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Ann Arbor.MI 48106-1346 USA800-5210600THE QUEST FOR OPERATIONAL MANEUVERINTHE NORMANDYCAMPAIGNSimonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured BreakoutROMAN JOHANNJARYMOWYCZDepartment ofHistoryMcGill UniversitySeptember 1997Thesis submitted to the Faculty ofGraduateStudies and Research in partial fulfilment ofthe requirements for the degree ofDoetor ofPhilosophy1+1National Libraryof CanadaAcquisitions andBibliographie Services395 Wellington StreetOttawaONK1 A ON4canadaBibliothque nationaledu CanadaAcquisitions etservices bibliographiques395, rue WellingtonOttawa ONK1 A ON4canadaYou, file Votre rfr8tICBOur file Notre rfrenThe author bas granted a non-exclusive licence allowing theNational Library of Canada tareproduce, loan, distribute or sellcopies of this thesis in microfonn,paper or electronic formats.The author retains ownership of thecopyright in this thesis. Neither thethesis nor substantial extracts from itmay be printed or othetwisereproduced without the author' spermISSIon.L'auteur a accord une licence nonexclusive permettant laBibliothque nationale du Canada dereproduire, prter, distribuer ouvendre des copies de cette thse sousla forme de microfiche/film, dereproduction sur papier ou sur formatlectronique.L'auteur conserve la proprit dudroit d'auteur qui protge cette thse.Ni la thse ni des extraits substantielsde celle-ci ne doivent tre imprimsou autrement reproduits sans sonautorisation.0-612-44465-1CanadNC Roman Johann Jarymowycz 1997CONTENTSAcknowledgments ivList ofIllustrations viiList ofTables ixAbstract xAbstrait XlPrologue 1Chapter 1 Canadian Mechanization And Western Armoured Doctrine 12Chapter 2 Maneuver Warfare In The Beach Head - Two Armoured Battles 58Chapter 3 Breakout1: Operation Atlantic Jul 19 IIIChapter 4 Breakout 2: Operation Spring JuI25 145Chapter 5 Breakout 3: Operation Tota/ize Aug 8 184Chapter 6 Breakout 4: Operation Tractable Aug 14-21 228Chapter 7 Canadian Armour In Normandy 264Chapter 8 The Operational Art In Norrnandy -SHAEFvs STAVKA 299Appendix A Allied Armour Formations ETO 332Appendix B Armoured Corps Casualties 333Appendix C Sampling of Allied Tank Casualties 334Appendix D Analysis of Sherman Casualties: 6 June - 10 JuIy 335Appendix E Tank States 2 CAB Normandy June-August1944 336Appendix F Effective Tank Strengili 2nd Canadian Army July 1944 339Appendix G German Panzer Strength Normandy 1944 340Bibliography 341AIl Maps, Analyses and Charts are original art work drawn by the author.iACKNOWLEDGMENTSr m not sure l would recommend this to anyone over fifty. The hope thatexperience brings wisdom and practice makes perfect is poorly buttressed by stubbornhabits, failing vision and selective memory. In the end it is the love of history and themil itary that proves irresistible. Soldiers can only hope that any tactical interpretationsurvives close scrutiny -this applies more to amateur historians than their victims.It is necessary to thank a host ofkind supporters. lmust begin with Brian McKenna who,by including me in the process of creative historical drama, afforded me an opportunityfor research l would have never managed from a classroom in Pointe Claire. The headyexcitement ofhis film projects gave me the impetus to approaeh McGill University andseek admittance. This too would have not been possible without the help of my formerprofessors, Terry Copp and the late Robert Vogel, who cordially stood on my behalt:Sadly, Professor VogeI died before l could demonstrate any tangible effort for him taread.l have been fortunate enough to meet and learn from Canada's great militaryhistorians. The encouragement ofTerry Copp, Jack English and Stephen Harris has beensplendid and educating. They have shared important documents, offered sage advice andmost importantly, have given me the gift offriendship. l doubt very much l would havehad the opportunity to test any historical conclusion if not for Terry Copp's ensuringthere were symposiums at whieh to speak and journals whieh would publish an earlyeffort. Like Terry, Jack English has been both inspiration and sustenance. 1cannot resist asophomoric sense of awe that these gentlemen so willingly and cheerfully take the time tosupport historieal hoplites Iike myself:The research behind this thesis has been made possible by sympathetic academicsthroughout North America. l must particularly thank Mr. David A. Keough, Chief,Manuscript Branch at the United States Army Military History Institute, Upton Hall,Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Without bis guidance 1would not have discovered the UnitedivStates Army in its most aesthetic and important years. Upton Hall's Librarian, Mc. D.Slonaker took me into dusty dungeons and pointed out armoured studies that gavesubstance ta theory. The Direetor ofthe Patton Museum Library, Dr. John M. Purdy wasa generous hast and ensured 1left Fort Knox with enough data and insight fromthemanuscript collection ta do American Armor justice. Professor Reginald Roy' sgenerosity in sharing the Marshal Stearns Papers allowed me ta begin with an earlyinsight into Simonds and his peers. The ladies at McGill's InterLibrary Loan deliveredvital papers from obscure lands and at one point secured the entire collection ofCavalryJournals -ten shipping boxes worth. Academie thanks must include Mr. Earl Clark, myformer principal, who never forgot his historical roots and kindly permitted me ta betmant for an extra year when 1needed time most.Colleagues in the Military have offered support and opportunity. FormerCommanders ofCanadian Forces StaffCollege at Fort Frontenac, Brigadier GeneraisClive Milner and Bob Alden, ensured 1participated, as a Militia member ofthe DireetingStatI: on StaffCollege Battlefield tours in