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VickiC.Jackson1

Introduction:OfBrandeisandtheDemocraticDeficitinNationalPolitics

Intheearlypartofthe20thcenturyLouisBrandeis,agreatprogressive

crusaderandoneofthefirst"publicinterest"lawyersinournation'shistory,argued

infavorofallowingthedifferentstatestoserveaslaboratoriesofexperimentation

ineconomicregulation.2Andheimplementedthisattitudeindecisions,asa

SupremeCourtjustice,rejectingchallengestostatelawsrestrictingeconomic

competitionandregulatingcommercialactivity.3

Thevirtuesofsmallercommunitiesassitesofdecision-makingwere

obscuredby"statesrights"rhetoricofthemid-20thcenturyanti-raceequality

movement,amovementthatstillcastsalongshadowoveranumberofsouthern

states.Butinlightofdevelopmentssincethemid-20thcentury’suglyinvocationof

statesrightstoprotecttheracialcastesystemexpressedinsegregation,our

thinkingaboutconstitutionalfederalismneedstobereconsidered,asbothpolitical

liberalsandconservativesexplorethevalueofdegreesofautonomousdecision-

makingatthestateandlocallevel.

Suchrenewedthinkingaboutfederalismalsoneedstotakeintoaccountthe

changesintherepresentativecharacterofthestatelegislaturesasaresultofthe1WiththankstoRobertTaylor,MichaelTaylor,MarthaMinow,JohnManning,DickFallon…forhelpfulconversations.2SeeNewStateIceCo.v.Liebman,285U.S.262,---(1932(Brandeis,J.,dissenting).SofarasIamaware,hedidnothaveinmind"experiments"insuchbasicrightsasthoseprotectedbytheFourthAmendmentorFirstAmendment(thoughasJeffRosensays,neitherwasheacrusaderforracialequality).Butineconomicmatters,Brandeiswasafanofsmallness,wherepeoplecouldlearnfactsandparticipateinmakingdecisions.3SeegenerallyPhillipaStrum;JeffRosen[biographiesofBrandeis].

NotforCirculationorDistributionbeyondHooverInstituteWorkshopMarch10,2017;notforcitationorquotationwithoutspecificpermissionoftheauthor.

2

WarrenCourt’sreapportionmentdecisionsandtheVotingRightsAct.4Incontrast

toprevailingimagesintheearly1960sofstatelegislaturesasreflecting

malapportioned,frequentlyraciallyexclusionaryelectorates,statelegislaturesand

governorsnowmayhaveasomewhatstrongerrepresentativedemocraticcharacter

–inrepresentingthepeopleoftheirjurisdiction–thandoestheCongressin

representingallthepeopleoftheUnitedStates.5

AsChiefJusticeEarlWarrenwroteinReynoldsv.Sims,"Fullandeffective

participationbyallcitizensinstategovernmentrequires...thateachcitizenhavean

equallyeffectivevoiceintheelectionofmembersofhisstatelegislature.Modern

andviablestategovernmentneeds,andtheConstitutiondemands,noless."6

Althoughbythe1950sanumberofthestatelegislatureswereseverely

malapportioned,andstategovernmentssubjecttomassivecritiqueasineffective

4SeeVickiC.Jackson,TheWarrenCourtandthePostWorldWarIIModelofConstitutionalFederalism,inEARLWARRENANDTHEWARRENCOURT(HarrySchiebered.2006).UntiltheVotingRightsActwasfullyimplemented,therewerestatesinwhichsohighaproportionofadiscreteracialminoritywerenotvotingthatthedemocraticlegitimacyofthestategovernmentcouldbequestioned.Todaythatislesstrue.5Assumptionsorquestionsthatrequirefurthercheckingbeforepaperisfinalized:IassumethatpriortotheVotingRightsAct,AfricanAmericanslivinginpartsofthecountryoutsidetheSouthwerenotassystematicallyexcludedfromvotingastheywereintheSouth,andthustheHouseofRepresentatives--totheextentitreflectedvotingbyamoreinclusiveelectorateinsomeofthestates–mayhavehadgreaterdemocraticlegitimacythanthelegislaturesinstatesthatsystematicallysuppressedAfricanAmericanvoting.Astartonthisresearchisathttp://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-Congress/(showingthatthereweresomeAfricanAmericanrepresentativesintheCongressbetween1871and1901;andthennoneuntil1929,whenanAfricanAmericanfromIllinoisiselectedtotheHouse;in1945bothIllinoisandNewYorkhadoneAfricanAmericanmemberoftheHouse;in1955athird,andin1957,afourth,fromPennsylvaniaandMichiganbecamemembers;in1967thereweresevenAfricanAmericansintheCongress,allfromnorthernstatesorCalifornia).Anotherquestiontocheckistheeffectsofdistrictsizeintherepresentativenessofstatelegislatures,ascomparedtotheHouseofRepresentatives,withrespecttopartisanaffiliation.Iassumebutneedtocheckthatthestatesallusefirstpastthepostwinnertakeallvotingfortheirstatelegislatures.6ReynoldsvSims,377U.S.at565(1964)(emphasisadded).


3

andoutoftouchwithcurrentneeds,7thisbegantochangeinthelate1960s,after

theWarrenCourt'sone-person,one-votedecisions.Asaresultofthesedecisions,

statelegislaturesmustbeapportionedbypopulation,inboththeirupperandlower

houses.8Improvementinthequalityofstategovernmentseemedtofollow.9That

thereapportionmentdecisionswouldhaverevitalizingeffectonstategovernments

wasanticipatedbysomeprescientscholarsatthetime.10Indeed,levelsoftrustin

stategovernmentsvis-a-visthefederalgovernment--begantoriseinthelate

1960s;11today,oneseesgreaterconfidenceexpressedinthestategovernments

thaninthefederalgovernment.12(Moreover,allstategovernorstodayaredirectly

elected;intheearly19thcenturymanywereappointedbylegislatures.13)

7Seee.g.ROBERTMCKAYREAPPORTIONMENT:THELAWANDPOLITICSOFEQUALREPRESENTATION36-40(1965)(describinggovernancefailuresinthestates).8Reynoldsv.Sims(1964);Lucasv.44thGeneralAssemblyofColorado(1964).9SeeVickiC.Jackson,TheWarrenCourtandthePostworldWarIIModelofConstitutionalFederalism,inEARLWARRENANDTHEWARRENCOURT159-60(HarrySchiebered,2006)(arguingthattheWarrenCourt,contrarytotheargumentsofsomescholars,wasgoodforthestatesandforfederalism);seealsoFerguson,IntroductiontoStateExecutives,infranote13(notingeffectofreaportionment,promotedbythecourt,ingivingstategovernmentsnewenery).10See,e.g.ALPHEUSMASON,THESUPREMECOURTFROMTAFTTOWARREN262-63(1964)(arguingthatreapportionment"maybetterequipthestatestomeettwentiethcenturyneeds,revitalizingratherthandisablingtheseessentialunitsoflocalgovernment").11SeeM.KentJennings,PoliticalTrustandtheRootsofDevolution,inTRUSTANDGOVERNANCE218,239(ValerieBraithwaite&MargaretLevieds.1998);seealsoWARRENEMILLLER&SANTATRAUGOTT,AMERICANNATIONALELECTIONSTUDIESDATASOURCEBOOK1952-1986,at256(1989)(findingthatconfidencelevelsinstategovernmentsbegintorisebetween1968and1972,whileconfidenceinthefederalgovernmentdoesnotbegintofalluntilafter1972).12Gallup,TrustinGovernment(showinginSeptember2016,higherlevels(63%)whohadafairorgreatamountofconfidenceintheirstategovernmentthaninfederalgovernment(44%ondomesticissues,49%oninternationalissues);inSeptember1972,therewerehigherlevelsofconfidenceinthefederalgovernment(70%ondomestic,75%oninternational)ratherthaninstategovernments(63%))http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx13Atthefoundingthiswasnotthecase.SeeMargaretFerguson,IntroductiontoStateExecutives,EagletonInstitueofPolitics,RutgersCenterontheAmericanGovernor,athttp://governors.rutgers.edu/on-governors/us-


