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THE ETHlOPlAN REVOLUTION AND THE CHALLENGE OF TRADITION

1974-1991

Busha J. Taa Department of Political Science

Submitted in partial fulfilrnent of the requirernent for the degree of

Masters of Arts

Faculty of Graduate Studies The University of Western Ontario

London, Ontario September 1997

Busha J. Taa 1997

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ABSTRACT

The attempt to revoiutionize the multiethnic Ethiopian society was a fiasco

because the revolution faced enomous challengers from above and from below.

On the one hand, dominant international actors in the Western world were

dedicated to reversing the revolution to keep Ethiopia within the political and

economic capitalist wodd order. On the other hand, powerful local actors

supported cuntinuity and confronted the assirnilationist revolutionary policies in

defence of their localized traditional interests.

Therefore, the formation of a common front between local and international

actors against the revolution was not intentional. but rather incidental since

Ethiopian local actors never wished to be player in the international poiitico-

economic order; they were born autonornous and continued to live autonomously

by challenging national and international actors in defence of their localized

interests. Both the international and the local actors, by inadvertently converging

their interests sandwiched the revolutionaries and forced them out of power.

Two theories of revolution, stnicturalism and voluntarism are relevant to

this study: both overemphasize the study of change and pay limited attention to

the influence of traditional forces in the making of history.

This thesis does not underestimate the impact of the Ethiopian Revolution.

However, it argues that the attempts of the revolutionaries to alter long-lived

societal values, customs, morality, and culture proved to be a failure because

social structures unlike politicai structures. cannot be changed by decree or by

war,

Thus, Ethiopia remains a country of two crews who navigate the same

ship in different directions. While the agents of change promote and advocate the

modemization of the country, the guardians of wntinuity continue to maintain

their distinctive local, tribal, and religious interests.

To my Father

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am thankful to Prof. Andrés Pérez who stamped unfading memory in my

mind by his wngenial and intellectual encouragement and support in time of thick

and thin. This paper could not have been written without his sustained readings

and judicious comments. I also wish to express rny appreciation to professors. R.

A. Vernon, and Michael Keating for familiarizing me with the contemporary

political science concepts. Any fiaw that may remain in the final version of this

thesis is rny responsibility alone.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CERTlFlCATE OF EXAMINATION ............................... .. .............................. .ii ...

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ I I I

................................................................................... ACKNOWLEDGMENT .vi

TABLE OF CONTENT ..................... .... .... ....... ................................................ vii

.. - GLOSSARY OF AMHARIC TERMS ............................................................. .VIII

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 1---A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ................................................ A CRITICAL ASSESMENT -7

..................................................................................... 1.1 Defining Revolution 7 1.2 Voluntanst Explanation of Revolution ........................................................... 8 1 -3 Structural Determinist Explanation of Revolution ..................................... 1 O 1.4 Alternative Approach ................................................................................. 1 6

CHAPTER II-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ETHlOPlAN STATE .................................................... 20

2.1 Emperor Tewodros and the Centralization Project ..................................... 22 2.2 Emperor Yohanse: A New Approach to Centralization .............................. 25 2.3 Modem Ethiopia and the Arnbitious Menelik .............................................. 28 2.4 Haile Sellassie and the lncomplete Modemization .................................... .33

CHAPTER iii-REVQLUTIONARY ETHlOPlA ............................ .......... .......... 49

3.1 Why the Military Came to Power? ............................................................ 50 3.2 The Revoiutionary Transformations and obstacles ................... .. .............. 53 3.3 The Agrarian Reform ........................... .. ...............................................=.. 54 3.4 The Urban Land Reform and Other Auxiliary Refoms ............................... 60 3.5 The Formation of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia ...................................... 63 3.6 The Shift of the International Alliance .............................. .......................... 68

CHAPTER IV-THE COLLAPSE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME ............ 74

4.1 The Gaps between Social Theory and Social reality ...................... .. ..... 74 4.2 Practical Problems of Unauthentic Theory .................................................. 77

CONCLUSION .............................. ...... ........................................................ 94

........................................................................ VITA .................... l.. .......... 105

GLOSSARY OF AMHARIC TERMS

Balagar

Beta-kihinet

Beta-Meng ist

Birr

Dinkinesh

Derg

Debtera

Ereg na

Felasha

Fitwerari

Gebbar

Goad

Kebele

Niguse-negest

Ethically and economically peasant

The Orthodox Church

Palace with decisive functional

authority

The Ethiopian currency

An Ethiopian name for the first human

species found in Ethiopia (Lucy)

The military council that ruled Ethiopia

from 1 974-1 991

Sub-derical order

U ncultivated herder (misbehaving

person)

Beta Israel who went to Ethiopia in 10th

century to replace the Orthodox

Chnstianity with Judaic tradition

Front echelon Commander

Tribute payer

Conventional revol utionary name

(Corn rade)

Urban dweller's association

King of kings (Emperor)

Ras

Shengo

Shifta

Ti kdem

Ze begna

Zeian

Zemene Mesafint

Commander, equivalent to field manhai

Assem bly

Bandit with no real objectives

Literally first

A guard with little know how of guarding

Nomadic behaviour, unsettled

Era of Princes (1 769-1 855)

INTRODUCTION

Ethiopia is a country steeped in legend; it is a country where multiple

historical levels coexist and are maintained. Nothing is neglected because al! of

these levels have their own Gare givers: the past by the traditional. the present

by the modemizers, and the future by the futurists. Thus, it is a paradoxical

country where the nobility of the past and the misery of the present meet. The

segment of the population which was risk taker/sedentary/secular believed in

change and tried to cope with the ever-changing world. Many of these people

were deeply influenced by the revolutions that had conquered the developing

wodd since the 1960s.' These agents of change announced the necessity of

changing everything from coast to coast without discrimination in order to achieve

the objective of tuming the political structure up-sidedown. They never thought

about how to fix. maintain and preserve the old, but only how to displace and

replace it. They were avid for new fashions even when these fashions were not

useful.

The change that was proclaimed in Ethiopia lacked sufficient thought and

divided the population into two amorphous groups. The agents of change

ignored the limits imposed by traditional social structures. They contended that

change was an inescapably global. systemic, cornplex, and homogenizing

process. and they overestimated the new and denounced al1 the traditional.

* Michael S. Kimmel, Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 2-5.

However, the agents of continuity continued to defend themselves from

the encroachment of change; thus. Ethiopian society remained divided into twa

camps. In the paradoxical Ethiopian world. the agents of change led themselves

by means of the Western insight; whereas, the traditional people did not lead

thernselves by Western discourse, but by their own response to the Western

discourse. These traditional people have knowledge, wisdom. and innocence

sufficient to shape and cantrol their identity and destinya2 Their wisdom is not the

product of one man's speculation, but it is the experience of the whole people.

This expenence is transmitted from generation ta generation-from village to

village. Traditional wisdom contains a great number of tniths as the result of

experience; it is expressed in proverbs and rhythmic forms. Of course. I do not

pretend that this wisdom is a science. but I am confident that it gatherr a wealth

of useful experiences; it is an art of living rather than an inchoative system.

Although traditional people bury their dead bodies, they never bury their

undying customs. culture, reason. and spirit; they keep them by their solidarity

which is refiected in constant greetings. home visits. and social invitations. They

use a kaleidoscope of maxim, proverb, advice. and exhortation as a means of

problem solving and retaining their ~u l ture .~ They are conscious of being God's

creation and often manifest their godliness. In order to improve their life, they

D. A. Masolo, African Philosophv in Search of Identity (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 1 994) 2-5.

Claude Summer, The Source of African Philosoohv: The Ethio~ian Philosophv of Man (Stuttgrat: Verlang Wiesbaden Gmbh, 1986) 49-53.

pray to God to provide rain, and they ride their donkeys to know whether the rain

is coming. Donkeys are their rnetrologists; whenever the donkeys' two ears are

raised constantly while grazing or walking, it signals the imminence of rain.

Thus, it must be hypothesized that Ethiopia has remained a dual society

where Ethiopians have to choose between tradition and change; this is a dilemma

because they cannot accept either wholeheartedly. The problem the Ethiopian

people face is not so much whether to completely adopt the new. or to attempt to

recapture the old, since both are contentious; it is rather that in light of inevitable

change, they are faced with the question of how to reconcile this change with

either an established belief to which the traditional still cling, or the acceptance of

a foreign belief which even the anti--traditionalists acknowledge as superficial.

However, the problem is largely one of trying to think and act Western-trying to

forget the existing difference between the changing and the stable zones of their

collective e~istence.~ For example, the urban area of the country is changed by

the sheer force of circurnstances, but the rural (traditional) still maintains certain

elernents of choice.

Thus. the traditional people modestly reject theories of change because

these theories teach people to rebel against the past and to break from tradition--

ultimately alienating human beings from their ancestors. In their view. these

theories of social change are manipuiative instruments imposed upon people by a

few intellectuals who are politically intoxicated. Such theoretical influence cut

'Collin M. Turnbull, The Lonelv Africa (New York: Simon and Schuster Publishers, 1962) 14-1 7.

people off from the larger reality by appealing to their emotions; it concealed the

tmth by shifting people from reality to fantasy-by mixing facts with fictions.

Revolutionary theorles are usually not welcome because they persist in rejecting

al1 traditional values rather than creating level playing fields and ac~ommodating

existing social groups. These theories encouraged the agents of change to

trespass upon the unfamiliar terrain of the traditional forces and convert them to

the new fashion of change. But thiç was unacceptable to the agents of continuity

who were committed to defending their identity from assimilation and destruction.

For this reason. Ethiopia remains divided into two systems: the agents of change

who envision the new world of fantasy, and the agents of continuity who claim to

retain their authentic traditional system. 60th function by recruiting people to their

respective camps. Their clash is unavoidable.

Of course, the existence of structural dualism is not unique to Ethiopia but

is a cornmon feature of the developing world. In al1 the developing countries,

there are traditional forces which emphasize the importance of region. tribe. and

religion with the power of impeding social change by cantrolling their people

through Peer pressure, gossip, disapproval, and ostracization. Nevertheless,

theorist of the developing world, in a fashion similar to their counterparts from the

developed world. focus their attention on the study of change, especially at the

state and govemment levels. In fact, state and government institutions have a

crucial impact on politi~al change because they organize laws, finance budgets

and assign personnel to the structural frameworks. Such a restricted analysis

does not take into consideration the social structure that is led by kinship,

ethnicity, age, gender, and religious cults. In practical politics, these second tiers

have enormous power in facilitating or retarding changes that may occur in the

developing world. In addition, these primordial structures signiw that the people

of the developing worfd are not simply subsewient ta the international system;

they are not simply dancing to the tune of the dominant actors; they know how to

defend their identities and how to manipulate the prevailing circumstances to

retain stability and ~ontinuity.~

Thus, the societies of the developing world cannot be expiained by

focusing only on social and political change because these processes tend to be

exclusive, sectonal, and incomplete. The inability of the agents of social change

to incorporate traditional social çtrata prevented them from accornplishing their

histoncal missions; their projects face a grand challenge from agents of stability

who resist change for fear of insecurity. Therefore, theorists such as Fred

Halliday and Lefort Rene from the developed world, and Masolo D. A. and

Andargatchew Tiruneh from the underdeveloped world are unable to adequately

explain the structural dualism that has prevailed in developing nations because

they overemphasize the significance of institutional change at the level of the

state?

Being an Ethiopian who understand unuttered gestures and verbalized

Christopher Calpham, Third World Politics: Introduction (Madison: The University of Winwnsin Press, 1986) 3-6.

"harles F. Andrain, Political Chanae in the Third World (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1988) 12-16.

6

political rhetoric, I have made every effort to highlight the importance of historical

legacies and personalities in shaping the Ethiopian nation; their fates and their

vision for the country. But caution is necessary because this is metely my

interpretation. I do not pretend, either to have an unquestionable interpretation,

but only one that I hope is insightful and useful. With this caution noted. I offer a

modest discussion that balances past, present, and future changes in Ethiopia

rather than equating the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 with a hurricane that has

the power to decimate everything.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: the first chapter offers a critical

assessrnent of revolutionary theories as a guide to the readers' understanding of

the coexistence of past and present social structure and political powers in

Ethiopia; the second chapter deals with the historical background to the Ethiopian

revolution during the period of 1855-1970s; the third chapter analyzes the

emergence of the revolutionary regime. its transformations and the challenges

posed to it by the agents of continuity in conjunction with the United States of

Amenca; in the last chapter. the national and international problems that brought

about the fall of the Derg are discussed. Finally, the thesis will be concluded by

indicating some of the essential theoretical lessons offered by the Ethiopian

revolution.

Cha~ter One

A Conceptual Frame Work-A Critical Assessrnent

The existing theories of revolution can be classified into two categories7

Voluntarist and Structuralist theories. The Voluntarist theones argue that

revolution is a result of hurnan will, imagination, and creativity; whereas, the

stnicturalists wntend that revolution is a resutt of a defomed, distorted, and

fractured institutionalized set of social relations. By analyzing both perspectives.

an alternative model, that comprises the coexistence of change agents and

traditional structures, is proposed.

Definina Revolution

What cunstitutes revolution? The abundance and the diversity of the

studies of revolution make it diffwlt to choose among the rnyriad of competing

and sometimes contradictory explanation of the causes and the consequences of

revolutions. In this thesis, the following working definition will be used:

"Revolution is a sharp sudden change in the social location of political power, expressing itself in a radical transformation of the process of govemment, of the officiai foundation of the sovereignty or legitimacy of the conception of the social ord&Ia

Voluntarist and Stnicturaiist theories of revolution contend that revolution

is a special kind of change-intense violent and thoroughly articulated.

' Theories of revolution can be classified in many ways but this is only one variant.

Eugene Kamenka, The World in Revolution? (Canberra: Australian National University, 1 970) 6.

8

Revolutions are supposed to overtum al1 existing systems. cultures. and custorns

through every available rneans. However, revolution is limited change because

al1 things are not vulnerable to change. Thus, the difference between both

schools of thought lies in the main cause or detemining factors of change. But

both overemphasize the swpe of social change that revolutions bfing about.

They focus only on the power stniggle between the incurnbent and the

contenders for power by underestimating traditional social structures that are

signifiant in retardhg or obstructing revolutionary proœsses. Consequently.

both voluntarist and structuralist explanations of the Ethiopian revolution are

inadequate because they exclude or underestimate the power of traditional social

structures.

Voluntarist Explanation of Revolution

Voluntarist advocate that conscious human beings are the main engines of

social change; they are the creators of their own environment and architects of

their destiny. Ted R. Gurr emphasizes that revolution originates in the mincis of

men. For him, people revolt under condition of stress when material availability

does not meet their value expectation. Such inability to meet expectation leads to

frustration and frustrated people become revo~utionary.~ The greater the intensity

and the scope of discontent in a population. the greater the magnitude of strife;

thus revolution is a product of discontent.

Nonetheless, this rnodel is inadequate because it fails to explain the

Ted R. Gurr, Whv Men Rebel (Princetown: Princetown University Press. 1970) 10-1 3.

causes of frustration. It is also il1 prepared to explain the outcome of revolutions.

In the case of Ethiopia, fnistrated people would never think about capturing state

power; at best. they would become desperate, sometimes submissive and

dependent and at worst, they would destroy thern~elves.'~

The principal argument of the Voluntarist school of thought is that

revolution cannot be waged without revolutionaries. Groups who are cornmitteci

to participate in a revolution need a leader who has a quality which gives that

individual influence over a iarger number of people. A chansmatic revolutionary

leader is an individual with seemingly special qualities and abilities that maintain a

hold over his followerç, an individual who has a unique ability to communicate to

his followen and an individual who initiates new ideas that persuade his

followers. '' Although the revolutionaries in Ethiopia were uncharsimatic, mentally

dwarfed, and unable to initiate ideas that could develop the country, their

devotion to the revolution galvanized Ethiopians more than the structural crisis of

the Haile Sellassie regime. They wanted to resolve the Ethiopian puzzle by

tuming the country's power structure up-side-down.

Voluntarist explanations of social change argue that the origins and the

course of contemporary revolution need to be behaviourial rather than structural.

Yet, agency alone cannot explain the configuration of the Ethiopian revolution;

the fracture of Haile Sellassie political structure was also very important.

'O Kimmel, 96

" Robert Blackery, and Clifford Paynton, Revolution and Revolutionary ldeal (Cambridge: Schenkrnan Publishing Company, 1976) 18-20.

