IEEE ENGINE~; R.I ~G MANAGEMENT R.t:V IEW. VOL. .'39. NO.4, FOUR.TII QUAR.TE R., l>ECEMliER.aon

Not Your Father's Y2K: Preparingthe North American Power Grid forthe Perfect Solar Storm-eIIRI~TOPIIER COOPER

- BENJAVIIN K. SOVACOO L

Abstract - Solar storms have the potential to inJlict massive damage tothe North American electricity infrastructure. Policy makers and utilitiesshould begin to coordinate efforts /0 prozecr vu lnerable components.prepare system operators and automate protective opemncnclprocedures.

Th e electrtctty journal by El.SEVJI<:R INC..Reproduced wtth perrnrss ton of EI~"EVlER

INC. In the format J ourna l via Copyrtgh tCleara nce center.

I. INTRODUCTION

F O RI two days in February20 IO. sen ior government o fficialsa nd a handful of represen ta tivesfro m select publtc-prtvate entitiesfrom the United S tates, Sweden ,and the European Union quie tlygathered at the David SkaggsResea rch Cente r in Boulder. Colo.They ha d been ca lled togetherby the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) andthe Department of HomelandSecu rity (DHS) to s imulate whatwould ha ppen if. as they weremeeting . the Nort h Americanbu lk power system were s truckby a s eve re solar storm.

The results we re sobering. Wit h inthe first h our. the s imulatedstorm wo u ld cause cascadingpower o u tages throughout th eeastern a nd m id-Atlantic U.S. andeastern Canada. Power siationsacross the northern hem is pherewould report n umerou sstep-up and transmissiontransformer failu res . La ck ingback-up transformers andwith Virt u a lly no domesticmanufacturtng capability. re pai rsa n d re placements wo uld takeseveral weeks . with fu ll gridrecovery taking at lea s t sixmonths. Within the fir s t fewdays . emergency responsepersonnel would face criticalInfra s t ru ctu re fall u re as waterdtstrtbuuon. sewage. medical

care. phone service . a nd fuels u pply syste ms co lla psed. Servicedi s ruption of sa te llite and GPScom munications would severelyhamper emergency responsea nd re covery . Util ity workers inaffected populated areas soonwould aban don their posts to bewith their fa m ilies as civil societycrumbled a rou nd them. i

It might be easy to di smis s th isscenario as m ore the synopsisof a Hollywood big -budgetdi s a s ter Hick than the realisticassessment o f the world's bestemergency managemen t experts .Bu t the gro u p 's fin dings wereenough to co mpel Brtt atn's chiefscience advisor to warn that asevere solar s to rm cou ld lea d toa "globa l Ka trtna" cost ing thewo rld's econom ies as much as $2trtllton .:'

Solar s torms in the for mof coron a l mass ejections(CME I-superheated ga s andcharged particles d ischa rgedfro m the sun- have the potentialto in flict massive damage onelectrici ty infrastructu re. Asth e FEMA a nd DH S s im u lationrevea led . c urrents ind u cedby a CME can im pair thesecuri ty a nd performance ofh igh-voltage transmission lin es .comm u n ica tion satellites . GPSn aviga tion syste ms, data cen te rs.and a ir traffic con trol factlt t tes.:'They can cause la rge vol ta ge

' 0 IEE E ENGINEEIUNG MANAGEMENT REVIEW, VOL. 39 . NO. 4. FOURTIi QUARTER. DECEMBER 2011

d ifferences between grou nd ingpoin ts in power lines and for cea huge a mount of DC powerthrough system com ponen tsincapable of handling it.

Some of the world 's best solarresearchers ha ve co ncluded tha tthe plane t is overd ue for a severesolar storm. They warn that thechance for a major geomagneucd is tu rbance is increasing as thesun is en tering it s n ext solarmaximum." Recently . NOAA'sSpace Weather Pred iction Cen terha s observed s igns of s ign ificantacuvtty. alerting th e s tart ofthe new so la r cycle (cycl e #24).Some scien tists a re pred ict ings torm in tens ities s imilar to themost powerful CME events sincethey were first recognized in1859. A dd ing to this concernis the su rprise d iscovery in2007 of a breach in the earth'sprotective magnetosph ere thathas contributed to predictionstha t cycle #24 co u ld be far moredestructive than a ny recorded inh u m a n htstory."

Indeed, in Jun e 20 10, the S paceWeather Enterprise ForumISWE Fj, a coalition of federa lagency a nd private -sector s paceofficials engaged in monitoringspace weather a nd its effec ts oncritical civil and national secu ri tyInfrastructure. Issu ed a reportstating tha t the potential impa ctsof s pace weather a re n ot widelyknown or poorly underst ood. Asa result . the study cautionedthat the na tion is not ready foran extreme weather event , n oris it prepared to cope with thenationwide Impa ct s that wouldresult fro m even a solar s to r mof m od est stze ." One SWE Fparticipant. FEMA Adminis tratorW, Craig Fumate. gave hi s0\V11 agency poor grades for Itsprepared ness for catastrophicsolar storms a nd declared thatthe nation was in dire need of

better foreca s ting , preparationand coordtnatton."

This a rticle begins by explainingbriefly how CMEs are formedbefore di scus sing the Im pact ofs pace weather on transmissionlines . transformer s . grid s tab ility,a n d the entire el ectricitysyste m . It then proposes aset of eigh t recommendationstha t poltcymakers a n d u tilityplanners in the United Statesland elsewhere) can taketo minim ize system -widevulnerabilities to sola r storms,Thes e suggestions includea ugmenting NERC reliabilitystanda rds a n d requ iri ng bettersolar s torm forecas ting, as we llas eslablish ing an early warn ingand a lert system a nd im pro vingsituationa l awaren ess al u tilitiesthrough fa s ter data acqu isi tionan d m ore com plex a nalysiscom m unicated to operators. Wea lso recommend fa s ter controlof syste m componen ts th rougha utomate d voltage co n trol a n dpower flow m anagement a t boththe t ra nsmission and distribu tionlevel s , a n d adaptive adjus tment ofprotective m ech anisms th roughembedded intelligent devicescapable o f provid ing dynamicselective load sheddi ng a ndinten t iona l Islanding ." Finally,we call on the federal gover n mentto Invest in local manufactu rtngof system co m ponen ts a nd toprovide a dequate fu nd ing tocoordinate gover nment efforts atresponding to solar storms.

II. A BRIEF PRIMER ON SPACE

WEATHER

To under s tand the risk posed bys pace weather, it is neces saryto understand the n ature andmagni tude of th e threat. Thesun's surface Is a veritablecald ron of white-hot matter moretu rbu lent tha n a nyt hi ng on th isplanet. Sunspots---dark a reas

on the solar s urface-are smalleddies a long colossal solar river swhere s trong m a gn etic fieldsconstantly s hift . When grou psof these planet-sized s potsconverge, complex solar-magneticfields collide and release solarnares , intense sparks of m a gneticenergy violently spat into thecosmos.

Despite the powerfu l tu rbu len cein the sun 's corona (its outer m ostlayer). most m a gn etic c urren tsthat try to lea p out into s pacea re overwh elmed by the s u n'ss heer m a ss . Gravity force s thesecurrents to bend back into thecorona. creating great loops ofintens e energy. Sometimes. a smagnetic fields on the coronaco nverge a nd sh ift . a magneticfie ld will suddenly s nap withenough force to break the loopedcurren t like a d ry twig . Thisvio lent reaction hurls a m a s s ofcharged particles . a CME, In tospace and . so metimes, d irec tlytoward the earth .

