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Non‐alignment and the power balanceCoral Bell aa Reader in Political Science , University of Sydney ,Published online: 03 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Coral Bell (1963) Non‐alignment and the power balance, Survival: Global Politicsand Strategy, 5:6, 253-262, DOI: 10.1080/00396336308440432

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Non-Alignmentand the PowerBalanceCORAL BELLAustralian OutlookAugust 1963Miss Bell is Reader in Political Science, University ofSydney, and an authoritative observer of the evolutionof the power balance in the last decade. Here sheexamines the relevance of non-alignment to the presentchanges in the world balance.

(By permission of Australian Outlook)

' \ \ 7W* SHOULD WE inherit the hatred of others ?W It is bad enough that we have our own

burdens'. These words of Mr Nehru's1 conveythe original emotional essence of the policythat its exponents have insisted should be callednon-alignment rather than neutrality: absorptionin the domestic tasks that faced the underdevelopedcountries, impatience and resentment at whatwere seen as efforts to force them into servicepulling other people's chestnuts out of the fire,and a tendency to put the two cold-war campson the same rather squalid moral level ('thehatred of others'). The insistence that the conceptwas not to be confused with neutrality of thefamiliar sort, and the efforts to find a sufficientlydistinctive name for it ('non-alignment' or'non-commitment' or, as Marshal Tito used tosay, 'positive co-existence') were in themselvesindicators of one main element in it, a repudiationof the traditional machinery of power-politics,in which the neutral states were of course usefuland even essential cogs.

Yet despite this repudiation of power, whoseantecedents lie as much with the radical-dissentienttradition in English political thought2 as withthe Gandhist doctrine of non-violence, it maybe argued that the viability of non-alignmentas a policy has been and is related to particularphases of the power-balance. The present momentis one not only of profound change in that balance,but of reappraisal for the concept of non-alignment.It therefore seems an appropriate time for a re-examination of the relation between them,

which is of course a two-way affair. That is,one may ask not only how the position of thenon-aligned powers has affected the centralbalance, but also how the changing centralbalance affects the viability of non-alignment.

Since a definition of non-alignment wouldcertainly vary somewhat according to whetherthe definer was looking to Delhi or Belgrade,Cairo or Djakarta, Baghdad or Rangoon, Accraor Pnom-Penh, there seems no point in attemptingto force upon it any greater precision than ithas borne with those who use it. As with manypolitical words and phrases, its very imprecision -the fact that it is susceptible of a number ofinterpretations — is part of its usefulness. But onecan at least go so far towards a definition as tosay that the driving impulse of non-alignmentas a principle of foreign policy has been an effortto 'opt out' of direct involvement in the centralpower-struggle of our time, a refusal to 'stand upand be counted' for either camp. If this soundsnot so unlike neutrality after all, one mightrather flippantly define the difference by sayingthat for Mr Nehru at least (and he has giventhe term its distinctive moral colouration) hisrelationship to the great antagonists of the power-struggle has been seen not as that of a spectator,but that of a referee, who at need would doublethe roles of ambulance-man, pourer of oil ontroubled waters, and Greek chorus prophesyingwoe for the central characters and everyoneelse unless they (the central characters) mend theirways.

Yet the children of that complex mind showalways in their lineaments not only the KashmiriBrahmin and the devoted New Statesman reader,but the intellectual tradition of Harrow andCambridge. Thus the visible influence of balance-of-power theory, despite the repudiation ofpower, is not surprising. In an interview justbefore the Colombo Powers meeting in April1954 Mr Nehru said 'When there is substantialdifference in the strength of the two opposingforces, we in Asia, with our limitations, willnot be able to influence the issue. But whenthe two opposing forces are fairly evenly matched,then it is possible to make our weight felt in thebalance'.3 He went on to say that it was essentialfor some nations to assume this role in the interests

1 Interview in The Hindu, 1 April, 1954.2 Both Nehru and Menon had of course long-standing

connections with this intellectual tradition.3 Hindu, 1 April, 1954.

