Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Case Digest: Lozano v. MartinezG.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986 FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.

YAP, J:Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality.

BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the draweebank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by thedrawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check.

Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.

ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt.

HELD: No.The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.

ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract.HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state.

ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause.HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary.

Tiro v. Judge Hontanosas (G.R. No. L-32312. November 25, 1983)18AUGFACTS:Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Superintendent Tiro because the latter forbade the formers collection of salary checks of school teacher from division office, following the issuance of Circular No. 21 s. 1969 by the Director of Public Schools. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of attorney and to declare Circular No. 21 as illegal. The trial court ruled in favor of Zafra. Tiro sought a petition for review and reversal of trial courts decision.ISSUE:Whether or not Circular No. 21 s.1969 is invalid for being violative of the non-impairment clause under the Constitution.HELD:No. The circular is valid and enforceable, and is never invasive of any contract. Petition is granted.RATIO:The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands on firm legal footing.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-56450 July 25, 1983RODOLFO T. GANZON and GREGORIO L. LIRA, in his capacity as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff of Iloilo,petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, Presiding Judge, Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, RANDOLPH C. TAJANLANGIT and ESTEBAN C. TAJANLANGIT, respondents.Salvador A. Cabaluna, Jr. and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.Hannibal de los Reyes for private respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:May the respondent court order that a mortgage on real property be substituted by a surety bond and direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated on the Torrens Title since the surety bond already secures the obligation earlier secured by the cancelled mortgage?The petitioner comes to us stating that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of its jurisdiction in so ruling.On August 28, 1979, petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings to extra-judicially foreclose a real estate mortgage executed by the private respondents in his favor. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed on March 19, 1979 (Annex "A", Petition) between Randolph Tajanlangit and Esteban Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note amounting to P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon, to wit:xxx xxx xxxThat whereas, the MORTGAGORS are justly indebted to the MORTGAGEE in the amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by their promissory note for said sum, in the words and figures as follows:P40,000.00 Iloilo CityMarch 19, 1979For value received, we promise to pay RODOLFO T. GANZON, or order, at his residence in Molo, Iloilo City, the sum of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, in two (2) installments as follows: P20,000.00 on or before 25 May 1979; and P20,000.00 on or before 25 August 1979. This note shall not draw interest. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 15)The mortgage covered a parcel of residential land, Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1- F of the subdivision plan Psd-274802, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324.Thereafter, petitioner Gregorio Lira, in his capacity as ex-oficio provincial sheriff of Iloilo served personal notice of the foreclosure proceedings on the private respondents. Lira also caused the publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Iloilo of a Notice of Extra Judicial Sale of Mortgaged Property, setting the sale at public auction of the mortgaged property at 10:00 a.m. on September 28, 1979, at his office at the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City.On September 27, 1979, a day before the scheduled public auction, the private respondents filed a civil action for specific performance, damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the petitioners with the respondent court. The action, docketed as CFI Case No. 13053, sought to declare the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and all proceedings taken in connection therewith null and void. The private respondents asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioners from proceeding with the foreclosure and public auction sale. Acting on the urgent ex-parte motion of private respondents, the trial court issued an order enjoining the provincial sheriff from proceeding with the scheduled auction sale on September 28, 1979.On October 31, 1979, the private respondents filed an amended complaint. For purposes of the instant petition, the pertinent allegations in the amended complaint are the following: (1) On August 25, 1978, defendant, now petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor of plaintiff, now respondent Esteban Tajanlangit. The parcel of land, subject of the sale is described as Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo located at Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579 with an area of 24,442 square meters, more or less; (2) The deed of real estate mortgage which is the subject of the extra-judicial proceedings initiated by defendant Rodolfo Ganzon executed by plaintiffs Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in his favor was for the purpose of securing the payment of P40,000.00 which formed part of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900; (3) Incorporated in the aforesaid deed of absolute sale was a proviso to the effect that vendor-defendant Rodolfo Ganzon guaranteed to have the occupants of the lot to vacate the premises within 120 days after the execution thereof, to wit:xxx xxx xxxThe vendor warrants to the vendee peaceful possession of the above- mentioned parcel of land and that the said vendor shall see to it that all occupants thereof at the execution of this deed shall vacate the premises within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days computed from the date of the execution of this document.(4) The aforestated guaranty was violated by defendant Ganzon since the occupants of the said lot up to the present are still within the premises of the lot; and (5) The extra-judicial foreclosure is illegal since defendant Ganzon committed a breach in his warranty and the deed of real estate mortgage does not contain any stipulation authorizing mortgagee Ganzon to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged property.On March 28, 1980 the petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint. They admitted the veracity of the deed of absolute sale covering said Lot No. 1900 but denied that the real estate mortgage covering Lot No. 1901 subject of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings was executed by Esteban Tajanlangit and Randolph Tajanlangit in favor of Rodolfo Ganzon to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. They maintained that the real estate mortgage was an entirely different transaction between the Tajanlangits and Ganzon from the sale of Lot No. 1900 embodied in the absolute deed of sale of realty. They further maintained that the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings would be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.After the issues had been joined but before actual trial, the private respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of Real Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or Cash In Lieu