Notes

Introduction

1. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ed. J. Cottingham, 1996) p. 17.

2. One of the most acute expressions of the argument that philosophy is a particular mode of thinking that begins with Plato is to be found in Jean Beaufret's La Naissance de Ia Philosophie in Dialogue avec Heidegger, Vol. 1, Philosophie Grecque, (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973) p. 20.

3. Kritik der Reinen Vemunft, A66, B90 (Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin Academy Edition, Vols. III and IV; translated by N.K. Smith as Critique of Pure Reason, Macmillan, London, 1929).

4. I return to the question of temporality in Chapter 3 of this study, but see Chapter V of Being and Time, particularly §74, for the analysis of how historio­logical Wiederholung - a fetching again, a retrieving of the past as a possibility for the present- is grounded in Dasein's historicity.

5. Cf., in particular, the conclusion to Sadler's Heidegger & Aristotle: The Question of Being (London: Athlone Press, 1996).

1 The Question of Being

1. Cf., for example, Metaphysics, E, 1, 1025b9 and 1026a31. Following recent con­vention, I refer to the books of the Metaphysics with the Greek alphabet. This is the only text of Aristotle that I cite in this way and this obviates the need to cite the Metaphysics by name in the references.

2. Cf . .1, 7, 1017a7. On this point and for Heidegger's most incisive reading of Aristotle's articulation of the question of being, cf. §2 of the lecture course of 1931 on Metaphysics 8, G33.

3. This distinction between the Leitfrage or guiding question, and the Grundfrage or grounding-question is a constant in Heidegger's work of the 1930s. Cf., in particular, the first chapter of Introduction to Metaphysics and NI 79/N167 ff. On the question of ontology, see, in particular, §106 of the Contributions to Philosophy, which concerns 'The Decision about all Ontology'.

4. Cf. r, 1, 1003a. 5. Cf. Frank Capuzzi's note on p. 154 of N4: 'The term ontology apparently was

coined by Goclenius in 1613, then taken up by the Cartesian philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622-65) into his Metaphysics de ente sive Ontosophia of 1656, and finally established in the German language around 1730 by the Leibnizian rationalist Christian Wolff (1679-1754).'

6. Cf., for example, r, 3, 1005bl. The non-extrinsic nature of the title 'ontology' is clear given the Greek words of which it is composed, but for the same argument concerning 'metaphysics' cf. Pierre Aubenque, Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) p. 28 ff. and Nil 213/N4 159 ff.

196

Notes 197

7. See Eudemian Ethics I, 8, 1217b 33 ff. On the idea of particular sciences relat­ing to one genus, see r, 2, 1003 b 19.

8. Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978, 3rd edition) p. 139.

9. For Owens' arguments concerning 'entity' and for a useful treatment of the long history of both substantia and essentia as translations of ousia see the fourth chapter of The Doctrine of Being. For further studies of this history see 'Notes sur le vocabulaire de l'etre' by Etienne Gilson, of whom Owens was a pupil, in L'Etre et /'Essence (Paris: Vrin, 1948) and, in particular, ].F. Courtine's 'complement' to Gilson's text, 'Note complementaire pour l'histoire du vocabulaire de l'etre' in Concepts et Categories dans /a Pensee Antique (Paris: Vrin, 1980, ed. P. Aubenque), which approaches Boethius' translations of the Greek from a Heideggerian perspective.

10. Certainly, this fact has by no means convinced anything like the majority of contemporary English-language Aristotelians as to the inadequacy of the translation 'substance'. Mary Louise Gill, for one, acknowledges the problem in her Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 13, n. 2 but holds, nevertheless, that 'substance' does not betray Aristotle's thinking.

11. C.H. Kahn, The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Riedel Publishing Company, 1973) p. 458.

12. Without referring to Heidegger, Owens (op. cit., p. 150) offers such an interpre­tation on the basis of the claim that the compound forms derive from the sim­plex: 'ITupoilcr[u and cJ.7ToDcr[u are rendered in English by presence and absence respectively. The notion conveyed by the syllable "sence" in these words would perhaps best correspond to the Aristotelian oDcr[u'. Heidegger deals with the formal objection to his thesis in the lectures of 1930, On the Essence of Human Freedom [G 31]. Sub-sections 7-10 of these lectures constitute Heidegger's most extensive treatment of ousia but for an earlier extensive treatment see §7 of the lecture course of 1924, The Fundamental Concepts of Aristotle's Philosophy [G18].

13. On this point, see Heidegger's essay of 1957 entitled 'The Onto-theological constitution of metaphysics' in Identity and Difference. For an earlier discus­sion of the question in relation to Aristotle, see G19 §19. See also Catriona Hanley's Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

14. Rudolf Boehm, Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965) p. 59.

15. Cf. Posterior Analytics, I, 22, 83a25. 16. For a treatment of this problem, see Chapter 2 of Aubenque's Le probleme de

l'etre chez Aristote. 17. Cf. Z, 13 and 14. 18. Gilson, op. cit., p. 52. 19. David Bostock, Aristotle's Metaphyiscs Z and H (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1994) p. 72. 20. Heidegger proposes this interpretation in 1927 [G24 151/107] but he is

hardly the first to do so. For a comprehensive survey of the interpretations that have been proposed of the locution, see Aubenque, op. cit., p. 460 ff.

21. As D.W. Graham notes in 'The Paradox of Prime Matter' (Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1987, p. 476, n. 5) it is for this reason that Aristotle is not

198 Notes

altogether satisfied in denominating earth, fire, air and water with the traditional name 'element'. The four 'elements' are not yet what is absolutely 'elemental' and thus On Generation and Corruption [I, 6, 322b1], for example, speaks of them as the 'so-called elements'.

22. Critique of Pure Reason A 266, B 322. 23. According to Heidegger in 1922 'Aristotle goes along with factical life in

facticallife's own direction of interpretation' [PIA 45/385]. 24. Cf., in particular, the essay of 1922, Phenomenological Interpretations with

Respect to Aristotle and SZ 24. Concerning the genesis of Heidegger's readings of the senses of ousia, see Chapters 5 and 6 of Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being & Time)(Berkeley: California University Press, 1993).

25. Cf. Z, 7, 1033b1 ff. 26. I follow Ross' interpretation of this argument on p. 64 of his Aristotle (London:

Methuen, 1923). 27. As Pierre Aubenque remarks (op. cit., p. 431) even essential attribution

requires a movement of the imagination that dissociates the unity of being into a subject and essential predicate.

28. The conception of primary matter - DpwTTJ uATJ - that Aristotle explicitly names and determines in On Generation and Corruption [II, 1, 329a24 ff.] as a pure possibility, that is, pure shortage has come under much scrutiny in con­temporary commentary. For the idea is somewhat paradoxical: if matter has no determinate qualities whatsoever than it is, strictly speaking, nothing. Nothingness would, thus, 'underlie' change as one of its principles. This dif­ficulty has occasioned revisionistic readings (e.g. H.R. King 'Aristotle without Prima Materia' in the Journal of the History of Ideas, 17, 1956, pp. 370-89) which argue that Aristotle does not, in fact, require a thinking of prime matter at all and that the four elements are the most basic substrate of all things. For a bibliography relative to this question see D.W. Graham's 'The Paradox of Prime Matter' (art. cit.) and for an extended study of the problem cf. Section 3.2, in particular, of Heinz Happ's Hyle: Studien zum aristotelischen Materie-Begriff(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1971).