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of world peace, since there were in the worldtwo crusades —the Communist and the anti-Communist - either of which could involve theworld in war, and that if the world became entirelydivided between these blocs, war would be'very close'. One might say that there was implicitin his policy a belief (though he would not haveexpressed it in terms so much associated withwhat Woodrow Wilson called 'the great gamenow for ever discredited, of the balance of power')that the substitution of a multilateral for thebilateral or near-bilateral balance of the immediatepost-war period would make for a securer peace.Certainly the existence of, and the need to woothe unaligned powers was conceived of as exercisinga form of restraint on the cold-war combatants,a restraint not totally unlike that exercised bythe small powers or the balancer in the traditionalbalance-of-power situation, even though theinfluence exerted on the main contestants proceed-ed from quite different sources. The small powersin a traditional balance system owed their influencelargely to the fact that even marginal incrementsof military strength could be important in thatcontext. The military strength of the uncommittedstates is too slight, measured against eitherthat of the Communist bloc or that of theNATO powers, for this to hold true of them.But the present conflict is between two theoriesof society, as well as two power-complexes.Both sides want to be assured they are right,as well as to know they are strong. At least forthe West, which has suffered hard blows to itsself-confidence in its dealings with Asia, theimage of its own society that it sees mirroredin the eyes of the uncommitted Asians has beenof importance. That is to say the ideologicalissue has complicated the power struggle, theuncommitted powers have been potential convertsor defectors as well as potential allies, and thishas meant that their susceptibilities must bemuch more carefully weighed than would be thecase if nothing more were in question than themilitary strength they can contribute to eithercamp.

This element in the influence of the non-aligned powers, which I shall call the 'floatingvote' factor, has been enlarged upon a good dealby spokesmen of the countries concerned. Itssignificance, though real, has perhaps beenexaggerated - or at least one might say that itis likely to affect the great powers only duringwhat may be called the spells of relatively static

trench-warfare in the cold war. It is not necessarilyeffective at moments of crisis.

'Ally-Cost'Much less adequately understood, and much

less flattering for the non-aligned powers tocontemplate, is an element in their positionwhich I shall call the 'ally-cost' factor, as seenby the great powers. Up to now this has beenvisible chiefly in American policy, especially inSouth Asia. It derives from the fact that thepolicy makers in Washington have had, in theendemic conflicts in that part of the world since1949, to balance the prospective dangers anddisadvantages of the loss of any particular areato the Communist power-sphere against thepotential cost, in servicemen's lives or less valuedresources, of preventing this loss.

Naturally those who had to find the actualmilitary resources to meet new and old commit-ments were most conscious of this cost factor.The best exposition of the way it affected Americanpolicy is to be found in the memoirs of GeneralMatthew Ridgway, in the account he gives ofhis own attitude and arguments as US ArmyChief of Staff in the 1954 crisis over Indo-China,in which this was a major point in debate inWashington.4 (General Ridgway was in a muchstronger arguing position vis-a-vis Dulles thanEden was, though of course British pressurereinforced the Army arguments.) Interestinglyenough, it echoes the theory of Communiststrategy in Asia put forward by the late M. N.Roy, the Indian historian who was head of theEastern Secretariat of the Comintern in thetwenties but later broke with the Party. QuotingLenin as remarking that the road to Paris laythrough Peking, and that London and New Yorkwould fall on the Yangtse, Roy wrote, chillingly,'Russia will not take part directly in the Thirty

4 'To military men familiar with the map of Indo-China, the outcome of that siege (Dien Bien Phu) wasa foregone conclusion. . . . I also knew that none ofthose advocating such a step (intervention) had anyaccurate idea of what such an operation would costin blood and money and national effort. . . . To providethese facts I sent out to Indo-China an Army team ofexperts in every field. . . . The idea of interventionwas abandoned, and it is my belief that the analysiswhich the Army made and presented to higher authorityplayed a considerable, perhaps a decisive, part inpersuading our government not embark on that tragicadventure'. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway(New York, Harper, 1956) pp. 275-8.