Thereof," to which the petitioners interposed an Opposition.In an order dated November 20, 1980, the respondent court granted the respondents' motion. The order states:This is a Motion for Release of Real Estate Mortgage and for the Clerk of Court to Accept Bond or Cash in Lieu Thereof.It appears that defendant sold to Esteban Tajanlangit, Jr. Lot No. 1900 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 39579. The document of sale provides that the vendee who is the defendant herein, promised to exclude from the premises the occupants. To secure the unpaid balance of P40,000.00, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage on their Lot No. 1901-4-61-B-1-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-274802. Because defendant failed to clear the occupants of Lot No. 1900, as provided for in the contract of sale, plaintiffs withheld payment of the P40,000.00. To clear the title of Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-1-1 plaintiffs are willing to submit a bond in the sum of P80,000.00 which is double the consideration of the mortgage.WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, considering that plaintiffs are willing and able to pay the P40,000.00 and considering further that defendant has not yet cleared the premises he sold to plaintiffs of tenants, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City is ordered to cancel the mortgage lien on Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324, upon showing by the plaintiffs that they have put up the surety bond in the sum of P80,000.00. " (Annex "F", Rollo, p. 58)On January 28, 1981, the respondents after receipt of the aforesaid order, put up a surety bond in the amount of P80,000.00 with the Summa Insurance Corporation as surety (Annex " G ") for the approval of the respondent court,On February 14, 1981, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration Of The Order Dated November 20, 1980, And Opposition To The Approval of Surety Bond.The respondent court in its order dated February 24, 1981, denied the aforesaid motion. The order states:Finding the motion filed by plaintiff through counsel for approval of surety bond well taken and considering that the opposition filed by defendants does not question the validity of the surety bond itself but is anchored upon grounds that had already been passed upon by this Court in the order dated November 20, 1980, the surety bond in the amount of P80,000.00 issued by Summa Insurance Corporation is hereby approved.The defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon, through Atty. Salvador Cabaluna, Jr., is hereby ordered to surrender to the plaintiffs, through Atty. Hannibal de los Reyes the owner's copy of TCT No. 50324, so that the mortgage annotated therein in favor of defendant Rodolfo T. Ganzon could be duly cancelled. (Annex "I", Rollo, p. 65).Hence, the instant petition.On March 18, 198 1, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the orders dated November 20, 1980 and February 24, 1981 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch I at Iloilo City.On July 8, 1981, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.As stated earlier, the issue raised before us is whether or not the trial court may order the cancellation of a mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the payment of a promissory note and substitute such mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same court to secure the payment of the promissory note.In issuing its November 20, 1980 order, the trial court before trial on the merits of the case assumed that the real estate mortgage subject of the extra- judicial foreclosure proceedings was indeed a security for the payment of a P40,000.00 promissory note which answered for the balance of the purchase price of the sale between Ganzon as vendor and Esteban Tajanlangit was vendee of Lot No. 1900. With this assumption, the trial court concluded that Rodolfo Ganzon violated his warranty that he would clear the parcel of land of its occupants within 120 days after the execution of the deed of absolute sale of realty. On this premise and upon motion of the private respondents, the court ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the mortgage lien annotated in the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the mortgaged parcel of land and to substitute therein a surety bond approved by the trial court.It must be noted that petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon vehemently denied the allegation that the P 40,000.00, consideration of the promissory note which resulted in the execution of the real estate mortgage to secure its payment was a balance of the purchase price of Lot No. 1900. As earlier stated, Ganzon maintained in his Answer that the real estate mortgage arose from a different transaction. At the pre-trial, what the parties admitted were the existence and due execution of the documents, including the absolute deed of sale of realty and the subject real estate mortgage. In connection with the documents, the issues per the pre-trial order were "... whether or not the documents express the true intention of the parties, and whether or not they complied with the provisions of the document. (Rollo, p. 78) Hence, at that stage of the case, the trial court's order dated November 20, 1980 had no factual basis.Even on the assumption that the factual bases of the trial court's questioned orders were justified by evidence in the records the same would still not be proper.A mortgage is but an accessory contract. "The consideration of the mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract without which it cannot exist as an independent contract." (Banco de Oro v. Bayuga, 93 SCRA 443, citing China Banking Corporation v. Lichauco, 46 Phil. 460). On the effects of a mortgage we ruled inPhilippine National Bank v. Mallorca (21 SCRA 694):xxx xxx xxx... By Article 2126 of the Civil Code, (Formerly Article 1876 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889.) a 'mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.' Sale or transfer cannot affect or release the mortgage. A purchaser is necessarily bound to acknowledge and respect the encumbrance to which is subject the purchased thing and which is at the disposal of the creditor 'in order that he, under the terms of the contract, may recover the amount of his credit therefrom.' (Bischoff vs. Pomar, 12 Phil. 690, 700) For, a recorded real estate is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. (Altavas, The Law of Mortgages in the Philippine Islands, 1924 ed., p. 2) Because the personality of the owner is disregarded; the mortgage subsists notwithstanding changes of ownership; the last transferee is just as much of a debtor as the first one; and this, independent of whether the transferee knows or not the person of the mortgagee. (Id., at p. 6) So it is, that a mortgage lien is inseparable from the property mortgaged. All subsequent purchasers thereof must respect the mortgage, whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee. For, the mortgage, until discharge, follows the property. (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1961 ed., p. 225; emphasis supplied. See also V. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1962 ed., p. 477)Applying the principles underlying the nature of a mortgage, the real estate mortgage constituted on Lot No. 1901-E-61-B-lF of the subdivision plan Psd-27482, located in the District of Molo, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-50324 can not be substituted by a surety bond as ordered by the trial court. The mortgage lien in favor of Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon is inseparable from the mortgaged property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the mortgage contract.Moreover, the questioned orders violate the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders dated November 20, 1980 and February 24, 1981 of the trial court are SET ASIDE. Our March 18, 1981 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT. No costs.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.Vasquez, J., is on leave.

BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984]Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teachers camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teachers camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them.

On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law.

Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a validinformation under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word office applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.

Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices a showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts. Read full text Justice Makasiar (concurring & dissenting)Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the CA, and thereafter to the SC. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the SC (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.Then again, par 3 of Sec 7 of PD 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only be reviewed by the SC through certiorari, likewise limits the reviewing power of the SC only to question of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the CA, and then by the SC. To repeat, there is greater guarantee of justice in criminal cases when the trial courts judgment is subject to review by two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with greater objectivity, detachment and impartiality unaffected as they are by views and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.Limiting the power of review by the SC of convictions by the Sandiganbayan only to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, likewise violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, which presumption can only be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution

PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to affordimpunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliationwith full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of theorganization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibitsacts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression andAssociation in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that theorganization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT

THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 141710. March 3, 2004]EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ, AND ANDRES ABONITA, JR., petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO-MORALES, J.:The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended information,[1] denying the motion to defer arraignment,[2]and entering a plea of not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead to the information,[3] are assailed in the present petition for certiorari.The antecedents of the case are as follows:On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been going on in different areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa, Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under the supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or license.Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some were hauled inside the Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound demanding the release of the lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut timber, duly indorsed by Mayor Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the approval of the CENRO, it was denied.On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner, Igang Barangay Captain Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to release the same without the advice of EIIB authorities. On even date, acting upon the orders of Mayor Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound accompanied by two fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal Hall of Taytay.On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for robbery[4] and violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829[5] (DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS) against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan.By Resolution[6] of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the filing of an information against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829,[7]and the forwarding of the records of the case to the Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer and the charge against her being work-connected.Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review Action[8] of October 19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information[9] for violation of Section 1(b) P.D. 1829 on December 8, 1998 against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 25065.A warrant of arrest[10] was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998. Before the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on January 4, 1999,[11] as did Barangay Captain Abonita on January 29, 1999.[12]On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment,[13] they having filed on even date a Motion to Quash[14]. By Order[15] of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment to February 26, 1999.During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecutor moved to defer the arraignment as recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon by the Ombudsman. Without objection from petitioners counsel, the arraignment was reset[16] to April 8, 1999.In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition[17] to petitioners Motion to Quash.Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information[18] which was filed by the special prosecutor, admitted the amended information by Order[19] of April 8, 1999.Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash[20] the amended information, to which motion the special prosecutor filed a comment/opposition[21] on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated filing thereof was due to the transfer of the records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its new office at the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information[22] which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The scheduled hearing on November 25, 1999 was, however, cancelled and reset[23] to December 3, 1999 upon urgent motion by petitioners counsel upon the ground that on said date, he needed to appear before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong.By Order[24] of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended information, denied the motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000.On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss[25] the second amended information.During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in open court the assailed separate orders denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended information,[26] denying the motion to defer arraignment,[27] and entering a plea of not guilty for both accused[28] herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for almost three years is unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as accused to due process,[29] they citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.[30] They add that the repeated and ex-parte amendment of the information by the Ombudsman resulted to inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial, which is a ground for dismissal of the information under Section 13, in relation to Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998).[31]Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations against them, one before the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City (Criminal Case No. 14959), involving the same subject matter constitutes forum shopping which is expressly prohibited under the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 directing the summary dismissal of multiple complaints or charges, and necessarily places both of them in double danger of conviction and punishment for the same offense.