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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY

HEARING BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE OX ARMED SERVICES UNITED STA.TES SENA.TE

XIXETY-THIRD COXGRESS

FIRST SESSIO~

xomXATIOX OF WILLLU! E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR Ot' CEXTRAL IXTELLlGEXCE

JULY 2. 20, AXD :!5, 19.3

Printed tor the use of the CommiUee 00 .A.r.m.ed Seniees

tJ II Wt,t\

Monograph File Indochina Archive

University of California

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1973

COMM1TU'EE ON ARlI1ED SEnYICES JOHN C. STENNIS,

STUART SYMINGTON, MiB@onrl HENRY M. JACKtiON, Washington HAM J. ERVIN, In., North Carolina HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada THOMAS J. McINTYRE. New Hampshire HARRY F. BYRD, Ja., Vlrginta HAROLD E. HUGHES, Iowa SAll NUNN, Georgia

MLsslsslppi. Chairman STROM 'rHOIDI0ND, South CaroUnll JOHN TOWEll, T('xtlll PETEit H, DO:\UNICK, Colorado BARRY GOLDWATER, ArIzona

, .WU.LlAM SAA"'DE, Ohio WILLIA!lI J~. SC01'T, Virginia

T. EDWARD BB.6.8WELL. Jr.;Ohle! Ooullul and Btal! Direotor JOHN T. Tlella, Cllle! Clerk

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CON 'r E N 'I' S

WillialJl E. ColbY I to be Director of Centr~l Intclligcncc_ - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - -­HUH. Hobert F. DrinfHI, V.S, Repres('utatlvc frolll Ma~s:lchu8ctb - - - - - --t-ill.lllud A. Adams. ____ - - - - --- - - --.- - .-- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - ---- - --- - - - --Pl1ui SJ\kwu _______ - ___ - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - -- .--David HllI'ridnn llnrrillKtulL. -- - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - -­l{t~llllcth Burton Osborn____________________________ -.------IJilI

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2 119 31 ;i5 S4 !15

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;NOMINATION OF WILLIA~1 E. COLBY

MONDAY. JULY 2. 1973

G.::;. ::;"NAn:, CO)Dll'nEE 0::-0 AHMED ~·h:n\:H't:S.

lra81t;lIytoll~ JjJ '.

Tho ('()J111i.iitt('(· Ilwt. plll'slInnt. to llotict'. nt 10 0.111., ill 1'00111 ;\ 1~, Hieliul'd B. HW:i!,,;p1l SmlHte Otli('e Building", lIon. ::-;tll,llt ~.nllill;!toll (net ill:,{ l'hu i 1'1ll 11 11 ).

Prt'st'lil : !"it'JUltOI' SYIIi i Il rrton (pl'l·sidill:',d . . \ Iso I)r{>~l:n~ :.T. li~d \\:IlI:S. B I'Us\\'(,Il •• J 1'., ell il',i' ('Oil n::;{' I H. Ilti stn 11' d i J'('('­

tOI'; .Jo III 1. lweI', duPi pIpl'!.::; It .J:lllles" ools(')', g('lH~l'I\l cOlllls(·ij .Johll A. Goldslllitlt~ HoiJ('l't (J, Old, and Fl'Hllcis .1. ~\111i":lll. prof("f;­siollnl ~tllll' 1l11'llIbcl'sj XHIICY .J. Beal'g'. I'c~pnr('h assistallt; Dorothy Pust.is. ('\('l'i('u! Ilssistnllt; HllIl KntlH'l'ine Xl~1soll, assistullt to :O-;('lIntol' S YJlI illg-tOll.

S(>I111tor SYMIN(ITON. The ht'ol'ill,l.{ will rOlllC' to OI'/lPI'.

'V(~ re~ret mCmbCl'9 nrc nbRcnt bCCtlllSe '0£ tlw h'cess. lnn~lll\lch as ])irC'dol' Srlilt>sin:,rp.J' hilS now become Sp{'rdnry of D(,-rcns(~ we thought it ulh·isnhl(l:to hnve ~ll'. Colhy IH'n~ nt till' l'nrlipst. npportllllity to ('oliHiliPI' his ('ol1iinllntioll ns tiH' lIew Director of Centl'ul Intpllip:Pll\·c.

r~ollliil!\tion rci'(,l'l'ncC' and n~l'0rt follow:J

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

Ix EXEl'"FrIVE SESSION.

SEx.\'n: UF TIJI'! li N ITED ~'h.\'n:s. J1 ay £4, lOt.].

Ortie/'cd, That the following llomination be, rC'fpITl'(1 to tllp COlll­

mittee on Armed Services:

'YilJiam Egan Colby, of ;\IarylaJl(l, to he Director of C(>ntl'nl Intl'lIig'('Jl(·(·. vicc .TanH's H. S{'hh'singcr.

.J nly 2G, 1!J7;1.

Ht'portl'tI'hy .:\f1' .• Jacksoll with the l'('('ollnnC'IHlation that the Jlomi­llntioll be ('o1iftJ-med, SlIhject to the nominee's cOlllmitlllent. to I'Pspolld to I'{'qill'sts to appear ailtl jpstify b('fol'(~ any (lilly cOllstituted COlll­mittel' of tIm Sl'nnte.

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Senator SnUNGTON. Mr. Colby hllB had along career in Government service, chiefly in intelligence and related matters. Ho .erved for" num!JPf of years in Vietnam on vurious assignments ill Olle of which he held the rank of Ambassador. The Chair wOllld emphasize that today';; hearing'S will not only be an l'xaminlltioll of IIfr. Colby's qUlIlifiolltions /I.Ildbaqkground, hilt will also review n number of policies relating to' tlie' Centrol Intelligence Agency itscl f. . There has been so mueh discussion Ilbout the structure and {unction­ing of the Agenc~',lIfl'. Colby, and because of y01l1' long connection with it, we arc going to tnke this opportunity to try to g'<"t Il bcUf'I' under­standing for ourselves and for the people as to illst what t.!10 CIA is and what it IsslIpposed to do.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM EGAN COLBY, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR 01' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

~r /', (\JI.H1". I welcome tlwt, 1\11'. L~llIlirrnun. ~ellator SrUINGToN. "re hcli('vu this the npproprilttc time to ('x­amine in some depth a numbel' of iSSUM thut have been the stlbj('ct of cons}stcllt. rrl.;ent. public nttentioll with I'e,spect to tht" operntioJl~ of the Central Intelligence Agollc·y. ~Il". Colby, do you have nny p['(~lillliJlul'y .stut(,HWJlt you wOllld like to makl~? !tIl'. COLBY. No, Mr. Chnirmun. I welc()IIl~ the chance t.o explain to you to the committee, and to the Senate, what my qunlificntions, I hope, are, for this important chnllenge aheau of me, and I thollght t/", ,Iuost useful thing is to answer the questions.in your mind, sir. Senator SnnNoToN. Very ",e) I. As you know, the SCHute ,l)cmocrutie Caucus hus adopt-eel n poli('~' with resp<'ct to C\'ery nomination which rcquir~s that cW'ry nominee be n"ked, do we have your conlmitment to r",<pond to requests to appenr nncl lestify before any duly-constituted committee of the Sell.te. "'ould you respond I Mr. COLBY. I will, lIlr. Chairman. Senntor SnilNoTON. You will what? lIlr. COLBY. I .will kstifv. S('nntor SrI\IINOTON, 'l'hank ),011. ""p will prO\~ic1C' for the. rceorcl nt this point a biog-raphicnl sketdl of your long' and ctTedin:- rt'i;onl as a GovE'-rnment ~('n'ant. [Mr. Colby's biogntphical sketch follows:J

\\~IJ>U.U.I "~IIAX ('OJ.IIl"

Mr, ',"ilJlam K Coilly waf;! horn in Ht. 1'11111, )1I111lt'sntn. III 111"20. 1'1It' .~HII Hf nn Army offi('('r, hl~ f'nrly life WllN "'1I(,lIt In \'nrll/IIM llll.~tl>l, 11It'llIdlnl{ II tilrf'~··.n·lIr J~riod In TlentsJll. Chinn. In HHO he was ltrntlllllh>()' [rum l'rillcptjln liniHn.lly nlld In 10-41 johll'lI flU' Unltpd StateN Army. flervlng in the Pnruchute Fit'll! .\rllllf'r.r, Wlwl! lilt· (HHe(' (It Strnt<'jil'lc Ser'f"icf'A put out a cull fllr Frf>n('h f.lII('nkl·l's III ]fHa. !\Ir. Colli;!" ,'olulI­..tee red and In 1944 wnll lmrD.cbuted h("hlOll enemy lill{·f.I In north ("f'lItrnl l<'rnUN> tn !Work. with a resIstance unit. Shortly before the end of the war In 10-15. he led 1\ t(>llm dr9PPN. In northern Norwny to dt!Ntroy a mil lille ur-:pd for tnlll.~Jl()rtlng Gprmnn reinfol"('elll{'nt~, l"oltowlng the wnr, Mr, Colhy Ilhttlinf'ti hi", Inw cl/'J.:'r('p frum f'nlnlllhin J,IIW Hc'hoot nn(l joinf'tl a Nc'w Yllrk Inw firm hf"tlll('11 hy "'111111111 J, PnnotllTl, forllll'r 11(>lId of OHH. lit' is a m(>lUilCr of the l'\(>w Yoric Htnte nnd U,~. RtlllI'{'IIlH~ ('ourt harH,

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In UHf) Mr. Colby ncc('pl(>d hi)! tlr~t E.~. GO,YCrJ~Ult'llt pmlitifll~ n~ :llj 1.\tl~::{I:~'I:·' tur the Natiunal Labor ltell\tl~nssnoakrld 1m "nt~1~~t~~~i~ol~~~81~:r\~~(\ iu till' Htlltr of tb{' American EmllaHsy 1Il toe 10 III aUI r. •

AI~~;.l~I~~~~~~~~~~~le~~~\~ry of t~e Am(>riclln EIll~J:l~~y:i.::, .~aigo~\~:~ V~~:::: It"u\"iDg in 1002 for au aRsigruneut as Clllef of the Far E.v;t DIHSlOn 0 trnII I~t!el1lte~~'i:i~CYci~~iaj~~~~~tOt~~e:PA~enCY for International Den'lopme?t n arc . tl )()~t of A!';si~tallt Chief of Stat! Hml III tlnd was postt"<l to Saigon to n:'lStne H' Iu' f MACV for the COltDH prllgrulII ~):~~~;~:~ It~h~t ci~~~~I~~~;Il~;I:I:~f \~~~~ll:l~·~e~)~CifiCnuon (.uUlPt~l~ll. ti~h ~:~~~lt:~~ SlIlIlll rallk of Ambassador, 1I~ Will'! reas~:}gned to the D£'l'ar well 0 •

30 ~~~~('ol~!!;unry 1m2 Mr, Colby wa~ IlI.:pointeu ExecntiYf' ])in'cto~-COlUri(~~!i:~~ (If the ('entrnl Intelligellce Agell(,},. )lr. Colhy waH appointed Dellut;) DIre Ol~'rntlons ctrcctive 3 JI,lnreh 1073, '1'1 hn "f' Cour ehillh'l'lI ~lr, ('(llhy JH married tu tbe furUll'r Burlmrll lleiuzen, Il'), uncJ. r('",hIC In Bt,thffidu, ", '

·f'cmator SY1'tUNUTOX. In the pnp<.'I" SUl~da~ was ~Il nrtlc1f', "London P'l WI" \ Fiscrts f:IA EngilH'cl'(:11 the Coup In (rr£'(~('e. r • 'f wiil ':00(\ ti:e first ",'Iltenee of that article in the New York Tllllt's Oil Sunday, July L . . .

'rill' '()tJ's(>n;('r "suhl t~dIlY· thn't it hus found f"'id.elle~ that til(> ('~'ut~flll} ~tt:I.I~; .; . i 'ed tl e ]Uti. 1ll1liturv coup In t.rl'f~e anti .is U~ !I", . C'( It t~I~~~I~~~n~ ~!~~~r:; Geo~~e PUllUtlopmllos "war-time collaborntion with til,· Nazis .... to maintain control of the regime.

. J~ there u.ny justification for these assertionB! . -Mr. ('Ol.IIY·. llUld that researched, Mr. Chall'lnnn. The CIA dId "ot t.'nu'incer tIte coup in (hel'C'c in HH)7. Se('ondly,'I tlunk we are not III ",'"";session of thnt kind of information about Mr. Pnpadopou)os thnl 1:; alleged there. And we dill not train him in tillS ('Olilltry as al1<.'gl'd

tItS:~ator SYMINGTON. At any time ·hn. ... '; l\f~, Papadopoulos hrC'n all ."ent for the CIA 1 m . 1 f II !"O~Ir COl uy lie Itn!=' not. bC'cn an agC'.nt.. I-Ie hus been, an 0 l('nt.? ,Ie Crook Go~(',r;lJllent Itt variolls tim('s, and in .those pel'lO{ls from tUIll' to t'ime we worked witllllini ill his oflicinl .capaclty. . 1 Scnator SYMINGTON, Did we pny lum (lny mone)' at any !.Ime, Mr. (''''I.BY. I cannot answer that no.w, Mr. ChalrmUlI. I Just do not know. I can say that ,,Ie did not pay hlln personally.

[The following statement was pro\'"lOO for the record:] TI CIA ' ' 'pnld Mr Pnlladopoulo~ any monpS· ,1(> ne\pr . e A P.I1C}' e\"(~r had with 1'1lpudoPOliloo of any Idml wa." 'Ihe only rtsoct"UO~:r oltllc'Greek Intelligence ~erviee, with which we lwVt;, ~~::~~~~~c IlYli~~S~~ ~elatlOllShlP since the Greek ch'n war in the late 11)-:1.0':-;. [The article froln the New York Times follows:]

. ['flH' :-It.\\' YlIrK Tlmf'6, SuthlllY, July 1, 1973\

I..oNOON PAI'ER ASSERTS C.I.A. ENGfNEERI:D TIlE COl'P l:'i GltEElJE

I,ONDO'N, 'S'ill'duy. July :1-Thp Ohs£,t\'er said tOdny tho.t,i~ has found I:'d.4!.t'nl:~ that the Centrol Illtelligpnce Agl:'nC'y enIPnel:'.recl the 1001 nlillto.r~ C::U? i~ C. e~\~ Rnd is uNipG'-Necret knowledge of Premier GI:'orge l'alla~lopoulos li \\artlll\£' l,t) L t. tiOIi with the :-';azls," to maintain control of the regime, . , 11 ;I~: Sunday l1(' wHlJuper said thnt at the Athens headquarters of the JOint Oulted Stntt·~ ~lIlitnry Aid As!<hltnIlt'e Uroup. Mr. l'npn<lupoul{Js is Imo\\~n n1U\:~I~ wnlor stnlr nWIQhl:'rs Illi "tlll~ t:Irsl C.I.A. ug"nt to hecolUc IlrC'luter of Il }<.Iml{lt ,\1\ couutry,"

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l1r.1J apadopoulo8 bus now procluhued liiw.t;cl! IIfo\"ls10uo.1 President and dC'-elared Greece a republic. . . . The Observer's writer. Charles Foley. quotE.>d uo unldenUfled AmeriC!&n w.llltary adviser In ~tbeoB as baving said: '~George giJ.·es gOOd value because there 8ft> documents in Washington he wQuldn't llke let out." . . . The British paper said that the Greek secret servIce. ,buIlt up atter tbe 104G--49 clvn war, 'was .formed ,by the United Stat8$, and that, according to AndreaR Papandr.eou, minister ot state in charge or intelligence In the GoVp...rnwent brO\u~ht down ,by the eoup. It "WBat in reality n financial ond adminlMtratiFe apl)Cndugl' ot Ule C.I.A." SENT TO THE U.B.

)Ir. Papadopoulos. n tonner colonel, WIlS 'amollA' hundredA or .R~r(>t-flprl'I('f' agents sent to .the United States tor trainlnJi. the Observer said. Ills unU-Cnw­munist credentials wf.re strlngelltly Investlgnt<·d ut We time. Th(' Ilf'wspnper said tllat n com rode of Gell .. George Grh'08, w(1rt.llIlt' It'Rtll"r ot an anti·CommuniAt guerr111n orgnnizntion. hnd ('ollfirnwd reports tllut lIr. 1'111111-dopouloH had ~f'r\'pd ns n cnptJlin In n ~wcurih' hnttul10n organized hy tilt' Nuzi'J.I to bold down' POrUBIlll8 during the war. . < The (,Ilrrpnt Govl'rnmeut Htund portrayiug COllunnnJsm ns Grpec~'s ouly en('wy and ndnlmh:lng the G~rman occupation '~clenrly reflects tbe dtctutor'M conceru at the danger that the gnp in 'h'H officlnl bIography WilY 80me duy be filled Ill," The OlJserver snld. It sold that the composHJ9n of the ~nlJnI of officers .who {'Urrloo out t.he ,1007 COUp suggested C.I.A. ,tnvolvement. ,Four of the live offi~ers. it suld, were c1nl'lt'ly connected with ,United States forces or intelllgence, und_ the tltUl- WQ.S brought in because of the armored units he corurunndetL ' , The newf'lpaper also suggeRted thnt Ampric'nll inthlPDce at the time of th(> ('(lUll prevented the carryJng out ot a contingeJl<'Y plan. drnwn up lIy the North Atl8l1th' Treaty Or.lQ,nlzatlon tor UBe.1t Ore<'Ce fnced War or revolution.

. ~enator SYMINGTO~., In a 'heu,ring of this character, if you would hke to defer the questIOn for au executire hearing, we will brglad to do 50.

. 1\.11". COLBY. I am nrepnred to proridc ('w'ry d('tnil in ('xt"cuti n' 8f'S­SlOIl, as you know, Afr. ,fThairmnn. Senator· SrMINuToN. This arti('le was a flntollt uss(.rtion. I thOt1frht we should, know. " t;:-

. lI[r. COl;,,1-. I can equally say that the CIA did not rngineer tlw COllI' 111 Greece III 1067. . . . .' Senator.8Y>IJNGTON. There is"a hooksomebodv has given me calhl "My ~'Tnrw;th the CIA'I,the memoi .. of Prince Norodom Sihnnouk as related to 'Vilfred Burchett, AuStralian journalist. Haye yOU read the book 1 " . ' ; Mr. Cow)". I ha,"r not hnd a chance to read the book, Mr. Chairman. Senator SYMINGTON.lha,.e not rend it all mysolf, only some of it. . Mr. COLn)". I know' a little abollt our relationship with Prince Slhanouk O\'er the years because I lin,'. been ;""oh"ed in Southoast Asi". And I know the thrust of hi" "ll(·~"tions that the CIA wns tl"\"in~ to unseat him nt various times. First. t-I can SIlY that we did not hllr~ anything to do with his ollstpr in 1$)70. That wus rOluJucted within till' Cambodian Gonl!rnrncnt nt that tim('.

:..- In refrrence to an ('arliN' incident. \y(' did Hot ('ollcluct nn uttcmph'<l coup It)!oinst him, although we did ho\'e <"<"rtain information as to tJlO people who were so doing. Senator SY1UNflTON. At nnv time hnyc we worked in conjunction with Lon ~ 01 or Sirik Matn k?' 1.fr. Cm.ny. As officinls of their Gon'l'nmcnt we IUll·e, of course. br<-Il in contnct. with ynrious pt'oplc. bllt Wf' hure not condudeu UIlY I'l'i,"ute relationship with Prime ~Iini"tor Lon XcI.

!::iCllator ,~:h:.Ml}/O'J'OX. The) were Ill',reI' paid clllployp(,s of tlw Cl'lltr:d Intclligl'llCC Agency?

~lr. COLBY. No.. " . " I l···."· . tl . Senator SYMINGTON. 'lou arc familIar With t lC COIl 10\C1S} O~CJ It Phocnix program in Yietn?-Ill .... ~rhich we 1l1l~e~'Stund ~'O~l sul~en'ls~d ,:,\~ Deputy U.S. Commander III \- wtnam foJ' 91\"11 Opel!ltlOns .\lld I.lII.d Development ~npport fr~:Hn IDCS to 1!)71. lh?t~ ~lfl\:~ ~('~'ll :;.llQ~a(~,I~,IllS. in effect, that the PhOl'HlX progrllm was nn <lS~:mSSlll<ltlOII plOr- 1•llll , What IIrc the fads! . . . J " , J 1\11'. COLBY • .:\11'. CltairllH,lll. I IHl.Y~ tl'st~fwJ l,n l'X~(,JlS~) O~l ,t ~1,::O ;\~ )~~ jl'd before tlH.' SCHute F(ll'el~1l UclatlOllS (:,O,IllIlllttec 1I~ I' ebl L1,ll) ~:) 11 . beCon' the ~(,Ilate COllllllittl'e OIl the JUdlCUll'Y, the ~\lb(,Olllllll.~t( (Ill Hefuu(.c::; ill earl\, lUi1, alltl before tIle House COJllll~lttel' on (JO\'l'ra-1IItmt.r">OperntioJis· ill ,Jilly Ul'j1. In c:ll'h of tho:ie heanngs I han' l~\at~(~ tlw stakllll'lIt. and 1 WHH \IIJ(h~1' oath amI alll pn'\Hln'd to rcpeat I~. II 1Il'('O::i:.ml'\', thut. thc PltOl'lIix pl'ogrnlll wus 1I0t. a progl':lm.of uS.S:l~SII\;I­tiO~I. The Phol'lIis program \\ US u part o[ the on~rall pacllicatlOll. pro­~l'l\1n which was designed ~o Htl'eHgthen the GOyel:llI~lellt of S~)llth, Yil,tllum alld its people ag:llllst tlie assl\u.lt, led <l~n.lIlst th:~~l b)- ,~h~ North \'idlla.lIll~Se throul.!h a program of S~lbn~niloll, gUC'lllllll \\,11-fal'e amI lIlilitary ope1'llt,iolls. The paciticatIOll pro~l'nm dealt l':;~pl\­tiull~' with the lirst two of those, subn',l'sio,ll and gnel'nll:1 wu dare. " " The Phoenix progl'aIll was de\'~lopcd III o~'del' to .... ln·lllg 8,01:1,(' Olll( " iuto till' fwitt, l)l'tw('('n tIl(' SUhYCl'SIOIl of the ~ort.h \ I('tJ~!IIlHSC ,1l\(1~~IH \,idCOIl~,~lIIJ the UOrCl'llllH'llt. ])Ul'lllg the lllid~U)(;~rs III :~o~lth ~' I~::: llall! tlH'l'l' was n p'l'cat (ll-al of :llUllThy nl\l~ COll(llSIOll. 1\0\\, It l..",..l 1l11111i)l'1' 0 C ·ll·,ti dti:;-s Wl~nt Oil thcn t hat are qtIltc frankly, reprclil'lls,Il dp. Thl; Ph~eBix program was designed in lat~ l~(jj nll(l (>ssl.'lIti:dly )H.tfUIl to oJlerate ill 111id-HH;o with a yie\\: to I.JI'ln:,!lllg' ~OIlW onIt']' !,!to th~ GorCl'lllUcllt side if llot the Commull!st sulCI of tl~ls pr(!Ol:~I,l .. ~ ~lt' C'ommull ists as you know, were condllctlllg' U CaInp~ll.l~n of ttl I OI.ltllll 1;lrl\ill~t tIl(', };eople of South Yietnam, against local oOI(,Jals, and l.q!aln~t N;,t.iqunl Government ollicials. In the process the cOllw.nHHl illl<l eOl~tlOl ~tl'udlll'l~ of this terrorist campaign w~tS rull uy an up}ll.lnltus,oi ;I~{' COllllllunist Party of North Vietnam, the Lao Dong Party, fllld}ll 1,)111 there was formed the People's lle"olutiollary Party of South: ,Ietnam as a front to pretend u se.paration uetween those two partles. llns np~ pnrutu5 was the controllill~ body and staff?f the o"erall program:" Tn o'rdcr to stl'ug:g-le agains~ this app~Ll'ntns It was necessary .t~ In ~~l~ top::ethel' the various lutclhg:ence, police fol'c~s, an~llocal secunt~ fOl ({,~ to begin to identify who the pe?plc WCi'C III ~l~lS apparat~s, becn:l~c they were sophistic"ted~ clandestlllc ,operators, I hey used "h"~es, uS! <I cutouts, and used a \,Ill'lety of ll1tclhgcllCC procedures III Oldel to Con-coal themselves. " . I In the ('ourse of the Phoenix progTtlm ,,'e lookc~l at the SltuatJ?Il all( it, wus IlPPlll'l"Ilt t~lnt too mnny people in. vory .m.lllor c~nt~c~ \nth, ~h~ l'l,IJl'llion werr hC'lIlg <.~aptHn.(1 or othcrWlSl~ ant-ded h} till co.untll,l( tioll Ufl'llillSt. this apparntus. The Pilot-nix PI'?gl'Hlll '\"llS <.I~II!Il('d to mukc t11is u. [wl'ulu.l' IH'O'I'l'UlH so thnt the attentlOll could be gln~n to th(' main people that wer~ in\·olvrd ill tbe COllHlHtlHl strllcture on tIll.' COllllllullist side. ..' FOl rX:lmple, It. fOl'm of <.I03sier was ('~tltbll::ih('u by WhICh the r\"!-dPll["(' cOllljl be ('IU'l)fllllr colh'dcd Oil the nallWS of the pcoph' \dlU

(i

were involved. A pl'o('('dl1re was spt lip that thrro indcpcndt'nt reportf> had to be ('ollected in order for a JliUIi to Le Ilnmed us n. nH.~lIIhr:1' of t h(' apparatus~'y the Go'"ermnenL The Plu){,llix pJ'o~ram set up rater;orit's (If ,these dIlrel'ent.people,on the Communist side. These WI'''' III tIll' tlm'i' eategories of A, B, C. The A cate/(ol'Y were the leadN'" lind the members of ,the People's R(>\"o1nt.ionnry P;lrty; the n C'nti'g'Or,Y wpre> the CUOI"e, the OJws who helped to make> it O{)(,l'lltC'. The C ('.utl'U"oq.' W(>I'O other prople who were 801m-how iu\'o '"(>(] ill SIIPl'ol'tillgt" th"c nppnratus and the cllf!1pllign. , The three CI~tcg:Ol:I(>.s were set up in 01'<1('1" to disting-uish th(~ iJll­pOitant ('nerny IndlvHluuls frOl~ the onrs \\'110 wpre rrnl1y not so impor­tant. For example, the PhocnIX pl'ogrnm was uddrrs""ipd only to tlH' t --:-\ UIlC} n categor,ies, and said to the people who w('i'e in tho polic(' nll,l Intt-'Jhgence SCr\'l(,~s that th~ C ('ntp-goo,.y WIIS not pOlt of t.1a(~ Ph()(>nix progrum LeellllSC It waS dpslred to 1(·u\,(> thosp penp](' ns 1I111('h nlOIlC' us possible and focus the eiTort ngninst the loa<l"r8 011 the othor side. T!lere w~ro n. variety of other: pl'og'rnms instituwd over till' ('ourse of tIme to Impro\'e the leg'lll bnsls and stl'uetm'('. tmdp,r which the- pro­gram operateu, Thp Provim'p Security Committee whieh had the nu~ thority to detain indi\'iduals for serul'ity pm'poses llsed to be mllde lip primarily qf police nnc.! inhdligence officiuls. SNlutor HYllIJ<i;OTO="', I do not IlH'lJn to int(-'ITIlPt. you hilt. \\'IlS this Plll't of the,Komer plnn for pucificiltion, 01' paJ't, of the Ytlug TUII s('hool operatlOll! . , .lIr. COLBY. There \yas a continuum, )11'. Chuirmnn, whieh ~fr, KOllH'1' started and which I then eontinue<l. Mr. Komer left, as you know, in Xovembo,' 1%8. so lIlost, of tho <1('­v~lopments of the Phoenix program Wt'f'1' my own nfter t.hat. Hilt 11 va­netv of other legal procedures and pradiclll proce(lu!'es wem instituter! rlll t1113 Phoenix pl'ogl'um, 'Ye tried to im}Jl'o\,{~ the lle('urlley of tilt' ill~ formation and, SC(',ondly, to impro\'c the trcutmeut giye.n to the indi­viduals captured. The 'thrust of the program wus to capture l~ol'lc who were on these lists or to get them to defect or rally to the Govern· ment. But in the situation, in the middle of " War like that, " lot of people were killed in the process of the incidents and !.1m attacks. J think sollie 87 percent, as I remembe.r, of the people killed under the program 'who were namedmem/>ers of the apparatus were killed by military forces, and only 12 percent were killed by the poliee and local \...1or~ of.that MtufC. . . . . ' , ' Senlltor SnuNoTox. In 1970 vou testiiiod b(.fore the Sonate Forcil!11 Relations Com mitt,," that the, Phoenix p)"O/(rIlm was desiln"'dinitilllly to eliminate the Vietcong infrastructure by capturing its membeNl, hrallyin~" them-that is~ persuading tlwm to df'fect-or by olirninnting them. How man~, roughly, would you estimat<: wfro eliminllu>rl? ~Ir, COLRY. "ell, the eliminat,ion wus nil t}uC>e cllteg'OI'j,·s Le(,RllSf' the word "eliminate" referred to the (,Iltirc pJ'ogl"Um uguillst th(> a pparntus. " .

Sl'nntor SnnxoTO". Kill them! . 1_ ;Mr. COLBY. "TO 8!lid kill, the filnll'~ we u.sed was people who we"e . 1"lIod. There was no euphemIsm apphed to ,t at, nIl. The overall wonl "neutraliz~" was applied to the appnrntus whet.her it was noutralized by the individuals being captured, rallying or being kill",!.

[See also p. 149.]

7

Senntor SY:l\ll~OT()~. ;\lIl1 YOll \\'(>I'£',opC'l"ating this progr:un ,lIlltll'l" instl'uctioll!i from highcr Iluthol'ity (lul'llIg t}l(> ('ourse of tlw \\'t1l', IS that cOl'rect? . , , ~Il'. Coury. It waS part of the war, alHI I was oppratlJlg It-~o alls\\"~'l" YOUl'· (J'lestion dil'cdly, :hII'. C~1I1jl'l1laIl: I b(~lien~ that the h~rtll'('s III iBid-I07I thnt werC testifieu to nt. tll(> tllll(' wel'p thnt SOllW ~H,O{)U il:ld been Cfl\>tl.1I'(,(), some 20,00( . .1 hnd 1>('PI1 kill('(L and some l'"i",()()O 11:.\(,1 nl'tll­!lily 1'1l1.j('d Ly thnt t,illle. Obviously, tlu.' pI'ogralll has bl'(,1l g'0I1lg" 011 5il1(,('1 then, nntl those flgllres arc larger today,., . Senator Sl"MIS"G'l'O~. There were statcIlll'nts Ill' some cOllgn:s:->lollal hearings that South Vietlln~cse ~olLhl be sti~p~ultizetl us Y1<'.te(,)I1~ infrnstnl('tures uy th.eil' ('W .. 'llIICS \~·lthotlt !li1l'tl p\Yldpll,ce of sHch. \llfr~- , strueture affililltion. "'ere you s\ltlsfled wIth the quallt)· of the IIIt!'llI· genco on which tht·sc Vil'tcong infmstrllctHr~l, dcit'l'llllllutlOIlS \\'('1"{' llIud(' ~, , ~r]'. CoI..OY. 1 was 1I0t. and we Huule ('oJlsidpl'able ell:ol'ts to lI11prO\"i' it niH! to impro\'(! the p.l'ot:(.dul"c so, that only bt·ttcr l'\,lllell('(~ wOllhl ~),(' uscd 111 the lpgal pl'ocl'edIIlgs ngnl1lst. th~'sl' ppoplt" I would not pi t­ti..md to yon that we wel'e u'l\\,ll)'s sllc('('sstul, aIltl tht'l"l' werp ('.l'l"tnlllly ubllst's ill that situation,

S(,IlutOI' SYllI:\(iTOX, ""'"hnt about chnl')..!:(,s made tllnt South Yil't­IHlIlll'SC Iluthol'ities nbllfwd tJlC Phoenix Pl"ogT:lIlI~thnt slIsped\'d Y('I Hi III pI V 11iHnpp(~n I"(~U ",h ilp uutler interrogation, and so forth? ;1[,.: COLIIY. 'Vell, I think the 11/(1II'('s thel'!' "oout the IlIUlI[)('1' of l'ap­t!ll'Nt Ilnd the BUlHlwl' l'ullic(l intiiellt('s t-'wi \"! .. 'I'Y Inl":,rc 1l\lll1tx'~"S "·l'I·(', illt.Cl'rogntcd and did. cuntribute, to t,Iw wtp lllgl'llcc basc" Ag"lllll, ('('1'­tninh'. aLus('s took place Lut I tlunk 1Il thp I'('{'ol'(l we also IlH.:luded tIlt' dirl'("tivo issuer! oy :II.\.CV which, frankly, I draft",\'. wlllch clIllr:d upon !lily AIl]{'ricfin who ",us in tllC pn's(,Il(Y,of sOIllPtillllg" wh~('h dill Bot Ilwct the lnws of war, first, not to pfllilclpntp, of COllI'S(". Spcoud. to indiente his displeasure nnd his 1'C'.jeeti.(lIl of it; to theye()ph~ IIlrol\'{'d anu, third, to rt\POl't it to higlwl' nut.honty. I dId l:N'Cl\'C SOHle I'l'ports of this kind of misbehtH'iol', and I took tlU's<' up wltl~ the G()\'el'flIl~(,Ilt. anu I am very happy to say in those cases I &'lW actIOH ttl-kcn ngaillst th" indi\'idual doing it. . Senator SYllI!\G'l'ON; According to .earlit'l' testBnony, a. SIlSIH'ch'd VC ('ould be imprisoncd without trial under the "all tl'i" law, and held for 2 years. 'Vhat do youlmow a~outthis! . . . , Mr. C-OUlY. That is correct, 1\11', Chnll'man. LIke I1Hll1Y ot.her ~OllJl­tries' Vietnam' had n procedure ·fol' (h-'tention as a thl'f'Rt t? ,llatlOllH 1 security, nnd a suspected VC could be ht'ld uIl(~el' that prOVISIOn 01' lie COli 1<1 be pnsseu to the l'eO'l1lul' (,011l'tS for S(-'ntellclIlg-.

Thnt partiCUlar provision permitteu his detention for up to 2 y('nrH" but thnt period could U~ l'xtendeu, nnd in a nmnl~eI' .. of l'~ISeS wus, Qne of the p\ll'pO~Wg of the Phoe1lix pl'Clgrnn~ WfiS !o (~Is~mgUlsh the 1"(,Jl~rt 11 of time of ut·tention of the thl'N' ('ntt':!ol'l(,s of lll(hYlciunls llllcntiolled. th(' A Band C, The A category, the s(>nior h'ndpJ's, W('I"(', to he }l(>ld for 2 ~'("Il.;'S' The B (,llh'g"oJ'\'. the ('!1tlrl:-, \\'('1'(\ to be hpld bet..WN'1l 1 nIHI '1. "eul's: The C cate~ol'y hop'('fllllYl W('I'(' to he l('t go 01' :1t tIll' mo'st, IH'lt!, I in th~ nLs('nce of otllet' l'in'ulIlf-ltllJlCe~, to 1 ),<'111', " Senntor SY)lINO'l'O~, Did su('h ab~~llce of dnl' pro('ess, III Y011r opinion, result in tli(' prot.ructed oet('ntiofl of inJl()('('nt pcopl(',~

8

l\Ir. COLDY. Then' W(~I'C certuinly pcopll' who were detaineu illl· properly. I think the Phoenix program·s objective was to rellure tlmt to the minimum possible. .

Senator Sl")UNGTON. lJndrr su('h cil'cmnstances, could the Phoenix program be used by unscrupulous individuals to put away their politi­cal enemies---:-withollt nny harel c\'idencc of suuvel'si '"C inteut 1

lIIr. COLIlY. It became more nnd mOre dillicult for that to happen, Mr. Chni,·man.

Enrly in tl"" mid-lOGO·s ] Illn Sllre thnt h"I,,,one(1 quite 1.!Cnorally. But nfter the Phoenix pr0l!l'nm llllci the l'e~tI urizntioll of tho procl1-uun's it. WllS IC'SS likl'ly. For instllllc(,~ Hlloer the regular pl'occ<iul'es any cuse w0l11d hnve to be referred to the villag-c chi(~r of th(' home of the inuividllul ('Ofl{'(~I'J1e(l to get. his viC'w of the popular nttitl1l1c tmrani tlw mall.

. S('(,Oll~1. he was 1"('fIuirNl to b(' :,!in'll Il copy of t1w ('lillq,t('g ng-u,illst hun, WhlCh had not Il(-en the case prior to thnt time. lIe WliS requir'(>(l to ha\'e a hear'inS{ and to nctuully HippenI'. This was only inst,it.utcd in 197L'bnt part of the program WIIS to make imprO\·cmcnts of this na· turo ill tIll? prO<'cdl1res. ' . Sertntor S1'MINO'fO~. f'om~ cl'itics of the Phoenix PI'Og"I1Wl lul\'C chnr..ged that. fiS un intelligence ]Jl'ogTlUll. it wus both clulllsy and inefT('di,'('. 'Vollld you comm(~nt on those nsw:'rtions ~ ,"

1Ifr. ('OLIIY. I do not think the enemy thon!(ht thllt. I think the enemy thOll:,!ht that. it was a major thl'pa£ to the stvlp of war tIHW \\,('J'(~

ltrying to run. Certainly it wns bnl"Caucmtic and It hnd II lot of prot.­lems in it, bllt I think it madp, fl contrihution to tIll', stT'lIC',rle nU1t.inst tlw ComolllniHt cfTOIi tn on~11hI'o\\ the g-O\'Cl'llmcIlt therc-.'" t"'O

S<matol' SYl\UXOTOX. :!\ow the Din-dol' of til" lentral IntelligPllco Agl'lH'Y repOits dil-edly to till' Prctiidl'nt of till' l~nite<l ~tah's. That is COITPd. is it HoI?

1\[1'. COLRY. J[p does, ~fl'. ('hninnnn. ~ell;l.tOl' H1'lllN(lTO;'l' InrllldinJ! the Phoenix pJ'o~ram, did )'ou. or" do

you know of any a~tlOn take.n uy the Agency thnt was taken without the approvul or agamst the Wishes of anv P .. "si(lent!

1\11'. COI.J11'. I do not know of nn" snch: Senlltor SnIIN01YlN. On N oveli,uer 5. lUil, Presi,lent Xixon dir('d:",1

11 reorgnnization of the intelligence community. We are interested in yonr concept of. nnd how YOll intend to implement your Iluthority under thnt reor!(nnization; also what is the rolo of tho 'Vhitc lIouse staff and the Nationnl Security Council sI<JfT; and what thoy should he with respect. to t~d~lnct~oning Of~OUl· Agency. . . .

For example, tillS dlrect.n-e estabhshes a NatIOnal &CUrltv Conncll IntA..~IJi.!!l'll('e Committee. C,.ould yon i(lJl this ('omn~itt('e wlui.t you be-Iie\'o the role of that. Nntionul Security Council! .

.1I1r. COLIIY., Yes, lIIr. ClII~irmlln. fl}('lievc the purpose of thut com­tnlU(I'e 18 to VIVO gcncT'td trl1ldnn('o us to wlUlt kinds of intulligt'I\('(', are needed and what kiml. of inte\lih""'"!', perhaps. Ilro renlly nllt all that, useful to the customer agencies, if Y011 wilt tho ])epnl·tm~llt qf Stutc, the Depart.ment of Defense, nnd the White HOlloo itself, of course. III other words. to !(i ve guidance us to the interests of the customers of ill­telligrnre as to what thin~s they are conceT'nod nbout., whut- t.hinf~ they think lJel'hf"pg we ~lo too Inli('h of, and so fmih. I w~ml<J pr()p~~ to work \'(,I'Y ('1()~.;(>ly With thnt ('011111110('(' lind to try to fh-fill(>, ItS tho

A~(I)H."Y 'has, the major !-mujl'cts of jnt~~l1i::elll'e illh'I'(':-;L ~o Wi' (':ttl l"l'-

UUl'e ucti\'itil'S whil:h 1\1'(- perluqn; Iltal',rlllal. ~.. Seuntor Srl\IlSGTON, 'VllO is the l~ltlirlilaU of that ?\ntlOllal ~(;('\I-

Coun(,il Iiltelligl'llrc Cmnmittcp? ..~' . :\11'. COLBY. The chairman of that l'omnllttcp IS ])r. h.,185111g('I"..:lnl1

the m('mbel's Ilrc the. lJndeT's('crctnry of :-)tate, tIl('. cllHlI'lll:ln of the .Toint Chiefs of Stnll', the Dc~ut)· Secretar), of Ddt'llse. the ,\ttOl'lw), Gl'llcrnl,luHI tli(' Din-dOl' of t{,lItralllltelh~('II('l', .

Scnlltor SY!lfD;(jTO~, rf yon repOlt. ilirl'<:tly to tlip Pn':->llll'lI!, of tlw lillit('(l.~ta,t<'s, anti 1)1'. !ZissiTlW'l' i,s tll(' chairmull of tll(' ~ati()ll:l1 Sl',l'lll'ity Counl'illntclli~(,Il('l' COJllllllttee, do yO~l take ordel's I rOlll l)\,. KiR....,inJ!l'I~ or do yon tak(' OJ'dl'l'S. from tl\{~ l~n'sl(lellt? .. ,. .

)fl'. Coun-. ~\s I 11I1del"F;tnnd It, j{l'. (,hall·Tl.l:IlI~ Dr. hlS~~I!g-l'J' 1"'; a stall' ofHcPl' for the Pl'cshlcnt rtwl he .tliPIl llllh.cat{'s sllbJ~~d~ .tllnt he thill1{H ",;ill De of int('n'~t, to tlU' PI'~'SJ(h'llt but m trrlll5 01 It dll"pd . 'on.ler thl~ 'nuthoritv luHi to IH' the Pn'sHh'nt 1\1011(', nlltl.1 1\111 pn'p:ll"pd to insist eli} that'ill an" l'm~,(- in \\'Irich it. npprnrs tllll)\OIlR~-

Srnntol' SY"n}l"G'fo~:1 do not. wHnt.to l~bol' it .lmt \\"{': wunt t(~ h:ow how it is hrindl(>d. ""P hu\,(' hpl'n hunll~ llH'1"Pf\SlI\g pl'o~)lel1ls tm(l~llg out just. where :tnd what is tlU'~ :\I~th.ority o~ thC's~ \,1ll'lOUS. agt'lll'lI'S.

If Dr. Kissing-{II' ('tUliP in Hml s:l1cl, It IH tilt' \\"lsil of thr Prt'sldl'llt tll:lt. ,Y0ll UO SHl'lI alld slH'h, \\'ollld yon cOll:-iid('l' tll:lt :Ill onl('r? l'

~Ir. ('m,HY. H \\"0111d (kp('n<i on ",hnt slIeh 311<.1 slIell \\ as: :\1 r. l iI.ur­mltH. I f it was to write ItIl C'stimnte of de\'elc!pmC'llts ill Chllln ,o~' SOllH'~ thing' 1 would probahly go alH'ad ulld \\"l'lte tltl' n'pol't. 1 f It Wt'I't~ ~rmH'tl1illg- ({,l('stiol1ab.le,.oeyond th~' propC'l' chartC'l: of tht~ _\gl'.ncy, I would olq('ct and lIIS!st on talklIlg to tl~(' ~1'l'slClent abOtlt It..

Senutor Snn~GToX. Yon report to the PrcsJ(lent; have yon dls-cussed YOlll' appointlllPllt with hill~'~, .

:\[1', (\)LB1'. I hrn'l·. only llll't Ium OIlCl' SllH'P my appollltlllPllt. and J (lid tlOt han~ 111\1('11 l'lltUl(~(~ to dis(,uss it.

SC'llator SYl[lXGTUN. lInn' yon gUllc into allY (h,tail as to \\"h('l'l~, t\uthoi'ity'lies or does not lie'~ ..

:!\[rJ COJ~HY. No, we hn"e not, ~{r. Cluurmnn. . .

Senator SY)[lNGTOX. Some thlllgs W01'1'Y me WIth respect to thp fUllc­tioning of YOHr Ag<'llCy. YO~l ha\'e already state<l YOH woul(l come tip 11('1'(- and l'epOl~ to. llS and gIVC us t~lC fncts.

~!r. COLBY. ] wlllllldeed, Mr. Clullrman. . Scnator SY1\IINOTO::-.r. Are therc any other members, bpsldes tIll' onC's

yon lIlBlltioned, of this National Secllrity Council Intt'llil!enee (~omlllittce '? •

~fl'. COLHY, Those are the only members, SIr. Scnntor SYMINGTON. Arc therc any wOl'kin/! p:roups that snpp0l't

this NatioHlLl Secnrity COUlwil IlltC'lligence Comlllittee ~ ~h'. COI.nY. There lIn' ofIicinls who li('lp work on the' proulpm, y('s. Senator SY1UNOTON. 'VllO do they work fol'? ~Ir. Coun". Of coursC', thel'e is a Nntiollul St'curity Council ::-tntf

itself that works for Dr, Kissill~cr. ~enntor SY311NGTON. Tlw nntiollttl s(~c\ll'ity staff is an tHhisory

body to the President under the law. !lIr. CoLBY. Right. Senator SY:!IIINOTOS. The working gl'onp of the Xtttionni Sl'('\lrity

COHB('ill11tt>llig-PIll'e COllllllitt('e, \\'ho <10 they l"~P()l't to? :Mr. COLBY. To till' ('liairlllllll of th(~ ('Ollllllltt('I', to ])1'. Ki~~ill:!Vl',

ill uther worus.

10

. Senator ~:h:MINGTUN. Do you feel YOIl nrc hemmed in, in nlly way. 111 functioning 011 thi~ joh '{ , Mr, COLBY. I do not, sir, r haw had a talk ,"'ilh Dr, ,Kissiul(er abollt I,t and I have had the fullest assurances o~,SUppOl't and Ilelp in this Job, , " , ' , , Sena!">r S~)nNGTO>1., If there is any development whieh chuu/,:cs your IUmd, will you fcelfroe .to come to this committee nnd so state 1

~t:r. COLBY. ] f I ('ailltot 1'C'EO!\'(' it. in allY otlH'l' WilY, Twill. SE'uutor th-)UNOTON. These (}lwstiolls ure asked ill you interest. lIIr,COl.IlY, I uppreciate it.

