NOVEMBER 2010 2nd ISSUE - NmiotcNOVEMBER 2010 2nd ISSUE ... NMIOTC MIO Journal possesses a good portion of it. The NMIOTC MIO Journal, the first Journal in MIO subject area, will continue

journal

WWWWMMMMDDDD iiii nnnn MMMMIIIIOOOO EEEExxppeerriimmeennttaattiioonn

NOVEMBER 2010 NOVEMBER 2010 22nd ISSUE ISSUE

PPPPIIIIRRRRAAAACCCCYYYY iiiinnnn tttthhhheeee HHHHooooAAAA &&&& WWWWIIIIEEEEDDDDssss

UUUUAAAAVVVVssss iiiinnnn MMMMIIIIOOOO ---- ““““VVVVeeee llll llll eeeerrrroooo ffffoooonnnntttt iiii ssss””””

NNNNMMMM IIII OOOOTTTTCCCC ’’’’ ssss TTTT rrrr aaaa iiii nnnn iiii nnnn gggg OOOO pppp pppp oooo rrrr tttt uuuu nnnn iiii tttt iiii eeee ssss &&&& AAAA cccc tttt iiii vvvv iiii tttt iiii eeee ssss

RRRReeeeggggiiii oooonnnnaaaa llll CCCCaaaappppaaaacccc iiii ttttyyyy BBBBuuuuiiii llllddddiiiinnnngggg

NMIOTC MIO JOURNAL

DIRECTOR Commodore A. Makris H.N.Commandant NMIOTC

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORCapt. O. Celebi , TUR. N.Deputy Commander NMIOTC

JOURNAL MANAGERCdr. K. Sampanis H.N.

EDITORLt G. Mantzouris H.N.

ASSISTANT EDITORLt. St. Stanchev BGN

ADMINISTRATION ANDDISTRIBUTIONEnsign K. Papanastasis H.N.

EDITORIAL BOARDDr. Alex BordetskyDr. Arden DouganProfessor A. DrougosProfessor I. MazisProfessor I. KoukosProfessor A. TamisProfessor K. Ramesh Professor T. Bruneau

COLUMNISTSLtCdr K. Tsakonas H.N.LtCdr I. Hazir TUR NLt. D. Ciobanita RO N

CONTRIBUTORSMr. G. PaterasColonel C. MoutosCapt. J. K. StaplesMr. D. TrombinoMr. A. AnargyrouCdr J. Singleton USNRLtCdr S. Karamoutas H.N.LtCdr P. Sergis H.N.Lt S. Mazarakis H.N.Lt C. Ntinias H.N.LtJG I. Nellas H.N.LtJG K. Karanagnostis H.N.

CONTENTSP4. NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION

OPERATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE: COMMANDANT’S OVERVIEWBy Commodore A. Makris

P6 V.I.P. VISITS AND CONFERENCES IN NMIOTCP8. MIO 10-2 EXPERIMENT AT NMIOTC:

NETWORKING AND COLLABORATION ON SMALL CRAFT MARITIME-SOURCED NUCLEAR RADIOLOGICAL THREAT DETECTION AND INTERDICTIONBy Dr. A. Bordetsky and Lt G. Mantzouris H.N.

P17. “VELEROFONTIS” - UNMANNED HELICOPTERS FOR WMD IN MIOby Prof. I. Koukos and LtJG K. Karanagnostis H.N.

P19. MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS RADIATION DETECTION USING RADIO CONTROLLED HELICOPTER TRANSPORTING A SMALL SODIUM IODIDE-BASED SENSOR SYSTEMBy Mr D. G. Trombino and Dr. A. Dougan

P23. HOW DO FEEDBACK LOOPS INFLUENCE THE NETWORK’SPERFORMANCE ON A MIO WITH SMALL BOATS?By LtCdr S. Karamoutas H.N.

P26. PIRACY TALKSFROM MERCHANT MARINE’S PERSPECTIVEBy Mr. G. Pateras

P30.PIRACY PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORSBy Professor A. M. Tamis & Lt JG C. Ntinias H.N.

P32. SECURING A WORLD LIFELINEBy Colonel G. Moutos

P34. THE CONTROVERSIAL ARGUMENT: ARMING THE CREW OR ARMED SECURITY PROFESSIONALS - CAPTAINS PERSPECTIVEby Capt. J. Staples

P38. PICTURES FROM NMIOTC TRAININGSP40. IMPACTS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

ON OPERATIONS THROUGH THE EXAMPLE OF PIRACYby LtCdr P. Sergis H.N.

P44. PIRACY AS AN INTERNATIONALSECURITY BREACHby Lt. S. Mazarakis H.N.

P48. CAPACITY BUILDING AS AN ANSWERTO PIRACYby Dr. T. Bruneau & Lt JG I. Nellas HN

FFrroonntt PPaaggee PPhhoottoo::NATO Unit in Operation Ocean Shield

BBaacckk PPaaggee PPhhoottoo::NATO Unit in Operation Active Endeavour

P51. MODELLING HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN M I Oby Dr T. Dobbins, Dr S. Myers, Dr J. Stark & Lt G. Mantzouris H.N.

P57. ATP-71 WORKSHOP IN NMIOTCby LtCdr I. HAZIR, TUR N

P58. MARITIME OPERATIONAL TERMINOLOGY COURSE by Cdr J. Singleton, USNR

P60. NMIOTC 2D - MIO SIMULATOR COURSE A FACT IN NMIOTC TRAININGby Lt D. Ciobanita RO N

P61.WATERBORNED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES W I E D SSIMPACT ON MARITIME OPERATIONSby Prof. R. Kolar & Lt G. Mantzouris H.N.

P65. MIO INTELLIGENCE & SURVEILLANCE – VALUABLE BUT FOR WHOM? by LtCdr K.Tsakonas H.N.

P66. LRAD SOUND CANNON A SOLUTION TO COUNTER PIRACY PHENOMENON?

by Mr. A. AnargyrouP69. NMIOTC TRAINING CALENDAR - FIRST SEMESTER OF 2011

The NNMMIIOOTTCC MMIIOO JJoouurrnnaall is a professional publication of NATO Maritime In-terdiction Operational Training Center, aiming to serve as a forum for the presentation andstimulation of innovative thinking on NATO Maritime Interdiction related issues such as doc-trine, concepts, force structure, employment and readiness.

The views and opinions expressed or implied in the NNMMIIOOTTCC MMIIOO JJoouurrnnaall arethose of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanction of NATO.The NNMMIIOOTTCC MMIIOO JJoouurrnnaall is open to receive and publish articles at [email protected]. We reserve the right to make editorial changes.

All articles within this issue not bearing a copyright notice (©), may be reproduced inwhole or in part without further permission. Articles bearing a copyright notice (©) may be re-produced for any NATO purpose but without permission. If an article is being reproduced,the NNMMIIOOTTCC MMIIOO JJoouurrnnaall requests a courtesy line. To obtain permission for the repro-duction of material bearing a copyright notice (©) for other than NATO purposes, pleasecontact the author of the material rather than the NNMMIIOOTTCC MMIIOO JJoouurrnnaall..

CCOOMMMMAANNDDAANNTT’’SS OOVVEERRVVIIEEWW

CC bbyy CCoommmmooddoorree AAtthhaannaassiiooss MMaakkrriiss HH..NN..

NNMMIIOOTTCCNNMMIIOOTTCCNNAATTOO Maritime Interdiction Operational

Training Center (NMIOTC), a NATO Education andTraining Facility, which is located in Souda Bay, Marathi,is running successfully its second year of operation.Contributing to ACTs’ (Allied Command Transforma-tion) training and transformational efforts ,our Centeris committed, on a daily basis, to provide to NATO/PfP/MD/ICI and NATO approved third party coun-tries iaw procedures in place, the best possible trainingproduct in MIO, in order to better prepare personnel inthe field to conduct their operational missions with ab-solute success.

NMIOTC was accredited from ACT and ac-quired its full operational capability in 2 April 2008. Themission of NMIOTC is to conduct the combined train-ing necessary for NATO forces to better execute sur-face, sub-surface, aerial surveillance, and specialoperations activities in support of Maritime Interdic-tion Operations and the vision of it is to become theAlliance’s recognized expert in the field of MIO Train-ing.

The NMIOTC fulfills specifically thefollowing roles:

• Improve Allied Units’ MIO Expertise through spe-cific training programs

• Promote Skills, Interoperability & Co-operationamong Naval Units through sea training & simulation • Based on lessons learned from its MIO training ac-

tivities, the NMIOTC contribute support to ACT inMIO Tactical Doctrines, training directives and manuals,as well as research, modeling & simulation in support ofMIO for the Alliace.

NMIOTC possesses the status of an Interna-tional Military Organization and it is 100% funded fromthe Hellenic Government. All operational and mainte-nance costs are covered by host nation, however thetraining tasks and products required for NATO andPartner Forces are being assigned mainly by SACTwhich is the one to accredit also training deliverables.

NMIOTC PersonnelNMIOTC’s instructors are specialized in the

theoretical and practical MIO field. A number of highacademic background and well trained officers and civil-

ians (in master and Ph.D. level) have been assigned toNMIOTC in order to deliver the theoretical courses tothe students. All NMIOTC instructors have also beenparticipated in real MIO operations and due to this assetthey are transferring their operational knowledge toclassroom and to trainees accordingly.

On the other hand, a fairly big group of experi-anced Hellenic Navy Seals are conducting all the practi-cal MIO courses. These highly specialized instructorsare delivering all practical MIO courses under the no-tion of proficiency and excellency, taking into accountthat MIO is in the foreground of NATO operations (e.g.Operation Active Endeavor, Operation Ocean Shieldetc). Additionally, NMIOTC is manned with interna-tional specialized personnel in other MIO subjectal areassuch as WMD, Simulation and Exercise Planning andTransformation.

NMIOTC after two years of operation and byusing its state of the art training resources, has made sig-nificant progress and acquired its reputation amongNATO - IOs and other international institutions, as thespecialized NATO MIO Training Centre which pro-vides training that adds value to Education and Train-ing in the context of current and potential futureoperational needs.

NMIOTC 2010 Training ActivitiesIn the last two years NMIOTC has trained al-

most 1400 students coming from 41 different countries.The number of trainees has been increased this last yearby a percentage of 1200 %, giving NMIOTC the credi-bility that its training resources and its deliverables arewell welcomed from trainees. It is not an exaggeration tosay that every week NMIOTC trains a different groupof trainees, coming usually from completely differenttraining environment. To the aforementioned prettytough training schedule, one must not forget to add allthe other activities and events that are taking place inNMIOTC throughout the year, such as Conferences,Seminars, Workshops, Experimentation and Simulationopportunities and many more.

NMIOTC is dedicated to provide first classtraining in the area of Maritime Interdiction Operationsstruggling to enhance trainee’s knowledge and educationto an absolute level, in order to meet the criteria thatACT and NATO generally has set for its personnel.More over, with the provision of the afore mentionedtraining we shall continue to contribute to the endeavor

4 NMIOTC MIO JOURNAL

to built the partnerships , enhance the interoperability, promote understanding and trust , necessary elementsfor regional security.

NMIOTC VisionOur vision is to become the Alliance’s recog-

nized expert, in the field of Maritime Interdiction Op-erations training. Based on the progress that has beenachieved and current dynamics, the future for NMIOTCseems bright. Cooperation with NATO and non NATOEducational and Operational Facilities as well as Cen-tres of Excellences globally, is a critical factor in order toenhance our expertise and broaden our views to whattrainees are expecting.

Updating our training with new courses and re-sources, the need of which comes directly from the op-eration areas, is a common goal for all NMIOTCpersonnel. This can be done either with close coopera-tion with Operational Commands or by contact withStanding NATO Maritime Groups-Forces.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in our visionand priorities pie, NMIOTC MIO Journal possesses agood portion of it. The NMIOTC MIO Journal, thefirst Journal in MIO subject area, will continue to be ed-ited on a semi-annual basis, bringing academia and op-erational factors all together to be met in a scientificpublication. It is our inevitable goal to attract the inter-est of all personnel in order to contribute their ideas,conceptual models and innovative minds to express theiropinions and make them well known through a period-ical that now starts to outshine globally and more im-portantly among NATO communities.

Taking into account that NMIOTC is situatedin a strategic geographic position,in the crossroads of a major maritime “high way”, the hole crew and I are de-voted to provide just in time operational training at thetactical unit as well as individual level, to standards that

have been set from ACT and are internationally recog-nized and accepted. We find ourshelves in a period thata wind of change in NATO is blowing and we have toadapt continously and thus, all available capabilities andresources of NMIOTC must be fully exploited. All ofus here in NMIOTC have continuously in our mindswhat Ploutarchos, the Greek Ancient Philosopher, said:“Training is a treasure which is being doubled when youshare it with another one”.

CCoommmmooddoorree AAtthhaannaassiiooss MMaakkrriiss HHNN,graduatedfrom the Hellenic Naval Academy with the rank of Ensign in1981. During his career he has been appointed on board surfaceships and submarines. He has commanded HS PONTOS(S119)and HS NAVARINON( F-461). Commodore A. Makrismain appointments include Aide De Camp to the Chief Of De-fense, Commander Submarines South- COMSUBSOUTHNaples Italy, as Operations Officer, COS Hellenic SubmarineCommand, Plans & Policy Director in HNGS andDeputyMILREP in NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE(NAMILCOM). Since April 2010 Commodore A.MakrisHN is the NMIOTC Commadant.

Besides his naval education, Commodore A. Makris isUndergraduate of Piraeus University in Operational and Ad-ministrative department. Additionaly, he has attended a numberof educational programmes, including Naval War College, Na-tional Defense College, NATO Defense College, NATO SchoolOberammergau, HARVARD Executive Programme in BlackSea Security.

Commodore A. Makris awards include the Knight GoldCross Of The Order Of Honor, the Gold Cross of the Phoenix,the Medal of Military Merit B’ Class, the Navy Force Merito-rious Command Medal, Staff Officer Service CommendationMedal, the NATO Medal for service with NATO on Operationsin Relation to KOSOVO and the NATO Medal on Operationsin relation to the Former Yugoslavia.

NMIOTC MIO JOURNAL 5

NMIOTC Annual Conference, 28 June - 01 July 2010

VV.. II ..PP VVIISSIITTSS IINN NNMMIIOOTTCC

Visit of the Chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff,

21 May 2010

Visit of the Chief of the Hellenic Navy

28 July 2010

Visit of Commandant US Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

17 September 2010

Visit of DCOM HQ MC NAPLES07 July 2010

Visit of COMSIXTHFLEET26 August 2010

Visit of British Defence Attache

09 Sept. 2010

Visit of COM SNMG225 June 2010


CCOONNFFEERREENNCCEESS -- WWOORRKKSSHHOOPPSS AANNDD CCOOUURRSSEESS

NMIOTC Annual Conference 28 June - 01 july 2010

Training of SNMG1 Personnel26 July 2010

MACA conference15 - 17 June 2010

WMD in MIO course21 - 25 June 2010

ATP - 71 Workshop07 - 09 September 2010

Maritime Operational Terminology Course20 September - 08 October 2010


MMIIOO EEXXPPEERRIIMMEENNTT AATT NNMMIIOOTTCC NNEETTWWOORRKKIINNGG AANNDD CCOOLLLLAABBOORRAATTIIOONN OONN SSMMAALLLL CCRRAAFFTT

MMAARRIITTIIMMEE--SSOOUURRCCEEDD NNUUCCLLEEAARR RRAADDIIOOLLOOGGIICCAALLTTHHRREEAATT DDEETTEECCTTIIOONN AANNDD IINNTTEERRDDIICCTTIIOONN ©©


bbyy DDrr.. AAlleexx BBoorrddeettsskkyy,, Principal Investigator for MIO Experimentation, NPS, USA

&& LLtt GGeeoorrggiiooss MMaannttzzoouurriiss, Ph.D. Candidate,Experimentation Lead, NMIOTC, Greece

1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The MIO 10-2 experiment, is a part of

unique field experimentation campaign, initiated by theNaval Postgraduate School (NPS) jointly with LawrenceLivermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and conducted semi-annually since 2005 (Bordetsky andNetzer, 2010). The project recently became a critical partof the Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism , spearheaded by DHS Domestic NuclearDetection Office (DNDO) and Defense Threat Re-duction Agency. It is a collaborative effort supportedby USSOCOM, USCG, first responders in SF Bay

Area, Port Authority NY-NJ, LMCO Center for Inno-vation (East Coast), AATC in Ft. Eustis (East Coast),ARDEC, and overseas partners from Swedish NavalWarfare Center, Swedish Defense Research Agency(FOI) and Viking 11 program, University of Bun-deswehr , Bundeswehr Center for Transformation/Ger-man NSW unit, and NATO Maritime InterdictionTraining Center in Souda Bay, Greece (NMIOTC).

The overseas part of MIO 10-2 experiment con-ducted jointly with NMIOTC in June of 2010 repre-sented next step in the collective field studies ofintegrating networks, advanced sensors, unmanned ve-hicles, and collaborative technology for supporting in-tegrated detection and interagency collaboration tocounter small craft sourced nuclear radiological threat. Itis the next step in feasibility and constraints analysis ex-perimentation for identifying:

− Ad hoc mobile networking architecture, which

integrates front line officers using hand-held, portable,and unmanned system based detectors with geograph-ically distributed experts and data fusion centers

− Information management architecture forsharing alerts on threats brought by small maritime craftor between land/ports of entry borders and translationof active and passive detection alerts into the shared sit-uational awareness events

− The surveillance techniques enabling taggingthe small craft carrying the illicit material, location andtracking of its global movement

− Operational constraints and search models forstand-off and drive detection at high-speed, in combi-nation with remotely network-controlled unmannedsurface, aerial, and ground systems

In the previous MIO 2007-2009 experimentsour main focus was the network-enabled operationalscenario, in which early detection/warning at differentplaces overseas and subsequent tracking to the Port ofDeparture (POD), culminated in multiple small craft de-tection and interdiction at different Port of Entry (POE)sites within the CONUS. Based on it the goal for theMIO 10-2 experiment was to extend the operationalhorizon for small craft-sourced globally distributedthreat countering, by the set of new models:

1.1. Integrated detection and interdiction ofsmall craft-sourced nuclear radiological threats tosome U.S. installations overseas. It included:

• Network-enabled swimmer detection of small craft-sourced threat at two overseas POE (Germany (GE),Greece (GR));

• Collaboration between U.S. experts and overseas POEoperators on:

- network-controlled choke point setup- drive-by primary and secondary screening- stand-off detection at high-speed pursuit (Eck

ernförde, GE)

• Modeling the application of Unmanned Surface Vehi-cles (USVs) to support small craft screening and pursuit(U.S. experts-POE operators) by remotely controlledmaneuvering of the POE manned patrol boats (Eck-ernförde, GE);

• Ground tracking of illicit material transfer to U.S. mil-itary site, collaboration between U.S. unit in foreign

country, foreign operations center (FOI-Sweden; Uni-versity of Bundeswehr (UoB)), and U.S. remote experts,on losing, finding, and tagging the ground target, re-solving the threat through source detection and adjudi-cation (GE); • Open water tracking of a source transfer to an overseasPOE that is in proximity to a collocated NATO and U.S.installation site (Mediterranean, Souda Bay-GR);

• Collaboration between the patrol crews from differentcountries on the target small craft tracking, choke pointscreening, pursuit, and interdiction, combined with thesituational awareness transfer and Unmanned Aerial Ve-hicle (UAV) integration (GR, Souda Bay).

The overseas part of MIO 10-2 experimentbegan with the overseas trials in Germany focused onstudying major constraints associated with network-en-abled detection and interdiction of a maritime-sourcednuclear/radiological threat to the U.S. and NATO in-stallations in a foreign country. In terms of the DNDOGlobal Detection Architecture, the set of the trial stepsin Germany explored several of the architecture’s keyelements (MIO 10-2 AAR, 2010):

• How networking with swimmers, sensor opera-tors, patrol boat crews, and U.S. operators in the area,combined with an instantaneous reachback to the re-mote experts, could help to identify illicit material deliv-ery to the foreign POE via the small craft,

• Enable tagging and tracking of its transfer onthe ground in the direction of U.S. military base,

• Facilitate illicit material/device finding and in-terdiction on the approaches to target area.

Correspondingly, the set of trial steps at NMIOTC inSouda Bay (Fig. 2) extended the experiment with:

• Blue water tracking of illicit material deliverynear a NATO / U.S. facility in the Mediterranean

• Collaboration among NATO MIO crews exe-cuting network-enabled choke point and target pursuit

• Integration of unmanned aerial vehicles to sup-port choke point screening & target vessel pursuit

• Detecting illicit material and interdicting targetsmall craft with coordination and shared situationalawareness between the multinational crews assistingeach other.


2. SMALL CRAFT DETECTION/INTERDICTION WITH NATO CREWS

AT NMIOTC

Based on the reporting materials, provided by the ex-periment participants: Steven Mullins (NPS), DavidTrombino (LLNL), Maj Michael Kutsor (NPS), EugeneBourakov (NPS), Michael Clement (NPS), Bryan Hud-gens (NPS), and Robert Forsgren (FOI, Sweden), theresults of findings during the NMIOTC phase could beillustrated as follows.

2.1 Network-Enabled Swimmer model: Detecting the small craft with illicit material

In accordance with Steps 1-3 of the experimentplan (MIO 10-2 Experiment Plan, 2010), the joint teamsucceeded in integrating swimmers into the ad hoc mo-bile ship-to-ship/ship-to-shore mesh network, and cor-

respondingly providing the swimmer video feeds on thesuspicions object (potential source) to the remote. TheNMIOTC patrol vessel served as the Mobile Opera-tions Base (MOB) to find the small craft and identifythreats to NATO base and nearby U.S. facility. TheU.S./Hellenic swimmers, equipped with experimental


FFiigguurree 22.. The elements of Layered Global Detection Architecture (DNDO) addressed with NMIOTC team inGreece (depicted by Steven Mullins)

FFiigguurree 33.. Hellenic swimmers are putting USswimmer on the network.

NATO teams aidedby UAV, USV, eval &

track small craft w/sus-pect materials at

NATO base (GR)

Network & reachback-enabled boatcrews conduct check-point, primary second-ary standoff detectionof small craft (GR)

Swimmers evaluate/tag smallcraft w/suspect materials IVO

NATO base (GR)

InstantaneousReachbeck to Expert

Response Needs

Shared manned/unmanned sensor

alerts

Shared SA emongUS, Intel partners,

responders infield, reachback sup-

port - (global)

Tag/Track smallcraft w/suspect

material after trans-fer from ferry (GR)

MIO SA, ISAS, IAC,DNDO, NATO MSS

Peer-to-Peer, Infocollaboration, via

web portal

Shared SA betweencheckpoints/

boarding parties

LegendSE = SwedenGE = GermanyGR = Greece


FFiigguurree 44.. The swimmer video feed on the suspicious device captured during the Romanian crewpatrol shared and review with remote expert in US

FFiigguurree 55.. The SA View on swimmer and NATO patrol crews dislocation (Ro-Romanian crew, Bu-Bulgarian crew)

networking and video capability, were called to find andevaluate the lost target boat. Fig. 3 illustrates the finalsteps in putting the US swimmer on the network priorto searching the pier area. Swimmers provided video andverbal evaluation on the object. Info was transferredthough the experiment collaborative environment to U.S.detection experts at the reachback location. Swimmerfed an underwater video stream, and his position wasmapped to the SA view. The Czech officer at NMIOTC(simulated regional WMD reachback center) observedthe video feed on suspicious object. Figure 4 illustratessuccessful sharing of swimmer video feed (unclear viewin the low left frame in the picture) with the remote ex-pert at NPS ( role played by Bryan Hudgens in Mon-terey, CA-upper right frame in the picture) during theRomanian patrol (upper left frame in shared view). Thedislocation of assets during the swimmer video feedsharing with expert is presented in the situational aware-ness view in Figure 5.