29. I return to this question but on the relation of the categorial to the poetic determination of being, see Jean Beaufret's 'L'enigme de Z', 3 in Dialogue avec Heidegger 4 (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1985), p. 20.

30. Cf., for example, Z, 1, 1028a14 and 7, 1032b3. 31. Gilson op. cit., p. 54. 32. Z, 4, 1029 bl3 and Second Analytics, II, 2, 92a7. 33. On this point see Jean Beaufret, 'L'engime de Z' (art. cit.). 34. Cf. 1028a31 ff. 35. Cf. Ross, Aristotle (op. cit.), p. 166. 36. Cf. SZ 46 ff. and 319. 37. Cf. §8 of G31. 38. Aubenque, op. cit., p. 437. The third chapter of this study returns to the

analysis of the three principles of movement. 39. Nil 431/EP 27. 40. Gilson, op. cit., p. 56. Cf. Owens, op. cit., p. 359, n. 58. For this 'Heideggerian'

critique of Gilson see Jean Beaufret, 'Note sur Platon et Aristote' in Dialogue avec Heidegger I (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973).

Notes 199

41. Werner Jaeger, Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923; translated by Richard Robinson as Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934; 2nd edition 1948).

42. I return briefly to the question of accidental being in the second chapter of this study but for a full discussion of this question, see Owens, op. cit, p. 307 ff. and the first chapter of Franz Brentano's Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder, 1862; translated as On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (Berkeley: California University Press, trans. R. George, 1975).

43. In medieval Scholasticism Tipos 8u equivocality will be interpreted under the title of analogia attibutionis, an analogy of attribution but as Owens (op. cit., p. 125) notes, this sense of the term analogy, as opposed to analogy as the equality of two relations, is not to be found in Aristotle.

44. Cf. K, 3,1061a35 where Aristotle speaks of a TL Kow6v 'to some sort of com­mon' but, to be sure, this is not the commonality of a genus.

45. Cf. G33 8-9/6. See infra 2.2 for an account of Kant's determination of possibility.

46. Ted Sadler remarks on the impossibility of the argument in 1931, and yet it is far from the case that otherwise 'Heidegger does not disagree with the pri­ority traditionally accorded to the categorial way of saying being' (op. cit., p. 51). Admittedly, the sense of priority in this sentence is vague but being as possibility and actuality and being as truth are prior, for Heidegger, in the sense of constituting the highest ways in which being is said.

2 Repeating Metaphysics: Heidegger's Account of Equipment

1. Cf., in particular, 'The Question concerning Technology' in G 7 /QCT. 2. Hubert Dreyfus, 'Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment' in Heidegger:

A Critical Reader, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 183-94 (originally published in The Thought of Martin Heidegger, Tulane Studies in Philosophy XXXII, ed. M. Zimmermann, 1984, pp. 23-25).

3. Michel Haar, Le Chant de Ia Terre, (Paris: L'Herne, 1988). I return to Haar's argument in concluding this chapter.

4. Michael E. Zimmermann, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Art, Politics, (Indiana University Press, 1990) p. 148. See, in particular, the tenth chapter of Zimmermann's study: 'Being and Time: Penultimate Stage of Productivist Metaphysics?'

5. In his The Later Heidegger (London: Routledge, 2000, p. 218, n. 9) George Pattison summarises the stakes of the argument thus: 'some argue that Being and Time itself endorse a technological-pragmatic view of the human sub­ject. See for example, Haar 1993. [ ... ] Zimmermann, however, emphasises that Heidegger was already privileging the world of the craftsman's shop over against factory production in Being and Time'. The term 'correction' is, in fact, one used by Jacques Taminiaux in his Lectures de l'ontolgie fondamentale, (Grenoble: Gerome Million, 1995) p. 170.

200 Notes

6. My argument develops Robert Bernasconi's judicious comments concerning the stakes of the analysis of equipment as a repetition of Greek ontology in his 'The Fate of the Distinction between Praxis and Poiesis' (Heidegger Studies, Vol. 2, 1986, pp. 111-39), comments that would seem to have been ignored in the debate that I have delimited. In referring to the above passage from G33, Bernasconi writes:

The remark still leaves unexplained the precise purpose of the discussion of equipment in Being and Time, but it leaves no doubt that the impor­tance of the discussion will be overlooked if we focus only on the supposed novelty of the descriptions to be found there, or its phenomenological credentials (p. 114).

The very intention of this chapter is to bring to light the unexplained 'pur­poses' of this discussion.

7. The term 'debt' is one that Zimmermann uses (in the heading of a section of Chapter 9 'Heidegger's debt to Kant and Aristotle' op. cit., p. 143). As I argue, it is precisely the approach that such a term presupposes which prevents an adequate response to Dreyfus' argument.

8. Such a formulation constitutes only a slight deviation from Franz Brentano's definition of intentionality as a sich rich ten nach. Cf. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (3 volumes) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968) I, pp. 124-5 translated as Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge, 1973, trans. A. Rancurello, D. Terrell and L. McAlister, p. 88.

9. As Macquarrie and Robinson note (Being and Time, Blackwell, 1995, p. 97), das Zeug can also mean 'stuff'. The artificial product is still meant here but quite indifferently as to serving a purpose.

10. Cf. the note of 1911 in Brentano's Psycho/ogie (op. cit.) Vol. II, p. 9. The term intentio was used as a translation of the Arabic ma'na and as Owens notes (op. cit., p. 133, n. 108), 'the early translators of Avicenna employed intentio in a number of senses but apparently with the common basis of indicating the dynamic function of intellectual activity in the Avicennian interpretation of Aristotle'. The term in its original philosophical usage is thus not specifically linked to the will in the sense of wanting to do something but for a full account of its history see the entry for intentio in the Historisches Wiirterbuch der Phi/osophie (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwab & Co., Vol. 4., 1976).

11. This is what Heidegger terms also the 'Schon-Anwesende' in 1925 [G20 270/198]. In his article 'Donner/Prendre' in Heidegger et la phenomenology (Paris: Unn, 1990), p. 293. ]ean-Fran~ois Courtine holds that the determination of nature as the immer schon Zuhandene, as a 'very singular' formulation, betrays another thinking, which 'according to the economy of the analyses of the period of Sein und Zeit', would hold nature to be vorhanden rather than zuhan­den. Although the author rightly stresses the positive sense of Vorhandenheit as naming the disposable, the available, it is necessary to recognise why the 'always and already Vorhanden' becomes 'zuhanden' in Being and Time.

12. It is misleading to translate Bedeutsamkeit as significance, since Heidegger dif­ferentiates the references that constitute this primordial level of meaning from the specific phenomenon of the sign. Cf. §17 of Being and Time.

13. This is clear from the lecture course of 1919-20 Zur Bestimmung der Phi/osophie, G56-7; Towards a Definition of Philosophy (London: Continuum, trans. Ted Sadler, 2000).

Notes 201

14. Dermot Moran, 'Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality' in Inquiry, Vol. 43, No. 1, March 2000, p. 62.

15. Cf. §§1-5 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, trans. P. Guyer and E. Matthews, 2000).

16. Cf., in particular, §29 of Being and Time. 17. Rene Descartes' Responses to the Third Meditations, (Paris: Vrin, ed. Adam &

Tannery, 1983, VII, p. 194). 18. Thus, as Gilson notes (op. cit., p. 16) there is a certain 'slippage' of the term in

the seventeenth century to the effect that existentia becomes simply an equivalent of esse. This slippage constitutes the possibility of Descartes' con­cern for the existence of God.

