NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2010 … · 2 ARMY SUSTAINMENT Brigadier General Philipe Ponties, Assistant Manager for Recruitment and Vocational Training for the French Army Human

Army Field Support BrigadesLessons Learned in a Multifunctional Medical BattalionSustaining a BCT in Southern Iraq

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2010

The 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command

Supports Disaster Relief

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionisunlimited.PB700-10-6Headquarters,DepartmentoftheArmy

WWW.ALU.ARMY.MIL/ALOG

InternationalRecruitingSummit —DonaldD.Copley,Jr.,andJuliaC.Bobick

Commentary:TheLogisticsBranch:Multifunctional andFunctional—LieutenantGeneralMitchellH.Stevenson

DeployinganExpeditionarySustainmentCommand toSupportDisasterRelief—MajorPaulR.Hayes

ASeriesofFirsts:The3dESCinOperationUnifiedResponse —MajorPaulR.Hayes

45thSustainmentBrigade:SupplyDistributioninAfghanistan —MajorKerryDennard,MajorChristineA.Haffey, andMajorRayFerguson

45thSustainmentBrigade:Echelons-Above-Brigade ConvoyManagementinAfghanistan —MajorMichaelJ.HarrisandCaptainEricP.Roby,USMC

45thSustainmentBrigade:AerialDeliveryinAfghanistan —ChiefWarrantOfficer2MichelleG.Charge

ConvoySupportTeams —LieutenantColonelStevenL.Updike,USAR

AFSBsandRDECOM:StrengtheningtheMaterielEnterprise —MajorO’NealA.Williams,Jr.

NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCananAFSBDoforMe? —MajorCamillaA.Wood

TheCapabilitiesoftheArmyFieldSupportBrigade’s Acquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirectorate —LieutenantColonelStevenG.VanRiper

SustainingaBCTinSouthernIraq —LieutenantColonelMichaelB.Siegl

ANeglectedPrincipleofWarinLogisticsAdvising —MajorJamesJ.Zacchino,Jr.

ContractOversightontheBattlefield —LieutenantColonelPeterW.Butts

TheBatteryManagerMaintenanceProgram —LieutenantColonelAnthonyW.Adams,KYARNG

SupportOperations:LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctional MedicalBattalion—LieutenantColonelDouglasH.Galuszka andSergeantMajorDavidFranco

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Cover:TheU.S.responsetoJanuary’sdevastatingearthquakeinHaitirequiredthe3dSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)(ESC)todeployintoanexpeditionaryenvironmenttosupporthumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.Toexecutethisno-noticemission,thecommand’sSoldiershadtoadapttoconditionsforwhichtheirpreviousdeploymentstoOperationIraqiFreedomofferedfewprecedents.Thearticlesbeginningonpages4 and9describehowthecommanddeployedandoperatedinHaitiandthenumerous“firsts”ithadtoaccomplishinordertosucceed.Inthecoverphoto,3dESCequipmentboundforHaitiisloadedontoaC−17GlobemastertransportatLouisvilleInternationalAirportinKentuckyon27January.(Photo by Kentucky Air National Guard)

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ContainersforHaiti:ProvidingTransportation andTemporaryInfrastructure—ThomasCatchings

UsingLessonsLearnedforContractinginHaiti —LarryD.McCaskill

ContractingSupportBrigadeRespondstoHaitiMission —LieutenantColonelAmericusM.GillIII

MedicalEquipmentConcentrationSites:AManagementSolution forArmyReserveMedicalEquipmentRepairandTrainingNeeds —LieutenantColonelPaulWakefield,USAR(Ret.)

ImprovementStrategiesforLogisticsAutomationSupport —CaptainAndrewM.Sawyer,ChiefWarrantOfficer2Rosung D.Petty,andStaffSergeantJonathanC.Shaw

FixingtheCurrentReserveComponentsPayProcess —MajorNolandI.Flores,CAARNG

ArmySeeksClaimantsUnderRetroactiveStop-Loss SpecialPayProgram—RobertPidgeon

WhereAreWeGoing?TheFutureofJointLogistics —MajorRobertP.Mann

BulkPetroleumManningRequirementsinanESC —CaptainShariS.Bowen

ExpeditingClassIXDeliveriesinIraq —FirstLieutenantAlexysM.Myers

ADayintheLifeofaDALogisticsIntern —AlisonSilverioandSusannahTobey

1stInfantryDivisionRecognizesBenefits ofLogisticsReportingTool—SergeantBenjaminKibbey,USAR

WritingforArmy Sustainment

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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BOARD OF DIRECTORSChairman

Major General James L. HodgeCommander

ArmyCombinedArmsSupportCommand

MembersLieutenant General Mitchell H. Stevenson

DeputyChiefofStaff,G-4DepartmentoftheArmy

Lieutenant General William N. PhillipsPrincipalMilitaryDeputy

totheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology

Lieutenant General James H. PillsburyDeputyCommandingGeneral

ArmyMaterielCommand

Lieutenant General Edgar E. Stanton IIIMilitaryDeputyforBudget

AssistantSecretaryoftheArmyFinancialManagementandComptroller

Lieutenant General Eric B. SchoomakerTheSurgeonGeneral

Ex OfficioBrigadier General Jesse R. Cross

TheQuartermasterGeneral

Colonel Clark W. LeMasters, Jr.ChiefofOrdnance

Brigadier General Edward F. Dorman IIIChiefofTransportation

Brigadier General Mark A. McAlisterCommander

ArmySoldierSupportInstitute

Brigadier General Joseph L. BassCommandingGeneral

ArmyExpeditionaryContractingCommand

Major General James K. GilmanCommandingGeneral

ArmyMedicalResearchandMaterielCommand

ARMY LOGISTICS UNIVERSITY

Colonel Mark McCormickPresident

STAFFRobert D. Paulus,Editor

Kari J. Chenault,AssociateEditorApril K. Morgan,AssistantEditor

Julianne E. Cochran,AssistantEditorLouanne E. Birkner,AdministrativeAssistant

GraphicsartsandlayoutbyRCW Communication Design, Inc.

ThismediumisapprovedfortheofficialdisseminationofmaterialdesignedtokeepindividualswithintheArmyknowledgeableofcurrentandemergingdevelop-mentswithintheirareasofexpertiseforthepurposeofenhancingtheirprofessionaldevelopment.

ByOrderoftheSecretaryoftheArmy:

GEORGEW.CASEY,JRGeneral,UnitedStatesArmy

ChiefofStaff

Official:

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69Army Sustainment(ISSN2153–5973)isa

bimonthlyprofessionalbulletinpublishedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversity,2401QuartersRoad,FortLee,Virginia23801–1705.Periodicalspost-ageispaidatPetersburg,VA23804–9998,andatadditionalmailingoffices.

Mission:Army SustainmentistheDepart-mentoftheArmy’sofficialprofessionalbulletinonsustainment.Itsmissionistopublishtimely,authoritativeinformationonArmyandDefensesustainmentplans,programs,policies,opera-tions,procedures,anddoctrineforthebenefitofallsustainmentpersonnel.Itspurposeistoprovideaforumfortheexchangeofinformationandexpressionoforiginal,creative,innovativethoughtonsustainmentfunctions.

Disclaimer:Articlesexpressopinionsofauthors,nottheDepartmentofDefenseoranyofitsagencies,anddonotchangeorsupersede

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Brigadier General Philipe Ponties, Assistant Manager for Recruitment

and Vocational Training for the French Army Human

Resource Management Command tries out a video

game at the Elizabethton, Kentucky, recruiting center.

(Photo by Julia Bobick, RecruiterJournal)

InternationalRecruitingSummitby DonalD D. Copley, Jr., anD Julia C. bobiCk

uringthethirdweekofMarch2010,theArmy RecruitingandRetentionSchoolandrecruiting representativesfromninenationsgatheredattheU.S.ArmyRecruitingCommand(USAREC)head-quartersatFortKnox,Kentucky,toengageforthefirsttimeinopendialogaboutrecruitingprocessesandtechnologies.