1 O

Generally, just as there can be no revolution without revolutionaries, revolutions

of an insurrectionary nature(as opposed to the military coup) have not been

possible in the absence of structural fracture. Without proper structural

conditions, the appeals of aspiring revolutionanes would have fallen on deaf ears.

Structural Determinist Ex~lanation of Revolution

Structuralism emphasizes the patterns of institutionalized relationships

among social strata in the explanation of revolution. In the case of Ethiopia.

structuralists such as Fred Halliday and Andargachew Tiruneh contend that the

breakdown of the Haile Sellasie regime was precipitated by institutional decay.

They argue that such institutional crisis are beyond human control; they insist

that structural problems are irreparable by human powers because institutional

issues are beyond the wntrol of human beings. Hence, the stnicturalists believe

that the Ethiopian revolution happened because of the collapse of the Haile

Sellassie power structure.

The earliest structuralist, Karl Marx, argued that the bourgeois and the

proletariat rise from the collapsing political structure when the development of the

material force of production cornes in conflict with the decaying relations of

production; this is followed by a period of inevitable social revolution in which the

proletariat is the only true revolutionary. l2

Mao< was inexact in imagining the decay and death of the capitalist mode

of production. There has never been a time when capitalisrn has faced an

" Lawerence Kaplan, (New York: Random House, 1973) 4-8.

I I

insurmountable crisis; on the contrary, it is growing faster, improving technologies

and accarnmodating both misery and prosperity. Nonetheless, the argument of

whether capitalism is dying or growing has no theoretical or empirical merit to the

Ethiopian case because the Ethiopian revolution was not a result of the growth or

death of capitalism. l 3

Theda Skocpol also ernphasizes that revolutions are the results of

structural cnsis. %y cornparhg the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions.

she prepared a template for al1 revolutions. She deduced from her examination

of three revolutions that revolutions arise from decaying and collapsing

structures. In an attempt to offer a concise approach, she cantracted the

explanation of revolutions to definition, cause, and outcomes at the expense of

the process. Thus, Skocpol expanded the cause and the outcomes by ignoring

the necessity of the process to be theorized. Nevertheless, what happened in

Ethiopia during the years of revolution cannot be explained solely by focusing on

the year 1974(the year the revolution started) and 1991 (the year it was reversed).

The true analyst of the Ethiopian revolution has to relentlessly explore those

years of ferocious socialist euphoria and those years in which socialism was

cursed. Such an extensive examination cannot be accomplished only by

explaining the two edges (cause and outcomes) because it denies the time (those

years from 1975-1 990) during which the revolution unfolded. Not only did

Skocpol contract the explanation of revolution. but she also focused only on

l 3 Ibid. 155-156

12

states rather than giving due consideration to primordial traditional institutions

which obstmct change. In Ethiopia, the rural population, the suburban

conservative family and the religious forces continued to survive autononously

without state control. These social groups have their own systems of nile, courts,

and local messengers whose tasks resembles those of modem police forces. In

this society, elden are respected, honoured, and allowed to nile, while the

younger serve as subsistence producers, workers, and defenders of frontiers;

thus hierarchies of power are based on age, rather than on wealth. Therefore,

analysts of the Ethiopian revolution have to be sensitive to these forces of

continuity because they are signifiant in retarding or obstructing social change

and possibly even stopping it.

In Skocpol's analysis of the causes of revolution, war was considered the

main one. War can weaken or destroy regirnes, but it is not always the friend of

revolution; it can also be an enemy. War can plague triumphant revolutionaries;

it can implode, ruin, and disintegrate a nation. War had served the French and

the Russian revolutions as a trigger, but this function cannot be extrapolated to

the Ethiopian revolution because, theoretically, revolutions are specific and,

practically, there was no war on the eve of the Ethiopian revolution. Hence, the

Ethiopian revolution was caused by revolutionary rhetonc which at times

resembled cuurtroorn drama and at other times escalated into a bloody clash

between the different groups seeking power. Thus, the argument that specifies

war as the cause of revolution is irrelevant to the Ethiopian case.

The second cause of revolution identified by Skocpol is peasant uprising.

13

Although the Ethiopian peasants were resisting subjugation, they did not want to

take a chance by waging a revolutionary struggle against their lords.I4 In fact,

there were obstacles to the peasants becoming revolutionary; they were

geographically dispersed throughout the villages, conservative, and resistant to

change. But this does not rnean that they were passive spectators of their own

plight. In the Ethiopian case, they challenged the exploitative system through

recurrent revolt but not to the level of revolution. They were invited by the Derg

to participate in the revolution, rather than causing or leading the rev~lution.'~

Although structuralist analysis of the Ethiopian revolution overestimates

the role of international actors such as the Americans in retarding, obstructing, or

reversing the Ethiopian revolution, these international actors would not have been

successful had not they had the support of the agents of continuity and tradition.

Ironically, the international actors who were engaged in reversing the Ethiopian

revolution developed a tacit understanding with the traditional population which

was dedicated to reversing the revolution and to saving their habitua1 orientation,

ancestral legacies, and culture. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the effort to

reverse the Ethiopian revolution would have been very dificult for the Americans,

if the traditional population was not bitterly opposed to the revolution from the

" Jack Woddis, d o n (New York: International Publishers, 1 972) 26-27.

l 5 Woddis, 59

very beginning.16

Moreover. Skocpol eliminated the necessity of thinking and acting hurnan

beings as the mediating link between structural conditions and social outcornes.

But if a midwife cannot slow or accelerate a pregnancy, she can at least bring it

to tem. Hence. conscious human who can produce patterns and control and

coordinate social activities are essential to maintaining the life of political

structures. The Ethiopian revolution could not have been quickened if not for

people like Mengistu; people who were dedicated to accornplishing sweeping

change; therefore. the structural collapse of the Haile Sellassie regime would

have not meant anything because structure is a mere chart if agents are

excluded. To explain structure without an actor is like advertking a car without

an engine.17

Furthermore. Skocpol neglects ideology as a part of the explanation of

revolutions. She daims that leaders do not accomplish according to their

ideological program; thereby, ideology cannot predict the outwme of revolution.

But how can one explain the sweeping reforms that abolished private property

without taking into account the ideological program of the Ethiopian Derg? How

can Ethiopians forget those new books about Marx, Engels and Lenin which they

were forced to read if they wished to reœive a promotion? Can any one present

l6 Walter E. Goldfrank. "The Mexican Revolution." Revolutions: Theoretical. - Corn~arative. and Historical Studieç (4.) J. A. Goldstone. (Toronto:

Harcourt Brace College Publishers. 1 994) 1 1 7-1 18.

" lan J. Cohen, Structuration Theoy: Anthony Giddens and the Constitution of social Life (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) 200-205.

15

a valid explanation of the demotion of military officers who went to church without

considering ideology? Of course, these puzzles are hidden in ideology. Hence,

the Marxist ideology was designed to be anonymous, collective. and constitutive

of social order. It was a weapon that helped the Derg visualize the future by

serving as a barorneter of their poli tic^.'^

In addition, the structuralist explanation of revolution assumes that

everything is cuntained in the structure of state, thereby, ignoring the part of

society that lives outside the sape of govemment influence and control. In

reality. structural changes do not autornatically render changes to every part of a

country because in countries like Ethiopia every region has its regional. cultural,

and religious differences and autonomy. Hence. some sections of Ethiopian

society have their own tribal or religious or regional political institution that are not

responsible to the state. These traditional forces do not even pay taxes or expect

govemment sewices. They are reiatively independent maintaining their

primordial powers; these power do not require clear responsibility, career. and

division of labour. Therefore, the Ethiopian state is not as powerful as it is

perceived by structuralist explanations of revolutionary change; it wuld not

encompass the whole society because the agents of continuity resist the

hornogenization, assimilation, and integration that might have led to the demise of

their power.

l8 William H. Swell, "ldeologies and Social Revolutions: Refiections on the French Case" Social Revolution in the Modem World Theda Skocpol, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 994) 1 70-1 73.

Thus. both the voluntarist and structuralist overemphasize the efforts of

the agents of changes and neglect and exclude the role played by the agents of

continuity in defence of their tradition. Therefore, their analyses of the Ethiopian

politics are partial and insufficient because they do not go beyond the population

who Iive in the provincial capitals and major cities. Thus, the nomads, clans, and

religious cults who in defense of their history, refused to be subsumed into the

state, are living proof of the power of tradition and continuity in Ethiopia.

Alternative Approach

As it was discussed earlier, the stnicturalists overemphasize the

importance of the structural precondition for the occurrence of social change

while the voluntarists overstate the importance of human action in bringing about

social transformation. However, the seemingly wntradictory theoretical

approaches are complementary. Therefore, in order to better understand

revolutionary change. one has to bridge the gaps between the two perspectives

because history is the outcome of the structural constraint and human actions.

Thus, the necessity of building bridges can be discemed as follows:

"Determinism and freedom are not antipodes. If one excludes from the deterrninistic approach any place for freedorn or for the role of human choices or decisions, one no longer has determinism but fatalism. If one expels from the social process the objective deteminants of it, one implies meaninglessness of society as a whole, ie., nihilism, and therefore. the impossibility of social science. Determinism is unthinkable without freedom and freedom is unthinkable without objective limitations, i. e., determinism. Determinism or freedom is a false dilernma. In the historical and social proœss there is always determinism and freedom."lg

I9Alberto G. Ramos, "Modemization Towards a Possibility Model" Develo~inq Nations Ed. Belling W. & G. O. Totten, (Toronto: Litton Publishing Inc.. 1970) 25.

Hence modern social change could be better understood if both human

actions and the structural constraints that condition human actions are

considered. Social change is the result of the interplay of the actions of the

agents of change and the structural forces that may retard or facilitate the efforts

of these agents.

Nonetheless, even if both perspectives are combined rather than bfidged,

they still remain inadequate in explaining the political history of Ethiopia because

they overemphasize changes produced by structural problems or by the actions

of leaders. Structuralists such as Fred Halliday and voluntarists such as John

MarkakisZ0 have argued that Ethiopian society had passed through different

alterations of social structure resulting from the modification and the radical

replacement of the old politico-econornic order. They have emphasized that the

changes that took place in Ethiopia were inclusive, pervasive, and reflective of

the total realities of Ethiopia. Of course, it is undeniable that the changes that

took place in Ethiopia affected the social structure and the values of the society.

However, these changes had little implication for the segmented caastal

populations. nomads, and rural women because these groups were under the

influence of traditional forces. Nevertheless, these 'backward' and traditional

people are "inhabitants" who must not be excluded from the explanation of

Ethiopian politics. Ethiopia is not only a country of change, but also of stability,

continuity, and tradition.

'O See their books in the footnotes or bibliography

18

Ethiopia is like a layered-cake that can be easily sliced into different

segments; beneath the state lie the different values, cultures, and traditions. It is

a country with numerous ingredients; some ingredients are donnant, docile, and

risk avoiders; whereas, the others are active, adventurers. and risk takers. but al1

are essential in making or breaking Ethiopia. Thus, Ethiopia is a country that

lives in the middle of a struggle between change-seekers and stability-promoters.

in some parts of the country, the continuity of stability caused invisibility;

whereas, in uther parts, these movements and changes led to visibility and

attracted Westem Carneras whose focus was designed to magnify mobility,

change, and t~rbulenœ.~'

Owing to this duality, there is always tension between the dynamics of

change and continuity. At any stage of Ethiopian history. the country is always in

a state of adjustment between the past and present. In the Ethiopian experience,

nothing is totally cancelled by the modern. From a structural point of view. styles

of life. political procedures, and legal systems that claim to date from the

Tewodrosian era are still relevant. From a traditional point of view. there are

several tribes in Southem and Western Ethiopia that still celebrate their ancestral

legacies. These tribes find their strength, cohesion, and morality in the past. For

them. morality is not conceived of as mere obedience to the letter of written police

enforced law, but as the belief in their culture and norm. For example, the

Diddessa Valley females in Westem Ethiopia are unwiliing to allow male doctors

21 Carlos Fuentes, A New Time for Mexico (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux lnc., 1996) 15-20.

19

examine their bodies. Thus, Ethiopia cannot be conceived without these

traditional communities, even if their lives are totally different from the otherç.

Hence, any attempt by the agents of changes to destroy, expose, and ridicule

them would create total chaos in Ethiopian politics.

Thus, many theoretical explanations of Ethiopia are unable to detect the

invisible aspects of Ethiopian politics; thereby, the existing facts of Ethiopia

collide with their painted blessings. However, the shortcomings of the

approaches, as 1 mentioned earlier, might have denved from the aspect of

Ethiopian politics that is inaccessible to foreign researchers because practical

Ethiopian politics goes beyond the wntten and spoken; it is dominated by

unenunciated and non-verbalized elements. Those arguments that appear on

paper or that are expressed at open meetings form part of an exercise in stage

management. The window dressing of real aims and motives remains an

entrenched preoccupation of the political elites. The most meticulous of

researchers would be unable to demonstrate a clear standpoint on the part of

those concerned with the critical issues of their respective struggle. As a result,

unravelling the basic dynamics of the political process requires more than a

critique of the published materials. Therefore, to try to analyze Ethiopian politics

by reading the literature without taking the non-verbalized practices into

consideration is vain because the divergence of deeds from words is not unusual

in Ethiopian political culture. Being aware of this dichotomy in the political

process, I have tried to incorporate facts and values in the larger explanation.

Chapter Two

Historical Backaround of the Ethiopian State

Historically, Ethiopia has captured the imagination of outside observers

who have been fascinated by its enigmatic aura. It is the only country with a

millenniurn history easily attested to by its many monuments to black Africa.

While most colonies of Black Africa were mshing towards independence, Ethiopia

remained 'Africa's hidden Empire'. Until recently, it has been virtually isolated

from the Western civilization because of its peaples' open hostility toward

foreigners. However, one of the questions historians ask is the question of

periodization. How old is Ethiopian history? One might answer by stating that

Ethiopian history is old as one wants it tu be.

If one wanted to take an extremely long view, Ethiopia's history is as old as

the history of the hurnan species itself because Lucy's remains were found in

Ethiopia establishing it as the birth place of humankind. On the other hand. if one

wanted to take a short view, Ethiopia's history can be seen as starting the day

Ethiopians inflicted heavy losses on ltalians at the battle of Adowa in 1896; the

day she became the jewel and pnde of Africa and of people of African descent.

Thus, Ethiopia is a country that cannot be blamed for submission, since it has

retained its independence throughout European colonial history. Hence, Ethiopia

is not a piece of territory cawed out by an European power and given a name,

but a robust, legendaiy, and glorious old country.

Therefore, I took the long duree approach to overview modem Ethiopian

21

history; for old countries like Ethiopia, one cannot start with an absolute date that

ignores the historical wntinum bubbling undemeath. First and foremost.

Ethiopia is a country that has lived in collision and confrontation throughout its

history. The extemal and intemal wars which were fought for the consolidation of

personal power and the extension of boundaries led to the unification of the

country. This assemblage of parcelized domains was initiated by Emperor

Tewodros, elaborated by Yohannse. consolidated by Menelik, and completed by

Haile-Sellassie.

During Zemene Mesafinit (1 769 to 1855), there were bitter rivalries among

the leaders struggling for power. This period was a period of cnsis in which al1

warlords claimed to have their own sovereign domains; central structure and

power were absent, and lawlessness prevailed. It was a politics of the jungle in

which only the strongest survived; whatever belonged to the poweriess populace

was expropriated by force. It was a wild political system that compulsorily

transferred the wealth from the producers to the consumers. Unlike the feudal

lords or the bourgeoisie, these predators had no interest in leaving even a certain

amount of production with the producers. They were warriors in search of

plunder; they took whatever they could and set fire to the rest; they were

professional destroyers. The outwme was the intermittent destruction of the

productive forces. Therefore, it was a time of disorder filled with the prevalence

of ungovemabi~ity.~ Thus, it became necessary to put an end to the ruthless

Teshale Tibebu, The Makina of Modem Ethio~ia 1896-1 974 (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press Inc.. 1995) 33.

predatorial political power of the Zemene Mesafint through the expropriation of

the means of rule from the local rulers and the rneans of violence from the

warriors.