19. The following chapter of the current book returns to this question. 20. Cf. Courtine, 'Donner/Prendre', (op. cit., pp. 299-300). 21. Heidegger adjoined the following note to the reference to the Greek term

eThos in §13: 'Why? eThos-: f!.Op<j>~-uA'Jj! From TExU'YJ and thus as an 'artistic' (kiinstlerische) interpretation; if: f!.Op<j>~ then not as eThos, L8ea.' [SZ 441].

22. In the essay of 1922 Heidegger distinguishes the three terms thus: dunamis is the 'always-particular being able-to-have-available', energeia is 'the using of this availability' and entelechia is 'the utilising holding-in-truthful-safe-keeping-of­this-availability (das verwendende in Verwahrung Halten dieser Verfiigbarkeit)' [PIA 51/390]. Admittedly, Heidegger's interpretation of the distinction between entelechia and energeia is ambiguous here but as the fifth chapter of this book will show, this reading of dunamis, along with the analysis of Zuhandenheit as such, will be radically transformed by a reflection on the origin of the work of art.

23. I return to this sense of energeia in the following chapter but cf., for example, On the Soul, III, 2, 426a 17 ff.

24. On the Soul, III, 8, 431b21. Cf. SZ 14. 25. For an excellent rebuttal of the modern critiques of Aristotle as a naive real-

ist cf. Owens, op. cit., p. 128 ff. 26. Cf. G9 138/111. 27. On the Parts of Animals, 687a21. 28. Remi Brague, La Phenomenologie comme voie d'acces au monde grec, in

Phenomenologie et metaphysique, Presses Universitaires de France, 1984, eds J .L. Marion and G. Planty-Bonjour, p. 272. Robert Bernasconi (art. cit., pp. 112-13) writes equally well on this question: 'it is not the task of so-called fundamen­tal ontology to offer a rival thesis to that which has been maintained by the tradition' since 'ancient ontology while harbouring this meaning, neverthe­less fails to articulate it and this is what constitutes, according to Heidegger, its naivete.' Yet it is nevertheless true - a fact that the author seems to bring into question - 'that with his analysis of the world Heidegger attempted to transfer to Zuhandenheit the priority traditionally accorded to Vorhandenheit'.

29. Michel Haar Le Chant de Ia Terre, L'Herne, Paris, 1987, pp. 51-2. 30. Ibid., p. 162 and 48 for the two quotations. 31. 'Die Frage nach der Technik', in Vortriige und Aufsiitze, G7; 'The Question

Concerning Technology' in Basic Writings, trans. D.F. Krell, London: Routledge, 1995.

32. Taminiaux presents the argument in the chapter of his Lectures de /'ontologie fondamentale entitled La Reappropriation de l'Ethique a Nicomaque.

202 Notes

33. Ibid. p. 169 and 171 for the two quotations. 34. Jean Beaufret Entretiens avec Frederic de Towamicki, Presses Universitaires de

France, Paris, 1984, pp. 15-16. 35. Cf., in particular, 'The Age of the World Picture' in G5/QCT. 36. Cf. SZ 358: 'Reading off the measurements which result from an experiment

often requires a complicated "technical" set-up for the experimental design'. In his Le Principe d'Anarchie (Seuil, Paris, 1982) p. 25 Reiner Schiirmann has written that there is here a 'completely insufficient' thinking of technology. Insufficient as it may be, it is necessary to understand how fundamental ontol­ogy constitutes the possibility of the later reflections on modern technology.

3 Time and Motion

1. Cf The Postulates of Empirical Thought in Critique of Pure Reason [A 218-26; B 264-76] and the essay 'What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?', in Theoretical Philosophy after 1781 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, eds. H. Allison and P. Heath, 2002).

2. On this point see in addition G24 92/66. 3. Cf. The Parologisms of Pure Reason in Critique of Pure Reason A 341-405,

B 399-432. For Heidegger's discussion of the positive account of the being that we are inherent in Kant's determination of moral personality cf. G24 185/131 ff.

4. Although it is not properly thematised until book V Aristotle uses the term metabole three times in Physics I at 186a16, 191a7 and 191b33. I return to the sense of the term below.

5. Cf. 190b28. 6. Physics II, 1, 193b20. 7. In 1927 Heidegger writes: 'the common Greek expression eKaTnnKov means

stepping-outside-self. It is affiliated with the term "existence"' (G24 377 /267]. 8. Aubenque does not speak of The Introduction to Metaphysics by name but the

reference is clear. Cf. p. 433, n. 1 (op. cit.). 9. Ibid., p. 437.

10. Cf. Physics v, I, 225a1: Tliian f.LETC1~0A~ eanu ~K TWOS el:s Tl. Heidegger would appear to adopt the traditional reading of metabole as the most general con­cept of movement unreservedly. However, for a genetic reading that attempts to isolate the particularity of becoming, movement and change in their individ­ual contexts in the Physics, see Lambros Couloubaritsis La Physique d'Aristote (Brussels: Ousia, 1997, 2nd edition).

11. Cf. Physics V, 2, 226b10-16. 12. Cf. On the Soul, II, 5, 417b2-4 and L.A. Kosman, 'Substance, Being and

Energeia', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 1984, pp. 121-49. 13. Criticisms of the 'process-view' date from Aristotle's medieval commentators

but the contemporary debate stems largely from Aryeh Kosman's 'Aristotle's definition of Motion', in Aristotle: Critical Assessments, (Routledge, London, 1999, ed. L.P. Gerson; first published in Phronesis 14, 1969, pp. 40--62) which proposes a version of the 'actuality-view': given that the definition is supposed to yield the process rather than the result of movement, movement must be understood as an actual rather than a potential potentiality. The definition

Notes 203

implies in some sense a distinction between different modes of potentiality, between the potentiality of bricks to be formed as a house when they lie idly in the builder's yard and their potentiality when the house is in the process of being built For rebuttals of Kosman's criticisms of the 'process view' and of his statement of the 'actuality view' see D.W. Graham's 'Aristotle's definition of motion' in Aristotle: Critical Assessments (originally published in Ancient Philosophy 8, 1988, pp. 209-15) and J. Kostmann's 'Aristotle's definition of change' in History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4, 1987, pp. 3-16. For a recent international bibliography concerning the question of the definition see the fifth chapter of Couloubaritsis' La Physique d'Aristote (op. cit.).

14. Aubenque, op. cit., p. 454. 15. Aubenque, op. cit., pp. 442-3. 16. In his 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Mind' (in Contemporary Philosophy: A New

Survey, ed. Guttorm Folistad, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, p. 307) Thomas Sheehan expresses well Heidegger's reading of the very being of the being in movement for Aristotle:

But such relative absentiality is precisely what lets the entity be a moving entity. Therefore, to know a moving entity as what it truly is means to keep present to mind not only the present entity but also the presence of the absentiality that makes it a moving entity. The presence-of-its-absentiality is the moving entity's Being-structure. We may call it 'pres-ab-sentiality'.

The conclusion to the fifth chapter of the current book returns, however, to the specifically verbal sense of presencing and absencing in this passage from Heidegger's essay on phusis.

17. As Macquarrie and Robinson note on p. 41 of their translation of Being and Time the verb 'geschehen' ordinarily means to 'happen'. Yet, Heidegger stresses the etymological relation that it bears to 'Geschichte' or 'history' and uses it to denominate the historical existence of Dasein that is prior to history in the sense of the work of historians.