France and Germany. Leal John A.MacDonald kindly shared his notes and manuscript on the Canadian senior generalship.Colonel David M. Glantz offered encouragement and direction in my attempts tounderstand the Soviet Army and Deep Battle. Despite my seeming reserve towards theArtillery, 1am grateful ta two gunner officers, Leols Peter Kraemer and David Pattersonfor access to their libraries and collection of military pamphlets.Finally, 1am indebted ta two people without whose support 1would not havecompleted this effort: my wife, Sandra, and my mentor, Professor Desmond Morton. Thealmost miraculous appearance ofDoctor Morton from distant Mississauga resurrected awork that had been long donnant. With bath stick and carrot, he managed ta drive ascruffy Phoenix out of military ashes. His patience and detennination overcame my moststubborn inability ta listen ta common sense and the voice ofexperience. His militarydetermination ensured l fell into line and recognized pearls ofwisdom when they weregiven. As most staffcollege habitus, 1needed a senior OS ta clean up my tacticalapproach. Fortunately, his magistrator's gift to balance discipline with kindness andhumour made the experience a pleasant one. lcan ooly hope 1have not let him down.vMy wife overcame challenges that would have broken MOSt. She somehowmanaged to balance personal reversais, a successful professional career, the editorship ofthis thesis, and still create a splendid home lire. Her uncomplaining patience, creativity,and ever supportive wit were an inspiration and put iota perspective my own pettydifficulties with drowning chapters. Her unerring eye, a perfeet comprehension ofauftragstaktik, and a partisan alliance with Dr. Morton ensured the mission reached itsgoal. l cannat adequately express my gratitude.vi4.5.6.7.8.9.10.Il.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.23.24.ILLUSTRATIONSFigure Page1. The Royal Canadian Artnoured Corps (1914 - 1945)................................. 252. '. Western Infantry Main Battle Tank............................................................ 283. Western Armoured Divisions 1942 30Lessons From the Desert............................................................................ 32Desert Solutions......................................................................................... 35Western Armoured Divisions1943 39Canadian Armoured Division 1943-44 41The Royal Canadian Arrnoured Corps 1943. 42Western Armoured Divisions 1944 49Buron: 7 June 1944.................................................................................... 71North Nova Seotia Battlegroup and 25 S8 panzergrenadier: 7 June 1944... 75Buron: 1400 brs, 7 June 1944..................................................................... 78Buron 7 June 1944: Phase 1 and Phase 2.................................................... 81Buron 7 June 1944: Phase 3 and Phase 4.................................................... 86Le Mesnil-Patry Il June 1944: The Dempsey-Keller-Wyman Plan 96Le Mesnil-Patry Il June 1944: Maneuver Warfare 106Goodwood's Last Phase 20 July 1944: Operation Atlantic 128Ficst Battie ofVerrires Ridge: Phase 2......................................... 135Operations CobralSpring: Normandy Front 24 July1944........................... 149Operation Spring: Opposing Forces. 158Spring: 2 S5 Pz Korps Counterattaeks 173Spring 2S July 1944: Taetieal Analysis 179Operations CobraITotalize: Normandy Front 7 August 1944...................... 187Opposing Forces 1 Cdn Army Front 8 August 1944 193vii25. Totalize - Attaek Formation. 19626. The Allied Strategie Offensive - Operational Evolution............................... 23227. Four Battle Groups......................................................................................... 24928. Operations TotalizelTractable: Taetieal Analysis 25829. Canadian and German Main Battle Tanks: Franee 1944 27930. Allied and German Tank Destroyers: Franee 1944....................................... 29231. Allied Tank Casualties 31832. The Allied Strategie Offensive 325viiiTable1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.Il.12.13.14.15.16.17.TABLESPageGerman Panzer Units Normandy 1944 June -July 52Panzer Arm Strength. as at 7 lu.ne 1944 53Tank States 12 SS Panzer Division 7 -30 June 1944 922nd Canadian Corps: Operation Spring 153German Forces Facing 2nd Canadian Corps..... 1572nd Canadian Corps Int Summary No. 13 1572nd Canadian Infantry Division18 - 25 July 1944..................................... 160Armour Available ta Simonds for Phase 2 Totalize 213Simonds's Armoured Corps -Normandy 1944 243Strength for German Tank Forces in the West............................................ 275German Panzer Battalions vs. Canadian Tank Battalions............................ 276Tiger vs. Sherman Penetration 284Tank Losses from 136 Engagements 291German Tank Losses by Causation 1944-45 '" 2942 CAB Losses Operation Spring .. 3162 CAB Lasses Operation Tractable.. 316Allied Tank Casualties Sampling ETO 1944.............................................. 