contempt the Sovereign or the Government, the laws or constitutions of the realm, and generally all endeavours to promote public disorder.

13. In S.RangarajanVs.P.JagjivanRamandothers4

the Supreme Court considered the fundamental right to

freedomofspeechandexpressioninthecontextofcensorship

under the Cinematograph Act. A Tamil film criticised the

GovernmentpolicyofreservationinGovernmentservice.After

examining the judgments of the SupremeCourt of USA, the

ApexCourtobservedasunder:

7. .... The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedomof speech, or of the press."ThisAmendmentisabsoluteintermsandit contains noexception for theexercise of the right. Heavy burden lies on the State to justify the interference.Thejudicialdecisions,however,limited thescopeofrestrictionwhichtheStatecouldimpose inanygivencircumstances.Thedangerrulewasborn in Schenek v. United States, 249 U.S. 47. Justice Holmes for aunanimous court, evolved the test of "clearandpresentdanger".Heusedthedangertestto determinewherediscussionendsand incitementor attemptbegins.Thecoreofhispositionwasthatthe FirstAmendmentprotectsonlyutterancesthatseeks acceptance via thedemocratic process of discussion andagreement. But "Words that mayhaveall the effect of force" calculated to achieve its goal by

4 (1989) 2 SCC 574

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circumventing the democratic process are however, notsoprotected.

8. TheframeworkofourConstitutiondiffersfromtheFirstAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.Article 19(1)(a) of our Constitution guarantees to all citizenstherighttofreedomofspeechandexpression. Thefreedomofexpressionmeanstherighttoexpress onesopinionbywordsofmouth,writing,printing, pictureorinanyothermanner.Itwouldthusinclude the freedom of communication and the right to propagateorpublishopinion.Thecommunicationof ideas could be made through any medium, newspaper, magazine or movie. But this right is subjecttoreasonablerestrictionsongroundssetout under Article 13(2) of the Constitution. The reasonablelimitationscanbeputintheinterestof sovereigntyandintegrityofIndia,thesecurityofthe State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,decencyormoralityorinrelationtocontempt ofcourt,defamationorincitementtoanoffence.The Framersdeemeditessentialtopermitimpositionof reasonablerestrictionsinthelargerinterestsofthe community andcountry. They intended to strike a properbalancebetweenthe liberty guaranteedand thesocialinterestspecifiedunderArticle19(2).

11. Hereagainwefindthedifferencebetweenthe FirstAmendmenttotheU.S.ConstitutionandArticle 19(1)(a)ofourConstitution.TheFirstAmendment does not permit any prior restraint, since the guarantyoffreespeechisinunqualifiedterms.

17. Itwillbethusseenthatcensorshipispermitted mainlyonsocialinterestspecifiedunderArticle19(2) oftheConstitutionwithemphasisonmaintenanceof values and standards of society. Therefore, the censorship by prior restraint must necessarily be reasonablethatcouldbesavedbythewellaccepted principlesofjudicialreview.

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Asregardsthereasonablenessofrestrictiononthegroundof

socialinterestsunderArticle19(2)onthefreedomofspeech

and expression, the Apex Court laid down the following

principles:

45. Theproblemofdefiningtheareaoffreedomof expression when it appears to conflict with the various social interests enumerated under Article 19(2)maybrieflybetoucheduponhere.Theredoes indeedhavetobeacompromisebetweentheinterest offreedomofexpressionandsocialinterests.Butwe cannotsimplybalancethetwointerests,asiftheyare of equal weight. Our commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unlessthesituationscreatedbyallowingthefreedom are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched. It should have proximateanddirectnexuswiththeexpression.The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangeroustothepublicinterests.Inotherwords,the expressionshouldbeinseparablylockedupwiththe actioncontemplatedliketheequivalentofa"sparkin apowderkeg".

53. We end here as we began on this topic. Freedom of expression which is legitimate and constitutionallyprotected,cannotbeheldtoransombyanintolerantgroupofpeople.Thefundamental freedomunder Article 19(1)(a) can be reasonably restrictedforthepurposesmentionedinArticle19(2)andtherestrictionmustbejustifiedontheanvilof necessity and not the quicksand of convenience of expediency. Open criticism of Government policies and operations is not a ground for restricting expression.Wemustpracticetolerancetotheviewsof others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracyastothepersonhimself."

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14. In Sakal Vs. Unionof India5 the SupremeCourt

observedthatCourtsmustbeevervigilantinguardingthemost

preciousofallthefreedomsguaranteedbytheConstitutioni.e.

freedomof expression and speech. In Manubhai Patel Vs.

StateofGujaratandanother6theGujaratHighCourtobserved

thattherecanindeedbenorealfreedomunlessthoughtisfree

andunchecked,notfreethoughtforthosewhoagreewithus

butfreedomforthethoughtwehate.However,theconstitution

does not permit the Legislature to make laws imposing

reasonablerestrictionsonsuchfreedomonthegroundssetout

in clause (2) of Article 19, including in the interests of

sovereigntyandintegrityofIndiaandthesecurityoftheState.