18. In Margins of Philosophy (Heme! Hempstead: Harvester Press, 1982 trans. Alan Bass), p. 61.

19. Admittedly, Aristotle does not refer to his predecessors within the part of the exoteric discourse that concerns the question of whether time belongs to beings or non-beings but it would seem difficult to hold that this aporetic is one that the Stagirite formulates simply from his own reflections.

20. This argument is the most intuitive but Aristotle does provide another: the now is a limit, time is divisible into finite periods and each such period must be limited by at least two different 'nows' that form its beginning and end [218a21-5]. The 'nows' must, therefore, be different.

21. It should be noted that time, as pertaining to the enquiries concerning phu­sis, is already an object of esoteric or, to use the expression proper to Aristotle, acroamatic concern. The Stagirite uses the expression uKpOufw.nxu in describing his writings and lectures destined first and foremost to the stu­dents at the Lyceum rather than to a general audience. On this point, see the first pages of]. Tricot's introduction to his translation of the Metaphysics (Paris: Vrin, 1966).

22. Cf. Heidegger, G24 358/253-4: 'Mental actions also come under the determi­nation of motion - motion taken broadly in the Aristotelian sense and not

204 Notes

necessarily as local motion. The actions are not intrinsically spatial but they pass over into one another, one changes into the other. In such a mental action we can stop and dwell on something. We may recall the passage in De Interpretatione: LOTlJO'L ~ 8t0.uow. [16b20), thinking stands still with some­thing. The mind too has the character of a moving thing'. I return to the question of the movement of the soul in the final section of this chapter.

23. Cf. 221b4-5. 24. Cf. G24 356--7/252-3. 25. Cf. 218a33 ff. Heidegger reads the question of the phusis of time in this way

in the lecture course of 1927. It has, however, been interpreted in a different sense. Joseph Moreau- in L'espace et le temps selon Aristote (Padua: Antenare, 1965)- holds the difference to be a difference between an ontological and a merely epistemological determination of time. This is a reading that Jacques Derrida repeats unreservedly in Ousia and Gramme, but for a telling critique of it see Chapter 4 of Jacques Marcel Dubois's Le temps et /'instant selon Aristote (Paris: De Brouwer, 1967).

26. Cf. 223a16-29. 27. Cf. 223a29-bl. 28. Cf. G24 343-4/243-4 and Ross, Aristotle's Physics, Oxford University Press,

1936, p. 65. 29. Cf. Ross Aristotle's Physics (op. cit.), p. 122. 30. Aubenque, op. cit, p. 437. 31. Cf. G24 347/245. 32. Cf. G24 372-3/264 33. Cf., in addition, G24 368/260. 34. Aubenque, op. cit, p. 466, n. 1. 35. 'Ousia and Gramme', op. cit., p. 262.

4 The Moment of Truth

1. Jacques Taminiaux, Lectures de /'ontologie {ondamentale, p. 162. 2. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason A58/B52 and SZ 215. 3. Cf. Critique of Pure Reason A293/B350 and SZ 215. 4. Edmund Husser!, Logische Untersuchungen (Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana,

Vols. XVIII-XX). The first Investigation is to be found in volume XIX/I. I refer, after the backslash in the following references, to G. Findlay's translation which has recently been reedited by Dermot Moran: Logical Investigations, Routledge, London, 2001.

5. LU 30/183. 6. For Husserl's analysis of the essence of indication see §2-4 of the First

Investigation. 7. LU 62/206. 8. Cf. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, trans. J. Cottingham, 1996), pp. 50-1. 9. LU 67/210.

10. LU 46/191. 11. See, in particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'On the Phenomenology of

Language' in Signs (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, trans. R.C. McCleary, 1964).

Notes 205

12. Jacques Derrida, La Voix et le Phenomime, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1967.

13. Concerning Husserl's determination of expression, in 1927 Heidegger writes:

[T]he sign-function of the written form with reference to the spoken form is altogether different from the sign-function of the spoken form with ref­erence to what is meant by it. A multiplicity of symbol-relations appears here which are very hard to grasp in their elementary structure and require extensive investigations [G24 263/185-6].

In claiming that there is some kind of absolute distinction between the spo­ken and written word Heidegger may seem to be more Husserlian than Husser!, an impression that would only be reinforced by the account of Rede in §33 of Being and Time. For a discussion of the problem of the account of Rede in Being and Time in relation to the later Heidegger's reflection on lan­guage see Ullrich Haase, 'From Name to Metaphor ... and Back', Research in Phenomenology 26, 1996, 230-60.

14. Thus, as Heidegger continues: 'we thus obtain a phenomenological interpre­tation of the old scholastic definition of truth'. For Heidegger's reading of Husserl's determination of truth in the Logical Investigations see the whole of §6 of G20. For an extended discussion of this reading see the second chapter of Daniel 0. Dahlstrom's Heidegger's Concept of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

15. This definition of logos as such at 16b28 follows from the definition of the particular species of language that is the noun at 16a27-9: 'No sound is by nature a noun: it becomes one, becoming a symbol. Inarticulate noises show (OlJAouaL) something - for instance, those made by brute beasts. But no noises of that kind are nouns.'

16. On this point see Aubenque, Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote, p. 109, and Tzvetan Todorov, Theories du Symbole, Seuil, Paris, 1977, pp. 14-15. Todorov reminds us that it is significant that the term 'sign' does not appear in the ini­tial definition in the first line of the passage. Concerning c:J"I]fHtvnK6s and OlJfLEcov, the same ambiguity occurs in English when we talk about the sig­nificance of something - as in the preceding sentence - even when it is not in any immediate sense a sign.

17. Cf. G21 133: 'Caufwiesend sehen lassen (Aussage) ist nur das Reden, darin das Entdecken oder Verdecken die eigentliche Redeabsicht tragt und bestimmt'.

18. On Heidegger's reading, the prefix apo simply means from the being itself. Cf. G21133.

19. Pierre Aubenque, op. cit., p. 112. 20. Cf. 1011b26: 'This will be apparent if we first define truth and falsity. To say

that what is, is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is, is, and what is not is not, is true.'

21. That it is quite legitimate and natural is the argument of Aubenque, op. cit., pp. 109-10.

22. Cf. 893b2 and 983b17. 23. Cf. 993b20. 24. Aristotle makes the same point concerning perception at 427b12 and

428a11. 25. Cf., in addition, 429b15.

206 Notes

26. Cf. A. Schwegler, Aristoteles, Metaphysik, 4 Vols. 1846-7. Re-edited Frankfurt 1960, Vol. 4, p. 186.

27. W. Jaeger, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Berlin: Weidmann, 1912) p. 52.

28. Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ed. and com. D.W. Ross, 1924) and The Works of Aristotle, Vol. VIII, Metaphysica (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928).

29. On this point, see Owens, op. cit., p. 412. 30. Ibid. p. 414. 31. Cf. G21160. 32. Cf. the whole of §3 of Brentano's text (op. cit.). 33. Cf. 1139a8 ff. 34. Cf. G19 45/29-30 in particular. 35. Cf. G19 §7 and §§19-23 for Heidegger's most extensive analysis ofphronesis

and the whole first part of the lecture course for the analysis of the different modes of aletheuein.

36. Cf. PIA 43/383. 37. Cf. 1104a9. For a comprehensive account of the etymological origins and

development of the term kairos in Greek thinking see §2 of Pierre Aubenque's La Prudence chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963).

38. It is on the basis of his earlier interpretations of the sense of kairos in St. Paul and primal Christianity that Heidegger returns to Aristotle in 1922 to locate in it a phenomenon of original temporality. On this point see Otto Poggeler, 'Destruction and Moment' (in Reading Heidegger From the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought, Albany: State University of New York Press, ed. T. Kisiel and J. van Buren, 1994, pp. 137-58); Chapters 8 and 10 of John van Buren's The Young Heidegger: Rumour of a Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Chapter 4 of Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis ofHeidegger's Being and Time (op. cit.).