319ixABSTRACTTHE QUEST FOR OPERATIONAL MANEUVERIN THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGNMechanization signaled the end ofthe cavalry but the renaissance ofheavy cavalrydoctrine. The tank heralded the retum ofbreakthrough operations and maneuver warfare.Initially, the western cavaIries refused doctrinal revision and chose instead to fight bitterrear guard actions against Fullerist zealots.The Canadian Cavalry, prompted by Blitzkrieg's triumphs, effortlesslyevolvedinto a tank force - virtually overnight. Canadian doctrine, however, was ersatz. Denied itsown vast training areas, the aCAC WH sandwiched iota southem England and saddledwith British warfighting techniques developed-in the Western Desert. In Normandy,Canadian operational art was driven by GeneraIs Simands and Crerar, both gunners, whohad neither the skiII nor experience to conduet armoured warfare. Hampered by GeneralMontgomery' s inability to reproduce a strategie offensive comparable to thatdemonstrated on the Russian front, Allied armoured forces were squandered inmismanaged frontal attacks.In the United States, the attempts to protect the horse forced a praetorian's revoitthat ended with General Chaffee garroting the US Cavalry, eliminating it from futurebattlefields. The doctrinal dominance of the American Armored Force was subsequentlythreatened by a cabal under artillery General Leslie McNair who imposed the TankDestroyer philosophy. Internecine squabbles and economic nationalism preventedAmerica from producing a tank capable of meeting German panzers on even terms.Though failing technically, the US Armored force succeeded doctrinally via the Louisianamaneuvers and produced a balanced Armored Division. General Bradley' s 12th ArmyGroup arrived in France with a purposeful dogma that had been further refined at theCombat Command, Divisional, and Corps level in North Africa and Sicily.American annour maneuvered during Operation Cobra but it did not fight massedpanzers; this was saon redressed in Lorraine where American armoured doctrine reachedtaetical maturity. Canadian armaur fought tank battles throughout Operations Spring,Totalize and Tractable, but it did not maneuver. American and Canadian annour' s bestopportunitYfor strategie vietory occurred in Normandy. The Canadians, despite bettertanks and favourable terrain, failed operationally~ d received no second chance.xABSTRAITEn qute de manoeuvres oprationnelles lors de la Campagne de NormandieLa mcanisation marque la fin de la cavalerie -mais la renaissance des principes dela cavalerie lourde. L'utilisation des chars de combat marque le retour aux oprations enprofondeur et la guerre par des manoeuvres. Dans un premier temps, les cavaleries del'ouest repoussent Padoption de cette nouvelle doctrine et choisissent plutt de s'opposerfarouchement aux fanatiques de Fuller.Voyant les succs nonnes remports par le Blitzkrieg allemand, le Canada passe,presque du jour au lendemain, de la cavalerie la force blinde. Malheureusment, lanouvelle philosophie du Canada est inapplicable sur le terrain. Habitu aux grands espacespour les manoeuvres, le F.RB.C est cantonn au sud de l'Angelerre et soumis desstratgies de combat britanniques labores pour le desert. De plus, en Normandie, lesoprations militaires canadiennes sont sous le commandement des gnraux Simonds etCrerar, tous deux artilleurs et sans aucune exprience dans le commandement des divisionsblindes. Handicapes par l'incapacit du gnral Montgomery laborer une stratgieoffensive comparable celle dmontre sur le front russe, les forces blindes allies sontvictimes de mauvaises stratgies militaires.Aux Etats Unis, les tentatives de maintenir la cavalerie dbouchent sur la rvolted'une bande de hauts grads, rvolte toutefois touffe par le gnral Chaffee q u ~ du mmecoup, met fin la cavalerie amricaine, ainsi l'liminant des futurs champs de bataille. Ladoctrine de la prpondrance au recours l'infanterie dans l'arme amricaine fait ensuitel'objet d'une cabale de la part du gnral de l'artillerie Leslie McNair qui impose plutt laphilosophie de la destruction de la force blinde par les canons antichars mobiles. Cesdisputes internes et le nationalisme conomique des amricains les empchent de produireun vhicle blind apte tenir tte aux panzers allemands. Cependant, en dpit de cetteinfriorit technique, la force blinde amricaine russit laborer une stratgie lors demanoeuvres' en Louisiane: cela lui permet de former une division blinde quilibre. Le 12egroupe d'arme, sous les ordres du gnral Bradley, dbarque en France avec une stratgiebien arrte ayant fait ses preuves en Afrique du Nord et en Sicile.A l'occasion de L'Opration Cobra, la force blinde amricaine russit manoeuvrermais, lors de ces manoeuvres n'affionte pas une force organise de panzers allemands. Ellaxiaura le tire faire en Lorraine -moment o la doctrine quilibre de la force blindeamricaine atteint sa maturit tactique. La force blinde canadienne affronte l'ennemi lorsdes oprations Spring, Tota/ize et Tractable mais la manoeuvre stratgique n'y est pas. Laplus belle occasion pour les forces blindes canadienne et amricaine de remporter unevictoire stratgique a lieu en Normandie. Les canadiens, en dpit d'une supriorit techniqueet malgr un terrain de dbarquement favorable, chouent par manque de stratgie offensiveefficace et n'ont pas de seconde chance.xiiPROLOGUETHE QUEST FOR OPERATIONAL MANEUVERINTHE NORMANDY CAMPAIGNSimonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout Battle"There is no teacher like a bullet." Stacey' s terse summation of doctrinal realitycantains the nut ofthe tactical evolution. Whether in the execution ofbattle drills or theconduet of a strategie offensive, experience bred success. The evolution ofNorthAmerican armoured doctrine featured a steady repetition ofthe Allied-Axis ballet:apprenticeship under the unforgiving scowl of the veteran. German and Soviet skills werehoned inSpain, Poland, France, and the Russian steppes. American andCanadian doctrine survived the Mediterranean only to discover the bitter reality of theTiger and the Panther in the vexatious quest for operational maneuver.It May be argued that there is Iittle new to be said about Allied arms in theWestern European Theatre. In Canada, the dean ofmilitary history, Professor C. P.Stacey, has touched on most aspects. The more research condueted, the greater Stacey' sstature. In the Staff College Battle Field Studies, military historians walk the ridges andorchards, well-thumbed book in hand, quoting passages to each other -"Stacey 174,verse 9: 'Weil May the fields growgreen and lush upon its gntle slopesH.'