15. Onaperusaloftheaforesaidjudgments,itisclear

thattheprovisionsofsection124AofIPCcannotbeinvokedto

penalizecriticismofthepersonsforthetimebeingengagedin

carrying on administration or strong words used to express

disapprobationofthemeasuresofGovernmentwithaviewto

their improvement or alteration by lawful means. Similarly,

comments,howeverstronglyworded,expressingdisapprobation

of actionsof theGovernment, withoutexcitingthosefeelings

whichgeneratetheinclinationtocausepublicdisorderbyacts

ofviolence,wouldnotbepenal.Acitizenhasarighttosayor

5 (1962)3-SCR-8426 1972-Cri.L.J.-388

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writewhateverhelikesabouttheGovernment,oritsmeasures,

bywayofcriticismorcomments,solongashedoesnotincite

peopletoviolenceagainsttheGovernmentestablishedbylawor

withtheintentionofcreatingpublicdisorder.Thesectionaims

atrenderingpenalonlysuchactivitiesaswouldbeintended,or

have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public

peacebyresorttoviolence.

16. Cartoons or caricatures are visual representations,

wordsorsignswhicharesupposedtohaveanelementofwit,

humourorsarcasm.Havingseenthesevencartoonsinquestion

drawnbythethirdrespondent,itisdifficulttofindanyelement

of wit or humour or sarcasm. The cartoons displayed at a

meetingheldon27November2011inMumbai,asapartof

movement launched by Anna Hazare against corruption in

India, were full of anger and disgust against corruption

prevailinginthepoliticalsystemandhadnoelementofwitor

humourorsarcasm.Butforthatreason,thefreedomofspeech

andexpressionavailabletothethirdrespondenttoexpresshis

indignationagainstcorruptioninthepoliticalsysteminstrong

termsorvisualrepresentationscouldnothavebeenencroached

uponwhenthereisnoallegationofincitementtoviolenceor

thetendencyortheintentiontocreatepublicdisorder.

17. Wedonotfinditnecessarytodwellonthesubject

anyfurther,asthelearnedAdvocateGeneralsubmittedthatthe

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StateGovernmentinHomeDepartmentwillissuethefollowing

guidelinesintheformofaCirculartoallthePolicepersonnel:

(1) In view of the felt need to issue certain

guidelinestobefollowedbyPolicewhileinvoking

Section 124A IPC, the following preconditions

mustbekeptinmindwhilstapplyingthesame:

(i) The words, signs or representations must

bringtheGovernment(CentralorState)into

hatredorcontemptormustcauseorattempt

tocausedisaffection,enmityordisloyaltyto

the Government and the words/signs/

representationmustalsobeanincitementto

violence or must be intended or tend to

create public disorder or a reasonable

apprehensionofpublicdisorder;

(ii) Words, signs or representations against

politicians or public servants by themselves

do not fall in this category unless the

words/signs/representations show them as

representativeoftheGovernment;

(iii) Comments expressing disapproval or

criticismoftheGovernmentwithaviewto

obtainingachangeofgovernmentbylawful

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means without any of the above are not

seditiousunderSection124A;

(iv) Obscenityorvulgaritybyitselfshouldnotbe

taken into account as a factor or

consideration for deciding whether a case

fallswithinthepurviewofSection124Aof

IPC, for they are covered under other

sectionsoflaw;

(v) A legal opinion in writing which gives

reasons addressing the aforesaid must be

obtained from Law Officer of the District

followedwithintwoweeksbyalegalopinion

in writing from Public Prosecutor of the

State.

2.(i) AllUnitCommandersaredirectedtofollow

aboveinstructionsscrupulously.

(ii) It must also be kept in mind that the

instructions mentioned above are not

exhaustive and other relevant factors

dependingfromcasetocasemayalsobekept

inmindwhileapplyingSection124Aofthe

IPC.

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18. Weclarifythatthismatterwasheardonlyonthe

limitedquestionofinvocationofSection124AofIPCandthe

permissible lawful restriction on the freedom of speech and

expressionintheinterestsofpublicorderandnotinanyother

respectnorinrespectofanyotheroffenceallegedtohavebeen

committedbythethirdrespondent.

19. ThePILaccordinglystandsdisposedof.

20. Wewouldliketoplaceonrecordourappreciation

forthevaluableassistancerenderedbyMr.DariusKhambata,

the then learned Advocate General, as well as Mr. Sunil

Manohar, learnedAdvocateGeneral, Mr. Mihir Desai, learned

counselforthethirdrespondentandMr.Marathe,thepartyin

person.

(CHIEFJUSTICE)

(N.M.JAMDAR,J.)ABS

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