39. The whole of the Contributions to Philosophy [G65] articulates such a discourse.

40. The term is that of Franco Volpi in his 'Being and Time: A translation of the Nicomachean Ethics?' in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in his Earliest Thought, (Albany: State University of New York Press, ed. T. Kisiel and J. van Buren, 1994, pp. 195-211, trans. John Protevi).

41. Again see §2 of Aubenque's La Prudence chez Aristote (op. cit.). 42. Taminiaux, Lectures de L'ontologie fondamentale, (Grenoble: Gerome Million,

1995) p. 166.

5 Art and the Earth

1. See §34 of Hegel's Aesthetics Vol.l, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, trans. T.M. Knox).Jacques Taminiaux offers an instructive and extensive com­parison of Heidegger's hermeneutic circle, with reference to §32 of Being and Time, and the circularity of Hegel's speculative approach to the work of art in his 'Heidegger et !'heritage de Hegel' (in Recoupements, Brussels: Ousia, 1982).

2. Julian Young Heidegger's Philosophy of Art, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 49.

Notes 207

3. Cf. N1 126/N1107 ff. 4. Maurice Blanchot L'espace litteraire, (Paris: Gallimard, 1955) p. 296. 5. As Emmanuel Martineau points out [UK2 56] the description of the temple as

specifically a temple of Zeus in the second version of 'The Origin' is omitted in the third, which means, to be sure, that Heidegger by no means pretends to describe an extant temple.

6. On this point see, in particular, the essay 'Time and Being': 'Coming-to­presence (Anwesen) concerns us (geht uns an); presence (Anwesenheit) means: to come-to-stay-with-us (uns entgegenweilen)' [ZSD 12]. It is to be noted, how­ever, that Heidegger here rethinks the very sense of Anwesenheit as a coming­to-presence, whereas in the 1930s, as I will show below, the question is one of locating an Anwesung or presencing that is prior to any Anwesenheit under­stood as presence.

7. Heraclitus's fragments are numbered according to their ordering by Diels and Kranz in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker 7th edition (Berlin, 1954).

8. Cf. the essay Aletheia in G 7 /EGT. For Heidegger's most extensive reading of Heraclitus see Heraclitus, GSS.

9. Cf., for example, Metaphysics r, 1, 1003a26-32. 10. Cf. Metaphysics A, Chapters S-8 in particular. 11. Cf. fragments SO and 54 respectively. 12. The Poetry of Michelangelo (bilingual edition), trans. and ed. ].M. Saslow, Yale

University Press, 1991, no. 151, p. 302. 13. F.W. von Herrmann (Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst, Frankfurt am Main:

Vittorio Klostermann, 1994, p. 359) provides the following reference for Durer's dictum: 'Die Lehre von menschlicher Proportion', in Schriftlicher Nachla~, 3 vols. ed. H. Rupprich, Berlin, 1969, p. 295.

14. Concerning the sense of the term 'creation', in his Die Entstehung des Geniebegriffs- Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Antike und des Friihkapitalismus (Hildesheim/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1972. Originally published by J.C.B. Mohr, Tiibingen, 1926) Edgar Zilsel has shown that the use of the verb 'create' to characterise artistic production, as opposed to divine creation, is still only very rarely used in the Renaissance and, consequently, that when the artist becomes a creator this not only implies a certain slippage of the sense of creation itself but, and more significantly, an elevation of the artist - in comparison- to the position of God.

15. Cf. p. 128 of 'Ne sutor ultra crepidam: Erasmus and Diirer at the hands of Panofsky and Heidegger' in Heidegger and The Art of Existing, New York: Humanities Press, 1993.

16. Erwin Panofsky Idea, trans. J. Peake, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968.

17. The Poetry of Michelangelo, op. cit., poem no. 84. 18. Zilsel, op. cit., p. 221. 19. Cf. ibid. p. 220. 20. Critique of the Power ofludgment, §43, p. 182. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., §46, p. 186. The remaining citations from Kant are to be found on this

or on the following page of the text. 23. ].M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art (London: Polity, 1992) p. 101. 24. Hegel, Aesthetics Vol. 1, p. 440.

208 Notes

25. In his article The Still Life as a Natural Object. A Note on Heidegger and Van Gogh (in The Reach of Mind: Essays in Memory of Kurt Goldstein, Springer, New York, ed. Marianne L. Simmel, 1968) Meyer Schapiro holds the shoes in the paint­ing of which Heidegger speaks to be not those of a peasant woman but those of Van Gogh himself. In his La Verite en Peinture (Flammarion, Paris, 1978) Jacques Derrida has rightly pointed to the naive and pre-critical nature of Schapiro's argument insofar as he holds the painting to be simply a represen­tation of some existent thing. Yet is Heidegger not guilty of the same naivety insofar as the ontic claim as to the painting showing a pair of peasant shoes is the condition of the 'ontological' argument that the painting makes their being as reliable manifest? This is undecidable as there exists nothing to dis­qualify the claim that the shoes painted make manifest a pair of shoes belonging to a peasant. Derrida has written of the 'ridiculous and lamenta­ble' (p. 334) nature of Heidegger's reading as a 'moment of pathetic collapse' (p. 299) yet these comments seem excessive.

26. Cf. 'The Thing' in G 7 /BW. 27. Robert Bernasconi ('The Greatness of the Work of Art', in Heidegger towards

the Tum (Albany: State University of New York Press, ed. ]. Risser, 1999) p. 101 notes that this return to the Greeks 'look as if it might threaten his [Heidegger's] attempt to separate' creation from production, yet without elab­orating this problem. Similarly, in his Heidegger. L'reuvre d'art comme peripetie de Ia pensee (in Phenomenologie et Esthetique, Encre Marine, Fougeres, La Versanne, 1998, p. 63) Holger Schmid notes briefly that the attempt to make the distinction in returning to the Greek sense of techne 'fails' and that 'a tension remains until the end, bound to the implicit problem of Platonic-Aristotelian poiesis'.

28. Cf. EM 113 ff. As Heidegger emphasises in the final version of 'The Origin', however, the shock of the new in the work of art 'is in no way violent (hat nichts Gewaltsames)' [UK3 54/40]. For an extended discussion of this change of register see Chapter 2 of Daniel Payot's La Statue de Heidegger, (Belfort: Circe, 1998).

29. On the manifold meanings of &puipEms in Aristotle cf. Owens, op. cit., pp. 382-5. On Durer and Michelangelo's inheritance of Neo-Platonism see Chapter VI of Panofsky's Idea (op. cit.).

30. Aristotle, Physics, Harvard University Press, 1996, trans. Wicksteed and Cornford, pp. 126-7.

31. Cf. Owens, op. cit. p. 162. 32. For the doctrine of the four causes cf. Physics II, 3; Metaphysics, A, 1-10; 2

(which reproduces Physics II, 3); H, 4, 1044a-b; Z, 17; 7, 4; Second Analytics, II, 11-12; On the Parts of Animals, I, 1.

33. H. Happ, Hyle. Studien zum aristote/ischen Materie-Begriff, p. 296. 34. Pierre Aubenque notes this; Aubenque, op. cit., p. 441, n. 1. 35. For this argument, cf. Gilson, op. cit. p. 64. 36. Beaufret 'Energeia et Actus', in Dialogue avec Heidegger I (op. cit.) p. 124.