,Scnator SnIl>10TON. It has been Illy experience you should IlCver give u mUll respoJlsibility. without uuthority awl vice versa. Y01l IWVC~ have had, In the CeJltrallntellil(ence Agency. tho kind of public relutlOns developed by the late J. Edgar Hoover in tho Federul BUI'Cau of Investigation. '~·o the best of our. knowledge, this is the first time there has been a CIA hcarmg of tlus character. Everybody realizes, the way the world IS today, we need an agency like the Centml Intel" lIg'el.l~e Agency . .somo of liS 111.\.\'0 been qhitc surprised, hOWC\,Cl', that ~d(htlOnal aSSIgnments ha\-'e been given to an intelJigcnce agency. Now IS the time to get these matlCl'S clarified.

You arc satisfied base{l 011 what you know Uuollt this to dnte, correct '{

.1\lr. COLBY. I Rm satistied. Mr. Chuirman, t.hat I han'! the amount of authority I nred to do the job that I \\'ill b" asked to do.

Senator SYM[NUTON. 'Vhat is the role of the Net Assessment Grollp? .. Mr. C;OLUY. The Net Asse,.sment Group is a staff \\'hich works with the NutlOnal SecurIty CouncIl to COme to conclusions as to the relati,'c strength of oUl'Selvrs lind ",'rtllin otI",r countrics that might be a threat to the security of the Unitt·d States. . Senator SYM[NGTON. Who is the chairman of that grou]l! . ~Ir. COLBY. I do not-I IIIll not sure right no\\'. 1 will supply thllt. If 1 may, Mr. Chail1nan. .

t-;ena~or SYMINGTON. Is there anyone hero who ('.an get thnt in. formatIOn. That must bo a matter of general knowledge,. is it not. Mr. Maury! Do you know who is the chairman of the Net Assc$mellt .Grou]> 1

Mr. MAURY. No, sir. [The following information was provided for the record:] Tbe chairman 01 the Net Assessment Group is Andrew 'V. Marshall.

Senatol' SYl\[lXGTON. Do yon- kno\\' if they II1H'e uny working gl'OUp that supports tlwir etforts? '. , . }'Ir. CO~lY. Th~ N~t 1\-ssc~s~CJit Group i~ nn interagency gronp, n ~roup whICh consIsts of mdlvlduals from dllferent intelligence a"",n. e[('s, and the other departments of the (JovenJnlCnt who have \\,o;korl out a common understanding of the rclnti,'c balance between oursclw~s and ~thcr.nntioIlB. There will he a number of officials who will pnrtici­pllte III tIllS.

Henntor SrM,I~GTON, "~hat is t ~,~, role of the K(·t Assessment Group ~ !III' .. COLBY. 10 try to determlJlc whether some other co\lJltn' has

n. partICular advantage over ns or "icc versa in some pnrticular situa­tIOn .. Th!, renson for. that, lIfl'. Chairman, is that tl .. intelligence com­mumty IS foclIBCd on foreign intelligence and wo do 1I0t focus on tho stren!, .. th of the United Sttttes, This is " matter for the National Re.

11

curit.y Couneil, the DepartlHl'llt of lJcfense and so f011.h 'H.ld. c~m­sC:(IllCntly if you arc goiJ1t, to In\,w a net balance as to thl' ~atuatloH bt~twccn dursci\-'cs and Illlother COlmtry, you Heed t.he intellib"l'llcc l'01l­triLmted on Olle side and the American side of the equation contrilmted on tho other. The intelligence cOllllllullity and the CIA would COll-

tril.mtc the foreign intelligence .to that Het ~~sl~lent. . ~ ::lcnutor SYMIXGTUN. 'Vhat IS the functJOIl of thc Inte1l1gl'ucl' he-

,:;ourCL'S AJ.\'.iso,r~· COllllllit~te(' '!. .;.. .llr. CULBY. 1110 Inh'llIgl>llt.:.c UCSOll1Tl'ti Adntioyy CUll II III ttt'.t' 1:-; .all

:Hl\:i80l"Y group to thl' Virl'dur of Central IJl~.('1I1~~'llC(' to aSSIst IUIII

ill un examination of the J"eSOIll"0('·S doyot·ed tu llltclhgellcc throughout the Government und·to assist him in making a recommendation to th~ President once a ~'car for :l budget for the entire fOrl'ign intcll ig-CIl('l~ activity of the U.b. GO'·Cl'llIl1cnt. ~enator SnUNU'l'ON. Who is the chllinnnn of that uoard'? }'fr, COLBY, The Dircl.'.to.(.' of Cl'ntl'l.ti Illt('lIigl'lH'(~ would ill' thl'

('iluirmn.n of that. ;-;enatol'SY:louNO'l'OX. IOU are the cliail'lllan'? l\Ir. COLBY. That is ril,ht. Henator SYMINGTON. I am glad it is plnuned for yon to be the chair­

IlHlll of sOllie u{hi!:lory cornlllitt(~c . . !Hr, Cor..uy. I am going to \.)(' the chairman of qllitt, a fl~\y things,

~r,·. CI,,"irlllun. ~l'.Jlatol' S·f.l\U.:\"GTOX. "rho will Le on this wOI-king grollp with YOH ~ .Mr. COLBY. On the A(l\'.isol'V COllllllit;tee on HeHOllrl'l'.'"i YOIi hun~ the

01Iico of ~faJULgement awl BlIl)g-et~ the Assi::-.iant Secretary of Defl'll:-;(, fot, Intdligencc awl the Cl'ntl'al Intellig{~ltcc Sgellcy~ awl tlll' ])cpal't~ 1II,·ut of St.~te.

Sonator SYMIXGTUX. l~lHler thiti machinery, who wil1 han' cOlltrol o\'er the btHlgets of the int~lIigence age~H.:ie~, including; the CI A'? If yO.ll~ for (~xnlll!)lc, recOl~}m~nded a l'Cdu~tlOn III pIA pcrsollnc.l, do yO\! tlul1k you COll d make It stICk unuel· tillS COllllluttec ~tructllrc?

. )11'. COL\lY. 'Veil, tile adual authority for the appropriation COI1-

cerlleu is in the hands of that department hea,d. whoc,'er It IS, to whom that uppropri",tion was gi,·en. The responsibilities of the director lII11lc'r this instruction nrc to look a.t how those resources are alloc..'1ted (','ell thOUlrh it is not his direct rcspon.sibilitv to control those fumb: As you Cl1~ St~e; there is a chance for a ~liffcrc;nce of opinion, [IS to how many people should be used on. a certaIn tOpIC or how mUIlY l'<.'SOUlTI.'S should be allocated to it.

In that situation the Director is required to submit his "iew to the President for r('solution after list.cHing to this advisory cOlllmitfA~l'. but there is no' vote in the lldvisor,Y COIllIllittC'.c, It is the director~s yiew u.s to what tho allocation of resources shoulu be c,'cn though SOill{' of tiloso rc:;ourccs, as a mutter of fuct, the g-rcllt majority of th(,lll~ an' not his tlir"ct responsibility.

Senator SY1'IIINGTON. Do you believe that allY of the intelligcnce cOlllmiUi..'<-'s of which you arc not chuirman will be nble to in..flut!lll'l'­the substance of intelligence estimutcs ~

lIfr. COLBY, They wlll certainly help us choose the topics. They will not affect the 1ISsessment made because the procedures are that the intelli~nc(\ t~stiIllatcs submittctl to the Nn.,tionn.l Security Coullcil are t.he Dii·cctor's n.ppreciutioll of what is going 011. That is n \-rory personal

12

and singlCl, responsibility. Awl I propose to (>XPIt. e\"(~I"'y f'fTod, I C:lll,

and I plun to be 8u('.('cssfni or not continw .. •. the> etrort, to mnkl' tluw(! objective and straightforward n .. <O;SC'R.<;lIl(,llts.

SeJlator SYMINOTO". )Iol'C spoeifica)ly, Mr. Colby, I read a speoch by a General Graham who 1'(>C('ntly JOJnC'd tlw C('ntr~111 Int..(·IIi~r(>IH'l' Agency, lind then cnllC'd t.he Dil'Pctol' llnd nskpd, '·'Vhat is bJ'oilJlr Oil",

because, in efFect, tli£' spcC'ch the g('J)('rnl Ilindc stnted th(~ ])~ff'Il~(' DCplll'tlllellt should appraise the military postUl'P of tIle po:;sihlf' enemy, when it came to wcapons SystC'IIIS, their OPC'flltions. tlw nmnbt'1' of troops, find so forth. III the YC'Ul'S] han' 11('('11 011 the ('PJltl'nl Tn((>I· Jig-Pllcn AgPIlCY Suu('olllmittC'C', 1 hlln': llP\'{'1' SC'(IJI an p"t.illl:l1.t.-' hr III 1\'

of tho services which (lid not ('still1ute the possible C'nt'nry\.; ('ailll('it" higher thall the estimate of the Central Int<'lli"enee !\.''''llC\'. wid, one conspicuous exception, the C('ntJ'al Int('lJi'~ncc AWlIc,"s "'(,I'f'

always 10\\'(,f, ana ultilllUtcls found nhnlYs to l>er;lIorP. 011 ttll';"'~~t. Sf'uutOI' Srl'l[lXOTO~, ])()('s (1(,I1('ml Grahalll wOl'k for you 'I ~f r. COLBY. ] Ie aO(>s, Senator' ~;';'':\IlXOTON, Hnn' yon Rtl'uight('ne(l out hi!=-! thinkilJ~ oil

this mutter '," )fl'. C()J~nY. 'Yell, it is \'cry e]C'nr to IlS us to how Olll' relationship Oll

military inte~librence will work. Spuntol' Symington. Yon say "to us," Drn's that incluac hilil ~ Mr. COLIlY. Yes. I talked to him about this in some depth. Senator SY~IlNOTOX. Scyernl Y(,Ul'S ago, as chairman of It sl1IJCOJll­

mittec of the Foreign Helations Comllllttec, I hnd two ablp ,talrlllen, ""'alter Pincus and Roland PUII1. TllE'v "'{'nt. aronnd tlw world und J'C'ported back Uwm was n g-reat deu) o'f dnpliration in our hUllIlrcds of large uases and thon~ands of small uU~('s all 0\'('1' the world. Th('\~ said the most duplieation thoy found was in the intelligence fipld. '1 have been around mvself lind corroborate that finding.

In that speech thls General said nil intellig-ence, In effect, should be concentrated in the Defense Department. I do not think the Amer­ican taxpayer who already has mounting tax problems, would 811p­

pOlt that type of conclusion. There is no use belnborin ... it, but would you ag-ree now, if you hal'e problems along these fines you would report them back to this committee 1 .

lIfr. COI.nY. I do not anticipate having any problems. Senator SYMINGTON. I know you do not 60 anticipate. Xohody an­

ticipates a car wreck nntil they haye it; but if you do get into that kind of trouble, will you so repo'lt back to this committee!

}.Ir. Cor.BY. l.will repOIt bark to th(' committee anything- I eanllot handle, lire. Chall·mnn.

I would say that on that suLject of military intelligence, I ha,·. wOl'ked in a military headquarters and I think I know some of the Htren;:rths and some of the wealnleSSl'S of such an npparatus. I be­lie\'c that we can lIse the military intelligence nO'encies for n. 1l1lmb('1' of !he thin~rs that are necessaJ'y to accomplish in the int('])igener Ll1sJness.

lItl\\'C\'el', as I said Lefore, when the Director gives his assessment of what. is going on to the Prrsi<1('nt it has to Le his personal (l8.')('SS­mpllt, and he has to have a conviction that it is accnrate, and he hns to have, and r will insist on, every Iibody to conduct independent tPsear('h, redow, whtltl~\'er, in order to IlSSlIl'C' myself of the nccllrney of what )1(' FllyS. ••

St'lHltOl' SY~llNGTUX. In the yt'nrs 1 hr\\:e ,hrrn on thi~ ('(lllllllitt,l'P Wl' luu'u hud incorred bomber gaps and Hllssll(' ~aps, an(l h:l\'P Illl!1t agnillst them; lut,er found they were \\TOllg,,",VC ,,"ollhl han' lmllt more if it itnd not been for indepeIHlellt CIA eS\lllla~l'S, .. ,

Today we nrc winding down the wor, but flsklllg' for mal~.r Ill,Ill.IOJlS of

dollars 'more Lcc.nuse of what the possiLh· ('n~'lllY has. I thIllk It l~llpor­tunt wc have n JIlUIl in Gon~rnmellt, t.otally lwl(·pl'IHll'IIt.. l'l'l~()rtllll! tn the President, who also has !tIl ob1i¥utio,IlIlIHh'l' the ('Oll~tJtlltIOll,tO tl'lI us whu.t his opinion is without. l)(,lllg iu)"('pd to pl'rs{'lIl sUIlll'thlll~ lit' does Hot b(>lil'n~ (,OITl'('t. . _ . ... '

)11", CUIJn-, I tnke thnt oLlIgatIOn Y~l'y, "cry ,Sllll'l'~·ely .. MI', l h:lll'­mall. 1 think that ollC of the contrilmtlOns that llltelhgenc,e ('Illl n~akt' to n. peacetime world is to bri~lg' morc a(:cnrac,Y to our prepal':ttlOlis uO':linst. possibJc"thrents to natIOnal ~eelll'lt,Y so that we do lIot oprl'­ate ouly Il.gaill~t whnt a possiLle l'IH'I~l'y is l'upHh~c of bllt rather that we kno~\' precisely whnt he is planning and dOlllg' to the extent ',"l'

call find thnt out. I

SellutOI' SYlIll~(lT{)!,\. ] nll1 iutel'csted in your indepl'H(~rll\'('- 1,Slwllt some years in the P('ntagon and hllYC spent. S(!IlW ,Years III tlll~ ::-;PIIHtt' and thillk the Central Intelligence Agency ll11port ll llt till' w,n~' tl~l' world is too"y; bnt its impOl1:nnce is almost completely lllllhhed If its best juuwnent cnn be subordinated to that of somebody else who lS not in the intelligence business,. '

)11'. COI.IIL I think tho structure IS such that the Dnwto!' has to gi\'6 you h.is Ycry persollul opinion and I assure you that It IS gOlIlg to he a str~llghtforward one. . '

Senator SYMING'I'OX. 'ViII intelligence cstllnatcs, as prc\"lOusly, be nliltle through the U.S. Intelli;:ence lloard? .

1I1l'. COLlIY. Yes; they Wlll be caordlllatccl mth the boanl hut nguin, that is no~ l1: Yote, !t i~ a consultation, alltI th~ estlllI~tte wIll l>~ the result of the Dll'ector·s VIeW and assessment, lIe IS reqmrcclun<ln tho rules to in(licato 11 substantial dissent by any lllember of the 1'.S. Intelligencc Board to nil est,imu,te in order to give t}w customer ~hl' benefit of the filet that there IS dIsagreement on oome lmportant pam!. And that procedure will be continued.

Senator SY~[JXGTON. You would agree, would you not, that a s~Hlnd economy with It sound dollar is just as important to true natlOllal security as the latest weapons systen:? "

)Ir. COLIIY. I \'ery strongly bell""e thot, ~Ir. Chamllan. I thlilk the security of the United ~tates depends upon a lot .lllore than Just guns. It depcmls IIp011 0111' economy anel a lot of other thlllgs. .

StHlutor SYlHNGTON, And you would also agree that tlll're IS lit)

position in Government marc important than yours frolll the ~tlllld­point of weighing what is necessary for security amI what is Hot, Lased on whut is the position of the possible enemy. , ~:Ir. COLBY. Let me sny I think this is n n~ry imp0l'tallt positiol1,

~rl·. ChnirmlLll.I willllot engage in comparat}Yes, Senatol' SY)UXGTOX. As we understand It, there has been a. eoIll­

mittee over the years one which went by difi'el'cnt llnllH~s-The :~o;1 Committee j the ~ 40 Committee; et cet('rn-\\"l~ich apprm':s certai,ll operations of t.IH~ (,IA. Is this corred. :1wl, If S0, who IS on tillS

committee ut the present. time, Illlel whnt is its function '? i\lr, Coun', ]\11'. Chnirman, tho ::\'atioIlnl :--;rt'nrity .\d, of 1!)17

~tlys thnt tilC' Ag-PIH'Y will do \'ariOlls things. :llHl tlH'1l in the last ::ml,-

14

pal'u~ru.ph it says ~,hat the Agenc~' wil~ conduct, perform HliCh other (ullct.lOns and dutIes related to lJlte}hgellce aJrediJl'r the national S~CUl'lty as the National Security Council lIlay froll~ time to tillle dlrect.

Kow, thntlarticl~lar lj.roy~sion of law is the authority under whil'h t\ lot of the gency s activities 'are conducted.

'~'he National Secu!'ity Council hils set "I', as we ,Iiseu""e.) a little while ago, ~he IntellIgence Committee ano it hus also set. up some othcl' ~Ilmlltt~es. ~ beliere ~ll this mu.tter since I nm tlllkillg ubout the .NatlOnal S.ec~lI'Ity Co~ncil, th!'t I wOllld prefe~ to respOIid flllly to )OU III det,nII 1Il executive sesslOn, because I tlunk somo of the-so lIIutters arc still classified. MI'. Chuirman.

Sen:,tor SnnNGTox. Very well. lVhat is the name of the Intest comllllttce of this churaeter 1

M,·. COLIIY. Forty Committee. Senator SnUNGTON. lVho is the chaimlan? Afr. COLIn:. 'Yell, ngtlill.~I would 1)I,pfcr to I-{O into exceu,tivc Hession

on ~ltc descnptlOJl of the I, ort.Y Committee, l\lr. Chairman. Scnato~ SYJ\.n~OT()N. As to who is the ehllirmllu, you would prefrr

an exccutJ ve S<'SSlOn ? l\[r. (;OLUY. The chairll.Hlil. all right, :\f1'. ~hllil'mlln, ])r . .J(i~ingel' is

the ~halrman 118 the assIstant to the PresIdent for national security aifall"S.

Senator SnUNGTOx. Do any of the committees we hal'e diseuss(>(l ~o fax: have any. I"?lc ill cnduuting, ('oonlinatillg', 01' otherwise deul-11.1:': 'nth domestIc lIltclligcnre, or intelligence which is targeted at U.S. citizens?

lfr. C<:H,HY. No, tIl(> fUl~et!On of th.e A[!t>Jlcy is foreign Intcllig'ence, 1\[, .• qhall'man, .Rll'! that IS Its functIOn. In the COUl'S() of our forei/:n Ult.elh/:e!lcc nelll'lbes obviously, lI'e have to employ people, we hlll'e to IOvestlp:at" the people we employ. lVe denl with u number of Anll'ri­("!Ins who hc1p us iI~ u; varip.ty of ways. III that rcspcct wc hn \'C in forma­tIon a?out those cIlIzens but we do not target thom for intelligenco operatIons. .

Senator Snn!,<GTO". And you will issue instrnctiollS to your people that under no ClrGUmstllllces nrc they to participate in anv domestic efforts? •

IIfr. CoLllY. Th~t has be~n a "~ry strong' l.'ril.lCiple in .th~ '\g'ency .. r have e,:cry IntentIOn of rcmforclIlg that prInciple nntilllsIstmfr on It vc;;r. vIgorously. ~

.- cflator SY1tfINOTON. "Te llndcl'Frtanu that Dr. S('hlcsincrer hrOll,rl!t to the CIA t.wo military ofiicers.lIfajor G"neral Allen 1IJl(Ir.fajol· G~n­ernl Graham. to serve on his staff. Do you inten.) to use these two omcel'S on YOur stat! ~

IIfr. (',oJ.IIY. At the moment I do, lIIr. Chairman, I oln'iously hal'r 110t developed my entire stamng' plan at this point. nut at the moment I ,10 plnn to d.n so hf'callsp; 1 t~lillk that tlwy are- wOl'kin!! on the intelliJ,.tl:'llCO rOIllI!.umty stui! 'yl.lI;h IS the s~aff that helps the Director in his rom­IIlUlllty responslblhtws as (hstmct from his Ag'ency responsihilities.

Senat<>r SnnNGTON. "1m! will their function be 1 . IIrr. C.0LnY. General Allen is the hear! of that l'omm'mitv stafT, and

n:ram, slnc.c ~ost of the ('onuhunity reSOllrce~ arc in the ncfen~c De­partment, It IB perhnps uppr'opriutc that 1\' lIIilitul'Y oOker be a ,)jut of

15

that. I lis uelJuty is n drilillll at the moment allJ it is my intention that. that will still ue the case.

iienator SnIlNGTox. That is General Allen? .Mr. COl.BY. Y ('s-Gl~llcral GrahuJll is ill charg-e of u program of prod­

uet. l'oview as to ",hnt killJS of intelli;;enc~ proJuds we h~\y, ~IlU h?w good th(".y are. anu so forth, and agal!l, Sln~e he has f:.~tmh?-rlty Wlt!l tho sweep of tho intcllilTcncc COIIUlHuuty cHart from Ius prIOr expen­cnce, I would propose t~ continue him for the time being in .that rull"

Senator SYMINOTOX. This is important. ,Yo hare becn heanng about 1\ !:'tca<ly reuuction of the g-ross national pro,duct total that goes to ue­fcnse, but a recent report Illude uy It group of able and (,xpCrICI1cc~l IU?,il wonltl appl'nr to !Jlo\\" tilat COllCCI)t out of tIle water: l!l~t.catl of ~)elIlg .)1 pcrcent of t.Iw budget it is "i-pins percent. $98.1 bllhon. That IIlclndes such things lis Iltomil: \ylll'hl'nus for missiles, oyer $1~ billion for rd­('rUIlS IllufsQ. fort.h, nIl part of defense; so in addition to the s~n.le $80 uillion GOO million uein" askeel for you can add another $18 hilhon 01'

so to the truc def(,I;~C co~,~, This is onc rellSOIl wIty it would appear ilH-pOl·tant we get thct:)c e~timates right. . . .

Do you belie\'c, in ~ell('rfl,l, thut thc llllhtn.!·y s~l'neeS, ~,he Dc.fenst· Inklhgenco Agcne)", shouhl have a more lluIll11lntlllg rule 1Il the llltf'l-ligcJlt'c (~stilllntlng process thon in the l)Ust? . .

~!r. COI,BY. I do not helim'c the.v S lOuld have a dOlUlllatlllg role. I beliel'e they should ha I'e" contributory role.

Senutor SY::,\llXUTON. Your fOl'mer cl)icf has just l)e(;omc Seerctar.,r of Defense. lIe is able llnd persuasive. Naturally he is going to be in­torested in tho .Joint ('hiefs position. Do you think you can hold up!

Mr, COLl.y.l think so, ~r.-. Chairman. As a matter of fact. my former ehirf, as you know, was associated with the drafting of the NO\Tembc_l' 1071 leUer and tire decisions tlrat the President made about strengthen­il'" the hands of the Director of Central Intelligence and I beliel'e I,,· III:;; 11. ycry strOller illtelledual commitm('ut in tIus regard. I propose to work with him \~ry closely in that role hut, at the saBle time, I proposl' to take my own responsiuilities I'cry firmly., ,.. ,

Sf'nntor SY~nNGToN. Once :you arc over III that budJIllg It lS pretty hard to havc independent jud'p:l11cnt, as we all know from past expcri­ence hut I will say that 111'. Schlesinger, when he was Chairman of the Ato~ic Enf'rcry Commission. he did morc in less time to clarify the overall posit~n of thnt Agclley, which has been operat.ing IIlHh·1' totnl1v Ufllwecssnry excess secrecy, at a cost to the tuxpayers of many billio;" of dolla!'s.'

lIfr. COLBY. "'ell. he haua I'cry short but, I think, an exceptionally effoeti"e tenure in the Central Intelli/:Ol.ce A/:ency.

S".nntor SY)IINOTOX. ":'"IHlt he staiied out to do is being intl'l'pn>h'll now'. It. is a more healthy situation, ill my opinion.

]'II'. COLBY. Yes, und I propose to contimH' many of tho&~ pI'O~nllil::;. ~t'nat.(}r SY1\UNOTOX. I was talking about. the AEC'. 1II!'. COI.IIY. Yes. Senntol' SY)IlNOTO:X. 'Yhat primary problems of efficiency anel cost

in the intcllig;cnce COllllllllllity do you bcli('\'c shouhl take fin.;t priority in yonI' attention?

~Ir. COLny. "rell, we han'! a vcry seriolls problPlTI. ~Ir. Chairman. which is developing-which is the total amount of dollnrs required fa!' intcllig-e.nf'c. and the iucrcnsing pen'('llt,ug-e of tlint. which is nOl:es..' ... ury

I.

Hi

to p8y·t.I~e prrsollI.H'1 ill\'olv(>~, and th('5(.' ('I1IT('~ IUI\'(! IH'('Il,roillg lip for a long tUIIC anu, If you project the ('utTl'!-) \'~'I'\' far ~\:Oll end til' with all peqplc alld no IJI'ogranl nwl I do not tllln!..:: thnt IS It satisfadol'r olltc~me.' There.fore, .w.e arc g'O~n~ ~o hu H' to Jig-lire out way.s to ('Olulul:t the lmpOI~tnnt IntellIgence actIVIties nt n ]0\\"('1' price than Wt' hun. ill tho past.' ,

Senator SYlUXGTO'N. Do you beHm'(' \H' tC'Htl to COJll·et mOre inh'ili. g(,flC? than we ('un ('f1iCi~l~t1y procc'ss nll(~ dissCllIillatC' !o the appropri­ate Government authorItIes. Do you bche\"(~ we SOJllctlJllCS ovel'whelm our~v('s. with dutn. we cnnnot ~l'nalyze?

. ~fI' .. COLn)~. I tlunl~ in any lUl'ge-!::('ulc IIdi"jty, ~ll'. Clw,il'lIl:lIl, 'y01l wIll lmd cor!lel'S ,!f It thut cunnot beur close s(,I'utillY but I tl.ink ill general" the Intelligence effort of the United Stutes is fOI'Hs"d 011 the ,mUIIl,thlJll.,"5. There hus been U VCI'y suustantial reduction of Ute tutu] Intelhgence effort over the )Just sevel'lll years purtly rl'Jioctinl( th" dl'll w­down !I'om Southcust AsIU. but ulso l'cfledillg otit('1' \,ory SlIbstulltinl l'pc]lIdlOJlS Ill'oUJHl the wol'ld. Some, of this is It I'psult of 1x.'th~1' h.dl­

Ilo!ogy, a,lI<1 some of,it is n. result orjUf)t sC'ledi\'(~ pl'uning of tiJing'!i that may have been lUee to have but cannot meet the test of these times.

Senatol' SYMINGTO!'lf. It is sometimes sflid that it is ralunble ill illtelli­genco work ,to hnve morc than Ono organization nnulyzc a problem and mn,kc 3,1,1 estImate. 'Vo cun aU sec why som~ con.1p~titioll in tluulysis and ('stunatIOn would ~c v~lua~lc. Do you Lchcn~ It IS also llCCOSSUI',Y, ho\\,­en'}', to ha,'c duphc:lt~on III the coJJection of intellif!'()nr-c?

,~Ir., CO~Y, In certai!1 situations it may be, ~ll'. Chnirmnn. In CC'I'­tUln SItuatIOns one partIcular source fOI' col1e<'tion lIlay not he "('iiaLJp at a pUlticular time of attention 01' it lIIay not he IIli that IJclievuhl,' and, ~onse'luelltly, YOIl mIght have to d('\·e!op a mdUlldllnt system, liS

thesClentJsts would say, But certainly. I think this is a mlue'decision, If IIltclligence IS satisfactorv through one channel it should not ho duplicated, 'Ve cannot afl'ord'it in this dav and time,

Senator.SY1UNOTON: ~Vithin ,the nex~ () months, will YaH make n re­p'"t 011 tlus and sl,lbmlt It to thIS comnllttee with respect to collection after YOll have hud ~l good look at it frolll the top 1 '

MI'. COLBY, I ~m III th~ coursc of dev~loping a III'esl'ntntiou 011 the bUdget of the entIre IIltelhgcnce communIty to the appropriations com­mIttees of the Senate and of the Irouse, I assure rOll I will look lit this very, v~l'y severely, rlu~ the fact that I nlso Illn'c to submit Ill\' I'OCOIll­mel?datlOns,to the Iresl(lent on the /ism1 yelll' 1fI75 hudl(et luter on,

~enator SY1\I!N~TON. "'"0 \\:ould appreciate I't'\'iewillg ",hut ,rOll ~in' to the, apprOpl'latlOns comml~te,es.No on? has 1II0rc respect for that ~ornmlttoo t!lUn we do, but tillS IS the Leglsluti\'e Conllnitteo involve,l If We nrc gOIng- to make nny changes ill the In w; and SOlllC for clurifico­tIOn after 'YatRr-gate, would appear uesirnble.

~Ir. COLBY. I certainly will repOlt fully to this committe", lIIr. ChaIrman.

~(mntol' SYlllNOTON, Turning' now from the mnnugellwnt of the ill­te!hgcneo community itself to tho manngemellt of the CIA tho COIII­

mIttee understands ,t1nt .Dr, SchJesin,t!cl' initiated n \'igorou~ pr'og-mIll of pel'SOnncl reductlol~S 11\ the CIA, H?w far has this gOIlO, IIl1d what !Ire YOUl' futuro "Inns 11\ tillS regard! lou can IlIISwel' that bl'icfly now and supplement It.

Mr, COLBY. Yos,

17

'Ye hJlvC determinl'll that quite u sul-*"ltIlTltinllunnb"I' of iIHliy~dH~tl~ w(', ...... ('XI..'{'SS to our llC'rus and our total strength has <lroppl..,d 1H t.he ncig-llLorhood of 7 or g PCl'(,<"Ilt. 1 thin}\:. in the past 4: mont.its. As to tb,t, futul'e us I indil'ah'd, the prob1elll of the cost of personnel and the ('o,t of oj)(:rntions now nre going- to I'(·quirl'. I b('lw\'f>, some n,d~11tH~nal pruning' of a(,ti vi ti('~ that IlIlly not bc able to stand tl.lc, (,~l~l.pet, I,~ I VC' ~lt ~1-ation foT' n~source:-; that w(' han~ and, l'onscquC'ntl,\, It IS posslLle th'lt otiwl' I'NIudions will ~HSU('. . .

S(>nator SY:!\Il~(lTOX. YO\l will eontiTllll' th.'s pl'og-ram of In,\-olnntlll:.\; l'etir('mC'nts, pHT'ti('u1nrly ('1.\ persoJlHel WIth o~'~rseu~ n.~SIg-IlIIl(:TltS ..

hII', COU\Y. I do intcll(l to rontIl1ue a P1"O:r1'UllH~f HlentlfYlllf,!: the JH(l~-. \'irhmls wlio stand 'lowest on the scalc of PCdOl'IlHIllCe amoJlg- tlJ{'ll

f£'Hows und annng-iHg' 1\ sitllation ",here t~e.v eall be hl'.lpecl to It'll\"\'

non'rJlIlll'nt sl'J'Yice rarIy rather thun havlIlg: them walt \\J'Olllld too

Iong-. ., f . Senator Sl'1\ll:SGTO~. Serernl ~lemhcrs of (:ongress linn> ('nli('~l or

tlu' on'rnl} bwl,l!ct (\f tlw illtl'lIig('ll{,(\ COIllTlllllllt,Y to be illn<l~' JlI~"ltc" so th(~ Amp"ieHn p{~onlfl (,Illl Sl~l'. ut l('ust t.he ,!.{enC1'll111lno~lIlt. Whl~'h IS SP,(,llt for intellig:enrc functions. In past yeurs. an~ de~plt.e tl~c mC~'('a~ll1~ dc~iT'(, of the Allwrirnn pcnpl(\ to know what IS ~(~Ing on III !ill'1]' (lm­Cl'llllu'nt. the flll'llishin:r of intelligeJl(~c informatlOJl h~s bCP.1l furtiH'r r(>~trid(>d, , .

no \'011 R('C' IlIlY ,'C'HSOil why oYE~rall,lHHl~!C't lll~ormnhoTl •. or f'YPIl a III1'akllown of the intelligcllte budget mto Jt~ ':nnloI' cat<'gonl's, \,,0111(1 p.nrlanpPl' nntionnl sernrity if it were mucIr publIc? . .,.

!\fr. ("'m.IIY. ] wOlllrlpropose to lClwe that questIon. ~Ir. ( h,'"ll.l'Jllan, ill thl' hllJld~ of the COnQTPSs to drddp, ,I think there nl'(' ('ow:ndpJ':l­t.iom .. pro uncI rOll on all sides of,thnt CllH\~t.lOn. But r h,aye fOHnd tha~. tl.le ("'Ollr!"r('''~ is at lpflst I\~ l'f'sponslhln Oil t.llls a:'-l 0111'. frwnds els("wheH~ 111 Go\'{~rnnlPnt. and we. 11u ve. as yOlt kno,\.'. shared WIth the Congress SOJlH'

,.p"\' f:(lllsitiyc Illukl'ial whieh hns been successfully Pl'otcctc(l by the

CO"t!l'P-FiR. . . , , \.. ,I r 011 tllP otJWI' J1fIl1<l, th0l'C' are~ltllatlOns In wJllrll Illl.: m('r~('[In 1~lt{ 14

O'(,llr~ f«"'rv;re willll1\\'e to 1)(1 HHlCh more exposed thnn th,e l1ltpl~lgl'n~(' ~.l',.i(,f>s of othpl' ('ollntries, "'"e are not !Toing to 1"\I,n til(' kmd of 1I.1tC'lh­~(mC'e Fi<'I'vi('o that othpr ('otwtri('s rnn. 'Ve H.re r:omg to rnn ono 111 tlw AmC'l"ira1, ~o('irty amI thp Anwl'i(,ll11 ronstltutlOnnl stT'11('hlI'C'" n~(l T ('nn ~(le that. t}H"re Illay he n rCQuIJ'PJ1)C'nt to exno!->{' to til('. ATIIPl'WHn lwonl(\ It great. d£'.nl more than might Uf' ('oIlYeni(,llt. from the !H\lTO\\"

int~l1i1r('.n('.(> noint of viC'\\'. ", SC'llntor :;;Y:\IINOl'ON. 'Vh!\t· would be l'ou" YJews r(,l!n.r~l1l!! t.ll<' 'i~4

Cluirpnwnt. for an allnunl f1lltilo."i7,ntion of,thf' bn(~!!et. of the Hlt('~l~g"('lH'(> ("olnnHUlit.v prior to n1)pI'Onrlfl.tlOn, as IS l'r<]mreo for n. pOltlOll of tim ne""l'tment, of Def.".p ""dept 1 "

l\[ 1', Cm.nY. That would be up to the COlIl!rcSS n,!nlll, Mr. Chalrmall, I tllink tllnt in t.lInt. eircnlll!=;tllnc('. wo would pxnlllHl 0111" 1)lf"ln~, to th" npl>roPl'intt~ m·C"rsl!dlt. ('OllHnittppo;; in th", ~llm .... "'ttl' :"f' ~lo tfl the np!lrn~ nl.;,..t:nn'" ,...ntnmltt(>(~s, "r('i ,,"0111d srin~ n f1111 (lCSC1'1ptlOll of whnt. \\,r~ hU"A in ly\ln,l to rio, ,

~pnlltor ~Y:MTSOTON, T flo not .want. to h .... ln.hnr tlw,. -:\ ftf:r S(l'~'P '.f>f1." :'l

on tJlI~ FOl'vj ..... n Rf\lntlonq rommltt(lP. fIlHl thf' ~.rrl"H'd ~('~"l(,pg ( ntrHlll:­

tN', wlwl't, 1 hn\'('. hf'f'1l n mf>lnhpr of th(\ C'" SnlwOTllflllttr>f', T, ('r\lll" 0 J'ol\li'l.(~ thnt mil'\\' ('OT\I'('nt .. of l)()li(~l' Wf're hpllI!! mnrlf' In- r~nl'(,H!n "pl:\­tions withollt nt'('lII'nt0 illfol'm:ltioTl. rlHlpl' the- oo-('idh,d l\PTln('(h 1('1·

IS

ter, the Central Illtclli~el1ce Agency mnn in the country in questioJl '"'ports ro the Ambassador, but when he comes back here CIA is li"ht yo.ars a~ay fro!,! any review by State of its functioning. So it was ofdl' a questIOn of 11me before we would run into some of the pl"Oblems \n' Jill ve now run into. It is one of the rl'[lSmlS the CIA hus had 511('h reCt'Ht llllfortlillutt' publicity: f~)~ exnml)le, t.Jtis J'P(,pnt Chil('UY,l t'l)i:.;;odC', SOllll'tillle.~ St.'en'l''y mar ue 1llstliIell ~ ot ler tUlIC'-S, to Illy cel'tum {IiOw!(·<l"e it eould He,'I'1' be justified. . <' , TI!cr,c is information. iHt~lligen(,E!. 'wltieh, of ('OIll'Sl', ('IUlHqt be H1uilf' pubhc In tho.JIltercst of national security; but Jleople helieve ~xcessive secrecy cun 1!1 \'C "ISO to lInWIl rrantNl suspic'ion t hn t J ntpU ig'(,lwe U.I!l',h.·j('s are engaged in sinister nctivitiPE. Thnt is what. they al'e saying. 'Youhl )'01~ ffl;vor Il polif'y of more OPPIl disclosllre l'('g'Hl'dillg illtclliW'lh'c uctlnt,l(>,!itluUl we 11In'e hnd ill the pn~t? MI'. Cnr.BY. I think it is prohnbly essential in Am(>I·iCII today. :If 1'. C'hflirl~lIlJl, und I would fuYor It g'l"l'Rter de:!I'(-'Q of (>XpOBlII"O of whut WI' ~re dom~. 'Ve have all'£'ndy hut! some mutteTi'i which we do expof'{'. Some of the exposurp Ihnt we have quite frankly, J,!ivl's us prohh>ll1s abrond in our r('lationships with other inte]jig-ence servicf.''S and m'en in onr relationships with individuals ,vho s{'cl'ptly agree to work with liS ~Y11O are 6om~what fre.ightened nt ~he prospert of t,heir names eomilld Into the puuhe and tlllng"S happCnllll(" to therIl us a re"ult. Bllt I think that th~re are ways in which the intellil("ellce community and the CI.\ ~~l pmtJcular, can reassure the appropriate commiU£'e..c;; and, also the Senate as a whole lind also the people as It whole as to the a("tiviti,'s ~,(> ":e enga'<l'd iI~. I think we are I("oint!: to have to draw that line. It

IS gOlllg ro be a difficult one in many situations but it is ohvious that nllnin we have to nm an American intelligence s{'n,j{'(>. Se!,~ror SYl\n~GTo,:. W~at would be your position regardinl(" thp prOVlSlon of wTItten Intt'lhl!£'llre reports to HlP C'onI!Tt~8~. similul' to tho"<l repOlts which are provided to high lcvel officials in the executivo hranch 1 ]lfr. CAluw. I plan to look into this very precisely. 111,·. Chairman, and do what I can in this regard. As you know; the AWney has alwHYs f'omn up and given €'xeclItive session briefings to "nrioll~ committ(:(,R on the substance of what is happening in the world. and the DirectOl"s n~s(':ssmel)t ns to whnt he thinks is g-oing- on. T would propose to ('011-tinne that acth,it.y and look very. very m>rions)" nt. wll(·ther tJll'l'C' nrf' improv£>ments tllnt couhl be lIinde 1;" wldeh 'tll(~ npl)ropriatj~' COJII~ mitteN!, Congr('ssmen, Senators, could bp giVf'll the uf'tll111 tlOCIlIIWllt~ w}l('re they 3,1'(' important. . Senator Eh~n~oTON. 'Ye understand some limit.ntions on, nud cl11'ectiyes to the intellig-ence communit:v, nrC' included in classifiNI dO(".uments called Nat.ional Security COllncil IntpJligcllce Directives. NSCrD's. "'ol11d yon (If':s('1'ihe in gC!-nC"rnl tlw 8uhiPC't mnt.ttH" of tlH'~ directivrs; Bnd, if you bclievp. tllp), should rrllln'in clnssified, w0l11d you tell the committeo Why you tliink so 1 .. lfr. Cor.UY. 111('8(': clirecth,ps nre th£' application of til(' nrovision of the Jaw that I ('ited, l'fr. Chairman, in s\I('h mntt{'J'~ ns tlH~ Nationnl S~cllrity ~'()Il,!cil ma:)' from ti.me to time ~Iireet.. The.,· includ" some ,C'enernJ dlr£"ct,ll'eS wluch dC'serlim t.he fllllf'tlOllS of tli(' ditr(~r('nt nwm­lX"rR of t}w intplliI!NlC'{" {'om II 111 n it v and t lwl'C' iA {'('ort n ill ~I'lisiti V~ ill fol'­mation in thoS(>. Those nre Nntional ~(I('I1T'ity COil 11 f'.i I dO('lIl1l('nt~.

1

!

! I

In ),11'. Chairman UIlU I do not hnvc tIl<' n~ltllOrity fOl: tlw d('d.~~sir,­~Rtion ~illce th'ey originnte with ·the ~Ilt JOllal :S~CUl"l.ty CO~Il,('~l: ., . Scnatol' SYl\U:SGTON. 'Nould Y011, ns nuedol' of Ccn~utl IHtelh~{ I\~ t, have the authority to decIas~ifl' Xational .~eeunt)" Cotll!cd Ill­t~lligence din'din's, OL' to prondc thPIll, classIfwd or ullchtSSlhrd, to the Congress? " • ',' ,1 :hlr. COI.n).'. No, 1 do not belIeve I do. I ho~c hplollg to the l\,ltlOIl,\ Security Council, ),11'. Chl.lil'lllun. "

8011l1tOl' SY.lllNGTO:\. 'Yould yOlll'rpOl't 10 tIllS ('O~1I1ll1tt,('l' who \\'o~ild have this authority, whnt the n~aSOllS IIrC COl' tillS pohl'Y I'Pg'ltnllllg these doclUIl('.nts ~ .

~lr. COLBY. I will ]rt yOIl know. SCHutor S¥."IU':-;IITON. Tlulllk YOIl. , Now we turn to the Nntionul S{'clIl'ity ~\('t of 10--17, Wlll~h, fo\" 'reasons tho.t nrc not illiportnnt, I ",ns ill\'oht'd in at that tlll1r, .1<.;

a mf'mb('1" of the ('x('cntivc brltllch. . The 1947 act direots the Agencl' to perfol'llI slIeh oth"r fllllct.IO!lS and duties related to intelligence affecting: the na!lOllul ,s('c.nrlty liS the National Security Council may from tllllC to tIme, dlI,,\~Ct. 1I1r. COLUY. Yes. . . ~ I ' I Senator SYMINGTON. Is this the pl'm'isl()J~ o~ the, 19-!j [Let W 11<: I giv{ls the CIA the authority, under the NSC s du:cctlOn, iO engage 1JI military-typo operations abroad, such as the "lVar 111 Laos, " . Mr. COLBY. Yes. Mr. ChaIrman, thltt IS the lel(.1, statutory aut~lOllt) because many of the activiti('s of that nnt,lIre do relate to,Ultell1gcll(,(, since intel1ig-ence techniques are an cssrntlllI part of nllllUng a coy('rt

operation of that nature. . . " , Senator SnnNGl'Ol<. ~fr. Colby, you and I h"\"~ had dlSCllSSlOllS when you were in Saigon in the past. .Al'(~ you snymg t.hat. tl,ll:' wal' conducted in Laos nndel' the direction of the Ambassador, \nth tl,,· full support of the CIA, primarily was .n intelligence maHcr~ lIr. C{)WY. No. no. not primarily. Mr. ChaIrman. I :\"ould sal' that the initiation of CIA's firtn-it.y in Laos was a matter wInch d,ld l'<,qUll'1:' the use .of intclligl:']H!f' techniques becausf' i.t. "-.ll~ felt ,to b(' llllportant at that time that the rnited Stall's not hI' ofhcrally mrohed 111 that artidty. and this wus (lone on"l" BlallY y{'a)'~, as yon w('11 kno\\', III an ulloffic.ial Wit V. • • 1 Senator f{Y],(l!'\OTON. Yes. and that is on£". of the pl'l1lClpa T'('n~olls ,,-hy the CIA hns had fi lot of unfortunate, III mnll)' ('asrs 1I11111l'l"Itp(1, adversepuolicity. . . ' ' )oIr. COU~Y. ()bdollsly, ~Ir .. Chair,nmu, n~ acflntv o~ tlil~ ll:ttul'P IS done without the proper reVIews, lllstrurtlOlls nne) dIrectIOn of tllP National Security Council, each such--. . , ' Senator SYMI:SOTOX. The National SE'cnnty Connell 1$ fi.1l adnsOl:Y hoarel to the PJ'esidellt. So whut you nJ'{' sayillg' is no fleti\·it.y of tIllS kind is' done without instructions froIll the Pn'si(lC'llt?

llr. ('<)I.BY. Corl'ect. ' . Senator 8Y'}.1I~GT(I'S'. "'hat j'Oll rraIls ('an call the C'l A then, IS "tIlt. }{ing's )}lpn" or "t he President's n rmy." . '. . :lfr. COLllY. I do not think that is the ca"e. ::If I'. (1mll'lltall, I tIll."k the CIA is an intelligenc(> Il~ncv. which has t~H' capabilIty of tlSII\g' Intrlh­H('Ilf'n h",elini'lu{>s ItS dil'{'t,t(t.(\ by the Pn'sH1<"nt and hy tIl<.' rO)\~n>ss· Lv tIl(' NatioJlul S(lclIrity Council. . .

:20

Henatol' SY.lUXOTUX. ,rt' WOtT.') ubout that Luotillll operation whi!.:ll wo ha,"c watched ovel' a period of yeal:s. hun~ tH.'C'll t!H~re o~t(,Jl. hav(> SCllt staff people out. Let II:; hope that m the fHtUI'C, ml.lsllluch us tIll' CIA is fundamentally ;lU intelligence ngency~ not un agcney dt'~i~'ll.CU to conduct a war, you would try to keep out of this type and chnl'n('tpr of operation. It has done nothing to impro\"c the st~ltUl'e of the CL\. You woulu agree wit.h that.