Emperor Tewodros and the Centrakation Proiect

The bold act of restnictunng Ethicpia from unstructured Zemen-mesafint

was first undertaken by the chansrnatic Kassa Hailu (Emperor Tewodros) who

mled Ethiopia from 1855 to 1868. He was an extraordinarily gifted person who

had the confidence and devotion necessary to create a unified Ethiopia by

displacing the parcelized traditional sovereignties. He had neither traditional

virtues. nor was he from the royal family; he was the son of a peasant-very

respectable, gracious and deter~nined.~~ tt were these qualities that led people to

foliow and obey him enabling hirn to defeat the contendem. After he assumed

power, he expropriated the autonomy and the power of those who stood beside

him and of those who in their own right possessed the means of administration

and political usable goods. His centralization process resembled that of other

African states because it was based on the expansion of temtory by bringing

various previously autonornous and semi-autonomous polities under centralized

mle through the use of force by means of local warmaking instruments, such as

Spear and S ~ o r d . ~ ~ In Africa in general, and in Ethiopia in particular. the role of

"' Seven Rubenson, Kina of Kin~s-Tewodros of Ethiooia (Addis Ababa: Haile Sellassie First University. 1 966) 35-42.

'" Mend Wolde Aregay, "A Reappraisal of the lmpact of Firearms in the History of Warfare in Ethiopia" Journal of Ethio~ian Study 14, 1980), 127-1 30.

23

armament and amy in state formation and consolidation was paramount. Thus.

the centralization process took place through gradua1 expropriation of the

local nilers.

Moreover. he courtized princes, and he coordinated the traditional values

and modernizing attitudes by disciplining their holders like a petty dictator-

Therefore, acting like a company manager with the power of hiring and firing, he

reduced and curbed the parochial and personal desires of local princes in order

to foster national unity. When his expropriation was completed, the vertical

differentiation of structure and power holders grew faster than ever. Hence.

those nobles who were once the rulers of regions became his staff in the project

of unifying Ethiopia. They were not technically trained but chosen for their

chansmatic qualities. Their ofice had no clear hierarchy, their work did not

constitute a career, and there were no opportunity for promotion in the modem

sense. Above all, the Emperor was free to intervene whenever he felt the staff

could not handle the situation.

In the process of aggrandizing his power, he also systematically

incorporated churches into the political processes by offering them legal

entitlement over one third of Ethiopian lands. He then used the clergies to

educate his political functionaries and ta train his new recruits in the necessity of

the centralization of power. However, there was a doctrinal difference between

him and the church in regards to the method of centralization. The Emperor

needed money to control local movements; this money was only obtainable from

the church. In 1860, when his attempts to secure these funds were frustrated by

24

clerical administrators, he retaliated by abolishing the class of debteras (sub-

clerical order) and by reducing the nurnber of parish priests. His reforrns

created more problems: the church was opposed to him and coordinated the

traditional forces, peasants and conservative groups against him claiming that his

actions were illegitimate from the very beginning.25

Another instrument of domination in the power structure of Tewodros Beta-

Mengisit was the army. The size of his army was detemined by the availability of

weapons. His army nurnbered 150, 000 men, both mounted and on foot,

complete with camp followers and turbaned priests with drums and cymbals and

the holy wooden cavenant of the ark. Hence, he commanded the superior

firepower that enabled him to assert his dominance over the other princes. Of

course, there wâs an uneven distribution of firearms because of the remoteness

of some regions fram ports. Such an uneven distribution of firearms created an

uneven distribution of power which in tum created hierarchical relationships

among regions.

F inally, the Emperor became erratic after his wife's death in 1858, and his

actions antagonised the peasantry who passively disobeyed and refused to pay

tribute. Peasants broke the cycle of ritual and social behaviour that dictated their

obedience to the law of the land and al1 foms of domination, maladministration,

and extraction of wealth became impossible. Since the Emperor had already lost

the institution of emotional and psychological control, the church, there was no

'' Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Time of Menelik II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 16-25.

other institution capable of convincing the peasants to obey the law of the land.

Therefore, the cumulative impact of his actions totally alienated the Emperor from

his subjects. However, he demonstrated dedication to his cause in the battle with

Great Britain in 1868 by committing suicide so as not to surrender to an alien

force. and by this action he left a novel record for history. Thus for Tewodros life

was not the highest end.26

Ern~eror Yohanse: A New Amroach to Centrakation

As the death of Tewodros was heralded, the stniggle for the throne

intensified. From the contenders for power. Yohanse IV emerged a winner and

mled Ethiopia from 1872-1889. His nile was bas& on his capacity to cluster

different tribal-values together. By considering al1 values as equal and rational,

the Emperor endowed his subordinates with the right to rule their people on the

basis of their traditional values.27 While the imperial idea, so drastically

resuscitated by Tewodros, was to endure, Yohanse, nevertheless, followed a

policy of centralization substantially different from that of his predecessor.

Although he continued to regard himself as a negusa-negest (King of Kings). he

was ready to share power with his subordinates and he followed a non-

controversial approach with regional leaders. He preferred to rule the country

through its traditional leaders and value systems. He benefited from regional and

26 Bahiru Zewude. A Historv of Modem Ethiopia 1855-1 974 (Adddis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1 991 ) 25-30.

27 Zewude Geber-Sellassie, Yohanse IV of Ethio~ia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) 93-95.

26

local initiatives while securing an over-al1 control at the centre. In personality, he

differed fmm Tewodros in his patient, less impulsive, and extremely devout

Christianity which enabled him to show great respect to the traditional forces.

older generations and local leaders2'

Therefore, Yohanse was interested in mobilizing the Church's influence

over its members to stave off the Moslem threat. The doctrinal disputes which

had hindered the unity of the churches and abetted unrest, cornbined with the

lack of a bishop, hampered the spreading of Christianity at the speed Yohanse

preferred. He clearîy supported the need for a single Christian doctrine and the

end of divisive s e ~ t s . ~ ~ lmplementing his plan, he baptized the Moslem governor

of Wallo, Muhammad Ali and named him Ras Michael. He was suspicious of al1

non-Orthodox Christian Europeans with the exception of Russia because of her

Orthodox Christianity. Thus, his religious policy lacked the liberalism and spirit of

tolerance that he had shown in the political field.30

Yohanse's amy was more disciplined, trained. and larger than that of the

Emperor Tewodros'. He also had numerous amies directly controlled by local

leaders. He mobilized these against the Egyptians at the battles of Gundet in

1875, and Gura in 1876, and inflicted heavy loses on Egypt in both battles.

28 Edmond J. Keller, Revoiutionary Ethio~ia (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991) 28-30.

Czealaw Jesman, The Russians in Ethio~ia (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1958) 40-42.

27

Moreover. he wled the country in the turbulent world of politics during the time for

the scramble for Afnca; the end of the free corn petition of capitalisrn, and, above

all. the opening of the Suez Canal which attracted Europeans to the Hom of

Africa. Despite the economic, political, and military weakness of the country, he

was able to retain the independence of Ethi~pia.~'

The Emperor realized the necessity of maintaining the support of the

peasant and local rulers on whom the government relied on for subsistence

provision. He kept the supreme value of patronclient between lords and

peasants in order to have widespread support during times of despair. He chose

to rule province, district, and villages through the existing traditional authority

structure. Rather than jailing his subdued enernies as did Tewodros, he secured

their loyalties through submission and allowed them to continue to govem their

people. These traditional leaders helped hirn in time of war by mobilizing the

peasants to the war-front in an effort to resist European attempts at

colonkation-32~ike his predecessor. he died in 1889 fighting for the integrity of an

independent Ethiopia.

Eamest W. Luther, Ethiooia Todav (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1958) 16-17.

32 Keller, 25-30

38

Modem Ethiopia and the Arnbitious Menelik

Menelik came to power after the death of Yohanse in 1889. He wasted no

time in making his ambition official by crowning himself the Emperor of Ethiopia.

He niled Ethiopia in a very pragmatic way from 1889 to 191 3. This approach

helped hirn to gain victory over ltaly in 1896; a victory which eamed unqualified

recognition for Ethiopia. This extemal recognition allowed him to restructure the

Ethiopian state by establishing modem ministerial institutions, schools and courts.

For these institutions, he prepared regulations, niles, and means of operation,

thereby, placing the institutions under the 'rule of law'. These institutions required

civil servants, and thus the right hand of the Beta-kihinet and Beta-Mengist, the

Ethiopian bureaucracy was created.

Owing to a lack of effective administrative nile, civil servants occupied the

dominant position in the state. As a result, the state became an arena of

confusion and illusion because of the colossal bureaucratie rule that was strange

to Ethiopians. Hence, professional administrators replaced amateur po~iticians.~~

The Emperor was devoted to maintaining and cansolidating a political

structure that consisted of three classes based on the tripartite functional division

of Ethiopian society. Those who pray were organized as Beta-kihinet ; those who

fight were organized as Beta-mengist, and those who provide for daily

subsistence were disorganized as gebars. Thus, praying, fighting and Ming land

were the three principal aspects of Ethiopia'ç political structure. But the structure

33 Assefa Jalata, Oromia & Ethioda (Boulder: Lynee Rinner Publishers, 1993) 50-55.

29

was an inverted pyramid, with the Beta-kihinet and Beta-mengist as power

centres extracting tribute from the powerless gebbars. The three classes

mentioned above were also classes of manners. values, and moral expectations.

They also have their distinctive denominations in the social hierarchy. For

example, nomadic pastoralists were known as Zelan, herders as Eregna, and

peasants as Balager. These ternis referred not only to the mode of production.

but also to the moral conduct of the population. Thus, in Ethiopian tradition.

these terms had a double meaning: economically, they showed backwardness.

and morally, they postulated that the producing classes Zelan, Eregna, and

Balager, were rude and uncultivated.

It was the responsibility of the Beta-KjhÏnet to indoctrinate this

acculturation in order to facilitate domination and foster the methods of economic

extraction. Thus, by crossing the principal Iine of their responsibilities, churches

were converting and maintaining people on the side of the regime by preaching

that the Emperor's dignity was inviolable, his power indisputable and that he was

sacred. The church did not shy from teaching that the Emperor was the

gatekeeper of heaven, and that whoever disobeyed him would go to hell. The

church also confirrned that the hierarchical order in society consisied of the

monarch. the clergy, and the farmers. The rulers, according to the churches,

were divinely chosen and entitled to total subrnission from their subjects. Such

intellectual domination created an atmosphere suitable for social and political

Y Tibebu, 5-1 0.

control.

The hub of the Menelikan political power was the Beta-mengist with its two

influential branches: the nobility and the amy. 60th branches aggressively

repressed, exploited, and subjugated the people. From the two. the nobility was

the main power holder? Nevertheiess, the Ethiopian social structure was not

rigid. nor was the nobility a hereditary estate like the European aflstocracy, or a

caste like India's dominant social groups. Hence, the Ethiopian nobility never

succeeded in permanently separating direct producers from the means of

productions. Thus, not until the nineteenth century were they able to seize and

hold vast stretches of arable lands as private property by expanding the sphere of

their political structure. Even then, the hailmark of the Ethiopian agranan political

structure was petty proprietorship based to a large degree on tenancy and

subsistenœ production. The European Seigneurial, or the Latin American-

hacienda, or the Asian estate type, where wealthy landlords directly controlled a

huge landless population was an uncornmon phenornenon in Ethiopia.

In sharp contrast to the European nobility, pnor to nineteenth century the

Ethiopian nobility was more interested in recruiting their tenants as followers.

soldiers, and subsistence providers for professional wamors, rather than

upsetting them by alienating them from the means of production. Thus, owing to

the existence of certain anomalies, it is difficult to apply the classical feudal

paradigm to Ethiopia because Ethiopia was never characterized by a strict

" Gebm Tareke, Ethiopia: Power & Protest New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 45-49.

3 1

manorial system; no serfs farmed on landlords' lands before the nineteenth

century, since lands were vested in the peasants until Ethiopia made contact with

the West.36

Another branch of Beta-mengist in the Menelikan palace was the army

which consisted of approximately 6OO.UOO rifiemen and innumerable traditionally

armed wamors. Every citizen was a potential soldier because social mores made

it mandatory that a citizen had to respond positively to a cal1 to amis from his

superiors. In fact, the professional salaried army numbered 200, 000 men and

were generally trained by the Russians and the French.

Menelik's army was intemationally significant in that it was the only black

army to defeat a European power forcing the Europeans to rethink colonkation.

Because of its heroic example, it was imitated and emulated throughout Africa;

many Afncan liberation movernents named their organizations Ethiopianist

movements. In addition, after 1896, as a result of the victory at the battle of

Adowa, many European states sent their permanent representatives to Ethiopia

signed a treaties of cooperation. Thus, the soldiers who fought at the battle of

Adowa placed the fbrgotten Ethiopia on the world map." In retum for the service.

soldiers were given lands as compensation. The private soldiers were entitled to

have a small amount of land with five tenants to be taxed: whereas, high officers

wuld have thirty to eighty peasants with large amounts of land. The tenants

36 Keller. 57-60.

37 Marcus, 90-95.

were responsible for paying taxes and rendering service whenever required by

the ~oldierllandlords.~~

Therefore, Menelikan Ethiopian peasants were powerless. Unlike during

the reign of Yohanse, the peasants prïmarily produced to fulfil obligations to those

who dominated them economically, politically, and socially. Pastoralists were

also included in the peasant category because they too relied on family labour

and were subject to the same obligations as the farmers. However. there were

important differences in their modes of iivelihood which were bound to have

varying impacts on the political behaviour of the rural population. Both peasants

and pastoraiists were exposed to the dynamics of rural expropriation.

However, some politicians such as Amilcar Cabral and acadernicians such

as Gebru Tareke argued that exploitation and expropriation were facilitated by

the passive and docile characteristics of peasants. In their view, peasants were

simply groups of people occupying a subordinate position in social hierarchies

who not only accepted their place, but also tolerated conditions of deprivation and

degradation; quarrelling and fighting among themselves rather than collectively

resisting their common op press or^.^^ Of course. the peasants' infighting cannot

be surprising because the peasant world is paradoxical; they are segmented

vertically into numerous groups and horizontally by an array of factors that

conceals class exploitation and enfeebles solidarity: ethnicity, religion, primordial

38Peter Schwab, Ethiopia: Politics. Economics and Society (Boulder: Lynee Rinner Publishers Inc.. 1985) 60-65.

'' Tareke. 4-6.

33

kinship affÎliations and villages. However, although peasants are seemingly

disorganized, scattered, and immobile, they do not reconcile themseives to the

expropriation and exploitation waged against them by their lords, nor do they

remain passive as it is claimed by Tareke; they struggle, resist and fight the

subordination and subjugation imposed upon them by their landlords. Therefore,

ai no time in history have peasants facilitated their own domination or

exploitation.

Haile Sellassie and the lnwm~lete Modemization

The fourth Emperor to solidify Ethiopian unity was Haile-Sellasie 1-first as

regent (1 91 6-1 930) and then as emperor (1 930-1 974). Because of his

shrewdness. he was able to monopolize the means of coercion on a level

unparalleled by his predecesson. He mled the country by promoting both legal

rationalization and traditi~nalism.~~ He tried to modemize Ethiopia by

constructing highways, by establishing industries, and by creating urban centres.

On the other hand. he sometimes preferred personal loyalty rather than

impersonality, and traditional beliefs and habitua1 orientations rather than modem

reason hg.

It is very difficult ta know what kind of a person Haile-Seilassie was. He

led a life of secrecy; keeping his ambitions and pians to himself; hiding his true

designs even to those closest to him. Yet to achieve his end, he tossed every

"Max Weber, "Methodology, History and Sociology" Classical Socialoaical Theory Gorge Ritzer. (Toronto: McGraw Hill Inc.. 1992) 236-240.

34

stone and used every person; 'to him no rneans were mean and no ends great'.

Nonetheless, his ingenuity enabled him to keep the two contradictory systems of

traditionalism and modemity in check and balance4'

He modified, consolidated, and expanded his predecessors' limited

institutions by decisively undercutting local powers and challenging and taming

the traditional dominant groups by using international conditions that broadened

his actions. Manipulating the conducive international situation, he benefited from

the Marshal plan, made Addis Ababa the site for the headquarters of the

Organization of African Unity, cut his countries' enemies into pieces, and isolated

hostile countries such as Somalia from the international cammunity. Therefore,

the combination of his intelligence, personal diplomacy, and his conviction made

Ethiopia the centre of Africa. Nevertheless, his extemal successes were not

accompanied by domestic achievements because of his reliance on exploitative

institutions such as the church, the nobility and the amy.