Beaufret's essay constitutes an essential supplement to Heidegger's most exten­sive genealogy of the transformation of energeia as actuality in 'Metaphysics as the History of Being' and 'Science and Reflection' in G 7 /QCT. For a wider genealogy of the movement from Greek to Latin thought see the lecture course of the winter semester 1942-3 entitled Parmenides, G54.

Notes 209

37. This quotation is from Beaufret's Lefons de Philosophie, Seuil, Paris, 1998, p. 126.

38. Zimmermann, op. cit., p. 163. 39. Cf. WHD 53-4/22. 40. Heidegger cites [G9 269/206] the phrase '0 O.d ~u<nAeuwv', the 'king for the

time being', which, as Liddell and Scott note, is to be found in Herodotus. One can say that this use of O.d is indicative of its original meaning because it is only on the basis of its being present at least for a while that something can consequently be determined as eternal.

41. 'We cannot assign what is to be thought as coming-to-presence to one of the three dimensions of time, namely, as one might suppose, to the present. The unity of the temporal dimensions rather rests in the play by which each is implicated in the other (in dem Zuspiel jeder filr jeder). This play shows itself as what properly plays in what is proper to time, and thus, in a certain sense, as a fourth dimension - in fact, not only in a certain sense, but in truth. Original (eigentliche) time is four-dimensional' [ZSD 16].

42. Cf. Thomas Sheehan's 'On the Way to Ereignis: Heidegger's Interpretation of Phusis', in Continental Philosophy in America (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, eds H.]. Silvermann, J. Sallis, and T.M. Seebohm, 1983a). The author focuses principally on the text of 1939

since Heidegger's explications of dynamis, energeia and physis are generally (and I emphasise that word) constant from the early twenties up through the winter semester of 1951-2 and differ only in minor and generally con­textual ways from 'Von Wesen und Begriff der Physis'.

Despite the reluctance to generalise, the author fails to recognise what has occurred within Heidegger's thinking with a reflection on the work of art.

43. Sheehan, 'On the Way to Ereignis', p. 161. 44. Schmid, Holger 'Heidegger: L'ceuvre d'art comme peripetie de la pensee' in

Phenomenologie et Esthetique, Encre Marine, Fougeres, 1998, p. 70.

6 Art, World and the Problem of Aesthetics

1. Hegel, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 102 and NI 100/Nl 84. 2. Cf. Critique of the Power ofludgment (op. cit.), §51, p. 199. 3. For Heidegger's critique of the modern concept of culture as an expression of

the modern metaphysics of subjectivity cf., in particular, 'The Age of the World Picture' in GS/QCT.

4. Cf. G56/57, §14, p. 73 and Kisiel, op.cit., p. 506. 5. Cf. UK3 56/42. 6. For Kant's account of the symbol as a mode of Darstellung cf. §69 of the

Critique of the Power of Judgment and Jean Beaufret, 'Kant et le probleme de Darstellung' in Dialogue avec Heidegger II (Paris: Editions de Minuit,l973). On the distinction between allegory and symbol in post-Kantian thinking see Tzvetan Todorov's Theories du symbole (op. cit.), particularly chapter 6 entitled La crise romantique.

7. F.W.J Schelling, Siimtliche Werke, Vol. 5 (Munich: Biedersteen, ed. M. Schroter, 1946), p. 407.

210 Notes

8. Ibid., p. 409. 9. Ibid., pp. 400-1.

10. Ibid., p. 411. 11. Schelling, op. cit., p. 410. 12. On this point, cf. Todorov (op. cit.), p. 242 ff. 13. For Kant, the symbolic is principally a mode of the presentation of rational

ideas, ideas that can otherwise gain no sensible presentation. Cf. §59 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment.

14. Ibid., §49, p. 192. 15. In 1927, Heidegger had already decried the ambiguity inherent in the mod-

ern conceptions of the symbol within conceptions of language:

Today the symbol has become a favourite formula, but those who use it either dispense with any investigation as to what is generally meant by it or else have no suspicion of the difficulties that are concealed in this ver­bal slogan [G24 263/186].

16. Hegel, Aesthetics p. 103. 17. For a comparison of the account on the historical transformations of art that

is to be found in Heidegger's Nietzsche (cf NI 91/N1 77 ff.) to that of Hegel, see Jacques Taminiaux's 'Heidegger et !'heritage de Hegel' in Recoupements (op. cit.).

18. Cf., in particular, §8-10 of the G34, HOlderlin's Hymns: Germania and the Rhine and Michel Haar, op. cit., pp. 204-S.

19. Cf. R.M. Rilke, Werke (Leipzig, 1953), Vol. 2, pp. 39--41, trans. M.D. Herter Norton, Norton, New York, 1949, p. 46 ff.

20. I approach this question in a hypothetical manner since Merleau-Ponty will develop Husserl's thinking of expression in delimiting any dualistic approach to the phenomenon of language and thus any literal sense of the term expression itself. Cf., in particular, the chapter of The Phenomenology of Perception (op. cit.) entitled The Body as Expression and Speech.

21. Fran~oise Dastur, 'Heidegger's Freiburg Version of the Origin', in Heidegger towards the Turn (Albany: State University of New York Press, ed. ]. Risser, 1999a) p. 138.

22. Cf. SZ 133. 23. For example, UK3 35/26: 'The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to

surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into itself and keep it there.'

24. In this sense Heidegger will even go as far as to consider thought itself as ema­nating from the earth. Cf. the essay entitled Hebel: Friend of the House in G13 and Alain Vuillot's useful treatment of this question in his Heidegger et la Terre (L'Harmattan, Paris, 2000) p. 25.

25. On the etymology of the word Dichtung cf. G39 29:

It comes from the old high German tithOn, and is related to the Latin dictare, which is a frequentative form of dicere, to say. Dictare, to say some­thing, to say it out loud, to 'dictate' it, to expose something in language, to edit it, whether this is an essay, a report, a dissertation, a complaint or a plea, a song or whatever one wants. All this is called dichten, to expose

Notes 211

in language. Only since the 18th century, the use of the word dichten has been reserved for the composition of linguistic constructions that we call 'poetic (poetisch)', that we call 'poems (Dichtungen)'. In the beginning, Dichten does not have a privileged relation with the poetic.

26. Cf. UK3 62/46-7. 27. Haar, op. cit., p. 191. 28. Cf., in particular, the whole of §277 of G65. 29. Cf. NI 93/Nl 77 ff. for Heidegger's delimitation of modern aesthetics. 30. Cf., in particular, the introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment. 31. Cf., ibid., §8 and 21. 32. In his 'The Greatness of the Work of Art' (art. cit.) Robert Bernasconi has

attempted to locate a certain 'rhetoric of greatness' in Heidegger's work in drawing a parallel between the idea of 'great art' and Heidegger's infamous remark in the Introduction to Metaphysics concerning the 'inner truth and greatness' [EM 152] of the National Socialist movement. One can, however, refuse this second conception of greatness in accepting the first.

33. Cf. the first page of Hegel's Aesthetics. 34. Cf. NI 95/Nl 80 and Alain Boutot's Heidegger et Platon, (Paris: Presses

Universitaires de France, 1987) for an extended discussion of Heidegger's reading of Plato's determination of art.

35. On this point, and for the interpretation of mimesis that has been presented here, cf. R. Dupont-Loc and J. Lallot's introduction to their translation of the Poetics (Paris: Seuil, 1980).