MI'. COI.IIY . .\1r. Chairman, I think the IIIIl11e of the Ag('ncy is intelli· gence, unu that is its primary responsibility und focus. Obviouslv, the Agency will follow nutional [lolicy but I think it is clear thut illld,,1' the pn?'sC'Jlt dil'C'ction of H.S. polin: it iff very 1I11Iikl')y.thut \yo would be i 11\'01 \'C'd ill such fln nd i \oj t \'.. •

Senatol' SY:,\H~'(lT(JX. This President did not sturt it so it is not IH.'CeS8Ul'ily II. crit.icism of tllis ,administrutioll. But wlll'1l yon justif,\' u war of this clllL~'act(,l' on the grolillus it is "1'l'latC'd to illtc~ng-ellr(l". you al'C ~tl'dchillg youI' assigned rolc nnd 1'1I1111ing into l'0h'ntial trouble.

~11'. CULHY. I do Hot think it was n w!l'r when it b('gan.l\Ir, Chairman, I think we were gi \'ill,~ SOIlI(' assistullce to the }l{'oplc in Luos who were l'('sistill~ the Korth YiptllanH'se cOllling into their country.

.senator ::;Y:lUXGl'OX, 1n allY euse by August 15 we will be out., let us hope.

Do not larA"c-&ealc operations" :mch as this U1wnding war in L;:lOS. ffo considerably beyonu what Cong-I'ess intplHled when it (lrovidcu fOI· 'ot hm' functiolls and, duties l'elnh·d to inte]] i1!Cllce"?

Mr. COLIIY. I thnk it undoubtedly did, Hnu I think nlso thnt as H practical matter u covert operation cannot he n \'(>1'\' big' OIH' he(,:~l1sf' it stops being ('overt wllCll it gets too big. I think this was tIl{' h~5f'On of the Bay of Pigs, among other things.

Sen"tor SYMINGTON. If Y01l operate this Agency in acconlan(·" with the philosophy you arc now expressing, we muy ha\'c II iH~W uay coming up.

!lIr. COWl'. 'Veil, I will try to keep it Ollt of the l<illd of. (''11)('''''·'' that Home of these larger Ilcti\'itics :rot us into, ,

Senator SY.llINOTOX. Do YOIl believe all CIA O\'(>I'ticnl-l opl'rutions should support its basic objecti"e of intelligence collection and analysis?

In othcr words, if Cong:ress would wi::;h to limit (;1.\ ovel'~ns OpCI':\­

tiolls to those which clearly >upport intelligence collection, \xolllu it be IJeCPSSUI"y to redraft the Ion act?

lIIr. COLBY. I think the interpretation of the lIet to date is thllt it i, a bit beyonu pure intelligence 0l,e.-utiolls and IInalysis. I think thllt it would hc appropriate to I('an- t w act us it iH in thut I'CSPl'et ht'l.'nu~(~ 1 think that the Agency mil(bt be fctterp(1 ill SOJJle res""':t whiCh would be of illJpol'!"nce to the Ullited States by ,olJle kill(1 of It broad,'r ]lJ"O­sCl'iption t,hnn is perhaps IICC(,!;Slll'Y, I think tho Imsic poiut is tllllt till' Ag'f'n~y O\'cl'scas IS g'oillg' to fo1Jow n,s. poli('y. And thut y0.1I 1111\'(' a tool in the A"ency to m;e ill sLlpport of U.S. policy if it i,; so .]"sir(·,1. I thi"k it lIlil(ht be appropriate to limit the Agency'" [uudion to fo .. · eign intelligence and thut ill C\'(>I'" casc in tlH.~ urt in which tl\l~ word intenig"""e "ppears ill the responsIbilities of the .\gcJlc)" that th" WOI d foreign couhl be insel'ted. .

21

Senator SY}n'XGTo~. I know yaH know tl~at. mneh of the CL\ (~l'f'ra­tion in T 4aos hud us milch to do. with intl'llI~(,II,('e as the prounrtlOlI of carpets ip the {TlIitctl StatN';, It. was thf' opC'rntlOn of a war ;ondllf'tP(L at least in some cases, by the State I)(>pu l'tmpllt aIHI the ,Ccnt;l:al ll~: tclligcncc Agency to coyer up what we '\P1'{' adually <lOIn,g, 1 hat l~ whnt wo'rl'i('s tht'. Al1lerican people, th".!' fllHl sOllletllln~ ,!;!:Olng on fOI years, ~illing tL lot of peop)c>, nb?u~ ,whIch th:'Y,..hnu 110 Id.~~a" ' ;,T' 1('

TUl'ning IIOW to domesttc actl\'ltlCS the 1,) I, :let prO\ llh,s, I I , A.gency sIlull htl\'e no pollcp, subpoena, law f'llforcement pO\n'rs~ 01

internal Sl'CUrity fI1JlctlOl~R," I woTuld ,ask, Y,~l~, a!}Ot.lt ~~\'~I'ul ,n'~T\~ events, 80mB ('ollll('('h'{l ,nth th~ " ntplg:a,fl, (.lSl, lJl\ ~}I~ lI1~ the ( :: The purpose o.f these qU('stions lS not to elH'lt SOl,U', oplIll,on ftb~ut, ~l{(/r­sions ninde uy your prrcl{'c('ssOl's or othl'l' CIA ofIIC'tnls, rlgl\t 01 \\ I 0l~1-' g09d or bad; ratlH'I', to cJnrify the menlli,llg of tlH'S~ statutor), n'strl(,­tions' o.n dOlllcst.ie uclivity us PXPI'('ssl·d 1Jl t1H' l!)-!j !~d., . , Do )'OU bclic\'c the pl'ohibition Il'rllinst thr C'L\ ha\,lIlg' POhl'(', o~'l:l\\ cnforceull.-.nt powel's,pr.intc~nlll sC~llrity functi~ms, ,~'(~uld rroluillt tlll' preparation qf n psychologIcal pJ"ofil~ OJ.' :l 1 .s. CItizen. . . .. , }'fr. Cp'LU'r:Not in {,'~(,l'y' Cllse, 1tlr, (hulI'ma.n, hccnusc, for IIlS.~.lIH1~~ w~ prl.!}ltl.l'c a psycho16gi('nlprofi~con 0111' appiJcants, on 0~1~ applh'al ' 'f r el'n loynicnt, and I think we ('on~l'qll('ntly l~ave u ICg'ltlInatl' {tIl\('­

·tfon.fo~: SOllie of these. Rut I think I Hgree 'nth the thrust. of your (Jll~sHon which'is ,,,ith reier",:,ce to Mr. Ellsbcrg. It" 1I0t our functlOlJ to use th!s capability in that case. .,' . - Srnntor SY)IlNOTO:S-~ That ,,~ns my next. qupstIon, ~", OU,l(~ It pi 0-

hibit the.prepamtipn of a psychological profile OI~ a 1 '.S. C1t.J~ell ~\'''o ,,'as llilder indictnlcnt for crirt:Ie, as ~yftS the Ci:lS~ 'Ylth, ~.Il', DanIel El1s-berO' in August 1971 ? ". '_ ' .

)1r. Cow,'. Ld us sa,' that I do not IIltend to do tIllS, MI'. Cha,rma n: Sennt'or SYlIlXOTON. If anybody asks you to do It would ,\ 011 COIIl{

back here alld protest! . ~1r. COI.BY, If J cnllnot humlle lt nlly otliPt' wny, ~ Senntor SY)Il~fTTOX. If you cunnot. halldle' It any other \Vay, MI'. COLIn'. Right. ~pnntor SY:MINQTON. Thank you, , '

. "'0<11d these proyisions of the 19-17 act prolllbltthe c\genry from providing n f'a.lllcl'u,.tupc recordcr, diSglli~(',s. an.d ~has docunH.~lltatlOn to it "'hite House employee if the Agency was IIlformed tl.!"t that ern'plorec',yas to usc these materials to ('ondnct UIl,"mte!:new,· as \Ya~ nppllrently the case with Mr. E. ~Io\\'aJ"(1 Hunt., III 10,1? , 1\Il'. COLnY~ This is It Ycry complJeatcJ qllC'stlOIl, ~11', Chtlll'lIJall.

, . Senntol' f'h:lnXOl'OX, Simplify It for us, , :MI', COI.HY. For (~xllll1plc, the Sl'Cl'C't. S('l'\"l(,(" .A~t ('aIls fOI' tll,(' f\lll

~,ollllborutipll' 'of other ng('nciC'S of the 00v('rllllll'nt 1ll ~hl) \}~'ot('dlO,Jl, of the indi \'idun Is (lC'Hi crllutcd for Pl'ott'ct lOll by that., SPl'\'Il'l', ,l he q ~l('~t 1011

as to whctlH'l' we ~lOl1)a giyp thl: ~('('J'(:t ~f'l'rJ{'c cC'rt:llll !l:-i:-;Istalll'l'

('onu's IIp I propose to llI'nw the dlstllletlOl) Ll'twrell-- . Se';lnto;' SYl[Jxo'roN, This wns Hot S('('I'l'f. S('~'\'i('(~, TI~p. 'Ylub .. , lloll~(:

called the Deputy DirrctOJ· of the CL\ J"("I'l<"tlllg all of tlus "p[l:lratn, be l(i,'enMr. IIullt. .. . .

)11', COLBY. Uig-ht, I wns llSlIlg tIllS as an 111nstrntlOn of th~~ C;),11,1: plexity of the problem, ~Ir. Chairman, 1n otlH'r words, I IlWllt \(,I~

difficult to say here t1Hlt we will never giro any other agmlCY of tht· U.S. Government help which they might use ill their respoll.ibilities becauso, for lnstance, we pl'(widc It considcI1Lule llmollnt of iuwlligclll'c to the FBI, and there are other ways in which WI' help the otlto!" agencies of the Governinent. , The fact is, hOWel'er, that I think in that particular case a lIlistnh was made and it. will not be mude again. SCHator SYMlNG1'ON . .A ,good UlUi\\'E"l'. '''ould the provisions of the 11147 aet pl'ohiiJit til(' usc of " ,,,-,,all<'<1 safe hOl1se to provj~lc such mutcrials to n "rhitr. IlolI~(' ClIlplo,Yt'tl'! ~f.r. COLBY. I thlllk the !:illllle Ull::lwcr applit'li to tllat (llH·:;tioll, )Ir. CIIIUl'lIlan.

. S,enator SY.MI~OTON. ''''auld these provjHion!-l of the 194-7 ad pro­lublt the. developlllg ofu film for such" White J [ouse elllployee! )~l" COLIrL Afr. ChairIHan, that .U.Cl){,1IC1'>, I lIH'nn, if 0110 of the \\'J"te lIouse employees has a film of some pal'ticulul' thing 0" even needs" sufe. hou"" for 80me perfectly legitimate pUl'pose I I'eally see 110 p~'obl~m,1I\ the Agency helping him wit~l tha~' particular fUllc~ion. I tlunk It IS really a matter of what he .IS dowg aud whether the Agency participates by he1l?ing hil/l in. SOlll~ ill)properactivity, and I aOS!lr!, you tllat the Ab",ncy IS Ilot going to plllticlpate in'lIny improper actlvlty,_ !11tlIOugh I call ellvis~ge a situatioll ill ~hich it would be Ilpproprlateior the Agency to help not Mr. Howard HWlt but a White House official to meet somebody 'without coming to public notice. ,Senator. S>:'WNOTON. III.the CIA's intel·esl. it is proper to.stl\t~ thnt when the Deputy Director, Generul Cuslunnn, foulul Ollt tho llature and degree of this operation he notified the White House,stu'lf member who had requested It that he would no longer aPl.'ro,·ej!,." Mr.COLDY,Yes...· " ". I: Sellator-SYlUNGTOX. So I w9uld not think you would MY<' /lily prob. )("m with this qupstion. ' . r lIIr. C<>WY. I thillk that is exactly it.WllOlI it begall to IJrinuicttt.,1 that th? Agency would begin to participate ill the nctivity ill tile Unitc,\ States m that regard tho Agonc_v withdl'ew fl'OlII thllt participation. Senator SnuNoTox. "'oulll these provisions of the 1941 act require tlICA~"'ncy to insure muterials loaned to a White Ho"s<> employee for One fllnctionwem not used for another illegal function! . Mr. Cow:>". Let us Bay I think we nre gooing to be "el'y careful with somo of·our unIque equlpment, ~II· .. Chnil'Iunn, find we nTe not going to let it out without control. " . Srllat<>f SnIlNomN. Is there allY prllcti('ulway the CIA can nlOlli· tor' the use of materials it proviu<"s to nlriolls cmpJoyccs in GO\'el'll-ment, includingthose in the 'Vhit. lIous<> 1· . " . lIIr. COLDY. It. dep~lIds on the equipment. '''ith ,·.rtain equiPlllont W~' cun, alld ~requently do. in~i'~ on kll?wing p~ccisely whllt i, done '\"lth tha~eq\llp~ent,and that It I" U!K'd III U legltllllute purl''''''' by the Al!~nt'y m questIon., '

I However, I think that it· is possible ill most cuses for us to do this, 11111\ we propose to do it.

Senator SYMINOTON. Is thC'l'c nny n,:,rrecmrnt hctwrcn the FBI and the CIA regarding what is to occur, if olle ugency, in the COllrse of Its operati(ms. oomOO ncross the operations of the other! ~rr. COLBY. There is an agrC'f'ment betw('cn the two ngcIlcie8 which

WitS (lrawn up some Yl'UI'S ng-o. I ha\'(~ not had n. chance to r(wicw this

ill detail hut I pl'OpOSl\ to now that tlH'l'c is new leJldcr~hip in both agencies. . .' . I .. ( ~euator SYlUNGTON. "TheIl you renew It, wIll you suLnllt to t ll~ 'committee your conclusions 'I, , :\lr. COLJIY. I would be ~lnd to. · Senator SnlIll'mro". Thank you. , Does either the CL\. or the FBI hare the allthont~' to tell the OtJ:"I: not to continU{~ with, 01' cowillct, CCl'taHl lllyest~gatlOns; Of, 15 thl.ll mcrely lUI agreement. to notify the othcr ngene,r In ense of tL potl'lltwl

conflict 1 . ' Cl \ :\11'. CULII:>". I think tl,,· Intlt'r is correct, I do not thlllk tlie, ; has tho authority to direct t.!lC Fill to ~nspcn<l nil IIlvcshhratIo~l: ~~ l~ \0 not. 'Ve do hare the uoility to exphlln to thclll thtlt sollle adl\ 1t) ,lu1s llJlother explunation which they might not hll\'L~ known Ilnd HS a Pl'uc,.'tice we always do this. . 2 Snnat.or Sl"lIlNUTON. KOl' would they hu\'(~ u ngl.lt to do so to yon, · IIIr. COLli:>". They do not have the authority to gIve me an or~er to suspwd any :tetivity, except, I su[>~, ';n tlm area of ~omestlc law if they told me I was doiIw somothmg llnproper, they mIght have au­thority to direct me no~ t.o d;>it or arrest me. '. . . , . . · [The following additIOnal statement was prOVided for tile reeo"l.] .' .'Ve have' an" ngreement that CIA's -foreign tntelltg~nce oI~eratio~s in t~H" United 8tatcB will be coordinated \\'i~ the FBI and termlllated If the Ii HI dett:r­mine.'t them prejudicIal to thl'ir adh"itU;'s.

Senator SY1tIINOTOX. They would appeal to the Pf;sid.ent thr~:)tlgh the Attorney Generlll,all!\ you would IIppeal to the.l reSident dJlwt. cOl'rect? .

:\Ir. COLBY. I would gotothe Presidcnt, ri!(ht. _ . Senator SYlUNGTOX. Aside from protcct~ng the phYSIcal secUl'lty of CIA property, such as the headquarters'lIi Langley, Va., .and ~~Oll­uuctilll-( security in\'~stigations ,of It~ owu e~lpl?ye(>s, doos the CL\ need to have authorIty to' provlde dIrect or llH.ltred !:mpport to nll~ domestic law enforcement agency 1 1.11'. COLBY. Y{'.-S, :Mr. CIHlil'mnn,' we do il~ terms of support to, for o3.ample, the FBI. If ,,~e Ip~1'I.1 t,hat a certfllil agent of another COUIl­try is coming here, I thlllk It IS lmpol-tant '.'1'6 be allow~ to pass that information to the I?BI and not be proillbltcd frolll dOlllg so. . 8t'nl\OOr Snm<OToN. Docs the authority of the CIA t~ collect 111-telligo"ce out"i.Je the United States extend to coll~ctlllg mtelhgpl\('" on U.S. citizpns ubroad who do not ap)?ear, to be 1,lIvolve,\ WIth the activitie.s of fOl'ci:rn. gO\'crnmcnts or foreIgn IHSt.ltUtlOIlS~

l\Ir. COWl". No; it doos not. Srnator SY1ol1XUTON. Your anSwer is"~ 0 ~". . . !\ll'. CoLUY. lIy. unswCl' is. "Xo," who \\"('I'l" not UlYolv('ti With fore-Ign

institutions. f;CButOI' ~h·M1NU·l'OK. Do you SllbRCrihe to Alllb;u:,s;\(lol' IIcIllIs ::;tatl'-ment in his puolisheu ad,ln's; of Aprill!J71 thllt "11'1' do not tlng"1

011 U.S. dtizens 1" . . . ~II'. COLUY. I (10 subscribe to that. ,\Vc turg-C'~ on.fOrE'ltrll lllt.('.Ihg'l~,nl'('. ~rl'. Chainnun, foreign illh.'lIi~cn('o n}'ul f~J'elgn llltelhJ.~('nce. ~I'\'h·(:!". T1H'J'(' is oCl!Hsionallv sOlIle lIlClllentnl mentIOn of AmerIcan Clt:ZC'Il~ III this regal"l, Tltn,t k'ind of information. if it il~dicates wmetll1n~ }l11-1)1'o)('r, is tm'!H'd 0\'1..'1' by llS to thl' F'BI. It 1S not h,tndled by 011t' Alr('JH'V. ~ .

24

Scnat.()l"S·Y1II~NGTON. ~TO~" the so-eullpd ,,"ut(·",:rntt· ('omillitt('~, the one clluln~d, by SenLLtor En'lIl, hus recently I'cJpUSt·u n s('t of dOClIrTH'nfFi

dealing ,vitl.l the pliln duri,:g the summer of l!1jO, apparently "ppm\"('(1 by the PreSIdent, to establIsh an Inter-Agency Committee all Intelli­gence, which would include t·he Director of tlie CIA and would d(':01 '~ith.doIneBt\c intelligence operations. Do you beliere 'thnt the prohibi­tIon In th~ 1.)47 nct ngnill~ the Ag'C'nr,'> h[lvillg' fill}' polic(' 01' Inw ('11_ forcCI!lel).t.powel's, or any Internnl security flmrtions, would prohil'it t?e Dll-~tor .of Central Intelligence from partieipnting in the (lI'ulull-tlOn of ~tellIgence on domestic grou)'s? . . .

lIfr, COLAY. No; I do not. Mr. Chamlllln, 1 tlllnk that m thut resp('pt the Age!'cy ha~ an.ohliqation to IlI:o"ide to the G':JVernment the rc­suits ?f Its forrugn llItelhgence uctlvltles and coll"ctlOn and if this clln contrlhute to the Government's knowledge of some problem in the pnited ptates that this can properly be passed by the Agency tQ nn lIlter~gency group but the Agency would not itself be engaged In those tunctl~ll.s . .oraI(Clt those pmyers, It wlluld merely pass the results of Its act.l.v~tIjl$ abroad to that mteragency etrort and to the approp";at. authorIhes of the Government. . SenatorSY~UNO'l'ON. Well, it is my understnnding that when the

Centrnl Intell!genc~ .Agency was created th.e 1I!0st difficult problellls th'l.t th~:y hltd m wntmg the la,! we;e.!he obleeaons of the Director of the Federal Bureau of InvestIgatIOn hecause of' hisapprohensions about mterferen~e in domestic nctivities. You have no intention of <10-ingtinythirig tilthat ehameted ,. . . Ur. COLBY. AbsolutelVnot,Mr. Chairman. I repeat that I read the w~rd "foreign" before the word "int~lJig('nce" in the authority under this act. I . I .'

. Sel'.ator'SnrrNo",!N. Bnsed 'on some (l1lpers We reccii'ed we hn"e the rl~t., I ~hlnk; to beheve that AttQrJiey Genernl Mitchell di<1 not. know of tins so-called plan presented by Mr. Chnrles Tom Huston n lawver ir: tho White House nt that time; Perhaps MI'. Hoover in "'1~ortil1g to Ins bo~, the_ ~ttorney G~neral, requeste<l that the plan-the roquest, I~e I)ut III w,:tlllg. IfIw dId that, ~lr. Mitchell,.being n lawyer, unques­honably . would have felt that Ingher autborlty was requesting !lfr. Hooverto.brenk the law: Ttm·ay.well be that is what happened and the reason the plnn, aft~r a few d\,ys, was ab.antlonded. In any cns,', the peop'l~ that I have dlscus~ed th,s matter WIth, who are far groater nu­thorltleg on the ConstItullon thnn I am. feel that it wns 'in effect a i·.­'Iuest to circumvent the Const.itution. "iolat. the Collstitution. I umllot Ilskin/! for your opinion on thnt flirt or lack of nccuracy Lut I would hopo thnt YOH would be very careful about thh~ in Uw futufC hCf'nl1SC

now e:erybody will be consi.doring this from tho stnnupoint of youI' oper~tlOns. As I u~ld.crstUl.ld ]t, y?U do not intclill to pfil·tlciJmte in nny WHY III 11 lly,U.OIlll'HtlC lIltel1J:!l~lH·C.1S tlint t'OITPd 1 r

.Mr. COLny. I do not, !lfr. Chairman. . ~enator SYJlllNOTON. 'Vould this pre,'pnt. y01l {rom helping to make

polIcy rcgnrdmg tl~c copection of intellig<'lIcc. 011 dOJll('stie groups ~ lIr. COLBY. I. beltm'e It. would, ves, Mr. Chall'lnan. I do lIot Src thllt.

ns within my-responsibilities at all. '. S~nator SnII.N?TON. Would the 1947 nct prohibit the CIA from col­!C~tll:>g, or pr~vldmg the sup-port n.ecessnry for collecting, intelligewe wlthm the UllIted States on domestIc groups! .

I I

i

25

~ll'. (",oI .. 1\Y. 10<> lj(~\·t' t hut i:; t he same question, css('nt ial1y. Hcnatol' SYMINUTOX. Yos. Mr. CQLIIY. And it would prohibit me from doing that. . . .. Senator SnIlNO'l'ON. Would it clarify your responsllHh~IOS, :1[1'.

Colby,anu the responsibiiiti,'s of theCIA under the 1047 act,If Itwol'O made dearer that your responSlblhtles e:s:tended only. to foreIgn lIltd­ligenco--no.mely, intelligence about Or relat.eu to fOI'e.lgn gove..l'llment.::;, gl'OUpS, or individuals? . ' ".

MI'. COLBY, I would cOI·tulllly have no objectIOn to thut. If It. ,,"oultl relieve any (",nrel'll thut.unyboJy feels about CIA, I wo.uld fully recolll­mend that that be done. 1 think the easIest way for It IS Just to usc tIll' wOl,ls "foreign intelligence." . . .

Senaror SYMINOTON. Ambassador Helms testllIed before the Senat(' Foreigu Relatjons Committee that the requiroment for the Direcwr of C"",tra! Intell;";ence to prot.ect inteIIigrulca SOUl;:"'S .and ,~ethods hilS sometimes leu to the eKlstell('e of a "gra;y aren., uSlllg ills,vords, of CIA respo)lsibiliti'C'l by i~ll)licntion vorglllg 011 the reqUlrcmwt to be involved in domestic actiVIties. _ : .

Do you know of any way to clarify or correct this situatio~! Mr. CoWY. My interpretation of .that partIcular proVISIOn, Mr.

Chairman, is that it gives me a .charge bu.t does )Iot glvo m~ anthol'lty. It gives me the job of identdy~ng any problem of protectmg SQu.rces and methods but in the event I IdentIfy Que It gIves me the responSIbIl­ity to go ro the appropriate authorities with tbat inforlllo.tion and It does not give me any authority to. act on my own .. So I really see less. of a grny aroa in that regard. I beheve that there IS really no au~horIty under that act that can b. used. If, on the other bund, there IS s~me concern over Ille matter I would have no problem because I do not vIew it as giving me any authority.

Senaror SnlINGTON .. Do you believe that some other qovemment official should have the overall responslblhty to protect mtelligence sourre. and metbods in ardor to make it olear, for example, that It IS not the CIA's rosponsibility to get involved in domestIc law onfol'cc-mont flmotions i .

Mr. CoaY. I think,.in a se!!se; 1111' _ CI~M~n, we. all haye the responsibility of protecting nahonal secur.'ty mformatlOn, and that most intelliJl'lnce sources and methods fallmto that category.

Senator SnIlNOTON. Well, if I understand, if there is.aGo>:ernment official th"t ehQuld buve such responsibj.lity,it should be yourself'/ .

Mr. COLllY. For Ole intelligrulCe lield, I think it is myself nO questIOn about it.

SelUlror SnIlNoTON. Right. In gllneral, what do you =id"r to be the propel' scope of youI'

agency n.ctivities within the United States! Mr. COWY. Mr. Chail1nan, we obviously ha\'e ro rUIl II h""dquartel's

hore; W6 have to rem'uit people for our Bt.affshllUd so forth; we hn,n~ to conduct investigations on those peol'le; we ave to protect our own inteJligenee SQUrroB IlJld methods wit~un the Agency; we have ro con­tract with a large number of Amencll'" firms for the varIOUS klpds of equipment that we might have nead for abroad. 'Ve nlso, I belI",'c quite properly, oon collect forej~.intejligence in the United States, including roquesting Amel'lcan CItizens to share WIth thmr. (}OYCl'll­mont certain infonnntion they may know about forelgn sltuat.lOns.

26

,Yo have. n senrjc~ that, Aoes this, nw:l. I nm happy to say, n. V{H°Y 1111"-::1'

number of AmCl'lCnn CltIZ(,IlS 113.\'(', ~l\'('ll us ROJrH"- Y('rv important ill­fOJ'nll1tion. \Vo do not pny for that iniornllltioJl. ,y~ ciln protect tiH'il' proprietary illtezol'st and en~1l proti..·,ct. t.heir n1llll(lS if 1l000"(~l.ry, if t.lwj' would rather not be exposed us the sou!'ee of thnt infoJ1nlltion.

'Ve also, I belicH', have- c:Crtain SUppOlt uct.iviti('s tllllt W()I must­conduct in the United States in order to Nmduet foreign intcllig<"IWl' opera.tiollE nUraad. Certain structures arc J1('('('SSlI ry ill this coulltry to give our people nbroad pel"lulps a reason for orUl'at-jng abroad jjl SOfie, rcspec;ts so that they can Il~)pelll" not ns ("1:1\. (,llIployeoL\;) but nH rcpl"(,8e,ntatIv('s of some other entIty. Lnbtly, I tlunk that them un' 1\

Humber of u..ctivities in the United States where forei~n intelliQ't'Il(,(! can be collected from foreign"rs, and as long as this is fOl"ign ir:t~lIi­gence, I think' it' quite proper that we 'do so, I ('nn certainly go into more detail on this in 'executive session any time you would likf', MI'. Chairman, but ,r reiterate that tire focus should lind must be foreiJPI intelligence only, and thut all the other netivities are only sUl'pOltr'·" of thut major function. "

,senlltor SYlI[lNQTON. If you should receive an order in the futuro which·appearson its· fare to be iIlegal, what would youda! ,,' , ·,Afr. CoI1'!. I wou!d·~bje~t.to it and, if neeessary I IUn quite propt"",1 to leave tillS responSibilIty If It came to that. '

Senator SYMINGTON.J did not hear you. .Afr.' COLBY; AI)d lam quite prepared to len,·o this job if it comes

to that.· ,"c.·," , . ,

·Sena.tor Sn,jNOTON. Po you believe that, CIA officials should r"fmin from malcing policy, or explicitly' mnking r"('commondations tLbout policy, IlIld, if so, what steps cun you tuke to insuro tllllt the CIA maintains its role as solely an intellIgence organiZlltion i '.

Mr. COLIIY.' I do indeed bClieve that the CIA's 1"010 is to trv to call wh~ is, .happ(mitfg, a~rood' vef1" u('curate)y and pl'l)£isely, amI,irlC'i­?elltally, t? show hvo' or .three different 'interpl"('tations if these legit­I matel y eXIst. But the achon thllt should be taken abont that isa lal·gel" 'Iuestion dl'l1ling with the interest and polidcs of tho United States and the vario~~ ~Ilpahilities .bfth~ United Statcs .. These nre not within th~ rcsponsIbll?tres .of the mtelhg.;nce commlJ~it.y ~r.d. therefare, I tlunk tha.t tl!e mtelhgence oommunrf.y, should stIck to Its own business and not get mto.reponvnending what ~houldbe done. . . .' '.,

Senator.SYMINoTO:<. What w~uld be 'youl·.pOAit.ion rel.'Ilrding CIA collaboration W1tJtrrlvnre AmerlCnn corpornt.}ons OVf'I'Heosj' " i i

~f!·. Cor.8Y. \\,,:1 , I think that in rnany respects them am p<H·footly Ieg!tlJUate ways.III wInch we can collaborate with American corpo­rntlOns OVerS~88'ln terms of the exchong-c of information and in sonw si~u":tions corpora,tio~s ovcrseas can help t.lre intelligenc~' activity and mlSSlOn~ .. .," , . . . . However, '1 thinkyo1)r mioi·ence is ruther to tire situntion that de· veloped with IT!' in Chile lind I think that our position there is tiln!. we are' not going to be a conduit!or corporate policies nndthat we' will not" 8.lIQw ourselves to be controlled by some corporation. . ! . ~cnatOr SYMIN'J,'O". There would ap]"'ur no I"<'n,,,,n, from tho stand­

]>Olllt of logIC, that prevents you utilizlIlg- Americlln citizens in a for­crgncountry to the best of your ability to obtllin information. You would agree. would you not!' " .

~Ir. COLIn. Ri~]It. S~'.JHLtor SY)[J1\'awx. 011 the otl1l'1' hand. \'Oll would Hot want tllnt

corporation to take n<h-untngc of your lWjll('st hy in turn ohtaillill,~~ spccial fILVOI"S fr-oll1 t.he' (To\'m11111cnt ~ .

~fr. COI.RY. Rig-ht. T think we h:nc only 011(' SOIll,(,P of Ollr alltilol'lty a.nd t.hat is the stlltut<.', I1ml the PJ'f'sid('ut, llJlcl that "\\'e' shouW lllab· d('cisiollS on what w(' do m't'l"S('flS hn~l'd on tIl(' Ilr-sf. illt(,l'l';sts of tltl' Unit<xl St·nt.('s Ilt.:. Hl'ti('nlut(',d br tilr. ('Ollg-)'('~,.:, and t.lll', PI'I'-sldl"IlL HIHI

not by uny iruli"idl1al (,'olJlpaIlY.' _,. . Smmtor SYMINGTOX . .As It Ilwlllb(ll' of tIll' ::-'l1il('OtllIluttcc on ~IlIltl­

Nationa.l CO~l)Orat.iolls .of til('. F'oI't'i!!1l H,('lat~ollS (.'ommit,t.c{-, I "',:IS

impI'('sscd WIth the obn0115 In.ek of coordlllntlOll WIth ot!lCr C?lllllllt­tees and lthink much of thllt t.rouble could hnye been fiyolded If tl",re had heen (' h>ti4:'l" ('OOJH'l'Il t ion bd,w(,(".ll the nll'inll8 inh'll'stNl ('.omm itt.('(,~,

I }mvo SOBlC qll(>:"tioIlH hpl'l", ~Ir. Colby. thnt. ~{'lllltOI' I LnglH's wOllld 1il{(} you tQ n..nSWN· for th(> r(,f~oI'd, )Inny (If t.IWlIl tOrN' ground W{' hn\"t' already disc.usscd this moruing, '

:Mr. Cor.RY. I will be glad to prm'ide thosC' answers, ~fr. Chairman. ',Senator HUGHES. Can you tell us publicly t.he budget totals for tIlt'

CIA IlIld for the I"('st of the intelligence community? If n~t, how nrc wo to judge whether the~ amounts ar~ approprIate 1n VICW of the intelligence product 3ml. the t'ompetmg chl1ll1s for Gorel'nmC'llt

resources? , Mr. COWY. The budget totals for the Central Intelligence Ag"lIey

ond the members of the int(>lligenee {'ommunity 11n n~ traditionally b('Pll

maintained 011 a. classified lJasls and re\'("nlp(l (wIv in cxecutiy(~. SC'SSiOll. I defer to the appropriate congressiona~ auth<!rities fo~ any clutnge i~1 this p~Alure. Budget requests afC nWlcwen In detull111 the AgeJ1C'Y'~ annual budg-et hearings with the A I'Pl"Ol'rintiolls Committees of tbe Senato Rn(l tho I-Iom;p of Rf'pr('s('ntnti\'('~'

Senator JluGIlE8, III 01'<1('1' for the l'{'spowsiblc {,Ollllllitt,('C's of Con­gress to do their work 011 national securit.y matt(~I'S ill a beUp.r infoI'lIH'd way, would yon accept legis1ation requiring- the CIA ~o ~urnis~l thrs(' committees regulftr and f>pccinl ~'pOl'ts ,on matters w1tlnn t.hel1: PUl'­vi'e,v;, ,subject; of rC:ll~rs(", to pr()p~r securIty ll)('as~tl'rs? "r ?uld t.l~lS not, bo"1L valuablo additIOn to the mfrequent and \YJde·rangl\lg Lrwfin;;s Ii-mv. gi'ven the ('ommit,tee? ." .., . " Mr. Cowl'. The Director of Centrnl Intellrgence tradlt.ionnlly has g;'veri briefings on the world sitt!~tion and 0!l specific t.opics to a lIum·

:) ber of Senlltc unci I-fouse <.'fln)mltters. I wIll N.'.YlCW the maHer anel report to the Armed Serviwi Committee ontlr. ]lossibility of sUI;p!r·­lnenting such hncflngf>. by approprIate wrItten matcnnls, provluNl tllCoo cl1n]){~· maintained on n. classified basis. I think this can he aCCOl\l-

plished without legislation.· . , ... Senator HuGHv ... "That steps have been (aken or ,,,ill you take to

insure thnt the" CIA never ng-ain will be inyoh"NI in dom('stic A.nH'l'i­can n.ctivitie.s, as it wllf in the training of police personnel from s~"l'r" 1 U.S. cities and in the assistance to Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy ~

Mr. Cor..IIY .. A careful. review '!as boon .!TIane of nil possible. Agency involvement III domestIc AmencfLll actlvltIes l and lIlstructlOIls un' being issued to ensure that no violation of the limitations of CIA's statutory Authority takes pla<;e in the fut.ure. 'Yith respect to the train­ing of local police personnel, I reiterate Dr. Sc.hlrsinger's asS'uran('('

that, <It'spite the fad that its legality llIight be dt'fcnded. IlIly f,lIl'tlwr such action will he tnkrll ollly in the most exceptional circuillstances and with the Direetor's ()crsom" approml. Hcgu},.tions are being de­veloped with respect to CIA 'L~ist"nce to othel' L.S. agencies and per­sonnel to ensure that any such assistance raises no question of CL\ in vol vem~nt in domestic A nwrieull aeti vities.

Senator HU"'IF~" Mr. Colby, publisl",d reports suy that your ex­pel'ienec has been jn the plum; uno operntioHS sido of the CIA l'atlH~r than ill intelligl)lwc or s('iell('e amI tcehnology. B(~eIlUSC of tho Il\·n.il~ ahility of new tcehnical intelligt'llce gathering' mellllS, not to mention tho lmeklash a.nd suspicion in many nn··us of tIm world l'ngunJing­a~rcnts, do you belif"ve that the tjme' has come to rcdU(~e sollie of 0111'

oyer8(>ns ?perntiolls in order to put grenter stl'CSS on intellib"Cllce nnnly­SIS and SCIenCe nna teehnolo~')' 1

MI'. COIJBY. Over the past 15 years groat stress hilS hoen placed on scientific and technological intelligence gathering. which hns JllD.dc n. ::treat contribution to nc('urato know)edge of important foreign dc\'cl­opments. Overseas intelligence operations must only be conducted in circumstances fully justifying the risks involved and in situations which cannot be covered by more normal methods. Analysis has mud" 1\ substlUltial contribution to intelligence and is being improved and refined to th, gI'Il\ttest degree possihle.

Senntor HUGHES. Published reports also gi"e yon a key policy role in decisions to ;nvoh'e the United States in clandestine operatioDS in fAlos in the lo.te 1950's "_nd early WGO's--operations ",hicl, grow into n secret, CIA-run WILl'. .

.(<<) On mtieetion, do vou Lelieve that it was wise for the Agency to get invoLved in such military operatious!

(b) Do you believe that it is proper under our Constitution for such militarv operations to be conducted without the knowle<;lge or approval of t.he CongJ"'SS 1

(e) '\Chere should the line Le dmwn Letween CIA and Defense Dc­Partment aetivities involving the usc of Imned forcel

Ur_ COLBY_ The AgNlcy's activities in LIWS wcre undertaken in di­re~t response tQ Presidentifil find National Security Co\lncil direction in.oro.er to carry out U.S. policy IlJld at the sume time I\.void the neces­sity for uniformed U.S. involvement in Laos. These activities grew in sizo over the years to meet greater North Vietnamese o,nd Pa~l\et Loa pressure, The size·to which these operations grew nuwe it difficult to mnintain norm.l intelligence procedures. Despite the difficulties for CIl\.. I~bmit that the Agency fulfilled the cha'!,'" given it efficiently llnd effectIvl>,ly.

The appropriAte committees of the Congres.q IlJld II number of indi­vidual scno.tors and conl,'Tessmen were briefed on CIA's activities in Laos duri,ngthe period covere,l. Xli addition, CIA's .progrnms were deec.,-ibed tQthe l\.ppropriations Committees in our allnual budget heanngs. . .

IP g<mera,!, the line should be draWll betWOOIl. CIA a.nd the Defensc De~ent with respect to $.fmed force at the po~nt in which the United Stat.es aQ!QJ.owledges involvement in Buoh activities_ As a pl'lLC­ti.,.l, roaMer, however, the BC1'le \If t,he activity will, in mo.ny CjlSeS, also affect whether. the United Sta~ is I.'evea]ed lIS engagllli in the activity_

S1\I1atoi- RVQUES_ Where. do you-and should we-:-dro.w the line

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between simply gathering intelligence a.nd manipUlating- e\'cnts or interfering in the internal affairs of other countries? Ill- particular, why should the CIA piny any role in nnlions of the underdeveloped world which pose no conceivable threat to us?

Mr. COLBY. As illdicntcd above, the use of intelligence techniques should be reserved to cases of importance in which IlO other means will serve. This same approach is even more stringently upplicll to any activity which could bo construed as interfering ill tlH~ internal u1Fnll'S of other nations, anu such activities are only conuuctcd ulluer the spo­cilic direction of tlte National Security Council. 1Vith this appronclt, it would be unlikel:y that CIA would playa role of this nature in any nation whose poliCIeS pose no conceivable threat to U.S. intcrests.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am impressed with your Illlswers, and look forward to voting- for your confirmation, hoping you will carry out the philosophy you have expressed this morning. If you do, your Agency will perform un important function incident to the secunty and pros­perity of this country.

Thank you, and gdod luck. Mr_ COLBY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator SYMINGTON. The committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11 :40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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I!

NOMINA'rION OF WILLIAM E. COLBY TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAl, INTELLIGENCE

FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1973

U.S. SENATE, COl\IMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

lVa,ghington, D:O. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.In., in room 2:}5,

Richard B. Russell Sellate Office Building, Hall. Stuart Symington (acting chairman).

Present: Senutors Symington (presiding), Cannon, Hughes, Nunn, and Thurmond.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staii dircc­tori]t. James 'Woolsey, general counsel; John A. Goldsmith, Edward B . .Il..enne:r, professional staff members; Ben J. Gillens, director of investigatIOns, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee; and Kath­erine Nelson, assist..'lnt to Senator Synllngton.

Senator SnnNoToN. The hearing will come to order. Congressman Drinan, we welcome you today. IVe will hear testimony

from five witnesses who have requested to be here. You arc the first witness.

We will hear first from you, Congressman Drinan. Do you have a p,repared statement i

STATEMENT OF ROBERT F, DRINAN, U,S, REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Representative DRIN AN. I do, Senator. Senator SnUNGToN. Will you read it? Representative DIUNAN. Yes, I will rend it. But may I submit it as

given here for the record at this time 1 Senator SnHNO'l'ON. Without objection. Representative D.lllNAN. I havo romo to testify agaillst the npl'Oillt~

ment of IIII'. Colby as the Director of the CIA because I 11"\'0 bcon almost compelled by tho voice of my conscience to raise my voice to provont tho confirmation of a man whmm I1rt.ivities in ViC'tnam and whose testimony before this commit.tee on July 2, 1973, indicate thut almostrcl'tninly IH~ will continuo within t.lw erA those ndivitirs of this intelligence Rfcncy which have In·ouf..{ht disgraco to the Fedoral Gov~ verrunent "nl to the American people.

On Sunday, June 1, 1969, I and seven other Americans talked "'ith William E. Colby in Saigon from 4 :30 p,m. to 6 :45 p.m. I was in South Vietnam as a member of the privately financed U,S. Study

(81)

Team on Religious and Political Freedom from J\[uy 29 to Juue 10 19G9. 'Ve/ut our report in tlfe.Congressional Record 4 years ago. '

."Then read that Mr. :WIlham Colby had been appointed as the Dlr~etor of the CIA I revlOwed yery carefully the notes whieh I took durlDg and after the 2 hours that I and my asso~iates spent with JIll'. Colby more than 4 years ago. Mr. Colby at that tIme WIIS of course in charge of the Phoenix program or CORDS. The precise l;urpose of tllO stu~~ team .of WlllcIl I was a member wus to determine the number of pohbeal p-",s0!lers and the extent ~o which, if Ilny, the United Stlltes w~s contnbutlDg to the suppressIOn of political frcedom in South Vletnam.

~~r. Colby d~d his best to .preven~ us from acquiring any hard infor­!llatIO,!- from hun or from h,s asSOCllltes. For the lirst 2G minutes of the m~rvICw Mr. Colby explained severnl obvious matters about South VIetnam all of WhICh were thoroughly known to the eight members of the U.S. ~udy team. Mr. Col~y also went out of his way to explain that PresIdent .Johnson had given'him the personal rank of Ambassa­dor when he left the CIA and agreed to run the Phoenix program for the State Department.

-,\t no. time did Mr. Colby .even concede the possibility that the paclfie!'tr?~ program was .a~Istmg. t~e govel"lUllent of President Thieu to put m Jail all of.t~e yolItrca} actIVISts who alone could fOl"lll a politi­cal party or a polItica coalItIOn capable of running a candidate in a gemnue election against President Thieu.

Mr. Col':>:r cO,!-ceded that the number of political prisoners increased as the paCificatIOn program became more widespread in South Viet­nam. M~. Colby. also conceded that many of the political prisoners did not r,,?Clve.1l trIal and that many of them remained for months and years III prIson merely because of the suspicion of some local official. Mr. Colby stated "I know brutality exists" and added without much proof that "we trye to do something about it." He never made clear hmyev,;r, wh.at he tried to do about the widespread existence of bru: talIty III prlsons--a phenomenon which I and my associates heard everywhere in South Vietnam.

Mr: Colby offered no assistance whatsoeyer and in fact professed total IgnOrRnCe about the "tiger cages" in the prison on Con Son Island. We were unable to discover these dungeons which were eventually dis­covered a year later by a U.S. congressional team members of which almost stumbled by accident upon the existenc~ of these hideous dungeons.

In fact Mr. Colby indicated that he knew little about the conditions in the prisons most of which wem built with American money and designed by Ameri,:"n engineers. I 11I1d the other members of the U.S. Study Team of PolItical Freedom in South Vietnam felt indignation at the way that Mr. Colby evaded our questions and outtalked us as a fOl"lll of brushoff.

I.did ,!-ot learn until 1911 that durin~ Mr. Colby's period with the paci!ication program ~O,581 South ViolnlLmeBO people were killed. Durmg that. "!lme perIOd-19G8 to May 1971-28,918 persons were captured or JaIled.

One had the impr"'lSion of Mr. Colby on that Sunday afternoon in June, 1969 of an mdividual who would do what he was told carrv out orders as they were given and always seek by misleading or'docep-

'~I

a :'Ii.

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33

tive statements to deny that ullything was wroIlg in thc, progra.m which he was implementing. . This impression was deepened by a conversation-which I will never forget, Mr. Chairman-which I had with an American prison official, present durin~ our entire interview with Mr. Colby, who spoke to me as I wOO leavmg Mr. Colby's office. This individual who had cOllle to Saigon ,from the United States because he was an expert in building prisons had denied in the presence of all of us that there was allv brutality against the political prisoners thllt were literallv rOUIHled up. by the Phoenix progl"lLlll and herd",! into prisons. He' confl'ssed prIvately to mo, however, as I was lcavmg that he knew of c:xtcllsi\'c brutality and he hoped that the U.S. study team would expose it to the entire world. He conel udcd by stating thlLt he would delly \\" hat he had said if I ever attributed it to him I

. On the basis of what we saw in South Vietnam the study Ipam recommended that the Nixon administration and the Congress have a complete investigation of the extent to which American offieials in the pOOification prbgram have turned over innocent South Vietnamese citizens to military field tribunals, the equimlcnt of a kangaroo court, and thus have contributed to the disappearance of oj! political opposi­tion to President Thieu. t. ,The study team predicted that the total number of political pris­on~rs would increase as long as the pacification program continued. This has of course happened so that. now there aro some 200,000 politi­cllI prisoners in South Vietnam-a situation which makes it virLually hppossible for any political opposition to arise against President Thieu. ,Mr. Colby seemed incapable of comprehending the fact that the

p.S. Goyernmcnt lind particularly the pacification program was mak­mg a mockery of the constitution of South Vietnam. He kept insist ina that war conditions existed in South Vietnam and that therefore tl~ violations were understandable. 11r. Colby seemed actually unwillinO' to listen when John Pemberton, the executive director of tlle Americ"~ Civil Libertics Union and Methodist Bishop James Armstrong, mem­bers of the team, pointed out to him that the South Vietnamese Con­stitution provides: -)l:Any restriction upon the ba.sic rights of the citizens must be prescribed h:,-" In w aud the time nnd place withIn which such it restriction Is enforced must be clearly speCified. In nny eVt'lIt the essence of all bnRIc freedoms cannot he vioInt(>d.