5 'The Communist Problem in East Asia — An AsianView' in Pacific Affairs, September, 1951.

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Years War in Asia. It will be a war between theEast and the West'.s

There were times in the period 1950-54 whenthis prediction seemed a plausible one enough.At the height of the Korean war it was calculatedthat there were over a million men engaged infighting the battles of the West along the fringesof East Asia —Korea, Indo-China, Malaya —against what was essentially a force drawnfrom the Communist second-eleven, so to speak,and such success as the West did finally claimwas hard-bought, and in two of these three casesinconclusive. It is one of the paradoxes of thecontemporary military/political situation thatthough the weapons of mass-destruction grow moreand more ferociously efficient, the revolutionaryguerrilla armed with nothing more advancedthan an old riflle and a nineteenth centurypolitical doctrine has proved the most effectivemeans yet devised for altering the world power-balance. One has only to reflect on the historyof Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, before 1954, orCastro's original landing in Cuba, to be disabusedof any optimism about the conclusiveness oftechnological superiority in contemporary conflictof this sort.

However, the decisions of 1953/4 in Americamarked a turning-away for the succeeding sixyears from any line of American policy thatmight have produced the kind of danger apprehen-ded by Roy, the danger of the '30 years warin Asia', with Russia sitting on the sidelines,and the West exhausting its morale and resourcesin a struggle in which the big battalions of Asiannationalism and Asian anti-Westernism wouldprovide unending recruits for the other side.This is not to say that the line of analysis suggestedby Roy influenced the Washington decisions:they were produced by quite other factors ofwhich the author has given an account elsewhere.6

Danger renewed?Since the accession to office of President

Kennedy, and the renewed emphasis on conven-tional or even guerrilla forces as an alternativeto nuclear weapons, the possibility of this dilemma- the necessity of choosing between the potentialloss of a particular area to the sphere of Sovietpower, or the dangers of a campaign on dis-advantageous ground that would waste thescarcest of Western resources, conventional militarymanpower — has arisen again. The most obviousinstance was the situation in Laos, but it was

also implicit in the situation in the Congo. Inboth these instances American policy illustratesthat the non-alignment of a small power may bethe 'preferred choice' for it of a great powerwhere the estimated cost of securing the smallpower concerned as an ally is greater than theprospective advantage of having it so. In thecase of Laos this choice was made after somebitter experience, in the period 1958-61, of thedifficulties of the alternative policy. In the caseof the Congo, the decision to eschew a cold-warcontest for allies (so long as Russia could bemade to do likewise) seems to have been reachedat the beginning of the crisis and maintainedsteadily throughout it.

Until very recently the 'cost' factor inhibitingWestern policy in the power-competition in the'grey areas' had little parallel in Soviet policy.Admittedly costs have to be balanced againstadvantages as much in Moscow as in Washington,and the economic surplus out of which thiscompetition and other expensive enterprises - thespace-race and the military establishment - arefinanced is much smaller there. But the supply ofmilitary goods as they become quasi-obsolescentin Russia's own forces has represented an almostcostless bargain in diplomatic influence, and ithas never proved necessary to use actual Russianmilitary manpower. Thus Russia was at a veryconsiderable advantage over the West in theseareas in that she had a weapon — revisionismthrough the revolutionary ferment - which couldalter the power-map of the world to Russianadvantage at very slight cost (to the Russians)and which was difficult to resist except at exorbi-tant cost (to the West). The non-aligned worldwas an arena in which Russia stood to gain agood deal (in power terms) and lose very little.