The joint experimentation team at NMIOTChas successfully simulated (step 4-8 of the experimentplan) the Regional Czech detection center calling toGlobal U.S. Expert Center (NPS-LLNL at NOC) assis-tance for evaluating the object (Figure 5). Upon com-pleting evaluation, the Regional and U.S. experts decidedthat suspicious object resembled shielded illicit materialand directed to maintain surveillance over the boat. Thechoke point (portal) drive-by screening was needed, so

a swimmer covertly tagged the boat and activated net-working with the tag, received voice portal confirmationthat small craft was persistently monitored, and returnedto MOB.

2. 2 Small Craft Stand-off Detection On-the-Moveby Self-Forming Mesh Networking Between the

Patrol Boats . In accordance with steps 11-16 of the experi-

ment plan, the reachback experts recommended portaldetection. Patrol boats from Romanian, Bulgarian, andTurkish sectors joined the operation. The U.S. sensorunit on site requested assistance from a Romanian boatteam. Via the experiment collaborative environment,the Hellenic MOB crew and the Regional experts con-figured a choke point (portal) on-the-move. The MOBand patrol boats maintained separation at 100 ft, samedirection (Fig. 6). The sensor alerted, but the Regionalexperts and the U.S. experts were jointly unable to makeidentification. Maintaining dialog with Regional experts,the Romanian patrol boat and MOB reduced the sepa-ration to 50’ and then to 20’ (Fig. 7), including changesin portal boat direction. The experts were still unable toidentify the material. During these steps, the NPS –NMIOTC experiment control team in Souda Bay, theNPS NOC and FOI-SE all evaluated any discrepancies,gaps, delays, and uncertainties, associated with RegionalExpert team’s (Czech officer) ability to help the boat


FFiigguurree 66.. Situational awareness view of recommended choke point initial setup (100 ft separation portal), conducted jointly by NMIOTC Hellenic, Bulgarian, and Romanian crews.


FFiigguurree 77.. Reducing separation to 50 ft, as recommended by experts

FFiigguurree 88.. NMIOTC Romanian and Hellenic boats comprise mesh networking relays to assist Bulgarian sensorboat continuing non-LOS stand-of f detection behind the island.


crews remotely to configure and conduct the portal(choke point) detection. The crews provided video andvoice recording of the process. The reachback centerat NPS also applied the C2 Maturity Model to the analy-sis of collaboration between participants.

Based on detection results, lacking sufficientnumber of counts, the expert team recommended con-tinuing following the target via stand-off detection(steps 17-19 of the experiment plan). The MOB neededhelp however, due to range limitations, so it requestedassistance from Bulgarian crew to extend the network-

enabled reach to the (red) target boat. Hellenic and Ro-manian networked patrol boats comprised the peer-to-peer mesh between Bulgarian sensor vessel and TOC tomaintain ubiquitous connectivity with experts. As Bul-garian patrol boat approached the target at about 100 ft,the MOB sensor operator issued a detection alert, butthe Regional expert was still unable to identify the ma-terial. The expert team recommended continuing sur-veillance. Figure 8 illustrates that at this point the patrolboat with sensor is completely non-LOS behind thesmall island. Hellenic and Romanian boats provide the

FFiigguurree 99.. Putting detector and networking payload on board Unmanned Helicopter

(left Lt.JG K.Karanagnostis H.N. right and LtCol D. Kotsifas HAF)

FFiigguurree 1100.. An Unmanned Helicopter approaching rapidly the target for detection

FFiigguurree 1111.. Unmanned Helicopter detection: Total hits from before takeoff until after landing. Includes viewing target source (Am-241).


relays on-the-move (at the same time learning how tocoordinate the maneuver), but are running out of peer-to-peer range.

2.3 Augmenting Stand-Off detection by Unmanned Mini Helicopter

As NATO crews collaborating on stand-off detectionat high-speed started to run out of peer-to-peer net-working range, an unmanned helicopter was called to as-sist in tracking on the target boat in order to facilitatevideo surveillance by transferring data via its wirelessnetwork to ground station at NMIOTC TOC (steps 20-21 of the experiment plan). Prior to UAV launch theNPS-LLNL-HNA (HNA stands for Hellenic NavalAcademy) experts had identified that allocating sensor orradiological source on board UAV is doable. Figure 9 il-lustrates Hellenic Naval and Air Force officers focusedon deciding of allocating sensor and networking loadbased on the LLNL and NPS experts guidance. If so,concurrently with the video feed the UAV will also dotrial aerial detection. The U.S. unit and Hellenic opera-tors on board MOB continue UAV-based video surveil-lance on target boat and its location tracking in SA views.The UAV video feed reveals suspicious maneuvering to-ward the U.S. installation.

FFiigguurree 1122.. Hellenic and US Navy Officers together with NPS - LLNL - HNA researchers

upon successful completion of aerial detection

FFiigguurree 1133.. Capturing and reconstructing the MIO 10-2 experiment events in Souda Bay at the remotedata analysis site at FOI Sweden

In result of successful aerial detection twenty-eight pos-itive identification events were noted; 23 clearly had theabove spectrum, indicating Am-241.

By adjudicating the threat (steps 22-25 of theexperiment plan), based on completed combined sur-face and aerial stand-off detection, the Global Reach-back expert analyzed and determined that it was ashielded signal. The Regional expert requested second-ary screening, so the MOB crew requested assistancefrom the Turkish sector boat and formed an on-the-move choke point with Turkish patrol vessel. Second-ary choke point screening started, and steps 14-15 wererepeated, but the result was still “not identifiable”. Atthat point, the Regional and Global experts recom-mended target boat interdiction and search. The MOBHellenic operators conducted the search. The boardingofficer used the swimmer camera to provide a video feedto the Regional expert. The collaboration resulted in theshielded device being found, and the vessel was inter-dicted. Figure 13 illustrates observation of NMIOTCbased activities at the MIO remote data capture andanalysis side in Sweden. This is another proof-of-concept element of global collaboration on analyzingand countering the small craft sourced threat.

ConclusionThe MIO 10-2 experiment with NMIOTC team inSouda Bay on June 12-14, 2010 has demonstrated thatcollaboration among NATO MIO crews executing net-work-enabled choke point and target pursuit as well co-operative integration of unmanned aerial vehicles tosupport choke point screening & target vessel pursuitcould be achieved within 2-3 days of joint learning. Itdemonstrated that ...

However, the discrepancy between perceivingthe state of stand-off detection process by remote ex-perts via network and situational awareness tools, andthe physical state of the assets on-the-move is signifi-

cant. Resolving this problem would require subsequentexperimental studies of integrated (multichannel ) de-tection, more scaled usage of unmanned systems, rapidexpert feedback, and new techniques for networkingwith sensors.

REFERENCESBordetsky, A. & Netzer, D. (2010). “Testbed for Tacti-cal Networking and Collaboration”, International Com-mand and Control Journal, Volume 3, Number 4.

TNT MIO 10-2 Experiment Plan (2010). Networkingand Interagency Collaboration on Small Craft Maritime-Sourced Nuclear Radiological Threat Detection and In-terdiction, Center for Network Innovation andExperimentation (CENETIX), Naval PostgraduateSchool

DDrr.. AAlleexx BBoorrddeettsskkyy is an Associate Professor ofInformation Systems at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey.He is also an Associate Chair for Research at the Department ofInformation Sciences. Professor Bordetsky is Director of the NPSCenter for Network Innovation and Experimentation(CENETIX) . He is Principal Investigator for one of the majorresearch projects at NPS, Tactical Network Topology (TNT)Testbed and Experimentation, conducted jointly and sponsored byUSSOCOM. Dr. Bordetsky is a recipient of prestigious RobertW. Hamming Interdisciplinary Research Award for his pioneer-ing studies of collaborative technologies and adaptive network-cen-tric environments. His work has been recently featured in theAFCEA SIGNAL Magazine, Via Sat, and the USSO-COM Tip of the Spear Journal. Professor Bordetsky publishesin major IT journals including Information Systems Research,Telecommunication Systems Modeling and Analysis, Commandand Control Systems, and International Journal of Mobile Wire-less Communications.

LLtt GG.. MMaannttzzoouurriiss HH..NN.. graduated the HellenicNaval Academy in 1998 and has served in various GreekFrigates as Communications, Intelligence, Operations and ChiefElectronics Officer. He has attended the British Comms and In-structional Courses and is a Naval Postgraduate School graduatewith two Masters in Systems Engineering and in AstronauticalEngineering with distinctions. He is a Ph.D. Canditate in thePolytechnic University of Thrace in the Electronics EngineeringDepartment studying design of microsatellites. He is now servingin NMIOTC as MIO instructor and as a staff officer in NavalDoctrine and Experimentation section under the TransformationDirectorate.


detecting illicit material and interdicting

small craft withcoordination and sharedsituational awareness

between the multinationalcrews assisting each other

is feasible.

bbyy PPrrooffffeessoorr II.. KKoouukkooss aannddLLttJJGG KK.. KKaarraannaaggnnoossttiiss HH..NN..

1.General

Early in the past decade of 2000, Hellenic

Naval Academy’s Telecommunication Lab headed byProfessor I. Koukos investigated the possibilities ofUAV use in tactical naval operations. Encouraged by theformer Chief of Fleet Adm. M. Horianopoulos, andwith funding from the Hellenic National Defense Gen-eral Staff constructed, in 2006, with the contribution ofChief Petty Officer John Koutsoulas, Hellenic Navy, alow cost Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) –Mini Helicop-ter, capable of being remotely controlled from theground, equipped with an also remotely controlled videocamera. Presently, the UAV pilot is the officer Lt.J.G. K.Karanagnostis H.N. who has suggested and performeda number of modifications-upgrades offering more ca-pabilities and enhanced safety for the UAV itself and thepayload it carries in light of the continued effort to im-prove it’s overall performance.

2. The experiment’s objectiveTo test the capability of the Lawrence Liver-

more National Laboratory (LLNL) gamma-ray (γ-ray)spectroscopy sensor when mounted on the UAV to de-tect the Simulated Low Energy Radioactive Materialplaced on board a small vessel and measure the detectiondistances.Gamma-ray (γ-ray) spectroscopy is the quantitative studyof the energy spectra of gamma-ray sources. A gamma spectroscopy sensor system, consists of a detector, elec-tronics to collect and process the signals produced bythe detector and a computer with processing softwareto generate, display, and store the spectrum.

3. Phases of the experimentDay one and two were devoted for preparing the

UAV and the Sensor, mounting the LLNL sensor on theUAV and extensive test flying to secure the smooth op-eration and security of the experiment. Special tuningand additional tests were conducted due to the extremehot weather conditions (more than 42 degrees Celsius).

On day three the experiment was conducted asplanned, in the docking area of the former Hellenic

Navy training ship “HS Aris” , in Souda bay.Multi runs were executed at various distances

and altitudes (10-1m) from many directions and at vari-ous speeds.

““ VV EE LL EE RR OO FF OO NN TT II SS ”” UUNNMMAANNNNEEDD HHEELLIICCOOPPTTEERRSS FFOORR WWMMDD IINN MMIIOO

FFiigg 11.. UAV mini helo with the LLNL Sensor onboardduring test flights in NMIOTC’s premises


CHARACTERISTICS SPECIFICATIONFuel Unleaded GAS

Fuel Capacity ½ lt. (extendable if needed)

Fuel Consumption ½ lt. for every 20�1 min Main rotor diameter 1,85 m

Fuselage Lenght 1.623 m

Fuselage Width 0.38 m

Fuselage Hight 0.74 m

Net Weight 4.5 kg

Main Rotor diameter 1.8 m

Useful load ~4 Kgr

Speed 80-100 Km/h

Radius ~ 3 n.m.

UAV’s Radio Control-ElectronicsFlight Receiver Spectrum AR 7000

Video Tx-Rx 1,3 GHz Audio-Video800mWatt

Camera CCD 3.6mm lens

GPS module 10hz Operating frequency

4. Gamma-Ray Sensor Recordings Next we present two graphs with recordings

made by the sensor flown on board the helicopter. In both graphs, the Y axis marks the number of eventsi.e. number of photons which hit the detector and the Xaxis marks quantities proportional to the energy of theevents, translated via calibration to keV.

The energy per photon can be calculated fromthe Planck–Einstein equation

E = h * fwhere E is the energy, expressed in the unit of

electronvolt (eV), h =4.13566733(10)×10−15 eV•sec isPlanck's constant, and f is the frequency in Hz.

Graph of Fig 5, presents a single sample spec-trum, recorded by the LLNL sensor detecting γ-ray pho-tons exceeding the background noise while thehelicopter is hanging above the “suspicious” boat, whichis carrying a jar with radio-active material.

Graph of Fig. 5 presents the cumulative record-ing for the entire flight of the Helicopter pursuing the“suspicious” boat, where clearly is shown that the LLNLsensor successfully detects γ-ray photons above thebackground noise.

4. Tactical Implications of the UAV in Maritimeinterdiction Operations

The Vellerofontis UAV is a promising low costproject, that can demonstrate operational usage for awide variety of navy needs. It can take off and land to aship deck with relative ease, and can be tasked with thesurveillance of a designated area either over water orland without the need of an airfield nearby. Via a wire-less link, it can download, in real time, streaming video to a console on board the mother ship for tactical use.The type of the video can be selected and adjusted ac-cording to the operational needs. Various types of cam-eras can be placed on board i.e. daylight optical low costcamera, HD camera, camera with high zoom capabili-ties are some choices, that can easily extend to night vi-sion / IR cameras or mini Synthetic Aperture Radar(SAR) payloads, for naval surveillance under the coverof darkness or fog. A typical scenario would be a shippatrolling as unit of a fleet tasked to prevent piracy orprevent trafficking of illegal immigrants or furthermoreprevent the transport of WMD materials overseas. Incase it detects a suspect target the unit does not have tocome close to it. The advantages are many. The suspectboat will not be aware of the ship’s presence, so it willnot take early evasive action. In case of aggressive moodof the crew of the interdicted vessel there is no fear ofdamages inflicted by enemy fire as their weaponry con-sists mostly of hand held equipment (with the deadliestbeing RPG’s). The friendly unit stays clear 6 miles ormore away and the UAV takes off. It approaches the sus-pect ship to a few hundred meters (so that it’s own en-


Fig 2. A high speed Low Altitude pass over the boat

Fig 3. High Speed Low Altitude pass as captured fromthe onboard sensors

Fig 4 High Speed chase of the vessel from the rear

gine noise will not give it away) and the far end user de-termines exactly the type of the vessel, it’s cargo, crewetc. If it is estimated beforehand that trafficking ofWMD materials is a possibility, then a low-weight sensor,like the one used in the above experiment, is placed on-board the UAV before takeoff and several passes areconducted at several altitudes and speeds. In case a de-cision to board the suspect vessel is taken, thorough ex-amination of the topology of it can be made so that theboarding team will know exactly where and what to ex-pect. Monitoring of the team’s actions during boardingand operating on board presents the advantage of eas-ier control and decision making.

5. ConclusionsThe analysis of the data showed that the UAV

during a 15 minute flight achieved 28 detections and 23confirmations of the simulated low energy radioactivematerial. This success is due to capabilities inherent toa UAV such as:

(1). High speed transits, chases, passes.(2). Low speed or hovering near the radio-activity area

to give the sensor time to detect and analyze the data.(3). High maneuverability and accuracy in approaching

suspect targets. By applying UAV’s capabilities to Operational

Training that NMIOTC is providing toNATO/PfP/MD/ICI countries and through close co-operation with NMIOTC’s specialized personnel in

MIO operations the above mentioned asset can in-evitably be a major profit for simulated real time MIOtraining, something that NMIOTC is pursuing on a dailybasis with proficiency and excellency.

DDrr.. IIooaannnniiss KKoouukkooss is a Professor at the HellenicNaval Academy in the Electronics Engineering Department. Hehas extensive knowledge in Electronics applications and hasworked for over 15 years in Southern California’s Aerospace In-dustry, including 8 years at the prestigious JPL laboratory inPasadena California for NASA’s Deep Space Network. From2006 he is doing research in avionics and architecture of UAV’sfor various Naval and Maritime Applications. Vellerofontis isthe project that he ran under the auspices of the Hellenic GeneralStaff.

LLttJJGG KK.. KKaarraannaaggnnoossttiiss HH..NN.. graduated from theHellenic Naval Academy in 2006. He has served on varioussurface ships as Staff Officer and Executive Officer. He is cur-rently attending the General School of Education of the HellenicNavy in order to pursue his specialization diploma as a gunboatofficer. The last four years he is working professionally with minihelo models where he has been certified as a mini helo pilot and hasearned awards among the Greek Modelers Community. For thelast year, he is working closely with Professor I. Koukos, flyingand assessing the capabilities of the experimental mini helicopter“Vellerofontis”.


Fig 5. Helo summed spectrum - total from before takeoff until after landing. Includes viewing target source (Am-241).

MMAARRIITTIIMMEE IINNTTEERRDDIICCTTIIOONN OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNSSRRAADDIIAATTIIOONN DDEETTEECCTTIIOONN UUSSIINNGG RRAADDIIOO

CCOONNTTRROOLLLLEEDD HHEELLIICCOOPPTTEERR TTRRAANNSSPPOORRTTIINNGG AASSMMAALLLL SSOODDIIUUMM IIOODDIIDDEE--BBAASSEEDD SSEENNSSOORR SSYYSSTTEEMM ©

bbyy MMrr DD.. GG.. TTrroommbbiinnoo aanndd DDrr.. AA.. DD.. DDoouuggaann,,UUSS LLaawwrreennccee LLiivveerrmmoooorree NNaattiioonnaall LLaabb

DisclaimerThis document was prepared as an account of work

sponsored by an agency of the United States government. Neitherthe United States government nor Lawrence Livermore NationalSecurity, LLC, nor any of their employees makes any warranty,expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibil-ity for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any informa-tion, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that itsuse would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein toany specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name,trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily consti-tute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by theUnited States government or Lawrence Livermore National Se-curity, LLC. The views and opinions of authors expressed hereindo not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States gov-ernment or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, andshall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

MIO Radiation Detection using Radio ControlledHelicopter Transporting a Small Sodium Iodide-

Based Sensor System

During the joint Naval Postgraduate School

(NPS) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(LLNL) maritime interdiction operation experiment,MIO 10-2 (June, 2010) a radiation search using a small

remotely operated unmanned aerial vehicle, a radio con-trolled (RC) helicopter was planned. The small RC hel-icopter had payload limit of three (3) kilograms, sofitting a radiation detector, power supply, multi-channelanalyzer, computer, and GPS into a waterproof con-tainer was a challenge. The scintillation detector selectedwas a 4 x 4 cm NaI(Tl) linked by USB cable to an OrtecDigiBASE. The detector was connected to an ArtigopicoITX computer powered with a Li-ion battery. Alsoattached to the computer by USB cable was a GarminGPS antenna. This stand-alone system was placed in aclear plastic dry bag (Figure 1) to protect it since theflight was to be over water.

After a test flight behind the NMIOTC buildingto confirm the system was indeed within the payloadweight limit, the detector system was started up andsealed in the dry bag for flight. Prototype software de-veloped at LLNL was used to capture GPS time and lo-cation stamped radiation count rate and spectra.Though not used for this demonstration experiment, thesystem is also capable of data telemetry via USB wireless(WiFi 802.11) communication.

Photographs and video were taken of the flightand chase of the target vessel (Figure 2).

Video was also captured with an onboard cam-era from the RC helicopter. Video images were viewedin real time via the helicopter operator’s laptop computer


FFiigguurree 11. Detector package prepared for flight.

and were available as a head up display on specially de-veloped goggles (Figure 3). With other telemetry infor-mation displayed on the head up display, there is apotential for incorporating a radiation count rate bar toenhance the video search capabilities.

The helicopter and the radiation detection sys-

tem performed well during the demonstration experi-ment. At the conclusion of the flight in which multiplepasses, chases, and attempts at overhead stationary hov-ering, the RC helicopter landed and the sensor packagewas removed for data download. As can be seen fromthe GPS track (Figure 4), the computer did not collect


FFiigguurree 22..Helicopter heads for target boat with high and low speed patterns

FFiigguurree 33..Head up display goggles and their view. Googles were provided by the Hellenic Naval Academy’s UAV MIOteam. Boats were provided by NMIOTC and Naval Support Activity Souda Bay (US NSA)

complete data from the entire flight. The system did capture a total of 28 ‘events’,

triggered by a count rate above a predetermined statis-tic. Of the events, spectra from 23 could clearly be usedto identify the target source, 241Am (Figure 5).

The system did have a difficult time due to theexternal temperature during the experiment. After thehelicopter landed and the dry bag assembly was re-moved, the system was too hot to touch and would notcommunicate via ethernet cable to the external com-

puter (the unit that had been used for preflight startup).Data files saved during the flight were only able to beretrieved after the system had cooled down later thatevening.

The experiment was a success in demonstratingthat a small radiation sensor could be deployed on asmall UAV. The total cost of the sensor package andthe helicopter was less than $30k (20k €). There are sev-eral key areas for improvement and further developmentof this potentially valuable tool as an asset to maritimeinterdiction operations. The most important functionto add would be real time communications and teleme-try from the radiation sensor to the operator and to thecommand center. Environmental protection for thesensor computer and battery would also be necessaryfor continued experimentation. Incorporating radiationdata into the head up display would enhance the opera-tor’s awareness and would improve the ability to searchan area where the operator cannot see the helicopter.

Acknowledgements:Hardware components and assembly:

Guy Urbina, LLNLSoftware development:

Dr. David Campbell, LLNLHellenic Naval Academy - Helicopter & Pilot: Dr. Ioannis Koukos and LtJG K. Karanagnostis H.N.

DDrr.. DDoouuggaann aanndd MMrr DD.. TTrroommbbiinnoo are membersof the Lawrence Livermore Natioanal Laboratory in California,USA.

FFiigguurree 55.. Individual helicopter event spectrum. The large peak to the left, near 60 keV is from the target source, Am-241


FFiigguurree 44.Target acquired! Yellow shows the detector onboard the helicopter GPStrack. Red shows the detector radiation level detected.