." In the end,Stacey is not overly protective of Canadian arms; his eritical analysis ofNormandy isabout as good as it gets in military history. He is, nevertheless, weIl disposed towardsSimonds and Crerar.The Allied record in Normandy is irritating simply because we know we couIdhave done better. The extensive casualty rates to infantry and armour nearly exhaustedAmerican arms and created a political crisis in Canada. The dazzling success ofAmerican armour during Cobra's pursuit eclipsed the Canadian armoured batttes ofAugust, despite the fact that the vast majority ofAllied tank casualties tram direct guntireengagements occurred in 2nd Canadian Corps. The exultation ofOperational Maneuver,the clasing ofthe Falaise Gap, and the liberation ofParis obfuscated the reality oftaetical12deficiency. It required three bloody months and seven major Operations to drive theGermans out ofNormandy. This occurred despite total air supremacy and a strategiealnumerical advantage. The reasons fortactical frustration are technical, geographical, andprimarily, doctrinal.Western experience with armour lagged behind central and eastern Europe. By thetime the King and Roosevelt governments were elected, Hitler had already formed bisfifth panzer division and Stalin had an entire Mechanized Corps in his tank park. WhenFrance fell there were only fourteen light tanks in Canada and the American Army hadless than thirty modern armoured fighting vehicles. lThe United States Cavalry drovehorses iota battle en porte and disguised its few tanks as "combat cars" to avoidgenealogical feuding.Colonel F. F. Worthington formed a Canadian armoured corps in1940 withancient Renaults but no doctrine; conversely, General Adna Chaffee was dispatched toWashington as the stiletto of a doctrinal revoit spawned in Louisiana. Both producedsuperb armored forces that were social and material mirrors of each other but differedsharply in dogma. The Canadians were totally shaped by the British; the Americans,notwithstanding flirtation with French and German doctrine, were in the end, produets oftheir own philosophes.England, despite Fuller, had considerable mechanical and tactical difficulty withthe tank. No saoner had the Western Desert Army adopted the massed arrnoured attack asdoctrine, than Rommel began ta decimate their desert tank brigades by employing a moresophisticated form ofall arms cooperation in the maneuver battle. By the end oftheNarth African war, Allied numbers and air superiority defeated the Deutsches AfrikaKorps, but it would require more than shaking desert sand out of map cases to prepare forthe Tigers and Panthers prowling western France. The British, and subsequently theCanadians, failed to appreciate what a panzer division was and the constant1 C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada (roronto: Ryerson, 1940), 125, ancl LanyWorthington, Worthy (Toronto: MacMillan, 1961), 138. See, Brereton Greenhous, Dragoon - TheCentennial History orThe Royal Canadian Dragoons. 1883-1983 (Ottawa: Campbell, 1983), 284 and, JohnF Wallace MC, Dragons of Steel (Bumstown: General Store Publishing, 1995), 115. Harry C. Thomsonand Lida Mayo, The United States Anny in World War II The Ordnance Department: Procurement andfuum!y (Washington, D. C.: U. S. GovemmentPrinting Office, 1 9 6 0 ) ~ 201-202."By the lime Gennanyinvaded France in May 1940, the US Anny possessed only 28 new tanks (10 mediumand 18 light tanks)and 900 obsolete models scattered amongthe infantry, mechanized cavaIry, and ordnance depots."3reorganization orthe "empire" armoured division suggests near desperation. TheAmerican approach, inspired by Chaffee and the Louisiana maneuvers, was nearer themark. Despite considerable German example and abundant reports from the Europeantheatres, there is little evidence that Canadian armour was used correctly by its generaIs.This has not really been appreciated in Canadian military history. The disappointingAllied tactical record in Normandy has been attributed to Many causes: the primary one isGerman military skiII, but engineering failures are equally significant. The Allies built thewrong tanks and found themselves outgunned and outarmoured.. The Canadian Army developed its panzergrenadier doctrine far too late to enablethe annoured units to fight effectively. Its key generals were primarily artiIIery officerswhose views regarding armoured warfare were established before the war and onlymarginally evolved by the Iimited battie experience they were permitted. Although theAmerican army was committed toward the flexible operational groupings prescribed byChaffee, it soon handicapped itselfby creating a semi-permanent tacticai bureaucracythat began with the Combat Command and often extended down to the Task Force. TheAllied offensive was built around the conservative set piece attack, rather than the fluidbattle.Although North American armoured formations fought in North Afiica and Italy,it was only in France that classical armoured doctrine could be tested at the taetical,operational, and strategicallevel. For Canadians, the proper study of Armour restsexclusively in the Normandy campaign; for Americans, the Iessons begin with the pursuittowards the Seine and end with Patton' s operational counter stroke in the Battle oftheBuige.There is cumulative excellence in North American military history. Theaccomplishments ofC. P. Stacey, Terry Copp, John EngIish, J. L. Granatstein, DesmondMorton, and Reginaid Roy are impressive and well buttressed by American counterpartslike Martin Blumenson, R. F. Weigley and Carlo D'Este. Their review of archivaidocuments suggests there is cause for sorne dissatisfaction with Allied