4

TheCongress,bycontrast,isconstitutionallymalapportioned,with

Wyomingandits584,000peoplehavingtwoSenatorswhileCalifornia,withits38.8

millionpeoplehasthesametwoSenators.Atthiswriting,thereare52Republican

SenatorsintheU.S.Senate,a48Democrats(actually46Democratsand2

independents,whogenerallycaucuswiththeDemocrats).Basedonstate

populationsinthe2010Census,14the52Republicansrepresent136million

Americans.The48Democratsrepresentroughly172million.15Sowehavea

countermajoritarianSenateatthepresenttime.16Althoughthe"equalsuffrage"for

statesruleofthesenatewasmalapportionedfromthebeginning,thedegreeof

malapportionmenthasincreaseddramaticallyovertime.17Andtheequalsuffrage

provisionfacesanevenmoredifficultamendingprocedurethanotheramendments

totheU.S.constitution,whichis,inturn,farmoredifficulttoamendthanstate

constitutions.

governors/introduction-to-governors/introduction-to-governors-chapter-1/(explainingthatgovernors,attheFounding,werequiteweakandinsomestateswereappointedbythelegislatureratherthanbeingdirectlyelected;followingAndrewJackson'selectionin1828,manystatesbegantoswitchfromappointedtoelectedgovernors).14ForstateswithtwoDemocraticSenators,ortwoRepublicanSenators,allofthestatepopulationisattributedtothatpartyinmycalculations.InstateswithoneSenatorfromeachpartythestatepopulationwassplitinhalfandallocatedaccordingly.Seenote[15]belowfortreatmentofthetwoIndependentSenators.15ThetwoindependentsarefromVermontandMaine.Ifthenumbersrepresentedbytheseindependentsaresubtractedfromthetotalrepresentedbythe46registereddemocrats,those46stillrepresent171million.16TheSenatehasbeenmalapportionedfromthebeginningofourcountry’shistory,ofcourse.However,thedegreeofmalapportionmentbetweentherepresentationofthesmallest,andlargest,stateshasincreasedbyafactorofaboutfive.Seeinfranote75(largesttosmallestpopulationstateshadrationof13:1in1790,and67:1in2010).Moreover,themostpressingconsiderationsthatdrovethecompromisethatledtotheallocationofsenatorsintheSenatehavelongsincedisappeared,asslaveryhasbeenabolished,seeHenryMonaghan,WethePeople[s],OriginalUnderstandingandConstitutionalAmendment,96Colum.L.Rev.121,145(1996)(describingconcernfor,interalia,protectingslavestatesundergirdingprovisionsofArticleV),andmajorregionaldifferencesdiminished,seeFeeley&Rubin,FederalismasaNationalNeurosis,[cite],thoughnotdisappeared.17Seeinfranote75.


5

ThePresidentiselectedthroughtheElectoralCollege,whichhastheeffectof

disproportionatelyweighingvotesinsmallpopulationstates.Thisaspectofthe

ElectoralCollegehasbeenhighlysignificant:Twiceinthelastsixteenyears

presidentshavebeenchosenwholostthepopularvotenationwide.The

malapportionmentofthepresidentialelectionsystemalsomeansthatU.S.

Presidentsdonothavethesamedegreeofelectorallegitimacy(vis-a-vistheir

constituents)fromarepresentativedemocracyperspective,asdostategovernors.

ThecurrentPresidentlostthepopularvotebutwontheElectoralCollegevote.

ItistheCongressandthePresidentwhoarethelawmakinginstitutionsof

thenationalgovernments.18Thereisnowagreaterriskatthenationallevelthat

legislationwillbeenactedandexecutiveactiontakenthatisinconsistentwiththe

viewsofthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesthanthereisthat,inanygivenstate,

legislationwillbeenactedinconsistentwiththeviewsofthepeopleofthatstate.19

Thereis,inotherwords,asignificantstructural"democraticdeficit"inournational

lawmakingprocessesvis-a-visthoseofthestates.20

18Asshownintext,thePresidencyandtheSenatearepresentlycountermajoritarianinstitution,measuredbythevotesoftheconstituenciestheyrepresent.WithrespecttotheHouseofRepresentatives:AccordingtoBallotpedia,inHouseelectionsin2016,Democratsreceived61.7millionvotes,andRepublicansreceived63.1million,whilemorethan3millionvoteswerecastforIndependentcandidates.With49%ofthevoteRepublicanscontrolled55%oftheHouseseats;theDemocrats,whowon48%ofthevote,held44%oftheHouseseats.Seehttps://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_201619Thedistortingeffectsofthetwosenatorsruleonnationaldecisionmakinghaslongbeenobserved.Seee.g.GillianMetzger,StLouisUniv,at1075n142015citingsources.20IdonotmeantosuggestthatdemocraticrepresentativelegitimacyonapercapitabasisistheonlyformofdemocraticlegitimacythatisimportantortheonlylegitimatevaluepromotedbytheConstitution’sstructure.Somedegreeofpopulation-baseddisproportioninrepresentationintheupperhouseisnotuncommoninfederalsystems,inordertoassurethatparticularinterestsoflesspopulousregionsarenotneglected.ButIamawareofnofederalsysteminaworkingconstitutionaldemocracythathasthedegreeofdisproportionthattheU.S.Senaterepresents.Andastoothervalues,havingstaggeredtermsformembersofthenationallegislature,asexistsintheSenate,hasthebenefitofhelpingtopreventrapidswingsbasedonsingleelections–astabilitybenefitalsoimportantto


6

Howmightthisshifttowardsgreaterdemocraticlegitimacyofstate

governmentsaffectthinkingaboutconstitutionalfederalism?Inthistimeinwhich

membersofbothtraditionalpoliticalpartiesarebeingchallengedbynontraditional

movementsandcandidates,oneofwhomhasbecomethePresident,perhaps

liberalsandconservatives,redstateandbluestatelawprofessors,informedby

awarenessofthetherelativedemocraticrepresentativenessofstategovernments

vis-a-visthefederal,canfindsomecommongroundaboutthebenefitsof

federalism,ifnotofthestrategiesforachievingthosebenefitsortheparticular

substantivegoalstowardswhichthosestrategiesareused.

Thispaperaimstoassistthisre-evalutionbydescribing,incapaciousterms,

threedifferenttypesofapproachestothinkingaboutthepossibilitiesand

challengesofU.S.federalism.First,Ibrieflydiscussasetofdoctrinalconstraintson

nationalpowerarticulatedbythecourts.Second,Iconsider"newnationalism"

theories,includingthoseof“disruptive”or“uncooperative”federalismapproaches.

Third,Iconsiderpoliticalformsoffederalreconstitutionorreconstruction.The

discussionisanefforttolayouttheseapproachesasapositivematter;normative

argumentswill,forthemostpart,needtoawaitanotherpaper.