The church was the rnost exploitative institution of the Haile Sellassie

regime. It extracted considerable wealth from the producers by forming an illegal

coalition with the nobility. The church had one third of the nation's land and was

exempted from paying taxes, but it was allowed to w l led its own tax from tenants

and rent lands. Through tax collection and exemption, the church evolved into a

political, social. and economic power of unusually large dimensions. Thereby.

religion was not only concerned with souk but also with wealth.

'"Madan M. saludie, Ethiopia: Dawn of the Red Star (Calcutta: Asia Publishing House, 1982) 40-42.

35

Nonetheless, the church was also the most important institution of social

integration. Every village possessed its own church which sewed as the hub of

community activity. Those churches contained arks associated with one of the

multitude of angels which reinforced the parish's parochial identity. The local

churches were a multi-functional institution serving as a place of baptism.

learning, and dynamic political interaction. They were led by priests who

supervised the elaborate rituals of baptism, communion, mamage. and burial.

These priests also provided education for some young people and rnediated

disputes and confiicts. Therefore, the church was a place where normative

values were acquired and social constraints imposed. It was the focal point of

the parish where political behaviour was ritualized and realized. The clergy were

the main mediators between local tradition and the nationwide Orthodox church

tradition. They also maintained a strong ideological connection to the monarchy.

While retaining its relative autonorny, the local church linked the parish

comrnunity with the larger and overarching socio-political o r ~ i e r . ~ ~ Hence, the

Emperor had to commit to unqualified partnership with the churches if he was to

rule Ethiopia. The Church had previously brought down Emperor Tewodros, in

1868, for his inimicalness to the churches' interest, and Lij Eyasu, in 191 6, for his

professing a religion other than orthodox Christianity-43Thus. in the Ethiopian

case, the political process was not insulated from religion.

42 Tareke, 60-65.

43Mulatu Wubneh, and Yohnse Abate, Ethio~ia: Transition and Development in the Hom of Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) 15-20.

36

Another institution that wielded economic and political power in the Haile

Sellasie regirne was the nobility; the nobles were drawn to court and used as a

political functionaries; thereby, politics became a vocation of the nobles. In retum

for their allegiance, they were given the right to tax their "subjectç" who were

tenants on their lands. They were also entitled to crop-sharing and mandatory

service from the peasants. When the modemization wave reached Eth iopia.

these nobles had enormous potential to manipulate the modemization process.

Nonetheless. as modemization from above developed a bureaucratic system, the

Emperor, by using the new systern, started to transfer the nobles from their

original home areas where they had the potential to challenge his nile. The

transfen were sometimes accompanied with promotion, and at other times. with

demotion. It was only in those areas where there was little challenge to the

imperial system that the nobles maintained their former political role: collecting

taxes, administering justice, and maintaining law and order."

The nobles were assisted by the amy and collaborated with the churches.

With the development of this alliance, the hierarchies of power. prestige. and

occupation found in the social order began to refiect the varying degree of

people's access to mate fial resources. The political structure allowed power to

be highly personalized and abusive with a chain of comrnand that linked the

Emperor through the nobles to the village headman at the bottom. Although

offices were institutionally differentiated, personal ties and nepotism were

Schwab. 62-65.

37

predominant. Officiais accepted the fortune that holding o f fw brought with it. but

rarely its duties and obligations. They were amed with the power to accuse,

arrest, and detain without due process of law, and they used their power for the

extraction of resources. Arbitrary decisions and fictitious charges against those

who refused to be bribed were not uncornmon; there was no act of dishonesty of

wriich any offcial could not be accused. All of these fraudulent bureaucratic

activities were the glue that held Ethiopia's power structure t~gether.~'

The army was another prominent institution in the Haile Sellassie regime.

As an institution. it formed the pillar of the regime as it was the "Emperor's

executive instrument parexcellen~e."~~ Constitutionally, the promotion, demotion,

and transfer of officers had to be conducted with the knowledge of the Emperor

because their function links them to the life of the Emperor in putting down

centrifuga1 forces, suppressing intemal rebellion, and in defending the country

from extemal aggression. Their training was undertaken by Israelis and advised

by the Americans. Indians, Norwegians, and Belgians were sufficient for minor

training such as police, military police, and Zebegnas (guards)." The best brains

were recruited into the imperial guard whose main objective was to spy on the

amy and to control any possible dissidence within it. The imperial guard were

recruited fmm the Amhara and Tigrai tribes who are both of Abyssinian origin.

. -

Tareke, 50-53.

a Rene Lefort. Ethio~ia: A Hereti-l Revolution? (London: Zed Press, 1983) 17.

'' Lefort. 18-19.

38

The non-Abyssinian Ethiopian tribes were excluded on the daim that they were

non-loyalist. Occasionally, the imperial guard was used to quel1 peasant revolts

and to harass student rn~vernents.~~

However. as the awareness of the miiitary increaçed, the amy realized

that they were not only defending the power of the monarchies. but also the

structure of the entire social system that exploited and impoverished Ethiopian

society. Thus, irritated by the exploitative social order, the rnilitary waged an

abortive coup d'etat in 1960. The major theme in the coup makers'

pronouncement was Ethiopia's backwardness in contrast with the newly

independent African states. The restoration of Ethiopia's glory was one of their

pledges. When the coup attempt was heralded throughout the world. the

Ernperor humed home from Brazil where he was on a state visit. In fact. because

of the strong opposition of the Orthodox church to the coup and American

intervention, in order to Save Haile Sellassie, the coup was crippled; destiny stood

on the side of the Emperor, and the coup, which at the time looked like a fait

accompli, failed .

While Haile Sellassie was ruling this system of "rnechanized feudalism,"

the peasantry arnounted to 90% of the population with equivalent GDP outputs as

presented by the Ethiopian ministry of agric~iture.~~ But the peasants had to give

a considerable portion of their produd. according to custom. to the nobility

'' Saludie. 20-25.

" Lefort, 9.

39

through tribute and tithes. These ievies were wllected from each household and

imposed on everything including land. cattle, poultry, and honey. They were also

forced to work for landlords twenty-six days a year, and on festive occasions,

they had to provide gifts for their landlords. Therefore, because of backward

customs, the peasants were providing their products for the non-producing

section of the society. Thus, the preexisting exploitation, expropriation. and

subjugation persisted and reached its summit under Haile Sellassie.

Moreover, the regime moved into the expropriation and leasing of peasant

lands to mechanized foreign famers. Commercial fams were given the grazing

lands of the pastoral people. By providing the tenants with no legal protection

from eviction, the govemment made it easier for the landlords to evict their

tenants and to lease the lands to the contractors. This policy of capital faming

victimized Pastoralists. Since many commercial fams were located in pastoral

regions, the Pastoralists were forced to move to less fertile lands that were over-

grazed and thus prone to soi1 erosion. The expansion of commercial faming was

accornpanied by the increased use of pesticide which endangered the health of

the livestock and the rural population. Thus, the cambined expropriation and

exploitation increased the hardship of life in the rural areas? However, in no way

does this connote that peasants were rural idiots who uncritically absorbed the

law, nor supine victirns who indifferently accepted their ordinal fate. They

expressed their opposition through metaphors, proverbs, poetry, and songs which

''John Markakis, & Nega Ayele 1 I (Nottingham: Russell Press Ltd., 1978) 54-60.

40

circulated rapidly among common people. By mouldering ideas around, peasants

strengthened their passive resistance, but their defiance was infrequent and

virtually ineffective in its irnmediate impact. Nonetheless, it inspired a generation

of radical students who served as a catalyst for the rev~lution.~'

Furthemore, in the name of modernization, Haile Sellassie pledged to

change the country's economic structure by introducing lmport Substitute

lndustrialization from the 1950s to its demise in 1974, while he concurrently

maintained the concentration of lands in the hands of the few. This was openly

contradictory; for industrial production to expand, the demand for manufactured

goods should grow. However, under the agranan structure, the production of

agricultural products grew slowly and income was distributed unequally. Owing to

the lack of capital and technology, the government granted income relief,

transportation tax relief and exemption frorn importlexport duties; they endowed

five years tax holidays to foreign investors. Ironically, many of the govemment

officials were shareholders in the modemizing sectors. These shareholder

officials became subservient to the companies and blocked any legislation

concerning workers' benefits. This helped cornpanies to amass windfall profits by

keeping the growth of employment behind the growth of outputs. These profits

were repatriated to their cauntries of origin. Thus, the policy of lmport Substitute

Industrialization created economic poverty and made the political structure of

Tareke. 2-7.

Haile Sellassie's regime dysf~nctional.~~

The political power became dysfunctional because it allowed landlords and

state oficials, who were already beneficent of the old order. to manipulate the

new modernizing system owing to their financial and educational cornpetence.

Therefore. the Ethiopian version of modernization was not about total

mobilization, but about narrow and sectoral development; it did not increase the

participation of the groups already excluded from political power. In fact. such

need for power would have been reflected through political parties. But the

Ethiopians were innocent of the curent of political parties because party

formations were illegal according to the Ethiopian Imperia1 constitution. In a

nutshell, participation was not tolerated by the irnperial system because the

Emperor and his successor were considered to be the chosen of god. and thus

subjects had to bow to them rather than request political parti~ipation?~

In sharp contrast to Ethiopia's imperial constitution and conservative

nobility. Japan's irnperial constitution and nobility allowed continuous mobilization

and participation. In Japan. the continuity of the imperial tradition served as a

focus for a new national identity. and the loyalty of the population was drawn

toward the centre by bureaucratic means. Hence. in contrast to Japan, the

growth of indigenous and foreign capitalism in Ethiopia complernented rather than

'' Aberra Worku, The lm~or t Substitute Policv of Haile Sellassie Govemment (Montreal: McGill University Press. 1 987) 2-1 0.

53 Samuel Huntigton and Joan N. Nelson. No Easv Choice: Political Partici~ation In Develo~ina Countries (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1976) 1 59-1 69.

replaced the traditional political structure."To cripple the foes of modernization. -

Haile Sellassie invited the regional notables who were trying to upset his half-

hearted plans for modemization to his court and kept thern there for a long time

under various pretences. It was not possible for the notables to refuse the

invitation because any sign of refusal was regarded as Shifta (bandit) and was

quelled by the imperial guard. In fa&. many of the traditional leaders who might

have opposed the rnodemizing policy were killed in the Ethio-ltalian war of 1936-

1941. In effect. the ltalians rendered unintended semice to Haile ~e l lass ie .~~

Dun'ng the period under study, a considerable amount of traditional life

continued and flourished. The ernergence of textile and sugar factories did not

change the belief of the factory workers. The traditional modes of thinking were

not transferred to the factory and the rationality implicit in the factory was not

transferred to everyday experience. Therefore, on the one hand. traditionalisrn

was adapted to modemity in order to survive, while on the other hand,

modernization neither demanded the obliteration of tradition nor imposed a

particular social structure upon the traditional people. What came into being was

a mixture of modemity and traditionalism; a mixture did not require the obliteration

of either.

Because of this mixture. the age-old exploitation of the population of

Ethiopia by their domestic ovefiords was freed of the mitigating constraints

Y Heinirich Scholler, and Paul Brietzke. Ethio~ia: Revolution. Law and Politics (Weltforum. velrlag , 1 975) 25-30.

inherited from the traditional ethos which protected cornmunalism. This traditional

ethos constrained the landlords' limitless aspiration for the exploitation and

extraction of wealth from the producers. The superimposition of business over

fixed and ancient relations of oppression by landed anstocracy resulted in

compounded exploitation, more outrageous corruption, and greater injustice. By

holding traditionalisrn and rnodemization together, Haile Sellassie was straddling

the fence: he desired the enhanced power and affluence that corne from

modemization but he wished to avoid certain social and political consequemes

such as the erosion of his power. He did not want to introduce rnodernizing

legislation that might have uproot the traditional lords, but he siphoned their

money for use in building churches and roads to keep thern in a weak financial

position. As this systern of checks and balances slipped out of his hands, he was

faced with the fundamental problern of what Huntington calls the "King's dilemma"

of "success versus survival." The fundamental dilemma is discerned as follows:

"On the hand. centralization of power in the [hands] of the monarchy was necessary to promote social, cultural and economic reform. On the other hand, this centralization made difficult or impossible the expansion of the power of the traditional polity and the assimilation into it the new groups produced by modemization. The participation of these new groups in politics simply could corne at the price of the monarch. This is the problern of some concern to the monarch: must he be the victim of his own achievernent? Can he escape the dilemma of success versus s~ rv i va l? "~~

As a result of his inability to cope with this dilemma. the senile Emperor

was unable to cany out the affairs of the state and remained waiting for the day

56 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Chanaino Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 968) 1 77.

of surrender. Thus, in the name of modemization, the contacts between Ethiopia

and the Western Wodd culminated in the monetization of the economy, structural

deformation and disarticulation, and led to the partial transformation of the

relations of production.

Although Ethiopia was inserted into the international hierarchical order, in

actuality, it was inserted without a proper fit; its modemization was incornpiete, it

was a country where tradition and modemity have equal significance. Thus,

Ethiopia's insertion resulted from its strategic position and religious aflliation with

the Western world rather than from its economic or political significanœ. Ethiopia

was invited to rnodemize by the West who subsumed all political conflicis about

Ethiopia into the Arab-lsraeli conflict, thereby, angering the Arab world who were

traditional opponents of Ethiopia. Therefore, in the frustration of their defeat by

the Israeiis in the 1967 war, the Arab countfles aided Entrian rebels in their

struggle against the United States and Israelits friend, Haile Sellassie. The

Soviets were also aning the rebel movement because the hom of Africa was a

scene of astonishing political acrobaties during the cold war? The Americans,

who were the dominant international actors, chose to see different perspectives,

rather than responding to Ethiopia's loud cry for amaments. As the local saying

goes, "the eyes of the tiger are to the goats. while those of the hare's to the

'' Claude Ake, Revolutionarv Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1978) 65-68.

Hagos Mehary, The Strained US-Ethiopian Relations (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1989) 47-49.

45

leaves".

The Americans' wmmitment to Ethiopia first arose from the global radio

communication network that enabled them to control issues in Eastern Europe

and the Middle East. In fact, from the beginning to the end, Ethio-Arnerican

relations were not genuine. It was a typical asymmetrical relationship in which

Ethiopia gave too much for too Iittle. By sending Ethiopian troops to Korea as a

peace keeping force and by leasing the red sea naval bases ta the Americans,

the province of Eritrea was retumed to Ethiopia. Again, by sending the troops as

peace keeping forces to the Congo, to Save Mobutu Seseseko, the Americans

infiuenced Afncan leaders and designated the Ethiopian capital as the site for the

headquarters of the Organization of African unit$'

As distrust grew between Ethiopia and America, their diplomatic relations

worsened. Among several factors to affect these relations was the Cuban

revolution. This revolution was greeted with w a m smiles from below because of

its cornmitment to redistribute lands. Examining the implication of the land reform

in Cuba, the Kennedy administration suggested that Haile Sellassie introduce a

programme of land refom. but the Emperor ignored it. Thereafter, the Americans

started a tadical retreat from the Haile Sellassie regime predicting its gloomy

future. Second, as the Palestinian Liberation Front's Black September wing

threatened Amencan envoys in Libya, the Americans invited Essyas Afeworki,

one of the leaders of the Eiritrian Liberation Front, to their base in Asmara and

j9 Koran, 4-5.

46

signed an agreement to protect their citizens from being victimized by the front;

thereby delegitmizing the Emperor. Third, as the lsraelis captured most of the

Arab lands in the Six day war, the Ameficans were impressed and shifted their

support toward the lsraelis instead of squandenng their finances on an aging

~mperor.~O

Without Amencan support, the state muld not retain its cantrol over the

structure of power relations in the country. Hence. conditions became favourable

to the amassing of wealth by means of unrestrained confrontation for powerful

social forces. All these placed a high premium on political power and made the

struggle for power Hobbesian. The custadian of the state lost legitimacy, and the

mass withdrew its loyalties and redirected thern to particular ethnic and religious

groups. The Haile Sellassie government thereby became irrele~ant.~'

However, the Haile Sellassie regime did not surrender without stniggling.

as a histoncal agent in its own right, to retain its power. It was intirnately involved

in the struggle for power in order to Save its structure from destruction.

Therefore, the Emperor tried to reform his power structure by replacing his Prime

Minster in February 1974. This act was an attempt to appease the contenders for

power and to show that he was strong enough to nile. On the one hand, this was

considered to be too little too late, and, on the other hand, a confirmation of

Fred Halliday. and Maxine Molyneux. The Ethiopian Revolution (London: Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux Press, 1 981 ) 21 0-21 9.