,,,iWe found of COlu'Se other American officials in South Vietnam who wero just as inscnsitive to the complicity of the United States in law­lessness as Mr. Colby appeared to be. . I feel obliged by my convictions and by mv conscience to stale that .. man who displayed the attitudes which Mr. Colby did when ho operated the Phoenix program should not be confirmed bv the Con-gress of the United States to be the Director ofthe CIA. ' '~"I want also to raise other questions about the unsatisfactory nature of the testimony which Mr. Colby gave on .July 2, Inn, before this ~lllIllittee. I al[;() wnnt to state my shock and indignation that 1 hour and 40 minutes has boon t.he total time spent, with one Sonator present. in hearings on the crucial question of who will be the next Director of the CIA. But I rocognize tlllLt that now has changed, and I hope that th":,!,, hearings will remain open as long as any Member of Congress ~ !! '

34

or any knowledgeable indivillual wants to testify about this crucial matter. . This is th~ Agency, we must remember, that brought disg-mce to Itself by Its lJlvolvcmcnt with t.he ITT in Chile shock and HIlU"Cr to everyone by its involvement in the 1Vatergate sCUI:del. ~

The ch3.lrn;nn of this COIlllnittc;e also state(~ in his op(lliing fCmarks that ~he hearmg on ~fr. Colby WIll "also reVIew a number of policies relatmg to the CIA Itself." The chairman went on to note that we are going to take this opportunity to try to I(et a hettel' ullderstallllilll-( for ourselves ollll for the people as to just what the crA is alld what it is su1posed to do.

want to .state" with all due. respect, that it has bl'l'll the Senate Armed ServIces CommIttee wIucll, more thnn nny other ,ngency in COllgl'ess, h,ns IH'(wf"ll~ed the CongTcss nlld the ]ll'ople of thIS ('ollnt.ry from knowlllg nnytillng ai>ol1t the CIA. In fllt, last 2 d(·(,lh.h's more than ?OO bills aimed at making the CIA aecoulltahle to Conl(rcss have been mtroduced. None has been en~ctoo. The most recent attempt to mak~ the CIl\ accountab!e came on 3uly 17, 1972, when the Sennte Forelgn. RelatIOns CommIttee reported out a bill requiring tho CIA ~o submit regnlar reports to congressional committees. That bill died m the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In all candor, Mr. Chairman, the record of the Senate with re~.rd to oversight of the qIA has been disgracefu!. On November 23, 1071, Senator 301m StennIS and Senator Allen },llender-then the chnir­men of the Armed Services and the Appropriations Committee as well as of their CIA Oversight Su?committel}--Said that t!J.ey Imew nothing about the CIA-financed war m Laos-surelv CIA's bIggest opcmtion. (Congressionnl He('ord I"'I-(e S l!J:'21-HI":\i). f . I hope therefore that these hearings will remnin open, as I men­

tl(~ned, sh?uld any Member of Congress ",ant to address himself to th,s questlOn.

I fi~Hj the testir:no!lY ?f l\fr. Colby very alllbiguolls, equivucal and unsatJsfactory. H,S JustificatIOn of the Phoenix pro"rum lidded little to the unsatisfactory evidence which he gave on tl~at mlltter before the Senate and House congressional committees in 1070 Ilnd 1971. lIe m~e absolutely no response then or on 3 uly 2, 1973 to the vehement cntlcIsms made of the basic injustices in that program of which he was practically the architect.

No,,:here has Mr. Colby responded to the criticism that he and the Phoemx pro~ram have brought about the virtual dictatorship of Pr~sident Tlueu because the Unitcd States has put all of the potential pohtJcal opponents of Prl"sidcnt Thion ill jail.

I visited Mr. Rowe in his jail after the election in lOG8 and talked with him for more than an hour.

lIfr .. Colby stated o~ .Tuly 2--on page Hi-that he directed any AmencanB 1Il South VlCtnam to report any. illegal abuscs to higher autho~lty. Mr. Colby states thnt he dId receIve some reports of mis­behaVIOr, that he took theln up with the South Vietnamese Govern­ment and that he "saw action taken aOllinst tho individual doing it." This may have heen in some individ.fal clISes but the awful fnct re­mains that. Mr.Colby presided over n pattei'll of totallnwle><sness and n~lute VIOlatIon of the basic and fundumental no.,ns of constitu­tIonal,governments in South Vietnum during the entire life of tho Phoclllx program.

it

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• ,: " "

35

I do not want to have a Director of the CIA who for whatever reason by his own arunission was lUlable or unwilling to gnarnntC'c to South Vietnamese citizens tho basic provisions of due process. . .

Mr. Chairman, I wish to set forth another reason why m my Judg­ment the confirmation of Mr. Colby should be l"'stponed. On .r uly 2, 1973, Mr. Colby waS asked by the chairman if he would allow ~Ien!­bers of the Congress to "sec at least the g-eneral amount which IS spent for intelligence functions annually." Mr, Co.lby statl~1 Ol~ several occasions duriuf' that hea.ring thnt thnt would he, up to lhe Congref's itself. And I tlunk we should take MI'. Colby at IllS word allli ask Mr. Colby how the CIA spent that money,

Mr. Colhv made no objection to that right of the Congress, and the least that tho Congress could do is to postpone the appomtment of Mr. Colby until we have nsselted our right to. know what tho CIA is doing and how it spends tho money approprIated for It. .

If Mr, Colby is confirlllcd and the CI;\ COllt.lllIlCS to. becollle lIlvo~ve(1 in activities which,bring disl'race to It and shame to the AmcrIean people the citizens of this natIOn can blame the Congress al~d the Con­gress alone. At this particular time ?f substRI~tUll change III our for­eign policy it would be reckless and IrresponsIble. for t1w Congress to refuse to tnke ilIr. Colhy at his word and 10 c1eclme to say ~hat from this day forward the Congress will, as IIII'. Colby conce!les It call, es-tablish'the budget ofthe CIA, . '

I object to IIII'. CDlby's confirmation hecnusc 1Il the testlllIOn)' .on 3 uly 2 he made no firm commitment that the .CIA under IllS du'ectlOn would not become involved in ano.ther operatlOn such as the CIA con-ducted in Laos. , .

In response to questions asked by IIII'. H!'ghes, IIIr. Colby 111 \\,1'1t­ing was even more ambignous ubout the Involvemcnt 1ll Laos, and would not concede, as Senator HUl(hes sUl(gested, that that was a very inappropriate Ilnd llnlnwful nrtivity on ~he part of the CL\.

IIIr. Colbv is also less than clear or satIsfactory when he statcs t1~nt he would not preclude the CIA fr?m nssistiy:! oll~e~' ;Fcdcrnl a~cnc.lCs even thouRh the CIA should restl'lct fill of Its actlvltIe'S to forcIgn I.n­te!ligence opel1~tions., M~. Colby says, for example, that he can, ""'(VIS­

age a SItuatIOn m whICh It would be appropl'late for the ogenc) to. help not Mr. Howur!l HUllt but 11 White House official to meet somebody without caminl! to puhlic notice."

It is true that the CIA has ,l(iven to individuals in COll(!'rcss thnt are hil'hly placed. some informatIon about the finances. But Jll all cancioI', tins is cheating me as a Member of the Conl'ress, an~ the pe0l!le I represent, of the knowledge and the InfornmtlOl1 to WhICh the CItIzens of this countrv t1re entitled. , Mr_ Chairman, for the first time in history YOII have holdly apd CDU­rageously had all open hearing OIl the CIA and the confirmat.lOn of a chairman. But ttt that hearing I\Ir. Colby would I~ot even thsclosl' tho nature and mnk(Jup of the so-called Forty Conl'Jmttp(~, fi S('(,I'P.t pronp accountable to the National Security Council. And, Mr. Chamlllln, Mr. Colby has done intelligence wOl:k for most of his adult life. He believes in the apparatus set up by thIS Forty CommIttee, hut he would not tell liS in public what that Forty Committee d?es. ]\fr, qolhy ~­lieved in the Phoenix program; he believes in scndmg Amencan clh w

Zens to other nations who will pretend that they are not employees of the CIA. And I hope felTentl)" ~Ir. Chairman, that the world of se-

3G

cre~y in Governlllent tlwt cl'eated nIl th(\so hOlTcndous thilll-."8 nnd in WhICh AIr. Colby hils been illvolvcu for SOllie ycltl's al'~ JlOW comino­to an end. /;":I

. In conclusion, I would therefore urgently plead that the confirma­tI.on of Mr. C,?lby be delayed until tho lI1embers of Congress <:nn re-Vlew .~be NatIOnal S~unty Act ,?f 1947, can question IIfr. Colby 'C:t\'s"oely,. can estnbh.sh CongressIOnal review of tho budget of the U 'te~ng, 111 ~hort, raISe and resolve this basic question: Does tho . n~. tates 111 IOT3 want or need a clandestine CIA headed by an 1I1dl"1ual ~ho carned out tho most despicable part of tho Wllr w),ich =~~ 1 mencans feel was the grentest mistake tho United Stntes c,'er

. Mr. Chai'"!"nn, I thank you for this opportunity. And I will respond to nny questIOns.

[Congressman Robert F. Drinan's full testimony follows:] th I ~i~e ~ome to testJfy ngo.lnat the appoIntment ot Mr. Colby- as tbe Director ot refuse I have been almost conwelJed by the voice ot m,' conscience to

ra Be my vo ce to prevent the confirmation ot a man whose act1v1tl:es tn Vietnam and whose testimony before this Committee on July 2. 1973 Indicate thllt nlmost certainly he wlll continue within the CIA those activities of this Inte1Ugence

Amagli!DCY which have brought dIsgrace to the Federal GovernD.lent ant} to the erican people.

Co?n Sunday JUDe 1. 1009 r and seven other Americnns talked with "'i1Uaw E by In Saigon tram 4:30 p.m. to 0 :45 p.m. I was In South Vl€'tnalll as n lliew:

ber of the privately financed U.S. Study Team au RellgioUR nnd Political Freedom r::l1Matn Y 29 to. JW1e 10, 1069. The extensive report of UUlt study t£'am 11.; printed D: the OongreBlfional Record of June 17.1909 on page Eti018

When I fead that Mr. WilUam Colby had been appointed a~ the- Director ot ~he CIA I reviewed very carefully the notes whIch I took durin", aud after the wo hours that I and my associates spent with Mr. Colby more thlln four "E'tH'S C~:R~S' Colby at that time wa~, of cour~e, In charge of the Phoenix Program or

. The precise purpose of the study team at which I was a m('mher was to determine the numher of polItical prisoners and the extent to which If any tvhl8 United States waR contributing to the supresslon of political treedom in ~outh

etnam. Mr. Colb,)' did his best to IJrevent U8 trom ucqulrlllg any hard Information from

him or trom his associatE'S. For the fiTst 20 minutes of the interview l\[r Colby cIplalnPt'l several Obvious matters about South Vietnam all of \\'hl(,)~ w~re thoroughly known to the eight members ot the U.S. litudy team. Mr. Colby also went out of his way to explaIn that President Johnson had given him the per­!3ono.l,rank ot Ambas8ador when he left the CIA and agreed to run UIC Phoenix Progrnlll (OT the State Department.

At no time dhl Mr. Colby even concede the pO£lsiblllty that the pacification (lro­gram was ass18t1ng the government of President Thleu to put In jull all ot the political activists who alone could form a polltlcal party or 8. poUtieal coaUtton capable ot running a cundldate In 11 genuine election agnlnst PreSident '1'hll'u

Mr. Colby conceded that the numbE'r ot 1i0litlcal IlrlRoners Increased n~ the paCification program becnm~ mOre widespread In South Vietnam. Mr. COlin' also conceded that many ot the political pr!f.;ouers did not receive a trial And that many ot them . remained tor months nnd YNlrH In prlaon merely bt'ClluHe of the ~usplc1on ot some local official.. Mr. Colby stated "I know brutality exists" and added without much proot thnt "we try to do something ahout It." He nevpr made clear however what he tried to rIo about the wlc1eBlJrud existence of bnJtnl1ty 1n prlsons--a phenomenon which I and my RS6OCiatesl1eard everywhere In South Vietnam. , Mr. Colby offered no, 8.Sslstance whatsoever and In tact profe88Pd total

ignorance about the "tJger cages" In the prison on Oon Bon Island We were unable to d.1acover th'ese dungeons which were eventually dl8Cove~ a year later by a U.S. Oongresslonal ~ members at which almost stumbled b aCCIdent upon the extIJteuce ot these hideous dungeons. , " ~ ,. In tact ,Mr. Colby indicated that he knew Uttle about the condttloD8 In the l.!~ona :m08t or, w~c:b were bunt with American money and designed by

37

American engineers. I and the oUlCr meroberfl ot the U.S. Study Team ot Political Fre(>(]om in South Vietnam telt indignation at the way that Mr. Colby evaded our quesUOD8 and out ta.lked us as a torm ot "brush off".

I did not learn untU 1011 that during Mr. Colby's period with tlHl pacification "program 20,587 South Vietnamese people were killed! During that same period .(1968 to May 1971) 28,978 persons were captured or jailed. " , One had the impression of Mr. Colby on that Sunday afternoon In June, 1969, of an, individual who would do what he was told, carry out orders as they were given and always seek by misleading or deceptive statements to deny that anything was wrong III the program which lle was imillewentillg". \ This impression was deepened by a conversation which I hatt with an American prison official, present during our entire Interview with Mr. Colby. who spoke to me as I was leaving Mr., Colby's office. 'I'hls individual who had come to Saigon trom the Unlted States because he was an expert tn building prisons had denied in the presence ot all ot us that there was any brutality "agalD8t the poUtical prisoners that were literally rounded up by the Phoenix '.Program and herded into prisons. He confessed privately to me, howevf'r, !HI I was leaving that he knew ot extensive brutality and he hoped that the U.S. study te-am would expose It to the enUre world. He concluded by Rtating that 'p,e would deny what he had said It I ever attributed It to him! . On the basis ot what we saw in South Vietnam the study team recommended

'that the Nixon Administration and the Congress have a complete investigation "ot, the extent to which Alnerlcan omc1als in the pacification program have turned over innocent South Vietnamese citizens to military field tribunals, the ,equivalent" of a kangaroo court, and thus have ,contributed to the disappearance ot all political opposition to President Thien.

The study team pre:dlcted that the total number ot political prisoners would increase as long as the pacification program continued. This has of course pappened 80 that now there are some 200,000 political prisoners In South Viet~ nam--a situation which makes it virtually impossible tor any politieal oppoSition to" arise against President ThJeu. . ":Mr. Coloy seemed incapable of comprehenuing the fact that the United States government anu particularly the pacification program was malting a mockery of the constitution ot South Vietnam. He kept insisting t.hat war conditions existed In South Vietnam and that therefore the violations were underStandable . Mr. Colby H£'elloo actually unwilling to lIsten when John Pemberton, the Execu­"~tve Director of' the American Civil Lluerties Union and MethodLst Bishop James .Armstroog, members of. tile team, pointed out to him that the South Vietnamese Constitution pro\'ldes: , L "Any restriction upon the basic right.s of the cltizenf:l must he preflcrIhed by law and the time and place within which such a restrictIon iH enforced must be clearly sVi.-cilleu. In any event the essence ot all basic freedoms cannot be violated." J.' We found of course other 'American officials in South Vietnam who were just "AS insensitive to the complicity of the United States in I:Hvlessuess as ~lr. Colby appeared to be.' " .' I"feel oblJged hy my convictions and by my conscience to state that a man who displayed the atltuues which Mr. Colby did when he operated the Phoenix pro­gram shoulu ltot be l..'Oufirllled by the Cougress of tIle United States to be the Dh:ectol' ot t.he CIA. " I want aif.o to mise other questions al)Qut the unsntisfactory nature of tlle 'testimony which Mr. Colby gave on July 2, 1973 before t1l1s committee. I also want to Htnte my shock and indignation that one hour nnd 40 minutes has heen the total time spent, with one Senator present, in hearings on the crudal question of who will he the next DIrector 01' the CIA. '.rIils Is tht- Ilgency which has brought dlHgraco to itHelt hy its involvement with the ITT in Chile, ~hock and anger to everyone by its luvolvf'wellt in the bugging of the office of the psychiatrist ot Dr. Dault·l Ellsbcrg and unIversal horror by Its Im'olvement In the Wat<>rgate scandal.

I also want to express my protest that the Scnate Committee Oil Armed Serv­Ices have "Iven a totally inadequll.te explanatlQu of why it held the one hearing on Mr. Colby on July 2 when the Congress was not In session. The only explana­'tlon Is the words ot the chairmnn who opened the hearing by stating: "We regret thnt most of the members are absent because ot the reecs:;; but in as much as DIrector Schlesinger has now become Secretary of Defense we thou~ht it ~,dd lie advisable to have lIr. Colby here at the enrliest opportunity in Order

3S

to 00111'1101'1" hilS cOIIJlrmatlou lHI the llew Vil'edor of the CIA." 11ll.lrsoDlilly would hope that tile chairwun would beutI a per8ullul letter to eVery HIngle wewver ot- tile House and of -the Senate inviting them to testily 1C they so desire about the nature llnd the future of the CIA.

The chairman of this committee also sUited in hIs opening rOllUlrlc..q that the heo.rlng on Mr. Colby will "alao revIew a number ot POllc1es relnting to the 01.4 itself". 'I'be chnlrmau went on to note that "we are going to take this opportunity to try to 'get 8. better understanding tor ourselves and lor the people 8.8 to just what the CIA is and what It ls supposed to do:'

I ·want to state, wItb all due respect, t.hnt It has been the Senote AnnNl S('rv­ices Committee which, more than any other agency ill Congress, bas prHcnted the Congresa and the people of this country from knowing anything about the OIA.. In the last two decades more than 200 bills aimed at mnktn£' the CIA. nc­countablo to Congre8H have been introduced. None hus been cnactM. 'rile most I'8CeDt attempt to make the CIA accountable cnlDe on July 11. 1972 when the Senate Foreign Relations Oommittee reported out a b111 requIring the CIA to submit regular reports to Conrressional committees. That bm died In the Senate Armed Services Committee.

In all candor, Mr. Chalrman, the record or the Senate with regard to over­Blcht ot the OIA has been disgraceful. On November 28, 1971 Senator John Stennis and Senator Allen Ellender-then the Chairmen ot the Armed Services and the Appropriations Conuoittee as well'as at their CIA. oversight SubcommJt­tee-<lald that they knew nothing about the CIA·financed war In Lao ....... urely OIA'. blggeot _ration (Oongre • .wnal R<lcord page 819521-10030).

I hope theretore that these hearinp whIch, a.e the chairman haa noted arE" deBlped to bring about a I·~etter uudel'litandlng tor ourselves and for tlw people" (and I underline for the people!) will remaln open aJJ long as any memller or the Congress desires to address \llmselt to this questIon. , I congratulate the cllainnan tor having an open bearing tor the first tIme on the confirmation of a director since the CIA was eetabllabed In 1047.

I.dnd the testimony of Mr. Oolby very ambiguous. equivocal and unsatisfactory. HIs justification of the Phoenix: program added llttIe to the unsatisfactory evi­dence which he gave on tbat matter before the Senate and House Congre-sslonal oommlttees in 1970 and 1971. He made absolutely no response then or on July 2, 1973100 ·the vehement criticlBms made or the -basle Injustices In that program or which he was practically the architect..

No where hllB Mr. Colby responded to the criticism that he and the Phoenix program have brought about the virtual dIctatorship or President Thleu bP.CQuse the United States has put all ot the potent1al political OPI)(ments or l'rl'lddellt Thieu in Jail! Mr. Colby stated on July 2 (on page Hi) tbnt be dlrectt>d any Americans in South Vietnam to report any illegal abuses to higher authority. Mr. Colby states that he did receIve Some reports of mIHbehavior, thnt lie took them up with the South Vietnamese government and that be "saw action taken against the individual doing it". This may have been in some incllvldual cuses but the awful tact remains that Mr. Colby presIded over a pattern ot total lawlessness and ab.olute vIolation ot the hlUJic and fundamental normFi or con­stitutional government in South Vietnam durin" the entire lite or the Phoenix program.

I nnd my associates told thIs to Mr. Colby on June 1, 1000 In SaIgon. lie smtes 1n his testimony on July 2, 1973 that It was not unt111971 that a South VIetnamese cItizen was able to receive a copy ot the charges made against hIm and to bave a hearing on tbo.se~harges at wWch he could actually appear.

I do not want to have a director of. the CIA who for whatever reason hy hLs own adm1uIon was unable or unwllling to guarwtee to Soutb VIetnamese citizens the baaic provisions or due proeess. - Mr. Chairman, I wish to set forth another rellAon why In my judKlllent the COli. ArmatJon ot Mr. Colby should be postponed. On July 2. 1{)73 Mr. Colbv waM BAked by the chaIrman it he would allow lllembers or the COngn'RR to "1011'S 'ut leth.t the general amount which is spent for intelligence tunctIons annnally". lIr. Colhy answered by stating "I would propose to leave tbat question, llr. Chainuan, 1n the bands ot the Congress to decide".

Xu response to a sImilar quesUon us to whether the Congress should he ahle to decide on the budget tor the intelligence community each yenr 8S for all other lredpral agencies lIr. Colby responded; "That would be up to the Congress agnln, lfr. ChairmaD."

As a meml)f>r ot Congress I want to aSFlert in the ciean'At an<l m()f!t Vl..:oroU8 way Rvallahle to me that I think that the Con~reHR Rhollid tnke Mr. Colhy nt

30

his word and dedde ribht now tltat CUll~reR.'l ha~ Ult' right L111l1 n tIuty tIl know what DlQney Is sllC'nt by the CIA and how it is spent. Mr. CoiL .... lms lJ\atlt~ 110 ob­jection and the least flIat the Congress could do if it is to couurm :.'II L COlllY i~ to assert tho rlg-llt which Mr. Colby lias CUl1l!et.ipli is tllut of the .culLlo:rt·,s:-;.-ll:.lIUl'b

the il"Ight to set the budget each j'enr for the CIA just Uli it does fur every other agency of the ]!'('deml government.

If Mr. Ooilly Is confirmed nnd the CIA continues to become involved in I1ctivitk __ which bring disgrace to it and. shallle to the American people the citizl"nH of this nation can blu.me the Congress anu the Congress almH> .. At this particular tillle ot subst.nnUal change In our foreign policy it would he recldess and irrespon­sible for the CongreH8 to refuse to take Mr. Colby at ilis word and tu decline tu say that from this day fonvard the Congress will, as Mr. Coluy concedes it call, estauUsh the budget of the CIA.

I obJcct to Mr. Collly's confirmatioll U('CltUSH in the testimony on July ~ he mutlc no firm commitment that the CIA undcr 1118 direction would not llecomp. illvol"ctl in another operntion SUell as the CIA condUcted in Laos. lIr. Colby olllr stnteu that "It Is very unlikely that we will be involved in such an activity". Mr. Colby furthermore, dO~-8 not want the Congress to change the 1047 act that created the CIA. Mr. Colhy conceded that the adventure in Laos "undouht~dJy" went beyond what Congress intended" when it stated that the CIA should perform other fWlctions as deslgnnted by the National Security Council. Even so Mr. Colhy felt that the 1947 nct should not lie changed "hecause I think that the ag(>JIC'y might 00 fettered in some respects which would be of importance to the l]nite(l Stntes .. ,"

Mr. Colhy is ulAo less thun clear or satisfuctory when he Rtntes thnt he would not preclude the CIA from assisting other Federal agencil:'s even though the ('lA should restrict all of Its activities to foreign intelligence operation~. ~Ir. ('olll~' liJaYs, for ('xnmpie, that he can "envIsa~e a situlltion in which it woult! he np­proprlate for the agency to help not Mr. Howard Hunt but a White lIou~e offi­cial to meet somehody witllOUt COllling to llulilic notice". Similarly l\1r. Colbr ap­proves of a secret FBI-CIA arrangement hy which both ot these ngencies ag-re-e to help puch oth{'r. Mr. Chairman, as a member ot the House ,ludicinry Com­mittee with direct oversight of the Departmellt of .Imlin' nnd til(' FBI I fl'('1 thnt I hun" a rh:bt to fief! tllRt. document and to qll+>~tion those who \\Toh~ it and thof.l(, wiJlllIllCrlltc hy It. On vagc G(i of hIs te~limon.r .'.Ir. Colll.v stntps that ill' hUH not hatl 11 l'hall('i' to fP\'iew this matter ill dl~tail. I feci strungls that the COII~r('l';~ of the lJoilPd States should review the agreement betwepo Ih(' (jIA and the FBI whkh, Mr. Colhy tells us was "drawn up some years ago."

11M'!, .rolr. ('hulrman, f1mt Ihe time hUH !onA' foilnec lIIlB/WI! when thp C'nlJ/.:n'f<~ of tho Unitl'c! StJltt'~ I'lhonltl rp\'lpw ('()mpletpl~' find ollenl), thp nature lint! Il\lrp()~e or the CIA. lt Iii frightplling to me to COIlRidl'r the iIuplieatioJlR of onc of ~lr. COlhy'R HtutpIOpnts on Juiy 2. On l1uge 64 he !-ltnt('s that "cl'l·tain structures Ht' necesllury III this country (America) to give our people ahroud perhaps a reason for OI)f'nltiUK' abroad in some -reH!wct so thnt tliey can appear not as CIA t'lllployees but as reprCHcntaUvcR of IWille otiH'l" entity .•. " If the Americnn people UlltI the Cungrcl!'ls are going to flnuncp ,Tnllw8 noud tnlt~H lil;:e :Ml'. Colhy su/"a:;eHts I thInk thnt the elected 1Il(,IIIIIl'rM of the Congress ha\,+> n right to know alion\. it. IIp to now tho CIA hn .. llretenil+>d that they -inform 0. handful of memhers of the House AJlproprlnt1olH~ Committee nnd a few mpmlwrR of til(' Senate Arllled ~('I'viees Committee. l.'hat h; not informing thc Congress. That is ('}1('ntillJ,;' lilt' UH II IIlPllIlu'r of the Con~reHH aull the peoplc that I repreNl'ut of the knowll'dgf' lind th(' In· formntlon to whIch the citizens of this country are ('ntitled.

!lIr. ChnirlUllll, the CIA for the first time in the hlstor.v of thiH n:ltloll htlf; in­troducod 11 8f"Cret agency into Our government. It Inay hav(' heeJl !If'('('si'lflry in 1947. YUII, Mr. Chairman, stated on July 2 that "everybody realizes the way the world Is t(}(lny we need nn ag(>tlcy Uke the Ceutral Intellig(>Dce Agency". That is your convIction honestly nrrlved at hut I ns a member of Congress nlso bave the right to ha"e the basic Information 80 that I Clln muke ROml:' judgment fiS

to whether we do In fact ne('(} a CIA today, The senior members ot the House and of thE" Senate have COOi-illired to pre­

vent the younger members ot tile House and of the Sennte knowing Ilnythin,l: about tho CIA. I think that the younger members of the House and of the Sf'nute hnYl' a right to resent that type of treatmeut. Their constituC'ntR also have a right to deplore the arrogance ot senior members of CongrelSs alleging or pretending that the CIA has ade<}untely informed them (If the budget and the aetivities of the CIA.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. eollly would liot even disclose on July 2 the nature and the makeup or the so-called 40 Commlttl'f', a secret group accountuble to the National

40

Security Counell. Dr. Kissinger Is the chnlrmnn ot the 40 Commlttf'(', '" it nut Incongruous that the Senate haa the right to confirm the 8}Jpolntm(,llt of Mr, Colby, the Director ot the CIA, but has no ria-ht to confirm Dr. Klfdug'cr or ev('u to compel him to come and testify 7 Slmllnrly the CongresS" knows vlrtunllY nothing ot the supersecret clandestine 40 Commtttee.-u group which over the post ]0 years or more has involved this nation, without Its advice or consent, in 1Il­advised wars, known and Wlknown. all around the world.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Colby hUB done "lntell1gence" work for most of his adult lite. He bell eves In tha apparatus set up by the 40 Committee. He helleved In the Phuellix program In South Vietnam. He believes In sending American citi­zens tn other nations who will pretend that they are not employ~s of the CIA.

,)lr. Chairman, I hope fervently that the world or secrecy In govprnment that created all of these horrendous things In which Mr. Colby has been Involved for 130 many years Is coming to an end.

I would therefore urgently plead that the con1lrmnUon or Mr. Colby be de­laYN until the members of Congress can review the Nntlonal Security Act ot 1947, can question Mr. Colby extenstv~lYI enn establish Congressional review ot the budget of the CIA and, in short. faiBe and resolve this bn81c~ question ~ Does the United States in 1978 want or need a clandestine CIA headed by an individual who carried out the most despicable part ot the war which most AmericalUl teel was the greatest mistake the UnIted s'tntea ever mnde?

. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Congressman. We appreciate your frankness in stating your position.

You mentioned the fact that we had this hearin~ thnt only one Senator was present. 'Ve scheduled the hearing on a aay thnt was not part of the recess that we had planned nnd were told by the leadership. Later on the House scheduled it a few days earlier, and then unfo .... tunately the Senate changes its position and extended the recess. That is the reason he came up on a day that was not a dny that the Senate met.

Also, as you see, we do not have a crowd of Senators here this morning.

Representative DruNAN. That is understandable. Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Thurmond was here and is coming

back as soon as he can. And Senator Cannon is here, and Senator Nunn.

I might add als(}-I am just looking over your statement-that this was the lirst time that a CIA nominee for Director has ever ap­peared in an open hearing. One of the reasons that we did it that way was because we felt he should state his position) which he has done, but then, Jet me add, nfter the recess WfiS ovor, and In accorun,nco with past custom. we interrogated him extell~ivplv in 0. closed hearing, And nt that timp he gave us in complete <1etail his budget

j hiB money-which

I agrcc with yon is something that the Congress 8 lOuld know 11. great denl aLollt.

I have just been given a noto----Representative DRINAN. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that therefore the

general details of the budget wOllld in fact be known to all Members of tJ,e Congrcos. That is one of the points that I make. And I don't think that it is trulv in the best interests of the country or the Con­gress or the people to have only a very few people in the House Appro­priations Committee or in the Senate Armed Services Committee know of that budget and not disclose that to other Members' of th" Congress.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I think that is true. And I might also add t1J.at in executive hearing) in accordance ·with past custom, he came before the CLo\. subcommittee, not tho full conunittco of the Senato. I want to be sure that the record is right.

I ,. '"

41

I have 11 few questions to usk you, sir. , , . . . As you know, "'0 are glad. to havo you here. 11.1(' qlle.stlOll that IS

before UB is the 'lualifieatlOns of MI'. Colby to be Dll'CCto,r. He reports to the National Security Council! but the N ation!,1 Sce~ll"lty Coullcil IS an, advisory cowleil to the Presldo~lt-that IS, If he IS cOllfi,rrn~d he would report to the National Secunty ~OllllCII: Ill. fact, the lresldeJ:t is the chairman of the advisory counCIl that IS IllS. So, therefore, III fact, Mr. Colby reports directly to the, President of the Unlleu Stat(', if he is confirmed. And tho Actmg DIrector today, Geneml 'V.ltms, tnerefore reports directly to the President. , . :",When your study team made ,ts tl'lP to VIetnam the war was III full swing, was it not i , : "Representative DurN A»:. It was in 1060, yes, It was one of tho worse years, after the Tet offenSive.. . . , ,. _., Senator SYMINGTON. Puttmg aSIde what you felt were hiS mlubl­tions on your team, do you b~heve that MI'. ,Colby's own eff?~t~ could l;I.'I)I"" remedied the situatIOn III VI~t'.lam wh~ch you have cntIclze~IlIl your statement, in'view of t~e polr?les and 111 the face of the polICIes that had been set and were bemg set m 1V ushm:,>i.on i . . .d ,Representative DRINAN. Yes, I d.o. And we made It very clear ill the report, which is in the Conl(1'esslOnal ~e<;ord, that he ".ould hu~e inIIisted on the fundamental right to a trml, and that he did not. " e Winted out to him in June 1969 that these people '~ho w,ere, belllg swept· into prison by the U.S. forces didn't hl1,:e a heanng, ,hdn·t even mow the charges against them .. And he a~ml~ lumself-apd thIS IS i,ii; my testimony-I didn't read Ilr--he admIts hImself th!'t It was not until 1971 that every Vietnamese person accused of oomg With tl:e Vietcong it was not until 2 years after that that they had the basIC right to be presented with the testimony against them or the charges a' t them and to be present personally at a hear:ng. So I do lllSISt 'tf,t:!:fespite the orders that he had, he was responSible for the sweep­ing'jitjustices done to thousands of individuals who were South VletIlamese. . t ·"Senator SY)IINOTON. As YOll kpow, the Phoenrx program was/l0 'l,.program of the United StUu,s, It was a program of tl,e South \ lCt· .nl!Jll\>S<l which we supported.. . . .. , ,,' Representative DruNAN. \Vlth U.S. mlhtary adVlSers m evelY n8.mlet. . h' t t· t Senator SYMINGTON. He was sent ont there Wit illS ruc.,ons 0 sup· port the South Vietnamese Phoenix program. That I Hunk we ha YO

~blished. , .. :i.nDO,Y.· ou lmow about what might be called tI.lO pm·qolby .r0he)' IIlCI· 'Mn~,to.Phoenix and what was being done pnor to hls.arr~ya.l? . ... Re resentative DruNAN. I think I do, Senator. I thmk It IS fair to '~ '. 'fuough, that Mr. Colby waS the ~rchitect of the rhoenix program, ilifth. ~. ,.pacilication progra!ll' Som.ethmg lIke that eXisted pnor to th~t ,rll\e~.andapparently was llleffectlYe. Some people saY,that th~ P!lOel1lX I~ogram was ineffective. I think it was tremendously meffect~ve III that '~A'jailed the very people who. alone could form .some coahtlOn that might oppose in a genwne electIOn the present president. ,'!·',senator SYMINGTON. Now, on page 10 you sav: "The CIA for the ·,ti~time in the history of this Nation has introduced a secret agency iritl' our Government." Would you say that the CIA created the CIA or thwt the Congress created the CIA I

j,' .

42

Hcpr('s(;ntati\'n DHlX.\X. 1\01 I han· Ow basi(' law 11('1'(' r'll'ntt'd hy Ill('! qongress 1111947. Alld us you know, this WlIS fol'"t.Jw fil'Si tilll(' till' ~n'lI' hon of an~ agency thut; did in fact hnve secret powers. Allel it llIay h:ln~ be~Il reqUIred, at ~hat tIme-, but I t~link nIl the l\fp,l)loors of COIlg-i'(lsS lit thIS JTloment In hIstory IHwc the rIg-ht and the <lllty to l'p-nsk tIl(' bnsie qu~stlOn of whether or not any secret agency of this type can 01' should eXIst.

Senator SnuNoToN. 'Would you say, with tho way the world is that ~le s~ould nbandon nn ag-cllCY that wn.s creaie(l p'rimllrily to obtain IntellIgence ah.out the enemy and enemy actions in nli other countries 1

Representatl ve DRYNAN. f can't answer that, Senator, us long" as they are holdmg" from me and other J\[embers of Congress the hasic infor­matlO!,' I don't kn(~w abo~t the CIA. I don't know about its hudget; I dont ~ow what It IS domg-. And I say this is a fundamental denial of my rlg!>ts as ';' Member of Congress ,md I say that that question is therofore ImpossIble to answer.

Senator S.nnNGToN .. You haw ~ CIA subcommittee of the Hou,", Anned ServIces Comnuttce--

RepresentativeDRINAN. 'Ve do. Sen!'tor SYMINGTON. Have you discussed this matter with that sub­

commIttee! Re1)re;;entative DmNAN. I ha,~c nnd J ('omnH'nd CongrC'Rsmnn Nedzi

of. Mwlugan for doing a very fille job in thi. newly rCI'iscd subcolll­lIllttee of the CIA. Hut I am sure that M,·. Nedzi wo'uld agree with me that th? Members ot the House nnd tlw Member, of the Scnnte stili Imowl"lrtuall.r nothmg abou.t the CTA. The only time I hear about the CIA IS I~hen ,: does sometlllng foolish amI makes the llCndlines, like the ITI' III 911l1e 'Uld t.he Bay of Pigs, and so many otl,er scandals.

Srnator ~Y1\nNC:T()N. Let mo say, t,he flllf's of thiR ('ornmittC'e are to get the te~nnony III 2·1 hours nl~cad if possible, so that we cnn study it lLncl ('s~ahh8h answ(>rs Il.J:!'nmst It, and W(II only got your tl'Stimonv n.. ~l)()f't tllnc ago. ~o t~wr(> are T?f'rlulps othf'r ,]l1f'stioIlH that J would 1ike to ;Isk YOll llnseu on It. Awl With your appro\'u], I will suLmit these for tho rcC',ord.

\V]l(~n YOII say ~,hnt tlJ(:~ ~(';}}iol" ~rP111b('rs of tlw r-Iolls('. nnd of the Senah' luwc COJlsPIJ'~'d to \)~'r\'cnt the ~'Olm,!!f'r ]\If'mhf'rs of tlw IIom~e nnd Sennte 'knowlllg- ,nnyt lln,g nhout the CIA. thnt I tlJink i~ a little strong. ",

n('I")r('SCll~nti\'e DRINk!";, I meant it to bf' strong, Senator. ~(>J1ator SYl\.nxnT()~. ,\,'0111<1 you tf'lllls n littlo more nhout thnt? R<'.prf'$(lntntl.\"c DHI!'iA~. I H1C'nllt it to be strOllg'. And I nm "not 1"<'-

trootmg" from It. Bnt all I ran sa.I' is that tho small subcommittees of the House and o~ the Senate tha.t ~Ilo,," son~ething about tile budget of the ('IA 11l\\"e, agreed t"? keep tJI!S mfonnatmn from other Members of the Cong;ess. And I thmk.that IS fundamentally wrong. They wnnt us to make Judgments on theIr knowledge and to hayc an act of faith in: them . .Arid ~any months ago this came ul' on the floor of the Honse. ~d tllC "hamnan of the House Armed Serdoes Commit.tee at tllot time, rnthe.r tl~l1ll~nll_ow.us to go forward with an amendment to delete al! fund.'ng 1ll tlllS hll!.for the ('lA, said that. he would reacti­",Ltc tIm commIttee on t.heCIA, which he lIas done. Rut wo ha I"e nel"er had a vote ,on how much money the CIA gets, we don't know where

that money is buried, or for what PUl"pOSl's. So 1 just think it is fumb­mentally wrong.

Senator SnIINGTON. On page 10, Mr. Congressman, you say that Mr. Colby did not disclose the nature of the makeup of the so-called li'9rty Committee. He gave us the details of that in executive session. And therefore we understand t.he nature of that committee . .. Let me say that I believe tJlat the CIA has been instructed by higher authorities to do things that It should not do and that Its ongmnl cbarf;er, you might say, did not justify us doinS", like, for example, rUlllling a war over a perIod of years m Laos. PerllapS son~e of us haye been instrwnenta.! in trying to bring all tlmt problem to hght, so that the Agency contains itself as to what. it was originally created for, namely, an intelligence agency, an intelligence-gathering agency. On the other hand, the pe01.'le who ran the Agency were under inst.ruc­tions from higher authorIty to do that.

I. One of the interestin)! things-and I submit to you that you might c<;>nsider discussin!l" Wlth Congressman N edzi and others-is that w}:lere;cs in the country in question, like Laos, under the so-called Kcn­nedy letter, the head of the CIA reports to the Ambassador, and the Ambassador directs his operation. But when you got bock here to Washington, there was no relat.ionship carried on, and the CIA was indepenaent of the Foreign Relations Committee. You see my point. So there seems to bo n. paradox, if not a dic.hotomy, you might. say, that there is 0. change of command as to congressional review.

Representative DRYNAN. I think it is contrary to the statute. I think they go far beyond their functions. And I thInk they go far beyond what the National Security Act of 1D47 provides for. And I might add that when Mr. Colby was asked about that in the letter or the question posed by Senator Hughes, he would not concede, and I have it before me-that the activities of the CIA in Laos were improper, or inappro­priate, or illegal. And I therefore tlunk that tillS IS a vcry key pomt, that he will not concede that the CIA made any error in that escapade in Laos.

,Senator SnUNGToN. You know the clause, which I do not have be­fore me, in the CIA charter, which the administration says justifies its functioning.

Representative DRINAN. They will do nnything that the N atio~nl Security Council directs them to do. I have it hero, Senator_ I tlllnk that is the operati ve word, is it not., that tJley will do anything that the N ationnl Securitv CouneilmUJldates them to do 1 'to Senator SYMINGTON. What worries me is t.hat I have felt for some tOOe that our military budget was too high in cost. And I am depressed with recent report .. , such as that report that Mr. Warnke, former As­sistant'Secretary of Defense, presented before our commIttee III fin open session earlier this week, where there was a savings estimated at $14 billion: And then I saw the Brookings Institute Report yesterday which stated that there could be a savings anywhere from $10 to $25 million in the military budget if we moved more toward modernity, you might say, in weapons as against tradition. And yet invariably the mil­itary budget will be decided on in the long run on the basis of what any possible enemy has capable of attacking in the United States. And without an agency of this character, I don't see how we could he faIrly II;

44

sure thnt wo know what the enemy has. Thnt is one point I snLmit to you with great respect. . Another point is that every time that the sen'ices corne up to justify ~. the billions of uollars that each service wants each year, we ul ways get ~ an analysis froIll the Central Intelligence Agencv as well as anllnalysis ~ oftl.,e p?ssibl~ enemy from the DrA. And with one conspicuous ex· ~ .. ceptlOn, mvarlably the estimate of the CL\. as to the po",ible enemy ~ grollllu strength has Lccn considerably Jess than that submitted bv ollr own people in the Army. Invariably ihe estilllate of the CL\. as to the actual strength of the possible enemy na \":11 forces has been less than iliat of our Navy. And the same thing is true of the Air Force. And the record will show that over tho years the CIA has bren Illul'h more nc· ?urate in its estimates than the services have, and therefore I do frel m that field that it has performed a worthy function, which it coulll only do if it operateu as an intelligence agency.

Representative DlUNAN. That IS one of the reasons, Senator why I want to get more credibility for o\lrointellig-enee activities. All(i in the ','Pentagon Papers" it was revealed that the CIA was less wrong than everybody else.

, Senator SnUNGTON. The clause that we are told justifies running the war in LMlS is in the National Security Act of 19-17, as amended:

For the purpose of coordinatIng the Intelligence activities of the several gov­ernment departments and agencies in Ule interests ot DoUouni sE"Curlty. it Hhnll h.! the duty ot the agency under the direction ot the National Security Council ...

And iliat gives five major duties. The fifth is: To perform such other tunctions and duties relnted to intelligence nt'Cecting the

national security as the National Security Counell mny from time to time uirect. , May I say I agx:ee with you, that I think the functioning of the war In Laos over n penod of years does not. come under t.hat heading', 01111 I have so stated on the floor of the Senate R number of times. , Representative DRINAN. I know you have, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Cannon. Senator CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. ConA'rcssman, 011 !>ng-e 4 of your statement :rou sa y that thel'e

are now some 200,000 po itical prisoners in South Vietnain. Is that 1\ factual statement j

Representative DRlN AN . Yes. Senator CANNON.'If so, how reliable do you think it is! Representative DRlNAN. I think that is quite reliable sir from every.

tiling we know. President Thien disputes that and s~ys that some of ~ese are not merely card-carrying Communists but dangerous. But VIrtually none of those 200,000 have committed an overt act. I have followed this .s!tuation over the last 4 years. I spoke most recently to two French CItIzens who have been iliere for sometime and who were in prison and ~ho rep~rted re!iably on this situation. And it is very clear that President Thleu has m fact consciously or otherwise impds. oned those who could form a coalition against him. I think that is well documented. And the figure 200,000 may in fact be conservative. Some people say it is 300,000 or more; , ,. . These ~ple are in ",r\sODS made by ~e United States. And last year 0: .this year, $21 mil han was approprrated by the Congress or in the mlhtary budget for the creation and maintenance of prisons in South Vietnam.

45

Senator CANNON. You suid just then that President Thiell lias ilial these political prisoners put in, and then on page 7 you say the U niteu States has put all of ilie potential political opponents of President Thieu in jail. How do you equate that with the United Stat~s has put iliem in jail! ~ave we in fact been jailinl> tho~ people 1

, Representatlve DIUNAN. Under the paCIficatIOn program there was au American adviser in almost every hamlet. And we went up to the hamlets and saw the military field tnbunals. And if a local person saI(l that tI1is l?articnlar citizen IS dangerous, the American adviser would acquiesce ill the jailing of this individual, and would not insist UPOll

fu,ridamental rights of a hearing. The American advisers were a vart)' to this lawlessness, and they acqulCsced 111 It; they cooperated m It.

And to some extent they initmted it in the sense that they wantecl to get rid ofilie substructure of the Vietcong. , Senator CANNON. So that by their acquiescence then, of our advisers, yo,~ Itre saying that the United States has jailed all of those political opponents I , "'Representative DRINAN. 'Ve visited ,vith these individuals ill jail. We spoke---,. Senator CANXON.lIow many did you visit with 1 - 'Representath'c DHIKA:-r. Dor.cns, hUlulreds. In our report" u mention name after name. AlId we Imd eight mcmbr.fs of the team. Some wpnt to' l(on80n; others went out to the hig-hlands. And 1 saw dozens: hun­dreds of people, including childr!'n 12 to H years old, suspected Yiet­copg. At least one-third or more, Sl'llator, were there without nlly heHr­ing whl'tsQCver at that time, 1%9. niSenator CANNON. You blame Mr. Colby for being-, as you say, ullable Or 'unwilling to guarantee to South Vietnamese (·.itiZPIlS the ha~ie pro­visions of due process! How ean you blame that on ~rr, (,olb~'-who ,is'outside of the g-overning st.ructure of ~o\lth Vietnam? "Representative DnINAN, III', conccdot! that he would profer it that way, he conve.vcd that he would like to have morc 1awyers. He nsstllllc(l the responsibility as the director of the Phoenix program for the jail­inl>" that were ~oing on as the American advisers, aided by fmlction· arIes o~ the ThlOU govol1llnent, moved into the cOllntryside and jflilNl those who were associated with the Vietcong, the infrastructure, as tliey called it. And I think it is fair to say that Mr. Colby felt t,hllt he wits in fact responsible for this. He admitted that he preferred mon' d~e process. And in 1971, he challiled the mIl'S. so that at that time e"('ry individual who was a South VIetnamese citizen lmd n. right to the ,charges ag-ainst him, and had a rig-ht to a hearing- before he would be sent ,to jail prior to that time during most of the life of the Phoenix program. In other words, the South VietIUuflPse citizens did not h:ln~ those fundamental rights. /,Sei.'ator CANNON. Are they being gnaranteed those rights at the pres­ent time! "'Representative DRlNAN. I doubt it. Most of our advisers, of COllrse, have left. We are no longer in charge of it. I don't know the answer t" that question, Senator. I know that those 200,000 remain in jail. some­timeS for an indefinite period. There is a very serious problem of polito iCa.~~uppression.1 don't konw 1?-ow many new individuals are going to'lail or what gnarantees they Ill1ght have.