I.ExistingDoctrine

The“federalismrevival”intheSupremeCourt’sjurisprudencecanbedated

toastatutorydecision,Gregoryv.Ashcroft,in1991.21Theissuewaswhetherthe

AgeDiscriminationinEmploymentActappliedtostatecourtjudges,whowere

subjecttoastatelawagelimitontheirservice.Thecourtheldasastatutorymatter

thattheADEAdidnotapplytosuchhighgovernmentofficials.Theinterpretationof

theADEAwasinformedfromtheoutsetoftheopinionbyconstitutional

considerations,asJusticeO’Connorexplainedthehistoricalreasonsforandbenefits

legitimategovernment.ButitalsomeansthatthemembersoftheSenate,atanygivenmoment,maynotmatchintheirpartyaffiliationsthemoodofthemostrecentelectionsfortheHouse.21501U.S.452(1991).


7

ofconstitutionalfederalism,includingacapacityforinnovation,increased

opportunitiesforparticipationindemocraticpolitics,andgreaterresponsivenessof

thestatestothedifferentneedsofcitizens.22

IntheyearssinceGregoryvAshcroft,statutorycanonsofinterpretationhave

beeninconsistentlydeployedinfederalism-relatedcases.23Thesignificanceof

Gregoryisitsforeshadowingofshiftsinconstitutionaljurisprudencethathavemade

asignificantdifferenceintheformalscopeoffederalpower.

A.Anti-CommandeeringdoctrineasalimitonCongress

ThefirstcleardoctrinalsignaloftheCourt’swillingnesstorevivejudicially

enforceablelimitstoprotectfederalismwasitsdecisioninNewYorkvUnited

States,24holdingthatoneelementofafederalstatutewasinvalidinthatitimposed

acoerciveliabilityonastatetorequireittotakethekindofactionordinarily

requiringlegislation.Thisanti-commandeeringrulewassaidtobesupportedboth

byprinciplesofaccountabilityandbyahistoricaldecisiontoabandonthepowerthe

centralgovernmenthadintheArticlesofConfederationtocompelstatestoact.

Soonthereafter,theanti-commandeeringprinciplewasextendedtoadoctrine

barringfederalrequirementsthatexecutiveofficialsofstateorlocalgovernments

22Id.at458("Thisfederaliststructureofjointsovereignspreservestothepeoplenumerousadvantages.Itassuresadecentralizedgovernmentthatwillbemoresensitivetothediverseneedsofaheterogeneoussociety;itincreasesopportunityforcitizeninvolvementindemocraticprocesses;itallowsformoreinnovationandexperimentationingovernment;anditmakesgovernmentmoreresponsivebyputtingtheStatesincompetitionforamobilecitizenry.)23Asanillustrationofthelackofconsistencyofinterpretivepresumptionsinfavorofstateauthority,compareMedellinvTexas,552U.S.491(2008)(President’smemorandumimplementingICJdecisionagainsttheUnitedStatesarisingoutofTexas’officialsfailuretocomplywithConsularConventionhasnoeffectonstatecriminalprocedurelaw)withAmericanInsuranceAss’nv.Garamendi,539U.S.396(2003)(findingthatexecutivememorandumwithGermanyconcerningfoundationmechanismtoresolveHolocaustperiodinsuranceclaimspreemptsstateinsurancelaw).24505U.S.144(199x)


8

enforcefederallawsagainstothers.25Thisdoctrineislikelytoremainastablelimit

onfederalpowersince,thoughoriginallypropoundedbymoreconservative

scholarsandmembersoftheCourt,ithasnowbeenembracedbyliberalor

progressivescholarsasameanstoinsulatestateandlocalgovernmentofficialsfrom

carryingoutfederalmandatesviewedasregressiveordiscriminatory,asin

immigration.26

B.LimitsonCongress’PowersundertheCommerceClauseandother

ClausesinArticleI

InUnitedStatesvLopez,27theCourtinvalidatedafederallawprohibiting

possessionofgunsnearschoolzones.Althoughaplausibleconnectiontointerstate

commercewasarticulatedbythegovernmentlawyersinitsdefense,itrequired

multiplestepsinaformofanalysisthatwouldsupportfarreachingfederal

legislationintomanyareasoflife.Moreover,thefactthattheprohibitedareawas

definedbyproximitytoschoolsseemedtosuggestaneffortorpurposetoregulate

education,amattertheCourtviewedastraditionallyoneforthestates.Although

thecaseoccasionedsignificantcriticism,andwasclearlyviewedasadeparture

fromthelineofcaselawonthescopeofthefederalcommercepowersince1937,it

wasarguablyjustifiableifunderstoodnotasacategoricalbar,butratheras

respondingtoaparticularruleoflawprobleminsofarasCongressitselfhadfailed

totakeseriouslytheneedtoshowhowitwasconnectedtointerstatecommerceor

whyafederallawwasneeded.28

25Inearlierwork,Idisagreedwiththeabsolutistapproachofthesedecisionsastoexecutiveofficials,butwasgenerallysupportiveofthedecisionastolegislatures.Forexecutiveofficials,thereismuchthatisattractiveabouttheideaofapresumptiverule,allowingforexceptionsunderspecialcircumstances,e.g.,foradraft,orothertime-sensitiveneedofthenationalgovernment.SeeVickiC.Jackson,FederalismandtheUsesandLimitsofLaw:PrintzandPrinciple?,111HarvL.Rev.,2180(1998)26See,e.g.,Galarzav.Szalczyk,745F.3d634,643(3dCir.2014)(“[T]hefederalgovernmentcannotcommandthegovernmentagenciesofthestatestoimprisonpersonsofinteresttofederalofficials.”)27cite28SeeJackson,PrintzandPrinciple?,at2234&n238,2238-39.


9

SubsequentcasesdevelopedLopez’sruleintoamorecategoricalone,

prohibitingrelianceonthecommercepowertoregulate,onanaggregatedbasis,

activitythattheCourtidentifiesasnot“economicincharacter.”InUnitedStatesv

Morrison29theCourtheldunconstitutionalaprivatecivilrightsremedyinthe

ViolenceAgainstWomenAct;forCommerceClausepurposestheCourttreatedthe

activitybeingregulatedasprivateviolenceagainstpersons(largelywomen)

becauseoftheirgender,ratherthanseeingprotectionfromviolenceasanecessary

aspectoffullparticipationinthe(federallyregulatable)economy.30YetinGonzales

vRaich,31theCourtupheldabanonpossessionofmarijuana(evenasappliedto

medicalmarijuana)becauseoftherelationshipofsuchpossessiontoanunlawful

interstatemarket.(DeterminingwhatpossessoryactionstheCourtwillfindnot

economicincharacterremainssomewhatuncertain.)

InNFIBvSebelius,32theCourtidentifiedanothersubstantivelimiton

Congress’commercepower:thattheCongresscannotcompelpersonstoengagein

commercialactivities.ItthusheldthattheCommerceClausedidnotsupporta

congressionalmandatethatpeoplepurchaseorotherwiseobtainhealthinsurance

(thoughtheprovisionswereupheldunderthetaxingpower).Determiningtheline

betweencompellingactionandregulatingcommercialactionalreadyundertaken

mayposeinterpretivechallengesinthefuture.

Ihavearguedinthepastagainstrigidapriorisubstantivelimitationsonthe

substantivescopeoffederalpower;Ihavealsosuggestedthattheruleoflaw

requiresshowingaplausiblechainofconnectionbetweenlegislationandafederal

sourceofpower.Inlightofmymorerecentreflectionsonthedegreetowhich–asa

29cite30IwasacoauthorofanamicusbriefintheMorrisoncase,arguing,asIstillbelievetobecorrect,thattheconnectiontocommercewassubstantial,andwell-documentedinthelegislativerecord,sincefearofviolencesubstantiallylimitedwomen’sabilitytoparticipateintheeconomyontermsofequalitywithmen,inwaysanalogoustotheeffectsofprivatediscriminationontheabilityofAfricanAmericanstotravel,inHeartofAtlantaMotel[cite].31545U.S.1(200532132SCt2566(2012).