61 Clude Ake. "The Future of State in Africa" International Political Science Review, 6 (l), 1985) 85-1 12.

wrong doingmB2

Despite the fact that al1 the structural contradictions undermining the

regime were set in irreverçible motion, these contradictions could have gone for a

few more years if accelerating factors, conjunctively, had not triggered an

insoluble crisis. The structural shocks were deepened by the inter-play of several

sequential factors. Among these accelerators, the famine in Wallo province, in

which about 200, 000 lost their lives, fuelled the pre-existing structural paralysis.

Although news of the famine was not disseminated by the official mass media,

university students sent their representatives to investigate and report on the

scope of the famine. The student reporters retumed with the photographs of

dying mothen and children. which, after being clandestinely distributed

throughout the country, made the nation ungovemable. That famine served to

expose the incapacity of the state, both at home and abroad, and to raise the

political temperature.

Another facilitative condition for the cnirnbling of the Haile Sellassie regime

was that on the eve of its demise, it introduced the legislation that dug its grave--

the Sector Review. This legislation forbad the govemment from concentrating

on the expansion of primary education and limited the enrollment in high schools

and universities. Above all, it made it implicit that education above grade four

was unnecessary. The teachers already outraged about their pay, feit justified in

rallying rnass support and leading strike after strike.

62 Kimmel. 145-150.

48

More importantly, in the middle of confusion in the palace, the military at

the southem border protested the worsening of their living conditions and

imprisoned al1 commanding officers. When the Emperor sent an investigating

cornmittee to solve the problem, the military jailed the Emperots messengers and

transmitted news of their action throughout the country. Soon after, similar

revolts flared up in most of the military barracks and made the Emperoh

situation hopeless; he lost a dependable ally that was needed to cnish the

revo~ts .~~ Internationally, the Americans, who had kept Haile Sellassie in power

were unable to help him because the Arnerican Presidency was in the middle of

the Watergate Scandal. Besides, they had not recovered from their humiliating

defeat in Vietnam. They chose not to engage in war-like activities which would

force them to commit their troops. Hence, the international context became

favourable to the revolutionary actions.

Therefore, al1 the combined necessary revolutionary situations robbed

Haile Sellassie of the ability to rule in the old way and made the people unwilling

to live in the old way. The majority of politically active people were ready to die in

order to change the power structure. However, a revolutionary organization

capable of planning, organizing, inspiring, and leading the people was absent.

Thus, the revolution, initiated from below, had no choice but to be hijacked by the

nationalist rnilitary-frorn the middle. By deposing Haile Sellassie, the amed

forces joined hands in taking radical action.

63 Marina and David Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1978) 32-35.

Chapter Three

The Revolutionaq/ Ethiopia

As it was explained in the second chapter, both modemity and

traditionalism were maintained by Haile Sellassie with intemittent compromise

and confrontation. However, during the closing years of his reign, the inability of

the Haile Sellassie regime to keep this odd partnership together led to serious

confrontations and crisis that caused the revolution of 1974.

The Ethiopian revolution was the most momentous upheaval in twentieth

century Afnca. The Emperor, renowned by the world. revered by Africans, and

reviled by students of history as the "Conquering Lion of the tnbe of Judah" was

finally conquered by a handful of his own men-in unifom who broke their oath of

allegiance to protect him. Thereafter, by separating state and church. the

revolutionaries tried to stop the interference of religion in the intemal affairs of

Ethiopia. Hence, by daring to declare Chnstians and Modems equal, by breaking

the political and social powers of the entrenched ruling coalitions. by shattering

the long established particulanstic ethnic domination. by nationalizing al1 foms of

property, and by introducing the new state language-the language of Mamism.

the Derg accomplished a revolution. The revolution unleashed extensive

transformation within Ethiopia and an international conflict that made the country

one of the flash-points of the Cold War.

In wmparison. the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 would appear to have little

in common with most recent developing countries' social upheavals because it

50

took place in a country that was dorninated by precapitalist social and political

structures. Unlike pst -1 945 social revolutions in the developing world. the

Ethiopian revolution occurred in the urban centres without having revolutionary

parties and ideology. The transition to capitalism was far frorn complete, but it

had already weakened the traditional basis of social and political power; this

transition combined with the protracted agrarian cnsis forced the peasantry into

destitution and shocked other sectors of the economy. In effect, the monarchical

nile which became the wrestling ground between the modemizers and the

traditionalists was debilitated?

Therefore, the structural crisis prepared a ground for the actions of the

revolutionary groups of 1974; the revolutionary groups harassed the old regirne

through strikes, demonstrations, and petitions breaking the backbone of the

senile Emperor. During the popular upnsings, it was organized social groups like

the security forces, students, teacherç, civil servants, and workers that were the

most active. However, when the old state collapsed, it was sorne 120 junior

oficers, NCOs. and privates who foned a leading cornmittee called Derg.

Analysis of the role of classes and groups in revolution is required to understand

the reason that brought the Derg to power.

Why the Military Came to Power?

Many theorists have proposed different social groups and classes as

effective agents of the Ethiopian revolution. The candidates are according to

Halliday and Molyneux, 23-25.

John Markakis. the lower classes (workers and peasants), according to Peter

Shwab, the upper classes (the high civilian and military officers), and according to

Andargatchew Tiruneh, the intemediate social strata. Such analyses are

essential because the question of which class or social group led the revolution is

important in the characterization of the revolution; the answer to this question

depends on the approach adopted. For example, in classical Mamist analysis. the

role of classes in revolution is as follows:

"The generation of a nascent mode of production within the confines of an existing one creates a dynamic basis for the growth of unity and consciousness of each proto-revolutionary class through ongoing struggles with the existing dominant class . . . The revolution is accomplished through class action led by the self conscious rising revolutionary class. i.e. the bourgeois in the bourgeois revolutions and by the proletariat in socialist rev~lution."~~

In Ethiopia, there was no cohesive middle class and the small size of

proletariat that existed did at best participate in the urban upnsing of 1974. Thus,

other latter Marxist ideas were more relevant to the Ethiopian case than those of

Marx himself. The Soviet Scholars who developed the notion of the non-capitalist

path of development or states of socialist orientation envisaged that an amalgam

of intennediate and lower classes in pre-capitalist states could lead any

revolution. However, it is impossible to leam whether such a revolution is a

nationalist. middle-class or socialist. This inability leaves us with the unresolved

question of leadership. Arguably, this approach was shared by Markakis who

65 Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1968) 40-46.

maintains that the Ethiopian revolution was led by the workers and peasants with

the support of certain sections of the intermediate Nevertheless, in the

case of Ethiopia, it is dificult ta maintain that the intenediate class and their

organizations were organically linked to the exploited class since interactions

between them, the workers and the peasants, were at best superficial coming

about only affer the structural coilapse of 1974.

The military took advantage of the disorganized civilian revolutionaries and

overthrew the ancien regime. Upon coming to power, however, the Derg, which

was a combination of educated army Generals and uneducated private soldiers,

had to face its own intemal power struggle. When the military seized power. it

was the moderates such as General Aman Andom who led the revolution. But

these moderates could not hold on to power because of the challenge from the

radicals who wanted power for power's sake. In the process of radicalization, the

well-known General, Aman Andom, was executed by the mediocre mernbers of

the Derg. When the struggle for power intensified General Teferi Bante, who

replaced General Aman as a head of state, was executed in 1977 by Mengistu's

faction. This execution was aimed at eliminating the traditionai officers and to

conœntrating power into the hands of one man-Mengistu Haile-Mariam. The

tempo of the revolution was quickened and the radical factions consolidated their

power by pushing through a senes of broad economic and political r e f ~ r m s . ~ ~

Markakis and Ayele, 52-58.

67 Colin Legum, Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Sellassie's Em~ire (New York: Africana Publishing Company, Inc., 1975) 58-62.

53

Revolutionary Transformations and Obstacles

In order to consolidate their power, Mengistu's faction strengthened a

guideline of Ethiopia Tikdem (first) by introducing basic legislation in order to clear

the way for major political, economic, and social refoms. They pledged to

drastically alter the old political structure by breaking the alliance of the ruling

class. This pledge was expressed in the slogan 'the keepers of the past cannot

be the builders of the future'. %y destabiiizing the political power of the old-

regime, the military prepared the prewnditions for social and economic

progress6' By dismantling the old economic structure. they pursued the mutual

development of industry ar;d agriculture because agricultural development can

only be successful if it is supported by industry. These industrial developments

helped produce agricultural rnachinery, fertilizers, and electnc power. Such

combined infrastructural work raised real wages and provided stimulus for

development. Moreover, the govemment took some progressive rneasures, such

as the suppression of scare resource and essential cornmodities speculation by

profiteers through rigorous p r i e control. The high demand for luxury purpose

was prevented through the divenionary principle, by allocating capital more on

basic needs. Foreign exchange. capital flight, and luxury imports were limited to

the low level. By combining these measures, the government introduced a

radical change in the structure of effective demand in Ethiopia and reallocated

productive resources to satisfy society's need for economic development. By

54

curtailing the luxury demand of the upper class. the regime boosted savings and

prevented the squandenng of resour~es.~~

The Agrarian Refom

Among the many refomis that the revoiutionary regime introduced, the

land refom of the 1975 was the most important refom in a country whose

population was 90% Nationalkation prohibited tenancy, and the

peasantry was mobilized in support of the transformation of the land tenure

structure of the country. Thus, mobilization undermined the traditional political

structure and transferred power to the peasants. It also cut the peasant-clergy

ecanomic relationships and confined their relations to churches. The land refom

not only destroyed one of the essential components of the old structure. the

monarchy, but it also disestablished the other essential component, the Copitic

Church, by depriving it of both its land and its ideological status."

On the other hand, because of the land refom, peasants were given

power ranging from the redistribution of lands to development programs. thereby.

replacing the old power holders. This measure enabled peasants to secure and

safeguard their political, economic, and social rights. Thus, the nationalkation of

land ended the peripheralization of the peasantry. To achieve their goals, the

peasants were called upon to stniggle against the remnants of the old political

- -- - -- -

" Keller. 216-220.

'O Lefort, 9.

'' Halliday and Molyneux, 98-1 00.

structure by working colledively to improve the level of productivity. The

proclamation thus enabled peasants to defend themselves from the unpredictable

actions of landlords who were opposing the reform by organizing their own

defence squads. Thus, peasant associations damonstrated an amazing degree

of initiative and success in organizing forestry programmes, local services, and

road constructions; these peasant associations created a structural basis for local

deve~opment.'~

Therefore, the revolution broke the cycle of subordination and relieved the

peasants from the shackles of traditional local lords and the tyranny of material

poverty. The peasants became a citizenry able to lead their own lives without

extemal interference. Hence, whatever political direction the peasant association

might have taken, the land reform brought about a significant and sometimes

drastic improvement in the standard of living enjoyed by millions of peasants.

They were allowed to keep the entire harvest, the price set by the government

was much higher, and some coffee producing peasants suddenly became

wealthy. Thus, the land reform represented a significant achievement for the

peasants. 73

Nonetheless, as they became better-off, the peasants began playing the

market in a fashion similar to the capitalists. For example, they held back

deliveries to force prices up. Such peasant individualism was intolerable, and the

72 Paul H. Brietzke, Law. Develo~ment and the Ethiopian Revolution (Toronto: Associated University Press, 1982) 258-260.

73 Ottaway , 1 73-1 78.

56

regime tried to solve the matter in two ways.

First, the government established the Ail Ethiopian Peasant Assocîation to

maintain a mediating Iink between the govemment and the local peasantry. This

method proved to be useless because there were no proper channels between

intermediate peasant officiais and the newly established All Ethiopian Peasant

Association. Many peasant leaders refused to obey the directives of the national

association because it was not elected by the vote of the entire peasantry.

Second, as the first solution failed, the govemrnent established associations of

cooperative producers from the peasant organizations that had reached a certain

level of econornic and social development. This was a stage that damaged the

success of the agrarian reform. At this level, the govemment simply trïed to

impose the Cuban experience, such as unionizing youth, controlling rural

produces, and forcing peasants to hold meetings every Saturday, disregarding

the Ethiopian situation causing uncontrollable conflicts between the peasants

and the govemment. Consequently, many members of the peasant associations

joined the rebel movements that opposed the govemment's policy thus

deinstituionalizing the peasant political structure. As a result, the power of the

regime in rural Ethiopia was paralyzed and the political crisis d e e ~ e n e d . ~ ~ In

addition, using their abusive power, the peasant associations robbed the

landlords' oxen, rifle, and crops and threw the former landlords out of their own

homes. Anyone with substantial property in rural Ethiopia was subjected to

Markakis and Ayele, 130-1 35.

57

harassrnent by the peasants. This vengeful expropriation was ruthless and

muid not be controlled by the govemment. Generally, the episode showed that

unrestricted power is always the engine of abuse and violence.

When the government rnobilized its loyalists to take corrective rneasures, it

was hindered by geographical limitations because the peasant associations were

far from the political centres. On the one hand, there were only a small number of

primary roads which were in poor condition, on the other hand, there were no

people living near the roads. Thus, the ability of the central govemment to reach

the people and ensure the lawfulness of the peasant political structure was

severely restricted. Here, the ideology of 'socialist Ethiopia' was besides the

point because the changes achieved at the level of the state were not attained in

the rural areas. The traditional noms, values, and socialization systems of the

peasantry were stronger than the Marxist collective paradigms. The modem

pnnciple of collectivization was accepted by the peasant who made use of it in

the ever-changing world but did not intemalize it. Therefore, the state faced the

same dilemma as the Haile Sellassie regime, it could not communicate with many

of its people, and as a result, traditional values and old political power started to

r e ~ u r g e . ~ ~

In fact, one of the causes of the disagreement between the regime and the

peasants was that their power relation was not well defined. Consequently, the

dual power structure created confusion in ternis of control and responsibility. The

58

govemment maintained central control through the administrative channel and

simultaneously used the peasant association to carry out its rural developrnent

policies. The revolutionary regime granted broad functions and responsibilities.

but the resources needed to exercise those powers were effectively absent.

Thus, the regime utilized the peasant associations as a transitional structure in

the long-term rural transfomiation~.~~

Another problem between the revolutionaries and the peasantry was that

peasants were very conservative and needed to retain their past legacies, while

the radical regime wanted ta change everything. The radicalization process led

to the establishment of a women's association in order to liberate worneri from the

oppression of their male counterparts. However, the formation of the women's

association sparked another conflict between the govemment and the peasants.

The peasants requested that the govemment pull out the students who organized

the wornen's association; this signalled the govemment not to interfere in what

was perceived of as a famiiy matter. When the govemment refused to remove

the students who were organizing the women's association, the peasants took

the law into their hands and started to shoot the students forcing the regime ta

camply with their demand. For example, in the Sibu Guto district, many students

were killed and many women who were elected as leaders in their associations

were widowed ovemight. In general, the conservative and traditionalist attitude of

peasants was completely opposed to the organization of women because they

- -

76 Wubhen and Abate. 92-98.

59

believed that women belonged in the kitchen. Thus, the revolutionafles' efforts

to change the peasants' habits were unsuccessful, and the govemment was

forced to live with them without altering their attitudes.

More irnportantly, Eastern Ethiopian pastoralists did not even know

whether the land was nationalized or denationalized because their conception of

property was entirely different from that of the heart land. They believed that

land, water and air were given to human beings by God and that no one can buy

or self them. They divided the idea of property into two; that which belonged to

God and that which belonged to human beings. Thus, land is resewed for God;

therefore, the nationalization or denationalkation of land was meaningless to

thern. Moreover, they did not need service from the government. they did not pay

taxes, they were an autonomous society of remote historical ongin representing a

classical stereotype of the culturally-integral tribal entity. Thus. the sweeping land

refonn was constrained by these traditional social mores and rernained

incomplete and sectoral. Despite the fact that peasants used the programme of

land refoms, such as peasant association, modem fertilizers and modem

tracton. they remained ideologically conservative local forces strongly opposed

ta the idea of homogenization, integration and unionization. Finally, they never

wished to be modemized, but this did not stop them from using the modem ideas

that served their purposes.