All this, however, depended on the fact that theworld balance of power was essentially bipolar.A major change has come into effect with thebreakdown of this bipolarity through the schismbetween Russia and China. (It might be main-tained that the bipolar nature of the balance isalso being modified at the Western end of thescale, since it appears the ambition of Presidentde Gaulle that the 'new Europe' should play forits own diplomatic hand. This may well be true,but the process is not yet sufficiently advanced forit to have an assessable impact on the field underconsideration. Temporarily one may treat the

6 See Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics ofPower by Coral Bell (New York, Knopf, 1963), Chapter 5.

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balance as far as this field is concerned as tri-angular, even though bearing in mind that itmay assume a more irregular shape.) To be ofimportance to the situation of the non-alignedpowers it is by no means necessary that the Russo-Chinese split should become any wider than it isat present: it is only necessary that, as at present,Peking should be clearly seen to be sponsoring analternative diplomatic strategy to that of Moscowin the contest with the non-Communist world(which has been the case since 1957) and that therivalry should look formidable from the point ofview of Moscow, which has perhaps been the casesince 1960. These factors operate together toproduce what may be regarded as a local balanceof power to complicate the central contest as faras Russia is concerned, and turn revisionism-through- the-revolutionary-ferment into a decidedlytwo-edged weapon from the viewpoint of theRussian foreign office. The 'local balance of power'is not, of course, a merely geographic one betweenRussia and China. It is the balance of powerwithin the Communist world. The reason why,up to 1956 or so, Communist parties in the non-Communist world could be regarded as normallyuseful (though not always reliable) instruments ofRussian foreign policy was the unchallengeableprestige of Russia, for the party-faithful, as thecountry with a Revolution not only indigenous andsuccessful, but established and assured. By theend of 1956 there were three and a half countries,counting Northern Vietnam, which could atleast claim that their revolutions were likewiseindigenous, and another half-dozen in EasternEurope where the revolution, if externally imposed,was nevertheless capable of developing doctrinalvariations of some interest. In the nature of thingsthe faithful in partibus infidelium were no longerlikely to feel that there was one indisputable starto steer by. Given this fact, the Russians must beconscious not only of the ambiguity now, asregards their own interests, of revisionism-through-the-revolutionary-ferment, but also of the greatnatural advantages of China in the competition ofthe forseeable future. For the revolutionary processmaintains its dynamic only in the under-developedworld - Africa, Asia, Latin America. Not eventhe most optimistic eye in the Kremlin is likelyto see much sign of a prospective new revolutionarywave in Western Europe: on the contrary, whatthey see there is the rapidly-growing threat of aneconomic and political focus of attraction, theEuropean Community, that may trouble their

own security in Eastern Europe. And Communistparty-membership in Western Europe has fallento not much more than half its post-war peak.In any case, as long as the Russians remainLeninists, they can hardly deviate from theorthodox view of the underdeveloped world asthe Achilles' heel of the capitalists. Yet whateveris done to step up the process of revolutionarychange in the tiers monde, while it may tilt theoverall balance against the capitalist world, islikely also to tilt the balance within the Communistworld in favour of China rather than Russia.

This is not simply a matter of China's presentinga more relevant model for economic and socialchange than Russia as far as the subsistence-farming economies of underdeveloped countriesare concerned. It is also a matter of historicsituation. The Russians may be Marxists, but toa non-European eye they are also members ofthat white-skinned, industrialized, comfortably-living segment of humanity whose base is inEurope and North America, and which has longsent its exploiting tentacles out to the non-European world. Roy has noted the importanceof anti-European racialism as a main driving-forcein Asian communism, especially among itsmiddle-class leadership,"? though one might expectthis factor to be offset in parts of South-East Asiaby anti-Chinese feeling, which has had there asextensive a history as anti-semitism in Europe,and many of the same manifestations, includingthe pogrom.