In what came to be knownas "The Carring ton Event. ..the planet's skies erup tedin c uroms so brilliant theycould be seen asJar southas El Salvador and theBahamas.

A large CME can contain abillion tons of matter in a longtrail traveling a t several mlllionmiles pe r hou r through the sola rsystem. 10 TIle shock wave of aparticu larly viole n t CME canaccelerate charged particles ton ear the speed of light. At thiss peed. geomagnetic di sturbancesfrom CMEs can be felt on earthwithin an hour of their erup tionfrom the s un's surface.

1\vo h is torica l events put thelikely impa ct of future CMEs in tostark perspective . Resea rc hers

NOTYOUR FAnlEffS Y2K: PREPARINGTIIF. NOR11l AMERICAN I'OWER GRl/l FOR lllE PF.IWECT SOIAH STORM

have determined that the CMEassociated with one strong solarstor m In 1859 co n ta ined as manyas 101b grams of charged materialtraveling at 2 .300 kilometers persecond. "! In what came to beknown as "Th e Carrington Event .~named after the solar astronomerRIchard Ca rrington who firstobserved it, th e pla net's skieserupted in auroras so brilliantthey cou ld be seen a s far southas EI Sa lvador and the Bahamas.Though elect ric a l t rans mi s sionwas not widespread . te legra phsystems went haywire. s hocki ngtelegra ph opera tors a nd settin gsome wires on fire . Even whenoperators disconnected thebatteries powering the lines . forseveral hours they could s t illtransmit m es sages .P The s ola rstorm was so powerful that NewYorkers repu ted ly co u ld read theirnewspapers at midnight by thebrilliance of th e aurora crea ted asthe charged particles bombardedthe planet's atmos phere . A 2008report published by the NationalAcademy of Scien ces fou nd thata s tor m of s im ila r intensity todaycou ld requ ire a decade to fu llyrecover from and produce up to$2 trillion in damages .J:l

More than a century after th eCa rringto n Event. a t 2:44 a.m.on Mar. 13 , 1989. a geomagneticstorm caused the Hydro-Qu ebecpower grid to co llapse within90 secon ds a n d left millionsof people without electricityfor as long a s nine hours . Apowerful CME s truck the earthand generated a la rge impulsein the magnet os phere a long theU.S.-eanadian borde r. Elect rica lcu rrents Ind uced by the stormcreated intense harmonic voltageson the Hyd ro -Quebec n etwork.Voltage d ropped so prec tp ttouslythat all five high-voltage linesbetween La Grande and Montrealtripped and 9. 450 MW ofgen eration evaporated nea rly

instantaneously . While thesyste m was des ign ed to shedexcess load automatically.p rotective con trols we re neverdes igned to rec over fro m a los seq u iva len t to n early half of thesystem . As a resu lt . with in 25seconds the rest of the gr idcollapsed.

Rec ent a nd m ore systematica n a lys is of impulsivedi s turbances like thos e thatstruck Q uebec In 1989 revealthat anal ysts h ave ten ded tounderestimate the inte nsity ofthese s torms. An a n a lysis ofboth contemporary and hi storicstor m data ind icate s impulsivedi sturbances la rger than 2000nT/minute have hit the earthon a t least thre e occa sions s ince19 72 a t latitud es tha t wouldaffect the North Ameri can bulkpower syste m.! -I This in tensity isro ugh ly fou r times la rger thanthe levels ex perienced in Quebecin March 1989 . NERC esti ma testhat. in extreme scenarios.di sturbance levels as high as5. 000 nT/minute (ro ugh ly 10times la rger tha n the disturbancelevels observed in 1989) may haveoccurred during a geo magne ticstorm in May 1921 .

As the high -voltage s ystemhas grown in comp lexity.if has become increasinglys uscep tibte to thesegeomagnetic dis turbances.

Were a s tor m capable ofproducing 5. 000 nT/minuteof energy to occur today. th eNorth Am erican bulk powersystem wo u ld ex perienceImpa cts fa r beyond a nythe indu stry ha s previouslyconstdered .P Furthermore ,Quebec's experience discloseda n in convenient tru th a bou tthe ability of so la r s to rms todi srupt modern power syste ms:

a s grids bec ome significa n tlymore dependent on disparateco mpon en ts to whee l power a ndmaintain voltage across longerdi stances . they become morevu lnerab le to fu ture geomagneticstorms. It>

III. THE THREAT TO ELECTRICI TY

INFRASTRUCTURE

For many system manage rs . theth reat of a perfect solar sto r mis as ra re a n d remote as thethreat of a n aste roid collision , Itis an even t of s uch low frequen cya nd unima ginable impa ct tha t itrarely kee ps them awake at n igh t.But the pot ential consequencesa nd in evita bil ity of a powerfu lCME a rc not hyp erbole .The im pact of a maj or solars tor m on the North Americanel ec tricity infrastructure wo u ldbe particularly damaging tohigh-volta ge transmis s ion lines.transformers. a n d ove rall gridstability,

A High-Voltage TransmissionLines High-volta ge transmissiongrids a re vu lnerable togeo magnetic events becausethey act a lmost like a n antennaduring a solar s torm. Suchnetworks have multiple grou ndpoints where DC cu rrentscould en te r the system a longthe earth's n orth-s outh axis.Between the late 1950s and theearly 1980s . the high -voltagetransmis si on grid (as we ll asannual energy u sage] grew nearlylO-fold . Yet as the hi gh -voltagesystem ha s grown in co m plex ity.it has become increasinglys uscep uble to these geom agne ticd is turbances ,

In th e 19 50s . for exam ple. des ignth resholds limit ed the operatinglevel s of high -voltage lines to100- 200 kV. Today. operatinglevel s are routinely 345 kV to765 kV. TIle ratio of resistances

IE EE EN GINEERING MA1'lAGEMENT REVIEW, VOL 31f. NO. 4 . FOURni gUARTER DECEMBER 20 11

varies stgn ttlcan t ly with each levelof voltage. Thus , for exa m ple ,resi s tance Is approximately10 times lower for a 765 kVlin e compared wit h a I lS kVlin e , In genera l. these lowerresi stances m ean tha t during asevere s pace weather even t, theh ighest -voltage lines (765 kV)....i ll be 10 times more vulne ra bleto Induced cu rrents th an thelowes t-voltage (I 15 kV) lmes . !"

Moreover, the evolu tion ofopen access regula tion s h asenco u raged the trans port ofgreater a mo u nts of ene rgyacross lon ger dista nces . Oneunintended consequence ofth ese long-di stance powertra ns fers Is th e need to wheella rge r a mo u n ts of energy ove rgrea ter dis tances . III These lon gerdistances necessitate highervoltage wh ich , in turn, placesthem at elevated risk to severespace wea the r .!"

B. T ransformers Transmissionlines a re not the only

vulne rabtltty. Transformersexperience exc essive In te rnalhcaung when curren ts sa tu ratethe trans former 's magn eti c core .Resea rchers a lready have foundtha i transformers have shorteraverage wor kin g lifetimes Inregions wit h greate r geomagnetics torm acttvt ty. The Nort heaster nregion of th e u.s. wtth thehighest rates of geomagneticacuvtty experiences, on average,60 percent more tran s formerIatlures .s'' Transformer failu rera tes a lso appear to follow thel J-year sola r cycle . As sola ractivity Increases, there fore,Nort h Am erican system opera torss hou ld expect an In crea s ingnu mber of trans for m er fai lu re sregardless of the In tens ity of a nystngle sola r s tor m.