HHOOWW DDOO FFEEEEDDBBAACCKK LLOOOOPPSS IINNFFLLUUEENNCCEE TTHHEENNEETTWWOORRKK’’SS PPEERRFFOORRMMAANNCCEE

OONN AA MMIIOO WWIITTHH SSMMAALLLL BBOOAATTSS ??

bbyy LLttCCddrr SS.. KKaarraammoouuttaass H.N., NPS’s Master student in Information Sciences Depart-

ment under the auspices of Dr. Bordetsky

This work is a brief summary of a research paper that wasproduced within the framework of the “Design of Experiments

for Research” class by Dr. Alex Bordetsky (NPS)

IInnttrroodduuccttiioonn

The war against asymmetric threats does not

have any borders, constraints or battlefields requiring thesynergy of multiple law enforcement and homeland se-curity agencies in addition to military forces from a coali-tion of countries.

The current dynamic environment and the un-certainty of the future requires the continuation andmoreover the enhancement of the efforts that all the in-ternational organizations and the individual nations dofor deeper cooperation and mutual understanding, es-tablishing trust, and interoperability, building the part-nership that the war against terrorism dictates.

Significant roles with a noticeable number ofsuccesses, in that global effort, have the Maritime Inter-diction Operations (MIO) as part of the strategic planthat the Network Centric Maritime Warfare has intro-duced.

It is axiomatic that, individual decision makersthroughout an organization who have improved accessand/or better information are more likely to make bet-ter decisions. The value of better information is clearlysituation and scenario dependent that require synchro-nization of plans and actions and the development ofsynergy. (D.S. Albert, R.E Hayes,2006)

Hence, the key objective of a network used forMaritime Interdiction Operations, would be the ability toprovide to the participating forces, the necessary meansto exchange reliably, timely, securely, and effectively allthe required information. Moreover the ad hoc natureof these networks, their mobility and the difference inmeans, technology and physical or technical environ-

ment makes the structure and their performance evenmore demanding.

Thus, we will attempt to present the influencethat the feedback loops have on the network perform-ance under the prism of the combined problems thatboth the commander (at the tactical level) and the net-work manager (at the technological level), confront, dur-ing operations within the MIO environment. Theobjective will be to evaluate the use of networks, ad-vanced sensors, and collaborative technology for con-ducting rapid MIOs. Specifically, the ability of aboarding party to rapidly set up ship-to-ship communi-cations which permit them to search for radiation andexplosive sources while maintaining contact with themother ship, command and control organizations, andto collaborate with remotely located experts. Analysis ofdata captured from teams performing their tasks in acollaborative environment could provide valuable insightinto what constitutes effective collaborative perform-ance. This understanding could then be used to developnew technology (or improve the existed) to support thiscognitive activity; develop tools to reduce cognitiveworkload, and techniques or processes to improve in-formation exchange among collaborating members.

EnvironmentFor the purpose of this paper we will select the

geographic area of the Aegean Sea, as the environmentthat the MIO tactical network is deployed, due to its im-portant characteristics. The sensitive nature of this areacontains the Southeasters’ edge of the EU and the crosspoint between the continents of Europe, Asia andAfrica where the first is a stabilization factor and thelater are significant areas of tension. Thus, the selectedenvironment fulfills the criteria of a check point for thecontrol of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass De-struction (WMD), smuggling, human and drug traffick-ing, illegal distribution of nuclear products and/orweapons, etc. Within that framework, the exploitationof an adaptive collaborative tactical network topologyfacilitates information and knowledge sharing that im-proves the decision making process of the MIO Com-mander. The real time connectivity between the nodesof the network eliminates the distance between subjectexpert groups and boarding teams that most of thetimes conduct and operate at geographically dispersedareas.


Our model’s environment is consisted of twoclusters of nodes where each node is a naval unit andeach cluster is a group of 3-4 units that operate in a spe-cific geographic area creating two independent LANs(Local Area Networks). Thus, each LAN has each ownLAN manager responsible for the connectivity and qual-ity of service (QoS) that is provided among the partici-pants meaning ship to ship or ship to shore or ship toboarding teams’ communications etc. Both of the

LANs are connected andexchange data with the

land-based H.Q. located atNMIOTC’s TMOC(Tactical Maritime

Operational Center)in Crete, Greece.

The local authorities, the RadHaz experts etc constitute

a LAN under the control of the LAN manager of theNMIOTC who also acts as Wide Area Network (WAN)manager monitoring and controlling the subordinateclusters of the naval units that operate under the

NMIOTC’s command. Then this land-based cluster willbe directly connected via SATCOM links with anotherone cluster that contains all the required participants atthe Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) within the frame-work of the already conducted Tactical Network Topol-ogy/MIO (TNT/MIO) series of experimentation (1) .The following figure provides the topology of the dis-covery experiment as it has been explicitly presented.

The situational awareness goals of the experi-ment is the exploitation of any feedback mechanism ca-pable of increasing the broad interagency collaborationand data sharing using the existed capabilities of thenaval and land-based units that participate in our net-work. In addition the involvement of the SATCOMtechnology will give us the flexibility of extending ourlocal capabilities providing a universal profile by con-necting the NMIOTC and the adjacent organizationsand authorities with Subject Matter Experts (SME) andother related agencies located across the ocean. Thesefeedback loops can be achieved with the establishmentof two-way data sharing techniques like the CENETIXSSA Observer Notebook or the Office Groovy toolwhich can both build a common Maritime RecognizedPicture (MRP) collecting and exchanging data that canbe analyzed and produce information capable of creat-ing knowledge that will ameliorate the shared situationalawareness.

Figure 1: Proposed Networkingconnectivities for a MIO Experimentation Scheme


Additionally, the real time exchange of data and infor-mation can be achieved by the implementation of videostreaming technology using any Video Teleconferencefacility that connects instantly and more interactively theparticipants of our network. Another one equally usefultool that was successfully implemented at theCENETIXS labs is the SA viewer where alarms andmessages can be exchanged presented on the actual lo-cation that are produced through the collaboration withthe Google Earth applications.

With all that in mind, we can maintain not onlythe shared situational awareness but also we can moni-tor and control the behavior of our network at each oneof its stages, locally, regionally, globally.

Furthermore, network monitoring tools (SimpleNetwork Management Protocol- SNMP type) in con-junction with the abovementioned collaborative systemscan provide network fault/performance/configurationdata at the packet level, which is hard to interpret by op-erational commanders. Hence the collaboration betweenTactical and Network Operations Centers is required.

Conclusions-Proposals for future research

There is growth, development and evolution ofthe network technology that provides the gears for suc-cessful execution of the Maritime Interdiction Opera-tion supporting the global Maritime security and fightagainst terrorism. The integration of the complex sys-tems that act as networks and the dynamic of the net-works that behave as systems, are the driving forces ofthe systems theory who determine the nature of theMaritime Interdiction Operations as part of the overallstrategic planning of the Network Centric Warfare.

Already, non-military technology and applica-tions seem to point towards future networks with: a) adhoc pockets of connectivity, b) consumer-owned net-works, and c) sensor-net technologies. For the purposesof our experiment a potential future use of UAVs over-flying the target detecting for RAD-HAZ indications orsuspicious movements on-board the ship could be ac-complished by appropriately modified and equipped hel-licopter model (like the VELLEROFONTIS projectintroduced by the Hellenic Naval Academy) or evenmicro Air Vehicles. Both video stream data and detect-ing messages could be sent wirelessly and in real timeback to the mother-ship without the safety issues of theboarding teams that strangle the MIO missions.

All of these applications will place increasedscalability demands on self-organizing ad hoc networksthat determine the future of MIO and open the floorfor challenging research areas and demanding achieve-ments.

LLttCCddrr SS.. KKaarraammoouuttaass HH..NN.. graduated the Hel-lenic Naval Academy in 1992 and has served onboard variousplatforms of the Hellenic Fleet as ASW, Ops. Officer and CO(La Combattante IIIb-class). He has attended the Principle War-fare Officers’ Courses (HMS Dryad-UK) and was honored to bethe Aid de Camp to the CINCHELFLEET and laterCHOD Adm. P. Chinofotis HN. LtCdr S. Karamoutas is cur-rently undergoing his Masters degree in Information Systems Tech-nology at the Naval Postgraduate School (USA).

FFiigguurree 22.. NMIOTC’s aerial photo.NMIOTC is located in Souda Bay, Marathi area in

Crete, Greece.

FFiigguurree 33. Ex Hellenic Naval Cadet training ship “HSAris” is now NMIOTC’s mock up ship, where practicaltraining for Boarding Teams is conducted throughout the

year, almost on a daily basis.

bbyy MMrr.. GG.. PPaatteerraass(presented at the NMIOTC Annual conference,

30 June - 01 July 2010)

Piracy is not something new, it has been

around for centuries, probably from when the first craftset sail with something of value on board, there wassomeone who wanted to take her cargo illegally. At somepoint in history Kings, Queens and Rulers took advan-tage of the substantial profits in Piracy and legalized theact, provided, of course, that they received the lionsshare.

In the past 3 years piracy has re-entered thenews, because the Somali pirates have changed the pi-rates “Modus Operandi” and don’t steal the cargo buthold the ship to ransom.

It is interesting to note that in the first half of2008, more pirate attacks occurred in the South ChinaSea and West Africa than in the Gulf of Aden. But theeffects of the Somali Pirates are more dramatic, moreexpensive, and more risky to life and hence more newsworthy.

The situation became so serious that the UN Se-curity Council produced a series of resolutions:Resolution 1816 Para 8

“Requests that cooperating States take appro-priate steps to ensure that the activities they undertakepursuant to the authorization in paragraph 7 do not havethe practical effect of denying or impairing the right ofinnocent passage to the ships of any third State.”

“Free and innocent passage” the fundamentaldoctrine of world shipping.Resolution 1846 Paragraph 11 states:

“Affirms that the authorizations provided in thisresolution apply only with respect to the situation in So-malia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or re-sponsibilities of Member States under international law,including any rights or obligations under the Conven-tion, with respect to any other situation, and underscoresin particular that this resolution shall not be consideredas establishing customary international law; and affirmsfurther that such authorizations have been provided onlyfollowing the receipt of the 20 November letter con-veying the consent of the TFG.” (Transitional FederalGovernment)

And most importantly resolution 1846 on the2nd of December 2008 paragraph 10 (b)

“Use, within the territorial waters of Somalia, ina manner consistent with such action permitted on thehigh seas with respect to piracy under relevant interna-tional law, all necessary means to repress acts of piracyand armed robbery at sea;”

On the other hand shipowners have been criti-cized for paying ransoms to Somali pirates, but we mustall remember two very important truths.

1. The Shipowners are buying back their crewswhereas the Somali pirate is selling a ship.

2. A Somali pirate is not ideologically motivated,he has no political agenda, he is a common thief.We say this because some ill informed critics have sug-gested that piracy is an asymmetric threat. This descrip-tion is appropriate only to terrorists.

At a recent un-classified meeting of the NATOArmaments Group workshop on Counter Piracy, Equip-ment and Technology, apart from the military briefingon NATO and EU operations, industry had a chance topresent non-lethal weapons and the military had thechance to promote protective boarding and vessel pro-tection detachments.

There have been several naval operations in theGulf of Aden both from NATO & the EU. Statisticsvary but the average shows that they are very effective.From 1 successful seizing in 3 attacks to 1 successfulseizing in 7 attacks, that is a substantial improvement.We know that several crews that have passed throughthe Gulf of Aden in the past 12 months are truly thank-ful of the Naval presence. Actually, a Master of a mer-chant ship while passing the Gulf of Aden was veryencouraged by the evident Naval presence throughouthis time in the transit corridor and quite relieved that theweather was worsening. However this is for the Gulf ofAden and not for the Somali Basin.

The Convoy/patrolling pattern has been greatlyimproved or redesigned to cater for the 16,000 merchantships passing through the Gulf of Aden annually. Navalresources are scarce and very expensive, NATO has 5vessels in the area, this actually corresponds to an aver-age of 2.2 vessels on any given day, the other 2.8 are re-fueling, victualling or being maintained.Nevertheless, according to the latest information, SO-MALI pirate attacks have reached an alarming 50% suc-cess rate in hijacking vessels since the end of themonsoon season.

The figures speak for themselves, up until theend of May 2010, 58 vessels had been fired upon, 28


PPIIRRAACCYY TTAALLKKSSMMEERRCCHHAANNTT MMAARRIINNEE’’SS PPEERRSSPPEECCTTIIVVEE


ships captured and 1 attempted boarding, equal to a suc-cess rate of 48%.

By contrast in 2009, 127 vessels had been firedupon, 52 ships captured and 4 attempted boarding, equalto a success rate of 41%.

The sharp increase in the pirates success rate canbe attributed to their move to attacking ships beyond600 miles from the Somali coast and up to 1,000 milesout.

Unlike the Gulf of Aden, where coalition navalforces have a strong presence, there are few naval vesselsin the seas 600 miles and beyond the coast of Somalia.The area is vast, and the distances that need to be cov-ered are huge, the analogy that we have been recentlygiven is: that it is similar to patrolling the whole ofFrance with 4 police cars that don’t go more than 20miles an hour.In addition pirates are attacking across such a huge areathat any warships in the region could well be too faraway to reach a merchant vessel under attack.

Mr Choong, of the International MaritimeBureau (IMB), said pirates were particularly targetingvessels trading into ports in Kenya, Tanzania and theSeychelles, as these ships have little choice but to turn intowards the coast to reach their destinations.

The IMB already warns ships transiting the areato stay 600 miles from east coast of Somalia, and nowalso advises masters to remain vigilant against pirateseven when sailing further out from the coast.

NATO sees its position from a legal perspectiveas we were advised “Yes we have the right to pursue Pi-rates and keep the shipping lanes open by use of force,subject to National caveats. We are not here, though, tosolve the Somali Pirate problem”

Attacking & arresting pirates is legal. Howeverthere are certain problems with detaining and prosecut-ing Pirates. This depends on Domestic law. Inevitably,pirates are released only to be re-captured days later.Industry, on the other hand, has been innovative; someof the equipment presented was interesting, and we willbriefly describe 5 of these developments:

1. The radio wave beam guns is a deck mounteddevice carried in a standard 20’ container. It is a non-lethal, totally legal, radio frequency beam “gun”. Thisdevise fires a non lethal beam about 200 m, concentratedonto an assailant, this beam penetrates about 1/16”below the skin, recovery time is almost instantaneous,with no lasting side effects. The assailant feels as thoughhe is being burnt and by instinct moves out of the wayof the beam, immediately recognizing the direction ofthe source. Due to its size, requirement for training, andpositional blind spots its attractiveness is limited but itseffectiveness is impressive.

Cost: Over $1,000,0002. The long range acoustic device is a deck

mounted movable acoustic device. It sends out a con-centrated acoustic beam to a range over 300m, it is loudenough to be clearly heard over 300m and as you ap-proach the source the sound becomes painful to the ears.At very close range it can damage the ears. Of course theelement of surprise is lost after the first use as all that isrequired is simple ear protectors as used in any engineroom.Cost: very expensive

3. A small deck launched un-manned surveil-lance aircraft:

This is a small, deck launched, unmanned, radiocontrolled surveillance aircraft. It uses a deck mountedlaunching devise with a footprint of about 4m2, it has aflying range of about 20 hours and an altitude of about1,000 ft. it is about 2m long and has a payload of about20 kg. The standard surveillance equipment consists ofGPS and video, of course the equipment can be cus-tomized. Other equipment includes night vision andthermal cameras. This aircraft has a deck mounted cap-ture device for “dry recovery”.Cost: just under $1,000,000

Detection enhancement4. Small Target Detection trough Advanced

Radar Technology:This device enhances the software & hardware of

existing RADAR thus enabling the user to spot Piratesin their small, fast, plastic Skiffs at a bigger distance. Theadvantage of this advanced Technology is obvious bothfor the merchant Navy as well at the military.

Cost: not discussedAnd finally there was the “Dazzler”, a narrow

green light beam that is very distracting to the eyes. Thisis a hand held device that looks rather like a torch, andis pointed directly at the pirates.

In spite of these technologies, the only practicalequipment for the merchant navy, which is still underdevelopment, is long range information sharing by useof the free band width of say the AIS. With this tech-nology vessels entering and leaning the Gulf of Aden orany other large area will be aware of events happeningat a greater distance giving the vessel time to take ap-propriate action.

That deals with the industries proposals; othershave made suggestions for enhancing self help by plac-ing the military on merchant ships or better still puttingarmed or unarmed mercenaries or guards on merchantships.

However, the idea of putting armed or un-armed guards or soldiers on a merchant ship has toomany short comings.

The reason war ships are in the Gulf of Adentoday, is to keep shipping lanes open and keep our crewsout of harms way. Or to put it another way maintain andprotect our right for “free and innocent passage” as laiddown in article 110 of the United Nations conferenceon the Law of the Sea.

If we put such personnel on our ships:• Are we sailing with the intent of free and in-

nocent passage?• Are we putting our crews in harm’s way?• Have we jeopardized our P+I & War Risks in-

surance cover?•Should we not notify cargo interests, Charter-

ers, H+M underwriters?• Do we need flag state agreement and that of

the Master & crew?• What is their status under the Athens convention?

• Above 12 Passengers a merchant ship changesSOLAS status

• Does the class safety certificate allow for somany super-numeries?

These are just a few of the un-answered ques-tions that come to mind when contemplating the ideaof placing armed or unarmed mercenaries or soldierson merchant ships.

There are also some legal issues:• Who defines the imminence of attack, the level

of response and liability?• Will pirates, returning fire at a merchant ship

have the opportunity to claim that they were acting inself-defence, as the ship fired first?

• What level of proof will the ship be requiredto provide to justify the use of lethal force?

• Who is in command of the situation? There isa conflict of interest between command of the masterand that of the mercenary commander, while SOLAS(Article 34) clearly states that command always rests withthe master.

• Will the mercenaries and the shipping com-pany be risking an international legal entanglement cost-ing far more than any pirate’s ransom demands?

• Who will carry out accreditation and due dili-gence responsibilities, and basically police the privatemercenary companies? There is a radical difference be-tween contracting third parities on land and doing so atsea.

• What risk is involved with the cargo interests,cargo damage and the risk of negligence being judged-does the use of armed mercenaries “taint the insurance”These questions need to be addressed before a disas-trous incident unfolds.

Furthermore BIMCO at their meeting in Athenson the 3rd June 2009 decided against placing either

armed or un-armed guards or soldiers on to Merchantships as the consequences of such action could be toodangerous.

Additionally, Intertanko declared that arms onmerchant ships are no way to fight piracy. The use ofarms “escalates the violence” from piracy and increasesthe risks to crew members.

On the other hand, the US Constitution’s uniquereference to the right to bear arms could be an influenceon the US approach to the problem.

However the U.S. Defense Department has suc-cessfully deflected a Congressional effort to require thatmilitary detachments be assigned to U.S.-flagged mer-chant ships carrying U.S. aid or other governmentalcargo that are operating in pirate-infested waters. Thechairman of the House Subcommittee on Coast Guardand Maritime Transportation attached an amendment tothis effect when the House debated the National De-fense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647).

During the debate, the Ranking Republican ofthe House Armed Services Committee had arguedagainst the amendment, noting that the U.S. Navy fearedthat “expanding the deployment of ESTs [embarked se-curity teams] would negatively impact other operationalcommitments.”

The Navy was more successful in its oppositionstance when the Senate wrote its version of the defensebill. The Senate bill had no provision comparable to theamendment.

A House-Senate conference committee con-vened and when the compromise bill emerged fromconference; Section 3506 of H.R. 2647 called only for areport to Congress. The Defense and State Depart-ments are to report on their efforts to (1) eliminate or re-duce legal restrictions on the carriage of arms and useof armed private-sector security teams on United States-flagged commercial vessels for purpose of self-defensein areas that are designated as being at a high risk ofpiracy, (2) negotiate bilateral agreements with other na-tions to allow United States-flagged commercial vesselscarrying government cargos, such as food aid, that musttransit areas designated as pirate-infested to enter for-eign ports while carrying arms or embarked armed pri-vate-sector security teams for the purpose ofself-defense, and (3) establish common standards for thetraining and professional qualifications of armed pri-vate-sector security teams. Thus, not only is there nomandate given to U.S. military forces, the report will noteven talk about the possibility of such a role.

The US Coast Guard has released two port se-curity advisories that clarify how existing US laws applyto armed self-defense and carriage of firearms on ships.Use of arms to defend US-flag ships from piracy re-


mains the prerogative of the shipmaster, and masters re-tain control over and responsibility for the actions ofeven embarked security teams. Consequently, the De-partment of defense opted for Armed Security guards ormercenaries for US flagged vessels rather than providingtrained professional soldiers.

The recent US executive order does presentsome further problems; this basically says that any com-pany or individual associated with the US are not al-lowed to pay money to certain individuals andorganizations on the SDN list. (Specially Designated Na-tionals). It is further stated that the EO is not intendedto target piracy, but to target the individuals who use ran-soms for terrorist activity against the US. The questiondoes arise “what do we do if a ship is seized bypirates ?” do we just abandon the crew?. Thankfully theOffice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will authorizeransom payments if allowed. In the short term I feelthat this EO will just stem the flow of information be-tween the Shipowners’ negotiator and the naval forces,until there are certain needed clarifications.

Iran has followed the US example and has pub-licly announced that they will put armed guards on theNITC tankers.

At the moment the status quo amongst the So-mali pirates is “non-lethal”. However the more you armthe merchant ship the more fire power the pirate willbuy. This delicate balance can shift very easily in theother direction.

Today Pirates are reinvesting their ill gotten gainsinto the family business and are buying more sophisti-cated equipment such as AIS, VHF, RADAR, GPS,SAT-COM, AK47, RPG’s, 50 caliber machine guns andbigger & faster boats, etc. etc.

Last year, the NATO PBOS had a workingGroup meeting in The NATO Shipping Centre inNorthwood. This was an eye opening experience. Hereis a large group of dedicated professionals spendingtheir days & nights protecting the merchant ships sailingin the Gulf of Aden. I believe that it is essential that

every vessel passing through the Gulf of Aden signs upto the MSC HoA and the UK MTO Dubai, all the con-tact information is available on Admiralty Chart Q 6099(which incidentally is free).

Recently the UN asked NATO to look into thelegal and practical aspect of placing armed soldiers onthe vessels taking aid to Somalia. We believe that this isa sensible solution provided the soldiers deployed arefrom AMISOM, and a practical means of embarkationand disembarkation is developed.

Of course this idea could be further developedand extended to other vessels; in this way it would bepossible to make better use of the very costly naval as-sets assigned to protect the merchant navy in the Gulfof Aden and Somali Basin.

In closing, we would like to add that we believehistory is a great teacher, Our fathers discovered that pa-trolling was not such a successful way of protecting themerchant ships in WWII across the North Atlantic andthat convoys with limited air cover was a better methodof protecting merchant shipping.

If we all work together and organize ourselveswith the assistance of the very able Naval forces in theGulf of Aden area, we can reduce the number of hi-jacking and we believe that this will be the solution forthe crisis in the Gulf of Aden until there is the Politicalwill for a land based solution. We need to help the Piratefind an alternative, legal source of income, otherwise hewill not give up the very lucrative act of piracy.