Senator CANNON'. My own personal feeling- is that YOU nrc blaming­Mr. Colby for a nnrnher of things that he had no control 0\"('1': ndll!lll~',

IHI- 27:1· - j:1--4

i 'I

he wns sent there to do ('crtnin thillg-s lIl\d curry out. l'ertnill poJieil's. I think that blame ought to lie with the poople over )[1'. Colby rather than a man who is carrying out what he is told to do.

Representativo DIUNAN. 'Vo spoke with allY nUlllber of oflici.ls, Senator, here and in the State Dep"l'tment, llnd in S"igon. And they aU said that the Phoenix program is carrying out this pattern. We went there predscly for the purposp of illn~stig;ating the number' of political prisoners. This was a privately sponsored group, funded by the churches and citizens of America to fUld this out, what is our Govcmment doing. And I am not saying that 1111', ColbJ: is exclusively responsible, I say that. we found mnlly AmerIcuI.} o~cUl.18 who were also implie.,ted in the lawlessness. But the questIOn IS, should he be confinned as the Director of the CIA! And in my judgment, his oper­ation of the Phoenix program does not justify confidence in him.

Senator C.\NOVON'. You also said that he made no firm commitment that the CIA undor his direction would not become invoh'ed in another operation such as the CIA condu~ted in Laos. I would say that if he made such a commitment as that he would not be a person to put in char!!e of the CIA, becansc he would have no sav whatsoever as to whether the CIA would or would not become ill\'oIVl~u ill It situatioll such as Laos. That again would be a policy dc(·ision of tho n.s. Goveru· ment, whoever is over the CIA. And If IHI is told by his 8uperior authority to conduct the type of activit)' ill Laos that. has heell COIl­

ducted in some other location, I would presume that he would have to carry out his orders, wouldn't he?

Representath'e DRINAX. I don't think that even the Director of the CIA has to he obedient to every command that is given to hina. He must live within tho mandate of the Agwcv. And it IS an intelligence agency. And as the chairman hns said. this~ g-Op.s fnr beyond nnything by way of intelligence, when tho Embassy itSelf is in Laoo eGnclucting all air war without the knowledge or consent of Congress or tho people. So I think thero is a point in time when the Director of tho CI A would have to say, that is not within the jurisdiction of tho CIA, and those flmctions wonld not be lawful. .

Senator CANNON. I would say that if he had beon told to do thnt by his appointing authority and failed to do it, he wouldn't he Director of the CIA very lon!l" I am suro he would be mmo\'ed by the. appoint­ing anthority it he dIdn't carry out tho policies that he wns (hroetcd to carryout.

I, too, raise the question about your statement on puge 10. You said you stood by it, and you admitted it was ha ... h. I think it is not only harsh, but I think it is not factual. I don't think that you hu\'e said one thinjr here that indicates that any lIIembers of the House or of the Senate have entered into any conspiracy to prevent the youn~r IIImn­bers of the HoUBO and Senate from knowing anyt.hing about the CIA. I think that is a very unfair stat.ement. I don't know whether I would be considered one of the senior Members in that category but I cer­tainly have had no part in any conspimey to deprive any Mambor of the Congress of the right to know whnt they oUl:ht to ~now about the operations of·the CIA. As a matter of fact, I have tr!Cd to find out myself on many occasions what actually the CIA was doing. And I have been unsuccessful on occasions. But I certainly don't contend that that is the result of any conspiracy on tho part of nnybody,

47

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. . . 'Senator Srl\lINOToN. I would adJ that the snnw thlllg IS trlli.' uf lilt'.

And when you say: , I want to state, with all due respect. that it hus been lltl' Senute Armed Services Committee which, more than aUY otll!'r agency of t.he Cong~css. hilS ll.re~ vented the Congress and the pe()1I1e of this country from knOWing anytlllng about the CIA."

I think that is a \'ery unfavorable statcmcllt to the lIouse of Heprc· sentatives. As I understanu it, Illost :\lcllluel's of the JIons(~ cOIl~Hk.I'l'tl that .their body has a full.aue\ equal posi!ion under the COIlStItU~I:ll\, and certainly m responsibilIty, that. the Senate has, should be sll.ll cd by the House in a matter of tIns chamcter, although the Sellatc llocs ~onfirm the Director of the CIA, as I am sure you know; under the Constitution the House itself is responsible, and is the only body that can oricinate the appropriations that at least by inference yon (11'('

crjticizing'this morning. ," 'Senator N unn. ' . ' :.'.Senator NUNN. IIII'. Chairman, before I get mto questIOns I would just like to say that as Olle of the :vo~U\g-er l\[.embcrs of the Sel~ate ~Ild one of the },ounO'cst members of tIllS comnnttec, 34, and h!Wlng Just arrived I hR\'e had absolute!y no problem in this committee or as a Senato~ in securing inforlllat.lOl~ that I deSire as faras the CIA.orcm-t~olfS were concerned. And CI1Ull'lllan Ste,nIlls, Chau'man SYlllmgton, Senator Call1lon, Senator .Taekson, finu Scna!or Thu~mo~ld. every.ouo tJiat I have ever asked for any kind of help III seeurmg lll.fo.rmatlOn, h~s ·I).ot only been cooperative, but they have arranged bl'lefings and done .whatever is nect-ssu l'y. I personally cannot speak for the Members of the House, but I can speak for the Senators. And I can also say that as late as yesterday ufternoon J talkee\ to Senator Jackson, and he ~uggested that I have a briefing, and ask another freshman .Senator to come about the CIA on the threat that we have on strategIC weapons npw .. 'So, as far as I am concorned, Congressman, as olle SCHlntor I elm ~ay.thatlhave had no difficulty. . . ,.,:'RepresentativQ DlUNAN. First~ let me say that tlns IS rather new, to htlye bdejings.. . ''':' Al\d secondly Senator Cannon sa\'8 he doesn't have enough mfol1lla­~ori' about the CIA. Maybe I shOUld have' stated that nobody in the w)Iol!" Oongress knows ~n?ugh about the CIA. And I hope that you learn more and more. ThiS IS a welcome develop.lent. .!"Senator NUNN.I am not.sure that even the Director of the CIA hns aU the' information about the CIA.

. R~presentative DRINAN.A very good point. . '. . ," ~eli'!'tor NUNN. And I dp think we have obligatIOns, I completelV a:gree 'with you to monitor more and more carefully not only the CIA yut any other ~ency that we give this kind of power to. r! would like to ask you a few questlOns"Cong~essman.

"'l'his,statelJlent on page 7 that Senator ,Cannon was asking about S'eems to me to be pretty far-reaching where you say: (,':'1:' do' ~ot want to have a Director of the OIA who for whatever reason by bis q~ ,admiBsiol).' )Vas unable or 1UlwlIling to guarantee to the South Vietnam citi-zens the basic provisions ot due process. . '''Ii,we had an American in either the CIA or military who was gual'­iInteeing tho South Vietnam citizens due process, would he not in'effect

, " '.

4R

ha\'e to be n dietntoJ' of ~()lIth Yi(·tJlulll nh;o1 "~otlldn't he have to toke over the GOyernmfm~ of South VietHam? And isn't this directly con­trary to your conceptIOll of America '8 role?

Representative DUINAN. One gOO? ~rljument, Senator, is thut '<e !>ave d.one thut. lIfr. Colby dId keep lllSIstlllg that we cannot interfere III the Internal. matters of South :Vietnam. We were involved, of course. AI~ I can say IS tl.lat when we dIrected It prol!"rnm like the Phoenix. in whi~h we were dIrectly respon~ible for building the jails, aUfI going ou~ m the HIghlands and helplllg the elected. gO"ernment or the np­pomted government to destroy the intrastructure of the Viet Con" that we are in effect acquiescing and cooperating in this denial of basid due process. Senato~ NUNN .. Do you r~all the statute which was a period ill

1971-wlllcl! was m ~ur AmerICan law passed by Congress and signed by the PresIdent which says:

Whenever there shall be In existence such emergency, Ule President actlng through the Attorney General, 18 autJlOr1zed. to apprehend and by order obtain pursuant to the provisions or this Subchapter. each person with r€'Rpect to who~ there 1& reasonable ground to beUeve that JR1Ch person probably win engage In. or probably will conspire with others to engage In acts ot espionage and .aholal!'!. •

Represen~ative DRINAN. I helped to remove that. That is the Japa­nese DetentIOn Act. One evil doesn't justify another . Senator NUNN. No, sir. But we had. that on Our books at the same tlm~ that we wert; ru,nnmg the PhoellIx program in South Vietnam. So, III effect, we ~l?n t have due process, under this analogy, guaran­~d to our own CItIzens, and yet you would impose the burden on the D,rector ~f t~e <;JIA in wartime, in a country that had never hnd democratic prmCiples,. to guarantee due process to those citizens. Is that what you are saymgi

R<;pr"""ntative DniNA»:. That is what I am saying; one evil doe. not JustIfy another. A~d. If we do what we d.id in South Vietnam. the least .that we could do l~ to carry out the constitution of South Vi.t­nam Itself. I am n?t a~kmg- the.m to impose Americnn stnndards. Anrl I quoted the constItutIOn of VIetnam, and that constitution provides for wa~tjme and emergency, but it goos On and says that nonethel~ the baSIC fundamental guarantees must remain under all circumstances

S.enator NUNl:'. Unaer that theory he should have been back hom~ tryIng ~ get this lIl;w off the books, shouldn't he, instead of being in South V,elnal!' t=g to guarantee that due process?

RepresentatIve DruNAN. Maybe all of ns should hnve heen bnck home.

Senator NUNN.,But you do ~eel t~at he should ha<e been able to, and you would thmk he was disqualIfied if he was not guaranteeing that due process. .' : . ~presen~tive DRn.<AN. I think it is very clear, Senator, and I

pomted out m th.e ~~Imony that we pointed this out to him in June 1969, tha~ these mdlVldnal8 that we met in prison were swept there n~t knowmg the charges against them, having no hearing, being de­!umed for mOl,lths or years without any reason given to them. And It was not untI) 2 years 'la!'!r that Mr. Colby issued a directive that every South Vietnamese CitIzen must have the charges a~inst hi must have a hearing at which he can appear, before his liberty c:~ be taken away. . .

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Senator N UNN. SO he did do that 2 years later! Representative DRINAN. He certainly d.id.

'J',Senator NUN-N. Do you kno.w the situ~tion prior to P~lOe!lix in South Vietnam j Did the PhoellIx program Itself have-was it dIrectly responsible. for taking away any kind of due process, or was there anything such as this. before Phoenix 1 . . -"l~epresentative DRINAN. It wa;m't as well orgamzed. Ph.oellIx was designed as a so-called falSIfication-later called Vletnamlzatlon. It means that in effect that we are the surrogates of the Thieu govern­ment and that we do the work of the Thieu government, and arc sup-pressing 'or opposing these political dissidents. . .

Senator NUNN. I would hke to ask you one other qUe6tlOn relatlllg to your statement on page 11. Y~)U state ~ere: "Mr .. Colby h:,s done fintelJigence' work for most of h,s adult hfe." And III the thIrd. sen­tence 'of that second p"ragraph on page 11 you stute: "He beheves in'sending American citizens to other nations who will pretend that they' are not employees of the CIA." Now, are you saying that thnt is a reason for not confirming him as hend of tho intelligence opera· jions I ',,,Representative DRINAN. May I go back and quote what I omitted when I read my testimony. Directly from the questions that were raised on July 2 with Mr. Colby, and Mr. Colby was asked: "'Vould yoilr collaborate with corporations in your work abroad 1" And he said-and this is at the bottom of 9-he said: "Certain structures are necessary in this country-America-to give our people abroad per­haps" 'reason for operating abroad in some respect so that they can atppear lIot as CIA employees, lmt ~lS representatives of some other entity." And I just mise this question: If the American people in the Congress are going to finance .James Bond types hke Mr. Colby sug­gests, I think that the elected Members of the Congress have a right to .know about it. And I am just raising that question-how many people, American citizens, arc there now abroad or will be nbrond pretending that they nrc not employees of the CIA when in fact they arel ' : . Senator NUNN. Getting back to my ori~inal question, ar" you

silying that. our intelligence network should m effect fa up and haye badges on or unifonns saying that we are members 0 the CIA; here werare, folks; weare in Germany; we are members of the CIA! . niRepresentative DRINAN. I did not say that, Senator, I simply SaId that If this is going to go on I think that the Congress should know ~bout it. .... .. !;Senator NUNN. Let me ask you a question on that point. Accord­ing to that, did you think that every Congressman and every lIfember of the Senate should have all the top secret infonnation that relates to,CIA on demand I Is that the logic of your contentions I

Representative DRINAN. The military trusts a lot of people and the State· Department trusts ,,·Iot of people. They all have clearance, and there is no reason in·my jud.gmeht why 535 men and women pauld not be given clearance': . ., 9[,Senator:NuNN. So' your answer, is "Yes" on that, that every Member ot'0ongressand every !lfemberot the Senate on any day they wanted to find out any top secret information, no matter how crucial--. lfRopresentuti\"e DRIN.\N. I didn't SllY that. r!',; .

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~cllator XUSN. '\There would you draw the line ~ Hcprescntativc DJUNAN. I ani: sorry. All I CUll say, Senator, is thnt /,

I lune not been able to learn nnything about tho CIA as "lI1ember I', of Congress. And all I can say is that when I know what the CIA is doing- and how much money they have and how they spend it, then 1 could make some judgment on that question. Senator NUNN. Do you think there onght to be a line drawn some­where? Is that the point 1 Representative DnINAN. I would say so. Senator NUNN. In other words, there is some point-yoll wouldu't say that every Member of the Congress should know everything g-oing on on a day-by-day basis! Representative bRrNAN. No. Senalor NmIN. There has to be a line, and the question comes to the judgment of Congress as to where that. line should be drawn. 'Vould you agree that Cong-ress does make that judgment, and yOIl are really lodging- a complaint agail,lSt Congress rather t.han the CtA! Representative DRiNAN. I thought I made that clear. Senator NUNN. 1 just want to make that clear. You are saying that' we ourselves are derelict, you are not criticizing- Mr. Colby or the CIA when you say that e,'ery member couldn't get all the infor_ mation they should! Representative DRINAN, No, the Congress has been derelict, I think that is my word, in its oversight function. Senator NUNN. Conwessmnn, if you were convinced that the Armed Services Committee nnd the Approprintions Committee in the House and Senate which have the supervision over matters re­lating to our national security were indeed fonned-I am not saying they were, and that was hypothetically the caoo-and there waS a balanced representation in these commlttees of the entire Cong-ress, do you think that under those conditions, numbers, that they were informed, and that they did have tho pro!!er supervision, and that thev were balanc<,d committees! Do YOU tlunk at that point that we cOIl'Id draw n logical line on the crucial information ns it relates to intprnational security! Representative DRINAN. I am not certain of that, because thero is no track record to g-o on. And as I mentioned, two disting-nished Sen­ators conceded that they never heard of the CIA operntion in Lnos. Consequently, I would have to say, I would have to ha,'o faith in that committee that they did have sufficient information. Senator "NUN", Rut under that hypothetical-if they never did exist----1ind we could get it to exist, your opinion might change, wouldn't it! Representative DRINAN. It might. Senator N uNN. Mr. Chairman, 1 have no further questions of this witn..... ' , Senator SYMINOTON_ Before calling on Senator Hu,ghes, I would like to read into the record, Mr, Congressman, the testImony in open session. ]\fr, Colby says: "I do not think it was a war when it began, Ur, Chainnan, 1 think we were giving some assistance to the people in Laos who were resisting the North Vietnamese coming into this country." . And I said: "'Veil, in nny case, by Aug-list 1.~ we will be out of it, we hofX'." And tJWIl is RRkrcl, "Do not lnl'g-c seRle op(>rnt.iolls such

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:' 'J bl bond what Congress intell,lr,1 'as the waf in Laos go conSI ~rn l ~Ynnd duties related to int('Ui­when it provided for other unc lOU gence!" '\ Mr Colby's rcply was, "I think .. That is part of that a'revlOus-aJU I t ~ a raetical matter a cO"crt 'it undoubtedly did. An I ttlllk alsobt ~~use it~tops being covelt when operationca!,not be, a ;ehQ' Ig o~~~ I~sson of the nay of Pigs, among it gets too bIg. 1 tlunk t IS was

h thO " ot S~ th~1"th!nk, you !Lnd i WOUl,~ b~;~tg,~~~~::[\';e is less direct than Representatlve DRINAN. ,lIllg. ,P f Senator Hughes lind I read that in his answers to the mqmfles 0 , from them. I asked "On reflection, do you think that it ,,,·~s/Yi,e Senator Hug les. I' d' h milit!Lry operatIOns III Lao,. 'for the CIA to get lIlVO ve ttl suC ' ;,i:-4:nswer: , undertaken in dIrect response to Prf'si· . The IlgeHCy'R opC'rntions in Ln()~ l\Nl~ di ctiona in order to enrry out U,S. dentinl nnd Nntlonul IK""urlly contle re· ty for unIformed U.S. involvement 'Policy anti lIt the SUIIll' tIme voice the neeeSSl tl e :ve-ars to meet greater );'ortlJ in Laos. 'l'he~m activities grew.r~~ ::~~ t~V~hi<':l t.hese operatlons grew makf' it -;Vi to. Be und Laos pressure. uC ldi~c~~o mnlntuln normal intelIigeuec proce{~ures, d'm It' f .tl 1 Cl \ , " 1 dds and concludes, "DespIte the 1 leu .J ~l)t ~ i !" And then lea, fulfills the charge I;(ivcn it effiCIently atl( I~=elt~\~:l:ff~f~~~Itl'[Ulicti.ng what l:c snHl in open sesSIOll. ", Senllto~ SnnNoToN, X 0, I can t agree WIth that. , Representative ~mN.\I· In;~~c~ have a problem tllat if he is .j'Senator SYMINGI'ON. 11 C CC \~O thin s to do based 011 illY Jwlg­"given instructions, he ,h~lS, on} ~li")t, ta rOll gaud I h;ve beCllllll t he CIA :ment. I Sl?ent many years tll t "1 'Illis!fasd you either ha,," to nih'.\' the subooJIlIlllttee for mally years"J fid 1 I t we ,,"ould hure ,lOll<' in a 1':>1'­orders or resign. 1Ve.o\Te1i die1 en ~:~lrollger be construct-in- and flll1('.­-t!cul~ casco But obVIOUS ~ 101~i~ su eriol's. Anu we Llo llnn' a 11l'ul',\{'1Il tlOll if he had refused to 0 h'Y I d~1 ree Secretaries of Dcf"Il'C >lllee fu turn-for example, we avo W', 1 0 • ,,,,('eks \yitlulIIt a :--;cc-the firstfoAf tI.le YdaI"i~~'t'L~{;e!~\~~J:;:el;:~~?un Assistant Senelar~ ~r'y a n, an ° A d the saUle thing IS true oHhe AIllI) , of Air for sever!'1 YDca,l'~ I~W. f DIe Ccdtral Intelligence Agency! IL gcn­WehaveanActm~ noc ro t'l I callie in as Deputy Dll'cctor, -, h as not Ul tho Agency un I Ie \' !' f erW.;W ,0 W t" to of all its problems uroullC t liS lltle, ~And,this G:overnmen., 1I~ Spl T worries me is whether or not we , \I.\IIS<,tocontUlue functlOnmg. ~'hat f til CI ,\.\.ll(\ I alll the fir,t to

, ,~l qiscusshrg here the fUllctlOnsb~ am! ,;.I;at ~ould he called their agree; I thmk they halve gonledon~t want to see it taken out on an charter On the other Jand, d t d t I ' futlc-~diyid~al if he is able I a~t\::;~i:l~nc~~ ~l:l:t ~~~~ ~~:1 ~~oI~ f~cl' morc tlomng of th~ Agency. g . h: future, And I can oll)' that the ,t.h\)~ough revleh,,: of the Att:I'6 I~:~ that the matter should be rc-c.hturman of t lS comIlll e . 1 t . cd more thoroughly than it has been 111 t 1e pas, Ylew 'D ' , TI '111- "aU Senator, RepresentatIve m-,.;A!Ii. 1. ~ .r. ,. . {. th test.imony -', M I au gest however that It IS not em'taIll 10m e It d ' , VJhi ir I ha~6 re~d and r~rea<i very carefully, that :III. CfOt! 'Y C~s ;\)' cd' t d will live bv the mandate ° .1e .,' - ' tn<!ifn~~~t~~r q~~~t~~~~:I~ll:Ol' 1 Iughes rlskra him, ·',yould you ahide

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hy the directive of the CIA that vou must keep out of all local domestic Am('ricnn activities?" . And Mr. Colby responded that in general he would do that. How­m·or. he goes on and says that "such ad ions will be taken only in the most exceptional ciretimstnnces, and with the Director's personal approval." The statute says that they can't get involved, and yet he weasles like that. Senator SnnNGTON. Of course we will have to have Mr. Colbv back now and discuss the matters that in a· democratic fashion are now being laid out before the Congress and the people. Senator Hughes. Senator HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. . . Congre~sman Drinan, you have obviously spent a great deal of time

III analyzIIlg the record. the background. and before your time in Con­gress you yisited Vietnam as part of the study mission, and are very concerned about what is happenin/f' I apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman; I was tied up on other matters that were related to the committee work in another way. But, I would like to ask if the Oversight Committee of the Senate on the CIA has been placed into the record! ,Vho knows in the Senate what is going on in the CIA? I have been told ever since I have been here that there is It committee composed of several people who actuallY serve as an Oversight Committee on the cr A. r s there someone other than the Armed Services Committee that docs that 1 Does anyone on the staff know? . Representative DnINAN. The actual funding of the Central Intelli­gence Agency ha" to go through the Appropriat.ions Committee. of course. And the five or seven senior meOiher~ of til(> Appropriations Committee get in detail the re~l1ests for and the justifications for the money that goes to the Central Intelligence Agencv. Senator HUOlIJ':8. As the rhninnnn knowR. hoth 'he nnu myself are members of the Democratic Policy Committee. and we I"n'e frequently discussed some of what is happening. And r want. to compliment the chairman, because he is pf£>ssed constantlv and cOIlAist(l!ntlv for more openness and any information than at any time in the 41;'; years that I have been in the Senate. He is continuously pressed for thnt, and I certainly think the record should show it. '" I am concerned, however. because I think I heard a fornler chair~ man of the Apl'ropriations Committee say in debate on the floor of the Senate that he himself did not want to know the actual facts, because he was afraid he might talk in his sleep. If I recall, that is the state­ment he made. And I think that if the chairman of the Appropriations Committee and the responsible people don't know the facts, somewhere on this Hill, I thing something is wron/l.

We have recently seen a very broad displav of what I consider deception and deceit in relationship to this committee in the Pentagon. And I am concerned that this may permeate other areas of the govern­mental structure also, as I know every member of this committee must be. . Father Drinan has pressed very hard in this statement, and in many cases it is a very harsh statement, which reflects what he must feel deep :-vithin hims~lf about a system that tolerates things like the Phoenix

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program, for whatever reason .. But I do believe, awl I nm not testify­mg Father Drinan I apolo~lze. but I do beheve that ,ol1]('lIow we , '0. d I . I " must improve the oversigh~ of ,the CI.t\" an '1 mt IS lappellIIlg oY(,1' there, and how the money lS bemg spent. . 'j :And again I comphment the chairman, because In the last Congress he pre';'ed very hard to get the nppropri~tions out into theopcn, und what we were doing with them. And I mIght add that 'Ye dId not suc-ceed too well with that. I supported the chairman III tillS. . ": Father Drinan, do you believe that there should be some SIde, some view of the facts that we are probably not going to get 5:)5 Members of the Congress-and I agree with you-if we can trus~ thousands of personnel with all kinds of secret mformatlOn, arc we III fact saym/( that they are more trustworthy. than. the men and women the people haveJelected to represent them III tillS Gm'ernment? . '"Representative DRINAN. I heard you make that point before, Sena­tori and give security clearance or deny lt to Member" of the Congress and make them accountable . . Senator HUGHES.'! wish that could be done. Herouse I don't beliey. myself that certain members of the committee should be given informa­tion that other members are not gIven unless we spcclfically set up some sort of oversight sul;commi.ttee -or special committee in the Congress o£';"cross-sectlOn plulosophlcally that can be cleared to know the total of. ,what is 'going on in the CIA.

lliRepresentative DnINAN. If I may say so, Senator, that was 1?l"oposed way back in 1955 by Senator Mansfield. He mtroduced a bill for It joint committee of the House and the Senate on the CIA. He had :34 cosponsors for the bill, and it came to th~ Senate floor on ApnlH, 1 DJG. The result was negative. The Members did not vote for 11.. But It spelllS to 'me that that ,vould be a very good idea, to have Memhers of the House and the Senate picked and selected accorelm!!: to their ](leolo~y, a~balanced committee, and I would be satisfied with that. tuSenator HumIEs. That would sat.isfy your needs? . . . jJ:Repr.esentative DRINAN. I would ns~umc so-the or<l111al".v ]Olllt committee--and they would be responSible and accollntnble for the opera.tions, of the CIA. ~a:Senator HUGHES. I personallV feel that the people of Iowa ek.cted me to represent their interests with the C~A as well as e>:en other Jacet ofr Govermnent and that I have an entitlement to be lllformcd. And " ihlfarniUntrust;'orthy, then I feel the CIA ought to tell the people of :.' 19wa:and the country why I am untrustworthy and on what they base ~" ~ould be satisfied also if the Joint C?mlmttee would be plCked on , ", such 0: ba&s to serve as an oversight comml~tee ~hat would ha "e straight irlforniation on everything that we are domg m the CIA. I share your !i>hcCrns'aoout what we might be involved III aroun? the wodd right now! iind in the future, as well as what we have been mvolved III III the past. r:arn not relating this particularly to IIfr. Colby. I am ralatlllg It

'I.. as a common concern on the need to know of the AmerIcun people. nt ,~, leltstbyra grouJ> oftheir electe? representatives.. .' . . ," -qIlfnow:this IS not an easy thmg for you to do m testlfYlllg tIllS way &D.d~~ressing your' concerns, but I commend you for havmg- the courage to do it. eaRepresentative DRINAN. Thank you very. much, Senator. ",Senator' HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. .UI! c I'

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Senator SYMINGTON. Thank vall, Senator. pressive, aml I called llim Ull~ aske~ him if he "'~uld lik~ to testify. }"'irst let me thank you very 'much for your gracious remarks. And, of course, ,ve welcome Ius testimony here tlns ~llOrnll1g. . Based on recent events in recent months on this committoo as far as ,And we are very grateful that you have come to gIve uS your POSl-

my collea!("ue, Senator Hughes, is concerned, I am reminded 'of lUI old tion, sir. p~mse, "T~ey laug~ed whe~ he sat down at the piano." Now, as to the ',' Are there any further questions? lomt comm.lttee, I Sit on a jomt committee of the Senate and the House " ".senator NUNN. Ihave one thing. " that you might look at at your discretion. And if you think there hos Senator HUGUEs. I would like to make" stateIllent III the hght of been any excessive secrecy around this program, I wish you would take " what you have said. .,' a look at the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, where, for example. a I want to go on record as a member of thiS comnuttee as saylIlg even though they supply the warheads and pay for them, they will not II< that I am not willing to trust anyone man in tillS country m a~,y POSI­nllo'Y me as a member of this committee, and nc.tin~ chninnnn in R. ~i tion without un oversight committee of some sort by tins Cong-re~s hearmg before the Military Appropriations Subcommittee of the Joint ~',' being totally informed as to what he is doing and what and how he IS At.omle Energy Committee which I chair, they will not allow me to ~ doing it. , ' bl'mg mto thot Committee not only 11 member of my staff, but the chief > ," Representative DmNAN. I fully agree, that. was the preCIse pomt of of the staff of the Senate Armed ServiceR Committee, oven though the I'?,:,' my testimony, and thwt now at thiS moment m history \\,e shonhl de-dis~ussjo~ is entirely abt;m~ whether or not we need these weapons . lay his confirmation unt.il t.he Congress has the apparat.us that w(>, Cfln

which Will cost many I)]lhon~ of dollnrs, nor will they allow any supervise--, mpmbers-- c . ·:'Senator HUGHES. Excuse me, Senator N unn. . .

Representative DRINAN. Excuse me, Senator, who is "thev *" ,:,' Senator NUNN. That is all right. This is not n qUC'St.IOIl; t.hC'rC' IS Senator SYMINOTON. The majorit.v of the ,Joint Atomic Energv something that I don't have an answer for and don~t intend t~, bllt

Committee, good question.' . I want to share it with you. Senator Hughes and I talked about It the Nor, will they allow my meml:ers to appear at any hearing of that other day. I think in this situation of c1~ssification, secret and so. forth,

com~lttee except the open hearIngs-and I have never seen 'an open we start off with perhaps overclassificatlOn, or a degree of clossIhcatl?n hearlllg '."hen it comes to militl1ry appropriations-to bring any staff that even the people Involved don't have very much confidence In. memLer lll. And then we get to an Ellsberg situation where we have disclosure

So we have a lot of things to clean 111' from the standpoint of not which hits the front pages, leaks, and then we have a loss of confidence only the public's right to know hut of Our own right to know. Thev !'b,'" all through the branches of Government, particularly the exccu­will !lot allow any members of my staff or an,Y mpmbl'rs of the Armed rP· tive, in the classification system, top secret, and so forth. Then we g'C't SCTY1(,(>:S Committee staff to go over nnfl rend classified data incident into a situation which is extremely dangerous, and perhaps. tlw most to weapons unless the Senator in question or some S(>llntor n, nd Can. dangerous part of the syste~n, U? Senator I-Illgly.:>s lu~s pOlIlt~tl out ~r(>$sman go ovor and rend the books while they rend the )m~moranda. mTecent days, and that is n SItuatIOn where tl.lere IS so httle conhd~I~CC .111 the \'ault of the ,Toint Committee. How this g-rew I don't know, but ill the classification system that we do away With that and start falslfy-It wac; started years ago. Rut it is an unfortunate situation. I say thnt ing and omitting inlormntion, which deprives even key l~eol~le at the becau:", I do believo in all honesty that we have t.he right setup here if ,very top of the chain of command from the very es,:"nt.~allllforrn~. we ~III p;o to work and make it work. And Senator Hughes is right, tion relating to our role in our pol~cy. And the .questlOn I~, you cant and m time I hope t.hat more information can be obtained about jnst ·ha.ve it all ways on all parts ofthe Circle-and It IS a.clrdc, III my OPlll-how t.his setup functions. iOIl. And how do you draw the hne, and at what pomt 111 the cll'ele do

Xow, back to th~ pl'obl~m. I have know~ lIIr. Colby for a good many , <ire: really start, and where does the cirele end! I just leaye that mth yea"., and I do thmk ~e IS an honest, dedICated, good American. I do 'You 'as an observation and a frustration that I have. . think there are forces III the world which coulrl endanger the security",' -i!!Representative DRINAN. Thank you, Senator. Let's begIn to un-o~ the Umted States. ,And therefore I do think we need an agency ," ~a.vel it !Ike t~~ Central Intelhg~nce Agen.cy in order to assess to the best of -'.;Thank you very much, lIfr. Chairman and Senators. I appreciate Its ablhty what our pOSSible enemlOS around the world are doing. If your kindness. we rIo!,'!, then for the first time in the history of the modern world, ,; Senator SYMINGTON. 'Ve are very grateful to you for appearing, you n11ght say-and I would go back several hundred years on that- jqll'he next witness is lIfr. Sam Adnms. It would be the first time that it was felt that such an agency was not (,) Mr. Adams, will your rise and raise vour right hand, please! needed. "'WDo you swear that the information you give this committee is the

So what I believe we are talking about now is the capabilitv of the 'tooth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you Goel! gentleman in qnestion to handle the Agencv in an efficient and ap- -l'Mr.ADAMs. I do, sir. propriate fashion and .. pol'! what he should back to the Congress hI Senator SYMINGTON. Haye you a statement prepared 1. what he is doing.

I would like to sav to the committee thot. Fat.her Drinan wrote me a letu;r which I Wo" much impres. ... rl with-I don't know whether to en]] hIm Congl'('ssman Drinnn or FatJwl' Drillnn-thc 1ettC'r was im~ "

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'HI: ffi' '1 TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL A, ADAMS c

Mr. AoAl\[S. Y ('8, sir. Senator S¥)fI~GTON. 'YilJ you ,'pad it'~

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lIfr. AOA>Is. T will, sir. First I would like to apolo/(ize for appearing so late, but I didn't ,,' realize t~at I was going to testify before this committee until relatively I> a short tIme ago. f Senator SnIiNGToN. I think sometime back you said YOll would be 'II,: ready to testify, and we said we would always be willing to hear you. ~" Is that correct! n !\fl'. ADAMS. Yes, sir. 11, Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. ~ 1Vould you read your stlltement, please i It Mr. ADA1\fB. Yes,"sir. t;: !\fy name is Samuel A. Adams. I resig-ned f!'Om the Central Intvlli-gency Agency on .JullO 1, 197:3. 1\1y resignation stemmed from dismav over what I thoug-ht was the sloppy and often dishonest way U,S. intelligence conducted research on the struA'A'le in Indochina. An ex­ample of the shortcominA'S, I believe, was the mllnner in which U.S. intellig-ence produced reports on the political and aclminist,rntive a!rtln­cies of the Vietcong. These agenCIes, sometimes called the infra­structure, were the target of the allied Phoenix program. The Phoenix program wa!" overseen at one time bv !1r. ('olbV', n. candidato to receive the CIA's clirectorship. . .

Seven of my 10 years at the Agency were devoted to research on 0111' adversaries in Indoehina.1\Iy reports included an oxtensive studv on the Vietcong- police system,'a treatise on Communist subversive ag-ents in the South Vietnamese Anny and police, nnd an examin:tLion of the Vietcong's covert structure in South Vietnamese territory. In 1?70. I w~ote a lenl[t.hy study entitled "Guicle to a Viet Cong Provmce" whlCh the CIA uses liS its stanclard field handbook on the Communists in South Vi~tnam. For nbout [) veal'S I g-ave the Aacncv's training course on the Vietcong to cr A case officers bound for Vietnn·m. The Phoenix program is an pxnmplc of n sonnd concept ,:rona awry. It was meant to destroy the Commnnists' politicnl apparatuR, but it has not done so, and the Vietcong are in the middle of a resurgence throughout South Vietnam. Although the country's surfnce looks peaceful enough-at least comparecl to the last few years-the appellr­ance is deceiving. Beneath the surface of the South Vietnamese Gov­ernment, the unraveling is well along.

Phoenix was conceived when the Allies' main weapons in South Vietnam were American warplanes, and heavily armed battalions whose mission was to "search and destroV." The weapons were bludg­eons, which all too often fniled to disc'riminate between the enemy soldier and the innocent bystander. More important, they were vir­tually useless against the Vietcong political cadre, who, it came to be realized, wasillst as dan!rtlrollB as the Vietcong warrior. ' Phoenix was desi!!"ed to fill the /:(Up. Copied from 8 British concept which had Buc,,<icded in"Malava, the Phoenix program was melUlt to replnce the bludgeon with a 'sca1 pel. Th. key to the operation was prode. targeting. I"'<lead of bombs-which killed large numbers of ch'ilians in acldition to the occasional political operative of the Viet­cong-Phoenix's main tools. theoret,icallv, were good intelligence and good files. The object of the prog-ram was to find out, who among the Vietnamese population wern Vietcong ('adreR, and to arrest or ki1l them. In theory, arrests w('ro pr~ferahlc to assassinations, becuuse a

57

prisoner caul, d lead to further arrests, and a cadaver led nowhere, In order to work, the Phoenix program had baSIC needs. These are five of the most important: , , ':', 1. ,A clear perception of the. nature and orgalllzatlOn of the target. " '2. Good intelligence concernillg th~ names, the whereabouts, and the activities of the people who belong t'? It... ' 3. A tight, well-run police orgamzatlOn'. With secuI:e files, .wIth the ability to keep close tmek of the POpubtlon, and With a lugh state of training and morale. , . " ' ' ,4. An efficient and fall' Judlcm1 system, wI~h st,?ut pnsons lind a rehabilitation progrum which could turn rebels mto citizens. ,,: 5. Most important, popular support. , ' 'J! JThe trouble with Phoenix, howev~r, a~d the reason It dId not ,,:ork, wa, s that its needs, although recogmzed m the,?ry were never ~ulhllecl in.practice. The divorce between hope and rea.hty be,came so WIde that the program degenerated into a game of sta~lstJcs, III '~lllc~ numbers 'were paramount, and the object of the exerCIse-the ,cnpplmg, of the 'Commnnist Party-was never 8\'en approached. I Will deal With the )leeds listed above, and unfulfilled, one by on~., . _,,'When U.S. troops first landed ill force 111 VlCtnam 111 earlv 1905, .we, were abysmally ignorant of the ~ature of the threllt. It WitS th~ught t1;1at the applicatIOn of enough mlhtary force by ~he United Stat;s "would eventually compel the CommuDlsts to lay o~. But they (heln t, lIm,d,the introduction of each new Amencan battalIon ouly seemed to 'get us in deeper than we already were. .,' . r;,Finally, the Tet offensive demonstrated the. Vietcong s abilIty to ,get large numbers of troops into ~he S.outh t;letnamese urb":ll areas '.w~t!l.Out detection, and jarred U.S. 1I1telhg~nce mto the realizatIOn th~t "the Communists had something there beSIdes an army. The Phoemx 'pwgram-which had existed in one form or auother for several year&-'began to take serious shape. . , , ;,I,'heinitial problem was that the basiC research on the nature of the ~,verSary and of his organization was either undone or ~isunde~'StO?d. l~en the time came to designate a target for the Phoe~,x organ~zatlO.n ~'aim at the most readily available entity was somethmg U.S. mte1h­, r '00 called the infrastructure, a catchall phrase l,?ng used to desenbe "~'norunilitary portion of the Vietcong orgamzatlOn. Un~ortu~ate1y, '''' ,t#Je,Communists themselves had no such term, and U.S. mtellIgence " J~ no precise definition of what It mcluded. It did have a number, :"'ll<>';'~ver 39 1'75 which had remained the same from June 1965 up :':':iWltj),th~ ev~ of the Tet offensive. Although the number changed after ,i, i'l'ef;-it has ranged smoo then from 60,000 to 90,000-the defimtlOnal .~ ipioblem was never cleared up. As a result, no one knows even now ':who belongs to the infrastructure, and the number given out offic!Ully lis 'the sum of the guesses from the fi.eld, m":de by J?OOple wl~o have 'i ;varying ideas of what they are conntlllg. It IS concelva,ble, usmg the ,,'loosely defined official criteria, that we cou!d, say the 1I1frnstructure ';.vas anywhere from 10,000 to a quarter of amilhon strong. -, \,.;A'salient problem of who to cou~t ar?se from th~ fact that for :;orne 't.i,niethe t;ietcong's. convert 0l?"ra~Ives m South VI~tnam~e,terrltory " ,were not illcluded ill the offiCial hsts. Thus.R spy III Thleu s office-­, there was one-would be excluded from the mfrnstructure because he }~" ifailed to fit the official U.S. definition. The problem was compOlmded

because of the ~eluctance on the part of U.S. intellig-.nce to look into the. matter of ylereong subve"!ion. For example, in May 1960, the CIA Ch~ef of StatIOn. for SaIgon llldlcatcd on a visit to 'Vashing-ton his behef that the VIetcong had only 200 agents in the South Vietnamese G~vernment. He spok~ from ignorance. An indepth research Rtudy gOlllg on ";t the same time suggested the r<>al number of such a~"'nts was more hke 30,000. . .

The question of the Communists' covert presence in South Vietnam­ese terntory became. partICularly "exing aftel' the COIlP in Cambo(lia in March 1970. 'Vhen It occurred, most of the Communists' army in the southern ~alf of South V!etna.m left for duty noxt. door. and large nllm­bers of ~Ietcong cadre~ III VlCtnam's Delta shifted f!"Om Vieteong" to Sonth VIetnamese terrItory, often by false JOiN'tion throllg-h Chieu HOI Centers .. The ensuing ,quiet in ,tho Delta-along with an appar­pnt In;rellSe ,111 the epemy·s ~efectlOll rnt<>s-gnvc ri~ to optimism

Jam I ong, AmerIcan OffiClals]n Vletnn.m, incllHling thOR~ 'Who mnnned the ) lOenlX program. .

Althou,gh hard intelligenC<l on tlw names, whereabouts and doing-s of Co,!,munlst cadres !S IJ.luch sou/?ht after, it is very hard to come by, !\Ihed files ~u.1ge. WIth lllfonn~tlOn of this sort, hut in tho "nst. major­Ity of rases It IS Olther f!llse or lllcompl,etc. Thing"S have imprO\'ed Since the early day~ of PhoeniX wl,len operatIOns against specific targets wero almost noneXIstent, But the Improvements have been marg-inal and the !atest reports from the field suggest the situation is gettin~ worso 1IIstead~f better, In any case, the type of person neutralized b PhoeUl~ IS about the same as it always was; they aro mostly low-Ie,); and of httle con~quence, The hardeore party member is still unrn u ht , The South VI.etnamese national I?olice and Jlfilitary Security S~rv: Ice~both of whIch work for Phoenlx-nre better now than the'v were say, 111 1966. But the base was so low that it iB difficult to concei~'C that they could have gotten worse,

The pr,oblem here is much more complicated than simply low mo­rale-whICh recent reports suggest i,s endemic among the South Viet­V'meso c.;'nstab,!lary. The mo~t trymg aspect of the· situation is the

letcong s cont1llued penetrntlOn of the South Vietnamese seeurit Rl?paratus. Capt.ured documents indicate that many hundreds of South ~Ietnamese polIcemen are in reality Vietcong agents, The penetra­tIOns occllr at all. le~els,. A government roll up which took place in r::hern South VIetnam 111 1971, show the di,!,ensions of the problem.

,ong tho.se reportedly apprehended as VletcollK agents were the chdfh,?f pol~ce of Da Nang C\ty. The chief of the pohce spedal branch ~h Ii IS a'hlstant fo~ ,?peratlons, and the chief of police for I corps: f e. rst'ctt .ree were Jailed, The last, after evidence proved insufficient Or convl Ion was reputedly t~ sfe d t S ' "

t th PI . ' ,"n rre ° algon as" pohce adVIser o ,e lOemx program. ,Although the ~merican advisory etTort to Phoenix coniaineci no

';;Ietcong , agents, It of,ten wa~ of questionable help. One of its main s fr t;;0'!'lIlgs ,was the Ig"lloranco of most advisors of the Vietcong tur­g-e; . rlOr to Augus~ 1968, the average CTA cnse officer received no ~;;I1I11).ng wha~soe\"er 111 the organiz~tion and methods of opemt.ions of

e ,0mmUlIl,st. structnre. Then, III late 1068, n tmining pro am ~ar~d up wl!lch by ~he end?f the year pave those bOllnd for Viet'f::,m, ~ lOUrs of mstl"lwtlOn. ThIS wa. rapIdly cut hack, The number of

59

hours in the Vietcong target now given to CIA cnse officers going to Saigon is four,. . . . . An ancillary problem IS the one of pOl,'ulatlOn control. DespIte many

attempts over the last 5 years, there is stIlI no adequate III card system in Vietnam, a:r:d large nrnnh:ers of pe.rsons, particularly i1.1 the. shuns, roam about WIthout the pohce knowmg who they are. LIkeWIse, the Phoenix system hus yet to devise as mundane a thing as 11 catalog of fingerprints, If, say, the U,S, Ambassador was killed tomorrow, and the gun was found which accomplished the killing, there would be no way to trace the assassin, from the prints on the gun,

South Vietnamese prisons continue to leak, although not as hadl y as a few years ago, Still, the average Vietcong captive-unlike the com­mon"criminal-willlikely go free within a very few months .. Agam,

· one can point to imprO\"cmcnts, but the basic problem re.mnll1s t.hat the accounting system which comes into pIny after a suspC'cfs arr~st is so loose that It is often very difficult to tell what happens to 111m

· shortly thereaiter, In several areas of Vietnam, at present, the system has broken down 'completely, so that Communist prisoners in these

,areas frequently fail to go to prison at. all. · Furthermore, there is nn almost complete lack of a rehabilitation

, system, The old saw that the most dedicate<] Vietnamese Communists •.• have,usually done time, continues to have a ring of truth. Captured

··"doounients still show that those who leave South Vietnamese prisons ,frequently rejoin the Vietcong organizations aiter their release from ,(jail.. ,. ... .'o·"But the bIggest smgle drawback to the Phoemx program IS that ex­

<"cept in a few arens it lacks popular support, What this boils down to is the reluctance of the average South Vietnamese citizen to turn in "

:_. Vietcong cadre when he encounters one. 'Vhether the reluctance stems '~.,~;Erom fear or ndmirati?Il of tho Victco~g, it amounts to the san!e thin.go j ·:!that is, the extraordmarily large VIetcong apparatus contmues Its

"t}. ,'cove:rt existence in South Vietnamese territory, .. '. connection with my statement to your committee, J respectfully

forward three conclusions: : The Phoenix program largely failed to eome to grips with basic

Perhaps doomed from the start by built-in flaws, ~~~~~:~f:~~a~n}~d~;c~la~;i)~m~ed~~improvemcnts were so margiIlal Uti to be of , were worsened by such shortcomings as wo('­mE"'IlICH'1IL training.