Extra -h igh -voltage (EHV)transfor me rs introduce a nadditional con ce rn. Th etrdesign ac ts to com pou nd theeffec ts of Induced cu rren ts,especially a lon g the high-voltageportion of the grtd . While E HV

transformers wou ld be subjectto proportionately h igher llowsof Ind uced current, they burnou t a t the same cu rren t levelsas lower -voltage transformers .During a powe rfu l solar s tor m,therefore , EHV trans for merswou ld become saturated morequickly than transformers u sedIn lower-voltage po rtions of thegrtd. ?'

One s im u la tion co nducted In2007, for example , found thata geo magnet ic disturbance of4 ,800 nT / m tn u te wou ld damagebeyond repair the core s of over350 transformers , Includ ing 9 7percent of all EHV transformersIn New Hampshire , 82 pe rcen t InNew J e rsey, 72 percent In Oregon ,40 pe rcent in Washington, a ndbetween 24 a nd75 percent of EHVtransfor mers in every s tate a longthe easte rn seaboard from So u thCaro lina to Maine (Figu re II .NERC warns that damage ons uch a wide scale co u ld prolon grestoration of the bulk power gridand lead to long-ter m ch ro n ic

F'~un· I : Percent of EHV Tra n sfor mers at RIsk from a 4 .800 nT/min u te Oeomagnettc Dis turbance .

Source : NERC, 2010

NOT YOUR FATI1ER'S Y2K: PRE PARlNG TI-lE NORTI-I AMEHIC AN roWER GRID FO~ TIlE ! 'E Rn :cr SOlAR STORM

shortage s of U.S. elect ricitysupply for multiple yea rs .rz

This dire prediction is based onutility experience over a numberof years that transformersgenerally cannot be repairedIn the field. They have to bereplaced with new un it s. An dthough some limited systemcomponent manufa cturingcapacity exi sts in North America.nea rly all trans forme rs a recurrently manufactured offshore.Replacement unit s cost moreth an $ 10 million and can take12 to 24 m onths to procure.PMoreover. each transformer (evenfrom the same m anufacturer] cancontain s u b tle d esi gn variations.Not only do thes e va ria t ionscomplicate attempts to calculatewhich tran sformers a re m ostlikely to be vu lnerable to inducedcurrents. they also co m pou n dthe challenges a n d increase thetime necessary to m a n u factu rereplacements .>'

C. Grid Stabllity In essence.these vulnerabilities withtransmission lines a n dtransformers m ean tha t theway the bulk powe r grid cu rren t lyst abil ize s vol tage increa s esthe risk of widesp read ou ta ge sfrom a s evere solar stor m.System operators must m aintainvoltage wi thin a narrow ra nge bybalancing the s u pp ly and demandof reactive power in the electricalsystem. Rea c tive powe r is createdwhen cu rren t and voltage in a nalt ernating current system a renot in pha se d ue to in teractionswtth e lect ric a nd magnetic fieldsaro u nd system com ponen ts.Reactive power is often referredto a s VARS (for volt a m peresre active) . Generally. u tilit iesgenerate VARS as a product ofgreater re al power output fromcentra l generation s tations orby in stalling ex pensive dynamic

ca pacitors a t various points a longthe transm issio n line .25

EHV transformersincrease the risk ofvoltage in s t a bilit y.especially along thehigh·voltage portions ofthe grid.

EI1V transformers increasethe ri sk of voltage instability ,especia lly along t he hi gh -vol tageportion s of the grid. Field test sby the Electric Power ResearchIn stitute (EPRII have confirmedthat the DC cu rrents inducedd u ring sola r s tor ms causetransform ers to consu me greateramounts of reactive power. "Si nce los s of reactive power by atransfor mer is a fu nction of it soperating voltage, proportionatelyhi gher-voltage tra nsfor m ers willex perience higher re active powerlos ses . A 765 k V transform er.for instance . will lose almost sixtimes the reacti ve powe r a s a115 kV transformer experiencingthe same induc ed current. As ares u lt, EH V transformers thata re fried by a p owerful sola rstorm will create greater voltageinstabilit ies w hen they burn outth a n lowe r-voltage tra nsform ers .The ir loss is more likel y to triggercatast roph ic vo ltage instabilitytha t co u ld th r ea ten th e reliabilityof the entire system .

Indeed. the major cause ofb lackouts among d evelopedcou n tries over th e past 20 yearsh a s not been the la ck of ra wpower n eeded t o m eet increa singdemand . Major blackouts ha vem ore likely been precipitatedby voltage instability causedby a los s o f rea ct tve powe r inlon g transmissio n \lnes . In fact.loss of reactive power was asignifican t causal fa ct or in majorpower outages worldwide from19 78 to 2003. Voltage colla pse

from los s of reactive power wasres ponsible for blackou ts on theWe s t Coa s t of the United S ta teson July 2 , 1996, and Aug. 10 .1996. a n d also factored intomajor b lackouts in Paris (1978).Tokyo (19 87) , Quebec (I 989),and London (2 0 0 3), as well a sin Swed en. Denmark. and Ita lyduring the 2003 European h eatwave. F

As both the 1989 Quebec a nd2003 East Coast blackoutsdemonstrated , if voltage dropsto o low, some genera to rs willautomatically d isconnect toprotect th em s elves . This los sin genera tion cau ses remotelys u p p lied rea ctive power to dropas we ll. necessitating greaterline charging to make up thed ifference . This line c harging (am easure d esi gned to protect thesystem ) risks creating a positivefeedback loop. As lines arecha rged to make up for the la c kof rea ctive power. current s p ikesand causes more ge n era tor s totrip offline . neces sitating m orecurrent to make up for evengrea ter loss es in reactive power.The res u ll is a pro gres sive a n duncontrolla ble system colla psemuch lik e the one that b rough td own la rge portions of thenortheast power grid in 2003. 2 ::1

D. System-Wide OperationalProcedures Taken individua lly .the th reats of a sola r s to r m totransmission lines. transformers ,and reactive power m igh tbe m a n agea b le . Bu t whencombined , they create asys tem -wide vu lnera bilitythat utility operators can n olonger ignore .

A s tu dy carried ou t under thea usp ices of the Elect romagn eticPuls e Com m ission fou n d that aseve re s pace wea ther even t hasthe potential to cause permanentdamage to th e nation's power

IE F.E ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT REVIEW. VOL. 39. NO .4. FOURTII gUARTER, DECEMBER 2011

grid requiring. "extraordtnartlylong restoration times ." 2!J Thisis partly becaus e existingequipment desi gn codes a re notadop ted with an eye to re ducingthe flow of induced cu rrents fromsevere geomagnetic di sturbances.In s tead . U.S. grid operationalprocedures generally a re designedto boos t ope ra tional re serves inthe event of a major systemdisturbance." These proceduresdo little to prevent or reduce thethreat of induced cu rren ts . Theymay even exace rba te the riskof complete syste m failure . Infact. th e kinds of over- cu rren tprotecti ons that system ope ratorscu rren tly employ are likely tocause many of the technologie sthat system operators re ly upon(shunt capacito rs, static VARcompensators. etc.) to trip du ringa maj or geomagnetic dis tu rban ce.