generalship.D'Este has made a convincing case against Montgomery; while Professors Granatsteinand Morton have noted at least one chink in Sirnonds's facade. English carefully recordsbath the casting ofthe Normandy Annyand the shortcomings ofits divisional4commanders while Copp has examined technical difficulties (what Smonds called"failure of minar tacties") and, with Bill McAndrew, the psychological effeets ofNormandy on the fighting man. Copp, who has written the greatest number oftaetical andoperational studies orthe 2nd Canadian Corps, considers Colonel English's effortsdeconstruetionist, and may regard this effort as particularly harsh. On the other hand, heacknowledges there is room for "technical analysis,,2 on the armoured battlefield.Ifthere is criticism to be made against A1lied commanders, and it is in theirinterpretation ofthe Operational Art. One hesitates to include Simonds, a CorpsCommander, in any discussion that centers araund - as any doctrinal discussion ofNormandy must -the technical application of the Strategie Offensive and the use ofarmoured forces as an instrumental part ofthat aim. It was perhaps more Crerar' shesitation to command rather than Simonds' s tactical dominance that elevates the latter tothe status ofArmy Commander.Conversely, it is Montgomery' s inabHity to achieve a strategie decision thatreduces him to the level ofa senior army commander in whose shadow Crerar, butespecially Dempsey, could not flower. The American army's faHure ta secure a totaltriumph in Normandy by slamming the daor shut at Chambois does not lessen Bradley' sstature as an Army Group Commander. For it was Hodges's bulldog tenacity coupledwith Bradley' s determination to claw through the bocage into "the green fields beyond"that set the stage for Patton to mirror Tukhachevsky. However, it was also Montgomeryand Bradley' s inability ta cope with Deep BattIe that permitted the bulk oftheWehrmacht to escape to fight again in Lorraine, Arnhem and the Ardennes.The Normandy-Lorraine historians -Weigley, Belfeld and Essame, Ellis, Wilmot,Blumenson and D'Este - placed beside their Canadian counterparts, present a phaIanx ofknowledge that is inspiring, intimidating and, in sorne cases, downright cruel. Belfeld andEssame lament: "It was unfortunate that the better trained British 2nd Army couId nothave been employed to close the Falaise Gap.,,3 BIumenson and D'Este are equally curt:"The First Canadian Army, by failing ta achieve its objectives quickly along the road to2 Terry COPPJ unpublished manuscript on Operation Totalize, deIivered at the Military HistorySeminar at Wilfrid Laurier University, 3 May 1997.J Eversley Belfeld and H.. EssarneJ The BattIe for Nonnandy (London: Pan, 1983), 233.5Falaise, provoked profound disappointment and helped to pralong the existence oftheFalaise gap, the German escape route.,74; "... the slowness in closing the two gaps, themost important ofwhich was the inability ofthe Canadians ta develop their operationsmore quickly."s By far the most critical assessments were made by Stacey himself:It is not difficult ta put one's finger upon occasions in the Normandycampaign when Canadian formations failed to make the most oftheiropportunities. In particular, the capture ofFalaise was long delayed, and itwas necessary to mount not one but two set-piece operations for thepurpose at a time when an early closing ofthe Falaise Gap would haveinflicted most grievous hann upon the enemy and might even,conceivably, Rave enabled us to end the war sorne months sooner thanactually was the case. AGerman force far smaller than our own, takingadvantage of strong ground and prepared positions, was able ta slow ouradvance to the point where considerable German forces made their escape.That this was also due in part to errors ofjudgment south of the Gapshould not blind us to our own shortcomings.5Stacey' s reflections invite closer inspection of both Anny Groups. While theterms "operational maneuver" and "glubokii boi" (deep battle) May not have penetratedinto Camberley, Kingston and Leavenworth by 1939, their essential elements, debatebetween "attrition" and "maneuver," were established. Although "Maneuver Warfare" isa relatively new term, its sum and substance are not. Allied (and this certainly includesAmerican) "errors ofjudgment" begin weil before Normandy and Africa. The fact thatBradley broke out and maneuvered with five armoured divisions rather than seven or nineinvites careful investigation of General L. J. MeNair's Tank Destroyer doctrine.Canadian General Charles Foulkes, a veteran orthe Nonnandy battles, candidlynoted: " When we bumped into battle-experienced German troops we were no match forthem. We would not have been successful had it not been for our air and artiUerysupport.'" This is seconded by Major General Harry Foster, a cavalry officer, whocommanded infantry formations in Normandy:4 Martin Blumenson, The HattIe ofthe GeneraIs (NewYork: WilliamMorrowand Company,1993). 269.S Carlo D'Este, Decision in Nonnandy (NewYork: Harper Perennial1983). 457.6 Colonel C. P. Stacey, Official History orthe Canadian Army in the Second Wortd War. Volumem. The Vigory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe. 1944-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,1966), 275-2767 Stacey, Vic:torv Campaign. 