Stalinism, but more soMoreover, it is difficult to see the rejection of

Stalinism and the cultivation of quasi-liberalattitudes in Russia as a source of strength to itin the competition with China for the adherenceof the non-European left. Quite the contrary infact, for the areas concerned might objectively besaid to be, like China, in the sort of economicand social situation which favoured Stalinism inRussia itself, only much more acutely so. That is,the educated middle-class is amall and weak, thegreat peasant base is resistant to change, and apowerful urge exists among the revolutionaryleadership for a forced march towards industrializa-tion. Besides, these areas are even less endowedthan Russia was with any kind of libertariantradition, vestiges of which certainly remainedalive in Russia even during the Stalinist freeze,

7 Ibid., pp. 228-231.

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and which in the more genial domestic climatepermitted by Mr Khrushchev have re-assertedthemselves to produce an amelioration of theCommunist police-state.

However, the chief potential advantage ofChina in the competition with Russia is simplyits diplomatic and political situation vis-a-vis theWest. In essence, it resides in the fact that Chinahas so much less to lose than Russia, and so muchless reason for satisfaction with the status quo, andso much less cause than Russia for any ambivalenceabout the contest with the capitalist world, thatit is inescapably endowed with strong commoninterests with the revolutionary-intellectual leader-ship in the non-European world which is thevital factor in this situation.

Even before the Cuban crisis there had beensome evidence of this. At a conference of Afro-Asian writers in Cairo in March 1962 the Russiansfound themselves facing accusations of putting ahigher priority on peaceful co-existence than onthe 'colonial independence struggle', and ofbeing half-hearted about 'wars of nationalliberation'. Obviously, the denoument in Cuba hassupplied illustration and substance to thesecharges against Russia, especially as far as theLatin American parties are concerned. No amountof Mr Khrushchev's dilating on his claim to havesaved Cuba from American invasion can disguisethe degree to which he in fact pulled the rug outfrom under Castro's 'movement of nationalliberation' when persistence in support of Cuba wasseen to entail the risk of a nuclear showdown withAmerica. Equivalent about-turns in Russianpolicy have doubtless been accepted by the partyfaithful in earlier years without a murmur, butthat was before there was an unimpeachablyorthodox Communist source to give them news ofthese events, as China has assiduously done inthis case.

Ought one to assume any countervailing damageto China through its hostilities with India? Onthe present evidence, one would say clearly not,though here one must of course make a distinctionbetween the attitude of India (including theIndian left) and the rest of the non-aligned powers.For India itself the assumptions on which policywas built appear to have been entirely under-mined: the assumption that the Himalayas werean adequate protective barrier, that Russiawould in any case restrain Chinese territorialambitions in the disputed area, the assumptionthat the tasks of economic development would

keep China too busy for such adventures for twenty-five years, the assumption that the dangers inAsia were purely economic and social, not military.Clearly all these hopeful views have been or arebeing re-appraised in Delhi. This does not meanthat non-alignment would necessarily be discardedin favour of entry to the Western camp even ifthe Western powers so wished. For one thing,Mr Nehru has indicated some remaining faith inthe usefulness of Russian influence on China, andany Indian formal abandonment of non-alignmentin favour of alliance with the West would diminishboth Mr Khrushchev's incentive and his abilityto exert influence of this sort. If this hope regardingRussia should prove a completely broken reed (andalready it has shown itself not capable of sustainingmuch weight) there would still remain, as countsagainst any complete abandonment of non-align-ment, both Mr Nehru's moral feeling about it(which should not be under-rated) and the factthat through the whole period of India's indepen-dence, its chief diplomatic asset has been itsposition as 'opinion-leader' and spokesman for thenon-aligned states. The other states concernedmay have offered conspicuously little in the wayof help or even sympathy to India in its security-crisis, but a rupture with them would not visiblyadvance India's interests. Of course, foreignpolicy cannot be wholly based on a cold calculationof national advantage: popular feeling must alsobe taken into account, and it is possible thatrenewed Chinese aggression or an obviousdetermination to hold on to all the area of Ladakhwhich its army already occupies would create somuch national anger in India as to force MrNehru's hand. And, of course, an indication thatChina was interested in a serious drive into Assam(as against its present apparent policy of puttingitself into a position to 'negotiate from strength'concerning the Aksai Chin area) would forceIndia to seek help from the only effective militaryallies it is likely to find, that is the Western powers.But short of these developments, India seemsdetermined to wear its non-alignment with adifference, rather than abandon it altogether.