At the sam e time, th e los s ofa s ign ifican t number of EHVtransfor mers in any geographicalarea will likely exacerbate voltagein stability a long the high -voltageport ions of the grid. Since a llof these effects a re likely toocc ur nearly simu ltaneously. the

modern high-vol tage elec tricitygrid Is at greater risk of acascading voltage co llapse unlikea ny previou s ly experienced(FIgure 2).:1l Add to this risk thela rge power transfe rs fac ilitatedby the evolution of open accesspolicies . an d it is easy to recognizehow modern gri d operators wouldbe faced with the los s ofmultiple protecti ve capacitiesthat they rely on cu rrently tos tabilize the system . Withoutseveral protective e lemen tspre -positioned a t s trategiclocations, system operatorswould be virt u a lly powerles s toprevent a widespread voltageco lla pse and the as soc iatedsyste m-wide blackout. 32

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Electric u tilities and transmis s ionsystem operato rs need n otwa it pas sively for the perfectsola r storm. A series of eightrecommendations . adopted aspart of a co mpre hensive s tra tegy.could address many of the threatsa large CME im poses on criticalparts of the Nort h American bulkpower system.

A. Incorporate Solar StormsInto NERC ReliabilityStandards Both the privatea nd public sect ors m ay n otfully u nders ta nd the level oftn terconnectt vtty of critica lIn frast ructu res an d cou ldthere fore fa il to grasp theenormity of the threat posed bysevere s pace weather. 33 Utilitiesa re not cu rrently required tomeet any mandatory U.S . orin ternational codes or regula tion sfor protecting power grids fromthe effects of sola r s torms.P"NERC s ta nda rds requi re utilitiesto test th eir systems to provethey can withstan d a n u mberof co n tingencies. in clu din g thesimu lta ne ous los s of up to twocritical Infrastructure assets .But n oth ing in NERC reliab ilitystanda rds requires utilities tos im u la te a solar event of the scalethat forecaster s warn is not onlypossible, but inevit able .

Whil e u tilities h av e s trongincentives to identify systemvulnerabilities and pro tect c riticalassets. none a re required to modelthe risks that a severe sola r sto r mwould pose to system reliability .

Figure 2 : Areas of Potential System Collapse During a 4.800 nT jminute Geomagnetic Disturbance.

Source : NERC, 2010

NOTYOUR FAlllEIf S Y2K: PREPARING 1lIE vox t u AMERICAN 1'O\\,'ER GRID r ONlllE PERFE CT SOlAR STO HM

Sin ce 198 3 . when EPRI developedth e first computer s im u la tionsof Induced curren ts. computermod els ha ve become tncrea smglysophis ticated . Today's modelsshould be capable o f si mula tingth e reliability e ffects of In d ucedcu rren ts wtr h unpreced entedaccu racy" Util ities a nd regionaltransmission organlzattonsshould u tili ze better co m pu termodel tng to Ide n ti fy how Inducedcurren ts from solar storms at avari ety of inten sit ies \1.111 affectcri tical system componentsat the local di stribution a ndregional trans mi ssi on levels .In a dd ition . utilities s hou ldra n k s ubstat ions. trans formers.and capa ci tor banks ba sedon their vu lnerab ilit ies toInd uced currents under d ifferen tscenarios.

Highly rellahlenear-term forecastsof solar stonns andeartb-threatenlng CMEswould provide criticaladvanced warning togrid operators.

NEHC s ho u ld m a ndat e thattransmis s ion com panies Installsu pplemental transfor merneutral ground resistors toreduce c urrent flows th roughEHV transformers that m od e lspredict are the m os t vu lnerab le.These resi s tors are relativelyInexpensive. require lil lieadd it ional engineering, a nd ca nreduce induced cu rren ts by60--70 percen t. regardless ofs to rm tntenstty .>"

EPRI has s tud ied how takingpreca utions to protect relativelyfew vuln erable transformers ina ny threatened service a rea docswry littl e to reduct' the risk toth e overall system.J; Therefo re.it is essential tha t u t ilitiesa nd region al transmission

o rga n tza t to ns coordi nate effortsto protec t transfor mers fro m theeffec ts of severe s ola r s to r ms . OneIdea is for b u lk power s u ppliersto develop a nd ex pand backupeq ui pment s haring programs .pa ying s pecia l attention to thes haring of EHV trans formersbetween at -rtsk grid syste ms a ndthos e lea s t likely to be affec tedd u ring; a severe s torm ,

B. Improve Solar StormForecasting Highly re liab lenear-term forec asts o f sola rstorms a nd ea rt h -t h rea ten ingCMEs would provid e cri ticaladvanced warning to gridoperators. Give n even IS minutesof notice . system o pera to rs canreduce generation in northernla ti tudes . s pi n up ge neratingunits in souther n latitudes .offload threate ned transformersa nd direc t pers onnel to them ost vu lnerable systemtnfra s t ructu re .:" Wit h adequatewarning. inde pe ndent systemoperators cou ld reduce powe rtransfers betwe en a dj acen tsystems a nd cancel plan nedmain te na n ce work to re d ucethe di rec t costs a nd secondaryImpacts o f major geomagn et icdtst urbances .s"

Currently. NOAA's S pace w eatherPred iction Center ISWPCjcan predict. wi th modera teconfidence. the probab illty of asolar storm one to th ree daysin a dvance . Bu t the Cen terdoc s not ha ve the a b ility toforecast s to r ms that cou ld hitthe earth in a matter of hours . ~ oIndeed. accord ing to a recentNa tio na l Research Co u ncil {N He)assessment of n ational s paceweather p rediction capacity. theUnited States h a s no satisfac toryshort -te rm forecast o r war n ingcapab ilities , I I

The SWPC re lies on data fromNASA's Advanced Co m pos it ion

Explorer lACE). a sate llitelaunched in 1997 to monitor sola rwinds a nd s pace weather fromthe L I liberation poin t (roughlythe poin t 1.5 mill ion kilome tersfro m the earth) where the s u na nd th e earth's gravitat iona lpulls a re In eq uilibrium. Us ingdata from ACE . SWPC modelerscu rrently can provtde about anho u r's wa rning wit h a high leve lof co n fidence.n There is someco ncern. however. that ACE Isnea rin g the e nd of its operationallife .U NASA headquarters h a swarned that . after I I years.ACE's detector heads are losingsenstuvtty and are vulnerable toelect ronic fai lu re . Nevertheless.NASA ha s n o plan In place torepla ce some of Its fun cuons .:"

On Feb. II. 2010. NASA did .however. launch the SolarDynamic s Obse rvatory (SDO).which provides continuousdata o n some s pace weatherwith o n ly a IS-min ute delay .Scientists h ave developed an ew data a n alysi s techniquethat uses elect ro n particle flu xm ea s u rements fro m SOO sensorsto p red ict the arrival times o fcharged particles from so la reve nts. This a dvancement holdsthe possib ility of foreca s tingin near real time . when solars to r ms a re likely 10 harm c riticaltnfra structure.:" NASA shou ld beencouraged to pursue th is op tionwhile developing longer -te rmpla ns for repla cing a nd improvi ngACE's fu nctions.

In the s hort term. the NRC.SWPC. a nd NASA s hou ld bec ha rged with develop ing acom pre hensive capab tlny fornea r-real -time forecast ing ofthe m os t risky CMEs u s in gex isting sate llite assets , Theagencies a lso shou ld prepa rerecommendations to Congress forfund ing additional assets capableof providing accurate rea l-li me

lEU: ENG INU:R1NG MANAGEMEl'IT REVU;W. VO l. . 39, NO .4 . rousru Q UARll-:R. J)~;Cf;MBER 2 0 1 1

a lerts of a ll m ajor s pace weat he revents .