“Thecommandhasalwaysreceivedforeignvisitorsinterestedinlearningabouthowwerecruit,”saidRickAyer,directoroftheUSARECcommander’sinitia-tivesgroupandcoordinatorforthecommand’sfirstInternationalRecruitingSummit.AyeraddedthattheRecruitingandRetentionSchoolatFortJackson,SouthCarolina,hasrunaprogramforyearsthatsendsrecruit-ingofficersandnoncommissionedofficerstoothercountriestoteachrecruitingpracticesandtohelpestab-lishvolunteerforces.Yet,theArmyhadneverconductedaformalrecruitingandretentionworkshoporconfer-encewithothernations.

DuringavisittotheRecruitingandRetentionSchool,MajorGeneralDonaldM.Campbell,Jr.,theUSARECcommandinggeneral,discussedthelargenumberofinternationalvisitorstoboththerecruitingcommandandtheschoolhousewithBrigadierGeneralMarkA.McAlister,theArmySoldierSupportInstitutecommander.Together,theydevelopedtheideaofiniti-atingaforuminwhichtheArmyanditsinternationalpartnerscouldcollaborateandexchangeideas.

USARECinvited15countriestoparticipate—somethatalreadyhadbeenworkingwiththecommandortheRecruitingandRetentionSchoolandsomethathadapproachedtheDepartmentoftheArmyandtheArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandtolearnmoreaboutrecruiting.Someoftheinvitednationshadbeenrecruitingforall-volunteerforcesforsometime,whileothershadnotyetestablishedall-volunteerforces.Ninenationssentrepresentatives:Afghanistan,Estonia,France,Germany,Greece,theNetherlands,Romania,Taiwan,andtheUnitedKingdom.

LieutenantGeneralBenjaminC.Freakley,command-inggeneraloftheArmyAccessionsCommand,toldsum-mitattendeesthattheU.S.all-volunteerforcehasbeenaroundforover40years.“We’velearnedalotalongthepathwaytosustaininganall-volunteerforce....Itiscrit-icallyimportanttousthatwesharelessonslearnedwithourpartnersandallies[and]wewanttolearnfromyou.”Freakleyreinforcedtheideaoftheopenforumduringhisremarkstothegroupviavideoteleconference.

The3-dayeventcenteredonfiveprimaryareas:therecruitingprocessandoperations;marketintelligence;marketing,publicaffairs,andoutreach;manningtheforce;andtrainingtherecruitingforce.Inthemornings,thegroupdiscussedchallengescommontomanyofthecountries.However,theyonlyhadtimetodelvebriefly

intopotentialsolutionstoindividualissuesbecauseofthetightlypackedschedule.

Intheafternoons,therep-resentativestouredtheArmyAccessionsSupportBrigadeonpost,theElizabethtownRecruitingStation,theLouisvilleMilitaryEntranceProcessingStation,andthecommand’srecruitingopera-tionsandcyberrecruitingcenters.

“We’reallinthesamebusiness,we’reopentogoodideasandwillingtoshareideasthatwork,”saidBrigadierJ.T.Jackson,UnitedKingdomDirectorofRecruitingandTraining(Operations).Jackson,whohadpreviouslyvisitedthecommandaspartofarecruitingpartnershipexchange,saidthatafterseeingUSAREC’sPartnershipforYouthSuccessprogram,theUnitedKingdomhadbegunworkingonchangingthewayitmarketsitsarmy.Inthepast,itsarmyhadbeenpro-motedasacareer.Henoted,however,thatindoingsoitwasmissingoutondevelopinglinkswithbusinessandindustrytosellarmyserviceasashort-termjobwithfuturepotential,astheU.S.ArmyisdoingwiththePartnershipforYouthSuccess.

Campbellcalledtheevent“beyondhiswildestdreamssuccessful.”Headdedthathehopedthiscollab-orationwouldfosterrelationshipsnotpreviouslyreal-izedandservebothUSARECanditsrecruitingpartnerswellinestablishingandmodernizingrecruitingbusinesspractices.“Justaswedoamongfriendsinourpersonallives,weareactingassoundingboardsforeachothertoensurewedotherightthingefficientlyandaccuratelyintherecruitingprocesses,”hesaid.

Campbellstatedthathewouldlikethesummittobecomeanannualeventandwelcomedtheopportunitytohostitagainnextyear.

DonalD D. Copley, Jr., is the DireCtor of training anD personnel Development at the reCruiting anD retention sChool at fort JaCk-son, south Carolina.

Julia C. BoBiCk is a writer-eDitor for RecRuiteR JouRnal at fort knox, kentuCky.

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NOvEMBER–DECEMBER 2010 3

readwithinterestthearticleontheLogisticsOfficer CorpsintheSeptember−October2010issueof Army Sustainmentmagazine.Itcontainedgoodthoughts(although,asapointofclarity,theLogisticsCorpsdidnotbecomea“branch”on1January2008;rather,theLogistics(LG)Branchwascreatedonthatdateandbecamethefourthbranch,alongwithQuar-termaster[QM],Ordnance[OD],andTransportation[TC],oftheLogisticsCorps).Ithinkthisarticlewasverytimely.

However,I’vesatthroughsomebriefingsrecentlyandlistenedtosomeexchangesonthistopic,andIamalittleconcernedthat,asaninstitution,wehavenotyetgraspedwhatweputintoplaceon1January2008.IhearlogisticsofficerscontinuingtobeunsureastowhethertheyareOD(orQMorTC)—orLG.Ofmoreconcernisthenotionthatanylogisticsofficercandoanyjob,sowhypayattentiontoanofficer’sfunctionalareaofexpertise?

So,letmetakethecentralthemeofthearticleandhighlightsomeofthekeypointsforall.

Logisticsofficers(nomatterwhatregimenttheywereaccessedthrough)areLGupongraduatingfromtheCombinedLogisticsCaptainsCareerCourse(CLC3)—Period.Ourintentisfortheofficertothinkofhimselffirstandforemostasamultifunctionallogistician.(Anexceptionistheexplosiveordnancedisposal[EOD]officer,who,becauseoftheuniquerequirementsofthatcriticalfunction,werotatebetweenEODandammunitionassignments.)

However—andthisisveryimportant—every LG officer is required to have a functional area of exper-tise.Youcangenerallytellwhatthatareaofexpertiseisbytheregimentalinsigniathattheofficerwearsandtheregiment(TC,OD,orQM)withwhichheorsheassociates.Wewantthis!Itiscrucialtothehealthof

ourLogisticsOfficerCorps!ItisnotabadthingforLGofficerstoassociatethemselveswiththeirregimentandbeproudoftheparticularfunctionalexpertisethatthey,asmembersofthatregiment,bringtothetable.

Whatthatmeans(orshouldmean)totheofficeristhatifheisamemberof(forexample)theOrdnanceRegiment,hebringsanexpertiseinthingsmainte-nanceandmunitionsthatnootherofficercanbringtothetable.Italsomeansthattheofficermustcontinueinself-studyandlookfordevelopmentalopportuni-tiestosharpenthatexpertisethroughouthiscareer.AssignmentandprofessionaldevelopmentmanagersintheArmyHumanResourcesCommandcanhelpbyensuringthatofficersrotatebetweenmultifunctionaljobsandfunctionaljobsasmuchaspossiblethrough-outtheircareers.(Irealizethisishardertodothemoreseniortheofficeris,butpersonnelmanagersmustnonethelessfactorinhowlongtheofficerhasbeenawayfromafunctionalassignment,thesamewaytheyworktoensuremultifunctionalopportunities).

Ifyoulookathowwecodedthepositionsforlogis-ticsofficersontablesoforganizationandequipmentandtablesofdistributionandallowances(andwe’verescrubbedthisthreetimesinthepast4years,hon-ingittoaprettygoodreflectionoftheskillseachjobreallyrequires;thechartsintheSeptember−Octoberarticlemakethisclear),they are not all coded 90A!Wecouldhavedonethat,butwedeliberatelydidnotbecausewerecognizethefactthatjobsremainoutthere(thoughtheyareaminorityofthetotallogisticsjobs,especiallyatthemoreseniorgrades)thataremorefunctionalthanmultifunctionalandthusrequireaparticularskillandexperience.