No search for shelterAs to the rest of the non-aligned world, any

assumption that the sight of India's difficultieswould cause them to seek the shelter of theWestern camp must be discounted. If it werenormal to apply to oneself the experience ofothers, international politics would not present

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the sort of spectacle that it characteristically does.And there seems to be no doubt that China'sdiplomacy has been more successful than India'samong the powers concerned, and that many ofthem are inclined to view the present frontier-demarcation as an illgotten Indian legacy fromthe British imperialist past, and to accept with ashrug the Chinese desire to alter it, even by force.Moreover, though India's situation might beheld to illustrate the dangers to a militarily-weakpower of a policy of non-alignment, the situationof Cuba might equally be held to illustrate thedangers of an effort to shift from non-alignmentto a place in the military camp of one of thedominant powers. (Cuba was for a time assumedby the non-alignment powers to be one of them-selves : it was, for instance, invited to the BelgradeConference in 1961.)

Glacis against ChinaPerhaps the joint meaning of the two crises

for the minor powers will eventually resolve itselfinto a simpler and less agreeable form still: thatit is a hard world for militarily vulnerable states,and that the effective decisions remain with thedominant powers. However, the crucial pointfor the world at large is the effect of the newconditions of contest on the relations betweenthe dominant powers themselves, that is betweenRussia and America. The central riddle of Russianpolicy is whether its situation vis-a-vis China inthe local balance of power of the Communistworld could seem, to the Russian leadership, tohold more dangers to the Russian nationalinterest than its situation vis-a-vis America in theworld balance. One can think of many reasonswhy Mr Khrushchev or his successor mightjudge so, the chief being the possibility of 'nucleartriggering'. Obviously it would be a very complexequation, involving among other things the stateof the military balance as regards both Americaand China. But for the moment we are concernedonly with the way this relation affects Russianstrategy in the non-aligned world.

For Russia, the non-aligned states might beregarded as in a process of change from so manystalking-horses against the West to a glacis againstChinese aggrandizement within the Communistworld. Thus the Russian leaders have an interestin strengthening the position of the 'nationalcolonial bourgeoisie' - Messrs Nehru and Nasserand Sukarno, et al. The Russian line of policywith regard to India in the dispute with China

offers an exemplification. There is thus clearlymuch to be said from the Russian viewpoint in'damping down' revolutionary social ferment inthe under-developed world. On the other handit is to the interest of China, as the standard-bearerof militancy within the Communist camp, tostep up the struggle, not only because of potentialdirect accretions to her strength from waveringparties in the under-developed world, but becausea position of orthodoxy and intransigence (so longas a total rupture is avoided) may be useful forstrengthening its hand in negotiations with Russiaon other issues, like economic aid.