10

resultofactionsbythefederalcourtsandCongress--statesnowhaveastronger

claimtodemocraticlegitimacythannationallawmakers,Iwonderwhetherjudicial

approachestoreviewingfederalism-basedchallengestonationalactionoughttobe

developedthatconsiderthedegreetowhichsuchnationallegislationsufficiently

reflectstheinterestsofthepeopleatthenationalleveltowarrantdeferenceacross

theboard.Iwonderwhethercourtsshouldtakeamorecarefullookatasserted

basesofnationalpowerandgroundsforactingbeforeupholdingfederallegislation

orrulemakingthatwouldcutofflawmakinginthestates–atleastintheabsenceof

reasontobelievethatthelegislationwasneededbecausestateswereengagedin

discriminationorinequitabletreatmentofdisadvantagedminoritygroupsnotable

toprotectthemselvesinthestatepoliticalprocessorthattherewasaneedfor

federalactionbecausethestatesseparatelycouldnotregulatewellorsomestates

wereimposingseriousexternalitiesoninterstatecommerceorothersubjects

withinCongress’regulatorypowers.

C.LimitsonCongress’spowersundertheFourteenthAmendment:

InKatzenbachvMorgan,33theCourtupheldprovisionsoftheVotingRights

ActprohibitingdiscriminationbasedonEnglishliteracyforthosewhowereliterate

inSpanishbyvirtueofbeingeducatedinPuertoRico.TheCourthadrejecteda

challenge,fiveyearsearlier,toanEnglishliteracyrequirementinNorthCarolina,

concludingthatitboreasufficientrelationshiptothelegitimateaimofpromoting

aninformedelectoratethatitwasnotunconstitutional.InMorgan,however,the

CourtupheldthelawbothonthegroundsthatCongresshaspower,underthe

FourteenthAmendment,toconcludethatactsclaimedtoviolateequalitynorms,

whichhavenotbeenstruckdownbytheCourt,nonethelessdoviolatethe

FourteenthAmendment,oralternatively,thatprovidingaccesstothevotewasa

meanstoenableSpanishspeakerstopreventunlawfuldiscriminationinother

areas.

33384U.S.641(1966).


11

InCityofBoernevFlores,34theCourtheldunconstitutionalastatute,the

ReligiousFreedomRestorationAct,designedtoovercometheeffectsofitsdecision

inSmithvEmploymentDivision.35InSmiththeCourthadheldthatstatesgenerally

neednotaccommodategenuinereligiousobjectionstoagenerallyapplicablelaws,

distinguishingalineofcasesseeminglysoholdingasinvolvingbothreligionand

otherclaims.TheRFRApassedoverwhelminglyandrequiredthatwhenapractice

waschallengedasintrudingonreligiousfreedomstateshadtojustifyitunderthe

standardsofstrictscrutiny.TheCourtheldthatCongressdidnothavepowerunder

theFourteenthAmendmenttosoprovide.Disagreeingwithatleastoneofthe

theoriesofMorgan,itheld,Congresscouldonlyenactlegislationaimedat

preventingorremedyingconductthattheCourtwouldagreeviolatesthe

Constitution.WhileCongresscouldadoptprophylacticmeasures,thosemeasures

neededtobecongruentandproportionatetotheconstitutionalviolationtobe

sustained.

Sincethen,theCourthasrejectedaFourteenthAmendmentbasisforthe

ViolenceAgainstWomenActcivilrightsremedybecauseitpermittedsuitsagainst

non-stateactors,eventhoughthisremedywastargetedatstatefailurestofulfill

theirresponsibilityofequalprotectionunderthelaw.36Similarly,thepreclearance

provisionoftheVotingRightsAct–whichhadbeenanessentialtoolforincreasing

andmaintainingvoterregistrationamongpoorandblackvoters–-wereinvalidated

inShelbyCountyvHolder(2013),because,theCourtbelieved,thefactualbasisthat

oncesupportedthelegislationnolongerexisted.Ignoringtherecordonwhich

CongressactedandCongress’sconclusionotherwise,theprovisionwasfound

unconstitutional,asnotmeetingthestandardsofproportionalityandcongruence.

34cite35cite36Morrison,at__.TheCourt,interalia,misrepresentedthestateoftherecord,insuggestingthatfewerthanhalfofthestateshadproblems,whentheevidencebeforeCongresswasthatinatleast21statestherewerestatesponsoredgenderbiastaskforcereportsthathadidentifiedbiasintheprosecutionofviolenceagainstwomen,andeveryreasontothinkthatsimilarproblemsexistedinmostifnotalloftheotherstates.Compareidat__withidat__(Breyer,J.,dissenting).


12

TheFourteenthAmendmentwasnotintendedtoabolishthestatesassemi-

autonomouspartsoftheUnitedStates,nortogiveCongressgenerallegislative

authoritytoenactlawsforthegeneralwelfare.Toocapaciousanunderstandingof

theFourteenthAmendmentmightleadinthisdirection.Soitisperhaps

understandablewhythecourtdidnotadoptthecapaciousapproachofMcCullochv

Maryland,whichinterpretedtheNecessaryandProperClausetoallowCongress

amplechoiceofmeanstofulfillitslegislativepowers,aslongastheywere

appropriatetotheendandnototherwiseprohibited.

Butwheretherehasbeenahistoryofstatepersecutionofminoritiesand

suppressionoftheirvoting,considerabledeferencetothenationallegislature’s

effortstoremediateandpreventrecurrencesisinorder.Therewasnothingunclear

aboutthecompellingfactualbasisfortheVotingRightsAct’sinitialenactment,and

Congress’decisiontorenewwouldseemtobewellwithinthelegislativejudgment

astohowlongtheremedywasneeded.InthisrespectthecaseisunlikeCityof

BoernevFlores,wheretheexistenceofmassiveconstitutionalviolationswas

doubtfulunderjudicially-controllingstandards.37

Boernev.FloresanditsprogenywillenabletheCourttomonitormoreclosely

pretextualusesoftheFourteenthAmendmentpower,shouldtheyarise.Arguments

incaseslikeFloridaPrepaidvCollegeSavingsBank,38thatCongressenactedchanges

tothepatentlawsbecauseofconcernaboutconstitutionalrightsviolations,wereto

somedegreepretextual;themotivationofthelegislationcouldreasonablyhave

beenregardedasprimarilyconcernedwithadvancingthepurposesofthepatent

andtrademarklaws.Bycontrast,ShelbyCounty(theVotingRightsActCase),or

Morrison,reflectedCongress’seriousattentiontoconstitutionalrightsofequality

37ThedecisioninShelbyCountygavetheappearanceofjudicialover-reachinconcluding,contrarytoCongress,thatthetimeforneedingthepre-clearanceremedyhaspassed.If,asthepluralitywroteinColemanvMiller,307U.S.433(1939),thequestionofhowlongisreasonabletoratifyaconstitutionalamendmentisnonjusticiable,thenthequestionofthedurationofaremedythatwasatonetimeconstitutionalwouldseemtobeonewhereverybroaddeferencetoCongressisappropriate.38527U.S.627(1999)


13

andrighttovote;thesedecisionswereviewedbyanumberofscholarsasinvolving

judicialoverreachinreviewingcongressionalaction,essentiallybecauseofan

ideologicalhostilitytothesubstanceofthelegislation.TheCourt’sFourteenth

Amendmentdoctrinethusholdsbothpromiseandpitfallsfortheoverallwell-

functioningofthedemocraticsystem.