36. Cf. 'L'Enigme de Z', Dialogue avec Heidegger IV, p. 30. 37. Cf. Nil 409/EP 30.

Bibliography

This bibliography refers only to the texts that I have cited or, less frequently, that have influenced this study. Heidegger's texts do not appear in it since they are fully referenced in the list of abbreviations at the beginning of the book.

1 Aristotle

1.1 Collected works Aristotelis opera (Berlin Academy edition, 5. vols., 1831-70). The first four volumes

were edited by E. Bekker whilst the fifth, which contains the Index Aristotelicus, is the work of H. Bonitz.

The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, ed. J. Barnes, 1984).

1.2 Other editions, translations and commentaries Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ed., com., D.W. Ross, 2.

vols., 1924). Aristotle's Metaphysics Z and H (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ed., com., trans. David Bostock, 1994).

Aristotle's Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ed., com., D.W. Ross, 1936). Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics (London: Loeb, trans. H. Cooke and

H. Tredennick, 1938). Generation of Animals (London: Loeb, trans. A. Peck, 1942). Metaphysica. The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 8, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, trans. D.W. Ross,

Oxford, 1928). Metaphysics (London: Loeb, trans. H. Tredennick, 2. vols., 1933 and 1935). La Metaphysique (Paris: Vrin, trans. J. Tricot, 2. vols., 1966). Nicomachean Ethics (London: Loeb, trans. H. Rackham, 1926). On Generation and Corruption and On Sophistical Refutations (London: Loeb, trans.

E.S. Forster, 1955). On the Parts of Animals (London: Loeb, trans. A. Peck and E. Forster, 1937). On the Soul (London: Loeb, trans. W.S. Hett, 1936). Physics (London: Loeb, trans. P. Wicksteed and F. Cornford, 2. vols., 1929 1934). Posterior Analytics & Topica (London: Loeb, trans. H. Tredennick and E.S. Foster,

1960). Poetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ed., com., D.W. Lucas, Oxford University Press, 1968).

Poetics (London: Loeb, trans. S. Halliwell, W. Fyfe and D. Innes, Loeb, 1927). La Poetique (Paris: Seuil, trans. R. Dupont-Roc andJ. Lallot, 1980). Rhetoric (London: Loeb, trans. J.H. Freese, 1926).

1.3 Studies Aubenque, P., La prudence chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,

1962).

212

Bibliography 213

--, Le prob/eme de l'etre chez Aristote, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966, 2nd edn).

Boehm, R., Das Grundlegende und das Wesentliche (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

Bostock, D., 'Aristotle's Account of Time', in Aristotle: Critical Assessments (London: Routledge, ed. L.P. Gerson, 1999- originally published in Phronesis, 25 (1980): 148-69).

Brentano, F., Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1862); On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (Berkeley: California University Press, trans. R. George, 1975).

Code, A., 'The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter', in Aristotle: Critical Assessments (Routledge: London, ed. L. P. Gerson, 1999 - originally published in Philosophical Studies, 29 (1976): 357-67).

Couloubaritsis, L., La physique d'Aristote, (Brussels: Ousia, 1997, 2nd edn). Dubois, J.M., Le temps et /'instant selon Aristote (Paris: De Brouwer, 1967). Gill, M.L., Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (New Jersey: Princeton

University Press, 1989). Gilson, E. L'etre et L'essence (Paris: Vrin, 2000). Graham, D. Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987a). -- 'The paradox of prime matter', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 25 (198 7b):

475-90. --'Aristotle's Definition of Motion', in Aristotle: Critical Assessments (London:

Routledge, ed. L.P. Gerson, 1999- originally published in Ancient Philosophy, 8 (1988): 209-15).

--'The etymology of evnft.ex(q!, American Journal of Philology, 110 (1989): 73-80.

Happ, H., Hyle. Studien zum aristotelischen Materie-Begriff(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1971).

Jaeger, W., Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Berlin: Weidmann, 1912).

--Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923; Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, trans. R. Robinson, 1934, 2nd edn, 1948).

Kosman, A., 'Substance, being and energeia', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2 (1984): 121-49.

--'Aristotle's Definition of Motion', in Aristotle: Critical Assessments (London: Routlege, 1999- first published in Phronesis, 14 (1969): 40-62).

Kostmann, J., 'Aristotle's definition of change', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4 (1987): 3-16.

Moreau, J., L'espace et le temps selon Aristote (Padua: Antenare, 1965). Owens, ]., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto: Pontifical

Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978, 3rd edn). Ross, D. Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1923). Schwegler, A., Aristoteles, Metaphysik (4. vols., 1846-7, re-edited Frankfurt:

Minerva, 1960). Waterlow, S., Nature, Change and Agency in Aristotle's Physics (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1992).

214 Bibliography

2 Heidegger: studies

Bartky, S., 'Heidegger's Philosophy of Art', British Journal of Aesthetics, 9 (1969): 353-71.

Beaufret, ]., Dialogue avec Heidegger (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973-1985, 4. vols.). -- Entretiens avec Frederic de Towamicki (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,

1984). -- Le(;ons de Philosophie (Paris: Seuil, 1998, 1 and 2). Bernasconi, R., The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being (New Jersey:

Humanities Press, 1985). --'The fate of the distinction between praxis and poiesis', Heidegger Studies,

1986, n. 2, pp. 111-39. --'Repetition and Tradition: Heidegger's Destructuring of the Distinction

Between Essence and Existence in Basic Problems of Phenomenology,' in Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, eds]. van Buren and T. Kisiel, 1994).

-- 'The Greatness of the Work of Art', in Heidegger towards the Tum (Albany: State University of New York Press, ed. ]. Risser, 1999).

Bernstein, J ., The Fate of Art (London: Polity, 1992). Blanchot, M., L'espace /itteraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1955). Boutot, A., Heidegger et Platon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987). Brague, R., 'La Phenomenologie comme voie d'acces au monde grec', in

Phenomenologie et metaphysique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, eds J.L. Marion and G. Planty-Bonjour, 1984).

Buren,]. van, The Young Heidegger: Rumour of a Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

Courtine, ].F., Note complementaire pour l'histoire du vocabulaire de l'etre', in Concepts et Categories dans Ia Pensee Antique (Paris: Vrin, ed. P. Aubenque, 1980).

-- Heidegger et Ia Phenomenologie (Paris: Vrin, 1990). Dahlstrom, D., Heidegger's Concept of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2001). Dastur, F., 'Heidegger's Freiburg Version of the Origin', in Heidegger towards the

Tum (Albany: State University of New York Press, ed. ]. Risser, 1999a). -- Heidegger and the Question of Time (New York: Humanity Books, trans.

F. Raffoul and D. Pettigrew, 1999b). Derrida, J., La Voix et /e Phenomene (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967). --La Write en Peinture (Paris: Flammarion, 1978). -- 'Ousia and Gramme', in Margins of Philosophy (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester

Press, trans. Alan Bass, 1982). --'La Main de Heidegger', in Heidegger et Ia question. De /'esprit et autres essais

(Paris: Flammarion, 1987) pp. 173-222. Dreyfus, H., 'Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment', in Heidegger: A

Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 173-85. Fried, G., 'What's in a Word?', in A Companion to Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, eds R. Polt and G. Fried, 2001) pp. 125-42.

Haar, M., Le Chant de Ia Terre (Paris: L'Herne, 1988). Haase, U., 'From name to metaphor ... and back', Research in Phenomenology, 26

(1996): 230-60.

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Hanley, K., Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

Herrmann, F.W. von, Heideggers Philosophie der Kunst (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994).