Special operationalschemes designed toprotect the grid lackthe ability to adapt as aso lar event.

c. Upgrade Solar Storm EarlyWarning and Alert SystemsFollowing the March 1989 s to rm.Hyd ro-Quebec Install ed anactive communications softwarepackage on syste m operatorconsoles tha t provides each of theNortheast Power Coo rd ina tingCou nc il Coordina tors withgeomagnetic ston n a lerts as wellas the s tatus of a ll so la r ac tivity.When alert ed of a geo magneticstorm of sufficient inten si ty .the softwa re triggers visual an daud ible a la rms. A main screenprovides the system operatorwith a ll Information currentlyknown abou t the possible solarth reat an d a d ialog box permitsin stantaneous com mu nicatio namong all re liability coordinato rsof a ny observed geomagneticphenomenon."

TIlt" effectiveness of SWPC a lertswas tested d urtng an October2003 CME that threaten ed thenort heastern U.S . power gri d. Thetest revealed significa nt s hort fal lsIn th e system's acc u racy.Because the SWPC relies onground-based magneto meterstations in Boulder. Co lo.. a ndFredericksburg. Va. (both Inm id-latitu des). S\VPC analys tsmust co llect a nd average multiplemagnetometer samples In orderto predi ct the Intensity ofprospective geo magnetic eve nts.During the Oc tober 2003 storm.th is mean t that SWPC's estimatesof the storm's Int en si ty laggedbe hi nd effects al ready being felton the gri d a t h ighe r latitudes .For exa mple. monito rs located

a long the affec ted gri d measuredInduced cu rrents tha t exceededthe levels foreca st by SWPC 38m in u tes later. t"

North American utilities s hou ldInstall system operator consolestha t comm u nicate real -time.accura te Information abou tspace weather Intens ity a ndtrajectory provided by the SWPC.111e SWPC s hou ld coordinateWith North Ame rican syste moperators to forecast s tormInt ens ity and trajectory ba sed.In pa rt . on mea surementsfrom a n array of high -la tit u demagn etomete rs . NERC s houlda lso coordinate wnh the SWPCto test th e effectrve ness of thissystem a t provtdrng greaters itua tio na l awareness undernormal opera ting co nd itio ns.

D. Use Smarter GridTeChnologies to ImproveSituational Awareness Asthe bu lk transmiss ion syste mexpands in s ize a nd complexi ty .system operators face co nd itionstha t a re more diff icult toanticipat e . mod el. and co u n ter .While many utiU ties h ave s pe nts u bs tantia l a mounts In s taillngphasor measurement units(PMU) a nd collectmg rea l-timedata on syste m status, thistorrent of data can overwhelmmany operators. As more da ta Isproduced a nd di s seminat ed . Itcrea tes a challenge for operatorsto find the bus that they n eeda nd process them quickly enoughto make prudent decis ions. ~~And once they h ave formulateda plan of action . most operatorsa re lim ited to ustng conventionalpower now co ntrols em ployingmechanical switches tha t areslow. In flexible. a nd vulnerab le towea r.?"

Improving s itua tional awarenesswoul d a llow system operatorsto react more qutckly to threats

from sola r storms and othergeo magnetic dis turbances.The more rapidly systemoperators can Intervene. themore likely tha t they can averta bl ackout. 50 Un de r someemergency situations. eve n themost seasoned system operatorh as limits . Researchers a tCarnegie Mellon Un iversity havebuilt models th a t reveal tha tadvanced au to matic co ntrolsyste ms that comm u n icate withon e a no ther Ind ependent ofthe ope rator can res pond moreeffective ly.51 gulck response maybe crtuca l tn preventing a minorou tage fro m becom ing a majorblackout. An improved ability tore spond more quickly using morecom plex system Informationsignificantly Increases systemresili ency a nd co u ld substan tiallymitigate the impact s of a severesolar s torm .v

E . Expand Automatic ProtectiveMechanisms Cu rrently. specia loperational schemes design ed toprotect the grid lack the a bility toadapt as a sola r eve n t Is affectingdifferent parts of the system, 53

A s marter grid Is capable ofdata analysis and near -real -tl mecoord ina tion of co n tro l actionstha t co u ld provtde greaterprotecti on du ring a m ass ivegeo magnetic d is turbance.especially If organized on aregional or n a tion al scale.

For some time. grid operatorshave employed a tri age a pproachto widespread syste m failure.tnclu dtng removin g 01" s a crt tlc tngsmall portions of the systemto save the whole. 5~ So meregiona l sys tem ope rators.for example. have turned toemerge ncy load s hedd ing as amech a ni sm to protect networksfrom system dis turbances.Selec tive load s hedding is autility 's method of reducingdema nd on th e trans m ission

----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ........

NOTYOUH fAnl~;H'S Y2K: I'REI'ARlJliG rue NOHTll AM~;HICA.'" I'OWEH earn f a N ' 1 It: I'EIU'"E(:T SOlAR STORM

system by temporari ly swttch tngoff th e d istribu tion of electricityto specific customers. The u tilitypays customers that are wtll tngto ha ve their service interrupteddurtng a grtd emergency. Facingrolllng bl a ckouts in 2007.ERCOT, for example, d evelopedan Emergency lnterru puble LoadShedding (ElLS ) p rogra m thatpays q ualified customers topower d own d u rt ng an emergencyth a t threa tens the ERcar grid .""

Voltage stability iscritical to preventingtransformer losses fromtriggering cascadingvoltage collapse.

SUII. participa tion in contractedload shedding schemes is limited .typically re p re sem m g less than 5percent of a system 's peak load. s''Additionally, m ost emergencyload s hedd ing s t lll re lies on arel atively s low p roces s , withsystem opera tors conferri ngto d ecid e whether to deployemergen cy tnt erru puble loa d sa nd call tng qualified customers,who then ha ve a set period oftime from recetvtng the call toco n tact releva nt personnel wi thtnstrucuons to power d own.s"This proee s s Is inhe rently s low,unreliabl e a nd dependen t oncommunica t ions systems tha ta re themselves at risk du ring amajor solar s torm.

Recently , u ti lities haveexperimented wnh smart gridcom po nents like Intelligent feederswitches and real -tim e p ro tecti vedevices tha t can Isolate fa u ltsa nd switch to on-s ue e lec t rtcalstorage devices or di stributedgeneration u nits wit hou t needingto walt fo r s upervisory controland data acquisition ISCADA)commands from network controlcenters. This technique. knownas dynamtc Islanding, generally

ha s been used in areas wi thfrequent e lectrica l outages , whereloa d centers a re fed by o lderlines and aging Infra s tru ctu reor areas where dense vegetationcan come in to contact wi thelectrtcal lines a nd causetransmis sion tn terru puons .?"But the ex pa nsion of advancedm et ering infra s truc tu re IAMI)co u ld make dynamic isla ndinga m ore practical methodfor reacting to system-wided ist urbances by automating theprocess of remotely managingcustomer loa d s . Given sufflc rentdevelopment a nd deployment ofAMI. ut ili ties will be a ble to createIsl ands at wi ll. Thus . cr itica l loadssuch as hos pitals . police s tations.water treat ment faci lities,transportation fu el d istributionnodes . and control centersthemselves can maintain powerwhile Ih e system strategicallyreduces power flows to lesscrtucalload centers."