Thus, as members of the Communist bloc theChinese had nothing much to lose (save thesupport of the Indian party) by carrying theirfrontier-dispute with India to the point of openwar. Indeed, the further their advance pushedMr Nehru into alliance with the West, the bettertheir case against Mr Khrushchev on his supportof the 'colonial national bourgeoisie'. And ofcourse, as Chinese, they had a good deal to win,not only in the sense of the national claim todisputed territory, and a strategic strengtheningof control of Tibet, but in the demonstration ofmilitary ascendency in Asia and even the securing,ironically, of some support from the ChineseNationalists in Formosa. The unilateral Chineseproclamation of a cease-fire is an underlining ofsuccess, not an abandonment of it. It leaves themin a position to 'negotiate from strength' in threesenses. Vis-a-vis Mr Khrushchev it has provided ademonstration of how embarrassing a position hecan be pushed into if the struggle is renewed. Onthe territorial plane the areas of military occupancyseem designed to provide the basis for a 'com-promise' settlement that will endow China witha substantial area that India has long regarded asits own, the loss of which may damage Mr Nehruand his government domestically. The cease-fireitself and the virtuous protestations of readinessfor a negotiated settlement have placed onIndia the onus of renewing hostilities, at a timeand place in which the Indian army has shownitself at a disadvantage, against the urgings ofhis non-aligned friends of the Colombo conference,and at the risk of having to make concessions toPakistan which would be even less domesticallypalatable than any made to China. Mr Chou EnLai's reputation as a notably astute diplomatistis well sustained: one wonders how Mr Nehrunow feels about having helped this particulardjinn into his present sphere of influence in 1954.

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Yet even the wiliest players of the power-political game find their techniques to someextent governed by the real distribution of thecards of power and interest. The limits of Russianacquiescence in courses deemed likely to provedangerous to Russia itself has already beenpublicly indicated by Mr Khrushchev, in hisspeech of 12 December, 1962 pointing out that theAmerican so-called 'paper tiger' had nuclear teeth.One may also interpret the comparative non-chalance with which he accepted the outcome ofevents in Cuba as conveying some relief at havinghad it demonstrated to China how dangerous andintransigent the 'American imperialists' could bewhen their interests were threatened. The limitingfactor in Chinese ability to push its policies inthe tiers tnonde to extremes is the danger of creating(or enhancing) some kind of diplomatic consensus,or sense of common interest, between Americaand Russia. It is not fanciful to see the faint hintof such a development in their joint settlement ofthe Cuba crisis.

Mr Isaac Deutscher's analysis8 of the nature ofthe understanding reached between Khrushchevand Castro during the latter's recent visit toMoscow provides an interesting illustration ofthe mode in which the contest between Moscowand Peking for the loyalty of the revolutionaryleadership in the tiers monde does in fact operate tocreate a kind of common interest between Washing-ton and Moscow. According to Deutscher, Castroreturned home to repudiate his own and hisparty's 'unrealistic revolutionary idealism', andto assure the Cubans that they have no real groundsto fear American aggression, because of theprevalence of sound and realistic thinking inofficial Washington! If this is indeed Dr Castro'snew position, one might say that Mr Khrushchevhas succeeded in converting him to the view thatthe Americans had been failing to persuade him ofever since 1959. Even taking all this with a handfulof salt, its relevance to the growth of a minimaldiplomatic consensus between America and Russia,about the management of the world balance ofpower, seems obvious, and has been very shrewdlyand properly capitalized on by President Kennedyin his new initiative vis-a-vis Russia over the banon nuclear tests. For the underlying issue here-the nuclear weapons oligopoly —is the othermainstay of the potential minimal diplomaticconsensus between America and Russia. Together

8 Sydney Morning Herald, 19 June, 1963.

these two issues might prove strong enough tosustain a safety net of shared power interestsunder the perilous balancing-act of contemporaryinternational politics.