Finally, a point that we raise in every meeting,conversation and presentation on Piracy is that, we inthe Merchant Navy are really appreciative of the serviceprovided by the navies of the EU operation Atlanta andNATO and the Joint Naval Forces, but we need oneother service, and that is assistance to the ship after it isreleased from pirates. Often we are unable to providebunkers and provisions to even get the ship moving, be-cause a supplier is too scared to come to where the shiphas been held hostage unless there is a military presenceto provide security. I know this is a sore point with thepowers that be, but for the crewman this humanitarianassistance makes all the difference.

MMrr.. GGEEOORRGGEE DD.. PPAATTEERRAASS was born in Lon-don in 1958. He received his Bachelor in Marine Engineeringfrom the University of Westminster, London and his MSc inNaval Architecture and Marine Engineering from Massachu-setts Institute of Technology. He is a member and advisor in var-ious International Committees and presently he is an advisor to theHellenic Ministry of Defense and Chairman of the HellenicShipping War Risks Insurance S.A.


Are we putting ourcrews in harm’s wayby trying too hardto protect them?


PPIIRRAACCYY PPSSYYCCHHOOLLOOGGIICCAALL FFAACCTTOORRSS

bbyy PPrrooffeessssoorr AAnnaassttaassiiooss MM.. TTaammiiss,, Notre Dame University, Perth, Australia andLLtt JJGG CC.. NNttiinniiaass HH..NN..,, M.Sc student

There is no doubt that global technology,

global politics and global economy had influenced ide-ologies and cultures and seriously affected the interpre-tation of meanings, values and social behavior. It is alsoa well established fact that the conflict of cultures andcivilizations stemmed from unbalanced and biasedsocio-economic grievances triggered globalization ter-rorism and thus threw into peril and destruction theworld’s social stability. Consequently, a significant num-ber of researches and relevant literature have been pub-lished, trying to explain the behavior of a terrorist (e.g.pirates) through different conceptualized frameworks.So, what is/are the factors that stipulate an individual to‘’pick up a gun’’ and express an aggressive behavior? Theanswer will arise through the perception of social psy-chology. From this point of view the aggressive behav-ior or generally the attributes of a terrorist areconsidered as a gradual progression in which the char-acteristics of an individual interact with environmentalfactors. Therefore, in the present article an attempt isbeing made to portray certain relevant social psycholog-ical processes namely social influence, social interaction,social identification, social conformity/compliance, in-group/out-group theories etc that can contribute in in-creasing our knowledge of terrorist behavior. It is worthnoting that this approach does not aspire to supplant thesociological and psychological perspectives whose con-tributors we considered to be equally necessary and en-riching. Equally important in the debate and analysisabout the origins of globalised terrorism is the contri-bution of political-science and religion studies.

According to the social psychology approachpertaining to terrorist (e.g. pirates) attributes, firstly, weshall define the term of Social Influence as being theprocess whereby a person’s attitudes, opinions, beliefsor behaviors are altered or controlled by some form ofsocial communication. It includes conformity, compli-ance, obedience, persuasion, minority social influence,group polarization and the influence of social norms.

In terms of terrorism, a significant number ofstudies have arguably suggested that the causation of in-ducing or even triggering terrorist behavior seems to relyheavily on the political subculture in which subsequent

terrorists are socialized in the context of and within theframework of their family relations, group of friends,school, local community. Growing up in an unstable en-vironment marked by nationalist values, dogmatic cul-tural meanings or by the strong influence of certainextremist religious currents could be assessed as deci-sive factors (San Martin, 2005). Some of these unstableenvironments usually predominate individual poverty,grievances, injustice and inequality making people livingwithin susceptible, by motivating the role of a group’sdynamics and peer pressure. Like Sageman (2004)demonstrated that networks of friends or relatives wereinstrumental in the radicalization process. In addition, agrowing sense of alienation and a feeling of insecurityamong youth make them “available” under the powerand dynamics of social groups, facilitating the processof conformity. Conformity Groups provide expecta-tions for individual beliefs and conducts that result inshifting individual attitudes, opinions, and behaviors infavor of group norms (Sheriff, 1935)- and compliance-Compliance Groups foster increased compliance withgroup requests and obedience to orders. It was foundthat high group cohesion, isolation from alternativegroups, increased cost of defiance, and the degree towhich the group satisfies individual needs increase thelikelihood and severity of group conformity (Milligram,1965)- as a need of response to the aforementioned so-cial instability and its characteristics, perpetrating ter-rorist acts.

In terms of intergroup dynamics, the process ofsocial categorization offers members of a group thesense of necessity. They categorize the world into “us”and “them” and their perception that anyone who is be-longing to an out-group is considered as a target of vi-olence. Thus, from the point of view of the members ofterrorist (e.g. pirates) organizations, acts of violenceagainst civilians are justified because civilians are part ofthe enemy. The psychological mechanism of catego-rization takes place by exaggerating the differences char-acterizing the in-group and the out-group perceptionsand knowledge. This psychological distance is achievedapart from the sense which is given to a member of agroup, also by the adoption of terrorist ideology, valueswhich will be fulfilled by aggressive behaviors. If thispsychological distance will be combined with the per-ception of rewards then this combination constitutes amotivation tool that could be useful for terrorist lead-ers. Group polarization creates strong divergences andseverely manipulates individual attitudes to the extreme

(Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). Thus, social interac-tion that takes place during these processes combinedwith other factors help push individual members to aradicalized state of affairs.

Social identity is another process that can con-tribute an appropriate explanation and approach to ourprimary question: “what is/are the factors that stipulatean individual to ‘’pick up a gun’’ and express an aggres-sive behavior”. Why is the element of identity impor-tant? All people have basic human needs for a sense ofbelonging, an identity, recognition, and security. First ofall Social Identity Theory asserts that group member-ship creates in-group/ self-categorization and enhance-ment in ways that favor the in-group at the expense ofthe out-group. The examples (minimal group studies) ofTurner and Tajfel (1986) showed that the mere act ofindividuals categorizing themselves as group memberswas sufficient to lead them to display in-group fa-voritism. After being categorized of a group member-ship, individuals seek to achieve positive self-esteem bypositively differentiating their in-group from a compar-ison out-group on some valued dimension. This questfor positive distinctiveness means that people’s sense ofwho they are is defined in terms of ‘we’ rather than ‘I’.More often than not, we define ourselves by first iden-tifying what we are not and by distinguishing ourselvesfrom others. Consequently, identity is shaped by the waywe identify those members of the in-groups with whomwe associate and the out-groups with whom we disas-sociate. Attachments to in-groups and preference of in-groups over out-groups are universal characteristics ofhuman social life. These attachments and preferencesresult in a variety of in-group and out-group behaviors.The more negative behaviors include stereotyping, dis-crimination, prejudice, and violence (Brewer and Brown,1998:558-559). Members perceiving themselves as mem-bers of the same group greatly help them to meet thedemands of terrorist activity (Taylor, 2003). They putthe interests and goals of the group before their own,and hence increase their commitment to the movementand their disposition to sacrifice themselves for it. Thegreater the identification with the terrorist group, thegreater the identification with its goals and norms, andthe lower the likelihood of disobedience to directivesand orders from group leaders. More often than not,people who experience intense frustration and insecu-rity enough to hold a deep and violently aggressive senseof others are living in politically unstable and economi-cally fragile societies. Unfortunately, the leaders of a ter-rorist group or organizations can play on groupidentities and frustrations to build enemy images in aneffort to redirect internal dissent away from them andonto others. As a result, conflicts and terrorist attacks

with the out-group become functional serving purposesand values beyond the culture of a balance and ethic so-cial life.

In this almost codified discussion paper we at-tempted to offer an introduction to the debate on ter-rorist/pirate behavior from a socio-psychologicalperspective. Terrorism and terrorist behavior specificallyis a complex phenomenon that needs in depth researchthrough combined conceptualized frameworks. In thecontext of pirate’s behavior, taking into account theaforementioned as well as the fact that a ...

pirate’s behavior is motivated mostly byeconomical reasons which in turn are

caused by political turbulences,

a research approach could be considered simpler. Thiscould be implemented by utilizing an interpreted ap-proach and basing our knowledge and meaningful real-ity on the epistemology that human practices are beingconstructed in and out of interaction between humanbeings and their direct and indirect cultural environmentand transmitted within an essentially socio-psychologicalcontext.

PPrrooffeessssoorr AAnnaassttaassiiooss TTaammiiss was born in Thessa-lonice, Greece. He arrived in Australia in 1971. He has been ap-pointed Head of the Department of Hellenic Studies(1992-1997), inaugural Director of the National Centre forHellenic Studies and Research (NCHSR) (1997-2008), founderand inaugural Convenor of the Dardalis Archives of the HellenicDiaspora (1992-2008) and inaugural President of the Aus-tralian Institute for Macedonian Studies (1986-2009), Professorand Academic Post-graduate Co-ordinator, University of NotreDame, Australia (2009). Professor A. Tamis has been interna-tionally acknowledged as a world authority in Greek Sociolin-guistics and the history of Greek migration and settlement. He isalso considered as the expert scholar on the Hellenic Diaspora andthe State of the Greek Language in a Language Contact situation

LLttJJGG CC.. NNttiinniiaass graduated the Hellenic NavalAcademy in 2000 and has served in various Hellenic ships (De-stroyer, Fast Patrol Ship, Frigates), mainly on frigates as a staffofficer. He has received a psychology bachelor degree from the Pan-teion University of Athens (2007) and he is an M.Sc of theUniversity of Notre Dame in Australia. His current researchdeals with the working environment on a frigate and leadership is-sues (psychological factors affecting a MIO team). He is currently


SSEECCUURRIINNGG AA WWOORRLLDD LLIIFFEELLIINNEE ©©

bbyy UU..SS.. CCoolloonneell ((RReett..)) GGuuss MMoouuttooss

Since the days of ancient mariners, the Red

Sea, the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the Indian Oceanhave been the trade routes, and indeed the life blood, ofmany nations, particularly European nations. Nations ofOld Europe perished when these trade routes wereclosed.

The same holds true in today’s world. The mosteconomic and useful trade routes from Europe to Asiaare still through the Suez Canal and near the PersianGulf. All types of commerce and travelers pass thoughthese areas and must endure the threats of the IndianOcean especially close to the coast of Africa and theStraits of Molucca in Indonesia.

Unfortunately these trade routes have chokepoints that can stop or severely limit the passage ofcommerce. Each of these choke points/danger pointsrequires careful analysis for a diplomatic or military so-lution. Planning must be made now when time permitsa less hurried effort to find solutions.

THE THREAT:1. The Suez Canal.We can recall an earlier time

when Abdul Gamal Nasser sunk a vessel and renderedthe Canal useless for an extended period of time. TheMiddle East is a powder keg that could explode at anytime and the canal could be closed by military action orterrorist activity. The canal is narrow and cannot be by-passed. NATO involvement is essential to ensure peacein the Middle East and cooperation with Egypt to se-cure the canal. Security forces, primarily Egyptian, mustmaintain constant vigilance. A NATO contingency tosecure the canal’s safety in time of hostilities must beexplored.

2. The Horn of Africa. The threat there in-volves a multitude of possible actions. Yemeni militantscould close the passage by terrorist action. Terroristforces from Djibouti, as well as Somali pirates, couldthreaten the passage. All of NATO’s political powermust be focused to insure that Yemen remains a viablenation capable of handling insurgent threats. Yemen isa poor country requiring massive economic and techni-cal assistance to survive. In the absence of a viableYemen, NATO must plan for the security of the Hornof Africa and the Gulf of Yemen. A secure Yemen can

provide NATO with a desirable operations base on So-cotra Island where supporting NATO forces could bestationed.

3. The Somali Coast. This Gordian knot forregional security will require constant political maneu-vering to secure a stable and friendly Somalia. In the ab-sence of that and barring direct NATO military actionon the Somali coast, a presence of NATO naval forceswill be required for a long time. This will be expensiveand tiring for participating NATO forces. A contingencyfor military land action will be required if the situationworsens.

4. The Straits of Hormuz. This presents per-haps the most difficult challenge. Iran can block thispoint with naval, air, or missile action. The presentgeopolitical arena involving Iran is a challenge forNATO. Iran possesses the military power to act quickly.To counter this, NATO must be prepared to deploy alarge force to secure the straits. In addition, terroristscould cause paralysis in the straits and the Persian Gulfwith or without Iranian help. The full capacity of thepolitical power of NATO needs to be deployed as wellas international pressure to insure that the Persian Gulfremains accessible. With the cooperation of the nationof Oman, contingency plans can be developed to ad-dress these dangers.

5. The Straits of Molucca. At present terror-ist activity does not present a major problem, but NATOmust keep an eye on the area.


Photos from Operation EU ATALANTA(Courtesy HS SALAMIS)

Possible courses of action:1. Enhance present operations with better sur-

veillance and action forces.2. Secure bases in Djibouti, Socotra Island,

Oman, and the Seychelles for stable operations. Fromthese points, forces, particularly heliborne or airborneforces on standby, can be sent into action rapidly. Thiscan prove to be an economy of force move that will costless than a large number of vessels operating at sea; thatwill provide a base to quickly launch forces in the area;and that will be a key basis for reconnaissance with a va-riety of craft and reduced cost (land based aircraft costsare less expensive than carrier based aircraft).

3. Mobilize political efforts to neutralize thethreat. In today’s difficult economy, diplomacy can havea major effect.

The security of these vital lanes is more criticalnow than ever before. NATO is the principal force tomake it happen, and constant planning is a must for sur-vival of the NATO economy.

CCoolloonneell GGuuss MMoouuttooss ((UUSS AArrmmyy,, RReettiirreedd))spent more than ten years as a Foreign Area Operations Officer(FAO) in the Middle East. He served in several Arab nationsand traveled extensively throughout the Middle East. His dutiesincluded advising governments in intelligence gathering and militaryorganization, training, and operations.


Pirates acting like “sailing”. Photos from Operation EU ATALANTA

(Courtesy HS SALAMIS)

Photos from Operation EU ATALANTA(Courtesy HS SALAMIS)

In today’s difficulteconomy,

diplomacy canhave a major

effect.

bbyy CCaapptt.. JJaammeess KK.. SSttaapplleess,, MMaasstteerr MMaarriinneerr

When Captain Richard Phillips was

taken hostage a common question asked by thegeneral public in the United States was “why doyou not have guns on board. You should be al-lowed to protect yourself ?” This question is agood one and the reason sound, however the re-ality of shipboard operations and crew nation-alities and religious beliefs make it acomplicated solution globally. If we look at thesituation on board U.S. vessels we find thatcrew turnover and how a crew member findsemployment present some of the difficultieswhich go along with arming a crew. Most U.S.Captains feel that arming the crew is the wrongthing to do, for which I concur. The employ-ment of a U.S. crewmember starts at the hiringhall; he must wait until a job is put on a bulletinboard. The seaman then puts a shipping cardin as his or her bid on the job and dependingon a few variables they may or may not get theassignment. He must first be qualified to takethat position, to be qualified he must have hisS.T.C.W. for the rating he intends to sail in, hemust be drug free and competent according toU.S.C.G. regulations. To receive his documentsthe seaman must have had a background checkwhich is completed by the U.S.C.G. when he ap-plies for or renews his documents. The back-ground check is done every renewal period at 5year intervals. Background checks on Americanseaman are comprehensive and extensive, gen-erally most seaman have a clean record and re-ceive their documents with no problem at all.As we know nothing is perfect and this is truewith the American Merchant Seaman who hasbeen checked out by the U.S.C.G. and F.B.I. Ithas been found that some seaman have exten-sive criminal backgrounds and never shouldhave been allowed on board American vesselsnever mind foreign vessels. Yet they seem tofind their way on board and become part of thecrew. This does not happen often, but it doeshappen.

On board American vessels we have sea-man who served timely prison sentences forcriminal activities. Some seaman slip betweenthe cracks, are overlooked or have a politicalconnection to get the endorsements and docu-ments needed to sign aboard a merchant vessel.No system is perfect and not all seaman need tobe squeaky clean.

We as Merchant Seaman understand thatand respect that a man or women with a check-ered past may now have found a new directionin life or heard the calling of the sea; theyshould be given an opportunity for a new lifeand career.

After the seaman has had a full back-ground check his documents are issued and heis clear to take a job on board a merchant ves-sel. With his documents in order he can nowproceed to a hiring hall and look for his nextjob assignment. When he finds employment thepaperwork is sent to the home office and en-tered into the computer system prior to board-ing the vessel. He shows up on board andmeets with the Master or Chief Officer, de-pending on who does the sign on. His info ischecked and verified and he now becomes amember of the crew.

The problem with this system is that theMaster must rely on the background check thatwas done on this crewmember. The Master hasno idea of past history or criminal involvementthis crewmember may have had in his or herpast, virtually the Master knows absolutely

TTHHEE CCOONNTTRROOVVEERRSSIIAALL AARRGGUUMMEENNTT:: AARRMMIINNGG TTHHEE CCRREEWW OORR AARRMMEEDD SSEECCUURRIITTYY PPRROOFFEESSSSIIOONNAALLSS ??

AA CCAAPPTTAAIINN’’SS PPEERRSSPPEECCTTIIVVEE


nothing about this person who has just signedon board his vessel. Depending on the crew sizethe Master may only know his top fourcrewmembers and may have never sailed withor even knows the rest of his crew when hesails the vessel from port. This plays into theissue of arming the crew, under U.S. firearmsregulations it is illegal and U.S. laws prohibitanyone from having a firearm if you have had afelony conviction. To pass out weapons tocrewmembers who the Master knows nothingabout would be unconscionable and a criminaloffence in itself if they had prior felony con-victions. We must enable the Master of his ves-sel to know who has signed on board his shipincluding past criminal history. The Master’s re-sponsibility on board any vessel is endless andthe safety of his crew always paramount. Thisincludes keeping his crew safe from one anotherduring the sea voyage. To have a crewmemberon watch at 0200A.M. and having been con-victed of rape and served time, now on watchwith a young twenty something female couldpose a potential life threatening situation forthat young lady, the seaworthiness of the vesselmay be in jeopardy as well. The Master mustknow who is on board when it comes to thecrew. How can he be expected to keep intact se-curity when he has no idea who is working onboard the vessel?

This brings us back to the question ofarming the crew which should not even becomp-templated with out first giving the Mastera full and complete background check on allcrew members. Having that being said, what wecan do is to train a few individuals who are per-manent crewmembers assigned to the vesselwith small arms training and arming them. Thishas been done before and is actually being done

on some American vessel now. Most Americanvessels allow for the Master to have a small cal-iber hand gun. This is for his personnel protec-tion and maintaining discipline in a lifeboat ifthe situation ever arises. The senior personnelon board any vessel’s primary mission are thatof the safe navigation of the vessel and havingto defend the vessel would take away from thatmission.

You will usually find the top senior per-sonnel on board American Merchant vesselshave been sailing together and know each otherwell. Unions in the U.S. offer their memberssmall arms training and those who choose totake this course must qualify every two years tobe proficient in the weapons of choice and staycurrent. With this training in place and the sen-ior crew being permanent members on board itoffers the option of weapons on board foremergency situation’s to keep the vessel andcrew safe. Having already sailed with weaponson board and in the ready while transiting theMalacca straits we never encountered any prob-lems, with pirates or having the weapons onboard

Now if we look at vessels other than U.S.flagged ships we will find multiple problemswith arming a crew. The diverse nationalitieswhich make up the crew on board can create its


on problems never mind adding weapons to theequation. Certain cultures and religions preventthe taking of life, even when defending them-selves. This alone should prevent the arming ofthe crew. The language barrier on board shipswhich should have been addressed by S.T.C.W.but was not in reality will prevent the safe train-ing when it comes to firearms. Now we mustlook at the same problem as we see on boardAmerican vessels with the background checksdone on seaman. To try and imagine that non-U.S. seaman go under the same tough back-ground checks as an American seaman would bereaching and trying at best. So we must assumethat with the diverse nationalities and culturesthat the Master must deal with, security is nomore keeping the vessel safe than it is aboutbeing compliant and a paper chase. The Masteron a foreign vessel must rely on a hiring orcrewing company to do proper backgroundchecks of the crew he has coming on. Thispresents a huge problem for the non-U.S. vesselwhen it comes to arming the crew, and a verygood reason as to why the crew should not bearmed. The mission of the merchant sailor is tomove goods from one port to another, it is notmeant to be a role which involves defendingyourself from pirates or criminals. The vesselneeds to have on board the proper equipmentin helping with the detection and to have the ca-pability to deter the un- wanted intruder-pirateor criminal-terrorist from getting on board. Thecrew can and should be trained in these proce-dures. What we are left with is the defenseof the vessel and how do we get this accom-plished.

The vessel needs to be defended for manyreasons, first and fore most is the safety of thecrew, then the cargo and vessel. How can we dothis and at what point should we do this.

Keeping the crew safe is our first concern,so we must take up the challenge of getting thisdone. We have done this when it comes to asinking, or a fire, we have lifeboats, survivalsuits and firefighting equipment. The crew hav-ing been trained and certified in emergency pro-cedures on a regular basis have no problems inkeeping the vessel safe. Piracy is a differentissue; vessels have limited capabilities when itcomes to detecting a pirate, never mind deter-ring or defending a pirate. This is an area thatneeds to be addressed and improved upon. Weneed to give merchant seaman the proper equip-ment to help combat piracy and terrorism atsea. The last thing any seaman wants is to be-come a hostage on board his vessel.

As we saw with Captain Stapleton onboard the 18,000 ton cargo ship Boularibankthat was attacked by pirates, not only did hehave his crew to think about, his wife and 11passengers were also on board during the at-tack. The crew repelled boarders by tossing tim-ber in to the approaching boats path as theytried to make their way alongside. Sometimesyou need to have luck on your side and this timeCapt. Stapelton had all of that. The question weshould ask is why the crew should have to relyon throwing timber on to the pirates, or usesafety flares to try and defend the vessel. Realsecurity needs to be added to the vessel securityplan. Capt. Stapleton used his imagination andhis seaman’s wit when it came to defending hisvessel. He trained his crew, and carefullythought out his tactics which proved to be suc-cessful. What he did was defend his crew andvessel, as a Master should be allowed to do,bravo Capt. Stapleton

If we are not going to arm the crewswhich has been recommended then we need tothink in terms of real security and defensewhich will keep the crew and vessel safe. A fewshipping companies have opted to put armedsecurity teams on board to keep all assets safeuntil Somalia is stabilized, which could takedecades. This can also present many obstaclesfor a shipping company when it comes to trans-porting weapons from one country into an-other, given strict regulations already in place.Insurance becomes another problem for thehired security team and the crew as well. Thebigger problem is who are these security per-sonnel being placed on board the vessels. Themany overnight companies which sprang up


should cause some concern on many levels.First it is and always will be the Master’s re-sponsibility and liability if an accident orwrongful death occurs for either the crew or theso called pirate, if it can be proved he was in-deed a pirate. Documentation must show without a doubt that the crew and vessels safety wasindeed in peril. We must develop a processwhere these security companies are qualified tohave trained security personnel on board. Train-ing records need to be made known to the ship-ping company as well as background checks oneach individual. Security companies should havea quality and safety program in place, carry allthe required insurance and have a reputable rep-utation.