Yes,itisabsolutelyrightthatanyLGofficershouldbeabletodoanyjobcoded90A.(AnexceptionagainistheEODofficer.)ButweshouldavoidtakingthepositionthatanyLGofficer,regardlessofregiment,candoanyandallfunctionallycodedjobs.

Ihopethismakessense.It’salllaidoutinDepart-mentoftheArmyPamphlet600−3,CommissionedOfficerProfessionalDevelopmentandCareerManage-ment.However,ifyouhavequestions,pleasebringthemuponthenet.Healthydebateanddialogandquestionsmakeusbetter.Disagreementisnotdisrespect!

ArmyLogisticians—AlwaysThere—AlwaysReady!

lieutenant general mitChell h. stevenson is the Deputy Chief of staff, g−4, Department of the army.

TheLogisticsBranch:MultifunctionalandFunctional

by lieutenant General MitChell h. StevenSon

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COMMENTARY

Any LG officer should be able to do any job coded 90A. But we should avoid taking the position that

any LG officer, regardless of regiment, can do any

and all functionally coded jobs.

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ithaunithistorystretchingbacktothe KoreanWar,the3dSustainmentCommand (Expeditionary)(ESC)hasoftendeployedtoprovidelogisticsexpertiseandsustainmenttothewarfighter.Since2003,the3dESChasdeployedthreetimestosupportOperationIraqiFreedom(OIF)andmoveditsheadquartersfromGermanytoFortKnox,Kentucky.Butthroughoutitsrichhistory,the3dESChasneverbeencalledontodeployintoanexpedition-aryenvironmenttosupporthumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.

Buton12January2010,adevastatingearthquakeintheCaribbeannationofHaitiledtoexactlythatscenario.TosupportOperationUnifiedResponse,theU.S.military’smissiontoassistthesufferingpeopleofHaiti,the3dESCdeployedintoanimma-turetheaterthatchallengedtheresourcefulnessofitsSoldiersandrequiredthemtoaccomplishanumberofunit“firsts.”Thisarticleandtheonethatfollows

tellthestoryofhowthe3dESCdeployedtoandoperatedinHaiti.

TimingoftheOperationWhenthe7.0-magnitudeearthquakestruckHaiti,

the3dESCwas25daysawayfromcompletingthe180-dayresetphaseoftheArmyForceGeneration(ARFORGEN)cycleafterreturningfroma15-monthdeploymenttoIraq.AlthoughtheunitinitiallyreceivednoorderstodeploytoHaiti,itwasarealpossibil-itythattheskillsandcapabilitiesoftheonlyactive-componentESCinthecontinentalUnitedStatesatthetimewouldbeneededforhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.

AsexpectedintheARFORGENresetphase,theunit’savailablestrengthwasinflux.TheESCcouldfillonlyabout50percentofrequiredjoint-manningdocumentpositionsneededtomantheJointLogisticsCommand(JLC).Mostoftheunit’sequipmentwasoutofreset,but

DeployinganExpeditionarySustainmentCommandtoSupportDisasterReliefby MaJor paul r. hayeS

W

The damage to Haiti’s Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince is just an example of the devastation caused by the earthquake of 12 January. (Photo by SFC Dave McClain)


thecommandhadnotyetfilledshortagesintentageandotherassociatedfieldlife-supportequipment.WhentheearthquakehitHaition12January,the3dESCwasfeel-ingtheeffectsofmanning,equipment,andtraininglimi-tationsstemmingfromtheturbulenceofreset.

DevelopingtheTaskOrganizationOnly4daysaftertheearthquake,the3dESC

headquartersbeganitscontributiontothehumanitar-ianassistanceanddisasterreliefeffortinearnest.On16January,thefirstelementsofthecommandwerecommittedtotheHaitireliefeffort.The3dESC’scommandinggeneralandseveralplannersdepartedFortKnoxfortheU.S.SouthernCommand(SOUTH-COM)headquartersinMiami,Florida,tocontributetothesustainmentplanningeffortforaU.S.militaryresponsetotheHaitidisaster.

InwhatwasafirstfortheESCheadquarters,theirworkwasguidednotbyacontingencyplanorcombat

ordersbutbywhattheplannersanticipatedmightbeneededinHaititosupportitspeopleinatimeofcrisis.Relyingonthemodularstructureandstandardizationofsustainmentforcesacrossthemilitary,theplannerseffectivelyresearchedunitcapabilitiesandappliedthemtotheanticipatedrequirements.Thisultimatelysavedplanningtimeandensuredthattheproperunitswererequestedtodeployinsupportofthemission.

Thankstoexisting3dESCtrainingandreadi-nessauthorityrelationships,theunit’splannerswerefamiliarwiththereadinesslevelsandavailabilityofmanyofthesustainmentunitsthatwerelaterselect-edforcontingencydeploymenttoHaiti.Asrecep-tion,staging,andonwardmovementcommenced,theESCheadquartersalsoobservedtheeffectivenessofexistingcommandandcontrolrelationshipstomakedailysustainmentoperationsmoreefficient.Theseobservationssettheconditionsforeffectiveemploy-mentofArmywatercraftinsupportofjointlogistics

The massive earthquake in Haiti in January presented the Soldiers of the 3d Expeditionary Sustainment Command with an unprecedented challenge: deploying to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in an expeditionary environment.

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over-the-shoreoperationsandtheuseofmortuaryaffairsteamsinsupportofJointTaskForce-HaitiandDepartmentofStaterecoveryoperations.

PrioritizingLogisticsForceFlowOneofthechallengesfacedby3dESCplannersin

theearlystagesoftheoperationwassettingprioritiesfortheforceflowintoHaiti.Withlogisticsforcescom-petingforpriorityairflowintoHaiti,sustainmentandhumanitarianassistancerequirementsquicklyoutpacedlogisticscapabilityontheground.

Inadditiontodeployingitsownheadquarters,the3dESCfacedthedauntingtaskofprioritizingandadvocatingforthedeploymentofallsustainmentforc-esintotheaterthatwouldconstitutetheJLC.ThelastsustainmentforcesdidnotarriveinHaitiuntil7Febru-ary—25daysaftertheearthquake.

DeploymentfromFortKnoxWhileelementsofthe3dESCwereengagedin

planningatSOUTHCOM,theremainderofthehead-quartersreadieditselftodeploytoHaiti.Between13Januaryand3February,the3dESCheadquartersdeployedpersonnelandequipmentfromFortKnox.

Thedeploymentbeganon13January,whenone3dESCplannerdeployedtoFortBragg,NorthCarolina,tosupporttheXVIIIAirborneCorps’planningefforts.On16January,six3dESCpersonnel,includingthecommander,deployedtoHaitiviatheSOUTHCOMheadquartersinMiami,followedbythedeputycom-manderandoperationssergeantmajoron17January.On27January,the3dESCadvancepartyof31Sol-diersdeployedtoHaitionaC−17Globemastertrans-port,withthe60-SoldiermainbodydeployingaboardanotherC−17on3February.

Althoughthiswasnotthefirsttimetheheadquartershaddeployed,itwasthefirsttimetheheadquartershaddeployedinacontingencyandanexpeditionaryframe-work.Conditionedbydeployingintoamaturetheater

ofoperations(OIFin2003,2005,and2008)withlongleadtimes,theunithadneverbeforedeployedonshortnoticeorduringtheresetphaseofARFORGEN.

Butwhilethisfirstcontingencyandexpedition-arydeploymentfromFortKnoxhaditschallenges,itprovedthattheunit’sSoldierswereadaptiveandinno-vative.Despitealackofrapiddeploymentexperience,bothwithintheunitandwithintheFortKnoxinstal-lationstaff,theESCwasabletosuccessfullymeetthechallengesofreset,prepareSoldiersandequipmentformovement,anddeploybymilitaryairlifttoHaititoprovidesustainmentanddistributionexpertisetothereliefefforts.

AnExpeditionaryEnvironment:NotOIFAnotherfirstforthe3dESCwasdeployingintoa

theaterthatwasnotmature.Naturaldisastersoccurwithoutnoticeandposesignificantchallenges.Com-paredwithdeploymentstoIraqandAfghanistan,wheremanyfactorswere“knowns,”limitedinformationontheoverallsituationinHaitiwasavailableinitiallyandtheinfrastructuretosupporttheunitwasaustere.