[32]Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES) as neither of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere executive officials of their respective local government units with entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation against them is not in relation to their office.[33] Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.[34]The petition fails.Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[35] cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the present case. The cases against Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to dismiss them in light of the following observations: political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; there was a blatant departure from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the record.[36]From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took only three months, from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution finding probable cause against petitioners. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took eight months to review the case and come up with the joint review action on October 19, 1998. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case for around two months. Considering that the records were passed upon by three offices, the period of preliminary investigation, which did not exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have violated petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due process and to a speedy disposition of cases.As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan[37] instructs:The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings [are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that maybe considered and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.[38]Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed to the delay, thus:With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally getting the case ready for arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated that, to a certain extent, the claim is valid although the delay is caused not unreasonably but because of the exercise of the right of the accused to determine whether or not they could be charged under the Information for which they have filed Motions to Quash; thus, the delay cannot be considered unreasonable nor the grounds for setting aside the amended Information as it now stands.[39] (Underscoring supplied)The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.[40]In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7[41] and 13[42] of R.A. 8493, averring that the unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a ground for the dismissal of the case, they having been arraigned only on January 17, 2000, after several and repeated amendments of the information.The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners continuous filing of motions that the arraignment was deferred.Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the pendency of petitioners motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and pre-trial) provided under Section 2 of said law.Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other cause justifying suspension of arraignment shall be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated amendments of the information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be amended in form or in substance without leave of court at any time before an accused enters his plea.[43]In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed forum shopping by filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 (Additional Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints).Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was also filed before the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Special Prosecutor contends in its Memorandum, since the Information in Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with the Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988, while the information before the regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February 24, 1999, then, if there is any case to be dismissed for forum shopping, that case should be the one before the Regional trial Court, as it was the second action filed.[44]Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they were indicted.Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them for instead of showing that the offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 (obstruction of justice) - is not in relation to their office, they argued that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 the offense subject of the investigation which petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners argument that the act complained of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as long as one (or more) of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,[45] the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees in relation to their office.[46](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez, who holds a position of Grade 27 under the Local Government Code of 1991[47], committed the offense charged in relation to her office.In Montilla v. Hilario[48], this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can not exist without the office.[49]As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,[50] held that although public office is not an element of an offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office,[51] the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,[52] held that although public office is not an element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any person, whether a public officer or a private citizen, the circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed the victim in the course of trying to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioners case squarely within the meaning of an offense committed in relation to the [accuseds] public office.[53]In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to have been committed by petitioner Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the mayor. As found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is tasked to exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces[54], used her influence, authority and office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.The joint-counter affidavits[55] signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the letter of petitioner Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:To: SPO1 Juanito G. Gan andPO2 Emmanuel Nangit; PNP Members of Taytay Municipal Police Office, Taytay PalawanUpon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion Taytay, Palawan, at the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order t]o haul the flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of the Municipal Government of Taytay and to turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.For immediate strict compliance. [56]Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution[57] of the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan and the Joint Review Action[58] of the Graft Investigation Officer-Luzon.What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the information[59]. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took advantage of her office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the amended information reads:AMENDED INFORMATIONThe undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of Section 1(b), Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as follows:That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Palawan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS ABONITA JR., both public officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang of the same municipality, respectively, committing the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of the same, confederating and conspiring with each other enter the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while inside with force, intimidation and against the will of the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT. ERNAN O. LIBAO, did then and there willfully, feloniously, unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted dimensions of ipil lumber, that were officially confiscated by a joint team of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNP-TINIGUIBAN COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for safekeeping while waiting for available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and brought the same ipil lumber within the compound of the Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as evidence in the investigation of the case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended.[60] (Italics supplied)There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of January 17, 2000, denying petitioners motion to quash.The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of not guilty for petitioners in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any grave abuse of discretion.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951), is a ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that a municipal loyalty oath which required an oath and affidavit about one's beliefs and actions for the previous five years and which was enacted more than five years previous is not an ex post facto law nor a bill of attainder.In 1941, the California State Legislature amended the charter of the city of Los Angeles so that no person could obtain or retain public employment with the city if they advocated the violent overthrow of either the state or federal government, belonged to any organization that did so advocate, or had advocated or been a member of an organization which advocated such action in the last five years. In 1948, the city of Los Angeles passed local ordinance No, 94,004, which required all employees to take the loyalty oath.Fifteen employees with the Los Angeles Board of Public Works refused to execute the required affidavit. At an administrative hearing on January 6, 1949, all 15 individuals were fired. They sued for back pay and reinstatement in their jobs, claiming that the oath and the affidavit they were required to execute constituted a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. The District Court of Appeals denied relief.The petitioners then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.Decision[edit]Majority opinion[edit]Associate Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the opinion for the majority.Clark discussed the oath and the affidavit separately. In three sentences, Clark held that since past actions and beliefs may impugn present fitness for duty, the affidavit was justified.[1] The question for the oath (which reached back five years into the past) was its constitutionality, and here Clark relied heavily on United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), to answer that the oath was valid.[2] Since the charter change had occurred seven years before, and the oath reached back only five years, the oath was also not a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.[3] Clark distinguished United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), which was not a general law establishing qualifications for office but which specifically named certain individuals and required their separation from government service.[4]Petitioners had argued that the charter amendment required scienter (knowledge that the organizations they belonged to did, in fact, advocate the violent overthrow of the government or a communist political philosophy). Clark assumed that the city would not implement the law in such a way as to punish those individuals who lacked scienter, and assumed that scienter was implicit in the ordinance.[4]The decision of the District Court of Appeals was affirmed.Frankfurter's dissent[edit]Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part.Frankfurter noted in his dissent that the majority had repeatedly referred to public employment as a privilege, which to his mind invoked the "doctrine of privilege."[5] Invoking this doctrine, he concluded "does not meet the problem."[6]But Frankfurter was unable to agree that the Los Angeles ordinanace implied scientier. He wrote: "To find scienter implied in a criminal statute is the obvious way of reading such a statute, for guilty knowledge is the normal ingredient of criminal responsibility. The ordinance before us exacts an oath as a condition of employment; it does not define a crime. It is certainly not open to this Court to rewrite the oath required by Los Angeles of its employees..."[7] The lack of an explicit requirement for scienter in the law, he concluded, asked the employees "to swear to something they cannot be expected to know. Such a demand ... can no more be justified than the inquiry into belief which [was] invalid inAmerican Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)."[8]Frankfurter would have remanded the case back to the state court with instructions that the petitioners be allowed to take the oath under the scienter requirement imposed by the Court.Burton's dissent[edit]Associate Justice Harold Hitz Burton dissented in part. Under the Court's decisions in United States v. Lovett, Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867), and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867), Burton concluded, the oath as currently framed was an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder.[9] However, Burton would have affirmed the lower court concerning the judgment regarding the two employees who had refused to sign the affidavit. The affidavit merely represented an assertion of true facts, Burton said, and as such could be required of the employees.[10]Douglas' dissent[edit]Associate Justice William O. Douglas dissented, joined by Associate Justice Hugo Black.Douglas concluded that the entire case was governed by the decisions in Ex parte Garland and Cummings v. Missouri.[11] A bill of attainder as defined in these cases inflicts punishment without a judicial trial, and may be inflicted against an individual or a class (contrary to the majority's conclusion that it applies only to an individual).[12] That Garlandand Cummings involved professionals rather than laborers and that Garland and Cummings involved vague accusations of misconduct rather than the single specific accusation in Garner was irrelevant, Douglas said.[13] Since the Los Angeles ordinance permitted no hearing, it was a bill of attainder and not constitutionally valid.[14]Douglas did not reach the issue of whether the ordinance was an ex post facto law.[15]Black's dissent[edit]Justice Black further dissented from the majority by making two additional points. First, he argued that the majority mischaracterized the decision in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors. The Maryland law in Gerende was limited to actual acts of violence or overthrow, while the Los Angeles ordinance was not.[16] Second, Black believed that the majority's decision in Garner significantly weakened the Court's holdings in Ex parte Garland, Cummings v. Missouri, and United States v. Lovett.[17]The arrest of defendant for failure, owing to insolvency, to pay past and present support was declared invalid.