Well trained security teams on board mer-chant vessel weather we want to admit it or notis in all probability the only real solution tokeep the vessel safe, when under attack by a pi-rate or terrorist in high risk waters. If a piratewishes to engage in the act of piracy then hemust realize and deal with the fact that he willbe met with resistance and his newly found ven-ture could end in his demise. Security teamswill be trained in the escalation of force andonly use deadly force when absolutely neededand under the command of the Master. Thismust all be set out in S.O.P. and R.O.E. The pri-mary goal is to keep the seafarer safe and allowhim to do his profession.

When a merchant mariner signs on boarda vessel he should not have to worry aboutbeing taken hostage or be at the mercy of anowner who will negotiate best price. These ne-gotiations can take up to seven months andmaybe longer, as the crew is made to suffer without basic human needs, where is the out cry forthese poor sailors.

If armed security teams are to be placedon board then we need to ensure that all assetsare protected. The crew, cargo, vessel, and se-curity team the corporation and managementcompanies also need to be protected from lia-bilities if an un-wanted death occurs for eitherthe pirate or the crew-security team. A very fewcompanies now operating as maritime securitycompanies offer services to protect not only themariner, but also the vessel and company theyrepresent. One such company located in Col-orado Springs, Lakonian International can offera shipping company endless opportunity whenit comes to risk mitigation, insurance, logistics

and security for their vessels and facilities.We are now faced with a very challenging

problem with no easy solution or way out. Theshipping companies did not create this problem,but they must continue to do business in thispart of the world and need to find solutions tothis growing problem world wide. At the mo-ment a hard decision must be made, weather toput armed security on board or not. The answerlies in the question. Do we want to keep our in-nocent crews and vessels safe? I believe that an-swer is YES. The time has come to make thosedifficult decisions and keep are vessels safe. Thegreater majority of ship Masters and crew willfavor putting armed security on board their ves-sel, it’s the right thing to do. The ship ownerneeds to find the right security companies forthe job.

The last question to tackle is that the pi-rates will escalate their weaponry which is a vi-able question and concern by all; it could alsoescalate if the pirates see their prey count di-minish as Masters do not stop their vessel onceengaged by the pirate. Either way the chance ex-ists or most likely the pirate will go to an esca-lation of weaponry as a ploy to intimidate theships Master into stopping his vessel.

CCaappttaaiinn JJaammeess KK.. SSttaapplleess is a Master Mariner and thepresident of OceanRiver llc. Company which is specialized in supporting mer-chant vessels with private security measures especially in the Gulf of Adenfighting against piracy.


NNMMIIOOTTCC IISS AALLWWAAYYSS RREEAADDYY TTOO TTRRAAIINN YYOOUU IINN MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONSNNMMIIOOTTCC IISS AALLWWAAYYSS RREEAADDYY TTOO TTRRAAIINN YYOOUU IINN MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONS


FFiigg.. 11 :: NMIOTC’s Container stack

FFiigg.. 22::NMIOTC’s Fast Rope Tower

NMIOTC IS ALWAYS READY TO TRAIN YOU INN MMAARRIITTIIMMEE IINNTTEERRDDIICCTTIIOONN OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNSSNMIOTC IS ALWAYS READY TO TRAIN YOU INN MMAARRIITTIIMMEE IINNTTEERRDDIICCTTIIOONN OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNSS


FFiigg.. 33 Boarding Team member are trained from NMIOTC’s Hellenic special Forces in Crew Control Technique

FFiigg.. 44:: RHIB insertion onboard mock up ship ARIS FFiigg.. 55:: NMIOTC’s training mock up ship ARIS

FFiigg.. 66:: Boarding Team of a Naval Unit in tactical sweep techniques onboard NMIOTC mock up ship ARIS

bbyy LLttCCddrr PP.. SSeerrggiiss HHNN,, HNGS Legal Advisor,Ph.D. Candidate

I would like to begin with one preliminary re-

mark. Any views or opinions expressed in this presen-tation are solely those of the author and do notrepresent the views of the Hellenic Navy General Staffof the Greek Government.

It is maybe a truism to argue that one of themajor factors to be taken into account during the plan-ning and the execution of Maritime Interdiction Oper-ations, especially in a Non Permissive Environment, isthe legal framework, governing the conduct of the op-eration. Equally important is to take into account thatthe way operations are conducted has a profound im-pact on the legal regime itself. The conduct of the op-erations and the legal framework have a two-wayrelation, affecting one another. The aim of my presen-tation is to demonstrate this connection through the ex-amination of the anti-piracy operations, conducted inthe Horn of Africa.

The main reason for this relation is the inade-quacy of the international legal regime concerningpiracy. International law was always living up to its nar-cissistic view that piracy was one of its most regulatedtopics. The piracy provisions of LOSC are generallyconsidered as reflecting existing customary law on thesubject, repeating almost verbatim the relevant articlesof 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. Notwith-standing this, the resent growth in the piracy activity offthe coast of Somalia, although it created a new uniquefield for international cooperation, has put into strainsthe existing legal framework of dealing with this dis-turbing phenomenon.

To start with the definition of piracy jure gen-tium, the most controversial aspect of it is the “privateends” requirement. Under Article 101 LOSC, piracyconsists of any illegal acts of violence or detention, orany act of depredation, committed for private ends bythe crew or passengers of a private ship, and directedon the high seas, against another ship or against a ship,aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the juris-diction of any state. The distinction between acts com-mitted for “private ends” as opposed to acts committedfor “public ends”, which is relevant to the discrimina-tion between piracy and maritime terrorism, is not clear-cut.

The difficulty with the definition is that is basedon one internal, psychological element. Instead of usingone objective criterion, independent of the motives ofthe perpetrators, such as the undertaking of the act with-out due authority, which was the base of the distinctionbetween pirates and privateers, the “private ends” for-mula was chosen. There seems to be general agreementthat the concept of “private ends” should not be con-strued narrowly as to include only acts committed withthe intent to plunder (animus furandi). Although plun-dering intentions strike at the heart of piracy definition,it is difficult to assess its parameters. Absence of “dueauthority” seems to suffice for some international lawexperts in order to characterize one act as piratical. Someothers argue for one additional requirement especiallyduring civil strife: if the attack is directed against “non-legitimate targets”, these being the vessels belonging tothe government that the insurgents wish to overthrow,it is qualified as piracy.

The discussion is not without relevance for thepresent situation in Somalia. Being the epitome of afailed state, Somalia has offered the perfect sanctuaryfor the pirates. Until now, their operations fall within thecore of the piracy definition: the private gain seems tobe their motive. But what about if, for example, the pi-rate groups join forces with the al-Shabaab, the Islamistinsurgency group, or begin subsidizing its activities? Insuch situations we can admit that both private and po-litical motives exist and a sort of balancing is required inorder to determine whether an attack is a piracy jure gen-tium. Following the “due authority” criterion, if the vic-tims of the attacks are foreign merchant vessels, it isobvious that such actions come under the definition ofpiracy. Although de lege ferenda, piracy and maritimeterrorism cannot be assimilated, the gradual wideningof the piracy definition can be expected, in order to in-clude the new enemies of the whole mankind (hostishumany generis).

As far as the suppression of piracy is concerned,in accordance with Article 110 LOSC a warship or anyother duly authorized ship or aircraft, which encounterson the high seas a foreign ship is justified to board her,if there are reasonable grounds of suspecting that she isengaged in piracy. But how the reasonable grounds arefounded? Just mere “grounds” not suffice, they must bealso “reasonable”.

There is no other way to specify when this pre-condition exists, but to base the decision on the modus

IIMMPPAACCTTSS OOFF TTHHEE LLEEGGAALL FFRRAAMMEEWWOORRKK OONN OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNSSTTHHRROOUUGGHH TTHHEE EEXXAAMMPPLLEE OOFF PPIIRRAACCYY


operandi of the pirates, that is on the information al-ready available on the way pirates operate. Taking intoaccount that the ability to intervene to suppress piracy isan exception to the freedom of the high seas and as suchmust be construed narrowly, the most preferable way isto create a matrix giving different weight to the variousrelevant criteria. That is actually what was done by thetactical messages of the Force Headquarters (FHQ) ofthe Operation “ATALANTA”. But this is not the casewith all the forces operating in the region. The use ofmore loose criteria involves the danger of impairing theright of the freedom of navigation on the internationalwaters. The utilization of the available information isone of the most vexed problems in the application oflegal norms.

The boarding operations against the suspectedvessels are generally classified into three distinct cate-gories: unopposed (or consensual or cooperative) board-ings – non-cooperative boardings – opposed boardings.The use of the term “consensual boarding” is somehowtricky, leading to confusion with “consent” as a circum-stance precluding wrongfulness. Under article 20 of ILCArticles on State Responsibility “consent by a state toparticular conduct by another state precludes the wrong-fulness of that act in relation to the consenting state,provided the consent is valid and to the extent that theconduct remains within the limits of the consent given”.Consent in this legal dimension is used in the boardingsconducted during the Operation “Active Endeavour”,where it serves to legitimize the conduct of the unitsparticipating.

On the other hand, the terminology used toqualify the anti-piracy boarding operations has no legaldimension, expressing only the expected difficulty ofthe boarding operation based on the level of coopera-tion of the suspect vessel and relating the authorizationof the action to a specific level in the military command,in accordance with that difficulty. There is no need forconsent either by the master of the vessel or the flagstate or both in order to conduct the boarding if thereare reasonable grounds for suspecting that a ship is en-gaged in piracy. This authorization stems from Article110 LOSC. That is why it is preferable to use the termsunopposed or cooperative boarding only, in order notto sustain the existing uncertainty.

If the suspicions are proved, then follows theperplexing issue of the arrest of the suspected piratesand the disposal of their vessels and paraphernalia.Under Article 105 LOSC, which is the Achilles Heel ofthe LOSC anti-piracy provisions, the warships of everystate are allowed to seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or aship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control ofpirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on

board. The courts of the state which carried out theseizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed,and may also determine the action to be taken with re-gards to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to therights of third parties acting in good faith.

Thus, Article 105 LOSC establishes universallegislative and enforcement jurisdiction over the inter-national crime of piracy or piracy jure gentium. Al-though every state may seize the pirate ship, thesubsequent judicial proceedings, pertaining to the penaland civil aspects of the case, must be carried out by thecourts of the state, which carried out the seizure. Ofcourse, LOSC does not create any obligation upon theseizing state to try the suspected pirates. That state, sim-ply, “may” decide upon the subsequent action. The pointmade here is that the wording of Article 105 precludesthe transfer of the arrested pirates to any third state,other than the one, which arrested them. This interpre-tation is not based only on the text of the Article and thestriking difference between the language of its first andsecond sentence. It is also supported by the drafting his-tory of the Article. The drafters had the intention tolimit the trials to the capturing state. Other scholars havea different approach on the matter. They assert thatnothing in Article 105 affects the right of a state withcustody of a suspected criminal to either prosecute thatperson or transfer him to another state for prosecution.In accordance with customary international law, everystate has jurisdiction to prosecute a pirate subsequentlypresent within its territory. This assessment does notcover the transfer of the arrested pirates to a third state.Furthermore, it runs counter to the view that the articlesof the LOSC reflect the current status of the customaryinternational law on the matter.

It is possible that during a piracy incident dif-ferent states could claim jurisdiction over the arrestedpirates, based on different jurisdictional principles (e.g.passive personality, universal, flag – state jurisdictionect). It is true that general international law provides norule of priority between these competing jurisdictionalclaims. But this is not the case, when the potentiallycompeting jurisdictions are based on Article 105 LOSC,which establishes the universal jurisdiction over piracy.In such a case, the above-mentioned Article gives anystate the right to seize pirate ships and arrest the sus-pected pirates, to have them adjudicated upon by itscourts. This right cannot be exercised at a place underthe jurisdiction of another state.

Despite the content of Article 105, in practice,the nations operating off the coast of Somalia are veryreluctant to prosecute the suspected pirates, due to theanticipated practical and legal difficulties. When the sus-pects are detained, they are seldom sent to the states that


captured them. We are actually facing the “death” of theuniversal jurisdiction of the capturing states. Taking intoaccount that all the efforts to establish other mecha-nisms for prosecution, such as an international tribunal,a regional court or a special domestic champers with in-ternational components, have until now failed (despitethe resent call by the SC Resolution 1918(2010)) andtheir prospects are rather faint, most of the arrested pi-rates are transferred to regional countries, in order toface trial. For example, EU had agreements, in the formof exchange of letters, with Kenya and Seychelles inorder to facilitate the transfer of the suspected pirates tothese countries. Kenya had accepted also pirates cap-tured by US ships, pursuant to a MOU signed betweenthe two states. This practice is not confined only to west-ern countries. For example, Russians have transferredarrested pirates to Yemen. Although, the penal systemsof the regional states may have reached the saturationpoint, as it is shown by the resent announcement by theKenyan Authorities that they will not try any more pi-rates detained in international piracy operations off thecoast of Somalia, there does not seem to exist any vi-able alternative at the moment.

Although there are claims that such transfersfrom capturing states to third states is of dubious legal-ity, there exists a relatively big amount of state practiceto conclude that a contra legem custom has emerged, al-lowing such transfers to take place. Although the cre-ation of a customary rule, which is contrary to theprovisions of a treaty, is not free of difficulties, such apossibility exists. In our case, we have a general practice,which does not fit into the provisions of the treaty, withthe concomitant opinio juris. It is noticeable, that no ob-jection has been yet lodged, at least to my knowledge,regarding the transfers of the arrested pirates to regionalcountries, based on the violation of the provision of Ar-ticle 105 LOSC, proving the acquiescence of the inter-national community to that practice. The treatyprovisions, which are replaced by the new customaryrule, fall into desuetude. As long as the human rights ofthe arrested pirates are safeguarded, there is no legal dif-ficulty to acknowledge that a customary rule hasemerged, regarding the potential transfer to third states.

The last comment prompts us to question if therights of the suspects are fully respected. To begin with,Article 105 LOSC provides that the judicial power is re-sponsible to determine the action to be taken with re-gard to the ships, aircraft or property of the pirates. Theprovision of LOSC has a profound reason: only thecourts must have the power to adjudicate a penal issuethat seriously affects the property rights of the suspectedpirates and maybe the rights of third parties acting ingood faith. Its rationale is to protect individuals from ar-

bitrariness. Despite this provision, the seized propertyis further destroyed without any involvement of anycourt, only by a decision taken by the commander ofthe naval unit. Some scholars argue that a contra legemcustom is created; enabling members of the executivebranch of the government, such as the naval officers totake the decision for the destruction of the property,when there is no other option available. That is the caseespecially when the suspected pirates are subsequentlyfreed. It is doubtful whether such a custom can exist. Itis beyond the ambit of this presentation to deal with thejus cogens character of the provisions that protecthuman rights. The issue is not free from controversy inthe international literature. For our purposes, is suffi-cient to remind that:

“Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair andpublic hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal,in the determination of his rights and obligations andof any criminal charge against him” (Article 10 Univer-sal Declaration of Human Rights).

The destruction of the vessels and the equip-ment of pirates is not the only controversial aspect re-garding the respect of the human rights of the arrestedsuspects. At sea, suspects most of the times have beencaptured with no ability to access legal advice and in theabsence of an interpreter so they are unable to commu-nicate in their Somali language or understand the evi-dence, despite the fact that that the UN Covenant onCivil and Political Rights stipulates that in the determi-nation of any criminal charge against him, everyone shallbe entitled to be informed promptly and in detail in alanguage which he understands of the nature and causeof the charge against him (Article 14). Moreover, theEU Standing Operating Procedure for the arrest of pi-rates provides a 48 hours timeframe for the Command-ing Officer of the naval unit that took the pirates intocustody, to reach a decision whether the suspects aregoing to be arrested or not, without determining any-thing about their legal status during this period. Operat-ing under these “wholly exceptional circumstances”poses great problems regarding the respect of humanrights.

Piracy jure gentium exists only in internationalwaters. All piratical acts that occur in the territorial seaof any state do not qualify as piracy. That is why the dis-tinction between “piracy” and “armed robbery” was in-troduced by IMO, in order to signify the differenceresulting from place the illegal acts of depredation takeplace. As is evident from Article 105, universal jurisdic-tion exists only for the international crime of piracy.Subsequently, the states that have incorporated the crimeof piracy in their internal penal systems refer only topiracy jure gentium. Despite the fact that the relevant


UN SC Resolutions authorized states cooperating withthe TFG in the fight against piracy and armed robberyat sea off the coast of Somalia to enter the territorialwaters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts ofpiracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistentwith such action permitted on the high seas with respectto piracy under relevant international law, there is not, atleast the present writer’s knowledge any country withprescriptive jurisdiction for the armed robbery in So-malia’s territorial waters. The issue is of great impor-tance, taking into account that the current operations ofwestern forces in Somali Basin take place very near tothe coast of the country, just outside the camps of thepirates.

Another issue regarding the relevance of Arti-cle 105 LOSC is the provision that every state may seizea ship or aircraft taken by piracy. Until now this possi-bility, although perfectly lawful, has not be explored bythe naval forces operating off the coast of Somalia. Res-cue efforts are not launched, once pirates have takencontrol of the merchant vessel, as it is often felt that in-tervening would endanger the hostages. Of course thereare some rare incidents were military forces intervenedafter the boarding of the vessel by the pirates, but in allof these situations the pirates were not in control of theship and the crew was locked in a safe place. Probably weare facing another erosion of Article 105 LOSC, mov-ing towards release operations with the consent of theflag state of the merchant ship, as it is provided by theROEs of operation ATALANTA.

Leaving the issues of Article 105, another inter-esting point is the confusion created by the current Mar-itime Interdiction Operations, regarding the “right ofapproach”. Under customary international law the rightof approach deals with the privilege of any warship toclose the distance with merchant vessels in order to ver-ify their nationality. Although, the customary right ofapproach was not subsequently codified by the treatiesregarding the law of the sea, it is still applicable and it isimplicit in the provisions of Article 110 LOSC. The cur-rent practice of the naval units taking part in the opera-tion ATALANTA uses the term “approach” with adifferent meaning: An approach is defined as a de-esca-latory low key interaction, which gives no jurisdictionalpowers and has as a prerequisite the invitation of themaster of the vessel. Although approach does not in-clude “boarding exploitation” of the vessel, it is rou-tinely used by the naval forces. The same idea ismaterialized by the NATO forces under the term “con-sensual visit”. Although as a principle a consensual visitis conducted at the invitation of the master of a vessel,which is not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of theboarding officer, nevertheless it allows for a rapid veri-

fication of the legitimacy of a vessel’s voyage by ob-taining or confirming vessel documents, cargo, and nav-igation records without undue delay to the visited vessel.The blurring of the different definitions (“right of ap-proach”, “approach”, “consensual visit”, “consensualboarding”) is an expression of the tendency to the re-laxation of the current rules of international law re-garding the interception of merchant vessels oninternational waters.

Because of the absence of a “leviathan” in theinternational system, the issue of the change in interna-tional law is a very complex one. A constant interplaybetween existing norms and emerging customary rulesensures the adaptation of international law to the cur-rent circumstances. In this period of international up-heaval, a new balance between mare clausum and mareliberum is emerging. In such circumstances the two-wayrelation between conducts of the operations and legalframework is heightened.

LLttCCddrr PPaannaaggiioottiiss SSeerrggiiss HHNN was born in Athensin 1973. He graduated from the Hellenic Naval Academy in1995 and has since served onboard various frigates of the HellenicFleet, as a deck officer.

He has obtained a law degree from the University ofAthens (2002). He has received a Law and Legislation Master(LLM) from the University of London (2004) and from theLondon School of Economics (2005). He has also acquired aMSc in the field of International Relations, from the PanteionUniversity, Athens (2008). He is a PhD candidate of the beforementioned University.

From December 2008 to April 2009 he has served asthe Legal Advisor to the Force Commander of the first EU navaloperation, “ATALANTA”. He is currently serving at the In-ternational Law Department of the Hellenic Navy General Staff.


Hellenic Navy Seals during a Boarding Operation

bbyy LLtt.. SSppyyrriiddoonn MMaazzaarraakkiiss ,, Ph.D. Canditate

After the end of the Cold War, a new ap-

proach to security emerged. The concept of security hasmoved away from classic state-centric relations, and hasbroadened to include other aspects of security that ex-ceed national borders. With the shadow of the Cold Warlifted, critical security scholars recognised a wide rangeof security threats ranging from societal and economicto environmental and political threats. This concept wascaptured by the Copenhagen School of Security Studiesfounded by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde.Moreover, the concept of human security started to be-come the focus of security and gained the attention ofall international organisations and institutions. In its2009 Annual Report, the UN Office on Drugs andCrime recognises maritime piracy as being one of themost significant emerging forms of transnational crime.Consequently, maritime piracy came out from the back-ground which was after the end of its Golden age andre-emerged as a protagonist of the international scene.Piracy, as an emerging form of crime, is a challenge forinternational security as security is conceived today. Ob-viously maritime piracy constitutes a security issue whichinvolves the loss of life (human and societal security) aswell as loss of property (economic security) and may in-clude collisions at sea and potential environmental dis-aster (environmental security). With oceans coveringalmost three-quarters of the earth’s surface and the 90percent of all international trade transported by sea ,piracy and any kind of maritime crime is undoubtedly anissue of international security.

Piracy as a phenomenon has an interesting circular na-ture. Piracy finds the opportunity to flourish in areaswhich are characterised by an absence of law enforce-ment and a vacuum of authority, where simultaneouslyundermining the structures of civilisation and gover-nance. Even though piracy was always conceived as acrime which all states had the obligation to counterpiracy was never eliminated But why is piracy such a di-achronic phenomenon? The answer is obvious; As Mar-tin Murphy suggests “piracy is a low-risk, criminalactivity that pays well.” Undoubtedly, profits frompiracy are disproportionate in contrast to the losses ofthose who are engaged in this kind of activity. Piracy hasthe same requirements as other forms of organisedcrime (trafficking, armed robbery, smuggling) : motiveand opportunity. The motive is almost always the same,the gain of wealth. The challenge for governments andthe international community is to eliminate opportuni-ties. Piracy is an opportunistic crime which takes advan-tage of areas with limited law enforcement caused bythe existence of weak state entities in the area. Duringrecent years, piracy has increased in such areas aroundthe world for instance the Gulf of Aden, the MalaccaStraits and the Gulf of Guinea. Peter Lehr and Hen-drick Lehmann argue that successful piracy depends onan ‘enabling environment.’ Such an enabling environ-ment is characterised by the existence of narrow andcongested waterways, in conjunction with the existenceof important and dense sea lines of communication,near to coasts which feature mangrove swamps or wa-ters littered with small islands and islets. An amplifyingcause of an enabling environment is the existence offailed states in the area which are incapable or unwillingto uphold law and order. As it is shown n the followingimage the areas of the contemporary piratical activitiesis centred in places with such an enabling environment.The area of the Gulf of Aden and of the Horn ofAfrica is one of them.