AlthoughU.S.involvementinHaitiisnotuncom-monhistorically,the3dESCmaintainednoinforma-tiononthesecuritysituationandinfrastructureinHaiti.Fromthetimeoftheearthquakeuntilthefinalunitelementsdeployedon3February,thestaffcon-tinuallyconductedmissionanalysisandintelligencepreparationoftheoperationalenvironment.Thiseffortprovidedthecommanderwiththebestinforma-tionavailableonthesecuritysituationfollowingtheearthquake,infrastructurecapabilitieswithintheareaaffectedbytheearthquake,andtheunit’scapabilitiestoprovidesupporttothehumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.

Whenthe3dESCwasnotifiedfordeployment,itappointedliaisonofficerswiththeXVIIIAirborneCorpsandSOUTHCOMtoassisttheheadquarterswithrequestsforforcesandmatchinglogisticscapa-

bilitieswithemergingrequire-ments.ThecommandalsocoordinatedwithUnitedNationsforcesandnumerousinter-nationalaidorganizationstoaccomplishsupportanddistrib-uteaidoncedeployed.

Equipment is loaded on a 7th Sustainment Brigade landing craft utility at Fort Eustis, Virginia, on 16 January in preparation for deployment to Haiti. The 3d ESC had never been challenged before to deploy on short notice or during the reset phase of ARFORGEN. (Photo by SFC Kelly Jo Bridgwater)


Toaccomplishthemission,the3dESCrequiredrobustnetworkconnectivity,whichwasnotorganictotheunit.Theunitexperiencedcommunicationschallengescreatedbyoperatingundernumerousele-ments,resultinginlimitedconnectivitytosupportallrequirements.Frommaintainingsituationalawareness,coordinatingrequirements,andobtainingworkspaceandnetworkaccesstoimprovinglivingconditions,theaustereenvironmentinPort-au-Prince,Haiti’scapitalcity,presentednumerouschallengestotheunit.

FirstTestofSoldierFieldCraftSkillsHaitiprovedtobeafirsttestoffieldcraftskillsfor

manySoldierswithinthe3dESC.Essentially,itwasbacktothebasicsinArmyfieldcraft.ManyoftheSol-dierswithinthecommandhaddeployedatleastoncetoOIForOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF).There,Soldiersupportfunctions,suchascontainerizedshowerunits,diningfacilities(manyservingfoodanddrinks18hoursaday),laundryservice,gyms,movietheaters,internetcafés,andlibraries,areroutinelyprovidedbyunitsorcontractors.Forthemostpart,dutyinIraqandAfghanistanisrelativelycomfortablebecausemanyper-sonnelandagenciesworkdiligentlytoprovidequalityservicesforSoldiersduringa12-monthdeployment.

ConditionsweredifferentinHaiti.Servicessuchaslaundryandbath,diningfacilities,internetcafés,andgymswerenotprovided.ForyoungSoldiersorthosewhohaddeployedonlytomaturetheaters,beinginformedthattheyhadtopackadditionalitems,likeasmallboxofsoappowder(notliquid),clothespins,andaclothesline,wasaneye-openingexperience.

ThecommandrealizedearlythatsomeSoldiers(evenyoungsergeants)hadnevererectedageneralpurpose

mediumtent,emplacedcon-certinawire,washedtheirownclothesby

hand,oreatenonlymealsready-to-eatfor30-plusdays.InadditiontoprovidingdirectsupporttothousandsofHaitiansdesperatelyinneedofassistance,Soldierswerealsotryingtosurvivetheelementsthemselves.

Theinstitutionalknowledgepossessedbyseniornoncommissionedofficers(NCOs)withDesertShieldandStormexperiencehelpedteachyoungSoldiershowtosurviveandstayhealthyinthehot,unforgivingclimate.Forthecommand’smostseniorNCOs—ser-geantsmajor,mastersergeants,andveryseasonedser-geantsfirstclass—itwastrulyanopportunitytoteach,coach,andmentorSoldiersonbasicfieldstandardsandcampplanningandestablishment.

Soldiersalsoreceivedtraininginbuildingfieldshowers,washingclothesinthefield,andmaintain-ingtheessentialsoffieldsanitation.Theknowledgegainedthroughthisdeploymentreinforcedtheimpor-tanceofbasicArmyfieldcrafttrainingandprovedthatthistrainingiscriticaltodevelopingadaptiveSoldiers.Inall,3dESCSoldiersprovedadaptiveandreadytotackletheaustereconditionsinHaiti.Asatestamenttotheirresilienceandspirit,17Soldiersreenlistedduringthefirst-ever3dESCmassreenlistmentceremonyinPort-au-Princeon27February.

FirstDeploymentWithoutTPEOperationUnifiedResponsewasthe3dESC’s

firstdeploymentinwhichitdidnotfallinontheater-providedequipment(TPE).Infact,allunitssupport-ingtheoperationdeployedwiththeirorganizationalpropertybookequipment.Forthe3dESC,someofitsequipmentwasstillintheArmy’sleft-behindequip-mentprogram.Withoutknowingthespecificrequire-mentsofthemission,unitleadersdetermined,based

In contrast to Iraq, only the most basic field services were available to troops in Haiti. The lack of support functions meant that Haiti provided a first test of field craft skills for many Soldiers in the 3d ESC. (Photo by MAJ Paul Hayes, 3d ESC PAO)

8 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ontheirexperience,whatequipmentwouldmostlikelybeused.Complicatingeffortswasthefactthatthe3dESChadnotdeployeditsorganicequipmentsincetheearlyrotationsofOIF.

Theunithadtobuilditsloadplansandunitdeployedlistwithoutknowingtheoperationalenviron-mentinHaiti.WhileallunitsintheArmyarediffer-ent,the3dESChadbecomeaccustomedtodrawingTPEinmaturetheaterstoexecuteitsmissionwhiledeployed.ThemissioninHaitiprovedthat,regard-lessofwhetherornotdeployingunitsaregoingtobedrawingTPE,unitsstillneedtoplacetheirequipmentreadinesshighontheirlistofpriorities.

FirstTestoftheESC’sMTOEAnotherunexpectedfirstduringOperationUnified

Responsewasthetestingofthe3dESC’smodificationtableoforganizationandequipment(MTOE).CouldtheESCdeploytoanexpeditionaryenvironmentwithpersonnelandequipmentauthorizedonitscurrentMTOEandsuccessfullyexecuteitsmission?

Haitiwasanimmature,austeretheaterofopera-tions,whichmeantthatunitshadtodeploysolelywiththeirauthorized,availableMTOEequipment.Theimpactofthisequipmentsetonoperationswasimme-diatelyfeltontheESC’sarrivalinHaiti.

Forexample,ESCsarenotorganicallyequippedwithsignalsupportotherthanthepersonnelintheirG−6sec-tion.Doctrinally,theyshouldbesupportedbyanexpe-ditionarysignalbattalion.DuringOperationUnifiedResponse,theJLCinitiallyhadnothingtoprovidecom-municationsfortheusersinitsheadquartersexceptforservicesprovidedbytheMulti-MediaCommunicationsSystem(MMCS)broughttothetheaterbytheArmyMaterielCommandelementattachedtotheJLC.

TheMMCSprovidedalimitednumberofvoiceanddatalines.Thatwasenoughfortheearlyarriving

elementstobegincommunicatingwithjointtaskforceelements.Laterinthedeployment,theXVIIIAirborneCorpsJ−6workedwiththeJointCommunicationsSupportElement(JCSE)toprovideateamwithorgan-icsatelliteequipmenttoaugmenttheheadquarters.

ThepurposeoftheJCSEteamwasnottoprovideapermanentcommunicationssolutionfortheJLCbuttoprovideenoughNIPRNET(Non-secureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork),SIPRNET(SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork),VOIP(VoiceoverInter-netProtocol),andvideoteleconferencingcapabilityforthecommandtoreachinitialoperatingcapabil-ity.Oncethe24thAirExpeditionaryGrouparrivedinHaiti,itprovideda“lineofsightshot”acrosstheairfieldthatpermittedmoreuseraccesstovoiceanddataservices.