Im p roved a u to matio n thata llows m ore strategic dynarntcIslanding is especially critical Inpreventing secondary Impa ctsto Interdependent systems.lil t

Dynamic islanding of criticalInfrastructure min im izes the timeneeded to restore the system,mtt tga tes secon dary effects.and Increases survtvabtltty." !Ea rly deploymen t o f s mart gridco m ponen ts a n d prepos it tcntng o fdistribu ted ge neratton . If p lannedcarefully. also can benefituti lities beyond sefeguardtngcrtttcal tnfra s truc tu re. Dynamicisl anding can provide animm edi a te fix for a problematicnetwork or s hort -term extensionof a portion o f an aging network.a llowi ng utilit ie s to defer cap italtnves tmen ta u ntil they a rem ore convenie nt or fiscallytm pera n ve .li Z

A s m a rt e r grid provides u ti liti esand system operators wt th

a bett er way to Implementemergency load shedding anddynamic Islanding in res pon seto severe solar s to rm s . It wouldharness modern commu n icationand IT tnfrastructures to p rovt d eInstantaneous bt -dtrecuonalcom rnurur-atton a mong co n t rolcenters a nd grid co m po nen ts. Asmarter grtd ca n process vastnumbers of data transactionsand d elive r sub-second responsesto system components designedto implement emergency loa ds hedding more quickly ands trategically.(;:\

When a lerted to a n approach ingsolar stor m , co nt ro l room scou ld launch co mpu ter m od el sthat simula te th e path ofind uced currents under specificconditions. These simulationscan hel p system operatorsIdentify the most vulnerableassets and determine a strategicload s hedding scheme toprotec t th em, TIle s ma rtgrid can then commu nicatea u to matically to begin poweringd own interruptible loads a ndcommanding co nnected assetsto take protective measures. Byfacil itating a n au tomated anddynamic response. a s martergrid co u ld react more qutckly toprotec t only vul nerable assetswh ile main ta in ing opt imal service(u nder the ci rcu mstances) tocri tical loa d centers. Th is fastera n d m ore dyn a m ic res pon s eensures 1<.'88 service tn terrupuond u ri ng a severe solar storm andfar les s recovery after one.

F. Automate Volt ageStabillzation Voltage stab ility Iscritical to preven ting transformerlos s es from triggering cascadingvoltage co llapse th a t risksbrtnging down la rge porttons ofth e bulk power grid. Typically.operators regulate voltage co ntroldevices with locally availablemeasurements of voltage

I E ~:E ENGINEE Rl NG MANAGE M F.NT IUWIEW . VOL. 39. NO . 4 . FO IJH.TI I gUAH.TER DECEMBER 20 I I

and c u rren t. On lines withmultiple voltage regulation andVAR compensation devices , eachdevice Is controlled Independentlywithout regard for the resultingconsequences of action taken byother co n trol devices . This ca nlead to problems when trying: toregulate large voltage flu ctua tionswt thtn a geogra ph ically broada rea.v'

Smart grid a ppl tca uons a llowvoltage and VAR con trol d evi cesto share infonnatlon a ndevaluate co m pre hensive controls trategies a u to matically toop tim ize voltage s tab ilizationduring a crt s ts . Acceleratedadoption of s ubstation a nd feederautomation tec hnology. cou pledwith the widespread deploymentof AMI , would lay the gro u nd workfor automated control syste msto optimize volta ge con tro l Inreal time. Recent Innovations Incontingency modeling In com plexnetworks holds the promise ofrapidly identifying opLlmal volta gea nd VAR operation s trategiesfrom millions. If not billions, ofoperational possibilities.b.~

G. Invest In DomesticManufacturing of SystemComponents As pa rt o f thiscomprehensive strategy toprepare for a severe so la rstorm, the federal governments hould pursue efforts to bringmore of the s u pply chaina nd manufacturing base forcrtuca l sy s te m components liketransformers . shunt ca pa citors.and static VAR compensatorsback to the United S tates. Inaddition. the governmen t s houldexpand funding a nd accele rateresearch and development ofnext-generation power conversiontechnologies like gallium nitridetransformers that can Increa seefficiency wh ile providing greatercapacity to withs tand largeDC cu rrents Induced by solar

storms.f" This research notonly would help to Jump-start adomestic component industry. Itwould ensure that spa re partsand key system technoloates aremore available tn the even t of asevere solar storm.

H. Coordinate PolicyAction The SWPC is theonly governmental e n tHyc harged wi th coord tnaungspace weather forecasting.But there Is no s ingle a gencyresponsible for coord ina tingspace weather Informationacross a gencies. re portin gactionable alerts to affectedindustries. and ove rseeing asystem-wide emergency response.Responstbtltty for various aspectsof CME preparedness is scatteredthroughout the U.S . federalgovernment . Con s equ en t ly .affected industries rely ondata haphazardly gleanedfro m multiple governmentoffices. fore ign governments,In ternational agencies. and theprivate sector.fi7

The SWPC s hou ld be chargedwith developing. in co nsulta tionwith pu b lic a nd priva te sectorstakeholders, an actio n pla n10 deliver by 20 12 accuratenear-rea l-ti m e a lerts a ndshort - and long-term spaceweather foreca s ts . However.to ensure that a ll of theserecommendations are adopted aspart of a comprehensive strategyto prepare the North Americanbulk power system for a severesolar storm. we propose thatCongre s s o r the President requirethe White House Office of Scienceand Technology Policy (OSTPJ todevelop a plan for coo rd ina tingaccurate, sustainable operationalmea surements o f sola r acu vnythrough a cent ral office withoperational autho rtty to Is suecomprehensive forecasts a n da lerts a nd to coord ina te

emergency re spon se acrossaffected utilities and the m u lti plejurtsdtctrons and governmentagencies already charged withregulating critical Infras tructu re .

The SWPC operates with a verysmall and unpredictable a nnualbudget of less than S6 m illionland modest a dd itiona l fu ndingfrom the Un ited States Air Forcefor data preparation associatedwith selected operations) . TheNational Research Council hascharactertzed this insubstantialappropriation as "more reflectiveof a research and development(R&D) enterprtse than anoperational enterprise withrealtime national space weatherprediction res ponsibi lity .~6lI

Despite benefiting di rectlyfrom SWPC's modeling andforecasting reports . the other51.,< agencies that participa teIn the National Space Wea th erProgram {NSWP)-NASA. theDepartment of Com merce. theNational Science Fou ndation. theDe pa rtmen t of the In te rior, theDe pa rtment of Ene rgy . and theDepa rtment of S tate--cu rren tlydo not co n t rib u te to SWPC 'soperating b udget. Congresss hou ld fu lly fund SWPCeither through a dedicateda ppropriation or a n nu a lpermanent funding fro m eachof the participating agencies. orboth . Th is fu n di n g s hou ld reflectthe Important role the Ce n terwill assume in prepari ng thenation for a potential electricalca ta s t rophe.

V. CONCLUSION

President J immy Carter o ncewrote that the United S tateseither could develop a na tionalenergy policy in an "tntutttvea n d planned way. ~ or reactivelywhen "forced to" by "chaos" andthe "laws of nature.r'" Given thelikelihood that the nation (indeed

NOTYOUR FAll-IE KS Y2K: PREPARING 11IE NOR11l AMERICAN POWER GRID FOR TIlE PE RFECT SOt.t.R ~'TORM

the planet) will fa ce a severesolar s torm with potentia llydevastating co nsequen ces.?'' h iscommen ts s uggest that we ha vea rare o ppo rt u n ity to a void , or a tleast mitigate . impending disasterthrou gh carefu l pla n ning a ndpreparation .