D.LimitationsonCongress’sSpendingClausePowerstoImpose

ConditionsonReceiptofFederalfunds

AsAllisonLaCroixhasargued,constitutionalfederalismintheUnitedStates

doesnothavefixedboundaries,asillustratedbyherstudyofthespendingpowerin

theperiodbeforetheCivilWar.39Specificallyshearguedthatearlynineteenth

centuryconstitutionalthoughtconceivedofthespendingpowerasrequiring

structuredformsofcooperation,inordertopreventfederaldominance.40Without

suggestingthat19thcenturynotionsoffederal-statepowerbeassuchrevived,the

notionthatanunboundedspendingpowerwouldmaketheideaofalimitedfederal

governmentverydifficulttosustainremainstrue.

TheresurgenceoftheSpendingClauseasalimitation,aswellasagrant,of

powertoCongressarrivedinthe21stcenturyinNFIBvSebelius.41Inthisrecent

decision,theCourtinsistedonandreliedonadistinctionbetweencoercive

regulationandconsensuallimitationsagreedtobyrecipientsoffederalfunding.The

Courtinvalidatedaconditiononfederalspendingthatineffectrequirestatesinthe

Medicaidprogramtoexpanditseligiblerecipients.Eventhoughthefederal

governmentwouldhavepaidallofthedirectnewcosts,statesobjectedtothe

administrativeburdenstheywouldneedtoassume,andarguedtheycouldnot

realisticallyturndownthenewrequirementbecausethestatutewouldpenalize

thembywithdrawingallfederalfundingforallexistingMedicaidprograms.The

Courtwrote:“CongressmayuseitsspendingpowertocreateincentivesforStatesto

39AllisonLaCroix,TheInterbellumConstitution,--StanLRev--(2015)40Idat40141132SCtat2304


14

actinaccordancewithfederalpolicies.Butwhen‘pressureturnsintocompulsion,’

thelegislationrunscontrarytooursystemoffederalism.”42

ThispartoftheCourt’sdecisioncapturessomethingimportant:Unbounded

authoritytoconditionfederalgrantsontheobservanceofpositiveornegative

requirementshastoomuchcoercivepotential--forstateandlocalgovernments,

andforuniversities.43Bothofthesegroupsareamongthemajor,ongoingrecipients

ofsuchconditionalfederalspendinggrants.Andbothlocalandstategovernments,

ontheonehand,andcollegesanduniversities,ontheother,playimportant

constitutionalfunctions:first,aschecksonabusiveuseofnationalpowerand

second,assourcesofinnovationthatwouldbenefitthepolityoverall.Theeffortto

relyontheexistingprogram(consenttowhichrequiredconsenttochangesthat

mightinthefuturebemade),wenttoofar,intheCourt’sview.AsHeatherGerken

outit,“theSpendingClauseanalysisis…themostdeeplyintuitiveportionofthe

opinion…rest[ing]onasimplepremise:Congresscan'tpulltherugoutfromunder

thestatesbyradicallyalteringthedutiesassociatedwithacooperativefederal

regime.”44

E.Limitations,derivedfromtheEleventhAmendmentandPrincipleof

SovereignImmunity,onCongress’spowertosubjectstatestoprivatesuits.

In1996theCourtoverturneditsearlierdecisioninUnionGas,whichhad

upheldCongresspower,whenitspokeclearly,tosubjectstatestoprivatesuitsin

legislationenactedunderthecommercepower.InSeminoleTribetheCourtheld

thatCongresslackedpowertosubjectstatestoprivatessuitsinlegislationenacted

underArticleI,althoughtheUnitedStatesretainedtheabilitytoitselfsuestatesfor

damagesunderfederalstatutes.TheCourtwasandremainscloselydividedonthe

issueofstatesovereignimmunity.

42NFIBvSibelius,at__2602(quotingStewardMachine)43Cf.e.g.RumsfeldvFAIR,546U.S.47(2006)(rejectingconstitutionalchallengetofederallawconditioningreceiptoffederalfundsonuniversitiesallowingmilitarytorecruitevenifmilitary’spolicyviolatedanti-dsiscriminationnorms).44Gerken,2014HLRat__.


15

AsIhaveexplainedinearlierwriting,45theCourthasbeenmistakeningiving

thisbroadreadingtosovereignimmunity.Butunlessthereisasignificantchangein

membershipontheCourt,thisdoctrineislikelytobestable.Thisdoctrinedoesnot

constrainCongress’substantivelawmakingbutonlylimitstheremediesavailable

toenforesuchlaws.AssuchIthinkitunlikelytoplaymuchofaroleinupcoming

federalismdebates.

II."Uncooperative"Federalism,Disruption,The"NewNationalism,"

FederalismAlltheWayDown,andtheLike

Anothersetofscholarlyapproaches,includingthatofHeatherGerken,the

Dean-electofYaleLawSchool,challengesconceptionsoffederalismbasedonthe

ideaofsovereignty.Theyinsteademphasizedescriptiveaccountsofhowtheformal

doctrineconcerningsovereignty,theallocationofpowersandevensupremacyof

federallawdonotreflecttherealityofinfluencesgoinginmultipledirections.46

Emphasizingvoiceoverexit,Gerkenarguesthat“federalismwithoutsovereignty”

embracesasystemofverticalchecksandbalancesthroughsituationsof

interdependenceinlawenforcement,implementation,interpretation.47Sheoffers

amoredescriptivepoliticalaccountofhowthefederalgovernmentshapesstate

agendasandhowstatesshapefederalagendasevenafterlawisenacted.48Nodoubt

theseobservationsaretrue,anditisimportanttoseehowpoliticalimpactof

federalismworks;butitisnotclearhow"federalismallthewaydown"inthis

respectdiffersfromdecentralization.

45Jackson,1988,Yale;Jackson1997orso,NYU46See,e.g.HeatherGerken,TheSupremeCourt,2009Term,Foreword--FederalismAlltheWayDown,124HarvL.Rev.4(2010);seealso,e.g.,GillianMetzger[AdministrativeFederalism,cite};FederalismunderObama,cite];arguingthatfederalregulationisnotazerosumgameattheexpenseofstatepower,whichsurfacesinimportantwaysintheadministrationoffederalschemes).47SeeGerken,supra,at10(“theenergyofoutliersservesasacatalystforthecenter”);idat33-44(exploringthe“poweroftheservant”).48SeealsoAbbeGluck,Our[national]federalism,Yale2014(arguingthatCongressistheprimarysourceofourfederalism).