""i'I'I,. game of statistICS into which Phoenix plunged allowed the ~llM':: Government to conjure a picture of progre...ss arose from such ~r;:,:: as the exit from South Vietnam in 1970, of most of the Com­iJ, army, Ilnd the transfer of large numbers of Vietcong cadre ~(~~~~:d~:tl~ government territory, where c-von today thrS operat(' UJl-, by Phoenix statisticians,

faulty execution of the prop:rrun, ,vhich ,:raS e,xpE'Ilsiv(>; aml demonstrates once again the need for congressional

".,m11tiln'·vofthe CIA, UntilCong-ress begins to inspect closely "'hat th" -CIA up to, we may expect further questionable programs slH'h as

. ~PhoBnix. That is the end of my preparrd statement, sir. J ha \'e Rnot her

codicil that I would like to add to it if! might. Senator SnnNoTON. How long is it!

r ii

Mr. ADAMS. Two of these pages. Senator SYMINGTON. Didn't they tell you the rules of the commit· tee, that when it comes to prepared statements we would like 24 hours' notice ! lIfr. ADAMS. Y lis, they did, but I had such short notice. Senator SYMINGTON. Do you have a copy of itl lIfr. AnAMS. It is still hand written. Senator SYMINGTON. If you only had a short notice. we had short notice too, because we didn't know you wanted to testify. Who asked you to testify I Mr. ADAMS. Senator Kennedy's office, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. He is not a member of this committce. Mr. ADAMS. No sir, he is not, sir. But on the other hand, I didn't find out---Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. I am not being critical but the short notice had nothing to do with the staff of this committee. Mr. ADUIS. Absolutely not, no sir. Senator SYMINGTON. irow long is youradditiona,l statement I ~fr. ADAMS. It is three of those pages. Senator SYMINGTON. Will you proceed I Mr. ADAMS. Thank you very much, sir. I would like to attach this codicil to my main statement. It has to do with Cambodia, and what I believe was the deliberate fabrication of statistics of the Khmer Communist order of battle by the CIA. I made allegations concerning the fabrication to the CIA Inspector General in December 1972, and I was told that Mr. Colby was aware of the allegations. As far as I can determine, no attempt was made to investigate the chlhl"gcs. The circumstances of the fabrication are as follo,,"s : I would respectfully like to layout the circumstances of what I believe was a ia,brication. Senator HUGHES. 'Would you restate that again clearly! You are talking about a fabrication of CIA statistics I Mr. An,ulS. Yes sir, th .. tis correct. Senator HUOIlEs. I want to make sure I understand what you say. Mr. AnUIS. On the Khmer order of battle, that is, how many Khmer Communist soldiers are in Cambodia I As I said, I would like to layout briefly what I believe is the cir­cumstance of the fabrication. Between, April 1970 and June 1971, was a range of from 5,000 to 10,000. The range remained constant during this period because no one within the U.S. Intelligence Community was looking at the prob­lem or investigating how large the Khmer Communist Army was. A memo wntten by the CIA in May 1971 in fact gave us this range of 1\ to 10,000 as the official number. In June 1971 I wrote a memorandum of approximately 40 pages based on a review of all available evidence on the matter of the Khmer Communist army. Within a week or so the paper was killed. I was threatened with firing, and told to work on weekends for thp foresee­aLle future. I did so, that is, I worked a 7-day week throughout the summer of 1971. Senator SYMINGTON. Who told you thatf lIfr. ADuls. My immediate supervisor, sir.

61

Senator SYMINGTON. 'Vhat was his nome 1 'T~h. AnAMS. Harold Ford, sir.

Se;""tor SYMINGTON. What was his position? . Mr. ADAlI:S. He waS head of the specilLj research statI to wlut'h 1 Pelollged, sir. ' ,b.SenatorSYMINGTON. In1VashingtOld

. Mr.AD4.Ms. Yes,sir-well,largely. .,;!S<W,ator SnUNGToN. Thank you. .., Mr. AnA"S. In 1971 I would respectfully submit, Sir, that thiS was one rareinstaI\ce in which an intelligence analyst was pUl1lshed dur-

time of war for finding an enemy urmy. . ,

• ~:~:'~~'~~i1': ~ the l)uper was removed .from my control tho Job ot order of battle was :t&uguod to an analyst "ho hau on Cambodia, and who had never worko,l on combat

"~~'~~;dj;;l; I would put in parenthetically, sir, that I had worked II ' for a long time, and on orders of battlo for several yeurs. ""'ULle CIA's only order-oi-battle analyst. . Ill)I'/IH~.'~Il\,r the new analyst was ~lvell the Job of rc:searchmg the order the I(hmcr CommunIsts, ho was also gl \'011 il. rang!) to come

.• ~e3i~~~:~~E,iiS' a runge of from 10 to 30,000. lIe ,yu,s instructed to . that,range.. . . ;malyst took ii months to dense a way to como up With the '."J~~i.~ . In N ovcmber 1071, that is, [) months latol' after tillS l ·"·'Eo-'". to do this, the CIA filially released its oil.ici,,! order number in tho ollicinl order of battle was a range of 15 'is almost prcr.hicly the range gi veIl the analyst [) mouths

Khmer Communist order of battle, approximately of the old number, that is, the Hi to ;)0,000. I re­

it understates it. And I would make the obscrva­currently asks us to believe that the of 200,000 outnumbers the Khmer Com·

about 4 to 1 Phnom Penh seems about to full. I ~~~~~t.th~ia~it the order put forth by U.S. Intelligence are some-to note that I am in the process of laying out a ~:~~:~a:d~;~:~~dl account of what happened, which will mclude

who did what to whom. submitted the detailed oral complaint to the cr A

rlJ~#II~r,\j -on the matter. The Inspector Ucneru!, or rather lengthy notes on what I had to say. A day or so :ifj.I),.JDe<Jenlbe,l' 1972-1 waS told that Mr. Colby, the Executive W;,llll"l."P''''ll iniormed of my complaints, and that he had said

l!"~e:~f~~~~:~~~:~JIJ1'Ti let the chips fall where they may. ;;' said that now! (~~~j;;3;;~;~~~t;0Id that Mr. Colby said that. ~~ . Who told yOU that! ~~~14.'<_O, It, was another-It was either lUr. Breckenridh"C or a of the Inspector General's Office, I forget which one it was. SYMINGTON. Inspector General's omcc of ,,"here!

The CIA, sir. . Will you find out who told you that and rc­

committee!

(

i 62

1\[1'. ADAM •. I will. Senator SYlIlXOTOX. Check your nwmon', )"ou ~(-'(', that is H 1)('1"­

sonal attack against a nomince by hearsay. • ~[r. ADAMS. 'Veil, this isn't an attack agaillst. the nomin",'. Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is. ""'c jl1:-;t han' a diJf('rf'llC,~ tllPJ't'.

But as long as you mentioned t.hat soIlwbolly tolll you ",hnt IH' suid, 1 would like to know who it.. wa.B, so that Wl' can qupstioll him.

~rr. AnAMs. Fine. Thank you, sir. It wus t'ithl'I' l\h'. Bred;:l'lIl'it1:,!l' or :\[r. GrN'r.

S(~natoI' SY.MINGTOX. You find out who it WIIS Hllil h~ liS know. ::\1r. AnAMR. Y(lS sir. ThuIlk you vcry llIUf'll. .\s far as I call tell, only two thing'S hnPP<'Il('(l eOIH'Pl'lIillt:! Illy 1.'0111-

plaint, which as fur as I was nblr to clptC'l'mi'H' WitS IH'\'Pl' lookl'd into. The JiI."t time was during my testimony before the Defellse of th,' Ells· berg trial in ~Illrch 197a; Tile mwttf'r of Illy ('olllplniJlt O\'t'r til\' KhllH'r Communist order of battle wns l,trought lIJI I,." the pros('clltioll. The prosecutor, ~fr. Nissen, used my trip to the CIA Insp('ctor (JpJl("I'nl in order t.o impeach my testimony as a witJlC'ss. ] h· ~nid that thi~ ShOWll(l

that, I was a chronic complainer. The. second time-and I cannot l>e surf' thnt this is dirrdlv ('011-

nected-was aft(>I' my l'l'turn from thC' Ellshpl'g' h-inl. r wns tqfd tllnt my cmployment at the CIA was n!Jout to IIC terminated, although eventually the Agency Imd,ed down. I hn "e rrnsoll to believe that [wr· sons who prop'ost'd my termination, thnt is, fir-e(l mC', were tho!4('o were responsIble for fabricating the Khmel' Communist onlcl" of buttle.

That is the end of my codicil. Senator Snn"GTON. "'ill you repeat that uhout the [lCo!,le !Jeing

fired i Mr. ADAMS. Right after 1 came back from the Ellsberg trial, sir, I

was told that m)' employment with the Agellcy WlIS about to be tcrmi­nuted. I made several attempts to try to find ;mt who it was that waS putting me on the list to get fired. I was unahle to find out. But I be· lie"e that it was probably the people who had been responsihle in my opinion for fabricating the Khmer Communist order of battIe.

Senator SYMINOTON.-YOU said in your statement-you were ""ading from a supplementary statement-that you got up in the lust few hours--

Mr. ADAMS. That is right, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. You said in your statement that you ""signed

in the Central Intelligence Agency on the first of J una. Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. So whoever attempted to fire you did it

thnt time; is thnt correct 1 1.1r. ADAMS. Tha.t is correet, sir. Senator SnnNGTON. Why did they fail I Didn't they have

authority to discharge you? ]\[1'. AnAlIs. Oh, yes, they did have the authority to discharge me. Senator SYMINGTON. 'Vhy did they change their minds I ]\[r. ADAM •. I have ne"cr really been able to find out. I triccl to

out and couldn't. . Senator SYMINGTON. How did you try to find out 1 ~Jr. ADAMS. I wrote n numher of memoranda.. nsking why.

i , ! 0:,

"', SQIlator SYMINO'l'ON. You Sl'<':, ill the yt'lll'S. that. I han' 11('('11 COII­

neeted with the CIA in one way or another I have had mHIl\, what YOII

C!lll disgruntled employees of the CIA get in touch with "'':. Alld ihnt ~fbA.lsotrue:in·business, and it is also tnlO in any /!O\'cITl.mcntnl ageney. ..Aml:.I,wllS just wondering if you wem suying that vou '\'l'I'C notilic:d ~b.Il:1; fYO:U' were fired. But in your previous statement you said you r~slgI\ed.

Mr. AnA1oI8. Yes, sir; r was notified that. I wns fired, alld I wa~ 1111-able to find out who was trying to gin~ lI1e tllC' sack. And tllPn I thn'w in the sponge and quit. ) .. SenatorSYMINoTON. You IRstifj"d Lefom the Foroi"ll Helatilllls Committee; did you not I ~

Mr. ADAMS. That is correct, sir. 1l.J~I;get these confused. Does that, Illean J-Tollse or Senate? odSenator SYMINGTON. Senate. ,!J,M;r. ADAMS. No, sir, I haw·n·t. I t.('stiHcd ill front. of the HOIIs('. ,~h.·1(5enator SY1tIINOTON. Somehody t.old IIlC that JOu te::;;tiliClI1Jl'fore tile .JI01l$ •.

Is it fair to say thnt tll(' thrnst of your testimon\' is that the PhoPlIix p:r;ogram is not particulnrly dfectiv(. for good or "for ill?

Mr. ADAMS. '.Dhat would Le thE>. thrust of mv tt~stimony, yes, sir: that . itiwlIsineffective. " . DisS~ria.tor SYMINGTON. "'as one important obj('ctin' of the Phoenix

" to coordinute various types of lclritimate intelliO"t-'IH'C ~m'iti~1 ~ h'

Thnt is correct. si r. ~~~;;:; \Vas the Ph~nix program more st1c(,f'ssful in

II in1:elllig'OIlc,e not subject to abuses in some regions of Vietnam to_:~ ,?m,ere:ntdeg-ree than in other regions? .

!tt~i~:':~;~~~iI~;t;ih~i~~n~~k~;that is a correct statement j yes, sir. If so, what accounted for those diffel'(~nccs if during Mr. Colby's tenure I

,o..~J,~i<',f,Ul;'.M'l:. I suspect it is the same as you can say about nnything, t""'ple In some areas are better thon others in other areas. Also

. (IS'. the .matter o~ degree of penetration in the Da Nang arefi, :~il\ll:Jlllth,.:,.Vlet Cong III essence ran the cops; thinos didn't fTO very

~n other areas where they didn ~t run the police things w('nt , SnIINGTO". Do you hove ony specific oddence about ]\[1'.

of the Phoenix program? No, sir; I do not, excent in:-:ofar os the rcports came

Phoenix program which I read. SY'MI.NGITON .. ~ ou have Leen in Viptnnm yoursr1 f ql1itt' a lot.?

;'~'Ni;;~aY:u~els, SIr,. I have ocen on f01l1' temporary dllty as-sign-

SYMINGTON. One thing' thnt worriC's me ahout all this is that ~;~~~m~"l~~~~~ yes, SIr. we nerd nn intelligence ag-eJlry.

Ir::.'~1~~:tt;~:13~.~S;co~d~.0~o~I, sir. . . Do you ngl't'e with thnt?

~\.nu whereas the FBI owr :10 years has bern ~~~~;~~!l~1A~bl~s~0~I~u~ti~el v. building- IIp fl superh public relations department

l

not impoesiblc for the Central Intellig-encc Agency to

04

havo such n df'partrn{,llt hased on the nature of its work. You llgrCQ

with that; don't you 1 Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir. Sonator SnnNoTON. And therefore when something happens like

the killing of an agent, or perhaps the finding out about the raidin" of a doctor's offiee, everybody looks around find says, well. there is onl~ one place. "'0 believe we can dump this, and that is the 'CIA. 'VouI;l you agree with that, I1mt that has happened in the paot 1

]\[r. AJ)A" •. Yes, sir. Senator SYMTXGTO~. And it is vel'}' dif!if'ult for tlw t\(l'PIlC'V it!'lC'J( to

answer such crit.irism as against the public l'ellltioIlS d~partrn(,llts of tho Services, you would agree with thut. would Y011 not?

~rl'. ADAMS. Yes, sir, it is casier than the S{·",:ic('s. S(>natm' SYMINOTON. I urn thinking- about. the nSRassinntioll of nn

Itg-rllt. And the story was gi ven to the American prople throug'h the press that the CIA did it. And bC!ing n m('mhtw of tbis snhcommitu'c, I went to work to Hnd out whnt netllnl1y hnppf'IH'(l. Ami I found Ollt

tl.mt the CIA rceommendcd urgently that th(' agl'n,t ill (]lIcstion not be killed. Do vou rememher that incid,'nt 1

l\fr. ADAMS. Yes, sir, I 00. Spnn.tor SYMINOTON. Do yon know tllf' deta ils of it? l\Ir. ADAMS. Not the absolute details, but 11101'(' 01" le&'3 ns you put it. Sonutor SYMINGTON. If you had snid Yf'S, l would nsk you, hpcnnse

1 am confident-I don~t rf'memlwr whnt YOII just. ~mid, the statf sni,\ something' to mc, uut I know that your Ul;SWCI' would have been whnt you statcd if YOIl di<i know the details of it. You have no reason to doubt that!

Mr. ADAM •. I haye no reason to doubt either as vou said it or what I remember at the time. ~

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know of nny domestic intelli,:rence checks by the Central Inwlligence A~ency specially against any Mem­ber of Congress! This question is bemg asked for Henate or House. .

Mr. ADA'fS. I know that the CIA has people snch as businessmen or missionaries that are coming back from forCign countries. . Senator SYMINOTON. I didn't hear that. . . Mr. ADA>IB. The CIA hns people to que.stion. say, businessmen or

missionaries or something thnt c.ome buck from fOl"ol~ countries. But as I understand your question, I think it has to do With whother thoy spy on Senator&-I don't know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me repeat the question. Do you know of any domestic inwlligence by the CIA especially against any Member of Congress. '

~:fr. ADAl\o[B. I know of no domPJ;tir- intclligp.JlC'e against Congressmen, nor do I know of any domestic inwlligence in the Bonse that it is trying to find out something that is going on in the Uniwd States. However there is an intelligence processing going on locally within the country:

Sm.Ul.i.<?l' SrMINo:roN. ~o.u wouldn't object to nn intelligence ngoney quootlOlllng AmerICun citizens "dlO have retllnH~d from a forcif.,'1l country!

Mr. ADA"'. No, sir, not at all. Senator SYMINGTON. 'Under the organization in South Vietnnm at

the time did tho mnn who was the head of the position held by Mr. Colby have operational control over American military units 1

,.1';.

05

~;~~!::~1trlr;~ ~ ~~n't uc1ieve ]:e did, si~', in the sen,sf'- t-llat hp could D1VISlOIl to move 1Il ft eCl'tum urea, 110 ~lr. , You see, that is a very importunt illH'stioll to nl1·DDI"1 to know in a ease that I just saw that whell tliry

dU.ffilJed it on the CIA, and tilf'y dumped sOI~lethillg ng·alllSL what the CIA n'commcndcd. And ultllnah'!"

was allowed to leave the Si'I'\'ices, uut. ll(~ w:l~ ~:~;~~~~~I~a!~~~ discharged, the ~me. who ca..nied it out. I think that :Y whatlamtalkmgn,bo~ltTlo\\".

I·know what VOll art,!! tnll{lng Iluont. SYMINGTON. ,Vill the killing of prisoners 01' othC'1" ntr(l("itil's by.milit.ry units be the type of thing which til" C"J()~

Ilt.the Corps .eould j~lst order to be stopped und It would l>l' . .

II II.'" ,

[\;~~~~~J~~:~. ;iY;TC~:$;;':{Ii·~a:~n;;1;ll6;urc that he could order that not to occur If he ordered it not to occur do 1'011 think that.

hft \'c obeyed that onle rI .

. . Arc you primarily c~'iti('a] of thf' Phoenix pl'O~ it, was ineffective or bp.callsc It wns cruel'? .Primarily because it was inefft'ctive. But. also T ~IIPpOS:(,\

.':M9Upo\uJid;EIUY that. I woilld crit.icizc it for Crtwltv as \n.1I. And tliat h:" ineffectiveness. But the cruelty', I think, was accOIIl­

j2!f~t:~';~~06,tIY by~the South Viet.n(1mrSt~. rather th:lll tho ~\IIl(,J'i(,:lIl:::. I@i ~"~ll",·'".'·~'o. Now, in your tirst statement that you pI'('~eJlh'd, ,,<ll1p'>,liLIlIlJ)l'S, did not't.ake a position for or against the nomination

"l::oltw to, be Director of the C>ntrallntell ig:<'IlC('I Agency. bllt ill

;1:'~~~J~,ecimd my impression is that YOIl have taken that posi-correct?

No, sir. As [t ll1!ltter of Iact, I <loll't think I am taking tl I think :Mr. Colby shouhl b{' lIo11linatrd or sl_10111d

,I ha.ve certainly heard good things of ~Ir. Coil)), of Mr. Colby.

SYMING'rON. That is the purpose of this hearing-. say. that ,with much that you say I am in agreement.?

~~~~~:;S;;1[~e~S~.~S~ir~. ,. . And I think that the prof'ram is wry lmdl.'" much t.oo mueh of it was lwpt, UlllW{,(,SSlll'ily

..tho American people by the administrations that. \Y<'l'l'

tT"j;.m'np,rl against this war mf\n~r years ago, lonl! hf'fore. thp Prcs\llf'llt. so stated in spcC('lws to the SellutC'. So we (loll~t han~ that

the conduct of the war. The purpose of this hrnring is of this man who has becn nominatrd to be Director.

and ·mnch of the testimony-we have had mHlIY I)('oplf' recommendation. And we hnyc also had otlH"{" lwop]r

t"~:i~~K~,,~~s~ it. And I was just wondering hm ... you felt about it, bf'­h, is the basic purpose of this lll'uring-. _ . "~i<~,r.'AlD~~'~; I suppose viR-a-vis thnt fltl(>stion, I l'rally fecI ll11qn:l 11-

, whether he is a g-ood or bad mall. I-lO\\"f'w~r. I would i{.·Dlloti.ltcl< a.gree with what I was told of Senator Kennedy's position: ~'J.r!U!lJllell,,:t;h"'t a ma.tter of this importance nc(~(ls [l good deal of lookillg-

"

, ,I Ii,

uti (ji

" S . II - Yl"lI"'S ll'\\"(' YO\\ 1'l'l'Il with till' into. JIIorp than T think hr f{-'It was 1)('in~~dmH' in thos(> lJ('flrill!.,'RoJl.\Ir. 1" j;;S£uator 'YMINUTO~. 0" JUany ~ _. < .,

('oluy':::; nominat.ion. H is HI)' opinion, for whnt it. is worth, tllllt. HonlP- 'Agency? 1 10' sir 1 k I .o'M,r", ADA1oIS;I was t lel'~ 'l),earsll, £'tl II) ,'(",(I'S' "01' ",'I'I't 1"111Pllllll'l' thing w lich is as een as tl", Pirec!",' of (',,"tl'ld IlItelli!!Pllce 111'1" S <"Senator SYMING'fO,", • ."ll( 1Il a 0 '0.,,: ,1" •

II gl't'at deul of looking illto. R job lil,;:p that. and tllnt \'('''n' ofh'Jl p,'opJt· b d that you think would be a good dllUJOl . . tend to be glih either in th{lil' r(,l'OIllIllC'IHintions OJ' ill their clisupprontl ,any 0 y F 11 I I-lOW Colby mi<yht be u good Olle~ SLI'. .

of the candidate in C)uf'stioll. ",fMr. AnASS, or a, _ il just thouuht r~aybe you had sOIHe,body l'bl' 1Il Senntor S\"~[I:SUT()~. You eOIl~tnlltly rpfpr to SPlintol' K('nTlPdv. ~rny Senator YMING'IO~. ' b ~ ~

I say that] 1111\'(1, the t!1'('Ut<l~t respcct for f;pnntOl' Kf'IlIlPdy, Hut'h(> WII'~ . rnin~.", . N ... I am not runniwr

for the job myself, , not ill tlJrl ('x('cuti\"(\ hPltl'illg thnt w(' had on :'t[r·. CoHn" Ilftprw(>hn'l'.Ioi-"MSr.-,AnAMSs,r 0,_, ~1I; I huyc been nskeJ by the 13tatl', to ask tillS ~l'l(,~~ tllf' open heuring. And I wa~ mll(~h influC'Ilc('(J by 1h'. SchlesinJ.,.T{\r's Utl- . enator Y~nNU'll)}O. , -f (' Htd the Ihl'l'do[' of ( onb

l'ti I I' f 111 r< 11 II J) C 11' I tion and clanfyda Ptt'evUlO';;,s sqo"ledsl'e'IO'sll"II',',ol \\',,111,1' 11" 1"1"'(' to lllakp a qua I "' recommen! atlOn ° r, ,0 1,Y, eClluse 1', .~" ,esmger )('- . ," tly <rive or ers 0 ",,' , • , '

('Iune Chllirman of the Atomic Ener!!,\' Committ!'e a",1 di!lmore ill ,,,I~'lC,,- to the u.S, military cOllllnllmlel's/ , , h,ss t.inll.lj to put that ('ollllnittt'e und(,I' J)J'0P('I' (·jvilinJ\ control in !!I,V "" ' wouhl iruag-ine that he would ha-H\ to make a leI Olll-opinion than anybody, he did more in n few lliOnths than anybody hnd U.S. military command, done in many years. Allel nftJ'l' that. lw W('lIt illto the CC'utrn.J IntC'lIi- Thunk you. g-ellcc A~PJlr,y, "und Ilt' )'(·ol'g'lllti1.('d it, nJlf) ]i(' h,t n good mnny rwop!n uo t.hnt he fclt w~l'e lInlle(~e~8ar'v. And )1(\ WnH ill tllp p('()(,f"~ of nU.('lllpl· N 1\1' .\dams were yolt lwL'C It little while Ilgu _Whl'll illg to do Il joL frolll the standpoint, of th" tuxl'aY"r, And it was his u'D'::ina:; ;VII~ te~tifyillg!, lJi~1 you h~'"r ('o"gr,'ss""," I'('eolllrncndation of 1\[ r. ('olh" t,hnt lind It urpnt. dNI! to do wit,1t my inunechntdy prcc('.dlllg) OUl, OW!l '. .

bf'lievill,g' t.hat}lH would bC' It pJ'()pC'r IIInn f(lI' tll(~ job, " I wasn't listpning, sir, I was sl'l'lbbllllg" tIllS stuff ~o" I~. And I ,,"ollitl ask JOU this questioll, Do Y()ll kno\\' of nnythill!!"p!'l'ifi,' He made II rouple of statements Lllsed on yo~" pa~t

against MI'_ ColLy thnt you think dis'lnalifi"s him for the position! I would just like to ask you about, based on l~~" sta~,. ~Ir. AnA MR. I know of nothing'" specifi('. 110 ~il', I t.hrow ill thnt. ('(x)i(·il . 2 f his statement he says that muny political pl1~-

to show t.hat. r hnvl' IH'HI'd BOIII(>thing-. And r. of ('ours£'. ('un't tC'1I whnt ~orrl'nm did not receive triul, and that many of ~h.l'm 1\[r. Colb.v had to do with nny of thnt hllt-lilH'ss. so 1 cnn't Ray 01](> way P b

uud year5 in priS01ll1lCrely because of the. petI~lOIl

Of' the ot.h(,l" wlwth(,I' iw i~ at. fHlIlt. I 1111\'('. suilluitt£'d a n1Hnb(~r of ('om- A d 1,( 'J belie\'e in one of your statements une of till' plaints over thn y<>nrs-this is the IH'ohh'm 1 ha\,(' hrHI-1 hn\'(~ sllb· of the PllO~li~ program is that tlle jails leak, they come out mitted a number of eomplnints o\,('l' th<'- YP:lI'S to thp Al!l'IH'Y. And h' usually what happens is that that wl'y little, {)('('III'S, SO no so·eallp!1 ,t eytolll: b ttl yleakthewrongpeol'le, "'hcreasahard-fads arc CWI' establish(·(], e~~d;e had ~ wholc systcm pulling for it, the Vietcong

Senator SYM'''OTn''_ And thl'lI liS I nlHlerstllnd it anybodv in tll!' . , the average poor guy that was thrown III th~'?, fOl Ag(>IWY who wou1d he in a pO!iition to h(' Dirl'f'tor you \VOlilcl"he. wor· IIy didn't and it would be morc hkely these !-oUjS ri('.d about beeansc of the past. u('tidti('s of tllP AI!Pllcy. is thnt ('orr£'<'t 1 uSi~ the poki~ for years, whereas the hard core COlll-

Mr, AO."18, That. is c:orn'ct, Sil', O"er tl", \'('al's J ha\'e seen. pal'til'll- more likely let loose, ~ I '" t lnrl,v cOllcerninl! TIHlochina nIHi South Yietlln",. " gl'eat mnn)' iu- 1Vas tluit under the jll~isdi~tion of the ,out 1 Ie. stnnC(1,s of what I believe are fabl'icntiOlls of statist it's. und \"('r',V qups- when they got out of prIson ~ tiollllLle pl'aetices having- to do with r('seareh. And I Itn\'c gl'OWIl O\'f"r . the vcars to have n very uneasy fe(,ling about tilf1 hierarchy of tho CIA. ' SIr, CIA didn't lulYC nil)' jnl'j~(liction o\'cr that, dill And this included lIfr, nelms,

Scnator Sr~nNoToN. So YOII \\'0111(1 ~ny that· thprp, is nobody ill tim The CIA had no direct jllrisdi~tion. no sir. ~ C L\ who is fit to be Director! One other question I'elatmg, to the Congre~smnn ~

Mr, AD,n,s, No, I wouldn't say that at nil. he didn't directly state It., he unphcs-;-.lIHI h( ~(lnutor Sr~{f1\(1T():'I[. 'Yho hu·v(> you uot ill IlIilHI thnt. ~'Oll pre (PI' ? to some dcO'rl'e-that tilerc should he a commIttee that ~fl'. An.\l\ls. I have no one in mind that J wou1d pref('l'. And T Rn~y su )elTisj~n O\"cr the CIA in Cong-rcs.:-. But bused OIl

T don't believe that is a direct. attllck on lIfr, Colhv, Bllt it is Illy helicf d} vou think t.hat enry >!t'mber of the Con!!I'(':' that I think the Congress should he v("'y careful ahout tlw person thnt at their reqllest 011 c\"ery kmd of top sccret lllfollll.l-they put at the top,

Senator SnlINGl'OX, Thcn this hearill!! I!i"," ns the opportunity to .' . is It "cry broad question, sir, I think on mo;t t~:i,l:g" ill\'('stiJ,!at(' VOllr apnrehcm~iolls about past fUllrtiOIiR of tlw AgclI<'Y. is vVhat I Blean by substance, If a SE'nato~ or Con,..,1 (,-.:-;_ that correct', lllore thun it has to ,10 "'ith eollfil7nation or lack of COII- .. in knowin!! how many missiles thc Russ,ans have, alIt! fir",,,tifOn of ~f.' Colhy! . . . about the estimates, I think that. any Senator or COn!!le,,: ~fr, ADA,,", Yes. sil" Hut, I think tl,e two Illatters arc not ulll'lllnt.d. .' everv ri!!ht to get that type of IIIfol'lllatlOn" Ho"c,:.'. thnt because ~rJ'. Colby was for n IOIlg' time l'ip:ltt close ttp to the way we got the~informntion was from ~ome hypothetIcal RP) III top--

iO

~('~'OIHI part of your ~tatpfll(,T1t, that WI' had a n'n' illPIT('c~ti\.'l', \'j'ry clumsy, H'T'V badly managc'd sysh'lIl going. nnd it IJ'uln't work.

Sf'llutOI' Xl'XX. The' fpnl g-i~t of it is thnt Y01ll' f'l'iti"islIl of t!Jp pro~ g-rnm is nilIlDst rxactly oppositp of CongTf'~SJllaIl ])rinan's, isn't it?

~rr. An.\Ms. ?\Tot Tlcc(ls~ari1v.Ril'. Spnntor Nlr~x. YOII wfintpo n tig-ht(>r policp systf'ln of fill~pl'prints,

ID cards, awl so forth awl PO on, whi('h is (,p!'fainly n fig-litel' sy!oitrJll and much more didntol'inl in n. poli('.(' stut(' than thp progrulll was itsf'lf. And 11(~ cl'iticizP(1 it. on t.he bn~is of tIll" d('h'lItioll. I micht jll~t. ask you the qlu'stioJl: Do yon uC'lir.\.'c in tl,is dpf<'ntioll BJ(>thod tllnt was lIHe'd ?

~fr. ADAMfol. I (,prtniJlly think it is beUC'1' than killing' th(' g-uy. Tlow­('\-('r, I wouldn't, like to put ll1ys(']f in oppn~iti(ln to what he said, Ill'­cause I think n great dN\l of what he did say mach, an t"HOI')]lOIlS

fUIIOllllt of s('nse. S('llntoJ' NI1NN_ lInn'! yon n11 ('o()J'tlillutpd YOIII" t('HtimoTlV~ )fl'. AIlAMF<. I hIlYf'_ 11('\'1'1' 1II('t. the I1Inll, niHl T dOll't k'H;W whnt hI'

lool{s lileC'. J passed him ill tIll' lUll], f'enator Nl'~N. The first pnA'(l of ),our statf'lII(,llts iJl(1icatc~ thnt. .You

know that tllp, Pho('nix progTlIJII was illlph'IIJ('nt('d as a s(,alpel ratllP-r thnn n bludp;eon.

]\fr. ADA" •. That is rip;ht. Senator NUN::'\!. And it was implenwlltC'd as nn aItpnlat-ive to whnt

you described--. Afr. ADAl\IB. It was the nIternative to th(' pas.'"ii\·p ~par("h to dpo;tl'oy wh(,To you just, herc1pd (>\'e~'hody; it was mOTe of a s('lectin~ thing'.

~Ir. ADA"'. Yes. Ithink that is the rase. Senator NUNN. And do you consider it as an altemative to that kind

of " search to destroy, that it was in etrect les' enlel thnn the seareh­and-destroy type 1

Jlfr. ADA" •. Yes: !t killed" lot less people, and certainly it was 1<.," cruel than the bombIng.

Senator NUNN. Both of them were cruel. but the degree of cl'llelty were less than the alternati"e!

Mr. AnA'fS. That is correct. I think as it came to be implemented there were many of the problems which arose which the Congressman was complainin/r about.

Senator NUNN. lIfr. Chairman. I am thmltj!h with this line of '1 "es­tioninp;. But I would like to p;o into some of his supplement statement, nlthoup;h I haven't had a rhanre to examine it.

Senator SnfIxoToN. 'Vould you lea". us the supplement.nl state­ment and rome back at 2 :~O!

~rr. AOAMR. You menn have it.typNI up? Spnntol' SY1tflNO":lN. No~ you can g-i\'f' it to U~ the wny it is aHfl we

handle that part of It. Mr. ADA"". All rip;ht. 'Vlmt I snid in the rerord was not pre(·isr·ly

w11nt wns here. I wn~ nsinJ,! t.his aR a copy. Senator SnfIXGToN. Let's do it, any"'oy yO\l would like t<l do it. But

let ItS know what you think in the supplenlPntal stntement. Thank you. 'V~ will reress ancl at 2 :30 we will return. rWhereupon. at 12:10 p.m., the committee went into e:tecuti"e

sC'8sion.]

~ f ' : I,. ',: j,)

i' .

NOMINATION OF WILLIADI E. COLBY TO BE DIHECTOIt ('. ',],:"

'l~;"" Ii. OF CENTUAL INTELLIGENCE

, ,?fi 'I ,',,: .' ·JI(I~",.,

FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1973

't~: i') Il:.· Po8. SE~ATE, COl\Ulrrn:l': ox AUl\lF.lJ SERVICES.

lFa8hinqtoll, D.O. met, plInmnllt to n'l·l'~~. nt 2 ::1fi p.Il1., in 1'0011\ :!:~.~I,

Senate Ofli('l' Huiltlin,g, lion. ~tllnl't !:'yIllill~tOI\

Senators Symington (presiJ.ing-), and N unn. : John T. Ticer, dlief del'k; R .• Tames 'Vools{'lY, genN:ll

John A. Goldsmith, FrnH('is ,1. Sullinlll, professional stntr .. Doris Connor, c1erical assistant; :111(1 Katherine X"lsoll.

~;:~~;;;( Senator Symington. t; SY'MINO"m"'. The hen.l'ing will come to ol'dC'r . 4"'UIILS here!

Nunn, you said that you had some questions. NUNN. I just haye u few more, ~fr. Chairman.

'got It copy of the supplemental statement. ADAMS. Sir, I wonder if in deference to the committee I mig-ht

"'''rnn points that I think cam(' up in tbis morning's t('stimoll'y,

Ii\~~:~~~~~~~ttl~:r' Lefs Sl'e what yOll ha,·e to say first. IIa,'~ you l.! there JOu would like to make! That is our standard

!~~:~~i~s~c~ri~h~b~ll;e;~d notes. No volunteer ~tatements; you ll1L\,(' to sllow it. before.