The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contemptdoes not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than the payment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property.

Facts:

CFI of Negros Occidental rendered a decision ordering defendant Vicente S. Martin, Sr. to pay past and future support at P100 per month. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter court affirmed said decision.

A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The second paragraph of the Sheriff's return of service, dated September 21, 1964, stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay, Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides."

In 1964, counsel for plaintiff prayed that defendant, for failure to satisfy the writ of execution, be adjudged guilty of contempt of court.

In the Orders of January 9, and February 1, 1965, CFI of Negros Occidentalordered the arrest and imprisonment of defendant Martin.

Issue:

Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contemptof court for failure to satisfy the judgment were legal

Held:

The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant, Vicente Martin, Sr., for contempt of court for failure to satisfy the judgment were illegal, in view of the following considerandos:

(1) The writ of execution was a direct order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of things, have committed disobedience to the writ.

(2) The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence the Orders of 9 and February 1, 1965, in effect, authorized his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

(3) The disobedience to a judgment considered as indirect contempt in Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, does not refer to a judgment which is a final disposition of the case and which is declaratory of the rights of the parties, but to a special judgment, which is defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court as a judgment "which requires the performance of any other act than thepayment of money, or the sale or delivery of real or personal property."

According to Moran:

Generally, any order or judgment of a court finally disposing of an actionshould be enforced by ordinary execution proceedings, except special judgments which should be executed by contempt proceedings in accordance with Rule 39, sec. 9," citing Caluag, et al. vs. Pecson, et al., 82 Phil. 8. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. 3, p. 320.)

People v. Lagman and Sosa, 66 Phil. 13, July 13, 1938Avancea, C.J.Facts:The appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with aviolation of Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Lawfor being Filipinos having been reached the age 20 years in 1936, willfully andunlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1stand 7thof April of the said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. TheCourt of First Instance of Bataan sentenced each of the appellants one month and oneday of imprisonment with the cost.Issue:Whether or not the National Defense Law is unconstitutional.Ruling:The Constitutionality of said law was upheld. The appellants do not deny the facts, but they alleged in defense that they have notregistered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has amother and a brother to support and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support,has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.Under Sec. 2 of Article II of the Philippine Constitution, The defense of the State is aprime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may berequired by law to render personal military or civil service. The National DefenseLaw, insofar as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against theconstitution, but in the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of theGovernment to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army, andto leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make thisduty of the Government excusable should there would be no sufficient men whovolunteer to enlist therein.It was also held by the court that the right of the Government to require compulsorymilitary service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal withits duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.Citing the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts, the court said that, without violatingthe Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will,against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political convictions,to take place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of beingshot down in its defense. In US vs. Olson, it was also said that this is not deprivationof property without due process of the law since in its just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment. These justify that compulsory military service isthe defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it moreeffective, in case of need. The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does notexcuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Boardbecause, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying withtheir duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance toattend to these family responsibilities

U.S. Supreme CourtRobertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897)Robertson v. BaldwinNo. 334Argued December 15, 1896Decided January 25, 1897165 U.S. 275