The Urban Land Refom and Other Auxiliary Refoms

The lands in the urban centres were the property of the traditionally

wealthy aristocrats who never realized that the clash between rnodemization and

traditionalisrn would bring such sweeping changes. In their view, controlled

modemization was necessary because it could be manipulated by the traditional

forces in order to cope with the situation in the outside world. When urban land

refom was announced, some of them rebelled and fought against the regime.

and others passively objected and resisted the refon. Whatever might be the

power of the traditional forces to obstruct the refom, the proclamation of the

urban land and extra rentable houses in July 1975 had attracted popular support

for the regime by dismantling the old urban power structure and by establishing a

new power structure in consonance with the goals of the revolution. The

expropriated properties were to be administered by a neig h bourhood association

called Kebele, whose mernbers were democratically elected. The Kebeles were

to implement policies of adjudication and administration in their neighbourhood

replacing the old municipal institutions led by traditional aristocrats. Most of the

positions in the Kebeles were filled by teachers, accountants, and civil servants

whose political views ranged from wnservatism to radical leftism. Thus, the

Kebeles incorporated the urban proletariat and petty bourgeois into the revolution

extending into the farthest reaches of each neighbourhood."

Nonetheless, the decentralization of the peasant associations dictated by

77 Schwab, 57-68.

61

geography and the scarcity of the population was not applicable to the Kebeles.

Although they were autonomous, they remained under the control of the central

political organs of the state. Hence, the Kebeles muld not diverge from the

diredive issued by the state and responded to the centre. Their relationship to

the centre remained one of inferiority. At the same time, their proximity to the

central political structure allowed the centre to know what was going on within

their domains. Thus, the limitation of the centre that applied to peasant political

power was not apparent within the Kebeles. When the Kebeles became the

centre of political struggle between the regime and the civilian political parties, the

govemment curtailed their power by penetrating into the local levels and using

the Kebeles for mass rnobilization against opponents of the regime.

Therefore, the Kebeies were the instruments that helped the

revolutionaries to utilize modem methods to continue the traditional systems of

repression. More precisely, the Kebeles were instruments of control by the

govemment over the people, rather than by the people over the govemment. In

effect, the Kebeles, which were originally empowered as a check against the

traditional landlords and to replace the old municipal government, were easily

swallowed by the new-bureaucratic structure becoming an extension of the

central government. While implementing the regime's policies, they sometimes

coerced those people who did not participate in the govemment policy application

by depriving them of their legitimate entitlement. They sometimes labelled people

as enemies of the revolution and executed them without trial. Thus, the Kebeles

62

were among the institutions known for over-exercising their p~wer. '~

Another major transformation was the nationalization of banks. insurance

corn panies, and foreig n owned industries. This nationalization was fol lowed by

the restructunng of the power holding system around these institutions. Trade

unions and control cornmittees were established with the objective of following up

and su pervising the accamplishment of reg ulations and directives from the

government. They were also empowered to challenge any kind of fraud.

corruption, wasteful practices. and wunterrevolutionary economic activities. By

comparison, Haile Sellassie's regime was not able to achieve such

mmprehensive surveil~ance.~~ However, the attitude of the Derg toward trade

unions was arnbiguous; they viewed unions as simply institutions under the

command of the regime for the purpose of wntrolling labour forces in the modem

sector. When the trade unions became the stronghold of civilian parties, the

regime started to reorganize them by purging those leaders who had transferred

their allegiance to the civilian parties. Since industries were nationally owned,

labour unions did not have any power to negotiate. They were simply

instrumental in disseminating the new ide~logy.'~

In addition, the regime established auxiliary institutions such as youth,

women, and other associations which contributed to the political mobilization and

John W. Harbeson, The Ethiopian Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) 135-1 38.

79 Keller, 226-230.

" Lefort, 133-1 38.

restnicturing of power. In particular. the youth associations played a substantial

role in the combat against illiteracy. It was the sacrifice of these youth that

enabled the Derg to provide the citizens with educational opportunities. By the

1980s. many people became literate, and that was the ultimate achievement." In

the process of the campaign against illiteracy. the regime instructed the

volunteers to educate the people in the dignity and equality of citizenship and

designated three lslamic holidays equivalent to Christian holidays. This reform

not only destroyed one of the essential camponents of the old system. the

monarchy, but it also fragmented the other essential ideological branch. the

Coptic ~hurch."

The Formation of the Workers Partv of Ethiopia

Until the eve of the revolution, Ethiopians were largely unaware of

socialism; party formations were illegal and mass gatherings outside churches

were unlawful. However. in December 1974, the Derg declared 'Ethiopian

socialism' as the official ideology in an attempt to accommodate the clamour of

the civilian left for the adoption of Marxist-Leninist programmes. In fact. Ethiopian

socialism was rejected by leftist political organizations on the ground that there is

only one kind of socialism. namely Maotism-Leninism, and that whatever else it

might be, Ethiopian socialism is not such an ideology. In 1975, the Derg fell

under the sway of the leftist political organizations. In April 1976, it adapted

The govemment claimed that the literacy rate was about 80%. but this figure was disputed by many scholars.

" Halliday and Molyneux, 96-1 02.

64

National Democratic Revol ution as the officia1 ideo~ogy.~~ The question of whether

Derg members actually believed in the ideology or not is in a way rather

academic. Whatever the merits, the new ideology had in practice been important

in infiuencing the nature of the reforrns that were adapted by the new regime. It

brought into existence socialist programmes: a shift of alliance frorn west to east,

central planning, and a Leninist party? Ironically, al1 of the contenders for power

were concentrated on the left of the political spectrurn while the right was empty.

For example, the capitalists and the landed gentry did not have a vanguard

organization to articulate their interests, and thus their influence on the political

process remained minimal.

Therefore. those segments of the population which were devoid of their

own vanguard party appealed to the traditional forces for assistance in their

struggle against the revolutionary decrees. In response to the demand, the

agents of continuity rendered extensive support, from politics to finance. and

organized opposition against the regime in collaboration with the dominant

international actors. Moreover. religious groups struggled to oust the atheist

govemrnent that ousted thern by organizing religious opposition, by defying the

policy of religious restraint, and by openly teaching about God. When the church-

-goers number increased exponentially, the revolutionaries themselves started to

go to church because they were the only places to meet large numbers of people.

83 Lefort, 83.

" Andargatchew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1 987 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 300-305.

65

This traditional mechanism of defiance to change tested the regime's patience

and forced the revolutionaries to reconsider their socialist objectives.

However. by confronting massive opposition, the revolutionary regime

continued to launch a campaign of consolidating the revolution by defending the

gains and establishing further noms. By declaring the National Democratic

Revolution. the regime vowed to eliminate "feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism,

irnperiali~m"~~and to build a new democratic Republic of Ethiopia under the

leadership of the proletariat and the peasantry. To accomplish its tasks. the

regime established the Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs to

organize parties that could articulate the direction of the National Democratic

Revolution. Yet, creating a genuine political party proved to be difficult because

of the endless splintering of the political elites seeking unrestncted power.

Nonetheless. five political parties were formed from 1975 to 1976 with

unclear political platfoms and illdefined boundanes. Of course, al1 pledged to

Marxism in their orientations. Their main differences lay in their attitudes toward

the military regime and the personalities who led them. A few weeks after signing

a communique of united front. they began to fight against each other; some of

thern supporting the military; others opposing it. Consequently, they were divided

on the issues of the right of self detemination, foreign relations, and the policy of

ecbnornic management. Those parties which supported the military favoured

Marxism; whereas. those who were opposed to the military tended to preach

'' cited in David and Marina Ottaway, (1 978) 21 3.

66

Maoism. This ideological rift between the political parties created an opportunity

for the military to strengthen its power. By realizing the inability of these factions

to f om a coherent party, the military took advantage of the situation and

established the Commission for organizing the Workers Party of Ethiopia in 1979.

The Commission's structure was sirnilar to comrnunist party structure with its

principle of democratic centralism. It was, in fact, integrated into the military

government with little autonomy, and it was instrumental in the creation of the

Workers' Party of Ethiopia. After the establishment of the Commission, there was

a policy shift from the military value and orientation toward a political one. In

effect, the Commission politicized the military and allowed Mengistu HaîleMariam

ta exchange his military unifom for civilian clothes. This Commission also had

laid the foundation for the Workers Party of Ethiopia which was fomed in 1984.

When the party was foned, it named eleven politburo members who controlled

and coordinated matters in their domains like petty dictators. Surpnsingly, after

becoming a politburo member, even the technocrats with doctoral degrees acted

like their military bosses.86

One of the main tasks of the party was to lead the transformation of

Ethiopia from an empire where one ethnic group dominated the others into a

country in which al1 enjoyed equal opportunities. However, the Workers' Party's

cornmitment to dernocracy and broad participation in the party's affairs was

further brought into question by the party's apparent lack of attention to the

86 Schwab, 50-54.

67

national question. In the party, ethnic nationalities were not fairly represented.

Given the continual civil unrest among ethnic groups, the regime's cornmitment to

the equality of tribes was dubious. The party was founded as a single party

without any legal opposition, on the ground that a multi-pafty would threaten the

unity of the country because many tribes preferred to be represented by their

tribal leaders. Therefore, the party could neither clearly represent the interest of

the grassroots organizations nor be held accountable for its actions.

Nevertheless, it took bold action in structuring the Democratic Republic of

Ethiopia by encouraging public participation in the transformation; it drafted a

constitution and presented it for public discussion and approval in a referendum.

The referendum on the draft constitution was held on Febniary 1, 1987, and was

approved by eighty one percent of the eligible voters. Although the procedure of

the referendum was polemical, it was the first election in Ethiopia's history based

on the principles of universal suffrage. As a result of the referenda, the People's

Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was proclaimed in 1987. The most important

organs of the People's Dernocratic Republic of Ethiopia were the Presidency. the

Council of State and the Shengo. Like the late Emperor, the constitution granted

the president sweeping power; he could nominate, appoint. promote, demote and

dismiss any official in the nation. In effect, the power of the council of the state

was relegated to the lowest profile, and the Shengo, which had supreme

constitutional power, was unable to function. Moreover, Some of the Shengo

members were not able to speak the official language because they were picked

68

simply on the basis of regional representation. Hence, since both institutions

lacked real power, it was up to Mengistu to direct the affairs of the state like a

fire-brigade commander. Like the old irnperial parliament. the Shengo served as

a decorative instrument to Mengist~.~'

Thus, the traditionally repressive autocratie method of rule reappeared in

new clothing signalling the penistence of traditionalism in the Ethiopian political

scene. Therefore, the emergence of a one man autocracy can be seen as a

continuation of Ethiopia's political culture, and hence, not a transformation.

The Shift of the International Alliance

Although the revolutionaries embarked on dismantling the traditional

system of rule, their efforts were largely unsuccessful. They were caught in the

battle of the local traditional actors and the international actors who were

defending their respective domains. Therefore, for three years until 1977, the

revolutionaries were forced to balance and maintain Haile Sellassie's foreign

policy. But in 1977, the "centuries-old" traditional friendship with the Western

nations was almost erased at a stroke and relations with the United States,

Britain, and Sweden swiffly degenerated into open hostility. This animosity was

caused by the Americans' refusal to provide arrnament to Ethiopia when Somalia

waged a war of aggression. As Somalia invaded Ethiopia, the Derg asked the

Americans for substantial deliveries of armarnents. However, Jimmy Carter

" Keller. 240-243.

69

stopped al1 arms deliveries to Ethiopia due to the allegation of 'human rights

violations'. In reality, the president did not wish to upset the ail rich Arab

countries who were supporting the enemies of Ethiopia and as a cansequence

supported the aggressors.

When the Americans tumed their face against Ethiopia. the Arabs reiaxed

and thought that the time had corne to settle theit grudge against Ethiopia. It was

in this life and death situation that the American govemment betrayed Ethiopia

despite their mutual defense agreement of 1953. To make matters worse, two

Amencan spys were sent to Ethiopia by the Central Intelligence Agency and were

caught by the Ethiopian intelligence service. After several investigations, they

were found to be the wordinators of the rebel movernents. They rewmmended

the funding and arming of the rebel movements." The new regime was also

infomed that Americans had secretly admitted the rebel leader into their hospital

in Asmara.

Having leamed of al1 these intrigues, the Derg could not toierate the matter

and was unable to keep it at a laissez-faire political level. Hence. many Arnerican

organizations in Ethiopia were ordered to be closed on short notice and three-

hundred and fi@ Americans were given four days to leave the country.

Moreover, the Derg also told the United States to pull its military assistance

Advisory Group and its Naval Research Unit out of the country and close the

American cultural centre in Addis Ababa. A week after the Derg closed the U. S.

88 Mehary. 60.

70

officia1 missions. Mengistu went to Moscow to lobby for armarnents; his visit put a

seal on Soviet-Ethiopian relation and apparently eamed an enormous material

and morale boost for the regin~e.~' During the subsequent weeks. several

fighting planes, tanks. and heavy machineries reached Ethiopia. Thus. as a

drowning man will grab at any straw, Ethiopia then had to associate with the East

ignoring the West by whom it was ignored. Reciprocally, Moscow also

unequivocally, severed its relations with Somalia in favour of Ethiopia because

Ethiopia is a much larger country in area, population, and resources. Ethiopia

also had greater political influence in Africa than Somalia since Addis Ababa is

the site for the head quarters of the Organization of African unity and other

international organization~.~~

Whatever might be the cause of the shift in Soviet foreign policy, their

massive military aid enabled Ethiopia to reassert its dominance in the horn of

Afnca. It was Ethiopia's resurgence as a regional power which led the Americans

to find pretexts to harass the Ethiopian government. They asked for

compensation for their nationalized property; however, the Ethiopian govemment

had neither the money nor the interest to pay. Using compensation as a political

weapon, they forced the International Bank for Construction and Developrnent,

the African Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to terminate

al1 development assistance to Ethiopia. They waged all-out war from training,

89 Ibid, 57-65.

Wubneh and abate, 182-1 85.

71

arrning and funding rebels, to irnposing international embargoes in order to

reverse the revolution and to dismember Ethiopia.'' Consequently, the Ethiopian

leaders were bewildered and consumed by the security dilemma; they were

forced to be more closely attuned ta extemal wnstraints than to domestic

matters. Thus, Ethiopia was dragged back from the revolutionary move by the

Amencans.

The reversal of the revolution was not only the business of the

international actors, but it was orchestrated by tribal rebels and dogged by the

forces of tradition who wanted to defend their customs, cultures and values from

succumbing to Ethio-Marxism. The traditional forces prepared a fertile ground for

the international farces to wnsider overthrowing the revolutionary regime.

Hence, it would have been unthinkable for the metropolis to overthrow the regime

without the support of the intemal forces. Therefore, the fight against the

revolution was carried out behind the scenes, by the collaboration of the

international actors and the internat agents of continuity, and, openly, by the rebel

movements.

Generally, the Ethiopian revolution posed issues of consuming importance

to the country itself and of fundamental significance for theoretical inquiry into the

political economy of less developed nations. By dethroning the Emperor and

trying to liquidate his rnachinery, the revolution took drastic measures. It dared to

declare Moslerns and Christians equal, and broke the political and social powers

9' Koran, 5 1 -53.

of the entrenched niling coalition by disrnantling the long-established ethnic

domination. It also introduceci several progressive reforms such as agrarian

refon, nationalization of urban lands, foreign owned companies, and diverted the

scarce resources to the public domains. Meanwhile. it confronted the challenge

of international actors who supported the maintenance of the status quo, and the

domestic traditional forces who preferred ta retain their old system.

On the one hand, the international actors who were unable to colonize

Ethiopia during "the scramble for Africa," managed to roll back the revolutionary

changes that had taken place in Ethiopia by claiming that the Ethiopian revolution

threatened the status quo and stnbility, disturbed the balance of power and

broug ht an unexpected and unpredictable reg ime which abandoned diplornatic

noms to the palace. Thus, by intervening in the name of averting an

"undesirable outcorne", the Arnericans were successful in the reversal of the

Ethiopian revolution.

On the other hand. the Ethiopian revolution, which had dismantled the

imperial structure and attempted ta redirect the social mores in line with Marxism.

could not alter the differences between the forces of continuity and change.

Although the revolutionaries first tried to break down the base of traditionalism by

eliminating the traditional institutions in an attempt to secularize the society, their

efforts remained fruitless. When the revolutionanes recog nized the impossibility

of eroding the power of the traditional forces, they made a corn plete tumabout

and started to manipulate the traditional forces by conferring power on the

educated persons of the traditional people. This vertical assimilation of people

73

from the lower social strata was also accompanied by an equally important

degree of horizontal interaction of the elite members of traditionally diverse

groups. However, this attempt of CO-optation did not appease the traditional

forces who were stniggling to regain and retain their political status, and they

continued to bleed the regime until its demise in 1991.