276.6We were no match for Germans once they were dug in. It could be arguedthat everything being equaI, defenders a1ways hold an advantage overattackers. But in Normandy everything wasn't equal. We held theadvantage; in the air; at sea and on the ground. Yet every time our troopsgot beyond the range ofsupporting artillery or sour weather grounded ourfighter bomber cover, the Germans stopped us cold.8The two are often quoted together and serve primarily to extend phantasm to the Normanbattlefield. Military history has innocently perpetuated or given approval en passant to amix ofmyths. These include overstated German tactical and technical excellence, theoverstated effects of taetical and strategical air superiority, and alleged existence ofoverwhelming AlIied numerical dominance.Our military history is both too critical and tao forgiving. It bestows exaggeratedvirtues to Teutonic warriors yet denies kudos to the German operational commanderswho fiustrated Bradley, bested Dempsey and stymied Crerar. Our history exculpates tooreadily the sins and errors made by operational chiefs. Indeed, Montgomery and Simondshave become virtual sacred cows. But this is more a Canadian vice. Weigley is not afraidto say: "Montgomery not only erred but persisted in error for days on end in hisjudgement of the Canadians'pace toward Argentan.,,9 The Canadian historian must riskre-examination of the Normandy pillars. Any investigation ofSimonds leads to Crerar, amiddleman and a compliant sign post painting towards Montgomery. Here historianshave left sorne room for maneuver. Acritical analysis, particularly an armoured doctrinalstudy ofNormandy, may not plow totally virgin ground, but will uncover a few newstones and buried icons.For if the Canadian Army has few champions, the Canadian Armoured Corps hasevenOur best historians did not write from the back ofa sabretache. This is not tosuggest that the Service Corps or the Queen ofBattle cannot be sympathetic to the armeblanche or familiar with its doctrinal raison d'tre. Professors Granatstein and Mortontook the gloves offin "Bloody Victory" when they wrote ofSimonds's armoured plan forTractable: "The result was a scheme few coffee-table strategists would use - even in8 Tony Fostert Meeting ofGenerais (Toronto: 1986)t 366.9 Russell WeigleYt Eisenhowerts Lieutenants (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990),216.7desperation." 10 Professor English has initiated sorne censure ofdivisional commanders,but in the end he saved his strongest criticism for Canadian annour: "Without questionthe tank arm remained the weakest link in the Anglo-Canadian order ofbattle."1L Bothstatements deserve careful scrutiny - it remains ta extend the Granatstein and Mortonthesis and include Operations Spring, At/antie and Cobra in the investigation.There are no operational studies of American and Canadian armour in Normandy.Fuller, Liddell Hart, Macksey and the authors12of a handful ofunit histories includepassing reference to American and Canadian tanks. Kitching certainly gives it a serioustry, but in the end there is ne>eanalysis that traces the resurreetion of cavalry as a break.through weapon, or offers a sympathetic shoulder for both the RCAC and the ArmoredForce. The terms "grand taetieal," "operational" and "strategieal" are sometimes raised,often incorreetly, but critieal examination is rare.The employment of massed tanks as an operational weapon that is capable ofstrategie result is not weIl understood by Canadian military historians. In fact while Hpservice is given ta tank attack, the majority ofNorth American historians have little or noarmoured experience. Worse, they fail to recognize the passion and the technical acumenrequired to effect a Blitzkrieg or an effective pursuit. The final suceess, or near strategievietory attained in Normandy, can only be properly understood in terms ofDeep Battle10 1. L. Granatstein and DesmondBloody Victorv (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys,1984), 173. British historian Richard Lamb presents a baJanced anacked on Montgomery which, though itnulS sorne friendly interference? makes it clear the commander of 21st Anny Group was neither decisivenor tactically perspicacious. Sec: R. Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943 - 1945 - Success or Failure?(London: Buchan & 1960).Il John A English, The Canadian Anny and the Normandy Campaign (New York: Praegert 1994).312.11 British technica1 and doctrinal evolution is weil covered by Lieutenant..General Sir Gifford le QOur Annoured Forces (London: Faber and Fabert 1945), Lord Carver, The Apostles of Mobility(NewYork: Lees Knowles LecturestHolmes and Meier Pubt 1979), Robert H Larsan, The British Armyand the Theorv of Annoured Warfare 1918 .. 1940 (Newark: University ofDelaware Press, 1984), KennethMacksey, The Tank Pioneers (NewYork: Janes, 1981).A. J. Snthers' two first rate efforts: ANewExcalibur - The Development of the Tank 1909-1939(London: Grafton, 1986) and, Rude Mechanica1s - An Account OfTank Maturity DuringThe SecondWorld War (London: Leo Cooper,1987). In addition, H. W. Winton, Ta Change an Anny General SirJohn Bumett-Stuart and British Armoured Doctrine. 1927-1938 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,1988). American unit histories include: Donald E. Huston Hen on Wheels (San Martin: Presidio?1977)?Robert S,Lucky Forward. The History orPatton's Thini US Anny (NewYork: VanguarclI947),George F. Hoffinan, The Super Sixth: Histoty orthe 6th Armored Division in World War II (Kent: KentState University Press, 1979); see also: General E. L. M, Burns Mud (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1970). Thereare no Canadian divisional studies.8and Operational Maneuver. The West's unpreparedness, particularly Canadian, ought tabe reviewed from a mechanized cavalry point ofview because, despite the cacophony ofclaims for either ofthe two other combat arms, it is armour and only armour that was andis the arm ofdecision.There exists a venerable hast ofEuropean armour aficionados who trace thesocial, political, technical and, to an extent, taetical history ofthe tank. The ranks ofarmour historians diminish as one crosses the ocean west. Despite the many fineAmerican and Canadian