16

TheargumentadvancedbyProfessorGerkenandothersisthat

governmentalprocessesinourfederalsystemaffordmanyopportunitiesforboth

levelsofgovernmenttoexerciseinfluenceontheother,withtheimplicationthat

accordingly,doctrineenforceablebycourtsbasedontheideaofsovereigntymaybe

inappropriateorunnecessary.Iamnotsure,though,thatthenormativeconclusion

followsfromthedescription,northatProfessorGerken’sapproachofferssufficient

guidanceastofederalismaslaw,exceptinonedirection.ProfessorGerkenclearly

intendstopreservethesupremacyofnationallawasamatterofjudicially

enforceableconstitutionallaw,apointonwhichIaminagreement49However,

explainingthatheraccountissupplementarytoothers,50herworksuggeststhatshe

maynotbelieveinanyjudiciallyenforceablesubstantivefederalism-based

constraintsonnationalpower.51

Shemakesapersuasiveandpowerfulnormativeargumentforanapproach

ofallowingexperimentationatstateandlocallevels,subjecttocorrectionby

nationallegislation.Indeed,sheargues,“divisionanddiscordareuseful

components”ofthefederalsystem,52andsuggests,alongwithJessicaBulman-

Pozen,53thatthe“uncooperative”anddisruptivefeaturesoffederalismhave

considerablenormativevalue.54Theseaccountslendnormativeforcetothe

49Id.(insistingthatthe“centercanplaythenationalsupremacycard”).50Seeidat10-11.51HereIdrawinferencesfromworksshecites.Seee.g.id.at12-14andnn.13-20.Seealsoidat16-18(discussingdebatebetween“process”theoristsandand“federalists”overstatepowerandidentityandasking,why“webothertohaveit”);idat28.InotherworkGerkenappearstoendorseclearstatementrequirements,asproceduralconstraints.52Id.at10.53JessicaBulman-Pozen&HeatherGerken,UncooperativeFederalism,118YaleLJ1256(2009).54Id.at20(arguingthatthisuncooperativedimensionallows“minorityrule”instatesandlocalgovernmentstoshapeidentity,promotedemocracy,anddiffusepowers).Seealsoidat24“(“Whenstatebureacratsrefusetoimplementafederalprogram,properlyorhijacktheprogramfortheirownends,theysendamessagetoWashington...aboutthefutureoffederallaw”);idat40(valueof“dissentandresistance”).Sheurgesattentiontocities,zoningboards,schoolboards,juriesand


17

requirementthatifnationallegislationintendstodisempowersuchstateandloca

initiativesitneedstospeakclearlyindoingso.55Theyalsoevenmorestrongly

supportargumentsagainstexecutiveoradministrativepowertopreemptstate

laws.56Giventhebenefitsofstateexperimentationanddiversity,herworkstrongly

suggests,aconsidereddecisionbythemostrepresentativefederaldecision-maker–

theCongress–shouldberequiredbeforethosebenefitsaredisrupted.

SomeofthelegalcomponentsofGerken'sapproach,thoughframedunder

therubricoffederalism,mightinsteadbeunderstoodasarguingforamore

expansiveconceptofconstitutionalequalitythanexistsundercurrentdoctrine.For

example,shewouldallowroomforamorediverseconceptoftheconstitutional

roleofdiversity,e.g.,allowingracialmajoritiesinsomeareastofavortheirown,as

ethnicimmigrantgroupsdidbeforethem.Thisappearstoenvisiona

reinterpretationoftheequalprotectionclause.Ifso,questionswouldarisewhether

currentU.S.lawhassufficienttoolstodistinguishsituationofdisadvantagedracial

minorityorimmigrantgroupsfromsituationofthosewhofeelsubjectively

disadvantagedbyequaltreatmentforminorities/women.

Inlaw,descriptiveandnormativeclaimsareoftenblended;thethrustofthis

scholarshipfeelsnormativeeventhoughitclaimsattimessimplytobedescriptive.

Itisinpartausefulefforttodisruptlawyers’focusoncategoriesandcourts,andin

other“specialpurposesinstitutions”oflocalgovernance,idat24-33,butwithoutexplicitlyconnectingthemtoconstitutionalfederalismindeed,drawingonscholarshipnotingthestrengthofmayorsinaunitarysystem.Id.at42(citing.Cf.VickiCJackson,Citizenship,GenderandFederalism,in___(notingschoolboardsandotherinstitutionsoflocalgovernmentaslocationsfor“actsofpubliccitizenship”andquestioningwhetherthedensityoflocalgovernmentstructuresisorisnotrelatedtofederalism).55CfGerken,SlippingtheBondsofFederalism,128HarvLRev85,92,109,122(2014)(celebratingclearstatementapproachtointerpretingfederallegislation,stating,interalia,that“IfyouworryaboutCongressinadvertentlyreadingonstatepowerinimplementingtreaties,itmakesperfectsensetoimposeaclearstatementrule.”)56SeeBulman-Bozen,102VaLrev953,1024(2016)(suggestinggreaterChevrondeferenceiffederalagencydecidesstatelawisnotpreemptedthanifitdecidesthatitispreempted).


18

partanefforttoshiftmeanings/understandingsofcategorieslikediversity.It

suggeststhatsomedefiantoruncooperativebehaviormaybenecessarytoadvance

legaldevelopment.Historyshowsthetruthofthis,sometimes.

Butthereareruleoflawconcernsforapproachesthatresttoomuchon

disobedienceanddisruption.57BearinginmindCoopervAaron,58anapproach

givingnormativeweighttodefiancebystateandlocalofficialsraisesconcernsabout

theincentivesforthosewhodisagreewithalaw,oraruling,tocomply.Thereis

clearlyanargumentthatdefianceofstatutes,forpurposesoftestingtheir

constitutionality,islegitimate(evenifnotalwaysprudent),andthusperhapsone

coulddistinguishthatfromdefianceofafinalcourtjudgmentonalegalpoint.

Anotherconcernisthequestionofwhethersuchanapproachispresumedtocarrya

onewayratchet.Wouldthosewhocelebratestatelawspermittingmarijuanauseor,

priortoWindsororObergefell,thegrantingofmarriagelicensesindefianceof

existingstatutorylaw,equallycelebratedefianceofguncontrollaws,orby

opponentsofstateuniversityaffirmativeactionplanstoprocurebyreferenduma

banonsuchplans?59Isthereanargumentforaonewayratchetinfavorof

defiancesonsomebutnotallissues–andifso,whataretheargumentsforthis

normativeposition?Isitnecessarytocivilizedsocietytograntthosewedisagree

withsimilarrightsof“defiant”or“disruptive”federalism?Isthereariskthat

argumentsfor“disruptive”federalismmaydetractfromruleoflawvaluesreqiring

compliancewithunpopularbutimportantnorms(e.g.,ofcriminalprocedurerights

fordefendants)?

57SeealsoGillianMetzger,TheStatesasNationalAgents,StLouisUNiv(arguingthatGerken'saccountgivestoolittleweighttostateautonomyandtherespectduestatesasconstituentpartsofthegovernment).58358U.S.1(1958).59SeeCaliforniaProp.209.HowwouldthetheoryapplytoissuesdecidedbyaSupremeCourtdecision,butbyanarrowlydividedCourt?Cf.MarkJoephStern,IsSame-SexMarriageSafe?,Slate(March12017)(describingTexasSupremeCourt'shearingofacasechallengingexpenditureofpublicfundstoprovidebenefitstosame-sexcouples).


19

Toreturntotheimplicationsforlawofthe“newnationalism”approaches:

Suchapproaches,focusingastheydoontheactualdegreetowhichstates,local

governmentsandthenationalgovernmentareinterdependentincarryingoutmany

aspectsoffederallaw,supportdoctrinesthatpromotegoodprocessesfor

establishingsuchframeworks.Strongerandmoreconsistentlyapplied

presumptionsagainstpreemption,andespeciallyagainstpreemptionbyexecutive

oradministrativeactionalone,wouldbeconsistentwiththenormativeargument

implicitinthenewnationalism.Clearstatementrules,aswell,mighthelppromote

actualcongressionalconsiderationofeffectsonstateandlocalgovernments.Clear

statementsinlegislationmayalsoprovidenoticetostateandlocalgovernments–if

theycomeupearlyenoughinthelegislativeprocesstodoso.Butitisunlikelythat

suchaproceduraltimingrulewouldbejudiciallyenforced;despiterejecting

nonjusticiabilityargumentsconcerningOriginationClausechallenges,theSupreme

Courthasbeenotherwiseunwillingtomonitorthefairnessandregularityof

legislativeprocessesoftheCongress.60

III.ReconstitutingPoliticalCommunit(y)(ies)ThroughLocalAction

Federalismmightbethoughttoofferopportunitiesnotonlytoinfluence

substantivepoliciesbutalsotoaddressproblemsofpolarization,inaction,and

failuresofrepresentationatnationallevel.BythisImeanatleasttwokindsof

failuresofnationalpolitics:failurestorepresentmajoritiesandfailurestogive

appropriateconsiderationtominorities.Inboth,partofCongress’sfailureof

responsibilityhasbeenasimplefailuretotakeactionthatisneeded–legislativeand

oversight.Partofthefailurehasbeenaninattentiontoconsideringminorityviews

andtheeffectsonminoritiesofproposedcoursesofaction.Whatarethe

possibilitiespresentedbyfederalismforimprovingqualityofpolitics?