Hodge,]., Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995). -- 'Heideggerian temporalities: genesis and structure of a thinking of many

dimensional time', Research in Phenomenology, 29 (1999): 146-214. Kisiel, T., The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley: California University

Press, 1993). Kockelmans, ]., Heidegger on Art and Art Works (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer,

1985). Marx, W., Heidegger and the Tradition (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,

trans. T. Kisiel and M. Greene, 1971). McNeill, W., The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory

(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). Milet, J.P., L'Absolu Technique (Paris: Kime, 2000). Moran, D., 'Destruction of the Destruction: Heidegger's Versions of the History of

Philosophy', in Martin Heidegger: Politics, Art and Technology (New York: Holmes & Meier, eds. Hames, K. and C. Jamme, 1994) pp. 295-318.

-- 'Heidegger's critique of Husserl's and Brentano's accounts of intentionality' Inquiry, 43, 1 (2000a): 39-65.

--,Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000b). O'Murchadha, F., Zeit des Handelns und Moglichkeit der Verwandlung (Wurzburg:

Konigshausen & Neumann, 1999). Pattison, G., The Later Heidegger (London: Routledge, 2000). Payot, D., La Statue de Heidegger (Belfort: Circe, 1998). Poggeler, 0., 'Destruction and Moment', in Reading Heidegger From the Start

(Albany: State University of New York Press, eds. Kisiel, T. and U. van Buren, 1994) pp. 137-58.

Richardson, W.]., Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).

Ruin, H., Enigmatic Origins: Tracing the Theme of Historicity in Heidegger's Works (Stockholm: Almqwist & Wiskell, 1994).

Sadler, T. Heidegger and Aristotle (London: Athlone, 1996). Sallis,]., 'Interrupting Truth', in Heidegger toward the Tum: Essays on the Work of the

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Schurmann, R., Le Principe d'Anarchie (Paris: Seuil, 1982). Schmidt, H., 'Heidegger. L'ceuvre d'art comme peripetie de la pensee', in

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about Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought (Oaklahoma University Press, eds. R. Shahan and]. Mohanty, 1984) pp. 62-85.

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Index

actuality, (energeia/entelechia), 41, 42, 43-46,68-69,78,87-93,149, 167, 177, 193-194

aesthetics (meaning of), 140, 185-187 aletheia, 46, 125, 161-162, 164 Antiphon, 164 architecture, 170-171 Aristotle

Categories, 27-29, 37, 42 De Anima, 45, 80 Metaphysics, 20-46, 88-90, 121-126,

152, 157 Nicomachean Ethics, 65-67, 127-131,

132 On Interpretation, 118-121, 124 Physics, 4, 23, 30, 34-35, 82-95,99-110 Poetics, 189-191 The Generation of Animals, 159

Aubenque, P., 40, 85, 92, 105-106, 110-111, 121, 132

Beaufret, J., 74, 76, 161, 162, 191 beautiful, 171, 184-188 Bernasconi, R., 147 birth-certificate (of metaphysics), 5-9,

32, 62, 64, 136 Boehm, R., 27 Bostock, D., 30 Brague, R., 70-71 Brentano, F.

on Aristotle, 44, 126 on intentionality, 51, 54

categories (in Heidegger's sense), 58, 61, 79 see also Aristotle Categories

Courtine, J-F., 65

Dastur, F., 181 death, 98 Derrida,J., 98-99, 110, 115 Destruction (phenomenological), 3-8,

11,48, 76-77,112-121,132

dismantling return (abbauender Riickgang), 11, 13, 112, 132

Dreyfus, H., 47-48, 71 Durer, A., 146-147

ekstasis, 85, 131 existence (meaning of), 41, 62-63,

72-73,78,85 Existenz, 58, 78-80, 180

fundamental ontology (meaning of), 7-10, 70-75

Gilson, E., 30, 37, 41

Haar, M., 47, 70, 149, 185 Happ, H., 160 Hegel, G.W.F.

on artistic creation, 150 on the death of art, 177, 187

Heidegger, M. Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 7,

62, 67, 69, 79, 101, 107-108, 131-132, 179

Being and Time, 2-11, 13, 21, 39, 47-62,65-66,70-77,81,96-99, 106, 112-117, 122, 126, 130-132

Fundamental Concepts of Aristotle's Philosophy, 67, 68, 69

History of the Concept of Time, 56-57 Introduction to Metaphysics, 85,

144-145, 156-157 Aristotle's Metaphysics, 11-13, 44

Heraclitus, 4, 69, 144-145, 161 hermeneutics

as-structure, 114, 117, 126 hermeneutic circle and art-theory,

139 hermeneutic concepts in artistic

presentation, 178 hule, 30-37, 158-163

218

prate hule (primary matter), 30, 35 see also matter

Husser!, E. on intentionality, 54 on expression, 114

intentionality, S0-59, 116, 172 see also Husser!

Jaeger, W., 41

Kahn, C. H., 25 Kant, I.

on the origin of philosophical concepts, 5

on matter and form, 32 on possibility, 78 on the forms of intuition, 102 on truth, 112 on disinterestedness, 140 on genius, 149 on architecture, 171 on Darstellung or presentation, 17 4 on the beautiful, 186

logos, 29, 117-122, 166, 180, 190

Marc, F., 178 matter, 30-37, 56, 68, 87-88 metaphysics (meaning of), 4, 9-10,

14,22, 71 as onto-theology, 27

Michelangelo, 146--150 movement, 4, 40, 80-98, 102-103,

106-110, 127-128, 132, 159-160 of Heidegger's own work, 10-11,

51-58, 68, 72, 135, 142, 154, 194-195

ontology (meaning of), 20-22 see also fundamental ontology

Owens,]., 20, 24, 25, 41

painting, 177-178 Aristotle's conception of painting,

188-189 Panofsky, E., 147 Parmenides, 4, 83 phusis, 23, 76, 77, 81, 82, 86-88,

93-95, 144-145, 156, 157 Plato

and the origin of philosophy, 2-4

Index 219

and ousia, 23-24 and the idea/eidos, 29, 33, 34 and the fall of philosophy, 145, 149 on inspiration, 149-150 on the beautiful, 186 on art and truth, 188

poiesis, 12, 13, 14, 66, 73, 89, 127, 139, 155-161, 163, 184, 190, 194

poetry, 120, 141, 150, 174, 179-180, 188

possibility, 45-46, 68, 78-79, 86-93, 126, 147, 150, 157-161, 166, 193

reduction (in Heidegger's phenomenological sense), 7-8, 10, 47, 71-72

Rilke, R.M., 179 Ross, D., 38

Sadler, T., 13, 14, 15 science

philosophy as science, 22 modern natural sciences, 56, 74,

143 existential conception of science,

74-76 Sheehan, T., 166 subject (to hupokeimenon), 27-41,

84-85, 94, 104, 159 substance, 24, 26-29, 38-41, 43, 46,

58,80,97,164

Taminiaux, ]., 72-73, 132 techne, 31-33, 49, 78, 87, 127-128,

155-161 truth, 12, 34, 42, 43, 44, 45, 75,

111-134, 191, 194 see also aletheia

Vorhandenheit (sense of), 54, 56, 58, 60, 61-63, 64, 65, 68, 74-76, 141, 153, 155

Young,]., 140

Zilsel, E., 148 Zimmermann, M., 47-48, 163 Zuhandenheit (sense of), 54, 58-60, 64,

65,67-69,72,74, 78,95, 113, 126, 136, 153-155, 175