Chapter Four

The Colla~se of the Revolutionary Regirne

No matter what triggered the collapse of the regime. there are a number of

perplexing questions conceming the last years of the Derg that social scientists

have to examine if they are to make the history of the Ethiopian revolution

cornplete and intelligible. However, such an extensive examination cannot be

carried out here. Thus I chose to focus on two important problems that

undenined the structure of the Derg: the gap between social theory and social

reality, and the wnsequences of unauthentic theory.

The Gap between Social Theory and social Realitv

From a theoretical perspective, the revolution was not planned and

organized within the framework of a solid theoretical understanding of its nature

and consequences. Therefore, to compensate for these drawbacks. scores of

young people were sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe where they

became overnig ht Leninists without the background necessary to carry out an

investigation into its application in the empire. When the young officers reached

Moscow, they were told that capitalism was decaying and dying. But reality

dernonstrated the opposite; capitalisrn was growing stronger, the living conditions

in the Western World were improving. and hostilities between the workers and

the capitalists were declining. Thus. the gap between what the new Ethiopian

Leninist learned from their peers in Moscow and reality was widening.

Nevertheless, the cornmitted and brainwashed Ethiopian Leninists declared

75

Ethiopian socialism overnight. In a demonstration of their solidarity, Eastern

Europeans also carne to aid Ethiopia without understanding the prevailing

conditions within the country sirnply assuming that they could force the situation.g2

At the time, no one bothered about the gaps that existed between Marx's

vision of socialism and the social conditions within which the Ethiopian revolution

tmk place. For example, 'Ethiopian socialism' was not a natural outgrowth of the

logic of developed capitalism, but a premature and forced outgrowth of

penpheral, backward, and deformed capitalism. Therefore it was led by a

nationalist military without a class basis, and the population was merely a

participant or spectator. Here, it is imperative to refer to Marx's famous line from

his own historical analysis of the revolution of 1848. People, Marx wrote:

"Make their own history, but they do not do so just as they pleased; they do not ma ke it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstance directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the p a ~ t . " ~ ~

In Marx's view, the making of history is done not just in relation to the

natural world, but also in relation to social structures and institutionalized social

relations. As we have seen in the previous section, social structures impose a

limit on agency. Social structures are not Iike political structures. They are the

outcome of slow processes. Hence, after 18 years of revolution, few Ethiopians

understood the meaning of socialism and fewer had benefited from the promised

92 Hommb Bonnie K. and Sisai Ibssa, The Invention of Ethio~ia (Trenton: The Red Sea Press. 1990) 330-335.

93 Karl Marx, "The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" The Marx and Enaels Reader (ed.) Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1978) 595.

76

socialist utopia. In fact, many party officiais had made a mockery of socialism by

creating wealth for the few and poverty for millions. A local saying went 'if

revolution makes everybody a king, we better had lived with our one Haile

Sellassie'. g4

When the young officers made their debut on the Ethiopian political scene,

they were modest in temperament and had moderate expectations of what the

reform was likely to deliver. Therefore, they seemed ta be easily contented with

the cosrnetic constitutional change by slowing the tempo of change that was set

by the students and intellectuals. The idealist view of the socialist utopia

embraced by these radical intellectuals had profound impact on 'the men--on--

horseback'. Moreover, the crash course in the socialist ideal, which the officers

received during the short-lived interlude of free press of 1974 and 1975. coupled

with the lively debate, which went on behind the scenes in virtually every nook

and cranny of Addis Ababa, were able to convert even the most inarticulate of the

soldiers into a vocal advocate of the promises of socialism. The soldiers were

exultant because socialism was meant to benefit the common men and they

thernselves were bom of common men. From this point on, the scene was set for

the radical parlance with which various political groupinys tried to outclass one

another.

Generally, it was alright to espouse a vision of socialism and advocate its

glorious promises. Nonetheless, during the process, the young radicals also

"Kinfe Abrham, Ethiopia fmm Bullets to Ballot Box (Lowerenceville: The Red Sea Press Inc., 1994) 4-6.

77

made foreseeable and unforeseeable errors. One of their mistakes was the

failure to hamess the sprit of dynamism and put it to creative use. Their

extensive agitation blurred the contours between reality and fantasy. The

Ethiopian revolutionaries could not even coin tneir own ternis; they simply

irnported concepts, models and theories from the then Soviet Union. No one tried

to adjust these theories to the Ethiopian reality. Even the translations that were

made to the Ethiopian languages were not modified; they were simply carbon-

copies unadjusted to Ethiopian reality because modification was considered

revisionism. Thus, such theory was foreign to the Ethiopian reality and it could

not shape Ethiopian society but only led to its fragmentation and disintegrati~n.~~

Hence when the revolutionaries were overtaken by the rnighty rhetoric of

socialism. they mistook the shadow for the substance. They did not give

sufficient thought to the practical details: choosing appropriate technology.

conditions of nationalization, and the politics of inclusion. Thus, they did not

employ the appropriate mechanism for leading an efficient revolution; thereby, the

failing of the revolution was not surprising.

The Practical Problems of Unauthentic Theory

From an Empirical perspective, the revolution was confronted with national

and international dilemmas. When the Raws in its domestic policy choices

uprooted its mass appeal, its mistakes in foreign pdicy eroded its legitimacy in

international politics; therefore the revolutionary regime had no option other than

'' Charles Taylor, Social Theorv and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 12-20.

78

waiting for the day of its demise.

The most severe blow was dealt to the Deig by its intemal enemies. such

as rebel movements, traditional forces. and regional forces who were colliding

with the regime to defend their autonomy from the sweeping refoms. These

forces were offended by the centralization and concentration of power, the

lengthy lines of communicationl the hinderance of popular participation, and the

abuse of power. Such a concentration of power in the hands of so few impeded

healthy political development and choked fiexibility and open-mindedness. An

unhealthy rigidity was caused by the sloppy bureaucratic mentality; offcials

fomulated a certain policy solution not because it was more efficient, but

because it was easier to rnonitor. Therefore. like the imperial systern, party

leaders amassed more power and authority than they could cope with. They

trusted very few individuals and delegated very little authority.

Although the official system was functioning in the same centralist style as

his predecessor, Mengistu did not have the dynastic credentials of the imperial

crown through which his predecessor wielded massive ecclesiastic and secular

support as the basis of legitimacy. Thus, for the priests, Mengistu was an

usurper who broke the divine line of the kings of the Solomonic dynasty, which

linked Ethiopia with a 'sacred and glorîous past'; he was seen as veritable curse

of god. According to popular opinion, Mengistu lacked the charisrna and personal

aura of Emperor Haile Sellasie. Therefore. in the traditional sense, Mengistu

was not qualified to rule Ethiopia bewuse the traditional forces were wmpletely

opposed to his leadership-from his personality to his programmes. On the one

79

hand, they were accustomed to be ruled by leaders who were attractive, tall. and

graceful; on the other hand, they were accustomed to slow, smooth, and

cumulative progresses rather than sweeping changes.

In the mid 1 980s. Mengistu faced an insurmountable cnsis of legitimacy.

He had iost confidence in his staff and started to regularly control and inspect

them. It was this kind of over-control and inspection which led to the structural

fracture of the regime and cnsis in the palace itseif. First, in 1986. Mengistu

sacked his defence minister. general Tesfaye GebreKidane, who was a standing

mernber of the Derg and a politburo member of the party, blaming him for

disobedience and disrespect. The rernoval of GebreKidane from the defence

portfolio was the beginning of the end. He was very strong and able to

command other ministries to provide supplies to the war zone. Thus. while

was defence minister, there was never a shortage of supplies at the front.

he

In his

place, Mengistu appointed General Haile-Gieogis Habte-Mariam, his yesman, as

defence minister. His position among other ministers was that of an equal.

Supplies to the troops drastically declined because he did not have the power to

order the ministers of transportation. communication, and ind ustry to g ive priority

to the logistical support of the a n d forces as had his predecessor. As a result,

food, clothing, and medicine became scarce at the northern front. This lack of

supplies helped the rebels to win many battles.

Secondly. Mengistu removed Fikre-Sellassie Wogideress, the Prime

minister and the secretary of the Derg and a politburo member of the party from

80

his position because he differed from Mengistu in policy rnatters. He was well

respected by most Ethiopians which made Mengistu nervous. Wogderess was

from the Air Force and well-educated which made Mengistu jealous . Moreover.

at the beginning of the revolution he was a member of the Proletariat League

while Mengistu was of the Revolutionary Flame Party. This initial ideological

difference lingered until he was rernoved from office.

Furthenore, Mengistu also sacked Debella Dinissa, the vice president of

the council of state and a standing member of the Derg. He was removed on the

allegation that he was a womanizer. But in reality, he was removed because he

was very popular, open-rninded, and friendly. When these Derg memberç were

removed. the structure of the regime was shaken; its basic tenets crumbled, and

the Derg as an institution was in political hot water. However, the Western World

argued that the use of force was directed only against the opponents of the

regime. But the excessive use of violence was directed not only against the

enemies of the revolution, but also against the agents of the revolution. In the

stniggle for power, thousands of people were killed who were supportive of the

revolution. 'Like Saturn, the revolution devoured its Chiidren.' Thus, due to the

violence and force it perpetrated against contenders for power and regionalist

movements, Mengistu's regime was seen by the national and international public

as a brutal transgressor of human rights.

Had the standard of living been irnproved in the new economic order, the

sacdfices of political rights might have been excused. But the socialist economic

8 1

policy did not deliver the goods either in the industrial or in the agricultural

sectors. It created numerous economic disorders owing to the overzealous and

over confident planning which created impractical goals. Economic programmes

were set without a clear understanding of local conditions, and the systern was

inefficient in its use of resources. The havoc caused by the inept administration

became more serious as centralization and incornpetence increased.

Administrators. professionals and technicians were selected more for their

political allegiance than for their qualifications. Such a process of economic

management fostered corruption and the country's economic development

detenorated. Thus, the military takeover did not reverse Ethiopia's history of

underdevelopment; it simply opened up the higher ranks of the bureaucracy to

low level bureaucrats further alienating enterpemeurial leaders. As a quasi-

feudal one, the military structure remained incompatible with modemization

imperatives by suppressing the upward mobility of enterprising individuals.

Therefore, in this sense. there was no real transformation but only the

continuation and culmination of the traditional system that had prevailed in

Ethiopia for centuries.96

In addition to the intrinsic weakness of the strategies adopted, the civil

wars that were waged on many fronts were responsible for the failure of the

regimes economic policies. Countless able-bodied men perished in these wars

leaving their families at the mercy of their communities. Continued conscription

% Daniel Teffera, ~ n o m v of Ethio~ia (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990) 100-1 05.

82

resulted in the emigration of youth to neighbouring countnes; the pursuit of the

policy in the countryside deprived agriculture of its most productive labour force.

On the one hand, the gnawing of inflation in the urban centres gave rise to

tremendous dissatisfaction. On the other hand, the siphoning of agncultural

surplus through the quota system in order to feed the amy. had stifiing

repercussions on the productivity of the farmers.

The failure of the econornic policy was made clear in the famine of 1984-

1985 when more than 150, 000 people petished. Although the immediate cause

was the lack of sufficient rainfall, it was aggravated by the civil war which

prevented the movements of goods and services between surplus and deficit

areas. Then, the regime forced the drought affected people of the north to

resettle in the western provinces. This policy was opposed by the Tigrian

Liberation Front which accused the regime of depopulating the north to deprive

them of potential recruits. Similady, the Oromo Liberation Movement blameû the

regime for promoting the recolonization of the Oromo by the Amhara and Tigrai."

Of course, the state could not provide the necessary materials for the people

affected by drought because of its empty granaries. These developments

undemined the basis of the regime's right to rule since it had justified the

overthrow of Haile Sellassie and the summary execution of sixty of his dignitaries

on their inability to provide subsistenœ for the drought affected populace.

When the centralkation and abuse of power reached an intolerable level,

" Tiruneh, 345-350.

83

the opposition from the traditional forces in Addis Ababa emerged daïing to

propose the replacement of the Derg by a cornmittee of elderç which would fom

a provisional body to rule the country until a democratic force could be

established through multiparty elections. The silent erosion of the power of the

Derg. throug h popular dissatisfaction and passive dis0 bedience, was accelerated

by the growing strength and nurnber of guerrilla amies who harassed and bled

the conscripted national army. In some rural areas, there was a general refusal

to be niled by cliques of the regime; in other places, there were open rebellions:

tribal, regional and secessional. Therefore, the Derg, which had assumed power

by default, was never be able to legitimize its rule. Hence, the defeat of the

regime never required any clearly defined policy or winning of popular sympathies

from its opponents because the Derg had no political capital left after it had

suppressed its urban opponer~ts.~'

In the rnilitary sphere, paor morale resulting from dwindling logistical

support, including a shortage of food and clothing, together with successive

defeats and the connivance of the military leadership with the opposition

movements immobilized the vast army and led to its gradua1 disintegration. The

conscripted peasants and the urban unernployed, who fomed a major part of the

army. found it opportune to defect to the rebels en masse rather than die in what

they perceived as an endless war. The chain of cornmand in the amed forces

9' Abate Dawit, "The End of Crisis? or Crisis without End? The Evolving Dynamics in Post-Derg Ethiopia" Ethiopia in Chanae

(ed.), Abebe Zegeye 8 Siegfried Pausewang, (New York: British Academic Press, 1994) 280-283.

84

was dealt a severe blow in 1988, when Mengistu executed his ablest General.

Tariku Laine, and demoted the well known General Kebede Gashe to the rank of

private. This illegal execution and demotion marked a precipitous drop in the

army's morale and was a tuming point in the war effort. As a result, the rebels

overran regions from AfFabat to Massawa; regions which had already been under

the control of the executed general. Therefore, by executing the commanding

general, Mengistu demoralized the troops and rendered unintended service to the

rebels. Although Mengistu tned to justify the execution, by blaming the general

for spending most of his time in the provincial capital rather than staying with his

troops at the front and also for squandering several thousand B i r of govemment

money, the death of the general outraged the entire population.

The execution of the general and other prominent army rnernberç resulted

in institutional incoherence within the armed forces, and a power struggle

between the remaining generals and Mengistu. The army generals plotted an

abortive coup in 1989 while Mengistu was on a state visit to East Germany. The

leaders of the coup pronounced that they were disgnintled by the disastrous and

lengthy war, and by the withdrawal of troops from the Tigrai province by

Mengistu's order. However, the leaders of the coup did not leam from the failed

coup of 1960 and again failed to enlist the support of the security, political

officers, and the army at large. Therefore, the majority of the troops resisted the

coup because they were unfamiliar with its agenda. Even the Tigrai People's

Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Entrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF)

rejected the generals' offer of cooperation in the removal of Mengistu from power.

85

Both rebel movements wanted Mengistu in power because their political aims

would be best sewed by retaining Mengistu, rather than helping new leaders who

might have substantial mass appeal. Whatever the motive of the coup leaders. it

failed, and a large number of officers and army generals were bnitally executed

without due trial. After the abortive coup, by eliminating the experienced officers.

the promotion of the loyal officers to a position of command reduced the

command structure to a skeleton of its former self. Consequently. al1 the wars

fought after 1989 were not won by the national army because of their lack of

qualified military leadershipg9

By and large, the coup attempt was ineptly organized and so pitifully-

amateurish that if, by chance, it had succeeded one wonders if the men who led it

would have been able to provide the country with better leadership and a more

viable political programme. Nevertheiess, it is a tradition in Ethiopia to ascribe to

failed rebels and coup leaders noble intentions and unselfish motives. Hence.

the conspirators of the 1989 coup will long be held in high esteem in the popular

imagination, whether they deserve it or not, because to praise those who died

and to blame those who lived is part of Ethiopian political culture.

In spite of the fact that the international and the local actors collaborated to

oust the regime, the demise of the revolutionary regime did not corne until 1990

when Mengistu delivered a coup speech against his functionaries in the party and

state. This was a remarkable act from the view of its timing, content, and

- -

99 Abate, 284-286.

authorship; in one stroke socialism was declared a failure, the party was

dissolved, collectivization was dismantled; al1 state imposed restrictions on

peasant production, marketing, and pricing were lifted, and the command

econorny was replaced by a mixed economy. Mengistu pledged to burry the

socialism he had ruthlessly wnstructed for over a decade; a decade during which

many people had been murdered and others imprisoned, tortured, and repressed.