A.Howwelive:Physicalmovementsofpopulations?

60See[19thcenturycaseconclusivelypresumingthatifrecordsaysthatenoughvoteswererecordedtheywere].


20

Itisuncleartheextenttowhichstatepopulationsaremorepolitically

polarizednowthaninthepastbutthereissomereasontothinkthatlivingpatterns

todayreflectmuchgreaterpoliticalpolarizationthaninthepast.Somedatasuggest

thatatthelevelofthecounty,morepeoplearelivingincountiesthatare

overwhelminglypartisaninonedirectionoranother(i.e.morethan20%margins

forpresidentialcandidateinrecentelections).61Thisaccordswithdatashowingan

increase,between1994and2014,of“ideologicalsilos”ofsocialcircles,thatis,that

thepercentagesofliberal,andconservative,voterswhoareclosefriendsprimarily

withpoliticallylike-mindedpeopleareincreasing.62Itisalsoconsistentwithdata

reflectingthatthereisasignificanturban-ruraldivideinpartisanandideological

identification.63

Thispolarizeddistributionofvotersbypartisanshipmayreflectsomesortof

Tieboutiansorting.Butwhilethismightbethoughtabenigndevelopmentinterms

ofmaximizingpreferences,whatislostinsuchanalysisisthewaysinwhich

preferencesarenotstablebutdependinpartonsocialinteractions.Notonlyare

preferencesconstituted,inpart,bytheirsocialcontexts,butsatisfyingsome

preferencesmayimposeexternalitiesonothers--andthetrendsinthese

demographicdistributionsimposesevereexternalitiesonpoliticalprocesses.

Themorewespendtimeonlywithpeoplewhothinklikeus,thelesspractice

wehaveinhavingconversationsandfriendshipswiththosewhothinkdifferently.

61BillBishopandRobertCushing,TheBigSort:Migration,EconomyandPoliticsintheUnitedStatesof‘Thosepeople,"‘https://web.archive.org/web/20080624204202/http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080229_BillBishop.pdf62CarrollDoherty,7ThingstoknowaboutpolarizationinAmerica(PewResearchCenterJune12,2014).63SeeThomasSchaller,GrowingUrban-RuralSplitProvidesRepublicansWithDown-BallotAdvantages(June2,2016),http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/growing-urban-rural-split-provides-republicans-with-down-ballot-advantages/;JoshKron,“RedState,BlueCity:HowtheUrban-RuralDivideisSplittingAmerica,”TheAtlantic,https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/red-state-blue-city-how-the-urban-rural-divide-is-splitting-america/265686/


21

Themorepolarizedandhomogenousourideologicalcommunities,thegreaterthe

riskoflessandlessbridgeabledifferencesarising.Whetherthereareappropriate

andnon-coercivewaystoincentivizepeopletomoveinto(andcreate)morerather

thanlessideologicallydiversecommunitiesisaninterestingquestion,64asis

whetherasanormativeandpracticalmatteranysuchapproachesshouldbe

pursued.

B.Newpoliticallyadoptedrulestoencourageconsideringminority

viewsandincreasetendenciestowardmoderation.

Isitpossibletopersuadepeopleinexistinglocationstoadoptnewpolitical

rulesthatwillempowerminoritiesandincreasetendenciestowardsmoderation?

Thismaybemorelikelytohappeninsmallercommunities,wherethereisa

greaterpossibilityforone-on-oneconversationonthemeritstohaveanimpact,or

inlargerjurisdictionsinwhichpoliticalpartisanshipisrelativelyevenlybalanced,so

thatbothsidesmightthinkeachhasachancetobenefit,ortominimizetheirrisks).

Reformisnotimpossible.Arizonaadoptedanonpartisancommissionto

reapportion,inamovethatwasupheldbytheSupremeCourt.65OneofPresident

Obama'slastspeechessuggestedthatinreapportioninglegislativedistricts,itis

importantnottodrawlinessuchthatonepartydominatesandcandidatesendup

appealingtothemostextremewingoftheirownparties;apportionmentwithless

unequalnumbersofvotersfrombothpartieswillhaveatendencytohavea

moderatingeffectonpublicdiscourse.66Ifnoonepartyalwaysknowsitcan

64OnpastincentivesformovementforpurposesofsettlementoftheWest,considerthevariousHomesteadActs.65cite66SeeBarackOBama,AddresstotheIllinoisGeneralAsebly,January--2017)https://www.c-span.org/video/?404557-1/president-obama-address-illinois-general-assembly("politicansshouldnotpicktheirvoters;votersshouldpicktheirpoliticians").Cf.DonaldHorwitz'sEthnicGroupsinConflict(1985)(arguingthat"centripetalism"inplaceslikeNigeria,withethniccleavages,andvotingsystemdrivingpoliticianstoseektobeasecondorthirdchoiceforfolkswhoarenottheirprincipalsupporters,helpsavoidextremismandgovernmentalbreakdowns)


22

control,candidatesfromeachpartywillhaveincentivestolistentoandappealtoa

widerswatheofvoters.

ScholarshaveobservedformsofwhatJessicaBulman-Pozenhascalled

"executivefederalism,"meaningnegotiationsamongfederalofficialsandthe

officialsofoneormorestates,thatareproviding"aneededforumforbipartisan

compromise."67Assheexplains,"[r]atherthanrequireagranddealthatsatisfiesan

aggregatenationalbody,executivefederalismunfoldsthroughmanynegotiations

amongdisaggregatedpoliticalactors.Thesediscreteconversationsfacilitate

intrapartydifferenceatthesametimeastheprocessofimplementationfurther

complicates,andmayattenuate,partisancommitments."68Shearguesthatalthough

theseexecutivediscussionstakeplaceinnon-publicfora,thismaybealegitimate

strength.69Non-publicdiscussionmaypermitbothmorecandorandmore

willingnesstomoveoffofinitialpositions,therebyfacilitatingthekindsof

compromisesonwhichworkinggovernmentdepends.70

Aseldomdiscussedpossibilitywouldbetointroduceorreintroduce

proportionalvotingforcollegialbodies.71MorethanadozenU.S.citiesused

proportionalvotingearlyinthe20thcentury;scholarlyevaluationsofitseffectsare

largelyfavorable.72Well-designedPRsystemscanpromotemoreinclusiveformsof

67JessicaBulman-POzen,cite(2016)at955,1001-68IDat__69Id.at__.SeealsoSarahBinderandFrancesE.Lee,MakingDealsinCongress,inSOLUTIONSTOPOLITICALPOLARIZATIONINAMERICA252(NathanPersilyed.2015)(onimportanceofsecrecyinenablingsuccessfuldeal-makinginCongress);GeorgeC.Edwards,StayingPrivate,inSOLUTIONS,supraat__;JayneMansbridge,chapterinsamebook.70SeeJackson,Proconstitutionalrepresentation,WilliamandMary2016.71ForarecentproposalforproportionalvotingforCongress,seeArendLijphart,PolarizationandDemocratization,inSOLUTIONSTOPOLITICALPOLARIZATIONINAMERICA76-78(NathanPersilyed.2015).72SeeDouglasAmy,ABriefHistoryofProportionalRepresentationintheUnitedStates,http://www.fairvote.org/a_brief_history_of_proportional_representation_in_the_united_states.Amy,aprofessorofpoliticalscienceatMtHolyoke,reliesalsoonKathleenBarberetal,ProportionalRepresentationandElectoralReforminOhio.