The escalation of piracy around the world andmostly off the coasts Somalia and the Gulf of Aden, in2008 concentrated the interest of the international com-munity and caused a coordinated response in this area.There, piracy was conceived as a significant security issuewhich had to be countered. What caused the interven-tion of the international community can be found in theof the IMB 2008 Annual Report, “from every perspec-tive, the phenomenon of Somali piracy is unprecedentedand has spiralled out of control.” The internationalcommunity reacted because of the extraordinary nature


PPIIRRAACCYY AASS AANN IINNTTEERRNNAATTIIOONNAALL SSEECCUURRIITTYY BBRREEAACCHH

Fig. 1: Image of Reported piracy and armed robbery incidents during 2010 (4)

of the Somali piracy. This is partly because large scalepiracy produces larger scale insecurities. It is arguablewhether the international community was willing to in-tervene in the case of Somali piracy if the incidents inthe area were limited to the classification of low levelarmed robbery. On that an important question arises;which is the threshold which piracy operations shouldpass in order to trigger international response of such ascale as in Somalia?

Assessing whether piracy should be interpretedas a security breach or as an ordinary crime is connectedwith the scale of the actual attack. Piracy targets varyfrom small fishing and sailing boats to cargo ships andlarge tankers. The difference of these patterns of attackis that the first are simply opportunistic or spontaneousattacks in contrast to the second which need an organ-ised and planned attack. The figures of the IMB reportsshow some interesting results.

This table shows the tendency of pirates to ex-ecute more sophisticated attacks than before. A com-parison of the figures of 2003 with these of 2009illustrates this tendency.

The degree to which it could be a threat to se-curity depends on its scale and organisation. The argu-ment that low level armed robbery can create asignificant economic security breach is debatable. In ac-cordance with the Danish Institute for InternationalStudies 2009 Report on piracy, attacks involving petty

theft from ships in harbour or at sea can hardly have anysignificant impact on global shipping or world trade. Onthe other hand there are some direct and indirect effectswhich influence economic losses from piracy. The directeffects concern loss of cargo, money or even the wholeship; damage to a ship or cargo; ransom money; andeven delays caused by detours to avoid high risk areasor investigations. The indirect effects concern increasethe insurance costs, increase in costs to provide addi-tional security measures on board or on shore, and costsincurred in the fight against piracy. It can be argued thatthe larger amount of economic losses from piracy is notcaused by actual attacks but by the effect of piracy inthe feeling of insecurity in high risk areas and by the ef-forts to provide security in such areas.

Concerning social and environmental security,the scale of the attack is crucial to determine the level ofthe threat. Undoubtedly, the higher the scale of the at-tacks, ,the higher the level of the threat. When low levelrobberies occur the feeling of social security may de-crease but it will not be the same if major hijacks startto occur since they involve greater loss of life and showthe existence of more organised groups of pirates whichin fact may became a serious challenge for the regimeof the states in the area. In the same sense, in caseswhere major hijacks occur, the danger of an environ-mental disaster is closer since the ship is controlled bycriminals which may or may not have the capabilities tonavigate the ship safely.


Fig. 2: Types of Attacks (Figures corrected as at 31 March 2009)

Unfortunately, the facts show that pirates are becomingmore ruthless and that they use more sophisticatedequipment in their operations. There are reports whichshow that Somali pirates have started to operate at greatdistances off the coast of Somalia by using “motherships” to extend their range of operations. Simultane-ously, the pirates have improved their equipment andthey now use GPS systems and satellite telephones forcoordination together, along with sophisticated weaponssuch as MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence Sys-tems) and RPGs (Rocket Propelled Grenades). More-over, there are indications that Somali pirates areplugged into an international network which feeds in-formation on the movements of vessels in the area. Thehighly sophisticated and coordinated attacks of Somalipirates show that the international community has “todeal with organised piracy, not with mere acts of ad-hocpiracy occasionally being committed by impoverishedfisher folk.”

Indeed, piracy of the scale of low level armedrobbery can hardly be conceived as a serious securitybreach which needs extraordinary measures to reversethe situation. However, as was shown earlier pirates havestarted to organise themselves and undoubtedly theprofits from piracy will equip them with even more so-phisticated instruments. The scale of contemporarypiracy supports its description as a transnational secu-rity problem but the analysis of cases of piracy shows agraver future for international security.

The threat is the potential linkage of piracy tomaritime terrorism which has dominated the securityagenda since 9/11. The scholars of maritime securitybelieve there is a link between maritime crime and piracyand maritime terrorism. The attack on the USS Cole inOctober 2000, undoubtedly the work of Al-Qaeda, il-lustrates the harsh possibilities when terrorist organisa-tions operate at sea. Piratical activities conducted byterrorists constitute a threat for international maritimesecurity greater than ever. So far there has not been suf-ficient evidence to support actual cooperation betweenpirate groups and terrorist organisations. Martin Mur-phy argues that “Piracy and terrorism show no apparentlinks, but the presence of piracy is a possible indicatorthat the conditions exist for maritime insurgency andmaritime terrorism to take root.” Arguably, the ‘soft un-derbelly’ of the maritime environment and shipping in-dustry is one of the potential targets of global terrorism.It is possible that when terrorists are unable to carry outacts on land, due to countries’ security services, they willinstead turn their efforts to the vulnerable maritime en-vironment. The possible consequences of such a situa-tion are beyond the foreseeable future. It is not in theWest’s interests to have a ‘war on piracy,’ as this would

hamper the customary value of the freedom of naviga-tion and will affect the international shipping industry.However, policy makers must act before such levels ofpiracy occur that would result in the making of a ‘war onpiracy’.

Even though the consequences of piracy todayseem to be regional and rather limited, the potential es-calation of this phenomenon may include further threatswhich will have a global influence. There is evidencewhich shows that piracy is starting to be more sophisti-cated; if has ceased to be just a robbery of small vesselsand sailing crafts, and is starting to include attacks onlarger ships such as tankers and cargo ships with the ob-jective of hijacking and kidnapping for ransom. More-over, there is a more frightening possibility. The potentiallinkages of piracy groups with terrorist organisationshave created a threatening combination which may dis-turb the maritime domain in the recent years. The mar-itime environment, with its vast oceans, seems extremelyvulnerable and opportunistic in front of the two threatsof piracy and smuggling to maritime terrorism. An in-vestigation must begin with the assertion that contem-porary piracy is a global phenomenon but not a globalproblem. The threshold which the level of piracy mustpass in order to be conceived as an issue of internationalsecurity is debatable. The decision whether a situation isextraordinary or not is a matter of politics. The act ofsecuritisation is at the centre of this process. Piracy in aregion will be conceived as a threat to international whenpolicy makers make it such through political speeches. The recent cases of piracy off the coast of Somalia andin the Gulf of Aden show that international coopera-tion, combined with domestic and regional efforts maybring about a suppression of this phenomenon. Coop-eration between governments, agencies and organisa-tions will not only suppress piracy but will also empowerthe maritime security environment to provide stabilityand development in the area. The question which mustbe answered is whether it is crucial to act before theemergence of a security breach in the maritime domainor wait until of has happened. This paper suggests thatit is better to act in advance than rather react to a secu-rity breach. Maybe piracy is not a significant current in-ternational security issue but what if piracy evolves insomething more threatening?

The only way to ensure the security of the seasis to develop a stable and secure maritime environment.The maritime domain must be protected by internationallaw which would be robust enough to regulate interna-tional cooperation and action. As was discussed in theprevious chapter, contemporary international law andsubsequent special agreements have responded to piracyas a new type of organised crime. However, interna-


tional law has weaknesses which may constitute a sig-nificant problem in the face of future threats. Precau-tionary measures can be used as a safety belt for thedevelopment and further existence of a secure maritimeenvironment. Piracy must be seen as a potential signifi-cant security problem and must be countered and antic-ipated today via international cooperation and action.Immediate action is important. Current piracy may notconstitute a significant security threat but its potentialand broader consequences are hardly foreseeable. Piracymust be countered as an issue of maritime security. Con-sidering the extent and vulnerability of the maritime do-main, it is highly risky to assume that maritime securityis not a crucial issue. The international community mustact before maritime crime reaches uncontrollable levels.Such an evolution would constitute a harsh situationwhich would need harsh measures to be countered. It isimportant to find “reasonable strategies and means” inorder to suppress piracy and reduce the risk of an unsafemaritime environment “without sacrificing importantvalues such as the principles of free navigation on theworld’s oceans and respect of the international law.

References Alan Collins, Ed., Contemporary Security Studies, (Ox-

ford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 60.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, AnnualReport 2009, United Nations, p. 4h t t p : / / w w w. u n o d c . o r g / d o c u m e n t s / a b o u t -unodc/AR09_LORES.pdf (accessed May 28, 2009).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas,“Oceans: The Source of Life”, 20th Anniversary, UnitedNations, p. 13. http://www.un.org/Depts//los/con-vention_agreements/convention_20years/oceanssourceoflife.pdf (accessed May 20, 2009).

Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, p. 24.Peter Lehr, Ed., Violence at Sea, p. 11.ICC, Live Piracy Map 1010

http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_fab-rik&view=visualization&controller=visualization.googlemap&Itemid=219 (accessed June 2010)

ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Report 1January–31 December 2008, p. 39.

ICC International Maritime Bureau, Annual Report 1January–31 December 2008, p. 5; ICC InternationalMaritime Bureau, Report for the Period, 1 January–31

March 2009, p. 5.

Bjorn Moller, “Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and NavalStrategy”, International Relations and Security Network,Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Report2009, p. 8, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Li-brary/Publications/Detail/?id=96541&lng=en (ac-cessed June 9, 2009).

Roger Middleton, “Piracy in Somalia”, p. 6.

Peter Lehr, Ed. Violence at Sea, p. 17.

Herbert-Burns, Bateman and Lehr, ed., Lloyd’s MIUHandbook of Maritime Security.,p.9

Catherine Zara Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism inSoutheast Asia”, p. 3.

Peter Murphy, “Suppression of Piracy and MaritimeTerrorism”, p.40.

www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=65 (accessed 20 July 2009)

Derek Johnson and Erika Pladdet, “An Overview ofthe Current Concerns in Piracy studies and New Direc-tions for Research”, Centre for Maritime Research, p. 34http://www.marecentre.nl/people_and_the_sea_2/documents/piracy.pdf

ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and ArmedRobbery against Ships, Annual Report 1 January – 31December 2008.

Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money, p. 177.Moller, “Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Naval Strat-

egy”, p. 31.

LLtt.. SSppyyrriiddoonn MMaazzaarraakkiiss HH..NN.. graduated from theHellenic Naval Academy and followed the normal carrier pathof a Naval Officer. Today he is holding the position of OperationsOfficer of HS NAVARINON. He holds B.S., a M.Sc. inGlobal Security, from Cranfield University (UK). He has beennominated for Imbert Prize (awarded by the Association of Se-curity Consultants) for his thesis on the contemporary anti- piracylaw and its security implications. He has a special interest inNaval History and on various occasions lectured on GunboatDiplomacy.


CCAAPPAACCIITTYY BBUUIILLDDIINNGG AASS AANN AANNSSWWEERR TTOO PPIIRRAACCYYCCAAPPAACCIITTYY BBUUIILLDDIINNGG AASS AANN AANNSSWWEERR TTOO PPIIRRAACCYY

byy DDrr.. TThhoommaass CC.. BBrruunneeaauu &&LLtt JJGG IIooaannnniiss NNeellllaass HHNN,, MSc student

In every era mankind faces security challenges;

however, one security challenge has remained through-out the ages, and its name is Piracy. Plenty of historicalevidence proves that piracy has been an issue for inter-national shipping since ancient times. In fact, there arehistorical reports on piracy that date from the 13th cen-tury BC. However, today many would expect that piracyis no longer serious security issue. Unfortunately, in thelast several years piracy has turned into a major issue andthe latest facts reveal that the piracy phenomenon ismore complicated than many originally assumed.

The challenge of piracy is recognized globally.Indicative of the severity of the problem is the numberof think tanks and regional experts that have focusedon this issue, as well as the significant number of coun-tries committing naval forces to address this challenge.This article attempts to present why capacity buildingon a regional level is the most promising way to addresspiracy by analyzing the origins of piracy in two localizedsituations, the Horn of Africa and Southeast Asia.

A wide consensus holds that piracy’s roots arelocated ashore and usually it is a consequence of politi-cal and regional instability. In our age piracy is occurringin two areas of major strategic interest, the Gulf ofAden and the Malacca Strait in South East Asia. Clearly,piracy signals weak control over littoral waters in the re-gion and weak local institutions that are unable to securetheir maritime domain [1]. In closing, the 2009 Interna-tional Maritime Bureau (IMB) report acknowledges 196attacks in the wider area of the Gulf of Aden and about30 piracy attacks in Southeast Asia [2].

Causal Factors of Piracy in the Horn of Africa (HoA)

The literature on this issue concludes that the causalmechanism of piracy in the HoA includes the followingfactors: intrastate conflicts, geography, cultural shifts,ship owner policy, and weak political and security en-forcement institutions [1] - [3].

For the last two decades, Somalia has been suffer-

ing from a civil war between clans, ending up being afailed state. Likewise, due to domestic issues, Yemen isfacing the danger of becoming a failed state. Both ofthese countries involuntary are hosts to pirate groupsbecause internal conflicts provide pirates the necessaryenvironment to direct and conduct operations [4].

Geography plays an important role, Somalia’scoastline is estimated to be around 2000 miles long;since no coastguard or navy patrol these waters, and pi-rates are able to conduct their operations from a num-ber of different bases without any trouble. Historically,the rise of piracy has been supported by the proximityof the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal. Yemen’s geog-raphy also is very attractive to pirates due to its longcoastline and proximity to high traffic maritime corri-dors ([4],[5]).

Piracy is supported from by a cultural shift onthe part of the locals towards a more lenient policyagainst pirates. One of the main characteristics of thearea is poverty, and piracy is providing a lot of money tothe area. That is why many young Somalis view piracy asan optional professional choice [4].

Finally, two important contributors to the rise inpiracy in the area is the lack of strong judicial/legal andsecurity enforcement mechanisms. The failed-state sta-tus of Somalia limits it ability to put on trial any of thealleged pirates. Furthermore, the European Unionmember states are unwilling to sign any agreementagainst piracy with Yemen due to the fact that Yemenilegislation opposes European Union laws regardinghuman rights on the issue of the death penalty. Conse-quently, the international community followed a differ-ent path and signed a memorandum with Kenya andSeychelles allowing these countries to put on trial allegedpirates ([3],[6],[7]).

Another aspect of this issue is the fact thatpiracy involves a number of jurisdictional restrictionsthat the international community has to overcome inorder to intervene. In 2008, after a request from theTransnational Federal Government (TFG), the UnitedNations issued resolution UNSCR 1851 allowing thepursue of suspected pirate ships inside the Somali terri-torial waters by foreign non-Somali naval units ([5],[7]).


Causal Factors of Piracy in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is the other geographical area where,according to statistics, piracy still occurs and where it isworth attempting to distinguish the regional factors lead-ing to piracy. The literature leans toward the same factorsas those in the Horn of Africa, but on obviously differ-ent context [1] - [3].

The Malacca strait geography is as important asthe Gulf of Aden since the Malacca strait is consideredone of the most important, global strategic shippingroutes. Indicative of the strait’s importance is that halfof world trade goes through this choke point ([1],[8]).The Malacca strait is about 600 miles long and is thefrontier between the three states of Singapore, Malaysiaand Indonesia. Specific features like the strait’s width (insome areas it is only 1.5 miles wide), make it conduciveto attacks.

Furthermore, the emergence of piracy has beenhelped by the fact that these countries do not have thenecessary technological assets and means to keep an ef-fective watch over the whole length of the strait. Pirateswere left free to continue their attacks since there wasno competent security authority to establish order in theStrait of Malacca ([1],[3]).

In Southeast Asia during difficult economic times,piracy provided a supplementary income to some vil-lages. In order to avoid poverty, a number of people, re-duced their moral standards and became pirates. Thepoverty in the region was so high that local fishermenwere tempted by the sight of large ships transiting atvery low speeds due to local draft limitations. In a sense,the pirates follow the same tactic as the pirates in theHoA; they ask for a low ransom, which after negotia-tion may end up at only a few thousand dollars- a rela-tively small amount in the global economy thatrepresents an extremely high amount in the local com-munity ([3],[9]).

Finally, piracy is helped by the unique geographyand proximity of national borders in specific parts ofthe strait. The littoral states were motivated to view thisproblem as a domestic and not a regional problem, aview that inevitably led to a conflict of intra–regionalinterests. This conflict was further escalated due to thefact that these countries, (as former colonies), are ex-tremely sensitive about sovereignty issues ([3],[10]).

Capacity Building

The preceding analysis of the factors of piracyin Southeast Asia and in the HoA clearly demonstratesthe problematic nature of this issue by stressing its do-mestic and international dimensions, Consequently it be-comes obvious that only a consistent capacity buildingpolicy against piracy will effectively address this issue.

Capacity building can be defined as: “Planned development of (or increase in) knowledge,output rate, management, skills, and other capabilitiesof an organization through acquisition, incentives, tech-nology, and/or training [12].”

The majority of regional experts agree thatpiracy can only be effectively addressed if the coastalstates assume responsibilities and exercise effective con-trol over their inhabitants. Considering the complexitiesof the region, this is an optimistic scenario. In the casewhere political challenges on shore result in a stalemate,the international community should take the necessarysteps they can towards capacity building to secure thearea and protect the global economy independently ofthe anomalies happening ashore. Thus this issue canbe effectively addressed only if the international com-munity can find innovative ways to intervene in cooper-ation with local institutions and implement moderntechnologies. Consequently, it is important to develop acapacity-building strategy in accordance with the politi-cal developments ashore. In addition, there are allega-tions that pirates are affiliated with terrorist groups, sothere is a great incentive for the international communityto intervene.

The best way to address this threat is by consid-ering the complexities in the area on all levels, from so-cietal fragmentation in clans and sub-clans to specificgeographic features of the region. Furthermore, in prin-ciple, there are some basic considerations that must gov-ern this policy. These considerations can be summed upas the following: The policy to address all these chal-lenges must be based on local, regional, and internationalcollaboration; otherwise all efforts to deal with this issuewill ultimately fail [7].

ConclusionsThe international community can offer tempo-

rary solutions by deploying naval task forces (i.e. Oper-ation Atalanta / Ocean Shield/ Allied Provider) or byproviding to weak littorals states support and aid to ex-ercise more effective maritime control over their area ofresponsibility. However, both of these methods of tack-ling this issue cause a significant economic burden tomany countries, which they are unlikely to assume, with-


out addressing permanently this issue.The issue of piracy can be addressed perma-

nently only when the involved states obtain the power toestablish strong local institutions, such as police andcoastguard forces. The moment there are strong localinstitutions, the level of all criminality including piracywill be reduced significantly.

Capacity Building is the best path to accomplisha permanent solution. However this cannot occur overa very short period time, but rather only after a coordi-nated series of efforts from the international commu-nity in cooperation with the locals.

List of References[1] Murphy, Martin N. Contemporary Piracy andMaritime Terrorism: The Threat to International Secu-rity. Adelphi Papers; no.388. London: IISS, 2007.[2] ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy andArmed Robbery against Ships Annual Report (UnitedKingdom, January 1 – December 31, 2009).[3] Riggs, Stephen L. Piracy in the Horn of Africa:A Comparative Study with Southeast Asia. Thesis. Mon-terey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009.http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Dec/09Dec_Riggs.pdf[4] Hansen, Stig Jarle. Piracy in the Greater Gulf ofAden: Myths, Misconception and Remedies. Oslo, Nor-way: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Re-search, 2008.[5] Ploch, Lauren. Piracy off the Horn of Africa.R405528. Washington, DC: Congressional ResearchService, 2009.[6] Meade, Richard. “EU Close to Legal Frameworkon Piracy Prosecutions,” February 27, 2009, Lloyd’s List,http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/viewArticle.htm?ar-ticleId=20017622826&src=rss,accessed May 2010.[7] Cline, Jeff. “Maritime Security.” In. SecuringFreedom in the Global Commons edited by Scott Jasper.Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010.[8] Bateman, Sam. “Regime Building in the MalaccaStrait and Singapore Straits: Two Steps Forward, OneStep Back,” The Economics of Peace and Security Jour-nal 2009 4(2): 45-61[9] Raymond, Catherine Zara. Piracy in SoutheastAsia New Trends, Issues and Responses, (workingpaper) Singapore: Institute of Defense and StrategicStudies, 2005. [10] Mark, J.N. “Unilateralism and Regionalism:Working Together and Alone in the Malacca Straits, inPiracy” Maritime Terrorism and Securing the MalaccaStraits, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb Singapore: Insti-tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.

[11] Young, Adam J. Contemporary Maritime Piracyin Southeast Asia: History, Causes, and Remedies. Sin-gapore: International Institute for Asian Studies; Insti-tute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.[12] Business Dictionary, http://www.businessdic-tionary.com/definition/capacity-building.html, accessedon August 10, 2010

DDrr.. TThhoommaass BBrruunneeaauu is a Distinguished Professorof National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.He has researched and written extensively on Latin America, Por-tugal and a wide variety of issues in security and civil – militaryrelations. Dr. Bruneau has published more than fifteen books aswell as articles in journals including Comparative Politics, ThirdWorld Quarterly, Encyclopedia of Democracy, Journal of Democ-racy, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,Democratization, and Military Affairs.

LLttJJGG IIooaannnniiss NNeellllaass HH..NN.. is now pursuing a dualdegree Master in Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in MontereyCalifornia, studying Applied Physics and Civil Military relationsHis thesis is evaluating the idea of NATO Capacity Building inthe Horn of Africa countries trying to eliminate piracy incidents.


bbyy DDrr TTrreevvoorr DDoobbbbiinnss,, STResearch Ltd, UK ([email protected])

DDrr SStteevvee MMyyeerrss,, University of Chichester, UK

DDrr JJuulliiee SSttaarrkk,, Combatant Craft Division, NSWC

Carderock, USALLtt GGeeoorrggiiooss MMaannttzzoouurriiss HH..NN..,,

NMIOTC, Greece

This article is a précis of a paper presented at the NATO RTOSymposium (HFM -202), 'Human Modelling For Military Ap-plication', held in Amsterdam (NL) during October 2010. Fur-ther information may be obtained from Dr Dobbins or fromNMIOTC (POC, Lt G. Mantzouris H.N.)

INTRODUCTION

Maritime Interdiction (MI) operations are an

increasingly important element of the littoral environ-ment, the control of Economic Exclusion Zones andthe Global War on Terror. This is demonstrated by theInternational anti-piracy operations around the Horn ofAfrica and the establishment of the NATO MaritimeInterdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC).A generic MI operation may involve the insertion of aship boarding team, utilising High Speed Craft (HSC),from where the team is required to board the ship usinga flexible wire (caving type) ladder. Once aboard, theteam undertakes a high-tempo offensive operationwhere accurate target recognition and prosecution areessential for operational success. The maritime environ-ment is arguably one of the harshest work environmentin which humans contend. In addition to hot, temper-ate or cold temperatures, the Repeated Shock (RS) andWhole Body Vibration (WBV) exposure of a HSC in-sertion transit has the potential to induce high levels ofpost-transit fatigue and injury.