VietnamThis paper is being completed before the July

meeting of the Russian and Chinese Communistparties, and the author is therefore conscious thatwhat follows is itself a somewhat perilous balancing-act. Nevertheless, if one were determined to livedangerously one might hazard the view that thelogical area in which to expect a further working-out of this three-cornered conflict may perhaps beVietnam. If events were pushed towards a militarycrisis on the 1954 pattern in the south of thecountry, America would be faced widi the prospectof a greater degree of intervention, and thusRussia faced with the choice of a new confrontationwith American power or with selling down theriver a 'movement of national liberation' moregenuine than some. The question is whether thelocal situation is ripe for such a development. Itis obviously impossible through the screen of thecensorship for an outsider to know precisely whatthe military balance is, but such evidence as hasleaked through, concerning for instance theoperations at Ap Bac, early this year, offers somesimilarities to that in the north in 1953, not longbefore the showdown of Dien Bien Phu. In termsof the strategic theory propounded by the com-manding North Vietnamese general, Vo NguyenGiap, such conflicts pass through three stages,firstly guerilla harassment by 'local' forces,secondly more ambitious mobile operations by'regional' forces and thirdly a general offensiveby 'regular' troops. It is said that Western successeshave put the Communist drive off schedule, butone cannot overlook the possibility that the thirdphase may be impending. The VietnameseCommunist leadership, after some initial resistance,has apparently allowed itself to be induced intothe Chinese camp and the allurements for it of apossible victory in the south to match that in thenorth need no underlining.

One must therefore assume that a re-enactmentof the 1954 choice might in due course confrontPresident Kennedy-that is, a choice betweenfull-scale and overt American military involvementor a sharp deterioration in the military controlexercized by the South Vietnamese governmentin its section of the country. Grave as would be

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Ladakh and 'Azad Kashmir' — should not beoffered the status of a unified, independentState competent to seek membership of theUN. From such a solution neither India norPakistan can expect to gain any territory: in fact,both will have to renounce much of what theynow hold. But such a gesture will have for Indiaan immense moral value because it will be inaccordance with our age-long tradition of re-nunciation.

The people of Kashmir cannot hope for anyhigher status than complete independence andmembership of the UN. Once again I must turn tothe story of Indo-British relations for guidance.So long as Britain challenged our claim to indepen-dence as she did for 20 years, India's leadersinsisted on it in its extreme form — of severenceof the tie with Britain. But Mr (now Earl) Attlee'sclear declaration as Prime Minister in 1946 thatIndia was absolutely free to decide for herselfwhether to remain in the Commonwealth orto terminate that association dramatically alteredthe situation. We chose of our own free will toremain, as a republic, a member of the Common-wealth and have not regretted that choice.

If India were today to offer to Kashmir andher leaders a free choice of the State's futuredestiny, the change in the situation will be im-

mediate and striking. Whether Pakistan acceptssuch a solution or not need not be our concernat this stage. The world at large will acclaimit as a generous offer. The only condition I wouldattach to it is that Kashmir as an independentState should have her frontiers guaranteed byIndia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US, theU K and the Soviet Union. There will undoubtedlyhave to be arrangements to cover such mattersas trade, tourism, etc., following such a solution.

India may formally lose Kashmir as a partof her territory. But the gains will be immense.Financially, since her accession, the State hascost the Indian Exchequer some hundreds ofcrores; and every year, for her defence and develop-ment plans, the Centre allots enormous sums ofmoney. Even if, for a time, India agrees to makecontribution until Kashmir becomes viable, thesaving for us will be substantial. Secondly, theprotection of Ladakh, which today is our sole(and increasingly heavy) responsibility, willbecome the joint concern of the Powers thatguarantee Kashmir's frontiers, or of the UNshould she, as a member, seek the protection ofthe world organization. Morally, the gain forIndia will be incalculable for a voluntary act ofrenunciation which must win for us Kashmir'senduring goodwill and friendship.

Non-Alignment and thePower Balancecontinued from page 259

the dangers of such a situation, there would beone element of advantage for the West in it,lacking in the 1954 parallel. The conflict betweenRussia and China was at that time dormant orjust beginning to stir, whereas it is now so fully

developed as to exert an indubitable and perhapsdecisive influence on Russian choices. The twodominant powers have a major common interest:seeing that the strategic direction of worldcommunism does not pass to China. There is acertain irony in the reflection that the under-developed world from which Mr Nehru hopedto banish power-politics may prove the operativefactor in a shift in power-alignments as momentousas can well be imagined.

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