The h is tory of pa st solarstorms-e-events inducingtelegraphs to ca tc h fire In1859 a nd causing the Cana d ia ngrid to collapse In 1989-shouldbe enough to convince readersof the vu ln erability of ourtransmtsston lines . tra nsformers ,and voltage controls to sola racttvtty. Ra ther than rea c t,however. planners a nd syste m

ENDNOTES

opera to rs can re s pond proa ctivelyby strengthening NERC reliabilitys tandards to In corporate theprobablHty of sola r s to r msa nd by making Investmen ts Inmore re llable nea r-term s paceweather forecasts. An activesola r s torm early wamtng a nda lert system wo u ld help warnsyste m operators before an eventa nd coo rd in a te respons es a fte rIt. Perhaps most s ignificantly.Investments in s mart gr tdtech nologies . a utomatedpro tec tive mechanisms a ndvoltage stab tltza t ton systemsland their domestic man u fact u re)s im u ltaneou s ly wo u ld im provegrid restltency and efficiency.

Ins titutiona lly , the SpaceWeather Pred iction Ce nter shou ldbe better fu nded a nd the Wh ileHouse Office of Scie nce a ndTec h nology Polt cy s hou ld developa n actio n plan for h andling as erious sola r storm . While Itmay be d ifficult during this timeof fiscal auste rity to Imaginedevoting substantial fu nd s to athreat that we ha ve never h adto face. a com pre hen s ive pla nto prepare for a severe solars to r m will cost far les s now thanwill addressing the catastrophicImpa cts to the North Americanelectricity ~rid when the pe rfectsolar s to r m fin ally a rrives.

1. The DO E asks tha t the ronowmg di s cla imer be run : "Th ts reportwa s prepared as an a cco u n t of work sponsored by a n agency of theUnited S lates Governmen t. Neit her the United S ta tes Governmen tnor a ny agency thereo f. n or a ny of their employees . makes a nywarra n ty. ex press or Implied . o r assu mes a ny legal lia bili ty o rresponsi bility for the a ccu racy, com pleteness. or u sefulnes s of anyIn formatio n. a ppara tus. product. or process dis closed . or repres entsthat its use wo uld no t infringe privately owned rights. Referenceherein 10 a ny s pecific commercia l product , proces s . or serviceby trade name. tra demark , manufa ctu rer, or o therwise does notneces s a rily co nstit u te or Im ply Its endorsement. recommenda tion , o rfavoring by the Un ited Stat es Government or a ny a ge ncy thereof. TIleviews a nd opin ions of authors expressed he rein do not necessari lys ta te or reflect those of the United Sta tes Gover n ment or a ny a gencythe reof."

2 . See Federal Emergency Mana gement Agency IF'EMAl (20 lO).Ma na ging Critical Disasters in th e Transaflantic Domain: The Case ofa GeomagnelicSrorm, Workshop S u m mary. Bou lder, CO , Feb . 23-24 .

3 . J . A10k (201 I I. Solar Storms Could Create $2tn 'Globa l Katrina.'Warns Ctuef Scienusi. GUARDIAN . Feb. 21. at www.guardtan.co.u k /sclence/20 I I j febj2 I/solar -sto rms-globa l-katrl na .

4 . A.V. Rlswadkar a n d B. Dobbins {20 lO1. Solar S rorms : Profecting YourOperations Agains t the S un's '[)ark S ide. ' Zurich Services Corp.,April 8. a t 2 .

5 . See Debe rshtre . D. {201l} . Get ready for a 'globa l Katrina' : BIAAestever sola r storm cou ld cause power cu ts which last for MONTHS.Mall On line. Feb. 2 1. Available at www.dallymail.co .uk jsclencetech jart1('le- 13 591 36 j Global -Katrina-Biggest -sola r-s torm -cas e- power ­cuts -MONTHS. h tm l.

6 . See Riswadkar. A.V. a nd Dobbins, B.. s upra note 4, at 4 .

.,

50 IEEE ENGINU:ItlNG MANAGEMEm rU;VIEW, VOL. 39. J',;O . -I . FOURTI-I g UARTER. m;C~:~1HER 20 11

7 . Na tion a l Space Wea ther Enterprise For-urn (2010) . 2010 SpaceWea lhC' f Enterprise Forum Summary Repon. National S pace WeatherProgram Co u ncil. National Pres s Club, Wa sh in gton. DC. June 8 . at 2 .

8 . let9. K. Mosleh t and R. Kumar (20 I 0). Smart Grid: A Reliltbill/y

Perspecrue . Paoc. IEEE PES CONFERENCE ON INNOVAffi'E S MAHT GRIDTECHNOlOGIES . at 4--7 .

10. Federa l Eme rgency Management Agency lFEMA) , sup ra note 2 at 8.II . National Academ ies o f Science (NAS ) (20 0 8) . Severe Space Weather

Events: Understand ing Societal a nd Eco nomic Impacts . Report fro mWorkshop of Cornnuttee on th e Societa l and Econo mic Impactsof Severe S pace Wea th er Events . S pace S tudies Board. Dtvtsronon E ngmeertn g & Physi cal Scie n ces. Na tion a l Re search Cou n cil.Wa shin gton . DC. May 22-23 . 2008 .

12 . A.V. R tswadkar a n d B. Dobbin s . s upra n ote 4 at 4 .13 . See National Acad em ies of Science tNASJ, supra note 11 .14 . Nort h Am erican E lectric Reliability Corporation (NERCl (20 10).

H igh-Impa ct. Lo w -F'requf.'ncy Ellen ! RL..k /0 the North AmericanBulk Power System S u m mary Report of North America n ElectricReliabiltty Co rporation a n d U_S. Dept. of Energy's Nov. 9- 10 . 2009.Works hop. J u ne. a t 67-68 .

I 5.ld.16. ta.. a t 64-65.17 . NERC. s up ra note 14 .18 . Na tional Academies o f Science (NAS). supra n ote II . a t 18 .19 . NERC. supra n ot e 14 . a t 70.20. Riswad kar and Dobbi n s . s upra n o te 4. at 6 .21 . Nort h American Elect ric Reliabi lity Corporation INERCJ, sup ra note

14 . a t 70 .22. Id.. a t 7 4.23 . Id .. a t 98.24 . Id.. a t 7 1.2 5. One way to conceptualize the difference between real powe r (current)

a n d rea c tive power (voltage) Is to thin k of a n e lectrical transmis sionand d is tribution system much lik e modern plumbi ng. Concetve ofcu rrent as the a ctua l water flowing th ro ugh the com plex n etworkof pipes a n d voltage a s th e wate r pres sure in a ny give n pipe. NowIma gin e tha t someone mad e a s mall puncture somewhere In theptptng system. in th e grand sch eme o f a mumctpaltty's watersystem . the a mount of water seepi ng th ro u gh this s mall hole m ayn o t repre sent an im porta nt loss . But the wa te r pres sure lost a s ares u lt of even a small p u ncture is orders of m a gnitud e grea ter a n dcan substantia lly und er m in e the a b ility o f th e syste m to deliverwater to custom ers. Without adequate pre ssure . wa ter ca n not reachcustomers further away from the central s ou rce. n o mailer howmuc h actual wate r there is .