~~~~~S~C~~r~i~bb~I~~e(d notes. . Then will you just sllpply it for the ]'('<'onl, other witnesses that We want to quC'stion.

~~~:J':~ Very well. ;( In the 8npp]C'tllC'ntary statement. whieh I llaxp now

I compiE'ted fl mprnorfllulum uhout 40 Tlfl~E'~ lon&::, witit'll wn~ ~~.~p'".a' "e!iew of all Rvnllnblp P,·tclN1Cf'. ~hortlr nftf'f I ilnnell'e) tilt· pnpl" ill

threatened with flrlu&:: nnd told to work on weekeud.>.; f,'i Iii"

:n ... t.nllil·you that I ,J1p'iAl"""s. The paper was killed nhont a day or so after I ha",lc',l

words, I was t<lld that the typed paper would ne,'('r see )II.\(~J.gn,t·of day. That came from severn I souJ'(,es. The thrf'nt (If firing 13I11nl.Onl /, (71) '1'1'0(1':.11" I: "

~') 1-

('allh~ the dav aftl'f I hundl'u the papPI' in. H wa;4 by ..\11'. lillrol(l F'onl, I 1)(, lieve. ~

S(~llator N U~:'i. 1 I a rold Ford 1 :!\Ir. AU.\MH. That,!s right. :--:l'nator NUNN. 'Vhy wu..r;; ·he ,going to nrc YOII? VitI he say? ~Ir. ADA:Mfl, The \Va,· it was phrased. he suid. "r f yon insist on push~

jllg' this kind of stutT you arc going' to find yourself out in tll£' st.rcds:~ Sl'lHltOl' NUNt-;. 'fhat was that 40-png'1' I'<'port? I Hill not nt nll r.1c:u'

on it from your !-ltatcmcllt. 'Vas it tuking issue with tIle prc,·jous rC'pol't that the Agency hud maue?. .

~{r. AUAl\{R. 'Vell, the prevIOus ]\hlllrr COnUHUJllst. order of haUIe, as I mentioned in paragraph 1 there, wns u. ring' of !'.i,O()O t~) 10,000. And where that lu\Cl orig-inally rome from was the Cnmh()(lIun G-~, that is, the. Cambodian Government intelligence. And they came uI' with this rin/! rig-ht after the coup which o"erthrew Sihanouk inl\fa~c I

W70. Anu the H.S. intellig-ence ,when. askeu how many Cambodolll Communist soldiers there wpre, we slud there were 5.000' to 10,000. Nobody ever questioned or e,'en looked at the numher. And what hal)­pened was that I SRt uown in May of 1971 anu ulscovereu that tillS

number had never heen looked at before, and thereupon urew tol(8tJlllr all 'avoilahle evidellre eoncerning tho size of the Cnmhodian Commu­nist militlll'Y structure. I wrote this 40·,HllZe p!lper ,,,,hie-,h ('nl~e to the fflnr.1l1sion that the numher was not !)~OOO to 10,000 as the oilleml order of hntll. put. it bllt 100,000 to 1 rlO,OOO. . .

Sl'nntor NUNN. 'Vhat J don't lIIHlerstulH]~ ure yon snying th'llt the CIA doesn't want their analj'sts to in nny way critiqne prcdolls reports? ' ( ,

Mr. An",,,. I am saying- that it happened in this particul~r rase, they ,Iidn't. like the fimling- tlmt I had come up WIth. .

Spnntor NUNN. Has that ever happened to you befom? l\[I'. ADX!I[R. Y(>s, sil"o Senntor NUNN. You nwtln you simp1y suhmit :t tinding, nnd if they

don't like it thrv SflV thC'v ar", going-to fire yon? ! ' ,

1'[1'. AD.\)[S. iYpll, t,hnt is the first time tlwy huw' ~\'('r ~:1iu th(>,)' were goin., to fire me. Tn AUhrnst lOGo, T looked fortho'firsttiJlle'ntth('l Viet­('on;ord(>r of hnttle, which nt thnt time wn~ listed fiR 275,000 mpu. r d["c'o\'cl'ed that, the Vieteong' ord<"I' of battle was didded into four parts, a!HI that three of the four parts had not Leen lookou at for It

period of some yearR. I 100ko<1 at tho three nr/!Irrted parts and callle to the conclusion that tho overall order of haUle was not 275,OUO, but roliO 000. And 1 discovereu in the Illst. part of 1 D(l6, that is, fram Ang'ust on, 'thnt e:'cry papf',~ T wro~.e Oil ~he ,suhject Wf.l~ kill('d. So I hn~l had :.:omn prenons ('xppl"lenec With thiS kllHI of hllSIlH'~S, Anel then mcntl1-ally tho CIA came to accept tho finding-s I had lImde in 1966 .. "Senator NUNN. 'Vho was pushing- the 10,000 to ao,ooo fijrurel Do

YOI1 know' nnvhodv that had' n r(>nson for l>ushing it Y 'Yhnt is the inotiye hC'hilHi this? J don't. Sf'em to know whut the motive wonld be.

1'fr. ADA1\[S. I helieve that there was a motiv~f course, ~ cnn't renlly tell the motive, hecause I am not the person that did thiS, ·Lut mv snsnicion is thnt, point ono, there was embarrassment on th~ part of'the CIA research hierarchy that they hau not looked at tile SIZe of the Cambodian Communist structure for n period o~ some I!, months, nen'I" e\'en looked nt it. And the reason that they nsslg'nC(_l tIllS nnmber

of 10.000 to ~)(),O()() wns t,hnt it i~ not that 1l.1lH'h di~~i,lllilnl' from tl~(' old IltllHlwr, the GJ)OO to l()~()OO) it just looks lIke tlJ(:re IS a gradll!d IY';P,

~ellntor Nux;\', ,Yho was the person that said thf'y wen' gOlug t() fire you now I)('('~nse of this report? ""

.Mr. AlUMS. lIn., nalllP, wus 1\11'. IIarold l~onl. Senator NUN". Is he still with the agency I 1\fl", AnA~ls. y(,s, sir. I don't think, ho\\,(-'\,('1', thnt he was tlu' Oil('

who--Senutol' Nll~:--;-. Initiated tl11lt? ,rho do yon think ",ns tlH' 011(' who

initiatcd thnt? Ilo VOll have any way of knowing? 1\11'. ADA)'IR. I hu\'CI no wnv o~f klH;wing- that. -I hn\'(~ had n .1lHlIllH'1'

of run·ins with the research hiernrchy.1\fy suspicion was tlint It w,ol1ld be ~fl'. Edward Pro('tor, who runs the rC'sPlLl'ch dl'l)ltl'tIlleIlt 01 tIll' CIA or his deputy, 111,'. Pnul "'nlsh. .

Se~ator NUN~. On dIe other suhjed., on pu,!.!c :~ of tllls~·of i'OIlr~(' you don~thave the sume page numher, I sllppose- you say:

In any case, ,I sulunitted in December 1972 n .detailed ornl complaint to the CIA Inspector General on the muUer. The IG ollielul took ll'llgthy Ilotl,~ 011 ",hilt I had. to slly.

Mr. ADA"S. Yes, sir. Senator Nn;N. A day or so later he told me that ~[r. Colby, thell til('

CIA Exccuti\'(~ Director, had said vis·a·yis my ('ornp1uint 1 "Let. tIl(' chips fal! where they may."

:M:r. AD.U[S. Y rs, SII'. • Senator Nu;-.;x, I don~t know whether that is g'ood or bad. 1 dOll t

know what he lD(>allt by that. Do you hu\'e nny i(lPfl. what he nH'Ullt ~ Did you put that in here? Does tl1ftt mean be wtlJlts a:lOtlll'r investigation? . '

lIfr. An ,,!s. I heE",'" that they lIltenderl, or at Il'ast the Illea ,,",,s, thnt this was going to be sOIlle kind of all illyestigution. But as f1lt' a~ I am concerIled it lle\'er ('nme about. , '

Senator NexN. It SOUllfls like to me ~Ir. Coil)), ()r<l('J'(~(llln ll\rt'stlg:\-

tion anu let tl", chips fall where they Ill",\", . ~il'. AD.D[S. The wily I put it ill, it SOUllUS y(~ry g-ooll, let tbl' (·hlJl:-;

fall where they may. Senator NtJ~N. 'This is in ciTed complimentary to him. . 1\Ir. ADAMS. It would oe complimentary to 111n,\ if s(~md~\(l\g 11:,\[1-

pened after that. But nppa~'ently there ,\"us llO lIl\'PStlgllhtJll ",11]('11 transpired after he made thIS remark. . .

Senator NU~N. Arc you S!l.ylIlj:!' that IS lW-i fault, If h~ gl\-yS nn ortJpl' and it is not cnnlNl out? 'Vith the, details he has on JIIS.lIlllltl, do ~'Oll t.hink that he can follow through that closely on cveryt.hmg? I alii )uq "YOJl(lcrinrr whether this is an o\'crall criticism of him 01' whetilpl' It I~ complimc~taJ'Y. I am n little puzzled.

~Ir. An'\)I~,~I fUll ~nyill:r, wltnt. T lTH'Hnt to portrny 11('1'(' was, lll' 1l!1(1 made this !'('mal'k, let the chips fn]) ""hern tllPY llIay, but t.hnl' ,,-us no ·invcstip-ution of \\'bat I was t'l'ying- to gpt ill\'l-,stig-at('~l n~ fnr as Icou1tI, tell and the only two ('hips thaL fell Wf're 011 JljP. I."1l'st, the )'rport,oi my'lulYing- n. complnillt wl'n~, out. .to the prnS('f'U:IOIl [u1(l ~h('y tnpd to portray llle, the prosecutIOn dld 1 ns a chroIlle complulI1el". An:l second in }.Iarch of 1073. I was told that I wus abont to g('t. the s:\('1.., , Sendto'r NUXN. That w'as how long after the fir~t time you \n'rl~ told you were going to be fired 1

..

, .,' '. ,

.. . . ",

i4

:r.r I'. AOAl'o{R. L(,t me Sf'('. Thr first t illl('

Sellator NUNN. J UllC of In, 1. Mr. AnA" •.. Tulle of 1971. And theIl it eallle a 1'011 II U fig-It i Il in 1\f n )"('11 0 f W7:t Sellator N UNN. 'Vllic.:h WitS about ~ "purs lafl'r. l\fl'. AUAJrIS. Ahout 2 years luter. 'TheI'O weJ'e a eoupJe of illtcrim

tIn'cats, howenw. Senator NUNs. 'Vhat W(~I'C tht'v l'('latrd to'~ "''"as thnt HOIIW othel'

documcnt you submitted 1 ~ ~rr. AUHrs. They seemed to be closely related to this whole mntt"r

of the Khmer COIIIlJlunist order of battie. I kept complaining that tho thlIlgs had been, the way I put it, hoaxed Or [abrimtcd.

Senator NUNN. But ,'Oll nl'c not 8flyin,r that )'lI-. Colby lind Iloythill(r to do with that?' . ~. ~

Afr. ADA~IS. No, sir. I am not. I am making' tlw observation, however', that he was awa.re that at lenst sOlm·body had mado allegations con. eerllJng the fabneatlOn, aud that nothlJw happened thereafter except those two chips falling. • ~

Senator NUNN. 'Vas lIIr. Helms the head of the CIA then! ~Ir. ADAMS. Yes. he was until F{'hruun'197!J. Senator NUN". Was he awareofthat, do vou think! ~r('. ADAMS. I think he probably was,' I'es. Helms had also Leen

in "01 veu-- . . . Senator NUNN. 'Vhat was your exact. job? Mr. ADAMS. Primarily just analyzing, sir. Senator NUN". And how lIIany people di,! I'OU hal'e lUlller you? Mr. ADA~[S. It ranged-ordinarily I was working by myself, but I

had at one tune ns many a5 thr('c people working for IIIC',

Scnator NUNN. lIo\\' many were ol'er voui Were you at the bottom of the pole! "

;\.11'. ADA" •. Yes, I was at the bottom of the heap. Senator NUNN. IIow many people would L(' on your level III the

CIAI . Mr. ADAMS. Most of the CIA woul<l be on IIII' level, I mean Im!ians. Senator NUNN. How many of them submitted the,., counter memo­

randums! Was this an unusual thing! l\fr. AOA],[B. Yes, sir; it is very unusual. I woul<1 point out. that wlwll

I wrote the memorandum which sai.1 that tile erA ord('r of Lattle wns not 5,OOO to 10,000 but 100,000 to 150,000, thut suggestod all error of ~etween 1,000 and 3,000 percent, which is pretty big'.

SClmtor Nu:,:,. 'Vas that your respollsJillilty! 'Vas that purt of your l'cspollsJiJlhty, to 1'p.Vlew that?

Mr. ADA" •. It woule! Imve cOllle within the "hurter I had for the P!lI)Cl' I was writillg' at that time. If sOJncb~dy nsked mc, why the dickens ,,:e1'c you domg that, I would wa\'c U,lJJcec of papcr about und say, here IS why.

Scnntf;'I' Nl!NN. Did you hlWC any disetisHions with your suporior aLout tillS! DId you tell us you wem frustmtrd bocallse 0(,Vi01l81y there was an errol' being made 1

Mr. AOA.IS. Yes sir. Senator NUNN. That is what the memol'an<ium said I Mr. ADA"S. Frequently, yes, I pointed out a number of times-­Senator NUNN. 'Vhat wus his response to that! Did he say, mind

VOIII' own bllsin('ss, ditl he say [KO ahead alld \\-rite fl Il1l'IUOl':lIHillll1 ~ \YIlS t II is IllPlJlontluhllll wl'ittC'li COllt l'Ill'y to the \\" ish('s of you r Sll l)l'riol' ~

1\.11'. ADAMS. No, sir. It wasn't nccess!ll'ily eontr!ll'y to th(' wishes of Illy slJp("l'iol'. lip didn't know I wus writillg it ulltil I II!UHlt~d it ill"

Hrnatol' NUNN, To him? ~r r. AU.\Mf'. To his deputy, who was ,also abon~ I~H'. Sl'lUltor NUNN. To the Ellsbcrg trwl for i.l Ililllute" . ..\s I 1'1':H1 your

st.utement: H,'('orlll, lIl'cH! rpturn from thp Elh;lH'rg tri~ll, I was iJlf(lrllll'd orall.\' tll:!t Ill,'"

t'lHplo),lllt'llt wifh the CIA wu~ about to be terminatpd, although en'utuull.r tht' Hgl'lH';'o' h:l("k,'tl dowH. I tUl\"e rl'u..,on to IH'lieve that tl~c pcrson:-; wlio ()1~IIO.~~'tl illY. tt'rmillatiou were tIlt.' ~allle (Jiles who wt're re~poll.';Jll!e for the fllhfll·at)(lll 01 the KhlUt'r COllllilUlli..,t onlt.'r (If battle in 1m1.

~Il'. AO,\1o[8. That is correct. ~('nator NUNX. 'Vere vou suggCstiWT he-I'D that it was the prp\'jou:-'-o

conflict. 2 Yl'UI'S prior to that that wns ~till kindling that was cau.;;ing-the possibIlity O~yOll~' bcing terminatc.d'~ ,.

?\Ir. AHkM:S. 1 cs, SIr. I am snggestlng that. The reason IS t.hat tIll." memorandum I wrote in .Tuno of 1971 was really an opl'nin~ gllll. because I wrote several other mcmorandums aftc'r that which indi­cated exactly the same thing. For example, whenthis analyst who had been assigned the number 10 to 30,000 came out WIth a memoranduHl 1Il

NOn~llll)er IfJ71 indien..tillg there was 15 to 30,000--Sellat.or NUNN. 'Vho was this ~ IIavc yon got hislllune'~ 1\11', ADA)[R. Yes, sir~ J do. I would "prefer if I could, bCe:lltSl' I alll

not sllre whrthel' he is lllHlel'coYcl' or not, to giyc },Oll--~ena.tor NUNN. 'Yould you furnish t.hat, ilnd we CUll detl'l"IlI i 11(',

whether it ought to be u matter of the pllblic. roc-onl or not. 1\11' . ..:\OA!\IS, Fine, I will, sir, Senator "IUNN. Thallkyou. 1tlr, ADA lIS. After he came out with this paper I wrot.e a length.· ..

cl'iticism of his official papcr which became t.he omcia~ orclc,r of b:~t~l(', point.jll~ out that he had used llluny of the samc t.cchIllques III tlc~Y1:-;lII~ the order of battle thnt the military assistance cOlllmand-that is. MAC V, had used prior to the Tet Offellsil'c. I had Leen. in a COIl­

siderable fight at that time before the Tet Offensl\'e, pOlJltlJl~ out that the enemy order of battle then was wav too low, and in fact when the of}'Pllsi\'c flit, lal'cre uumocrs of units which showed up in the Illid­die of Saig-on and ~her South Vietnamese cities had nc\'er oeell ill the ol'dC'l' of battle. Then I was afraid that that kind of thing was going­to rCCIlt',

Selllltor Nu"". Was this analyst that guyc this 15,000 tu :lO,illiu fi"tll'C,OIl rOIlI' level, so to speak?

<0 • • I !\lr . .ADA"!'oIS. YCS,SII',sotosPC<lr. . SPlllltor NUNN. So you wcre two at the same le\'el challcngmg- ~a('h

otlWI'. is t.hat rig-ht? J\Ir. An'\~I~.1 wOlll(ln't say challenging each other, out ,ve wcrc botlt

nt th(> same level, yes, sir. Senator N GXN. Do >'ou think he was the one that was instigating

yonI' tcrmination or firll1g? Mr. ADA" •. Oh, absolutely not, sir. He is a goou friend. Senator NUNN, Somcone up the line was~

" .'

70

)11'. ADAMS. SomewlH'l'c III' tJw JinC', I iIIIHg-illC' it, would pl'ohably bp either the h('ud of I'Pscfll'ch 01' hi:-l dC'plltr. Senator N{]XN. And {}w l'(~aSOJl t.hat VOII wOllld :..;urllli:-;c thnt. is hl'­cause they had U('<:'11 w:iing this (,l'l'onrou; infol'lilatioll. nIHI the.v didn't want to COI'rc'ct it becuuse it would Dc u(lillitting t,hat they would be wrong? Mr.' ADA"S. I think that is part of it. And one of tho rensons thnt they could g-et away with this thing, I think, is that I feel that tho administration pcrhnps---I dou't wnnt to lny too 1I1tlch blume Oil tIlt' administration-would notr--- . Senator NUNN. They are accustomed to it, I think. ~fr. ADAMS. At any rute, if an analyst comeS ont with n low Humber, the administration is not to go about beating' him on the Il£'.nd and linn) him raise the number. In other words, a<1mini~tnttion policv vis-a.-yis Cambodia is-at least at that time, and I think it continues more or less this way-the bad guys in Cambodia are Vietnamese, and if you come up with a big Cumbodianarmy, this tends to disappl"Ol"c tho underpmnings of our policy. Arc you with me!

, Senator N UNN. I am with you. Mr. ADAMS. Thank you, sil'o

. Senator NUNN. On this Ellsberg trial, then YOllr testimony there dIdn't really have much to do with the fuct that you were threatmed to be fired, is that right! ~1r. ADAMS. No. sir, it had to do with my qU(>Rtioning' of or ruther mv doubts ,about the honesty of some testimony of n prosccution witnrsR, one General Deputy. And he was sayin,tr thnt relrnse of c('l'tnin ~t:ltiH.­tics by Ellsberg was detrimental to the national security of the United States. The statistics included the order of battle stntistics of the 1967 period. And I knew, because I had worked on this at the time, that those had been fabricated, too. And Illy question was ,,.Iwther it was a Federal crime on the part of Ellsberg to release fabricated statistics. Senator NUNN. You said thry Ilful bncn fulu·icnt('(l. You mean thflY nr(', erroneous, or did you know' that SOlllC'OIlO with u moti"e had fnlsl­fied them 1 Mr. AnHIS. I believe that someone with a moti,·. hacl falsified them. I have been trying ever since then to find out who waS. Spuator NUNN. You don't know? :alt" AnAl\Ht No, sir, I have becm trying to grt un inv('stig'ution g-oing' to see who it was before the Tet Offensive that wus the eaHe of fnLricating the st.atistics. I trird in J)cl.:Nlllwr 197~ to get. an Army investigation going and failed. Senator ~u,,". Is this due to the CIA analyst again, Or is it pri-marily the, military intelligence! . Mr. AnHls. It is primarily the militnl"V intelligence, YOS, sir. Tho qIA was conscious of tIl(' fabrication nn(I wrut nlong ,,:jth it at the tIme. Senator NUXN. Yuu say they wrre conscious of tllC1 fnl>l'icntion. JIow do. you lmow! ~rr. AUA>lS. Beca use I told them. Senator NUN"-. You tolcl them! Mr. ADAMS. The CIA hierarchy. Senator ~UNN. SO if they believed you they were conscious of it.

77

)11'. AIM1Il.s. "T('ll, tilry l'UIliC to bl'lil'\'c fflP, lwe1!ww after tlli' TET Ofl'clIsi \'0 t III'y llsl,d my IiguJ'C's. S('uatol' Xll:';-X. So what YOIl an' tC'lIillg' 118 ig tllnt ill yom' opinioll if the CIA is clllldnce(l that the v are wrong', ('n'B if Olle of tlipir OWIl people tells theill. that they arc ~not willing- to make allY chaJl~(,s h(,­cause they would be saying tliat they were wrong. :lllci it would (w contrary to policy?

. Mr. AUA)I". I wouhln't say that of the whole ('fA. but perl"IJ" to some indi\"idunls in the CIA, )fy problem is, 1llo11't know who i:-: rc­sponsible fOl' this kin,tl of stllil', so ] find it ycry difIieult to IIlake a broau stutCUH'llt Oil It.

Senutor .x exN'. You said a minute ago you thought it y,as SOll}('Oll(' in the 1'('seal'('h di yision, Mr. AnAMs. That's correct. Yes. Senatol' ~UNX. ~rr. Colby is not in this diyision. is he? ~1r. An,Drs, X 0, sir.Bnt. i(collid be-und I ('(HIld n('w'r find out about things like this-it could be that the director hims('lf was aWare of this. Now, I know that Helms had been ,mare of the fabrication that went on of statistics back in 1967.

, Senat.or Nu.xx. How do you know thfl,t~ i, 111'. AOA)rs. Because 1 ,,:as working- in his office at the time .

Senator 'xlTNX, Yon mig-Itt. tl'lIlis a little bit about. that. It, is ,L }Jf't'tty ~rious cllllrge. He is not here, , ~1J'. An.\lr~. I nl!)H, I was "'ol'king in t hf' (,1.A lllldl'r un oilier!" ('u llt'i I Special A!'sistant t.o Vietnamese . .:\ ITairs. which is fin otlkc (lirl'et 1" under Helms . .Am1 I waH an fuwhst wit.hin this ollicl:', It is n sinall one, nnd perhaps has Il dozen or so people. From lUfiG, llutil a few days befol'f', the Tet Offpllsi\"e. I had been pushillg fot, higher 1lI1111hel's to descril.}f\ the size of the Vif't COllg Army. In othpl" words, I thought it was big,!!pl' thun thp ofTicial statisti('s sairl it. was, Tlll're was n spri('s of order of lmttle ('ollff'l'ellcC's O\'er findings that I h:ul illUde, in A lqr\1~1 If)~G, Wl1i('h sllgg"est(~cl tlult 1lIP OB wns !t largi.'!" fig-IlJ"P. SI:utillg-. I behcn,:. SOJlH'wllf'l'o arolllHl tJtllle OJ' .TlIly lUG7, the onh'r calllP down frOln the ~L\ V heil'Hl'chy to its 01'(1('1" of bntt.Je seetioll that thev wrre to try lind kp('p tilC'. ol'ch~r of Lmttle willy-nilly lIlH.lel' the 1ll11l1'l)('I' of 300,OUO. . Scnutor XUNN. The order came fmln w}H"re~

:\11'. £\D_DIS. This I h:l\'c nen'r I.Jc(')l nLle to ascrl'tnin, wllcre if, crimp from. . S{lnator X(lN:>;. Did YClI1 Sf'C tilt' order? :\h .. .:\PAM!4. I h(,fll'~l nhollt the Of'll!:'!'. I saw it ]'('portpd in ::I. (':11)1(' within the CIA, thnt tIle Army wflntf'cl to kcC'p the BlUuber below 300,000; . Senator XFXX. The Army g-nve the dirp.etiollS for this to be kept.? 1\11'. AIMMR. Yes: the Army , .... us responsible. S~nntol" Nu~x. The ArJliy was tcllillg the CIA what they wallted to .repOlt!

,.·:Mr . ..AIMMR. Tn essence, yes. And the question was. it seems to me, whethf'I' th(' CIA was willing to accept the Army~s number. Senator NUNN. Whnt month wasthis?

. l\ir. AOA:!\18. 'Yell, there wns n series of fights, and it was really .Tull(', ta67 through September 1967. And in September IG07, we threw in the 99-27f.-j3-0

is SPOIl,!!(' and sai(l, ,P'S, W(' ,yollid fl,CC('pt tllf' A nlly 1l1l1li1l1'r, 01' sOIlIPthing" "el'r elose to it, not ('xuct ly it.

SPllator NUNN. Did rOil :In II IOIlg' wit Ii thnt '~ 1\[", An.nIH. No: I I'Ui~ed the roof. S<>nator NUN::-l. '1'6 whom? 1\[1'. AnAl\ff::. To. first. ill n ~Cr1(,8 of nH'lrlOl'nnda tllnt. w('tlt t,o thr. Di­J'Pctor. to the }w(ul of tilr research. to the h(lfltl of ErOlwrnie H('~nr(·h. and n Jlum~r of otlH'I' offices. nnd tothe hertd of the noul'll of Nutionnl Est.illlates. I later W('llt to thp, eTA JIlRrX'('tor (1"11(,'1\1. T also ('OIll­plainC'd t.o the Presith'nt's V'orcj~l Intel1ig-l'lH'o Advisory Board. And I also ('omplninf'd to the Xationnl SpcllI'ity COIIlll'il 9tn.fT. And tlH'1l in. I think it was Febmary 01' ~r"rch of 1969, they threw in the spon!,,,,. Sl\nat.oI' NeNx. You (lid 11 lot of complaining? :.\II'. AnA)fs. Y cs, sir. f.;Pllator Nus-x. Did anybody agr(>c with yon ill th(> whole eTA? ~1l'. AnA:~ls. Yes, sir. [-;pnatoJ" NUS"N. And have you got. Hflm(>s? Mr. ADHI •. I hn,·c. But I \\"oul<l' like to submit thrm if r coul,I-­SPIHLtor NUNS". You do han', lwople that ngl'(l(> with you!" unalysis? 1\1r. An.HJs. Yes~ sir. Sf'nator NUN:S-, AlHI agree wit.h your flllf'gntion of falsifiC':ltion and fuhl'ication, I think that you said? }'fl'. All.UIf.!. T don't kllm\' \"hethel' tIle',\" wOll1d C'llar'llC't(lT'iz" it. ns thnt, but I think that they would certainly /!:o nloug with the (n<"toe-n lot of people wOBld go aIon.!! with the fnets HS I prc-srnt tllf'nJ j Y(,H, sir. Senator NUXN. And is thel'f' n. l'('USOIl yOIl jloJl't wnnt to g-in~ it in pllhlic.! . Mr. AnA,,". 1Vell. T hesitate to (]o thnt, heeame T am on the hook with

U SC('.I'C'-CY agreement, nIHI I dOIl~t \"ant to put my n('ck on tho chopping hlock now. Srnator Nu"". Are some of these prople still with the ('1.\ 1 :Ml'. ADAMA. YC$, sir. SPllutor NUK'S". "'11('11 did \,on t('rlllinnte with tllf' CL\ ~ 1\11', An,HIs . .Tune 107:3, ",'HS ",hell my ,'psig-nntioll lwcnlllf' efTediyf', R(>Jlator NUNY. Awl W(>1'('I Y011 not· find 1 l\Ir. ADAM"'. I wa~ Ilot fired: no, sir. Sellator ~UNX. But von were still under tlif'. tlirrut of Leillg fired, or ha.! that thl'""t subsi;]e.!? ~fl'. Aunls. No. sil"o It was on the HHh of )fHI'('h 1073, W1l011 Twas told that I \vas g'oin!! to bt' teJ'minut('d~ oral]y, thnt I would 6rct n. writ­ten notificution shortly theronfter. S("nat.oI' NUNN. And who told yOU that? 1\[r. ADAMS. A 1\[r. 1\[nllrice Brnst told me that. And he said that I woul. d get a written notification shortly thereafter, and the notification

lIC\·et· showed up. In the meantime I wus raising (Illite a stink, becn1Tso r snid that I tholl/!:ht thnt t.he r<'llson I would be fin,,] was 11O.<:n1l8<l of the Cambodiun Communist ol'd('r of buttle, Also, it ()('('nned to me--nnd this was almost II forIll of paranoia-that after the Ellsber/!: break that mayLc somebody in the 'Vhite House hnd ... nt the word to put the ",hlunlllY on me. And so I sent n memo to the Director asking him, hey, was it the White House--Senator NUNN. How mllny people sent these memos! I don't know how the Director had time to read all your memos.

if)

.. Mr. AIlA;\I~, 11(' n'l',\" s!'lclOiIl g'ot llH'fllOS from1llt'. IT('.did fOI'!L litt] .. IHt nftC'r I "·ll.~ tl'yill~ to find out ,,·ho Plit 1Il(' 011 the tel"fllilln.tioll list. ~Vhnt. llfl dill gC'llf'rnlly WH~ to s(,IHl it O\'PI' to thl' Ipg'a.1 ('Oltflsel's oni('('; III f~.l("!' tho guy t·hut used to write me is sitting' rig-ht oack thel,(" his Ilame Is--I don't kllow, he was thel"{' this mOI'ning---':--his name is .fohn GI'l't'n. And ho hlld Illy Il('connt. And I would scnd a memo to the Vi· J'l'ctor. And 1 sa.id sonH'thing- to the effect, Dil'cctol', wns it t.he '''hitp I-Iouse 01' wns it YOII t1~!lt. put. me on this list? Awl t}w first Ulf'>1lI0 I f!ot back, Bot frotH the T>lI'(,('j.ol" but from the legal eounsel's office, said, YOII al'C' not on the I ist at nIL

Sennt.or NUXN. i\nd \"0(1 kept t "vin(r to find out who wns tr\'illlr to fire YOll? . '" b • b

Mr. An,,,,,. And then I said, t.hat wasn·t the question I asked. I nskrd who put me on thC' list. And he kept saying, you are not on it anvllloro. Senator NUN". I am a ~ittle bit puzzled. If you were going to be fired and thnt thrent. ~ubslded, how did YOIl find it out? Everytillle you s('Int n. men~o nskmg who was firin(r you it looks like it would jeopardize your job that much more. '" 11k AnA>!s. I was annoyed, oo"anse r don't like to be threatened as Twas, und r wunted to find out who did it, So the ll('xt time I wC'nt to the Insp(>,('tor General. Senator NUNN .. So YOI~ had sort of a corollary ill\·estigation goillg as to who w.o.s trYIIlg' to tire you for almost 2 years

1 didn't VOlt?

Mr. ADAMS. No; I didn't really start tryin/!: to find out directly until.lIfay 19i3, this y~ar: I think it :vas April or May 1973, askillg who It. was that wns stIckmg Ille on tillS lIst all the tUllC or had stllek me on the Jist. ' Senator NUNN. 1Yhat made :rOil finally decide to leave? ~II·. An,D[s. I t.hink it was-as I put ·it in mv Jetter of l'csi!!Tlatioll-­a SO!t of longstanding- dismay over the fact t1Utt I thought thnt those stutlst.i('~ W('fC being fnlccd ull the time. And, inciuentally, r woulcllike to mentiull sOllll,thino·, if [ ('uuld. ut t]1B moment, that Senator Symin~rton in f]uestioning me brou1rht up the tcnn HdisgruntIC'd empJo'yC'('." I don~t consider ·myself It dis. gz:un.Ued cmp]oy('~, be(~'ll1S~ I th~nk the CIA performs a. ·very usef1l1 mISSion. r ,,"olllcln t e\'C'1I mmd g'Oll1g- back then', ns abslird as it sounds. Hut] simply g'ot sid{ of fl~lced statistics, . .And [ was hoping that till' CIA would get back to ItS Job, what I thlllk, of tellin~ the tl1Jth. ,Senato.r.~uNN, Kone of this reI utes directly-your-don't ha\'e any duect el"ltwlslll of )Ir, Colby, you ure talkin1r I'cnlh' about the whole CI A 1,"8ieally? ~ "

. lUI'. An.\1\ls. Yes; out this morlling's testimony and particularly Ill\' statement this IllOrning, was about Phoenix-- ' . . . Senntor NUN"'. I know that part of it. But these memoranda yOIl wert' oonding back and fOJ1:hl and so forth you firc not nlleo-inrr ~[r Colby tried to /!:et you fired, because you w~r;' brin/..>ing them "out? . .. ])fl'. ADA"8. I could nevel' find out who it was. ,I,'. Colby at the time Was Ex('eutive Director.

. Senator NUNN. It could have been anybody fl"om your level, right. on "1' to t.he top 1 Mr. AnA>rs. Ycs; I tend to think it was more in the hierarchy than the lower·archy.

I

80

Senator Nrs~. The hierarcby? I would like ,"cry much if you could give eOHlIsel tliosf' nnm~s thnt

you f(·fcl'l"co. to. l' re g-ot to go vote. The hearing- will resume whell ('ithe!' ~l'Il!ltor ~nJliJlgton or 1 ~rl't

iJack.· .. '"" :Mr. Adams, we npprcdntc n~ry mueh VOUI' corllinl' nnt! testifrillJ,!'.

And that will be ttll. \re wiI11wv(' the next witlil'S-'-; \\~H~1l we g(·t i>:lek. lIlr. ADAMS. Thani< you. . Senator Nu"". M,·. Sakw" will be the next. \yilness. "\n<i that will

be in approximatdy 15 or 20 minutes. r Recess.] [Mr. Samuel A. "\dams' statement follows:]

INTBOOl,;CTlO:'{

~IY name is Snmupl A. Adams. I resigned trom the Cf'utral lntelligence Agf'oll('Y on 1 June 19i3.'My resignation atmlllUI'U from u1,"mluy over whnt I thonght WH~ tho tdoPllY and often dishonest WBY U.S. intelligence conducted resenrch on the t-:truggle in IUllochiHIl. An example of "the shortcomIngs, I LJ('lIe\'e, was the muu­ue-r in which U.f;. Intelligence prouuced reports on the Jlolitical and ndmlnlstra­Uve agencil"B of the Yfet Congo These agencies, sometimes mlled the "infrastruc­lure", Were the target of the 'Allleu 1'lwonh: Progrflln. The Phoenix l'rogralll wus overseen at one time by .Mr. Colby, a candidat.e to rt"('el\'e the CIA's DItt>ctor­slJip.

Scw'n of my tpn renrs at th(' Agelley wen' dev:ot<>d to r('~{'an'h on our ndnr­snries in Indochina. My 'reports In{'ludcd nn pxtpnsh'e R[udr 011 the \'Jet ConI{ poliee system, a treatise on Communist !;uLJ"ers!ve ngents ill tilt" South Vietnnmel'e ArmY nnd police, nud aD cxuwilUltiOIl of the \'let (\)jl~(ij covert structure 111 ~()uth Vietname,sl'! territory. In Ul70, 1 wrote U leJl.l;th~' study {'ntitied '·Guil.]e to a Viet Cong ProvInce," which the CIA us{'~ as its I'tnndllrd lJeld 1I11I)()ho01;: on the Commuui!"ts III South nctnum. POI' ahout tlw~ ;n:,[lr~ I gAve thp A~t'Il('Y'~ traIning Course on the Viet Cong to CIA caRe officers bound for Vletnum,

I respectfully submit the following fltutemcut to your committee.

I'Rf;).'ACF.

'111e Ph()(>nix Pr/J~rnm if! an ('xamp1e of II Round conc("llt gO!)(' awry. Jt WllS' Ult'liut to df'~troy thp. CUnlillUl)iHt,,' polHlcnl UJiPUrutuR, but it lias not done HO. lHal the Yif't COllI; nre In the middlr or 11 rrSllrg(mCe throllglwut South Yjrtnnlll. Although t.ho country'H f:!llrful'e ]ooi(s Ilf'u("etul enough (fit h'llHt ('ompar(>fl III till' IUNt few ypars) the npJ)E'nr8Il('e If! clect-Iving. Beneath the Hllr(ll<'t:~ of the ;';outh YletJllunese gonrnment. the unra\'cillng h~ well ulong.

THY. TIIF.OnY 0).' pIlOF.NIX

Phoenix was ('oned,'pd when tho AlIlt·s' main W{'UIIOIiS In H()uth Vletnum W("rt' Americun wl\l"],lunpH, amI heul'ilY'armcd hnttuliurlH whOlw mlSHI(Jn WllH to "Hi.'arl'il nnd tiestroy". 'I'll!! w('aJlons ",pre IJItHll-:'pon~, wll1eh nil too (Jftf>1I (nllf'tl to dhH"l'lml­nnte between the {-'lIemy Roldler and tlip InnoN'llt bYfoItnnclf·r. Morf' hll)JfJr~lInt, ~hey were virtuo.ll;\' w~ele!ols agnlnst tiJP Vif't COllg p()lltlcnl l"lIdr£', who, It CIlIll{' to be reaUzed, was just as dangerous as the Vlet Cong warrior.

PhoenIx was desIgned to fill th<' gap. Copied from n British ('onc{'pt whleh IUlll Ru<'eeeded in ~IulIlYu, the Phoenix Program waR DU'unt to r{'plllf'e t1w IIlu<igf'on with a scnlpeL They key to the operation was pre<>IHe targeHlng. IIlRtf'ad or bombs-whIch kille-d large numbers of civJlians tn adtilt.lon to the occasional pOlitical operative-Phoenix's maIn tools, theoretically, were good intelligence and goou Hies. The objeet at the progrum ~'a8 to find out who amoug th(" Vletnampse population were Viet Cong cadre!!, nnd to Orrel'lt or klll them. ]n theory. arrests wpre preferable to assassinations, because n prisoner could leat! to further arrest,... and a cadaver led nowhere.

In order to work, the PhoenIx Program had basIc net"ds. These are five ot the most important:

1. A clear perception of the nature and organization of the target.

81

:!. (;"ocIlltlplli.!!f'II!'1' l'nur:{'rnlllJ.,;' !Ill' IlIl{lH'S, till' wlLl'n'ltholl!~, Hull th(' nl'!id!h'~ oC litp 11{"llllit! who h('\um: 10 It

:t A tI~lit, well-run IJOlil'1' nrgallizutioll. with ~('l"l1rt' Illt'~. with thp nhlllt.r til kt'{·p dose tra~k of the IJOllUlation, llnd with n lli/.:'h ~tllip of trainillg <Iud lUoral!',

-to All (-'1Ii('lt'llt and fllir judldal s),stt'lll. with .stout prison::; nnd a rpjnliJilitatiOlH Jlrogruill which ('ould turn rpileis into dtlzens.

0, )lmit important, llol)lliur support.. Thp trouble with 1'11Ot'nix, awl the reu!'.ou it dilln't work. waH that it!'. 111'1'41:0:,

although l'N.'ognizl'd In theory, werc neH'r fulflllPi.l in practit.."('. TilP tilvprsf' 1)(" tw{,pn hope RIllI rpality Ilf'cfllUt' so wicl(" thut. the program df'f.(pnernteLllntn U /!1\1Ilt' of stntl!;tkH, In wbleh nUlllllPr!i WHe paramonnt, and tht' ()bjl'd of thf'o ('xt'rl'i.-:c'­th(' erillpling of the CommunIst Party-was ncver f'n'n HPproachpl!. I will tll'al with the Heeds oue by fine.

TilE PEncEI'TIO:' OF TlH~ TAHOJ,:T

WIIPU Uu1tC'd StHh'~ troovs fir.;t landed in force in Yipluam in carl.r W(ifj, we wer(' uhysmully ignurtult of the nature of thf' thrcat. It was thought. thut till' uPlllkatioll of enough military forcc by the U.S. would eventually comllcl thp COlUlUuniRts to layoff. But they didn't, and the introdu('tion of each new Amf'ri­can battalion onJy ~eemed to get us in deeper than we already Wpre. Finally til(-' '!'et o1l'ellfil\'e demonstrated tlle Viet Cong'i'! nullity to get largf' numbers of tro()JI~ Into ~outh Yietnalllesp urban an'aN without detection aud parred U.S, int",lIi­geul'f' into the reall7Atfon that the ComillUllists had sonwthing there. besides !lit

nrUl;r. The PhoenIx program-which had existed in one form or ~lllother for ~pv­ernl }'{'ars hegun to tuke Herious shape,

The initial IJrolJlplll was that the LJasic rcs£'!lrch on the nature of the udv('r­snr", find of hii'i organization was f>ither undone or misunderHtuod; WIlen' the tilll(-' CIUlU! 10 dt-'signate a target for the Phoenix orglluization to aim at thl'! mOi:lt readily ayuilulJle t'utity WUI; i:lomething c.~. intellIgen('e called the "infnu,trneiur(''', It

elltl"lutU 'phrUliP long, used to descrilJe thf> non-military Ilortion of t hp.· Yiet ('OIl/!; orgulJizllti{Jll. Unfortwultely, the CUlll1llunists tlJ.C'lllseln>s had no sllcll. tcrm. aull U.S. Intelligence hud 110 precise definition of what it,included. It did ha.ve u IIll1ll­

hl!r, howev!:'r, 29,175, which had remained the same from June lU(iG,up until till' eye ·ot t111~ 'l'et offen~i n~. Although tile nUllllJer, ebang't'u after 'l't't~it haH ranged l:;iuN' Hltm from 00,000 to OO,OOO-the dffinitirllal pruhh'lll was never d!'arpti up. As n f(· .... IlIt. no one kl\(lws even now who helongH to,tlle "'iu[ra8tructurp". nnd tlil' Ilumhf'r gln'lI out oftklally in the sum of g,ue~lw~ from the fit'ld, mqde iJy pel»)!!p who huve Yarring hIt'as of whut they are (,OUlltiU,i(. It il{ ('oll('l'iva!Jlf', Hl'lilL/: 1 ill' lomH'I~'-definell ofiielul criteria, that-we, could Sl.lj the "illfl"t\struC'lure" was all~'­wllPr£' fruUl IO.()OO to II qunr(-pr of' tl million strong'.

A !oIlIlIent llroill(,1ll of who to count aros(~ fr(llll the fud that for liome tilllP till' VI{>t Con,;t'H ('overt, operu.tlvt·s in ~nuth -ViBtnnmese territory w('m not iul'llldpcl In th{~ omeinlliElh~. TInts n ElIlY In l'bieu's offict'--there WIIH ollP-----would 1Jf' ex(')uciC'cl froor the "Inrrustructure" LJp{'uuse he failed to fit tile offieial U.R, definition. Till' IIrnl11eIU W1l8 COffiJlOUlldl'11 ht'cn\l~~ of the reluctullce on the pnrt of U.K inl~lli­genre to lonk Into the lllattpr of Vil't Cong liubversion. Ifor (>xlllltpll:', In ~lay H1Wl, the CIA Ohlef of Station for Snlgon indicated on a visit to Washington hlH 1lt'lkf that th~ Viet ConK bad only 200 agents In thl' Sout.h Vietnamese goyernuwnt. Ii{' svoke from Ignorance, An In-depth researcll study going 011 ut the Nflm(' tlul\' SUKgpstt'd tbo real nUlllLJer ot such agents was more Hki.l 30,000,

'£he question of the Communist/i' covert presenc(' ill Houth YietuameRe tl'rrl­tory lJ('('nme partil"ulllrly \'exing ,after the coup In CamlJodla in 'March, lU.O. \YIH'1l it aecurred, mo~t of the CommuniHts' nrmy In the soulhern holt (If South \'letnam lett for duty next door, and lurge numberH of Viet Cong cadres ill \'ipt­nam'" Delta. shIfted from VIet Cong t.o South Viptnnmes;{, tprritory, Oftt'H hy defection through Chleu 1101 centers, 'l'he ensuinlrquiet in the Delta-.:.nlong with an upparent Increa~e in the enemy defection rates-gave rise to optimism nmon.!! Ampncnn officIul1i in Yletmun, including those who manned thl' Phoenix program.

PRECISE INTELL10ENCE

Although hard intelligence on the nllmes, whereabouts and doing:.; of ('OD!­munl.o;t cadres Is mUf'h sought after, it is very hurd to come by, Allied files bulge with information or this sort, but in the vust majority of ca~s it is either fabt· or il1('nmplete. 'l'hlngs have IlllllrOyed sluce the ('arty days of l'hopnh: whpll Olll'rll-

82

Hons IJA'lllnat Hpt'clfic tUrgpt."1 W(~rf' nlmo~t nOiu·xiiitllfit. nut tilt' Impro\'/;'IfIt'lltM Illlve lJe(~n murghlUl. antI the IUlt'Nt r(!Jlort froIn thp 11l'ld 8UggI"Nt tlu' /o,litull.tloll Is /.;etting worse insteud ot hett .. r. 111 ally eUHt', the Inl(' 1)( f/('TSOII "1lf'utrallzC't1" by Ph(lenlx is about the MIlle Ill'! H IIlwuYH WUIi; tlH'Y nr(' moslly low-hn'el :lJul of little conl;(>quclIt'e. 'I'II,e lmrd-('on> Party member is MJiI IIIl-caught.

WEI.L-RU:-.' l'OLICE'

The South Vif-'tnnlUe~f:> Xationnl Pol1ce and :\IlIitnry R('{'urlty Spr\'kl'--ilnth ot WIdell work for 1'1.lOenlx-nre b(,ttf!r now than tlll'.\" \H'r(', "lty. In )000. But tim iJUHO was 110 IOl\, tllut It hi difficult to Conl'elVe thnt tlwy ('{mid hun:! gotten worlH!.

l'he problem beee Is much more compllcuted OUlIl "'impl." low uwrule, (whldl recent rt'portR fluggeHt IN endemic lJlllUll~ the SIJllfh YI(>tn8111{'Ae ('onstnlJlllnry). The mORt trying aflpect of the situation is the Yit-t Cong'»; cOlltirllU,-'d I)t'twtrnlion of the South VJetnameHC lIecurity appnratul!. CRpturf'd {)(j{'llIu(>ntR J.lI(lIcnfc Ihut IIlIlny hundreds of South Vietnamese pol1ceuwn are in r€:'8lity ,'I(>t COil£' 1IJ.{l'lIt~. ,}'h(. penetratJ()m~ o('cur rtt all If'H'ls. A gov('rnUlI'nt nlll.up willch look pln('(-' In northern South YINnRUl In 1071 filJWW tll(~ dlml-'lIHlolllol ut fhp "rohlt.'IIl. AIIIOJIJt thoNO reporff!flJy nppreliPII(h>d n~ Viet COllg RgenlH wert> tllP ('111(.( of J)OlJt'l' of Hit Nang city. 'fhe chtef ot the poI1C{' SJ)t'einl Brnnch, and lilM IIHKll'ltunt tor 0111'1'11-tlOll,"" nnd the ('Iilef of pollcp for I Corps, The fir~t tbre(! W('N' jnllf'd. 'J'h~ InHt, nrt .. r f>\'ld(ll1ct> proved hJloIufflclf-'nt tor ronvlct1011, WRs reIIlHl'(lIy trullsferred to 8ulgun OR a pollee adVisor to tbe Phoenix program,

Altbough the Ameriran advlRory etrort to Pho(,llix contaIned no Vlpt Congo RJrents, It ofh>n "'aR of questiollable- help. One of ItR lualn Rhortcomlngs WfiS the ignorance of most ndvl!~orli ot tile Viet Cong targpt. Prior to August, 1908. the ave-rage CIA caJole o1Heer r(-"('('il"t>d no (raIning whnt RO Pvt'r In the organlzntl(JIj and methods of operatioO/J of thp CommuuIRt fo(truC'turf', 'l'hen, In late 1HflFt, n training program started "1) wldeh by the end ot th{' year gO'·a UlOse bound for Vif"tnlim 24 hours ot In~tnH'tion. Thf8 wa.'! rapidly cut haCk, The number of hours In the Viet Cong now gh'en to CIA cose otHC'f'rf! going to Saigon Is four.

An ancllJary Itrohlem is thp one of 1J0pulatlon' control. De.apite mnny ottpmptf! over the IO!lt .o.\'P yenrs, there Is !lUll no adequnte ID C!lrd Rystem In VletnuDl, and large numbers ot persons, parUc'Ulnrl,.,in the H!UlIlS, roam about wltbout the pnUf'e knOwing who they are. Likewise, the l'hoenix system has yet deVise o.s mundoliP a thing 8S a catalogue of Ilngerprlnts, If, soy, fhp T!.K nmooRElador wert. klllpd tomorrow, and the gun waR tound which nc('ornJlII~hptJ the killing, tber .. would be no way to trace the asBtlssin, trom the prints on tbe gun.

TIn! MATTER OF PkISOXfJ

South Vletnamefole prll'lonR ("ontinne to If'ak. altholl,llh not Off badly OM a f('w YPars ago. Still, the a\'erage VI .. t ConR' captive--unllkp tl1ft ('ommon crhntnnl-wlll likely go free within n fe-w' monthH. AR'Bln, one ('nn }.IOllIt to ImprovementH, but the baSic problem remaimt that tbf' accounting RYHt .. m whh·h CODlPS Into play after a I'IIU8pe('t'R Hrl'f>st Is ~o lool;e that It Is otten \'Pry difficult to t{-"II whnt hap()pI)H to him shortly thereHfter. In Mev-prnl areas ot Vlptnom, at prpl'lent, the MYRh>m hnA hrokell down completely, so that Communist prlHnnerR In fheS{> area" tn-qllelltJy fnU to go to prison at all,

Furthermore, there Is an almofilt complete In('k of n r(>linhllItntion RYFltem. The old saw that the most dedicated Vietnamese CommunlMtR have usually done tlmt' continues to have a ring ot truth, Captured dO<'ulIlPntH stili Ahow that thORP who leave South Vietnamese prisonR frequently rejoin tlle Ylf't Cong organIzlltion after their release trom ju1l.

POPULAR SUPPORT

But the ,biJrgeHt sIngle draWback to lhe PJ)(l('nlx proJ:rnm Is thnt excf'pt In It tf'W areas It lark" popular RUpport. Whnt thlA bolJ/oI down to Is the relUctllllcP ot the average South Vietnamel'O citizen to turn In n Viet Congo cadrP wllt'li hi' PJlcounfers one, "'hetber the reluctance RtelllR from r"ar or admIratioll ot til(' Ylet Cong, It amollntJ.~ to tht' same thing. That 1101, till> (>xtruordlnnrlly Iflr~t- Yh.t Cong apparatus continues its CO\'ert ('XlstPfH'(' In Suuth Yh.tnnmese tl'frltory.