23

representationthatavoidgivingexcessivepowerwithinlegislaturestopartiesthat

haveonlyasmallmajorityofthepopularvote.Howlikelyitisthatsuchmethods

couldbeadoptedisunclear;and,forthenationalCongress,legislationinplacesince

1967requiressinglememberdistricting.73Butchangeatthestatelevelcanhave

effects,albeitindirectly,onnationalpolitics.

C.Constitutionalamendment

Anotheravenuebywhichtoredressthedemocraticdeficitinournational

politicsisconstitutionalamendment.IntheorytheprovisionsoftheElectoral

Collegefortheelectiontopresidentcouldbeamendedthroughtheordinary

amendingprocess.Thisprocess,however,isquitearduous,anditwouldtakeyears

tobuildthepoliticalwill.And,becauseitwouldrequirethatsmallerpopulation

statesgiveupsomeoftheadvantagethatElectoralCollegecompositionprovidesto

thesmallerstates,itisunlikelythatenoughofthesmallerstateswouldwillingly

giveupthisadvantage.

Afortiori,thepossibilityofamendingthecompositionoftheSenateisasa

practicalmatteralmostnon-existent,absentsomeemergencythatwouldcreatean

extraordinarysenseofexigency.UnderArticleVoftheConstitution,nostatemay

bedeprivedofitsequalsuffrageintheSenatewithoutitsconsent.Ineffect,notonly

doesthisrequiremeetingtheeveryrigorousbarrierofthree-fourthsofthestatesto

ratify,butitgivesavetotoanysinglestatethatobjectstopreventthechange.

Thus,atthenationallevel,ourpoliticsonthisissueislikethepoliticsin

TennesseeatthetimeofBakervCarr74--thatis,frozeninananti-democratic

posturebyvirtueoftheunwillingnessofincumbentsandtheircitizenpopulations

AccordingtoProfessorAmy,politicianssuccessfullydismantledthesesystems.,e.g.,inthe1950sinNewYorkcity,whenCommunistswereelectedinsmallnumbersandtheColdWarprovidedammunitionformajorpartypoliticianstocampaignagainstPR,orwhen(alsointhe1950s)inCincinnati,African-AmericanswereelectedtotheCityCouncilforthefirsttime.SeealsoAmy(notingthatproponentsbelieveitis"accuratetoconcludethatthissystemwasrejectedbecauseitworkedtoowell").73See2U.S.C.Section2c74369U.S.186(1962).


24

toabandontheadvantagethattimeanddemographicchangehadconferredon

longstandingboundaries.75Inthesameway,ournationalrepresentativesandtheir

homeconstituenciesareunlikelytobewillingtoredresstheincreasinglycounter-

majoritariancharacterofCongress.Constitutionalamendmentisthus,barring

extraordinarycircumstances,notanavailablevehicleforthiskindofmuchneeded

change.

D.Secession

ManyAmericanscholarsbelievethattheCivilWarandsubsequentcaselaw

decisivelyruleoutthepossibilityofsecession.Notso.Whattheslimcaselawafter

theCivilWarrejectsisunilateralsecession,withouttheconsentofotherstates.76

Thecasethuscontemplatesthatsecessionwithconsentwouldbepermissible,

thoughitslanguageleavesunclearwhetherwhatiscontemplatedistheamending

procedureorsomeotherwaybywhichthestatescouldconsent,asinbyordinary

legislation.77Ifsecessionarydrivestrongenough,otherstatesmightagree?But

secessionshouldbeverylastoption(evenifnotaccompaniedbyviolenceand

75In1790,theratiobetweenthelargestpopulationstate(Virginia,747,000)andthesmallest(Delaware,59,000),wasaround13:1--andthisassumestotalpopulationfigures;theratioof"freewhitemen"overage16(110,000to11,000)wouldbeevenlower.[citeforsource?IthinkU.S.Censusbureaudaya]Today,theratiobetweenourlargeststatetoday(California,about39,250,000,U.S.CensusBureau,estimate2016,https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html)andoursmallest(Wyoming,585,000,U..SCensusBureau,2016estimate)issomethinglike67:1.Thus,intheUnitedStatesasinTennessee,thepassageoftimeresultedinincreasingthecounter-majoritariancharacteroftheSenate'scomposition.76Texasv.White,74U.S.700,725(1869)(statingthattheunionwas“indissoluble”and“[t]herewasnoplaceforreconsideration,orrevocation,exceptthroughrevolution,orthroughconsentoftheStates”).77QuerywhethertheprovisionsofArticleIV,Section3,statingthatnostate'sboundariescanbechangedwithoutitsconsent,wouldcomeintoplayintheeventofsecession.Asecessionwouldintheoryleaveboundariesuntouched.WhatwereformerlyboundariesbetweentwostateswouldbecomeboundariesbetweenpartoftheUnitedStatesandadifferentpolity.Sincethepurposeofthisprovisionwas,Ibelieve,toprotectastatefromlosingpartofitspreexistingterritory,itwouldnotmakesensetoapplyittothesituationofsecession,givinganyonestateavetoonapoliticalsolutiontowhatmightotherwisebeanintractableproblem.


25

lastingbitternessthatmayconfoundrelationsforyears)stilltendstoleaveboth

politieslessdiversethantheywerebefore.

Secessionshouldbealastresort,hopefullyonenotneeded.Aftersecession

bothpolitiesofwhatwasonceasinglenationendupbeinglessdiversethanthey

werebefore.Secessionisoften,thoughnotalways,accompaniedbyviolenceand

lossoflifeandenduringbitterness.Itistobehopedthatthingswillnotcometothis

pass.

Conclusion

Thegoalofthispaperhasbeentoidentifydifferentapproachestothe

enduringquestionsofU.S.federalism.Framingthediscussionistheargumentthat

Americanfederalismnowhasbetterdemocraticrepresentationwithinthestates

thanitdoesatthenationallevel.Untilslaverywasabolishedthiswasnottrueof

thosestatesthatmaintainedslavery.Manyofthosesamestatescontinuedto

disenfranchiseAfrican-Americanvotersintothe1960s.Butinthe1960s,Congress

andtheCourtsubstantiallyreformedthedemocraticbasesforrepresentativestate

government.Thesereformstooksometimetobecomeacceptedandbearfruit,

althoughbythe1990sprogresstowardsracialinclusionhadbeguntobeseen.78

Scholarsoffederalismneedtoconsiderthedemocraticdeficitatthenational

level,adeficitthathasincreaseddramaticallysincetheFounding.79andthatnow

standsinmarkedcontrasttothedemocraticlegitimacyofthestategovernments.

78Forexample,from1877until1993,theStateofAlabamaelectednoAfricanAmericanstoCongress.Seehttp://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Black-American-Representatives-and-Senators-by-State-and-Territory/.Alabama'spopulationwas45%blackin1900;by1990,itwas25%black.Seehttp://www.bplonline.org/resources/government/AlabamaPopulation.aspx`79Seesupranote75.

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