Operational analysis demonstrates two single-points-of-failure that increases the risk of mission failure of theMI operation as described in this paper. These are:

• The HSC coxswain during the insertion phase

• The ladder climb/transfer onto the target vesselA graphical representation of these risks is shown inFigure 1. It can be seen that the Risk to the Mission ishigh prior to the Transfer; this is where the actions ofthe coxswain during the approach to the target are crit-ical to mission success. Similarly, the Risk to the Missionand Risk to the Force are greatest from just prior to thebeginning of the Transfer through to its completion; thisis where the actions of the coxswain during the Trans-fer, and the ability of the boarding team to successfullyexecute the transfer are critical to mission success.

PHASES OF A GENERIC MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATION

PREPARATION PHASEPlanning & Rehearsal - The MI team, including theboarding and Command & Control (C2) elements, willhave completed a through planning activity for a rangeof different MI scenarios, including wherever possiblethe use of intelligence specific to the target vessel. Fromthese, the team will have undertaken training and re-hearsals to maximise operational effectiveness.

Move to the Area of Operation (AOO) / Drop-off-point - The move to the start line can be short or long;and can include road, water and air moves. For example,the HSC may be deployed directly from a larger mar-itime platform operating in the area, whereas a longerdeployment could include a road move to an air-head,where the MI team may be flown to the general area ofoperation. From this Drop-Off-Point the HSC maysubsequently need to transit a significant distance to thetarget vessel, potentially requiring refuelling.

Physiological factors - In high-tempo operationswhere MI teams have to remain on-call, it can be diffi-cult to plan and ensure that the team maintain the ap-propriate energy and hydration levels. Sleep deprivationis a commonly recognised factor influencing military op-erations. Where MI teams are kept on-call, rather thanacting as part of larger planned operations, it can be typ-ical for operations to start at times when the teams havebeen awake for significant periods of time undertakingnormal duties. If an MI operation is initiated when theteam has already been awake for 18 hours it is likely thatthe team members will have been awake for over 24hours when the boarding phase is initiated.

MMOODDEELLLLIINNGG HHUUMMAANN PPEERRFFOORRMMAANNCCEE IINNMMAARRIITTIIMMEE IINNTTEERRDDIICCTTIIOONN OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNSS ©



INSERTION PHASE BY HIGH SPEED CRAFT

Repeated shock & WBV exposure from HSCtransits has been shown to result in fatigue and an en-hanced risk of musculoskeletal injury, whilst the use ofshock mitigation solutions (e.g., suspension seating) maymaintain performance post-transit and thus support op-erational effectiveness. Figure 2 provides an example ofthe effectiveness that shock mitigation can provide formaintaining performance post-transit.

The HSC Coxswain - an essential component inthe MI operation, having the same level of importanceas the helicopter pilot. The control of the HSC isachieved via steering, throttle and trim control, with ef-fective throttle control being essential for reducing RS &WBV exposure, and ensuring the safety of the craft, em-barked crew and passengers. Although this may appearto be a relatively passive 'driving' task, evidence suggeststhat the Coxswains role is high workload and requires ahigh level of training.

FFiigguurree 22:: Differences in Post-Transit Performance (Fatigue) following a 3-Hour Voyage (~Sea State 2) in 8.5mRIBs for Occupants using Fixed and Suspension Jockey-Style Seats.

ACCESSING THE TARGET VESSELThis may be considered the most important evo-

lution of the operation and is a single point-of-failure. Holding Station on the Target Vessel by the

HSC: The Coxswains Role - The position held againstthe target vessel is a compromise between the wave pat-tern along the length of the vessel and the potential ac-cess points, lower level access being preferred to reducethe climbing height. The maintenance of the position isa combination of the HSC coxswains skill with steeringand throttle control. The coxswain is required to accu-rately control the following positions; longitudinal posi-tion for the access location of the target vessel and thedistance from vessel – this is important for not gettingstuck on the target vessel and to be able to rapidly moveaway from the vessel if required. For HSC to be an ef-fective part of the MI operation the appropriate Com-mand & Control (C2) is required. This C2 has a numberof aspects; communication with the operational com-mand structure, communication for the operation of theHSC, and communication between the HSC crew andthe boarding team. A model of HSC C2 (HSC3) hasbeen developed that supports MI operations but spe-cific operational procedures are required to achieve aneffective boarding.

Boarding Equipment - Placing the ladder,poles, etc., often known as 'hooking-on', is a highlyskilled task that must be practiced and perfected. Arange of equipment is required by teams for the types ofvessels they are likely to encounter. The boarding lad-ders used are of two designs; Fixed (limited height butdimensions and rigidity provide for good biomechanics)and flexible: (light weight and easy roll-up storage, butthe flexibility and dimensions of the ladder result in con-trol issues and an increase in the difficulty of climbing).There are a number of human factors issues that influ-ence the individual’s climbing performance. A numberof these include; gravity/weight, mobility/range of mo-tion/dexterity, visibility (darkness and water spray), lad-der climbing technique and skill, (foot and handplacement, Centre of Gravity (CoG), strength/muscu-lar endurance).

The Risk of Falling - There are multiple fac-tors that increase the risk of falling from the ladder. Inaddition to potentially compromising the mission, theindividuals are at risk of potentially fatal injuries. Thisissue contributes to making the climbing task a singlepoint of mission failure. The following two issues areimportant; Stepping on the ladder and muscular fatigue.



ACTION ON TARGET PHASE

Once onboard the target vessel the team will ex-ecute its Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) forthe actions on target, e.g. search fire & manoeuvre. Thisarticle does not address the SOPs, but rather highlightsthe human related factors that can limit performanceand operational effectiveness.Repeated Sprint Activity - In order to understandhuman performance during the on-target phase an ob-jective assessment of it is required. It is recognised thatmilitary operations are generally stochastic in nature, butsimilar to sporting events, there are generalisations thatcan be made. For example, the operators will spend cer-tain amounts of time undertaking the following activi-ties: stand/kneeling, walking, jogging, and sprinting.Therefore the following factors, which are recognised asbeing important for successful on-target tasks, may beexamined; Load carriage, Exercise intensity, Mobility,Clothing PPE, Respiratory PPE, Noise, Cognitive abil-ity.

Teamwork - The success of MI operations is depen-dant on effective teamwork. This requires an undertak-ing to understand how the following factors interact tofacilitate an effective operational outcome; Individuals

must understand and carry out their role within the op-erational framework, SOPs must be understood and ex-ecuted at both the individual and team level, andcommunication is essential for effective teamwork, andmethods of operation are required to cope with failuresin communications systems.

Target Prosecution - There are two aspects to suc-cessful target prosecution that relate to human per-formance; firstly target recognition, and subsequentlyshooting accuracy.

EXFILTRATION PHASE

This phase is not covered within the scope ofthis article, but is generally considered to be a lower in-tensity activity. It should be noted that the duration ofthis Phase could be as long as Insertion Phase if con-ducted in poor weather conditions due to rotary airasset’s reduced flying capability in these conditions.

HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELLING

Using the model graphically described in Figure3, the following questions may be asked; what is the per-formance degradation for each of the phases by the fac-tors than potentially limit performance? Is it possibleto quantify the 100% performance for each phase of theoperation if undertaken separately? What happens whenthe phases are put together ? How does degraded per-formance in one phase influence performance duringsubsequent phases?

By understanding the factors that limit per-formance and the magnitude of their effects, potentialsolutions can be identified and the cost/benefits of dif-ferent solutions examined and decisions made on theirimplementation. To model the human performance as-pects of the MI operation, the factors influencing theinsertion and on-target phases need to be quantified.The initial strategy of evaluation should include, a for-mal Task Analysis, to assess the potential degradation toperformance and operational effectiveness.

The ability to model these inter-related human, environmentaland equipment factors, provides the

ability to develop effective solutions, to reduce performancedegradation and enhance operational effectiveness.

FFiigguurree 55:: A Factorial Model, Illustrating How Behavioral and Environmental Factors may Adversely Influence Maritime Interdiction Performance and Operational Effectiveness.



DEVELOPMENTAL REQUIREMENTSThe development of the MI human perform-

ance model supports the enhancement of operationaleffectiveness by providing a greater understanding ofhow the environmental stressors, engineering systems,the human operatives, and their interaction, influenceperformance and operational effectiveness. The fol-lowing areas are highlighted for enhancing operationaleffectiveness and/or the maintenance of performance.EQUIPMENT

HSC – a User-Centred approach to HSC designprovides enhancements in system effectiveness and re-liability, including shock mitigation and Command &Control (C2).

Ladder - the system requires improved hookcontrol and placement, and ladder design foreasier/safer climbing.Individual PPE and equipment - these require improve-ments to the following features: reduced weight, im-proved mobility and enhanced thermoregulation.TRAINING

Training is an inherent foundation of militaryoperations. The following factors are highlighted asbeing essential elements within the MI operation thatmust be addressed by the appropriate training and as-sessment programme.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) - Thedevelopment of SOPs is recognised as essential for en-hancing and maintaining operational effectiveness.Their development is beyond the scope of this article.

Skill and TechniqueHSC Coxswain - professional coxswain training

is required including the appropriate specific MI trainingwith the full range of environmental conditions.Ladder climbing - it is essential that good technique istaught to ensure that climbing effectiveness is developedand maintained with the PPE and operational equip-ment carried.

On-board Search + Fire & Manoeuvre - repre-sentative environments are required to ensure thatboarding teams have the appropriate level of experienceand competency to undertake operations with the re-quired level of effectiveness.Physical Fitness

MI personnel require both high levels of gen-eral and task specific fitness. Therefore training meth-ods and pre-participation screening techniques arerequired to enhance performance and reduce the risk ofinjury in Special Operations Forces.

HSC transits - the harsh motion of the insertioncraft requires the occupants to cope with the repeated

eccentric contractions required for the vertical impacts.These eccentric contractions during HSC transits havebeen shown to result in elevated levels of muscle dam-age markers. Therefore specific eccentric training mayassist in coping with the RS exposure. The required pos-tural stability to cope with the lateral accelerations meansthat the individuals require an enhanced level of corestability and isometric strength/endurance.Ladder climbing - anecdotal reports of climbing trainingsupport the need for upper body strength and en-durance, but it should be noted that upper-body strengthwill, in the majority of circumstances, not cope with theweight of the equipment that the boarding team per-sonnel carry onto the target vessel. Therefore the ap-propriate technique must be practiced in addition todeveloping the specific strength and endurance require-ments.

CONCLUSIONIt is anticipated that further development of the

MI human performance model will help enhance oper-ational effectiveness by providing a greater understand-ing of how environmental stressors and, engineeringsystems interact with human operatives to influence per-formance. In support of the performance modelling itis recommended that a formal Task Analysis (TA) andTraining Needs Analysis (TNA) be undertaken. It isrecognised that although there is no typical MI opera-tion, it is essential that a generic operation be defined tosupport the development and assessment of solutionsthat have the potential to either enhance performance,or reduce performance degradation. It is therefore rec-ommend that the proposed model of MI human per-formance is developed to promote a betterunderstanding of operator performance in extreme mar-itime environments.

NMIOTC, using modern training facilities andtechniques (including real platforms and high-fidelitysimulations), is providing realistic MI training to Inter-national Naval Units/personnel, thus assisting in the de-velopment of their capability to confront a range ofdifferent scenarios within the MI operational environ-ment. By facilitating this coordination and training,NMIOTC supports the increasing recognition of theMI Sector, and adds value to the continuing NATO ef-forts of assisting with the development of anti-piracyand related operations.

DDrr TTrreevvoorr DDoobbbbiinnss is a Director of STResearchwho undertaken projects for Government, military, Search andRescue and commercial organisations. He has published exten-sively on issues relating to the development of amphibious opera-tions.

by LLttCCddrr II.. HHAAZZIIRR,, TTUURR NN,,NMIOTC’s Head of Exercise Planning Section.

In this century, Maritime Security is one

of the most key issue related to economy, environment,homeland security, transportation and etc. for all coun-tries even they don’t have coasts. The rising piracy threatin the open seas showed the horrifying face of terrorismto the humanity once more. Therefore to live in a peace-ful world, every one of us has to think what can do tocontribute to Maritime Security.

As NMIOTC, we work on issues related to Mar-itime security and we are dealing with ATP 71 documentwhich supports Maritime Interdiction Operations. Inorder to sustain today’s operational requirements, thesecond ATP-71 Workshop was organized and held byNMIOTC from 7th to 9th September 2010, inNMIOTC’s facilities.

The workshop works started with a warm wel-come address from NMIOTC’s Deputy Commander,Captain O. Celebi, TUR(N), who asked everybody foran active and fruitful participation. Following, NMIOTCStaff Officers initiated the procedure of presenting anddiscussing the NMIOTC’s change proposals along withthe participants from Belgium, Denmark, Germany,Greece, Spain and USA. During the workshop othernations change proposals were also discussed.

As NMIOTC, we hope that these change pro-posals will improve the currency of ATP-71 publication

and make contributions to the Maritime Interdiction

Operations. The discussions made over proposals con-sisted of the issues that are related to todays technolog-ical and operational requirements that were experienced by the help of previous Maritime Operations. For fur-ther studies, the final ATP-71 workshop change pro-posals have already been posted to the MAROPS forum(NSA’s official site).

The workshop also included an NMIOTC Com-mand Brief and an NMIOTC Facilities Tour, for theparticipants to acquire a thorough knowledge of thetraining capabilities that NMIOTC is able to offer to Al-lies and Partners. For us updating ATP-71 document isof utmost importance due to the fact that the most pre-cious contribution to Maritime Security is to feedBoarding Officers or generally officer in the field ofthe maritime arena, with information that depicts thereal operational environment needs. This is our goal andwe are dedicated to pursue this.

LLttCCddrr IIllsseevv HHAAZZIIRR TTUURR((NN)) is an officer fromTurkey appointed in NMIOTC as Head Of Exercise Planning.He has graduated from Turkish Naval Academy in 1994 andserved in various frigates and fast patrol boats. He has partici-pated as CO of TCG YILDIZ in numerous NATO missionsand exercises between 2006-2010.

AATTPP--7711 WWOORRKKSSHHOOPP IINN NNMMIIOOTTCC


FFiigg.. 11:: ATP -71 participants during discussions of proposed amnedments to ATP-71 publication

bbyy CCddrr JJ.. SSiinngglleettoonn,, UUSSNNRR,, MOTC OPR, NATO ACT HQ UNIT

NATO’s premier facility for training

navy and coast guard vessel boarding teams in maritimeinterdiction operations has successfully completed itsthird Maritime Operational Terminology Course(MOTC), from September 20th to October 1st, 2010.The NATO Maritime Interdiction and OperationalTraining Center (NMIOTC), located in Souda Bay,Crete, Greece, hosted the MOTC event with studentsponsorship provided by NATO Allied CommanderTransformation (ACT). NMIOTC reports to ACT’sEducation & Training branch as a NATO Training andEducational facility.

The Commanding Officer of NMIOTC, Com-modore A. Makris, GRC(N), welcomed all of MOTC

2010’s instructors and students during the first day ofthe course, “ I hope that you will find your time spentat NMIOTC both challenging and rewarding.”

MOTC is offered as part of NMIOTC’s exten-sive combined training program. This program enablesnaval and coast guard forces to better execute surface,sub-surface, aerial surveillance and special operations ac-tivities in support of NATO Maritime Interdiction Op-erations (MIO). NMIOTC aims at improving allied andpartner vessel crew’s expertise in MIO, while promotingskills, interoperability and cooperation among them.Additionally, it supports ACT in developing MIO tacti-cal doctrines, directives and manuals. Moreover,NMIOTC supports ACT in research, experimentation,modeling and simulation of MIO operations and con-tributing to ACT’s lessons learned process.

The objective of MOTC is to familiarize NATO,Partners for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD),Istanbul Cooperative Initiative (ICI) and other allied

MMAARRIITTIIMMEE OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNAALL TTEERRMMIINNOOLLOOGGYY CCOOUURRSSEE


FFiigg .. 11 :: Mari t ime op e ra t i ona l t e rmino l og y c our s e 2010 g radua t e s and in s t r u c t o r s

maritime officers with the use of maritime operationalprocedures and the associated terminology used byNATO naval forces. Students also receive instructionin NATO’s Operational Planning Process (ATO OPP)and ship tactical simulator training. For those studentsstaying a third week there was also practical MIO tacti-cal training using NMIOTC’s state-of-the-art facilitiesand expert instructors.

Upon completion of MOTC training the stu-dents will be better able to operate alongside NATOmaritime forces in a variety of contingency operations orserve as part of a joint NATO maritime staff. Studentsfrom Algeria, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Greece, Tunisiaand the Ukraine well represented NATO, PfP andMediterranean Dialogue nations during the course.

This year’s course focused on the many chal-lenges facing NATO and coalition maritime forces insuppressing piracy off the Horn of Africa (HoA) andGulf of Aden regions. The class schedule featuredbriefings covering related topics such as NATO Anti-Piracy Operations, HOA Geopolitical Analysis, NavalGuidance and Control of Shipping (NCAGS) and Mer-chant Marine Vessel Operations. These and the othercore MOTC courses are designed to help a naval officeron anti-piracy patrol with NATO forces to better un-derstand the type of environment he or she would bemost likely to encounter.

The success of MOTC 2010 was made possiblethrough the close cooperation between the HellenicNavy, NATO ACT and the U.S. Navy (USN). The Hel-lenic Navy provided multi-service instructors, advancedtraining facilities and logistical support with sponsorshipassistance from NATO ACT, while four senior officerinstructors from USN Reserve unit NR NATO ACTHQ UNIT provided the English-language maritime ter-minology expertise.

NMIOTC offers both classroom and tacticaltraining, to include small boat operations, ship and cargosearch procedures and helicopter fast-roping. Trainingcan be provided to individuals as well as navy and coastguard vessels visiting Souda Bay. NMIOTC teams canalso be dispatched to forward units to provide ex-portable training.

The NMIOTC facility is ideally suited to carryout its MIO training task. Souda Bay, on the north-west-ern coast of Crete, is a central location for all maritimeunits operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and tran-siting through the Suez Canal to operating areas off the

Horn of Africa, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. As aresult NMIOTC provides direct support to ongoingNATO naval operations Active Endeavor (Mediter-ranean maritime security patrols) and Ocean Shield (anti-piracy operations off Horn of Africa).

MOTC instructors actively encouraged studentsto engage in class discussion and interact as much aspossible, improving their English skills and enhancingthe learning experience for both students and instruc-tors. Students were tasked with giving a 20 minute pres-entation about their home country in English during thesecond week. They also learned to work closely togetherin 3-man simulator teams, taking turns filling the keybridge officer roles onboard a frigate-size vessel on HoAanti-piracy patrol. The MOTC participants were evalu-ated by instructors basis their graded results from dailyquizzes, a comprehensive final exam and daily class par-ticipation.

While the MOTC schedule was intensive,MOTC Course Director Lt Georgios Mantzouris, GRC(N), who was responsible for successfully coordinatingthe program, also arranged for a student tour of the an-cient Minoan archeological site of Knossos, near Crete’smodern capitol of Iraklion, as well as several socialevents. “In addition to ensuring that MOTC’s learningobjectives were achieved, we also wanted to ensure thatthe students and instructors had the opportunity to ex-perience the rich hospitality and culture of Crete,” saidLt G. Mantzouris.

CCddrr JJ.. SSiinngglleettoonn is the Lead US MOTC Instruc-tor for the last five years. Currently he is appointed as a memberfo USN Reserve Unit in NATO ACT Headquarters.



bbyy LLtt DD.. CCIIOOBBAANNIITTAA RROOUU ((NN)),, NMIOTC Staff Officer Exercise Planning Section

Nowadays the computer simulation is more

often used to better train the military personnel. This isoccurring to improve the theoretical training, when it istoo expensive or too dangerous to use real equipment inthe real world.

As NMIOTC and taking into account our mis-sion - vision and training objectives, we worked hard inorder to implement computer simulation in our theo-retical courses (Command Team MIO Courses). Sofrom the 29th to 30th September 2010, a 2D MIO sim-ulated training took place for first time in NMIOTC’spremises, giving trainees the opportunity to practice theterminology and procedures used during a Maritime In-terdiction Operation focused on Counter Piracy. For thissimulation, the NMIOTC’s Tactical Maritime Opera-tional Centre (TMOC) application was used.

The main objectives of simulation are to im-prove knowledge about maritime terminology, to prac-tice MIO communication procedures and to familiarizewith MIO procedures (interrogation, approach, stop-ping, boarding, diversion, seizing, legal aspects of MIO,ROEs, RMP building etc) and basic MIO messages. Ad-ditionaly, personel has the capability of undergoingtraining starting from a very basic level (e.g. Hailing Pro-cedures) and reaching an advanced level of addressingthe MIO Commander’s tactical situation and responsi-bilities. Therefore, by the end of this training an officerwill have the capability of undertake responsibility to al-most any MIO operation from a typical Hailing QueryProcedure up to MIO Commander of a Tactical Force.

The simulation scenarios address the SomaliaMaritime Security Situation, as well as multiple different

operations related to MIO. An assigned MultinationalTask Force is conducting Maritime Interdiction Opera-tions focused on Counter Piracy in Somalia’s basin inorder to support UNCLOS III art.110. The simulation incidents are built based on Operation Atalanta andOperation Ocean Shield reports. They resemble the realoperational world and even the OPTASK MIO mes-sages as well as any other related messages that studentshave in their files are exaclty similar with the real onestaking into account information security limitations.Also, students have the capability through voice commsto communicate with instructors who are at this pointresembling either a merchant vessel’s captain or pirates.Therefore, scenario is being executed in a very realisticway which is the most constructive method in thelearning process.

Taking into account the internal evaluation, thissimulation was conducted successfully during MOTCand it was further developed for usage during NMIOTCCourse 1000 MIO Command Team issues and Course4000 ( Final Tactical Exercise). Closing this brief, but atthe same time, very informative report it is fair and ac-ademic correct to mention that NMIOTC’s technicalteam struggled through the summer of 2010 in order tocreate from scratch this 2D MIO simulator softwarebringing NMIOTC’s simulation in a new era.

LLtt DDeecceebbaall CCIIOOBBAANNIITTAA RROOUU ((NN)) since July2008 is Staff Officer in NMIOTC Exercise Planning Section.He has graduated from Romanian Naval Academy in 2000 andserved onboard Romanian Minewarfare ships as well as staff of-ficer. From 2002 to 2008, he has participated into numerousNATO courses and exercises.

NNMMIIOOTTCC 22DD -- MMIIOO SSIIMMUULLAATTOORR CCAAPPAABBIILLIITTIIEESSAA LLEEAAPP IINN NNMMIIOOTTCC’’SS TTRRAAIINNIINNGG

2D-MIO Simulator Cubicles. Students are attending the build up of the MIO Scenario while Instructors assist them sitting on their backs.

bbyy PPrrooffeessssoorr RRaammeesshh KKoollaarr &&LLtt.. GG.. MMaannttzzoouurriiss,, Ph.D. Canditate

1. Abstract

In this article an overview of the improvised explosive

devices is provided. IED are weapons of choice used byextremist groups for gaining strategic and tactical influ-ence. Different types of the IEDs and their functioningare explained together with their effects. The effectiveutilization of the IEDs in an asymmetric warfare andconsequent influence on the public reaction is described.Some examples of water borne IEDs and their impacton maritime interdiction operations are also presented.