Thismissionwasalsothefirstinwhichthe3dESCwasforcedtouseitsorganicequipmentsinceithadrelocatedfromGermanytoKentucky.TheOEFandOIFmodelallowsunitstoconsiderTPEsetsaspartoftheirplanningassumptions.SinceHaitihadnoTPE,unitswererequiredtodeployastheywere.

Outsideofcommunication,thegreatestimpactwasfeltinlifesupport,includingtents,generators,andlightsets.Someofthisequipmenthadnotbeenusedforoverayearandpresentedasteeplearningcurveforthosesettingupandoperatingitforthefirsttime.Fortunately,theESCwasabletousesometemporarylife-supportequipmentsetsbelongingtotheFederalEmergencyManagementAgencythatwereavailableattheHaitiAirporttoaddressrequirementshortfalls.TheESCalsoreliedonexperiencedseniorNCOstoprovideonsitetrainingtoSoldierswhohadnotexperi-encedthisleveloffieldcraftbefore.

ConditionedbymultipledeploymentstoIraq,the3dESCwasforcedtoadaptandlearnhowtodeployintoanaustereenvironmentinsupportofhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.Althoughtheylackedexperienceinthisarea,theadaptiveSoldiersofthecommandwereabletodeployfromresetandtacklechallengingmissionsandconditionsinHaiti.Throughoutitspreparationsandactualdeployment,thecommandwasabletocontinuallysettheconditionsforsuccessfulsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse.

Whilethecontingencydeploymenttoanexpedition-aryenvironmentresultedinanumberoffirstsforthecommand,anumberofotherfirstswouldenablejointforcestoprovidetheinitialrelieftotheHaitianpeople.Thearticlebeginningonpage9examinesthecontri-butionsofthe3dESCtoreliefoperations.

maJor paul r. hayes is the puBliC affairs offiCer of the 3D sustainment CommanD (expeDitionary) at fort knox, kentuCky. the CommanD woulD like to thank the many inDiviDuals who Con-triButeD to this artiCle.

Rains increased the importance of field sanitation skills. (Photo by SFC Dave McClain)


eforedeployingtoHaitiinresponsetothe devastating12January2010earthquake,the3d SustainmentCommand(Expeditionary)(ESC)hadneverdeployedintoanexpeditionaryenvironmenttosupporthumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefoperations.AfteritsmainbodyarrivedinHaition4February2010,the3dESCquicklyrealizedthatthescopeandfocusofitslogisticsmissionwasverydiffer-entfromitspreviousdeploymentstoIraq.WithadaptiveSoldiersandadiversecollectionoflogisticsunits,thecommandaccomplishedaseriesofhistoricfirsts.

MortuaryAffairsTeamsOperationUnifiedResponseinHaitiwasthefirst

timeArmymortuaryaffairsassetsandtheDepart-mentofHealthandHumanServices(DHHS)Disas-terMortuaryOperationalResponseTeam(DMORT)operatedjointlytolocate,recover,identify,andreturntheremainsofU.S.citizenstothecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)forfinaldisposition.OperatingfromthePort-au-Princeairport,theArmymortuaryaffairspersonnelandDMORTsuccessfullyreturnedtheremainsof34U.S.citizenskilledinHaiti.

EveryaspectoftheeffortwasanopportunitytolearnandimprovetheinteroperabilityofArmymortuaryaffairsandDHHSassets.ThemajorlearningeventsduringOperationUnifiedResponseinvolvedunderstanding

ASeriesofFirsts:The3dESCinOperationUnifiedResponse

by MaJor paul r. hayeS

B thecriticalroleofatheatermortuaryaffairsoffice,inte-gratingArmymortuaryaffairspolicyandprocedureswithDHHSpolicyandprocedures,andunderstandingthecapabilitiesandoperationaldifferencesbetweenDMORTandArmymortuaryaffairsassets.

Ineverymilitaryoperation,atheatermortuaryaffairsofficemustbeestablishedintheinitialplanningstages.Thisappliestobothconventionalandhumani-tarianassistanceoperations.Initially,norequirementexistedforatheatermortuaryaffairsofficeinHaiti.Asaresult,recoveryoperationsweretemporarilyhin-deredwhiledecisionsweremadeaboutthedispositionoflocal-nationalremainsandwhichagencywouldtaketheleadincoordinatingrecoveryoperations.After-actionreviewcommentsindicaterecoveryoperationsinHaitiwouldhavebeengreatlyimprovedifatheatermortuaryaffairsofficehadbeenimmediatelyestab-lishedtofunctionasthecentralagentforArmymortu-aryaffairswhileliaisingwiththeIncidentCommandSystem(ICS).

ICSoperationsdifferfromconventionalArmymortuaryaffairsoperationsinbothdoctrineandpro-cedures.Ingeneral,ICSoperationsrespondtocata-strophicemergencieswithintheUnitedStateswhileArmymortuaryaffairsoperationsareconductedout-sideCONUS.OperationsinHaititooktheICSmissionbeyondU.S.borders.

A landing craft utility from the 7th Sustainment Brigade makes its way into Port-au-Prince, Haiti. (Photo by MAJ Paul Hayes)

10 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

Inviewofthisexpandedroleandinpreparationforthelikeli-hoodoffutureoperationsofasimilarnature,Armymortu-aryaffairsunitsshoulddevelopatrainingandoperationsrela-tionshipwithDHHS.Bothagenciesneedtobefamiliarwiththepoli-ciesandproce-duresthatare

specifictoeachorganizationandunderstandhowpolicydifferencescouldaffectcombinedefforts.Bothorganizationsneedtounderstandtheother’scapabili-tiesandshortcomingsinordertoprovidecomplemen-tarysupportinfutureoperations.

DMORTprovidedthemortuaryaffairsSoldierswithauniqueopportunityfortechnicalgrowthandhands-onexperienceintheremainsidentificationpro-cess.Armymortuaryaffairsproceduresallowforthepreservationandexpeditiousevacuationofforensicmediafromatheaterofoperationsforfurtherreview.InHaiti,DMORTteamsworkingwithArmymortuaryaffairsSoldiersconductedin-theaterforensicreviewsthatledtothepositiveidentificationofremains.The3dESCmortuaryaffairspersonnelhadneverbeforecompletedforensicreviewspriortorepatriation.

SupporttotheWorldFoodProgramOneofthemostimportantmissionsthatthe3dESC

performedinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponsewaslogisticssupporttotheWorldFoodProgram’sfooddistributionoperation.Duringthisoperation,Sol-diersfromthe119thInlandCargoTransferCompany(ICTC),servingunderthecommandandcontrolofthe530thCombatSustainmentSupportBattalion(CSSB),supervisedtheloading,movementtothehumanitariansupportarea(HSA),transloading,andstagingofrice.

Asthe530thCSSBdepletedexistingwarehousestocksofrice,the10thTransportationBattaliondeliv-eredtheadditionalvolumerequiredtoprovidericetotheHaitianpopulation.The97thTransportationCompanyoffloadedincomingvessels,andthe119thICTCtrans-

loadedthericeontotrucks.Soldiersfromthe10thTransportationCompanyaugmentedexistinglocalciviliantransportationandmovedricetotheHSA.

Nongovernmentalorganizations,withtheassistanceofU.S.andUnitedNationssecurity,tookthericefromtheHSAtodistributionpointsthroughoutPort-au-Prince.Over2.98millionpeoplereceivedaweek’sworthofrice(atotalof12,432metrictons),mitigat-ingthesufferingoftheHaitianpeopleandprovidingafoundationforstabilizationandrecovery.

ArmyWatercraftCommandandControlNeverbeforehadthe3dESCbeenresponsiblefor

Armywatercraftcommandandcontrolandmanage-ment.ThischangedwithOperationUnifiedResponse.The3dESCprovidedthecommandandcontrolofArmywatercraftperformingtheexpeditionaryjointlogisticsover-the-shoreandhumanitarianaidanddisasterreliefmissions.Watercraftledbythe10thTransportationBattalionunderthe7thSustainmentBrigadecompleted103missionsandloggedover32,000nauticalmilesinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse.The97thTransportationCompanyprovidedsixlandingcraftutility,andthe335thTransportationCompanyprovidedalogisticssupportvessel.