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITEDSTATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIASyllabusSection 4598 of the Revised Statutes is not unconstitutional by reason of its authorizing justices of the peace to issue warrants to apprehend deserting seamen and deliver them up to the master of their vessel.The judicial power of the United States is defined by the Constitution, and does not prevent Congress from authorizing state officers to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power, rather than a part of it.Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to carry out the contracts contained in their shipping articles, are not in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to doubt that the provision against involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to such contracts.The contract of a sailor has always been treated as an exceptional one, and involving to a certain extent the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract.This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California, rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon the petition of Robert Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris Hanson.The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained of their liberty by Barry Baldwin, Marshal for the Northern District of California, in the county jail of Alameda County, by virtue of an order of commitment, made by a United States commissioner, committing them for trial upon a charge of disobedience of the lawful orders of the master of the American barkentine Arago; that such commitmentPage 165 U. S. 276was made without reasonable or probable cause, in this, that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, petitioners were held on board the Arago against their will and by force, having been theretofore placed on board said vessel by the Marshal for the District of Oregon, under the provisions of Rev.St. 4596, subdivision 1, and 4598, 4599, the master claiming the right to hold petitioners by virtue of these acts; that 4598 and 4599 are unconstitutional and in violation of Section 1 of Article III of, and of the Fifth Amendment to, the Constitution; that 4598 was also repealed by Congress on June 7, 1872, 17 Stat. 262, and that the first subdivision of 4596 is in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment in that it compels involuntary servitude.The record was somewhat meager, but it sufficiently appeared that the petitioners had shipped on board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton, in the State of Washington, thence to Valparaiso, and thence to such other foreign ports as the master might direct, and return to a port of discharge in the United States; that they had each signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen during the course of the voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they left the vessel at Astoria, in the State of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested, under the provisions of Rev.Stat. 4596 to 4599, taken before a justice of the peace, and by him committed to jail until the Arago was ready for sea (some sixteen days), when they were taken from the jail by the marshal, and placed on board the Aragoagainst their will; that they refused to "turn to" in obedience to the orders of the master, were arrested at San Francisco, charged with refusing to work in violation of Rev.Stat. 4596, were subsequently examined before a commissioner of the circuit court, and by him held to answer such charge before the District Court for the Northern District of California.Shortly thereafter they sued out this writ of habeas corpus, which, upon a hearing before the district court, was dismissed, and an order made remanding the prisoners to the custody of the marshal.Page 165 U. S. 277MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the Court.Upon what ground the court below dismissed the writ and remanded the petitioners does not appear, but the record raises two questions of some importance: first, as to the constitutionality of Rev.Stat. 4598, 4599, insofar as they confer jurisdiction upon justices of the peace to apprehend deserting seamen and return them to their vessel; second, as to the conflict of the same sections, and also 4596, with the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude.Section 4598, which was taken from 7 of the Act of July 20, 1790, reads as follows:"SEC. 4598. If any seaman who shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage shall at any port or place desert, or shall absent himself from such vessel without leave of the master or officer commanding in the absence of the master, it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace within the United States, upon the complaint of the master, to issue his warrant to apprehend such deserter and bring him before such justice, and if it then appears that he has signed a contract within the intent and meaning of this title, and that the voyage agreed for is not finished, or altered, or the contract otherwise dissolved, and that such seaman has deserted the vessel or absented himself without leave, the justice shall commit him to the house of correction or common jail of the city, town, or place, to remain there until the vessel shall be ready to proceed on her voyage, or till the master shall require his discharge, and then to be delivered to the master, he paying all the cost of such commitment, and deducting the same out of the wages due to such seaman. "Page 165 U. S. 278Section 4599, which was taken for 53 of the Shipping Commissioners' Act of June 7, 1872, authorizes the apprehension of deserting seamen, with or without the assistance of the local public officers or constables and without a warrant, and their conveyance before any court of justice or magistrate of the state, to be dealt with according to law.Section 4596, which is also taken from the same act, provides punishment by imprisonment for desertion, refusal to join the vessel, or absence without leave.1. The first proposition, that Congress has no authority under the Constitution to vest judicial power in the courts or judicial officers of the several states, originated in an observation of Mr. Justice Story, inMartin v. Hunter's Lessees, 1 Wheat. 304, 14 U. S. 330, to the effect that "Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself." This was repeated in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 18 U. S. 27, and the same general doctrine has received the approval of the courts of several of the states. United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; United States v. Campbell 6 Hall's Law Jour. 113. These were all actions for penalties, however, wherein the courts held to the familiar doctrine that the courts of one sovereignty will not enforce the penal laws of another. Huntington v. Attrill,146 U. S. 657, 146 U. S. 672. In Commonwealth v. Feely, 1 Va.Cases 325, it was held by the General Court of Virginia, in 1813, that the state courts could not take jurisdiction of an indictment for a crime committed against an act of Congress.In Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300, it was also held that Congress had no power to confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a state to naturalize aliens, although, if such power be recognized by the legislature of a state, it may be exercised by the courts of such state of competent jurisdiction.In State v. Rutter, 12 Niles' Register 115, 231, it was held in 1817 by Judges Bland and Hanson of Maryland that Congress had no power to authorize justices of the peace to issue warrants for the apprehension of offenders against the laws ofPage 165 U. S. 279the United States. A directly contrary view, however, was taken by Judge Cheves of South Carolina in Ex Parte Rhodes, 12 Niles' Register 264.The general principle announced by these cases is derived from the third article of the Constitution, the first section of which declares that"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,"the judges of which courts "shall hold their offices during good behavior," etc., and, by the second section,"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects."The better opinion is that the second section was intended as a constitutional definition of the judicial power, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 2 U. S. 475, which the Constitution intended to confine to courts created by Congress -- in other words, that such power extends only to the trial and determination of "cases" in courts of record, and that Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the several states to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts not of record -- such, for instance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power, rather than a part of the judicial power itself. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Ex Parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156, wherein the authority of justices of the peace and other such officers to arrest and commit for a violation of the criminal law of the United StatesPage 165 U. S. 280was held to be no part of the judicial power within the third article of the Constitution. And in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, it was said that, as to the authority conferred on state magistrates to arrest fugitive slaves and deliver them to their owners under the Act of February 12, 1793, while a difference of opinion existed and might still exist upon this point in different states, whether state magistrates were bound to act under it, no doubt was entertained by this Court that state magistrates might, if they chose, exercise the authority, unless prohibited by state legislation. See also Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103.We think the power of justices of the peace to arrest deserting seamen and deliver them on board their vessel is not within the definition of the "judicial power" as defined by the Constitution, and may be lawfully conferred upon state officers. That the authority is a most convenient one to entrust to such officers cannot be denied, as seamen frequently leave their vessels in small places, where there are no federal judicial officers and where a justice of the peace may usually be found with authority to issue warrants under the state laws.2. The question whether sections 4598 and 4599 conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, depends upon the construction to be given to the term "involuntary servitude." Does the epithet "involuntary" attach to the word "servitude" continuously, and make illegal any service which becomes involuntary at any time during its existence, or does it attach only at the inception of the servitude, and characterize it as unlawful because unlawfully entered into? If the former be the true construction, then no one, not even a soldier, sailor, or apprentice, can surrender his liberty, even for a day, and the soldier may desert his regiment upon the eve of battle, or the sailor abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm at sea, provided only he can find means of escaping to another vessel. If the latter, then an individual may, for a valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his personal liberty for a definite time and for a recognized purpose, and subordinate his going and coming to the will ofPage 165 U. S. 281another during the continuance of the contract; not that all such contracts would be lawful, but that a servitude which was knowingly and willingly entered into could not be termed "involuntary." Thus, if one should agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another in a particular capacity during his life, and never to leave his estate without his consent, the contract might not be enforceable for the want of a legal remedy, or might be void upon grounds of public policy; but the servitude could not be properly termed "involuntary." Such agreement for a limited personal servitude at one time were very common in England, and by statute of June 17, 1823, 4 Geo. IV. c. 34, 3, it was enacted that if any servant in husbandry or any artificer, calico printer, handcraftsman, miner, collier, keelman, pitman, glassman, potter, laborer or other person should contract to serve another for a definite time and should desert such service during the term of the contract, he was made liable to a criminal punishment. The breach of a contract for personal service has not, however, been recognized in this country as involving a liability to criminal punishment, except in the cases of soldiers, sailors, and possibly some others; nor would public opinion tolerate a statute to that effect.But we are also of opinion that even if the contract of a seaman could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude. The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the "Bill of Rights," were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject to certain well recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In incorporating these principles into the fundamental law, there was no intention of disregarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed. Thus, the freedom of speech and of the press (Art. I) does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles, or other publications injurious to public morals or private reputation; the right of the peoplePage 165 U. S. 282to keep and bear arms (Art. II) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons; the provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy (Art. V) does not prevent a second trial if upon the first trial the jury failed to agree or if the verdict was set aside upon the defendant's motion, United States v. Ball,163 U. S. 662, 163 U. S. 627, nor does the provision of the same article that no one shall be a witness against himself impair his obligation to testify if a prosecution against him be barred by the lapse of time, a pardon, or by statutory enactment, Brown v. Walker,161 U. S. 591, and cases cited. Nor does the provision that an accused person shall be confronted with the witnesses against him prevent the admission of dying declarations, or the depositions of witnesses who have died since the former trial.The prohibition of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment is well known to have been adopted with reference to a state of affairs which had existed in certain states of the Union since the foundation of the government, while the addition of the words "involuntary servitude" were said, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, to have been intended to cover the system of Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade, the practical operation of which might have been a revival of the institution of slavery under a different and less offensive name. It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always been treated as exceptional, such as military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards. The amendment, however, makes no distinction between a public and a private service. To say that persons engaged in a public service are not within the amendment is to admit that there are exceptions to its general language, and the further question is at once presented, where shall the line be drawn? We know of no better answer to make than to say that services which have from time immemorial been treated as exceptional shall not be regarded as within its purview.From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailorPage 165 U. S. 283has been treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract. Indeed the business of navigation could scarcely be carried on without some guaranty, beyond the ordinary civil remedies upon contract, that the sailor will not desert the ship at a critical moment or leave her at some place where seamen are impossible to be obtained -- as Molloy forcibly expresses it, "to rot in her neglected brine." Such desertion might involve a long delay of the vessel while the master is seeking another crew, an abandonment of the voyage, and, in some cases, the safety of the ship itself. Hence, the laws of nearly all maritime nations have made provision for securing the personal attendance of the crew on board, and for their criminal punishment for desertion, or absence without leave, during the life of the shipping articles.Even by the maritime law of the ancient Rhodians, which is supposed to antedate the birth of Christ by about 900 years, according to Pardessus (Lois Mar. vol. 1, page 250), if the master or the sailors absented themselves by night, and the vessel were lost or damaged, they were bound to respond in the amount of the loss.In the compilation