2. IntroductionImprovised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are used by theviolent extremist groups as weapons of choice to inflictdeadly effects causing both military and civil losses. Theother effects include destabilizing the local governmentsand the economy, not to mention fear and disruption of

normal life activities. IEDs are also becoming major concern in Africa, parts of Asia Pacific region and Latin

America. Its usage is believed to continue because oflow cost and high impact causing high damage with min-imal risk and expense. The ideas and strategies are car-ried over maritime interdiction and are referred to aswater or underwater improvised explosive devices(WIEDs or UWIEDs). The rest of the article is organ-ized as follows- we introduce some of the common IEDdevices and their operation, followed by some applica-tions. Some examples of maritime interdiction are fol-lowed by the concluding section.

3. What are IEDs?IEDs are homemade homegrown low-tech bombs thatcan be made as simply from a group of artillery shellsleft over from other events or as sophisticated as a pro-jectile shooting out molten metal [5]. Ordinarily, an IEDincludes five components- a case or container, a power source, a switch, an initiator, and a main charge [6, 8,

WWAATTEERRBBOORRNNEEDD IIMMPPRROOVVIISSEEDD EEXXPPLLOOSSIIVVEE DDEEVVIICCEESS WW II EE DD SSSS

IIMMPPAACCTT OONN MMAARRIITTIIMMEE OOPPEERRAATTIIOONNSS



and 14]. Figure 1 shows notional elements of a typicalIED. As can be seen, the low tech IED elements cancause havoc to the high tech devices, weapons, and per-sonnel. The enhancements include a copper disk to-gether with other elements to form what is referred toas the Explosively Formed Penetrator or ExplosivelyFormed Projectile (EFP) and Self Formed Fragmenta-tion (SFF) charges. The EFP are deadly projectiles in theform of molten metal hurling at the target at speeds ofthe order of 2 Kilometers per second capable of pene-trating several inches of steel [10]. Joint Improvised Ex-plosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) [11] is ajoint entity of the U.S. Department of Defense estab-lished with a mission to focus (leas, advocate, coordi-nate) all Department of Defense actions in support ofthe Combatant’s Commanders and their efforts to de-feat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Thecounter IED strategies of the JIEDDO are given as fol-lows: defeat of the device, attack the network and trainthe force [11]. Figures 5 and 6 give the casualties of thecoalition forces in the Iraq-Afghanistan(Including

WIEDs), while the IED casualties are given in Figure 7[13]. It is also to be noted that in addition to the casu-alties, an enormous burden exists on the coalition forcecountries, both in terms of the hardship as well as thedevastating economic drain on the vital resources.

4. Emerging ApplicationsAs the extremists expand their operations and seek outvulnerabilities, they have extended the IED threat to themaritime operations. The attack on USS Cole [6, 12]demonstrates the vulnerabilities of water borne threats.There have been reported instances of explosives dis-covered in small boats [12]. The conventional IEDs are an outcome of low tech off-the shelf components de-feating high tech devices and systems to political and so-cial advantages in an asymmetric warfare scenario. It isvery conceivable that a similar extension can be madewith reference to maritime watch or underwater IEDs(WIEDS / UWIEDs). Carafano [12] refers to three types risks associated with

FFiigg.. 11:: Explosively Formed Projectiles [10]


FFiigg.. 22:: USS Cole in Port of Aden attacked from asmall inflatable boat in a terrorist/ pirate act [6,7].WIEDs were used in order to provoke this criminal

resultFFiigg.. 33:: IED fatalities in Iraq-Afghanistan [13]

(Including WIEDs)

Fig. 1: Explosively Formed Projectiles [10]

small boat threats: psychological, physical and disrup-tion of services. Also, to address a complex WIEDthreat in maritime domain involving international stake-holders, a JIEDDO like effort with clearly defined mis-sion, adequate resources, and concerted effort will be necessary also from NATO Institutions. Some of thechallenges include fusion of intelligence gathered by dif-ferent means and agencies in a timely manner as well dis-semination to all the concerned players in the theatre.Other issues include constant and continuous trainingand education, efficient and adaptable red teaming.

5. ConclusionsNMIOTC is a NATO Education and Training

Facility dealing with MIO training. WIED’s is a subjec-tal area fairly new in the maritime arena. In order forboarding personnel to be ready to handle an unexpectedIED situation and to counter WIED’s, NMIOTC ispreparing a Counter-WIED course that is going to beheld in its premises in the near future. Cooperation withInternationally recognized organizations in this field (e.g.US JIEEDO or C-IED COE in Spain) is one of theways that could lead to solutions to WIED problem andfinally produce a training material that would be orienteddirectly to MIO operations. NMIOTC could achieve co-operations like these and at the same time it will be ableto formulate knowledge and increase effectiveness incountering WIED’s, in the harsh maritime environmentof HoA and in the Gulf of Aden, where a few attemptshave been made in order to solve this obscure phenom-enon. Building a course like this, academia must becomea vital part in order to maximize the result and use allof the available learning cognition that exists interna-tionally.

6. References

1) HASC O&I Hearing entitled, “Defeating the Impro-vised Explosive Device (IED) and Other Asymmetric Threats:Reviewing the Performance and Oversight of the Joint IED De-feat Organization (JIEDDO), 29 October 2009 2) Metz, Thomas F., Countering the Global Challenge ofIEDs Today and in the Future, House Armed Services, October2009 Committee,http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI102909/Metz_Testi-mony102909.pdf3) Wilson, Clay., Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures, Congressional ResearchService Report to Congress, http://www.history.navy.mil/li-brary/online/ied.htm4) Package-Type Improvised Explosive Devises,http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-packaged.htm 5) Military Grapples with Onslaught of HomemadeBombs in Iraq, htt p://www.pbs.or g/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june07/ied_06-21.html6) http://www.cargolaw.com/2000nightmare_cole.html7) http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole1.htm8)http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/muni-tions/bullets2-shaped-charge.htm9 ) h t t p : / / p u b l i c i n t e l l i g e n c e . n e t / w p -content/uploads/2009/08/ied8.png1 0 ) h t t p : / / w w w . w a s h i n g t o n p o s t . c o m / w p -dyn/content/graphic/2007/10/01/GR2007100102020.html11) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JIEDDO12)http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/06/Small-Boats-Big-Worries-Thwarting-Terrorist-Attacks-from-the-Sea13) http://icasualties.org/OEF/Nationality.aspx14) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Improvised_explosive_device15) Dwyer, A., and King, C., Jane’s Unconventional WeaponsResponse Handbook, Second Edition, Janes Information Group,Sentinel House, Surrey, UK (2006)

PPrrooffeessssoorr RRaammeesshh KKoollaarr is on the faculty in thedepartment of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, NavalPostgraduate School, Monterey, CA. His current research inter-ests include Counter IED technology, Counter Directed Energytechnology, risk assessment and mitigation as well as defense fi-nancial management.


bbyy LLttCCddrr KK..TTssaakkoonnaass,, HH..NN..,, NMIOTC’s Staff Offier - Networking Support

Piracy in the maritime domain is not a new

issue. Its appearance is lost in time, along with the use ofseaways for trading reasons. More than obvious remainsthe fact that piracy will remain an issue, since the worldtrade is mainly using sea as a transportation means, andthe gain for pirates is more than tempting.

Also obvious remains the fact that through theyears, the pirates evolute along with their persecutors.The pursuit begun by trying to raise the trading vesselsself defense capability, and moved on by patrolling inthe high seas or by making the intelligence process moreefficient in order to achieve the productive surveillanceof the maritime domain.

The past years the broader international marinecommunity, focused on the need to know at all timeseverything that goes on in the maritime domain. Sys-tems built, companies came to life and grew, operationsestablished as well as co operations. The surveillance be-came quite efficient, still…

The statistics show that the slightest suppressionof piracy has a long way to go in order to be achieved.The decrease of the incidents does not follow the effi-ciency enhancement of the intelligence and surveillanceoperations.

The changes that were observed in the pirates’way of act during the last couple of years, includeamong others, extend of their reach in areas more thana 1000 miles away from shore, in an area quite vast forthe international community surveillance assets to han-dle. The size of the Indian Ocean does not allow for theprovision of adequate protection.

Of course this change brought number ofchanges also to the pirates’ tactics and equipment suchas use of mother ships laid in some distance from oneanother in a form of a net, as well as the use of sophis-ticated electronic guidance systems.

The evolution of the pirates’ tactics, as depictedearlier was more or less expected. The point of consid-eration here is our unwillingly contribution to their effi-ciency. Let’s take a moment to consider the matter insimple steps.

First of all, the trading vessels broadcast all theirinformation to the whole world in real time. AIS⁽¹⁾broadcasts position, course, speed, destination and num-ber of crew onboard, as well as flag. AIS has a VHFrange, essentially depending on the height of the an-tenna as well as the transmission means condition. Lowheight land masses do not interfere with AIS data trans-

mission. A typical value to be expected at sea variesaround 20-30 nautical miles and exceeding 100 nauticalmiles when airborne. These transmissions are not en-crypted and can be easily received by anyone who ownsa piece of simple and low budget equipment (most timezero budget since pirates capture AIS devices from hi-jacked ships). Besides that, the fused Realized MaritimePicture can be accessed nowadays from various entitiestrough commercial companies, Systems built for Na-tional reasons or Multinational cooperations with trust-ful as well as with less trustful countries, providingalmost real time picture to anyone that has access to thissystems.

The key point for thought is the enormous num-ber of stakeholders that have access to essential infor-mation today, through the global effort to enhance thesurveillance. Through only a corrupt employee, piratescan track and locate big and valuable trading ships eas-ily and plan their attack when and where the target ismost vulnerable.

The newest tracking system that is also manda-tory under IMO regulations since 1-1-2009 is a long-range satellite system, the Long Range Identification andTracking (LRIT) ⁽²⁾ which uses Inmarsat C equipmentto broadcast a signal to satellites. This system can pro-vide global marine traffic picture on a satellite range cov-erage area. LRIT information is not generally availabletoday with the exception of owning companies and SARagencies, but it also takes only one employee to searchthe database regularly to provide a number of possibletargets to the pirates.

In practice, real world scenarios have shown thatwe need to handle information carefully. So far this wasnot the case with AIS, and the number of actors hasgrown enormously. Can the situation rollback? Is AISmore useful for the “good guys” or for the “bad guys”?Will LRIT be handled more wisely?

It is certain that piracy won’t vanish, not nownot in the future, but it seems that there is a need formore close, wise and sophisticated consideration of thematter, in order to be able to handle the situation…

LLttCCddrr KK..TTssaakkoonnaass graduated from the Hellenic NavalAcademy in 1994 and has served in various Hellenic ships (destroyersand fast patrol boats) as Communications, Intelligence, Operations andExecutive Officer. He has graduated from the Hellenic Navy ElectronicWarfare Officers School, Hellenic Naval Staff and Command Collegeand the Hellenic Army Software Engineers & Analysts College. He isan M.Sc. Candidate in the Polytechnic University of Crete in the Elec-tronic & Computer Engineering Department. He is currently servingat NMIOTC as a Staff Officer for Networks in the Technical Sup-

MMIIOO IINNTTEELLLLIIGGEENNCCEE && SSUURRVVEEIILLLLAANNCCEE –– VVAALLUUAABBLLEE BBUUTT FFOORR WWHHOOMM??


by MMrr.. AAggiiss AAnnaarrggyyrroouu

Developed by the Institute for Fire Prevention andSafety Technology, Department of Research and Technology

In police operations and demonstrations, op-

erational resources are sought and used, to lead aggres-sive demonstrators to cancel the demonstration. This isintended to minimize the damage inflicted on demon-strators. To this end, among others, water cannons and

rubber bullets are set-in, which are not suitable to re-duce the potential of aggression of the protesters.

In fact, a truly reliable method of movingdemonstrators to cancel the demonstration peacefullyhas yet not been found. Only the LRAD1 offers the pos-sibility to contact demonstrators at a certain distance.Every possible conceivable deterrence, begins to takeplace at a dangerous close proximity. This is due to thevolume of these devices to be generated.

SOUND CANNON – LRAD

(Long Range Acoustic Device)The American Technology Corporation pro-

vides sound cannons (LRAD), which were originally de-veloped for military purposes. These cannons shallgenerate a very loud sound in the range of ca. 2kHz thatcan be addressed at a attacker and irritate him by the

noise exposure so much, that a well-planned demon-stration is not possible.

The sound generators, offered by the AmericanTechnology Corporation, have an input power of 400-600W, which are converted on electromagnetic sound-speaker-coils into sound energy that generate in theLRAD1000, in 1m distance a sound level of 151dB.In order to produce such capacity, the coils have to becooled with liquid nitrogen. From the Company's pub-lished data can be calculated that the LRAD1000 has amaximum capacity of 35W and the stated 151dB canonly be generated one area of a few cm².

For this reason, every single attacker has to bedirectly targeted by the sound, what makes this unit prac-tically ineffective for this purpose, as experience hastaught.

The HerbertzhornOur Department of “Research and Technology” of the

“Institute for Fire Prevention and Safety Technology”of our company Hügin Group International, has man-aged to develop a highly efficient equipment, whichunder others shall be applied in the area of police- andmilitary actions.

In collaboration with the leading scientist, Prof.Dr. J. Herbertz, certificated with diploma by the Stan-dards Committee of acoustic, noise and vibration engi-neering (NALS) and price awarded with theRudolf-Martin-Certificate in the field of ultrasound, theInstitute for Fire Prevention and Safety Technology ofthe Hügin Group International, has developed andtested and patented a pneumatic transducer.

At a frequency of approximately 1.5 kHz (reso-nance frequency of the human ear), the Herbertzhornshows an efficiency sound power of about 4.000 to5.000 W. This is approximately 100 times more than the

SSOOUUNNDD CCAANNNNOONN LLRRAADDAA SSOOLLUUTTIIOONN TTOO CCOOUUNNTTEERR PPIIRRAACCYY PPHHEENNOOMMEENNOONN??

FFiigg.. 11:: Water cannon used by the police

FFiigg.. 22::Herbertzhorn without reflector



sound power of the LRAD 1000, the so far strongestknown sound cannon.

The sound generated by the Herbertzhorn is fo-cused by a reflector and can be steered in any direction.As there is sufficient power available, the area where theHerbertzhorn is effective, is around 15° horizontally and10 ° in the vertical.

In this way a whole demonstration march can besonicated. The performance here is so high that it is re-liably possible to keep demonstrators at a distance of

150 – 300 meters2.

DURATION OF ACTIONHow long the protesters have to be sonicated,

depends also on their motivation. Experiences are notyet available. It is certainly possible to use the Her-bertzhorn in continuous operation. A coordinate actionof the demonstrators will be disturbed in any case sig-nificantly, starting at a distance of 200m to 500m andmade impossible, even with ear protection in any shorterdistance.

CONFIGURATIONHerbertzhorn and reflector are installed on a re-

mote monitor. This is equipped with a camera that trans-mits its images on a display, which is located in thecontrol panel.

The displayed image corresponds exactly to thearea, the sound of the Herbertzhorn is most emitted.The console is equipped with a joystick, with which youcan control the direction of the Herbertzhorn verticallyand horizontally.

...to control theHerbertzhorn, only oneFFiigg.. 33::Herbertzhorn with reflector device

FFiigg.. 44::Measured dB values in function of distance

person is needed.PROTECTION OF STAFF

The protection of personnel is inasmuch avail-able, as in the area outside the cone of sound, a soundlevel of 105 – 110dB were measured in a distance of ap-prox. 3 m. This level will be muffled by the doors andwindows of the car. A simple hearing protection insu-lates the sound level furthermore to values that are safefor the human ear.

MILITARY VERSION (SPECIAL RESOLUTION)

For the military sector, Herbertzhörner can beused as first stage as an alternative to weapons, when thesituation, as for example currently in Afghanistan, is notclear and possibly civilians are involved. In this version,for example, a tank or armored vehicle is equipped infront and rear with one Herbertzhorn. The reflectors(focusing device) may be omitted as the vehicle frontand rear with its rigid surfaces serve as reflectors.To operate the Herbertzhörner, exhaustgases can alsobe used.

The usual stock used engines should allow thisgood since they have the necessary capacity of approx-imately 100 kW per Herbertzhorn.

Our defense system “Herbertzhorn” on overview

• Our system generates a sound capacity of about 4.000- 5.000 watts at over 156 decibel.• Works with air pressure• Non leathal defense weapon

• Reduction of aggression• Puts attacker into a state of shock• Sonic is not faded out with hearing protection, becauseof to high volume• Secure against firearms• Goes easy on the defense because the sound achievesonly extremely intensity in direction of the attackers• Insensitive to long service life, rust, mechanical dam-age or corrosion

ConclusionAs the technology evolves we see that solutions

of non lethal weapons become more apparent in ourdaily operational lives. Therefore, such sound devices /cannons and in accordance with conformities to thelegal region regarding human being lives, can be used todeter pirates when attacking Merchant Vessels. TheJapanese have already installed systems like these ontheir military crafts maximizing the possibilities of coun-tering a pirate attack either on board their ships or in ad-jacent merchant vessels that they are escorting. By thisway, they have put the maximum halt to the phenome-non of piracy saving merchant vessel crews from horri-ble situations such as seizing and waiting for ransoms tobe paid endangering their lives to a huge extent.

MMrr.. AAggiiss AAnnaarrggyyrroouu is the general manager ofBIANA international s.a. (www.biana.gr, email :[email protected]), a company in Greece which is the official dealerfor TASER applications. He is a chemical engineer and he hascooperation with NMIOTC regarding potential equipment appli-cations for Boarding Teams and generally Maritime Interdiction

FFiigg.. 55:: Herbertzhorn military version on a schematic diagram showing the sound propagation


N.M.I.O.T.C. TRAINING CALENDAR

N.M.I.O.T.C. TRAINING CALENDAR

NOV-DEC 2010 & I

NOV-DEC 2010 & IststSEMESTER 2011

SEMESTER 2011

M I O C o u r s e s - T r a i n i n g

M I O S i m u l a t o r T r a i n i n g

For more Information on the Application Process or for detailed description of the Courses please goto our website: www.nmiotc.gr

Course Catalogue: http://www.hellenicnavy.gr/nmiotc/files/course_cat.pdfE-learning modules (ADL courses): https://jadl.act.nato.int

or for any further information please contact us to:Phone:+30 28210 85710 email: [email protected]

NMIOTC has taken the initiative of creating a software that gives the capability to the students of being trained in a twodimensional (2D) MIO Simulator, which is located in the Center’s Tactical Maritime Operational Center (TMOC). Throughsuitable Simulator Exercises trainees understand thoroughly the real maritime environment through Counter Piracy andMIO Simulated scenarios, which have been constructed in such a way starting from a basic level of a MIO Operation (e.g.Hailing procedure) and reach the student to a level of being able of assuming responsibility as a MIO Comander of a Task

Force. This training is available upon short request for a Unit’s Command Team Members.

1050 MIO Phases 1060 Units Organization1070 Air Assets1080 Psychological Aspects

1010 MIO Operational Planning 1020 MIO Messages 1030 Intel Support to MIO 1040 Legal Issues – ROE

2010 Actions Other than Tactical Sweep Onboard Suspect Vessel

2020 Inspection / Detection Techniques 2030 Intel Gathering on MIO Targets

2040 Tactical MIO Planning2050 Boarding Team Psychology2060 Suspect Vessel Crew Psychology

3010 Container Inspection3020 Small Arms Training3030 Tactical Sweep3040 Crew Control Suspect Crew Handling

3050 Small Boat Handling3060 RHIB Insertion3070 Heliborne Insertion / Extraction 3080 Boarding Under Multiple Threats

COMMAND TEAM THEORETICAL TRAINING - 1000 Series Course (16-20 May 2011)

BOARDING TEAM PRACTICAL TRAINING - 2000 Series Course (16-18 May 2011)

BOARDING TEAM PRACTICAL TRAINING - 3000 Series Course (19-27 May 2011)

NM I O T C i s o f f e r i n g a n E f f i c i e n t T r a i n i n g b y a p p l y i n g :- Modular Course Structure: Choose among multiple modules and subject areas- Flexible and Adaptive Training: Choose among multiple training areas in order to meet your requirements- Just in Time Training: Pick the time that fits most your operational requirements prior to deployment - Training Analysis for Audience: NMIOTC Trainers will adjust the training IAW your training level- Tailored and Customized Training IAW Customer’s Training Needs- Mission Rehearsal Training: Training will be executed with scenarios resembling the real maritime environment

NMIOTC provides practical antipiracy training to Naval Units before they proceed to participate in a real operation, usingthree different scenarios from Small Boat Investigation and Pirate Mother Ship Identification / Visiting / Boarding / Seizing

up to a Protection of a Merchant Ship from Pirate Attack at Sea.This course is available upon short request for a Unit’s Boarding Team Members.

P r a c t i c a l A n t i p i r a c y T r a i n i n g S c e n a r i o s

N M I O T C i s c o n d u c t i n g t r a i n i n g e v e r y w e e k a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s P r o g r a m o fW o r k ( N P O W - w h i c h i s a c c e s s i b l e o n l i n e ) t o C o m m a n d T e a m a n d B o a r d i n g T e a m P e r s o n e l .

A l s o N a v a l U n i t s a r e e x e c u t i n g M I O t r a i n i n g d u r i n g t h e i r p o r t v i s i t t o S o u d a B a y a n d b e f o r et h e i r d e p l o y m e n t t o c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s t r a i n i n g i s i n c l u d i n g n o t o n l y t h e o r e t i c a l a n d

p r a c t i c a l i s s u e s b u t a l s o c o u n t e r p i r a c y t r a i n i n g s c e n a r i o s . N M I O T C t r a i n i n g i s r e c e i v i n g r e q u e s t s v i a a n y p o s s i b l e m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d t a k i n g

i n t o a c c o u n t t h a t t h e r e a r e v a c a n c i e s i n t h e s p e c i f i c r e q u e s t e d t r a i n i n g p e r i o d .

B i - A n n u a l M I O C o u r s e s

W e a p o n s o f M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n i n M I O ( 2 0 - 2 4 J u n e 2 0 1 1 )Proliferation of WMD is an issue that attracts a lot of interest in NATO. NMIOTC is conducting a course with the participation of high

level guest speakers . The last day MIO practical training scenarios will be conducted.

NM I O T C A n n u a l C o n f e r e n c e ( 2 8 - 3 0 J u n e 2 0 1 1 )NMIOTC will conduct the Annual Conference in its premises from 28 - 30 June 2010

NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training CentreMarathi, Souda Bay, Crete, Zip 73200, Greece

Phone:+302821085710 Email: [email protected]

www.nmiotc.gr

“NEVER DECLINE THE DANGERS OF WAR”NMIOTC Crest Logo

Documents

NOVEMBER 2010 2nd ISSUE - NmiotcNOVEMBER 2010 2nd ISSUE ... NMIOTC MIO Journal possesses a good portion of it. The NMIOTC MIO Journal, the first Journal in MIO subject area, will continue