AlongwiththeircounterpartsfromNavyBeachGroupTwo,theseSoldiersandwatercraftprovidedcriticallyneededship-to-shoredownloadandhelpedmitigatetheoperationalimpactofaportdevastatedbytheearthquake.The492dTransportationDetachment(HarbormasterOperations)coordinatedwaterborneoperations,andthe73dTransportationCompanypro-videdlarge-tugcapabilities.SomeofthemoreuniquewatercraftmissionsincludedcarryingtrucksloadedwithreliefsuppliesandferryingArmyveterinarianstodifferentcitiesaroundHaititovaccinateanimalsinsupportoftheHaitianMinistryofAgriculture.Travelingtolocationsbygroundwasoftenimpossiblebecauseearthquakedamagemaderoutesimpassable.

HealthServiceSupportMissionsAnotherfirstfortheESCwasmanaginghealth

servicesupportinahumanitarianassistanceopera-tion.Giventhenumberofcasualties,medicalcarewasoneofthefirstessentialservicesrequiredtoaidthecitizensofHaiti.ThemedicalpersonnelactivatedinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponseweredirectedtodeploywitha30-daysupplyofsurgicalandmedicalequipment,includingmedical-gradeoxygentanks.

KellyUSA,locatedinSanAntonio,Texas,wasdes-ignatedasthetheaterleadagentformedicalmateriel.Thiscompanyassumedresponsibilityforproviding

A member of the deployment/redeployment coordination cell briefs redeployment operations during a rehearsal of concept drill at Joint Logistics Command headquarters. (Photo by MAJ Paul Hayes)


directclassVIII(medicalmateriel)supporttoactivegroundforces.Afterreceivingtherequisition,KellyUSAcoordinatedshipmentthroughdirectliaisonwithU.S.ArmySouth(ARSOUTH)andtheDefenseLogis-ticsAgency(DLA).ARSOUTHandDLAcoordinatedthepackagingandtransportationofsuppliesfromCONUStoPort-au-Prince.

The583dMedicalLogisticsCompany,JointTaskForce-Haiti(JTF-Haiti),theJointLogisticsCommand(JLC),the56thMultifunctionalMedicalBattalion(MMB),theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelop-ment,andanumberofnongovernmentalagenciesworkedtogethertoprovidelogisticsadviceandsupporttotheHaitianPROMESS[ProgramonEssentialMedi-cinesandSupply]medicalwarehouse.Withthesupportandrelentlessdedicationofthosemilitaryorganizations,thePROMESSwarehousewasabletodevelopandimprovesystemsforday-to-dayoperations,resultinginmoreexpeditiousandefficientcustomerservice.

HealthServiceSupportCommandandControlAnotherfirstfortheESCasitformedtheJLCwas

assumingcommandandcontrolofthe56thMMBheadquartersandothermedicalunits,suchastheJointTaskForce-BravoMedicalDetachment.NeverbeforehadtheESCcommandedandcontrolledmedicalunitsaspartofitsmissionset.The56thMMBbroughtatotalofeightmedicaldetachmentswithnumerouskeyassetsintotheater.Oneoftheseelementswasamedi-callogisticssupportelement.

Theheadquartersforthiselementwasthe583dMedi-calLogisticsCompany(MLC),whichincludedateamof83medicalsupplysubject-matterexpertswhoarrived4weeksintotheoperation.The583dMLCwasdesignatedasthetheatersingleintegratedmedicallogisticsmanager.AllmedicalunitsoperatingintheaterorderedclassVIIIitemsthroughthe583dMLCusingtheDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSupportCustomerAssistanceModule.The583dMLCassumedsoleresponsibilityforcommu-nicatingdirectlywithKellyUSA.

The583dMLCalsoprovidedmedicalmaintenance,oxygentankrefill,andclassVIIIdistributionoversightandmanagementfortheentirejointoperationalarea.Theinvolvementofthe583dMLCinthemedicalsupplychainmadeforasmoothertransitionfromtheautomatedsystemtothehandsofthecustomer.TheunitprovidedthesuppliesnecessaryforuninterruptedhealthcarewhileremainingagoodstewardofGovern-mentfunds.

ContractManagementCellAnothernondoctrinalmissiontheESCperformedin

Haitiinvolvedmanagingcontractsacrossthejointoper-ationalarea.On9February,theJLCassumedcontractmanagementoversightresponsibilityforallJTF-Haitiserviceandsupplycontracts.Forthefirsttimeinthe

unit’shistory,the3dESCestablishedacontractmanage-mentcell(CMC),whichservedasaconduitbetweenRegionalContractingCommand-HaitiandJTF-Haiti.

TheCMCwasresponsibleforreviewingrequire-mentpackets,preparingunitrequestsforjointacquisi-tionreviewboardapproval,andoverseeingcontractmanagementonceacontractwasestablished.TheCMCprocessedover89contractsandobligatedover$2.55million,withover$1.65milliongoingtohost-nationbusinesses.

Deployment/RedeploymentCoordinationCellOn17February,JTF-HaititaskedtheJLCtoestab-

lishadeployment/redeploymentcoordinationcell(DRCC)nolaterthan21February.TheDRCC’smis-sionwastocommandandcontrolredeploymentopera-tionsandsupport,manage,deconflict,andmonitorunitredeploymentactivities.TheDRCC’skeytasksweretosynchronizethemovementofredeployingper-sonnelandequipmentamongunitstagingareas,theseaportofembarkation,andtheaerialportofembar-kation;validateunitmovementdocumentation;andmonitorandcloseunitlinenumbers.

TheDRCCoperatedundertheguidanceoftheJLCsupportoperationsofficerandconsistedofseveralper-sonnelfromvarioussectionswithintheJLC.Thecellwasaugmentedwithredeployingunitliaisonofficers,personnelfromvariousJLCsubordinateunits,andamilitarypolicecompanytaskedtoprovidecustomssupport.

Onshortnoticeandwithlimitedpersonnelandresources,theDRCCestablishedcapabilitiescriticaltothesuccessfulredeploymentofunitssupportingOpera-tionUnifiedResponse.TheDRCCmissionwasafirstforthe3dESC,andwhentheunittransferredJLCrespon-sibilitytothe377thTheaterSustainmentCommand,theDRCChadprocessed,staged,andshippedover500piecesofequipmentandredeployedhundredsofperson-nelfromseveralbattalion-sizedorsmallerunits.

Althoughitwasnotdoctrinallyorganized,equipped,ormannedtoaccomplishmanyofitsmissionsinHaiti,the3dESCwasabletoestablishoperationsandsupportOperationUnifiedResponsewithindaysofreceivingdeploymentnotification.Despitelack-ingexperienceinhumanitarianassistanceanddisas-terreliefoperations,the3dESC—thankstoSoldierresiliencyandadaptiveleadership—arrivedinHaiti,assumedamissionforwhichithadnotpreviouslytrained,andprovidedmuch-neededsupporttojointforcesandtheHaitianpeople.

maJor paul r. hayes is the puBliC affairs offiCer of the 3D sustainment CommanD (expeDitionary) at fort knox, kentuCky. the CommanD woulD like to thank the many inDiviDuals who ContriButeD to this artiCle.

12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT12 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

fghanistanisnotIraq.Soldiersdeploying toAfghanistanshouldnottrytoimposewhat theylearnedandexperiencedinIraqinAfghan-istan.Thatisacommonmisconceptionamongmostnewofficersandnoncommissionedofficersarrivinginthetheater.MosthavenotdeployedtoAfghanistanbeforeanduseIraqasamodelforhowAfghanistanoperationsshouldrun.ButAfghanistanisverydiffer-entfromIraq.TheterrainandclimateinAfghanistanmakeitoneofthemostlogisticallychallengingenvi-ronmentsintheworld.AndeverythingmovesmuchslowerinAfghanistan,soeveryonedeployedtheremustbepatient.

TheaterOrganizationUntilrecently,Afghanistanwasdividedintofour

regionalcommands:East,North,South,andWest.[RegionalCommandSouth-WestwascarvedoutofRegionalCommandSouthinJune.]Currently,asignifi-cantnumberofservicemembersandcoalitionforcesoperateintheCombinedJointOperationsArea(CJOA).