efforts ta describe armour as a symbiotic energy, the interestedhistorian is left considerable room for maneuver. For the military analyst prepared toexamine the historical record with one eye on the existent doctrinal curriculum, thetaetical battlefield begs to be tilled. It should be understood that.save for Normandy,Lorraine and the Third Army counter stroke in the Ardennes, there are no other occasionsfor grand tactical and operational study of armour on the western front.The effect ofEuropean development in the thirties is clearer when examinedthough the reports ofMilitary Liaison Officers and the personal papers of American staffofficers, many ofwho become Yankee "apostles ofmobility" and future captains ofarmour. War Diaries and manuscripts, particularly the collections at the NationalArchives in both Ottawa and the United States Army Military History Institute, form thefoundation ofany armoured study. The ETHINT collection at Carlisle includes the vastbody ofETO interviews and unit tactical accounts - many ofwhich are translated. It isthe radio logs, in supplement to War Diaries, that are the most informative, particularly ifthe historian is fortunate enough to discover battle entries recorded in pencil - far moreinteresting than the detoxified typed versions signed off by a commanding officer monthslater.Canadian National Film Archives and the cinematic archives at both The LibraryofCongress and the British War Museum, are equally important sources ofhistoricalrecord. AlIid and Axis cinema teams often shot combat footage on the day ofkeyactions. WeathertvisibilitYt ground conditions, even orders of battle, can often heconfirmed. The reports of2nd Operational Study Group at first seem to unfairlycontradiet established Air Force accounts until the historian reviews a hundred guncamera reels ofTyphoons and P47s assaulting German armour and realizes the plight of9the pilot pressing home an attack deep behind enemy lines. Only a fraction dared to golowenough or close enough before releasing their rockets. The majority let fly weiloutside lethal ranges for small arms or light tlak. It is a wonder that any tanks were hit atail, and in fact, few were.University studies ordered by the AGF to supplement the technical studiesconducted by the Aberdeen Proving Grounds are invaluable complements to Lullworth,Bovington, Schrivinham and BRAC!ASG studies serving ta better illustrate the technicallimitations of armoured warfare and the real effects ofthe engineering failure. Theseappear to be passed over by historians -this may be due ta a certain unfamiliarity withtank: combat or a hesitation ta reviewtechnical data. But this is appropriate for a study ofannoured doctrine and the accumulated data (now far easier to study via the computer),presents a clearer illustration of the brutal consequences of technical inferiority, poorplanning, and the dangers ofintemecine competition.Operational investigations are best supplemented by a look at the other side orthehill. German archives in Freiburg are vital aides to any comprehensive understanding ofNormandy. Often, battles which figure prominently in American and Canadian histories,are tactical asides to Dietrich's Corps or von Kluge's Army Group. Conversely,seemingly secondary actions, virtually ignored by western official histories, tum out to beimportant efforts determinedly conducted by a panzer corps, or, in one case, the effort ofan entire Army. It is engaging to review Leibstandarte documents and discover that Tilly-la-Campagne, more a Canadian embarrassment than final triumph C'Congratulations,you've been kicked out ofTilly again"13), is the stuffoflegends in Schutzstaffel history.Imagine hardened lst SS Panzergrenadiers, veterans ofRussia, Italy and France, relaxingin a Kneipe, singing "Der Schlacht bei Tilly -Montecassino der Leibstandarte AdolfHitler." There are effiJsive articles, songs, even poems14written about the Leibstandarte'sstruggle with Canadians aver Verrires Ridge, which consisted of a series ofsmaIl unitactions almst forgotten by the Canadian Military.[3 DHist. 86/544 Crerar Papers. Montgomery to Crerar, 9 August 1944.l4 Correspondance Professor Gerhard Stiller; unpublished manuscript Pz.. 1SS LAHNonnandie 1944"', Stuttgart, 1990, 1991; unpublished manuscript "Nonnandie 1944 .. BeitragHeinz Wolfel(Kompanietnlpp 7. Pz. Rgt. 1)"; unpublished manuscript: Montecassino der Kompanie : gef. vonRolfEhrbardt" and, Rudolf Lehmann und RalfTiemann Die Leibstandarte Band IV/I (OsnablllCk: MuninVerlag,10Schutzstaffel histories were initially dismissed, unfairly, as propaganda butseveral are excellent. Lehmann and Tiemann's efforts on behalfofthe Leibstandarte andHerbert Frbringer for the 9th SS Hhenstauffen are particularly instructive. Adisappointingly small number ofGerman histories are available in English; HubertMeyer's long awaited Kreigsgeschichte der 12.SS-panzerdivision Hitletjugend wasfinally translated in 1994; Lehmann was not available until 1996. The remainder are leftto the determined historian arrned with basic German and a good dictionary. Examinationof the expedient Morgend and Abendmeldungs submitted ta Heeresgruppe Bheadquarters offer a better appreciation ofa squadron's defence ofSt. Andr in the deaththroes ofSpring or the practice of the operational art via the Auftragstaktik doctrine usedagainst Simonds during Totalize and Tractable.Although the armoured corps is chastised for alleged taetieal shorteomings, it isoperational failure whieh constitutes the real problem. Tactieal collapse at this level begsserious finger pointing at Simonds, Crerar, and their bosses. This should, in fairness,inelude General Eisenhower for he relinquished his tactical burden ta a bibelot trom thedesert.2nd Canadian Corps has long been