26. L. va n der Zel {20 I I}, TIle Effects oj Solar Flares on Critica lInj raslnlcture. I RENt:w. GRJl) 12 . J an . 8 .

27. See Federal Energy Regulatory Com m ission (2 00 5). PrinciplesjorE.Did ellf. I?el iable Rea cfi pe Power Supply and Consumption, StaffReport . Docket No. AD05 -1 ·000. Feb. 4 .

28. See C. Coo pe r (fort hcomtngj . Know If When You See It : A H euris t icApproach to Energy Security. ENERGY POU CY.

29. NERC. supra note 14 . a t 77.30 . Id.3 1. Id.. a t 7 1- 72 .

NOTYOUR 'ATI IERS Y2K: PREPARING TIiE: NORTIl AME RICAN I'O....'E R GRID f O R TII~: PERfECT SOLAH STORM

32. See S pace \'.'('tlt her Impacts on the Electri c Power System byFra nk KO/.a of PJ M lnterconnecuon In Appendix C of High -Impact.Low- Frequ ency Event Risk to the North American Bulk Power Sys tem.S u mmary Report of North American Electric Reuabtluy Corpora tiona nd U.S. Dept. of Energy's Nov. 9-10. 2009. Workshop. June 2010.a t 108-1 09.

33. Federal Emergency Management~ency (FEMAJ, s upra note 2 . at 13 .34 . Riswadkar a nd Dobbins . supra nol l' 4. a t 7 .35. Va n der Zel. supra note 26. at 9 .36. NERC . supra note 14. a t 79.37. Van der zel . supra note 26 . a t 9 .38. NAS. supra not e I I . a t 56.39. ld .. a t 72 (qucttng ISO New England Vice Presiden t James

McGovern).40.ld .. a t 4 .41. Id .. at 72.42 . NAS. supra not e II. at 47.43. Id .. a t 67.44. While the NASA Autho rization Act (House Ru le 6063. Section 110 I)

charges the Office of Science a nd Tech no logy Polley to wo rk wtthNOAA a nd o ther federal agencies a nd Industry to devel op a plan forsustain ing solar wtnd measurements In the absence of ACE. NOAAre po rts that they h ave no dear replacement in site. See NERC. supranote 14 . a t 87.

45 . NAS. supra note I I. a t 37.46 . NERC . supra note 14 . a t 63.47. NAS. supra not e 1 I. a t 53-54.48 . St aff {2009}. S ituational Awaren es s w ith PMU: GeoslXlHal

Visualization oJ Mass ive Dote. Space-Time l n stgh t . July. a t I.49.J. Haller, ef of. {2007j , Advanced Transmission Technologie s .

Na tional Transmlsston Grtd Study. at www.smartgrtdnews.com/a rt man /uploads/ l/sgnr_2007_ 12034. pdf.

50. ld . a t F· 21.5 1. M.G. Morgan . et a l. f2009J. The Many Meani.ngs oj "Snmrt

Grid. ~ Brt t-Iing Note from Dept. of Engineering & Public Pettey .Car negie Mellon Unlv .. Ju ly. a t www .epp.cmu.edu /publlc<lUons/Polley_BrieCS ma rt Grid_July_09 .pdf.

5 2. J . Shortle a nd C. Chen (20 I0) . \rVhat Can Lead to (1 Wid e-ScaleBlackout ? SIGMA J .. Sept. 15.

53. Mosleht a nd Kumar. sup ra note 9. a t 7 .5 4 . Ha uer et al .. s upra note 49. at F-21. F-22.55. Incidentally. ERCOT first successfully deployed Its ElLS plan on Feb.

2. 20 11. In res ponse to the sudden loss of 7.000 MW of generation .s imilar In s ize to wha t sy s tem operato rs ha ve a lready faced durtngsevere sol ar storms. See C. Ralsh (2008). ERCar EmeryencyInrerruptil)le IAad Sennce . AEIC Load Research Workshop. Feb.26 . at www .aelc.o rg / load]esearc h/docs/l I_ ERCOT_E merp;ency_Interuptlble_Load_Sen1ce .pdf.

56. fd.57. See Ralsh . supra note 55 . at S lide 19 .58. A. Noural and D. Kea rns (20101. Bouertes Included: Realizing Sman

Grid Goals with Intelligent Energy Srorage. IE EE PoWER & E~ERGY

MAGAZI~E. Ma L / April. a t 49 .59 . ta.. at 5 1.60. See E . Okafor. Dynamic Is landing : Improving Electric Serrtcc

Reliability with Energy Srorage. Conference Paper. Sandia National

IEEE ENGI N~:EI{]NG MA."AG EME NT REVIEW, VOL. 39. NO , " . fOURTI l QUAR1"'£R DEC EMBEH 20 11

Laboratory Ene-rgy Storage Systems Program lESS) Co nfe-rence. Nov.2 . at www.sandla.gov /ess/ docs/pr_C'on fcre nces/20 10 /okafor_a ep .pdf.

6 1. J .A. Hollman , e t al. (2006) . Dynamic Is landing oj Crilica li nfr astructures. a S uitable Strategy to Suruive and Mitigate Crit ica lEvents . Presentallon at In te-r na tiona l Works hop on Co m plexNet work a nd Infras truct ure Protection , Rome. Ma r. 28-29 , atwww.progetto rett.enea.n / cn tp06 / s lides / Ses sion4 / Hall man.pd r.

62 . Nou rai and Kearns , s upra note 58. a t 50.63. See Moslehl a nd Kumar. s up ra note 9 . a t 4- 7 .64. X. Feng. er al. f2009}. S marter Grid s Are Morc Efficient. ABB REVIEW.

March. at 35.65. Id.. a t 37 .66. See. for example. M. Briere (2009) . GaN Pla tform Promises

TenJold Boost In Pow er , E LECTIm NIC DESIGN. Feb. 20. a twww.electronlcdesl~n . com/artlcle / power / ga n -pla tform -prom tses­tenfo ld -boos t-tn -power-2071 7 .aspx.

67. NE RC. s upra nol e 14. at 8 9 .68. NAS. s upra note I I. a t 69-70 .69. Quoted In J OHN SC HAEFFER AND DOUG PRAlT. SoIAH LIVING

SoURCE BOOK: YOUR C OMPLETE G UID E TO RENEWABLE ENEHGY

TECHNOLOGIES ANI> S USTAINABLE LIVING (NY : Gatam. 2005). a t 3.70. NOM Administ rator Jane Lubchenco re ce n tly decla red that a

major solar s to r m " ts nol a matt er o f H, irs s im ply a matter o fwhen a nd how big." See C. Moskowit z (20 1I }, U.S. Mus t Take SpaceS torm TIlTea! Serious ly. Esperts Wa rn. S pace.corn . Feb. 19 . a twww.space.com / 10906-s pace -s to rms-th reat.htm l.

Ch rla topher Coo per Is t he S ma rt G rid Fellow a t the III"W u te for Energy Envtruntuent .

Vermont Law School. II I' ('lUI IX' contacted at {Toopt"r@v,·n non tIa w.ed u.

BeajamJa K. Sov.cool Is a n A.s s tstant Professor a t the Lee Ku a n Yew School of "ub11o.­

Polley. part of the Nationa l Uruverstty of S tn ga pcre. He can be con tacted Via ("111.111a l

bsov;l('ou l@nus .rou.s j;{.