TheCJOAhasonesustainmentbrigade,withthe45thSustainmentBrigadeassumingresponsibilityfromthe101stSustainmentBrigadeon7February2009andtransferringauthoritytothe82dSustain-mentBrigadeon31December2009.Thesustainmentbrigadeisanaggregateofdifferentunitsthatincludespecialtroops,finance,humanresources,rigger,andmortuaryaffairscollectionpointunits.

Threecombatsustainmentsupportbattalions(CSSBs)werespreadthroughoutAfghanistan,witheachprovidingareasupporttoitscustomers.Onaverage,eachCSSBhastwotruckcompaniesandaninlandcargotransfercompanytoprovidecargotransfercapabilitiesatthecentralreceivingandship-pingpoints;reception,staging,andonwardintegrationyards;andairfields.

Taskforcebasesupportbattalionsprovidedirectsup-porttotheunitswithintheirbrigadesandanyattachedcoalitionforces.The45thSustainmentBrigadesup-portedhundredsofforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)andcombatoutposts(COPs)throughoutthetheater.

TerrainandWeatherTheterrainofAfghanistanisachallengetomilitary

operations.Iraqis,forthemostpart,aflatcountrycomparedtoAfghanistan.InAfghanistan,Regional

CommandEastandportionsofRegionalCommandWestaremountainous,withelevationsreaching12,000feetabovesealevel.Kabul,thecapital,isat5,900feetandissetinabowlsurroundedbymuchhighermoun-tains.ManyoftheFOBsandCOPsinRegionalCom-mandEastareinaustereandmountainouslocationsandcannotberesuppliedbygroundformanymonthsoftheyearbecauseofbadweather.Groundmovementtotheselocationsistenuousandslowatbest.

Theweatherandterrainmustbeconsideredinallphasesofoperations,fromtacticalmovementstosimplelogisticsresupply.WinterinAfghanistanadverselyaffectslogisticsforatleast5months,fromthebegin-ningofNovemberintoMarch.ManyofthesmallerlocationsofU.S.forcesdependoncontainerizeddeliv-erysystem(CDS)andlow-costlow-altitude(LCLA)airdropsorslingloadsforresupply.Throughoutthesummer,atleast15COPsareresuppliedbyair,andthisnumbermorethandoublesduringthewinterastheheavysnowsclosethemountainpassesleadingtothem.

Inthespring,thesnowmeltsandrunoffcreatesthepotentialforflashfloodsinvalleysandlow-lyingareas.Floodsdepositwaterandmudonroadwaysandwashoutbridges,leavingCOPsisolatedfromgroundresupply.

Bycontrast,muchofRegionalCommandSouthandportionsofRegionalCommandWestareflatdes-ertandthegroundiscoveredwith“moondust.”Duststormsarecommon,andtheheatisintense.TheheatinHelmandprovinceinRegionalCommandSouthhov-ersaround90to120degreesformuchoftheyear.Thisheatadverselyaffectsalllogistics,fromtheairliftcapa-bilitiesofrotary-andfixed-wingairtransporttorefrig-eratedunitsandgenerators.Theshelflifeofwaterandfuelbagslyinguncoveredonthedesertfloorisdrasti-callyreducedinsummerheat.Personnelsufferthroughthetemperatureswhileridinginmine-resistantambush-protectedvehicles,workingintheirtacticaloperationscenters,andsleepingintentsorwoodenstructureswhileair-conditioningunitsstruggletokeepthemcool.

groundMovementandResupplyTheroadsysteminAfghanistanisalmostnonexis-

tentincomparisontoIraq.Mostroadsareunimprovedandpothole-marked.Manyoftheseroadsarenotwideenoughfortwovehiclestopassatatime,andvehiclesmusttravelextremelyslowlyastheywindthroughmountainousterrain.

45thSustainmentBrigade:SupplyDistributioninAfghanistan

Aby MaJor kerry DennarD, MaJor ChriStine a. haffey, anD MaJor ray ferGuSon


Thepriorityoftruckingis“AfghanFirst.”The45thSustainmentBrigadeusedhost-nationtrucksfor90percentofitssupplymovements.Thebri-gade’smovementcontrolbattalionoversawanindef-initedelivery/indefinitequantity(IDIQ)contractthatprovidesformovementofdrycargoandfuelacrosstheCJOA.Thecontractcurrentlyemployseighthost-nationtruckingcompaniesandwillberevisedtoincludemorecompanies,whichwillincreaseresponsivenessandcompetitioninsupport-ingU.S.forces.

UndertheIDIQcontract,AfghantruckersdeliversuppliesatamuchslowerpacethanU.S.SoldiersexperiencedinIraq.ThemajorityoftheIDIQtrucksdonothavein-transitvisibility,anddeterminingthelocationsofthesetrucksisdifficultatbest.

Thelocal-nationaltruckdriversalsodonotworkduringmanyMuslimholidays.RamadanandEidal-Adhaareprimeexamplesofholidaysthataffecttransittimesforhost-nationtrucks.Mosttruckdriv-ersdidnotdriveforanaverageof6daysduringEidal-Adhain2009.Plannersandsupportoperationsofficersmustconsiderthesemovementstoppagesduringtheirlogisticsplanning.Theyshouldplanaccordinglyandordertrucksandsuppliesweeksinadvancetoensurethattheyarriveattheirfinaldes-tinationsbeforeholidayperiods.

Afghanistanisalandlockedcountry,andsup-pliesandequipmentarriveintheCJOAfromtwoseparategrounddirections.ThemajorityofsuppliesandequipmentarriveatthePortofKarachi,Paki-stan,andarethenshippedupthePakistangroundlineofcommunication(GLOC)throughtwobordercrossingsintoAfghanistan.U.S.personnelarenotauthorizedtoworkatthePortofKarachiorany-wherealongthePakistanGLOC.TheenemythreatinPakistanalsoaffectsboththetimelineandarrivalofsupplies.SensitiveitemsandoversizedequipmentarenotauthorizedontheGLOCbecauseofsecurityconcernsandheightrestrictionsonbridges.

SuppliesalsoaretransportedthroughtheNorth-ernDistributionNetwork(NDN).Thesesuppliesare

shippedfromthecountriesnorthofAfghanistan.NomilitaryitemsorequipmentaretransportedontheNDN;themajorityofitemsmovedonthisrouteareclassIV(constructionandbarriersmaterials)con-tainersandfuel.

InAfghanistan,unitsmustproperlyforecastandorderitemsandsuppliesinatimelymanner.Theaver-agetimeforitemstoarriveatthePortofKarachifromtheUnitedStatesviaoceanmovementisapproximately2months.Thesuppliesthentakeanadditional21daystomovefromtheporttothemainhubsintheCJOA.

Thetimelyforecastingofsuppliesandequipmentiscrucial.Ifanitemisnotonhandatasupplysupportactivity,thechancesareslimthatitwillarrivewhenrequiredunlessitisflownintocountry.

ThecomplexnatureoflogisticsinAfghanistanisextremelychallengingbecauseofitslandlockedloca-tion,mountainousterrain,weather,andthecontinuousmilitarythreat.Ourheavydependenceonhost-nationtruckingrequiresearlyforecasting,planning,andpatience.

SustainingSoldiersthroughouttheCJOArequiresanapproachthatisdifferentfromthesustainmentmethodsusedinIraq.Thisapproachmustbeadaptiveandmultimodaltosolvechallengesandkeepthewarf-ighterssupplied.

maJor BenJamin k. “kerry” DennarD is the support operations offiCer for the 524th ComBat sustainment support Battalion. he serveD as the general supply offiCer in the Joint logistiCs CommanD During the 45th sustainment BrigaDe’s Deployment to afghanistan. he holDs a B.s. Degree in politiCal sCienCe from georgia College anD state university anD is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool, anD the army CommanD anD general staff College.

maJor Christine a. haffey is the support operations offiCer for the 45th sustainment BrigaDe. in afghanistan, she serveD as the Deputy support operations offiCer in the Joint logistiCs CommanD. she holDs a B.a. Degree in elementary eDuCation from paCifiC lutheran university anD a master of managerial logistiCs Degree from north Dakota state university. she is a graDuate of the transportation offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool.

maJor DonalD r. “ray” ferguson is the BrigaDe operations offiCer, J−3, of the 45th sustainment BrigaDe. he holDs a B.B.a. Degree in logistiCs/intermoDal transportation from georgia southern university anD an m.B.a. Degree with a ConCentra-tion in logistiCs from touro university. he is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs offiCers aDvanCeD Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD intermeDiate level eDuCation.

