Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726Post under case digests, labor law at Wednesday, February 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts:  Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works

promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue

to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers.

Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon

constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic

security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy

towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the

humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that

justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social

justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of

measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,

through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the

members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,

or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all

governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,

therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among

divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly

extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the

fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of

all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

CHUA-QUA vs CLAVE

GR No. L-49549 August 30,1990

FACTS:

The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in Tay Tung High school in Bacolod city to her 16 year old student. The petitioner teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of her employment “for Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher” which was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination.

ISSUE;

WAS HER DISMISSAL VALID?

WoN there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between the petitioner and her student constitute immorality and or grave misconduct?

SC RULING:

The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying: “If the two eventually fell in love despite the disparity in their ages and academic level, this only leads to the truism that the heart has reason of its own which reason does not know.”

Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS: 1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied. 

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. 

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order

No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

G.R. No. L-14283           November 29, 1960

GIL BALBUNA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

K. V. Faylona and Juan B. Soliven for appellants.Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino Padua for appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated June 23, 1958, dismissing their petition for prohibition and mandamus against the Secretary of Education and the other respondents.

The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the above Department Order, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the issue ultimately boils down the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.

This case, therefore, is on all fours with Gerona, et al., vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil., 2; 57 Off. Gaz., (5) 820, also involving Jehovah's Witnesses, and assailing, on practically identical grounds, the validity of the same Department Order above-mentioned. This Court discerns no reasons for changing its stand therein, where we said:

In conclusion, we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by the authority of the Legislature

of the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony, or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8 does not violate the Constitutional provisions about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony, is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

However, in their memorandum, petitioners-appellants raise the new issue that that Department Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette as allegedly required by Commonwealth Act 638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. We see no merit in this contention. The assailed Department Order, being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application. Moreover, as observed in People vs. QuePo Lay, 94 Phil., 640; 50 Off. Gaz., (10) 4850 (affirmed in Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank, 104 Phil., 573; 55 Off. Gaz., [6] 1006), —

the laws in question (Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930) do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, regulations, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be published shall be published in the Official Gazette but said two laws do not say that unless so published they will be of no force and effect. In other words, said two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

It is true, as held in the above cases, that pursuant to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is likewise true that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the force of law. Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank which provided for penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that influenced the rationale of those decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to maintain. As observed in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, supra,

... for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue delegations of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and definite standard by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of those rules

and regulations which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read as follows:

Section 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth, observed daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.

Section 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provide.

In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem — specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest"(People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328); "public welfare" (Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); Interest of law and order"(Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case" (Int. Hardwood vs. Pañgil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and efficient instruction" (P.A.C.U. vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz., 6230). That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellants.

PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948]Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a

permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the

government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is,

"that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the

fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar

speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their

government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace

and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local

government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against

public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or

procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body

or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful

assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.1

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two

constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant

or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession

in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject

to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the

view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public

places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.

The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the

Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such

unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in

cases of national emergency.

The Mayor’s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of

free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational

fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that

serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe

that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the

evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or

in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability

of serious injury to the state.

Ebranilag, et. al. v. The Division Supt. of SchoolsMarch 1, 1993

FACTS: 

1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in several towns of in Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.

2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions

3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion’ only given to God.They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State . They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control 

5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

6.  The students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and

hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship 

7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid

NO. The court upheld the petitioners' right under the Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs. Religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among human rights. It reversed the expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution. 

Although the Court upholds in this decision   nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

Cha vs CAPost under case digests, Commercial Law at Saturday, March 31, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Petitioner spouses Nilo Cha and Stella Uy-Cha, as lessees entered into a lease contract

with private respondent CKS Development Corporation as lessor. A stipulation of the lease

contract provides that the Lessee is not allowed to insure against fire the chattels, merchandise,

textiles, goods and effects placed at any stall or store or space in the leased premises without

first obtaining the written consent and approval of the Lessor. If the Lessee violates this the

policy is deemed assigned and transferred to the Lessor for his own benefit. 

Petitioner took out a policy of fire insurance over the merchandise inside the leased premises

with United Insurance without consent of CKS. 

On the day the lease contract was to expire a fire broke out inside the leased premises. CKS,

wrote a letter to United asking that the proceeds of the fire insurance be paid directly to CKS.

United refused. Hence, the latter filed a complaint against the Cha spouses and United. 

RTC ruled in favor of CKS. CA affirmed, hence the petition. 

Issue: Whether or not CKS can recover from the insurance policy. 

Held: No. Section 18 of the Insurance Code provides that: “No contract or policy of insurance on

property shall be enforceable except for the benefit of some person having an insurable interest

in the property insured.” 

In the present case, it cannot be denied that CKS has no insurable interest in the goods and

merchandise inside the leased premises under the provisions of Section 17 of the Insurance

Code: “The measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might

be damnified by loss or injury thereof.” Therefore, CKS cannot be validly a beneficiary of the fire

insurance policy taken by petitioner-spouses. The insurable interest remains with the Cha

spouses. 

The stipulation in the lease contract is void for being contrary to law and public policy. This is in

keeping with the provision under Sec. 25 of the Insurance Code that: Every stipulation in a

policy of Insurance for the payment of loss, whether the person insured has or has not any

interest in the property insured or that the policy shall be received as proof of such interest and

every policy executed by way of gaming or wagering is void.” 

Case Digest: Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et. al.G.R. No. 74457      20 March 1987Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if female).  The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process.

RULING:

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.”  Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty.  The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement.  The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing.  Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00.  The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive.  Due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights.  Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed

has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.