83

;';OT£

t lilY lU'liu -.;t:l\ement. It h:1.!' to (h) \Yith I woufd lik£' to nttueh tl~is :':tlJ;PI:I~(,Il~efilJe~ate' fahrication of statistics. of tIn:

Camllodill, aud whut 1 uelieve \\[l~ t ~e h CIA. I mati£' allf>g'atilms t'ol1C:enun~ n,lt Khmer Communist Orclpr of H:tttl\ b~ t, r, ]) cl'miJer Wi:!, lIud I was tohl tiJ,lt fabrication to the CIA lnspcctor Ge~le~,~ ~~,~ fl:l' as 1 cun determiJ1P, lin at(!'llIpt Mr. ColiJy wus llwnre or till' all('~ahOl1S.

" lde to In\'t'Htl~a\e II\{' ch{lrJ.;e~, '". ) wa8h~lclrcunu;tunccs of tlLe fllbrleution ure liS fUII:~;~'f;~rlh hy O.S. intcl1i~,::('IH'e Ill" ',I 1'he Khmer Commuulst Onler,of Battie, I" I from ... 000 to 10.1)('0. The.",""" :, tw~eu April 1070 and ~ul1e HI71, ~II; I~ ~~:ll:: l~O Olle within 111(> U.S. intl'lll).!f'IH'I' ' remained COIlHtUllt unruH: thl~ per o( e

'C:Q~lU::':ll;t,~. Willi looking into the matter, n ahout -10 puges long. \\ 11k" wa~ ,," Junp 11)71, I cOlllplclNI a Dle~Horal~Uu~l~rti . ufter I handed thl' pnpf.'r In,

on R. reYif'w or all available eVIdence. S i ~(Itl 10 work on 'Wppkl'lIli~ f(lr kHl('tl' I WliH tilrpntt'lH'd with ~rlll?~r~,I(~~l II 1"('\.('11-(111)" wt'f'k-thrlltlJ.,:lt(ltlt

fnlurt'. I did l'Io .. --~th.nt Is ~ " ) lit. thnt thi!! Wll~ 11 rare h~stn,m'l' II! Ibe t.ourn'''u''n''e·rr'nolt~ 11)71. I would rf'SltP(ttUll~'ls~~ lltlUriliR tinH' of war for hUlhllg: :111

," bl h an Inll'lIh:::ell(,H ullul,r!:it Willi pUUl1S I

1j,e~y army.' , d from my contrul. the job of n',e'''''ht.n~ ~(3 Right atter thp pnper was ~elllo,e . IlNl to an allal.r~t \\ho bud 1I(>H'] " . COUlmuniHt Oil In call1lho~~ld \~:~'e~S:~~ear('he(} fl (ombat Oil. (BfY eOlltr:~;lt: ~lworKeu on Cnmbodin, nud W 10 i tes for SP"f'rlll ~'(>an;., 0 ten ,u,. I

Oll COll\Ulunist strengt~ ~est rna 1l' nE.'\\ analy"t "ns gi,en Ihl:' J(J\l, Onh'llllnlrf.;t on the-lUlitte-r.) Ihf' day tl ... ]" 10000-30000. The aflal),,!'1

. ' t me up with-nnm~ , " 'd In also giv('u a rangc 0 co \\llh tlie assl~ne ron;.:'!'. month" to (It·,'lsl' a wny to (,ome nil1~al OB The nuwiJer it came np

'No,",ml'.r 1071 the CIA finnlly released its 0 CI l!:'.'l~' the numlJer the anal)::;t ' , t t 15000--30000 almost pre<:, , was a runge 0 rom. "

given the prf'\'lou~ .Tune. KC) Order of Battle approximately 50,OI)(~ .~.~ ,e, Khmer Communist { tf II SUbllllt that it is pxtremeIY.lUl!o<-

ot the old number, I respec u y III of the Commuuist 111I11lary grf'utly undelst,atcs theke8\r;~I~h!oif'rnltiOlJ thnt U.S. Intel!]1!t'n( \-'

Cambodia. I \\ould rna dinn (Jon'rnmPlLt army or _00.000 Uk! to believe tbat the Ca~bo. Phnom Penh sef'nUI about to fnll. KC army l~y tour to OHf'. ~ lIl(,C t f rth by U.S. intelligent'l;', urI' suggest tbat the odds, us l~ll 0

" an anomaly. f h out a Illorf> dplaited a(~COtHlt of I ould note thnt I am in the procefo(S 0 I~Yt ~ nnd who did wbat to whom,

I W b M!lIPU whh'h will Include names, (!l, £' •• I nllt'u oral ('omplaint to til(' wbat a~JIC8"",' I Hul>mltterl In D,'Cetul>~; 10~t,: I~·~fIldnl took h.ngthy not,:, "."

llll!! ector,(1t;'nernl (lG) on tbe rna er·1 1lIt' that :lIr. Colby, tll .. n tht' ( 1.\" fad to Hay. A day or so later, he to d lit "I et the chips fall wili'n' '~ecutlV"e Dtred()r, had said vls-o·vis my comp all, ..

1,1; S a rt'!-I\lJt of I t WO things appeared to hnplJen a. (,811 determine, Oil Y

) for the D('f(>nse at the Elisilprj.!' c".IDI" .• "~'" Prosecution, durin,l:t my testiuH n~1ibilitY fll'l a \\ Hue.;;:;. My trip to b~~t~:~~:t~,mntter up to impeach my ('r~l t of It rhronic coruplnln('r )] General waH portrayed as t l~ rCI "'liS inforrIwd ornlly thnt

2 Second, upon my rf'tnrn from!Jth~ ~~l~~er{'~m~l~ni-f'd. Although l,vpntu:tll.'] tit!' . if, m{'nt at the CIA was u ou , tI at tliP lwrsons "ho propn,,{'{ Ill.' A;e~~;) u:(.'ked t](m 11, I hn \'e renso.\\ to,,~~!e;:'''I)~llsiblt' (or th(' inllrll'ation of I hI'

t~rmlnutlol1 w('re the Rfi;Uo€'t ~~('t~l: 1~~ 1071.

Khmer CommunlNt Orde 'd' 1 The committee" ill recon\'ene. S tor NUN>! [presl lllg . 't ' ena . I S k' vho will be our next WI IH'RS.

And we have ~ r. n '., n..' b.k . t tl fC'w millllt(.S. J Senator SYl111ng1:on will be uc In JUS b t to "I\'e will be tllt' tl'lIt h. ~ . I t f ony you are a Oll ,.,.

th~'~l;ol~ :r:~~~ ;n13 l~~l~~g but the truth, so help) Oll God?

84

l\Ir. Sakwn, do YOU wHnt to UCSW0l'11 in? lIIr. SAKWA. I do. ~enator XVNX. I believe you do han~ a prC'pnred stlltelllcnt.

STATEMENT OF PAUL SAKWA, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SAKWA. Yes, I do, Senator. SCllator NVNX. ,,"-c would be tll'1iu'hted to JHln~ that. brI'. SAltWA. This is ,'cry brief. I l~l\'e ,suhmitt(>d a Il1l1nj,Pl' of UOCIl­

mCllts to the cOIllllIittee, and I didn't want to spollcl thu wl1Olo day reading then~ to IOU since you ha,'~ them here.

lily name 1S lllul Sakwa. I resale at 825 New Hnmpshire An'lIl'" N'Y:, in 'Washington, D.C. I wus a CIA employee, in the clandestine serVlccs, from 19!J2 ulltJ11DG2. At 0111' 1Vashingtoll headquarterH. from Feul'I1"ry 1950 until August lOG1, I had responsibility for politi('ul, p~y?J~ologlCal, a.nd paramilitary warfare operations, ill tho Fur East, D1v1s1On, for VlCtnam. 1Yhen I left this position to join the stlllf of Deputy Director (Plans), Illy title' wus Chief, Covert Activity, Vmtnam.

I ask, respectfully, that my memorandulllof July '1, IV7~, addressed to ,lIfr. Woolsey of this committee staff on the subject of Mr. William E. Colb)" be made a matter of record. . ..

,In. tlus memorandum:r state:

').rr.· C91by '8 an unco~troIl~ble agent, 'he s~nted Jutelligenc(', 'submitted misin­formation, nnd permitted U.~. funds to be used in rlJ;sllJg the lOQI el'!c.tion jll ~out~ '~ietnum. whilehe was Sl\l~()Il ChIef ot, Station. ' ,

In th~ same memorandum,I cited the number identilia'ations of ' as documents, plus the dates and' titles of JiI'e memoranda which I wrote and addressed to the PDP, who ihell "'as lIIr.Richard lit. Bissell, J I'.

'Vl,en I WIIS infonned by the comrnitt<>e staff that CIA eould not locate. my memoranda, addressed to Mr. Bissell, I gal'e copies to the comlllltt<'e. I ask, respectfully, that these melllortinda be /,111('0(\ ill (he record. Names of thosellOt i1l1'0lvcd ill this IlCllrin" shou d be deleted if I have not·already done so. ~ ,

Althoug'h I have indicated to Mr. Bissell thnt I could not aceount for lIfr.Colby's stra/lgeperfOrm~!lCe in ,Saigon, there is it possible explanatIOn. I ltll\"C JIO l>roof of tIllS: An uIlofIieillll'ITol't on t.he IJal't of RelliOJ" CIA officers to worsen the sitlLation in South Vi('tnam so that a gl'eat~r mil~tary preseHC~ WOII]~ be justified find an early nuclear COIl­

frontatlOn \\'lth. Commu111.t .Clllna might ta~c plnce. Amol1g otherR, Child,s S. Wlntehurst (Clue! .veL) al1d possibly Desmond lJ'itz-Gerald (Chief .FE) were ofthis mentalitv. .

.1 would like to add that regretfully 'llfr. FitzGerald is 110 lon"er altv., and of course cannot counter my interpretation of whu~ he kit uUaut Vietnam. I regret that. . .

I also submitted to, the committee 1\ crit.i'lue of CIA which I wrote in lVG2 and edited a bit in 1064. .

I want to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify. And I would bellappy to answer any questions. - .

[The document refelTed to follows:) . .- '.

85

(An Im:iIue Critique uy Paul ~nkwn)

(Author's Jlote: Since tlw author haR had extensiye experience ill th~ area discussed by this article he is writing under n pseudoll,rm in orupr to aYOHl nny posHiul(' embnrrnsslUC'ut to the D.S. (JOYt'rllIUPUt. ~\.ltlH~Ugl\ this. if.; n critiqUI' ~'f n cprtnin f('dprnl tu:eul'Y, it does not coutnin classll1l!u lllfol'lllatlOll. It wa~ wnt­ten In curly lOU~ lind elaool'uted 011 sllghUy in UHH.)

I~1'I(ODu("rIO~

Illsllireu ,hy tlie ('UUl'iCtiOll that 110 outside g:roull or iudiyltlnnls ,('\}ultl oiltuiu nu uccuruLI,!, \'i('w uf Ii cPl'tuin AgPIH'Y'S w{Jl'ldHg:~ ulld })rohh'lHS wltlll)ut upera­tionul Cl:IH:ril'IH.:e within the Agt.'lH:,r HSl'lf, this arliele se(;'i .. s to IJruyhl(' Ull iusitll' ~~.. . '.

]n the A~'('Il{'Y tit(' urts or ~;t>Clll'lty, cOllc('l\luH'ut find d('t'{'p!lon h!l\'~' U('PIl ~() highly n'Jhwd Hilil uluue allllol)t iustiw:tual that BOlile of till'se pmdll'l'S ll:l\l' nlOlllf('Htt'd th{'lIlJoll'h'(,R on ollldnl )('vl'l!i wlwl'I' tl'uth IIIHI IIl't'llrn('~- m'p It (,()]ll­JUouu ne<.'e¥slty. 'l'he natural hostility of tho ,(JtiWl' ngf'llcies ·wltieh Ollcrnt.e .11.101'(' openly .compoundJi the universnl burrnucratic trlld(!ll{:y to thwnrt crlticl!';lu. p~Yl'liolol{ienl l'nctors 11ncUue tlwHe totully nlmorlx!d \yUh. Hl'l'l'et i.ufurt~lI\tioll to dittuain'otlll'r,infol'maUon, Ambiti.ous men, driv('n to outfilll more llllplhgellct' and more ogf'l1ttt, be-come blludcd to.the,purpose of operations. The eOUlpnrtllli'I~­tUtloll a.u.d-spcr('('y rP<}uired for very sw.u,iti\'c n.cti\'itil'1'I pen'erts 1l1:r~Qnuel 11011-cles 80 t.bpt tbere is n tell<iI;'DCY to offeJ:' assignments ouly to one'H fnl'nl1~. .. Lacking" a public record of achievement, n dUmlestine eml)loyce enn hn~dlY avoId becoming n prisoner of his job. In some in~tllnces the internal llleehulllslli for· handling grievuucps functions ns does n SOviet tmde nnioll-lll'Olllis{'s II rp broken ond discipline is enforced. '1'h18 is a closed SOl'iety if nut a sealell OIlC'. l'echnieal and cruft requireWl'llts ,nnd the bypnotk fll8cinution of cl:tndestilll' (JQOU'&' Bond) techniques have given the technicians a vredominullt role, dis­placing'men of political judgment in an actiYity wliere mistakes ilan the gra.-est policy consequences. . I , •

" ··It eQuid: be maintained that any critique of the Ag('llCY can be refutt:'d on the grounds thnt the author does not know all the facts. The reply to tills is tIl,nt nl)

one knows all tht' facts, there has often bE-en confusion between what cOllstltull's absurdity or intelligence and those presently in {'ontrol CUll hardly be eXlwdl'(l to pOint the accusing Hnger at thelUsel\.'C's. Fnets exist and can IJe fount! lIy th()~.;(' who have nCCNIH to the JileR oud the ,pcrHons cOllcerlled.

Unt.il r(!Cellt "("nrs thf're was in the .AgPIH'Y nn utmosplwre that eIlCOIlTag'l'd daring, new hlens "nd objectivity. A residue of daring rPllluins, a lllajority Ilr the bptt.er meu have left, and lllllCh of the remaining talent is busily j'ngfig:eu ill avoiding rosponsibility and in oS/'!ifying their minds. lnter:ngency strugglf':-;', internal POlitical conflicts and an oVf.>r-extended involvt'mf'llt 1Il Illutt('rs of for. eign policy (ft process begun during the Eisenhower Administration when there was a lack ot policy) have made Borne men giddy with power nncl imbupu. t1H'1ll with self-righteousness. -In 1962 about hnlf the operations were usele:-;s If not counter-productive or· just plain not worth the expense.

Paying for miSinformation has COIlSf'quences more s('rious tllnn a m~re wflsh! or filOney. '1'hose holding ref'l}lonslble llm-titions on the middle find )':ellwr lp\'pl.~ know that the present situation protects them from embarrassing inquiries antI they naturally prefer the status quo. As a eOllsequence mnny of tllt'~ll 1m\"(' not only lost Some dpgrt'e of objectivity but they hnve also iJt'COIllC InonllIlntely SI'II­sttlve to the kInd of <'riticism contnilled herein. . ,!!'be AgeDC'Y perfornHJ Dl08t of its opemtionnl functions with .fldlllirnldp protcsfllonal1ty j its personnel are probably the most devoted if fit tIIllP~ HW~1. misguiiled men In our governuH'llt. ItH iletklC'llciC'R rpsuit in lar~e IIIP!\i'IIl't' f~'(11Il its v('ry rnphl growth, the pernldo\ls brprodnct~ of !'l('('rC'cr, the hIck \If ('nl1.rlll~la­tlou wlUI other ngenciC'N nnd WiUI tile Whitt:' H(IUSt', fillli th(, hwk Ilf t'rh'~'tl\'I' COII~rt'~"innnl rt'\·l('w. Culturnl fJE'~onnl lind t11h;'I'lIri,I1H\1 (nt'tt'l~ illlilit'lh'\' 1

"'­

!irk,,1 jUill!'lIlf"llt: a rnukinl!' ntlieilll with nn (lhl-fn~hinlJ~'tl 1'!lIHllla l'I)l~ll'lll~.\, mentnHty flimply will not cooperate in promoting penf'f'ful social l"('l"OlutlOn III Latin Awe-n('n-nnd runy even thwurt such policiC's; 11 {'oIUmnllder in the ('old

8G

"":1r with u c(Junh·r-e~l)lollllg\· 1lH'lltnllty trC'Cjul'lIt1y ('aUllu! tlistillA'uiHh 111'1\\"('1'1\ n Deillo('ratic l:)OCillli.st nllll a :\lurxlHt COIllIiIUIli. .. t. J'~n'lI SI)-t':ilh'ci pol'llfivj' Opt'f­Ilrioll!'! ar~ {'orrllpted hy the IJllrtieiputloll or PWf(·.'lHillllul Illlti-t'OIllIllUull'ltH who lOll,\\, whut tlley are llg"llillst but. Hut \",hut tlu>y un' for. cJrnllllu/o:' thnt 1111 Ug('Uell'S uutkt' mistukeij, th~ tus" is to discover if the Jlrol)(>J1sity to .'rror 1111101 hecoLU{, a hubit lind nh;o to Crt-ute the checks and mechunlslll whereby ruost of tbe avoid­able mistakes are indeed avoided.

Inusmu{'h 88 this article ('oncentrntes 011 the {lrrors and mistakes inherent In the "",ry nature of a clllllliestlne agency to the exclusion of Its accomplishments, it IIlIg-ht Jlroum-(> the iJUprp.H8iou thnt the Agl'lI{,Y 1101 11 burf'Jlu('rntIc nlOrnHH dt!\'old of ouy Huving grac('. ThiH 1I~ not the CUBe, Tlw Agt>ncy HUll (.'ontuluH n hlgb lIer­e('ntagf' of dedicated mell nnd wowen whose main l'OIlCCru is the wei (are of tht'ir ('ountry, In some areas pletHlnnt informality peNlistH, MoreoVl'r, the Agf"ncy tr('ots itfo! empioye(~R who suiYt'r perHonnl calnlllitll'Jol~l'Iervh'f' fir utht'rwist, 111-duced-wlth II hurllunlty und cOlUllderation which IIIh:ht wl'lI lIl' emulat('d l'IKe­whprt', 'Vue the heretic, howenr, who renounce8 this religiun Jllul leuvelt thll'l order,

A CLOSED ORGANIZATION IN AN OPEN SOCIETT

8y ItK vf'ry DntUN', n clandestine agency concelliR UH actlvltl4!'H, Including its lIIistakefi. And nil lmrpallcrats tend to avoid hlame and responsibility, curry tn vor and, on occasion, accept credit tor the work of others. However, since there iH otten more than a tair amount at resentment nnd otHclal criticism direct('(1 nt the Agency, the recipients ot this antagonisDl are underHtnndably reluctant to compound possible unfairness, In addition, any valid external criticism (valid only lJecause it citeA examples) suggests the PQsHiblltty of a security leak, In thlH way security considerations, selt-defense and misguided sClt-righteousness be­(.'OUle unavoidably Intermingled,

The pursuit of secret knowledge develoJls a "keyhole" frame of referent'P in till' mind ot the pursuer which severely limits hlH perllpecttve. The narrow taHk of cultivatIng or handling an Intelllgenee source allows llttle time for reftecUon or the aSRe8sme-nt ot an ovprall political situation. In the newer nations, whpre there may be close llaison relationshIps with hlgb rankln~ members ot a friendly government, biased rpporting may result from adopting the political blaH ot one's oppositt> numbprs, and Bome foreign officials may come to believe that the A~en('y h~ a quicker and more effective channel to action In Washington, If the Agency concludf'H that th~re h! 110 nlternatlvp to a partLcnlnr policy or regime (sua-Rest· Ing Romp h"ader's Immortality and thmt plnclng him nnd hiM rpglme In mortal jPopardy), tht>re Is an element of career rlf'lk Involved In Nubmltting reportA or evaluationK which contradict Agency poIlcy.

1.'he r)focllrement and handling ot f'leCret knowledJ::e fORtenl n fet-llng ot mllnl­Aclt>nce nnd promotes an attitude of dlRdaln for materlnl from overt HonrC£'s which could implement, support or question Intelligence rf'port". The proc(>dures del'llgnf'd to pr(>vent outRide scrutiny have bpcome rfl\'erSe hnrrlerH which In im­portant imrt:anct'R scrpen out truth, objectivity and the pOl~slbi1lty of Round judA'­llU'llt, DhCUmf'ntR stamppd SECRET tend to he rN:arded ns neceJilRarily true. 'l'hol'4e f'hflrJ::f'1l with carrying out poUtlcn) opt>rnUons nlso Ruppn·IRp. the procnrp­IllPllt:ot IntellIgence, which may reflect on the purpOIilp. and f'lIlCCeSR ot tht> Rante polttlcal operations. E,'en mt>Jl of litgh dedication cannot eAsily alloW the 8C~ curACY nnd thUR the Sl1C('f>R~ of one ActiVity to announce tho fnllnre ot tht> othpr.

Herf' the lack of ettecth'e EXf'('nt1v~ nnd Congrp!'fllonnl Ncrllt1ny prompts Ir· rp~ponfollhlllty whIch results in inltiutinJ:: find continuing nnnP<"l"j;lsnry o(Ierntionf'!. Emplr{'fo( nre sometimes juilgpcl hy their wealth. nnd n R('n",lhlo r(!tInction In a unit's hudget may coml'lif'ntf' the ohtalnln/{ ot nrlN]nnte fundH nt. n Inter dntp. TIU' pf'rtormnn('p of junior OmC('rH IN f'vnlnnt~1l on tht> hn~h~ fit tht" numllPr nt nA'fOnt rP<"rulbnpnts and thp numhpr of IntelllA'(,llce dlfotl'lemlnntloll!~, Th('r(> 1M no r('corel of an officer being pr(1Il1ot(>t1 iJ(!('IlIlRO h(> r('enllllllelulell the termlnntlon ot a IlH('INII'I projpct,

Ag('n('Y I1nkR with ('prtaln comrnunl('ntionM In('din may tl'nll to Int1l1pn<'p AUl(>rl· ('an puhllc opinion In hoth their olX'rntlonnl nnd nd\'erti!ilillg function."!.

Extreme FI('Curity InpnFlllr(,M. ()\'prCilIH!illfl('ntion of fwnNJtlVf' mnt,t>rlnl. (lxnj;(­JZ'prtlted liRe of compartmentntl(IIl, the crentlon £If specinl Intpr-8g{'ncy unltH for thf' htmdllng of flemdtlvp mnt(>rial and compo!ilpd of rn~n ,,,hn hnvf' not done th .. lr honl(>work promote a kind of hurPtlucratic f'houvinll1lm and pnranoln whlf'h, in turn, f'omnllcntp or pVf'n prf'nnt coordinntlon In nrpnR wiH"rf' rf"FlI)()nHlhllltle~ ol'f'tlnn. Npw l'llonnplf'! nftf'tl frllHtrnte nnd hlo<'k ('Mtnhllf'!llf'd nnd tN!h>t1 <'11nn-1I(>ls or IIolI('y formulntloll anel n('llol1. 'flip allrn of RP('r(>('y iniluf'(>FI nn f'ujoynhle

0-01

CUJlsplrafurinl 111\\'or while. Ii! the Sault! lilll<', it 1)J'l'l'd~ suspidoll or callaht!' otH­clul . .; who hl1\'e the 1I{'Ci'~s:lr.r l'it'1I1'Hlice hut nre strall~t'rs. 'I'll(' kl~{'flerH uf st'('n'!...; lU·t!.lIot u('C(!!:IHnrlly Wi.'H\ At tiUll'S they are en'n curruptpd by Ihem,

Cluude.stine operations lnvoh'e moucs of uehu\'iur whicb would be considered imlllOrlll within Ilatiollill l)(Junilarles, Such Vebll\'lor becumes "realism" h('YOlHl our uorderN and, in the process, tends to promote indifference to moral and democratic values: there i" a COlUlHllsive delight in IlctivlUf!~ wlierein the brPlIdl of ethleul behavior CUll he justilled nn patriotic grounds. (;in'u fL COUlOlon PII('lIly, the dlurncl('r and deportment of foreign contacts hf;'('(lJue alnlO~t unimjlortHllt consldertltiulI~. Cerilliu llillt till' hollor or Amerh:illls ('anllot be corrupted b~' for­t'lgll currt'ncles, it Is n""umet! that th(' s('r\'lc('s of foreigners~wl1() hnve stat.ure ~Ild Jnt~'gritY~lln be Ilurchascd with dollars, The doctrinal procl'tillres for hil'­III" Nil IUtelllgf'nce KOUrcc would Ilresent un,.,. intelllgf'ut foreh:lu'r with 1'\'idl'lU'l' of n 11I{'k ot Uiutuai truHt, nlHI working honlil'l of mutllnl Intt'rp.'It Itl'eulIIlI ruthl'r crudl! hllHlnl'~H rellltiollNldpH, The Ulan willi CUll lJe Imrchas('(1 works onlr (or hlml'itM. '

PI':RSON:"oi'EL: Tl:CIINICIANS AND l'OI.ITICAI • .JUOGME~T

A dundeRtJue tcclLllklall I~ uue who knows the mechnuies of ('SpiOlUlJ;"(' at'cord­IlIg Iu 1'l4nulhdwd dodrillC'. HIN I'Ikill in this Urt'tt is mmally C()lllll{'n~nt('d by his inabllily to nnticiJlRte the polltltal or other cOllseCluencm'l of upemllollal (uihll'p or ~t}(.'C("HS, lIe Is t. the Agency what n dleMel engineer Is 10 a steamsbip ('om­pany: ~IH se1'1.'ices nre e8J;elltinl, but his persllPcti\'e is limited. A petty lK"Curitv iulracUon may enrage him, while a blunder of some mugllitude Illay evoke little concern provided that doctrinal requirements have been followt'd, A tee-hni('ilill has nn insatiable appetite for intelligence (sometime" proJ)f>lIf'd hy ulllimit.l'c1 rf:"quirelUt'ntslevlP<l by oUler nl.:encies). Quality mUl'it ~Hlrrl'ndf'r to Clullntitv, ~illf'(' lie Cllnnut judge the former, The proceK[; of identifying n uSf'ful pif'Ce ot'iuteIH­gencp has been compared to the tnsk of gleaning II diamond chip from a pile of bro~en glas8. Wlten everything haH been reported, the Agency cannot losf'.

10 n comdderable degree the need for CtH'ert l)()liticnl action is reduct'd in pro­I'orti~n !o the impro,'ell~ellt In the quality and consistency of American foreign polic). Even pridr to thiS happy dev(!lopment, many politi('al operations ilf'I('l1lJlf' merely.1t means of payment tur the "intell1gellc(''' nc'eind from liai~on SOnr(;e~. If tllP .Jiul~on source repre~ut{'d. a {,lJrrupt, iU€lfficient Hud unpopular gO\'E'rIlInf'ut, ~n.lbNidl('S nnd close relntlOHshll)H Iwlped to sustain the rt-'A'imc in itH dil-!llstrouK dlr(~tjon, muklng the United States a partlwr in {'orruption and {'olllpli('nlillt:: h''''r, efforts at retorm. If su{'h rf'gimf's are und('r pre~S\1rf' l)y the AlUeri('nn Ambnssndor to llU~tltute reforml'l, high level omcinl~ of thf~ TI'~iUle muy nnll II

t-Iymllathetic nul' In flU! II(,rsou of the rankill.u: Agpn('y officer present. In ililflition to the olnrlous cOlltU/iioll, SOllW Yery wf'lrd intelllg-ence r('porting mlly result from the lUuintenanc(' of this ",'Hal" liulson,

Sil1(,(, the Cold WlIr WitH tllp mnin ju~tiflclltion for the creation nnd rapill px­Imnslon ot the Agellcy and .since the pnd or thc Cold War (a prosp{'ct not Pllsily CXJlerh'd In 1962) would relUO've its raison d'ct.re, there appears to be nIl uncoll­('i01H~ hlns fal'orillg- uction which could aggravnte what is mostly II politienl prob. 1f'm to the point whf're t1H'r{' l~ 110 choice hut 10 IltlOl't pllrnmilitary m('llsUrps, III1Imti~nce with Hnphlsticnted liiplomucy and illdinlct political aetion fllll()\\'~ from the fllct. tll1lt the (>lIl:'lllr IIIIK lllally a(]vunta,l.:'('s ill this g-alllf', as he ha.ol. in ('011-"pntioun} diplomacy, 'Vur I", War, and in n WlIr one tlOl"f'! not qn('Ktion til(' f'hnr­nct('r of one ~ UI1l{,H. "'hnt iK ofti'll mis.<;llIg, howC"l'er, ilo1 nn lIndprstandln~ of the­IIOJltlc'nl Rnd Hodnl factors wh!(,h mnk{' JntPl'llal ,<;ul"'el'~l(ln find ",rnrfllfl' SI](',

cClo1/olflll. The hnlo of fltrldellt nnti-ColllmuuislII blluds til(> c'old warrior to til ... fllct thnt his Ally nwy han' crf'lItpc1 and fostf'rf'd Iht' ]1r('(,OIHliIioIlR for SU('('I'~~f\l1 11lh'rlIH1 '('onlllct. In the Pri1('t'R'I of hll;\,lng uff('ction we l()~p thl' re.'lped of Ollr nlll('s unci thf'), mny 1m.£! tllI'lr tprritorh'R, ,'1')l(' A~f'n('Y'M opernUolllllur""l re~NnlJlf'R Ihl' haronllli sysll'lll of 11th ('\'ulnr"

J' rllII('P: f~hnll!.tf'/,j' In ('OItiIlUllld Rrf' rf\fern'j} to IIH n gnllIP of IIlIll'4knl ("IUllr!o1, Rl'lliu'r olll('pf')ot who flll(!11 Importnnt ~lotH teu Yl'nrlo1 11g0 f.ltllI rf'tnln til£"! f.llllllP or sllllilllt pOliltloTlR. Interrupted at times with ours to the desirable 1orf'lgn POf'lts. In con­trn,Ht, the Fo~('IA'Il/=tprrl('e rptlrf'fot 1010111(' Nixt)' to.niTlPty mf'11 n ),f'nr, mostly from tlu. !'I('nior If'\ ('I. I erp('tuotiug- tliPlUR('lves III oJIi('(' find ('uitintiuj! pf'rROllfil tif'lo1 tor Ul'{'r a dE'(,Rde, th('se offi(,prs inevitahly de\'f'lop proprif'tnrv :tttitudf's find the al'lfHUlilltion that lonti;'{'\'ity In a lo1pnior pOf.lltion mnk .. H for' llnfif'!AAlIah'(> jllrl~­Ill(>ut. IU('('lltlve Is rf'd.UCf'd. ll(,W ideas are not. Pllcourngf'd Ilnd ~tereotyped o'rlf>ra­tionH reflult. Old trielldshipH tend to fo;upers('de 0Iwrntional Ilf'ces~ity in a cloRf'(l

88

~och·t\' ano tht> ~nm(> of baronial politic~ more than ndel)untel:r fullllls tlll" gOMIIl ~f><:Jllirf>m{'nt."I of the A~en('y.

'VIWIl irlcOmp(·tf·ntH IIchlf>v~ t)(JSttlollR flf authority (111'1 tlwy will In nl1~' ngf'ntv) fl('cnrlty Jlro('(>dnn~R (~nll ('oll('enl their JIl~omp('t(>n('f' 1\11(1 f'rrllr~. ~\H'h

indlvtdn'nlR hp('ome ndt-Jlt ot nOisily nlltl~Communlst-nrul ofh"l) \H~('l(·I'f;;-l'PN· attollR. (Hurely 110 ol1e will crlti('lse the production of nnt1:('o~l.nunIRt l~rnl)nj:!'n 1111;' ven if It iR dull and unreudahl('.) N(>w idNHI and illln~lIlntl\e mllHls nre> JlltoIlI­~nhlY r('~nr(l('"<1 fiR n thr('nt to iucomp{'t(>ntR. AHflignmf'ntR ar(> mneJe h:<-' thf> npf'r­RtJn~ unttR nnd ",1I£>11 nn nffiC'ef Tf>hlTIiH from n fipld POl'lt h(" may wnlk ttw hnll;! tor monthH'if the 0111 Reho01 tip fnt1!-! to m('et slmilnr co]or.".. This pro('('dnrf> mny bf! ('ontrlll'lItl'd with thp Ollf" In f"Jl'C'ct III til{' l"fItt'l~n ~rr"It'('.

Thp. Agencv hltth('lv nfol~nmNI thnt clnnd(>stin(' trainln~ pro,i1H'NI Inhor (,X)lf>Ttloi nnd offlcel'R with polltltni judgment; 'where- nfl no onr would f]rf>Rm of p:xp('('t1n~ tlit> same"proc(,~R to produce ott(jrn(>~'~ and \'lolinIHtA. CllHuh'Attne f'xp!,rtlsf' t~ <,onfUFle-d with profi('len('y' in othf>r fif'l"~. Dhulaln for f>xt"f>rnAI C'riticHml nnd dlf:courngement of Int('rnal dhu;,ent preYentA anyone from saying that the ('111-}leror or Ollf>ratlollul lIa rOil 'ha~ forgotten hl~ clothe-/>!,

. ',:" Cn'ITICIRlt A~U 'LOYALTY,

'~e l'~~~ o~ ~md('r9t~n~t~rA' nnd,~'~p~('ln'tlon on 't~f! pnrt ot othpr Ilge>nC'h's, 1)111<; the tlm94colllmmln~ struggle to 'gain at'titlle4J theIr ncqnit>flf'IlC'f" for even tlit> mOfl;t necesl3a.yy',ahd obvlou8 operatloliS hng crt>at~ A.'mentolity'whlch 18 SUl>erf'lt>~IMlttve­to' any kind '<'il,~rtt1~lAm; 'ThtH' tncJud~1 conAtnlcttve' efittci~m, the·function mORt need~j''()uts1de''("ommltteeB'and groups'wlth authority to 1n6'nitor AIiCPhcy orttvi­tlee nre'lnevltablY'-re'garded sA'o'potentiol thrt-at. Rlnce rPt")l1lI'Pd fll'<'llrlty l,rnC'­tiees are I beFIt , obtained' from 'l"xtenRlve ltrntning and <'onrlltlonlng, thf'J'(' 11'1 nn understandoble relnetnnc& to 'Imps:l't'vltol ond controv('rslnl' s('crf'ts to vhdtln~ AcholarS and' mll1tar:v,typeFl: There'bl the rf'nl posRlbility thnt HOlne Ilf'f:'tollality wlll be unllUlYi1lhocke..li,y this prperience, Innsmlwh n~ tllp.Agency FlJll"Mnll~PR In thetart~h:Jt dece~Uon 'it Is not" difDeult to dazzle the unlnfttntM visltol"f'l "tth n rouple of good'spy stories,' It Is relatively en Fly to Illute nIl ('rltll'lsm by ac10ptllllit the pious posture of lonply and selftefl$, de(licntion against n dlahollcAI l'Jlemy whose evH 19' only imperteetly ullder~tood ("ls("where tn th(" Ilovernmt'nt,

, The Inverse pride in anonvmlty and the t'xtr('me r1NlIC'ntioll r(>(]\llrf'tl for tht:q profe~81on forces the A~ency to act like n Fltnte within n l'tntp. ,1olnlng th(l Age-ncy'IR Uke taking holy orderfl for-1if('. IIhdlt'r loynlty tn It rnth<>r thnn to thl' gOVl'nlme-nt IR n refll"x phenomenon, CIRncl(·~tlnely Ollf'rntln~ rPNon,,,'l hlH'f' no puhlie r('eorrl (nlthough thpl"C eX{RtR An offil'P to hplp with thl~ prfJl,If'llll, then> ('fin- tie no aplleal for outRide umlerFitnndlnl{. Th('rp nre ~('\"(lr('ly l('~q('n(l~l ollllortnnttiPR for E'mplo:t"m('nt elRewhpre> !'iince Ol}f> l'nnllQt ilro!olcrlht>, pr",'lollq t"mplo;\'mpnt p:xperiE'nce, R('signeC!'" nre stamped ns rNlegnilE"fl.. Tl,Pl:'p mostlY' In­herpnt conditiolll'{ discourage dorlnfC and diRRent, OfficerR with tnmlly rf'f.lllOn­Rii.lIIUeR -who IRCk 0 private Income nnd are not. Idf>ntlflpfl with till' originnl ORS and FBI e>irmentR, t(llHl'to del!enernte Into thl' drOIl("R ~tE"wnrt AJ!"'lop once cJaime>d thot he dIsconrNllu the Dcpartment of Stote,

CONCJ.UBIONfJ ANn RF.CO){).fF:NIIATlO~fI

Those who Rre acquainted with the Ag(,llcy'"" r(>Rpon:-:lh11lttefl, nc('oOlpH:'!h­mentR ond rledlcnt('d personnf'l wll1 not qUf'FltiOIl the vital role it mllf~t contlnnp to play In the nntional sf>cnrlty. Othpr spokel'men for the Agpncy wlll {'outimlP to justlfv or ('ven JZ"lorttv It. This nrtlclp he n crltlql1(" hOllPfnlly nil llOnPFIt nllil com~tructtve OIlE". rrhe- Agency'H dlfficllWeR are hullt Into tli(> FlYHtPIll nlltl go back Aome nftpen ypnrR. It hl1I'PRllcTn<'l(H~ have th('ir own InWR" lolitlc nnd pnrpoHP, n clnndestlne burpnucrncy wonld chulll"n~e even Mr. PnrkluFlOll H (lpflerlptlon.

'The weoknt>HRt'R of the A~ency rl"sult from ItR VE'ry rOlllE1 ~rowth In nn nrC'n where (>::I~rtIflP luu} to he R(,(]nlrl"il the hnrd way-hy ncCt'JltinJt rlHkR nnd hy RctinK swiftly where othe-r ngl'nclf's wprf' ullahlp or 11l1wll1lng to nct.

Tbts rapid (>xpnnflion placf'd mnny young men Oll \I)IIIE'I' proteHsionnl 1{'VC'lftl whpre thev have rpmalnecl too lon~,

Ne<.'essor" seellrttv procedurE's tn the clondPRtlne opprntion or('n have all but sealed openings to the healthy 8unll~ht of ol1tJlide NtticJFlU1 flnd to Important realities. Tlu:~ receipt of some unwarranted <,r1tlcISU1 bRR eliminated receptivity to any crltlclflm, I I ' The lack of Olltfli<1E" Rcrutiny ond the nh~("nce ot n conrt of 'oppe-a 1'f'rlt1 f("A that the internal mechanism for hnndling ~r1("vRnccs-where so much Cfin be-

('ouceah:d for 1:10 luug:~fllllelivll witll the higlH'.st iutcgrit;'o', \\,ldle this llludlill!,'ry hus 11!,'rfu1"uH_'d lllUII.\" useful fuw.:LiUlIH, It htl::; alsu Hetl alld eXt'r{.l'd gn:nt 111)\' l'r lo Il1'u!l'eL Iti; iUlluedliilc II1I1S(L'1", the ... \g-eue.}',

'l't'ehlliefll fL'flUln'luclils of tUI UIlfl!:H1ul lll"U1"l'ssiull hure lllal'l',l 11 llrelllinlH on clUlIUt'stiuc c:xpertist', reli.-!!;lltillg to u n:ry :-;ct.:OUUUl",}' plact' tOe fOl'~ig:u volh-y S'CllUitiitc of foresigot, lllllit.:il)UUUll, aud ::;uUlul 1loJiliml judgmt'llt, 'nll! Agl'IIQ" wake::; policy Ly the ::;iwpie expedieut uf ::;uulUitLing II V1"01)0::;ul fur approval ill IIU

lueu wllt're IJolicy Ii:! ulll'leur or nOll-existent, Its lJil"t.'ctor, wllLl vlays a .llel'Jin­like l"ull.', till::; ill the lllghe::;t coullcih; . .\11 A,.,:sislulit ~el'rl'tal"y of ~tute will Hvt eOlltrutl1<:t him, ':l'hc .\geJley, lilw lilly ugeuey whit-h twillS to ("uny out flJH'igll IJulky, Is L'upl1ule of lUodlfyiug it aud of {II\Vai"tillg it,

Tlle l"curg:uniZlttioll oi tl1e .Agt.'lIl'Y, UIUll'l'lal,P!l lJ.}' llwsl" wLo have lJl'rft'l'Il'd lhe gUlUe of lUuHil'nl elmirs, re::;uLts ouly ill U YUritltiol1 of the ::;Ullle gUllle-lIlll.-.;i_ cal otlh:e!-J or otller unils-Iea vlug tlle llmin }JrolJlelUS uurcsoiyctl.

All thetic fUdors han comlJillt-'tl ill such a way thut the Agency's capacitr tv luuke lll1stukel;i hus LecolUe illiltltutiollu!ized. AllY attempt to rellledy tJJis grun' /:iitUUtiull llllli>t tltke iuto account tbe cuurwous lJOwer wielded oy this Agcllc.\', ~ccrct kuowledge Is secrl't vuwer, Utber agencies lIlust contiuue to coontiulltl' wltl.l H I1l1d Uluilltaill its cOOpt;mltivt:'ucss, It bUB Yu::;t legal, political llull lul;itltuUollalllukl:l null power, It blli!! sougl1t lUHl gaiDpd {\vit11 110 evil inteut) till' cuvperuLion or n ll4l'ge llUllillt~r of illlportuut iudividuals and. organi:o;atiolls, ill 11 reslJOn~e to patriotic Ilel.'<.ll:l, 'l'bese vatl'iots are lluturally relUetuut 10 Sl~ frlendl:lhips, luOJs, pu::;t activities anu evell the liuerui t'stulJlisilUlent qucsliullPu. In OilY c\'ent, it tlVpeurs tuat st!ntiUlent is grow lug iu the CUllgr('I-JS for U strollgel" rC\'iew fuuction, :Such efforts might find some guidance in the foUowiug l'l'C­olllUlelldatiollii ;

::lellior Agency officers must have unqualified loyalty to the President uull should have demonstrated fOl'eigll policy views which are ill COIH!ert with if nut identical to the views of tbe President. In turn, these otlkers I:luould have full IJresidential support in fending unjusttiled attacks from other agencie~, till' !Jrekls nud the 0011gress. :Since it claims to Le u clundestine Ilgt~ncy, it ::;houltJ llot tlC'ek pullllcity, 1f senior officers are permitted to lecture, write aud relt'llse IJo.pers concerning the Agency, then every pre:sCllt and former elllploYeB is justi­llt'd in doiug the t>lll1lC, including the autitOr,

:SInce clandestine activity and its inevitable fnilures are of crudal COll(..'f"rn t(J the ~uccetiti ot foreign policy, an oujecti\'e monitoring element !:!hould ue intro­uuced, ~'bree fUIlCtiOllti nre required: supen'isioll uy n Killian-tyve cOluluittt'l' under t11e }Jxecut!ve, a permanent physical link with the Department of :-1t.tlte, unll the creation or Ii Joint Congressional "watchdog" Committee to ovenwe its operations.

(a) The new Executive Committee would consist ot a member of the White HOlUle :Sma (with access to all Agency fllcllities at any time), experiClleetl officers from sIster agencies and two nOll-goverruuentai representatives (Il\,oldiub" localiustltutiolls ha ving links with the Agency) who reside in or near Washing­ton, D.C., so as to l.lt"rmit frequent inspections,

(b) The link WiUl the Department of State would consist of twelve careflll:r chosen o1J1cerH from StIlte wllo would bave desks lu both agencies, covering Ideo­Ucul geogralJhlc:;ul or functional area"" who \voultl 11l1ye access to nil AgCllt,y lIla­terial in the areas of their assIgnment. This would be It two year assignlllent, wIthout prejudice to conSidering the officers for promotion oy State iu the normal lapse of time, This lJriuge would provide a secure window to und for a closed support orgnnhmtion, oud It would tacllitate cooperation lIetween two ageucies which waste much tillle thwarting and detesting each other. Present liaisiou nr­rangements cannot perform these functions and these fUnctions would not he It

l:Iubstitute for ulll)resellt lialsloll llnkl;i, '!'llis secure non-Agency scrutiny III dl'l,th would prouuce automlltic presl:lures ou the mOl:lt seriuul:I exlstlug dellc1ellcies,

(0) It .should lJe made clear tllat tile Agcncy is a foreign sUlJ!Jort ugellCy of tIll' Department of Stnte and that tile Director of tbis Agency Is of lower runk untl lJowcr tllllll Ule-Secretary of State,

(d) Agency opernUolls in the U.S, terrItories should be reviewed oy the Ex­ecutive before PDsslllle illegaUty is eXl)()l:Ied by tlle Congress,

(e) Although the Agency falls under the authority of the PreSident, this re­sponsibility cnu be a political and policy liability, 'rhe Agency tends to lie a power unto itijclf uuu U.S, Presidents llave felt ooUged to select as its directorH-ad­mlrals, generals, individuals who are not olways best qualified in the areas of foreign policy, I'resident Kennedy faUed to control this Agency because be and

llO

hifJ ndviflon; fnUed to npllolnt to it nnd protl'<'t wlthill It tI\(' Illcn who m'n- 111,",,1 to him nnd dedicated to hlg foreign policy obJeetIn~. . '

Sen.ator Sy1'tllXO'fu's" (presidillg).l\fr. fo;nkwn. I 1I1ldel'stnntl rOll "f)l~ untanly contueted t.he <.'omllliUeo oflice I1Il(I tlH'1l m(>t with t.\yO staff members and left the JIll'ITlOrandUIll thnt sl1.i!(~f'!-it(>d WI:' obtain ('C'rtnin d~u~(mtg pcrtnil~iHJ! to the period in \ylii(·,7 :\lr. Colby wus statioll ~~}uef ]11 S!l'lgon: JS thnt (,OIT&.'t? At that tilllP-we f\l'e pnrtif'lIiul'lv ~1~teI".est'P;d In In~l-yoll were a. CI A ('mplo),(-'(>, SlIPt'ITisillg ('O\'(>;J't ncti ,=_ Jtles In South VIetnam? -

Mr. SAKWA. Yes,sir. Sena!or SYl[lNO'l:ON. Did you hn,-c prior C'X}){'l'j(>lI('e in Inuo.Chinll.? ::\fl'. SAKWA. No,slr. Senator Srl\lING'IUN. Among the materials you suggest{'d we requpst

from .th,o CIA are 31 do('umcnts w~li('h rUl~ Lo d~'~('ri1Jed as in('oming­Illwl~lgcnce reports from the field; IS that rl/!ht 1 I hose doeumonts lire elnssllied; are they not'? Hnve you requested a declassification of tholll /

Mr: SAKWA. I don't know how I will go about, it, hut I think it is a good Idea.

. Senator SnlINoToN. Do you have copies of them yourself! Mr. SAKWA. No, I don't. , Senator SnnNoToN. Did you submit them to the committee! Mr. SAKWA. I suhmitwd a number so the eonllnittec could obtnin the

docwnents and review them. Senator SY~{INOTON. The CIA hilS furnished all those reports to liS

now. !n ad~ltJon you sug~sted the file nllmbe)'s of 70 other documents, both IIlComlng nnd outgoing- ~l'affic. Anu in three instanccs you sug­gested that we IIlso request rephes; am I correct?

lIIr. SAKWA. Thllt is ri/!ht, sir. . ISenator SYMINGTON. Two of the d?CUlnf'llt8 sllpplif'C1 in re-sponse to

J. o~r nun:tbers refer to oth(~J' countl'lf'S, and one could not ue found. It IS pOSSIble that some of your reference nlllTlhers were in error?

lIIr. SAKWA. That is possible: ycs, sir. Senator BYMINOTOX. In addition, you snl!g'C's~('d that we r(,({u('st fh·c

memos whIch you wrote as a CIA elllploYl'e IlL tho June-December period of 19G1; is that correct i -

Mr. SAKWA. Ye.r.;,sir. Senator Snn,:wTo". The CIA wns ahle to sUPj,ly only one of those

mcmf!S, and officIal:;; belIeve they may have JWCll HlIHl'cnl'l'ieu or han­dled III sueh lL way thnt !,]wv were not lost. Do I eOlTectly unders!u",] that when the stafl ad\"l""rJ you of t,]IlS you wem uble to supply the five rnp.mos? .

~fr. SAKWA. YC's, sir. Senator SYMINGTON. You left O)W Ilddit iOJlu114.page 1'I1P(,1' with our

staff when you met with them i . ~fr. SAKWA. YC's, sir. Henator SYMIXGTON. Does this summnl"ize fairly the materials YOIl

have sng-gestcd for our rc\·iew? ~fr. SaKwA. Yes, sir.

. Senator SYMINOTON. 'Ve may htlve some difficulty ller. in open ,<,s­slOn, because each of those documents, with the exception of J'our un­dated 14-page raper, is .classified. In your ",?vering memo to our stnIT you say thllt th,s collectIOn of documents whICh we hllve now ohtained to prove, "Mr. Colby is an uncontrollable agent."

01

"Thnt (10 you Illeallby that? :Mr. SAI{\~·A. I llH'an'hy that. sir, t,hat h(' Hrt~ with a ('crt:lin Haillboy­

HIlC(~ wl!ieb is l)(>l'linps (ypical of the older OSS ~\'oup, ,,:ho \\'~'n'. nll­

douutedly very tn-lcnteu U1Hl brave men, uut who iorlll a klIHl.of ('II(I'H' in tho Agency. They go way back. And tb('y wpre Iwrfol'ml11g- thr:-:(' fllneti,:ms during World 'Yar II. And they do fn'~ wheel. I. know th.~re W(lI'C t.Im('s when I would !Hlt1l'(,ss fL- cable to thp ( IIH·f of :-;.tatlOll. ~.II­g'01l, thllt is, to Mr. ColhY •. Hml all the callIes WPIlt I.Hlt- frolll 'Yf~shingttlIl hnu IJ..I>ll{ nmnbel', that IS, they huye the fluthol'lty of thl' ])lre\·tOI' of Central Intelligence ---_ ,

S(,Wl.tor SYMINGTON. Vo ~'ou kno\~' ~lr. ColbY.I)ersOJ~al1.Y.? . , ~Ir. SAltWA. No, I met hun Oll('e 1Il Hog-PI' III I III !ll\ S.OnH'l~ III :::-;tah'

years u:,!o, amI I think that is the only time.l haY(.' llothlllg persollally llgainst him. . .

SC'IlUtol' SYlIIINOTON. Yon haye nothing pel':-onally agalllst IUIll'~ :Mr. SAKWA. No,sir. Senntor SnlI,NGTox. 'Vhy did you lel\,'o the CL\? Mr. SAKWA. I was forced to IClLYc . There is another circumstance which I hflye not yet prescnted to the

commitkc. I don't think it ~\'ould be propel', as YOH pOlllted out, unlp::::: I gi ve you 11· few <1n.)"s. w:lrn~n~ on tll1S~ ~ut ~ would be happy t~) .l"i.'l:.'te that to you, because. It IS sll1ular to tlus. 1 here were two storH'S lil­

yoh·oo. One was the Yiotnam stOry--Senator' SYlI.II!'JGTON. Go ahead, what£~\'er you have in yonr mind,

let's hllve it. . Mr. SAKWA. Well, I wasn't prepared to cOllie alit with this at tlllo

ti~ , 'Senator SY:~IIXITTOX. You say that ~fr. Colby, who has bern JlOIllI­

nated for the Director of the Central Illtelligell{'e ..:\~ene'y, is an lIlH'OI\­

tJ'oJluble ugent. And that is [J.. pn~tty serio liS indict.ment. lIr. SAKWA. Yes, sir. . Senator SYlliNGTON. You have ml.Hle it, and you l1u\'e m:Hlc It p"l)­

liely. And therefore I ask you if you a,re in elfeet 11 disl(rllntled dis­charged employee, or l~ you hn.ye reSigned .and JOu want. to help. Because it takes a long tune to build a reputatIOn, and you ('all destToy it overnig-ht. I would just like t.o know your background and wh~' you left the CIA inasmuch as you h,we asked repeatedly and tnlke,l to a lot of people :,round town about this situation. and you asked t.o tl'.:-tify, and you nre, here.

:MI". SAJ{\\",\. Okay. sir; if YOH want 1ile to I will be \'er,\' hnppy to explain thnt. . . .

SellittoI' ~y::\n~·(lTOX. You would know wlH'tilel' It \'lohtl'S sP('unty arnot. Hut. I just fiske,l you why you left tho CL\.

JlII-. SAKWA. All ri/!ht. , I dOll't )u\.\'O tIle t'xnct dnt('s. hut, 1)('r1Ial)S lll'OlllHI-whrll T \\";lS stili

working in tho Far Enst division I had. prC\'iously worked i!\ tlw I~I­tC'rnnt.ionnl 01'g'nnizlttions division for Cord ).[l~yl'r~ .11'., who l~ HOW Jil

London nt OUI' Embassy there . ~~nlltor SYl'III~GTOX. I didn't h(,fll' yon. )1r. SAKWA. Cord )1eyer, Jr. I had worhll for ,rhat they ,all IO

divisiOJl. . Sl'lllttor Sr~[J~GToX. You say h('. is now ",11C'I'(,?