deprived of critical operational analysis. Thisis perhaps because the technical complexities ofarmoured warfare at the tactical andoperationallevel are generally not weil understood. The existence of a "Great TankScandai" and its effect on American and Canadian armour is grasped in general but nottranslated in terms oftactical and operational consequences. Gunnery, flotation,mechanicaI reliability, and protective armour demand comparative study. Daily tankstates often offer a clearer picture of combat than War Diaries. Comprehensive taeticalevaluations serve to answer basic questions. What killed tanks? How did tacticalmaneuver figure in actual combat scenarios? A pure tank battle, whether in Normandy orLorraine, deserves close, indeed, sympathetic study.American success during Cobra overshadows the faet that Patton, when facedwith a decision between maneuver and attrition, chose a most uncavalier option at Metz.The faet that Canadian armour finally does break out is overlooked or diminished.American armour maneuvered during Operation Cobra, but it did not fight massedpanzers. This was saon redressed in Lorraine where American armoured doctrine reachedf11tactical maturity. Canadian armour fought tank battles throughout Operations Spring,Totalize and Tractable, but it did not maneuver. Canadian armour's greatest opportunityfor strategie victory occurred in Normandy. It is appropriate that an armoured officerreview these matters, pick up the thrown gauntlet, and attempt ta explain the armouredbattlefield.CHAPTERONECANADIANMECHANIZATION AND WESTERN ARMOURED DOCTRINEGetting Ready for NormandyThe horses seemed to realize that sometlngWlusual was afcot, as saon they weremoving along very steadily with ears pricking and nostrils sniffing the new territolYwith. . great interest"A" Sqn RCD: route march from St John to Petawawa, JuIy 19371The Canadian Cavalry passed effortlessly from horse to tank. Unlike theirconfrres in America, there were no bitter doctrinal battles or opposing philosophies to bevanquished. This happened largely because the Canadian Cavalry missed the interim stepof initiatory mechanization and its accompanying baggage: the struggle for doctrinalcontrol. By the end ofthe Great War, the Cavalry was a professional force with creditablebattle experience perfected over four years of combat. With little fanfare, Canada haddeveloped the components of a rather sophisticated mechanized force which includedcavalry, tanks, and armoured cars. The first modern AIlied mechanized formation on theWestern Front was the Canadian MotorMachine Brigade2whose armoured carsdistinguished themselves in severaI battles throughout 1916 - 1917. It was raised inMontreal by private funds and permitted ta take part in operations in France as anexperiment. Commanded by the eccentric Brigadier General R. Brutinel, the "compositebrigade" performed particularly weil as a mobile rearguard during the last Germanoffensive.3However, while effective in favourable terrain, the brigade was not capable of1 Military Gazette Vol. XVOct 37. The March of"A" Sqn RCD from St Iohn PQ to PetawawaMilitary Camp, Ontario, 13 Jul-25J u ~ 1931.2 "Bngac" in the artillery sense, actually a battalion. The unit wu initially organized as squadrons (8cars, 16 Vickers HMGs, two per car). Designated Automobile Machine-Gun Brigade No. 1CEF on 15 Sept1914, the unit cornprised 230 men and 20 annouredcars. Commercial chassis by the Autocar Company ofArdmore, Pa., annoured with 10mmBethlehemSteel plate and anned with two Vickers HMG.3 LtCol W. K. Walker, "The Great Gennan Offensive, March 1918, With Sorne Accounts of theCanadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade", COQ, Vol IX. "The tactical annoured car wt is four cars andsomust not be split up.'" 412. Sec also, G. W. L. Nicholson, Canaman Expeditionary Force 1914-1919,(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), 432. Redesignated151 Canadian Motor Machine-GunBrigade, CEF on16 May 1915. In 1919 it became151 Motor Machine GunBrigade, Canadian Machine Gun Corps. On 1Oct1213accompanying attacking infantry. With a foot in the door of a future doctrine, theCanadian Corps went on to arder modem armoured fighting vehicles. The 1st CanadianTank Battalien4was authorized in May 1918, anived in the UK on 21 Iune and begantraining. Asecond battalion was formed in the fall, before the Armistice. By May 1919,both units were disbanded as indeed was the veteran army -Ottawa was anxious ta riditselfofa tao large and expensive machine that was really only good for killing Gennans.The post war Canadian military abandoned its Corps structure, dismissed its divisions,and even declined to field brigades. With the disbanding of the Motor Machine GunBrigade and the Tank Battalions, therewas no force left to argue on behalf of armour.Without tanks or an ersatz Royal Tank Corps (RTC) in its midst, the Cavalry resurfacedas a better model of the force that participated in the Boer War..The decade after the war offered minimal opportunity to train, although sornetrials were conducted.sThe arrivai oftwo Vickers light tanksin 1927 encouraged tankadvocates but did not advance Tank Doctrine.6The Canadian Cavalry remained on theperiphery oftactical evolution.' The two remaining active regiments, The LordStrathcona' s Horse and The Royal Canadian Dragoons, were divided into independentsquadrons stationed hundreds of miles apart and conducted training better suited tagamson duty in Palestine or Tndia.8Cavalry officers followed the mechanization debates35 it was convened to15t Armoured Car Regiment and rmally, on15 Oec 35 amalgamated with the 6thDuke ofConnaught' s Royal Canadian Hussars, a Montreal Cavalry regiment designated for mechanization:Duncan Crow, British and Commonwealth Annoured Fonnations