Thus, the refom of 1990 can be considered as a top-down counter-revolutionary

action. 'O0

This announcement enhanced the underiying process of the disintegration

of the structure of the state and caused the execution of the party cadres in some

provinces. The annulment of the Worken' Party, camed out behind the back of

the party functionaries, led to a great sense of betrayal. Similarly, the

replacement of the planned economy by the free market antagonised public

sector workers, state managers, and trade unions who condemned the retreat

from socialism. Nonetheless, the most decisive act was camed out by peasants

following the reform. They engaged in decollectivization: the disbanding of

peasant cooperatives, the distribution of their assets and the retum to individual

faning. All that remained standing were a few heavily subsidized model

enterprises in which the division of the assets had becorne too difficult to settle.

The process of decollectivization was followed by devillagization. Peasants left

'00 Dessalegn Rahmato. "The Unquiet Countryside: The Collapse of Socialism and Rural Agitation, 1990 and 'î99d" Ethiopia in Chanae (ed.). Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang, (New York: British Academic Press, 1994) 259-261.

the socialized villages and returned to their original local sites-killing party

leaders who tried to slow down the process. 'O' In this sense, the wnsewative

and traditional forces defeated the forces of changes by joining hands in

dismantling collectivization and nullifying the ideas of integration. But the

destruction of modem collectivization and cooperatives brought unintended

consequences. It resulted in social breakdown. At one time, both the traditional

and the modem structures were paralysed; there was a complete lack of social

cohesion and political coherence. Particularly, from June to August 1991,

cornpetition for power between the modem and the traditional forces became

Hobbesian; in fact, in the end, this cornpetition reinstituted institutional dualism;

neither force was a winner nor a loser. Thus, Ethiopia remained the country

where the forces a tradition and forces of modemity lived side by s i d e

sometimes wlliding and other times comprornising.

The serious roll back fmm socialism was not initiated by intemal factors.

but rather by the end of cold war which reduced the Ethio-Soviet relationships.

ARer the summit between Gorbachev and Reagan in 1988, Ethiopia was buffered

and the Soviets stopped their economic and political assistance. When Mengistu

visited Moscow, in the same year, Gorbachev told him to accept perestroika and

glassnost but Mengistu was displeased. Although Mengistu was critical of

Gorbachev and his new philosophy, he tabled the reform to the central cornmittee

'O' Siegfried Pausewang, "Local Democracy and Central Control" Ethio~ia in Chanae, (ed.) Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang, (New York: British Academic Press, 1994) 216-220.

where it was adopted since socialism was condemned throughout the world. In

effect, Mengistu's confidence declined and he faced the same dilemma that Haile

Sellassie faced in 1974. This crisis in confidence was not confined to the higher

echelon; it had also trickled down to the lower ranks of state, party functionaries.

and the public at large. While the lack of confidence did not lead to popular

upfising or the ousting of the party from power, as it had in Eastern Europe,

nevertheless it led to wild rumours and expectations of the impending overthrow

of Mengistu. Thus the Soviets' betrayal accelerated the existing power paralysis

and structural fracture of the Derg. 'O2

The Americans were seriously engaged in bolstering anti-Ethiopian

movements. For example, they partici pated in depopulating Ethiopia by assisting

the lsraelis in smuggling the Felashas from Ethiopia to lsraeli in 1985. It was

George Bush. then Vice President, who sent Hercules aircraft into the Sudan

where they picked up thousands of Felashas and flew them to Israeli. The

Americans helped the Mosad by appeasing the Arab countries during the

operation. They were ais0 brokering the Israeli payment of the money to the

Sudanese for their cooperation in allowing the Felashas to corne to the Sudan

from ~thiopia.''~

Moreover, they continued to support the Eritrean and Tigrian rebels by

furnishing materials and financial assistance to oust Mengistu's regirne; they

'O2 Tiruneh, 355-360.

'O3 Clair Hoy and Victor Ostrovisky, Bv Wav of Dece~tion (Toronto: Stoodart Publishing Corn., Ltd., 1990) 289-296.

89

allowed ail the rebel movements to have their office in Washington and the nght

to direct relations with Amencan congressional and state officials. It appeared

that the USA was intent on undemining the Derg to prove to the world that the

Ethiopian 'communist' regime muld not escape the fate of Eastern Europe

namely total collapse. The Amerkans' rettibution against the regime extended to

the point of equivocation regarding its former policy of maintaining the territorial

integrity of Ethiopia. Therefore, the struggle ta unseat Mengistu was a constant

preoccupation of the Amencan officials who saw political office as an end in itself,

rather than a means of implementing policies that might pull the country out of

backwardness and poverty. On the one hand, they placed enomous pressure on

Mengistu's regime through various mechanisms; on the other hand. they granted

unqualified material and tinancial support to the rebels. Finally, the regime was

unable to get material or financial support to defend itself. l M Thus, taking

advantage of the central political cnsis, various insurgent movements intensified

war against the regime. The wars reduced infrastructures to irreparable levels.

Nonetheless, the Americans hailed them because they thought that the wars had

a debilitating effect only on Mengistu, rather than Ethiopia at large.

In addition, the forces of tradition continued to render unqualified

assistance, overtly and cavertly, for the rebels by providing food, shelter.

ammunition and intelligence because any incoming regime was thought ta be

better than the Marxist regime which was identified with the destruction of the

Abate. 280-281.

90

past. In some areas, the traditional forces killed govemment agents; in other

areas they simply purged govemment agents and wntinued to nile themselves

by eiders. Many traditionai tribes living in the remote regions, religious groups.

and regional leaders called for the demise of the revolution with its foreign

ideology. The traditional leaders mobilized their people against the state and

alienated the state from the population; thus they quickened the already loose

national bond and the state broke down.

But to be precise, the Maotist ideology had no direct implication on many

of the traditional forces because they continued to [ive in their old way. For

example, the male of the Adal tribe cannot get manied unless he kills a non-Adal

male and cuts off the victim's genitalia. Killing a non-Adal and cutting off his

genitalia is a symbol of heroism for the Adal males. No Ethiopian govemment

wuld change this culture because cultures are beyond legislation. The

cumulative effect of this traditional, religious, and regional resurgence rendered

substantial support to the international and local actors in the struggle to destroy

the Derg regime.

In the closing years of the decade, there was a general lack of direction,

malaise, and a sudden increase in compt practices within the state apparatus;

bribery and the amassing of wealth were rampant. By 1989, the regime was

living on borrowed time. and it resembled a hut made of dried corn stocks that

requires only a gentle touch to collapse. For Mengistu's regime. that touch carne

from regionalists, tribalists. and factionalists. It is also equally obvious that the

regime's crisis was deepened by the lack of international support and the division

9 1

among the party functionaries. When Menigistu Left for Zimbabwe in May 1991.

rebel movements captured many of the important cities of Ethiopia.

By using the exacerbation of confiict and the departure of Mengistu as a

pretext, the Americans, who were acting as a midwife in Ethiopia's

dismemberment, invited al1 the liberation fronts to London and allowed the Tigrian

and the Oromo Libration Fronts to f o n the Ethiopian govemment, while allowing

the Eritrean Liberation Front to form its own separate transitional govemment.

The 'Ethiopian interirn govemment' was convened in July 1991 ; its memben were

from the Tigrian, Oromo, and lslarnia Oromia Liberation Fronts along with other

hand picked representatives of various linguistic groups. The pan-Ethiopian

nationalist groups were not represented in the power sharing. This fact, coupled

with the dismantling of Ethiopia's multiethnic institutions and their replacement by

an ethnicall y structured power, dictated the preponderance of reg ionalism and

tribalism in the post-Mengistu political order of Ethiopia.

By and large, the revolutionary regime had neither the organizational nor

the intellectual capacity to lead the complex Ethiopian society. Its rhetoric of

socialism was unpalatable to Ethiopians. Therefore, it was obvious that a regime

without any theoretical asset cauld not provide its society with practical

achievements. Even the officiais misused the principle of socialism by

accumulating wealth for themselves antagonizing people of al1 ages, regions. and

religions. While discrediting the former aristocrats in public, they turned out to be

the aristocrats of aristocrats in lifestyle and public images, yielding to the

traditional Ethiopian political culture. Thus, they lacked human face, conventional

92

wisdom and diplomatic suave of the tradition-oriented officiais of Haile Sellasie.

Therefore, the regime could not perform an economic or political function

in a meaningful way because it was robbed of its legitimacy by multiple

contenders for power ranging from regionalism to tribalism sponsored by

traditionalism. All forces fought against the Derg claiming that it disturbed

Ethiopia's glory by separating the church from the state, by introducing sweeping

refoms, and by jailing eminent people from religions, regions and tribes. These

elements of tradition were not interested in being inwrporated into the re fon

projects because ancient and recent historical poiitical realities impeded them

fram succumbing to the agents of changes. Thus, the traditional forces deterred

the regime's opportunities to extend its programme of refoms.

Moreover, since the Derg was locked in the international hierarchical

order, it was unable to show flexibility; it had to please the Russians, but pleasing

the Russians displeased the Americans. The Americans rendered a fatal blow to

the Derg by waging all-out war against it. In the end, the Americans continued to

wnstrain the regime; it lacked room for rationalized decision making. From

imposing embargo to arming rebels, they did everything it took to unseat the

revolutionary regime.

Therefore. in the Ethiopian case, the myth of unidirectionality-the idea that

al1 societies are ultimately heading towards modernity 4 s shown to be false. The

revolutionary or evolutionary attempt to separate the traditional forces fmm their

longer bound customs and cultures remained futile. The traditional society tested

93

the efficiency, effectiveness, and patience of govemment and continued to render

protection to stability, stillness, and continuity. Thus, despite the rhetoric of

establishing a uniform Ethiopian society, Ethiopia remained a worîd of tentative

change and strong traditions.

Conclusion

When Tewodros came to power in i855, he waged a serious battle

against the forces of tradition by trying to demote the values of traditional society.

He wnceived that the traditional system was too cornplex and inefficient.

Therefore, he strived to dismantle the traditional system by imposing his

charismatic leadership over traditional rule. Nevertheless, although he contrived

to establish centralized Ethiopia through his charismatic leadership, he could not

succeed because traditional forces organized thernselves and fought against his

system.

After the death of Tewodros, another charisrnatic leader Yohanse came to

power in 1872 and ruled the country until 1889. Although he was graceful.

respected, and as meticulous as Tewodros, he avoided confrontation with

churches, local leaders. and other traditional systems. Instead, he managed to

use them and extended his vision and the size of his empire. He did not question

the legitirnaq of the local actors; he even rendered thern more power to be able

to manipulate the traditional forces in wars, such as the Gundat and Gura against

Egypt in 1870s. He evaded the fate of his predecessor who risked not only his

power, but also his life by colliding with the traditional forces. Moreover. he did

not favour one tribe or region over the other, but he recognized them all equally

and clustered them in order to rescue Ethiopian integrity. Therefore, he benefited

from his cautious approach by combining religious, regional. and tribal initiatives

towards the centralkation of Ethiopia. As was the case with his predecessor, he

died a heroic death defending Ethiopia from foreign encroachment in 1889.

95

The death of Yohanse brought Menelik to power. Menelik proposed a

programme of madernization in a country dominated by traditionalism. He was

able to establish bureaucratie institutions of government with regularities and

patterns of actions.

However, he was not immune from the attack of the traditional forces who

claimed that the modernization process was irrational because it threatened the

wisdorn of god. For example, when Menelik requested war planes from Britain

1903, his defence minister, Fitweran Habtegeorgis opposed the idea. When the

planes amved in Ethiopia for demonstration, the minster insisted on sending them

back to Britain because he considered a war plane as the work of devil. He

reiterated that human beings who respect god neither invent nor fiy war plane.

Thus, Menelik's unquenchable cunosity about modem technology,

gadgetry, and weaponry was restricted. Facing enormous diffïculties from the

traditional elements who were interested in continuity, he began to share power.

Thus, the Ernperor's institutions of rationakation were scnitinized. restricted, and

tested by the traditional groups and therefore, unable to flourish at the speed

Menelik might have wished.

When Haile Sellassie came to power in 1930, the endless battle between

the traditional groups and the modernizing groups was accelerated because the

Emperor was dedicated to the modernization of Ethiopia. He was also a

cautious, systematic, and skilful statesman. He never favoured modemity over

tradition. Rather, he controlled and maintaineci equilibrium through his own

system of checks and balances. For example. he was wearing European-style

96

clothing in his court, while his court was ruled and regulated by traditional

ce rernonies.

When he could not find dedicated modernizers, he hired an Arnerican to

his Foreign Ministry, an Englishman to lnterior Ministry and a Frenchmen to the

Postal services Ministry. Nonetheless, he did not let these foreign employees do

their work without placing restrictions on them. He designated strong traditional

oficers to work with thern in order to control or cripple excessive modemizing

policies and programmes.

Therefore, with Haile Sellassie some elements of continuity became

functional for the maintenance of certain modem institutions and vice-versa.

However, in the closing years of reign, his inability to control and command this

odd balance became obvious because he was aging and he had lost his

dependable allies, the Arnericans. Therefore, he had no other option than to give

up by letting the endless bickering between the tradition and modemity resume.

Initially, the military revolutionary regime that replaced Haile Sellassie did

not face a challenge frorn the traditional forces and modernizers. The

modernizers hailed the refoms proclairneci by the military in the urban centres:

nationalization of the foreign companies, rentable houses, and urban lands.

Similady, the traditional people favourably greeted the rural land reforms,

confiscation of the property of landlords, and the introduction of fertilizers to rural

faming. Hence. until the 1980s, the revolutionary decrees did not face strong

challengers. But after 1981, al1 forces joined hands to undo the reforms declared

by the Derg.

97

Although the political decrees issued by the revolutionary government had

changed the state structure, they cuuld not change societal structures because

social structures are not randomly made or instituted by state decrees; they can

only develop with changes in the econorny, culture, morality, and values of the

society; these changes the Ethiopian revolution failed to accomplish. Thus. the

revolution was unable to displace the most basic social structures of Ethiopia.

As the result of the revolution, the country which was proud of how it

presewed its independence by resisting European encroachment for centuries,

was conquered by the portraits of three Europeans. namely-Marx, Engels, and

Lenin. The Ethiopian heroes who defended the country for several centuries

were discredited; the tallest statue in Addis Ababa was commemorated not to one

of the Ethiopian heroes, but to a foreigner-a European-Lenin. Thus, al1 the

billboards in villages and cities were doomed to cany the three gentlemen's

portraits. When I was taking a bus from west Wollega to the capital 300 km

away, it was aggravating to look at the numbers of billboards with these portraits.

If the village was large and wealthy, the billboard was coloured; if the village was

small and poor, the billboard was in black and white. I wondered whether they

were god sent or man made because of their presence over extensive

geographical areas.

For the students and the military who were sponsoring Marxist ideology

with their billboards, it was a hey-day; they did not have property inherited from

the past, and thus they were rebelling against continuity establishing the portrait

of these three Europeans as a symbol of change. But the traditional people were

98

wondering why their lives were challenged by adherence to the phiiosophy of

these three Europeans? They were mumbling about being forced to install the

portraits of people they do not know in their backyards. By billboardizing the

nation, the revolutionaries cornpletely repudiated the traditional belief system by

claiming that traditional reasoning is often inexad: its hub is moral rather than

scientific, its formulations are useless, it gives people no control over natural

forces. Their theories also aligned the Ethiopian revolution with the French and

Russian revolutions, but revolutions can not be produced like industrial product.

At the end of the revolution, these traditional forces reinstituted primordial

tribal boundaries. Thereafter, the state had no choie but to constitutionalize

tribal boundaries. Consequently, al1 the tribes are currently defending their tribal,

regional, and religious interests; Ethiopia once again resembled the Roman city

states where biology served as an ideology. More pertinently, the present

Ethiopia resembles the Menelikian Ethiopia where traditional forces and forces of

changes had equal power. As a local saying goes "when more things change.

they more remain the sarne." After various restructuring and reshaping efforts,

the country became the Menelikan Ethiopia of the nineteenth century.

In conclusion, I have to reiterate that the greatness of Ethiopia is still its

living past. It is an uncontestable truth that sorne valuable aspects of the past

were selected, saved and filtered, but they were not killed by the agents of

change as has often been claimed. The Ethiopians know there is no living

present with a dead past and no future without both. The country swims in the

present with the wealth of the living past. In the Ethiopian experience. there is no

99

absolute beginning or absolute end-instead there is only the continuity of life. It is

a country with a population of multiple life bearen of the past and inventor of the

future; in essence. Ethiopia is a country where the past is living in the present.

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