The timely forecasting of supplies and equipment

is crucial. If an item is not on hand at a supply

support activity, the chances are slim that it

will arrive when required unless it is flown into

country.

14 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ogisticssupportrequirementsinAfghanistan grewvastlyduringthe45thSustainment Brigade’s2009deploymentinsupportofOpera-tionEnduringFreedom.Astrooplevelsincreasedandcontractorsarrivedbythehundreds,thedemandforsuppliesandservicesincreasedexponentially.Althoughmostlogisticstransportationrequirementswere,andstillare,filledbytheAfghanistanhost-nationtruck(HNT)industry,theneedforU.S.Armytacticaltruckmovesbecameurgent.

Asaresult,thebrigadeexpandeditstacticalconvoyoperationsand,intheprocess,overcamethechallengesposedbyaustereenvironments,improvisedexplosivedevices,andimpassableroadsininclementweathertomeetthelogisticsneedsofthewarfighters.

growingSupportofConvoysWhenthe45thSustainmentBrigadeassumed

responsibilityfortheJointLogisticsCommandinAfghanistanfromthe101stSustainmentBrigadeon7February2009,echelons-above-brigade(EAB)convoyoperationswerevirtuallynonexistent.Nopalletizedloadsystem(PLS)companiesorothertacticaltrans-portationassetswereavailable.UnitsdependedontheHNTindustryforalloftheirgroundsustainment.

Atthetimeofthebrigades’transferofauthority,convoyswereexclusivelyforescortmissionsandpri-marilyoriginatedfromKandaharAirfieldinsupportofU.S.andcoalitionforcesacross200milesofsouthernAfghanistan.Therequirementformoresecureconvoyswasimmediatelyrecognizedwhenitbecamemanda-torytoescortallHNTsthatcarriedsensitiveitems.MoresecureconvoysensuredthespeedandsecurityofcriticalclassVII(majorenditems)astheymadetheirwaytoassignedunits.

Overthenext4months,the45thSustainmentBri-gadereceived73mine-resistantambush-protected(MRAP)vehiclesand60PLStrucksaswellasthe32dTransportationCompany(PLS).Thebrigade’sprimaryeffortwastoestablishcargo-haulingcapabilitiestoaugmenttheHNTindustryandprovidesecureandreliabletransportationforclassV(ammunition),high-priority,andsensitive-itemshipments.

Throughoutthebrigade’sdeployment,thetheatercontinuedtomatureandlogisticsconvoysexpandedacrossallofRegionalCommandEast,Regional

CommandSouth,andRegionalCommandWest.Tomeettheincreasingdemand,thebrigadegrewfrom1combatsustainmentsupportbattalion(CSSB),1move-mentcontrolbattalion,and1specialtroopsbattalion(STB)with11companiesand7movementcontrolteams(approximately1,300personnel)to3CSSBs,1STB,and27companiesanddetachments(approxi-mately3,200personnel).

CoordinatingOperationsToprovidecommandandcontrolofthenewly

arrivedtacticaltransportationassets,thebrigadeinitiallydevelopedanoperationspositionintheJ−3thatwasresponsibleforallconvoyoperationalrequirements.

Thebrigadealsostoodupabattalionheadquartersandmadetheoperationspositiondirectlyresponsibleforallbattlespacecoordination,externalsupportrequests,contingencyoperationsplan(CONOP)devel-opment,andtrackingforRegionalCommandEast.Theoperationssectionaddedaconvoyoperationsnon-commissionedofficer-in-charge(NCOIC)toassistinperformingtheincreasingdutiesofmanagingallEABconvoyoperationsinRegionalCommandSouth.

AstherequirementscontinuedtogrowinRegionalCommandSouth,thebrigadestoodupacoordinationcellinKandaharthatmanagedandcoordinatedexter-nalsupportforsouthernconvoys.Thiscellprovidedface-to-faceinteractionwithmultiplecoalition,UnitedNations,andU.S.forces.Itestablishedpositiverela-tionshipsanddirectcoordinationwithallcoalitionandU.S.commands,whichmadeiteasiertogetsupportwhenneeded.

Theoperationscellincludedabrigadechiefofoperations(acaptain),adeputychiefofoperations(alieutenant),anoperationsNCOIC(asergeantfirstclass),andanassistantoperationsNCOIC(astaffser-geant).Thecellevolvedintoafullteamdedicatedtosynchronizingeffortsamongbattalions,highercom-mands,andexternalsupportandcross-battlespacecoordination,withalldutiesandresponsibilitiesunderthechiefofoperations.

ConvoyProcessesAllconvoyswereplannedandmanagedbytheoper-

ationscell.Aconvoymovementtrackerwasprovidedbyeachbattalionandthebrigadesupportoperations

Echelons-Above-BrigadeConvoyManagementinAfghanistan

L

by MaJor MiChael J. harriS anD Captain eriC p. roby, uSMC

AMMO=AmmunitionCJOA =Combinedjoint operationsareaCO =CompanyCSSB =Combatsustainment supportbattalionDet =DetachmentDS =DirectsupportF =ForwardFLE =Forwardlogistics elementFM =Financialmanagement

HHC =Headquartersand headquarterscompanyHR =HumanresourcesICTC =Inlandcargotransfer companyJLC =JointLogistics CommandMACP =Mortuaryaffairs collectionpointMAINT=MaintenanceMCB =Movementcontrol battalion

MCT =Movementcontrol teamOPCON=OperationalcontrolPLS =PalletizedloadsystemPlt =PlatoonPOL =Petroleum,oils, andlubricantsQM =QuartermasterRC(E) =RegionalCommand EastRC(S) =RegionalCommand South

RC(S/W)=RegionalCommand South/WestRC(W) = RegionalCommand WestSTB = Supporttroops battalionSUP = SupportTRK = TruckUAV = Unmannedaerial vehicle

Legend

The year 2009 was one of growth for the 45th Sustainment Brigade. The chart above shows how the brigade looked at the beginning of 2009, and the chart below portrays the array of forces at the end of the year.

16 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

(SPO)officer;thesewerecompiledintoabrigadeconvoyoperationaltracker.Theexternalcoordinationgenerallystarted96to72hoursbeforetheexecutionofeachconvoy.Theoperationscellinitiatedexternalsupportrequestsbasedonthisinformationwhilewait-ingforthefinalizedCONOP.

Withinformationgatheredfromthemovementtrackers,coordinationforrouteclearancepackages,rotary-wing(AH−64ApacheandOH−58KiowaWar-riorhelicopter)support,fixed-wingcloseairsupport,andintelligence-gathering,surveillance,andrecon-naissanceresourceswereconductedwithbattlespaceownersandthe82dAirborneDivisionandRegionalCommandSouthheadquarters.

ConvoysthattraveledthroughKabulorKanda-harCityrequiredapprovalanddeconflictionwithotherlargeconvoysandtrafficpatterns.Requestsforconvoystotraversethesecitiesweresenttothe82dAirborneDivision’sheadquarters,theCombinedSecurityTransitionCommand-Afghanistan,andRegionalCommandSouthheadquartersforapprovalanddeconfliction.

TheplanforthelogisticsconvoywasdevelopedintoaCONOPbyeachbattalionandapprovedbythebattalioncommanderbeforeitwasforwardedtothebrigade.The45thSustainmentBrigadeoperationssec-tionreviewedmissiondetailsandcomparedthemtoinformationreceived72to96hoursbeforeexecutingandfinalizingcoordinationrequirements.

Theoperationssectionconductedthefinalcoor-dinationstepstoensurethatbattlespaceownerswereawareoflogisticsconvoystravelingthroughtheirbat-tlespaces.Twenty-fourhoursbeforeexecutionoftheconvoy,theCONOPwasforwardedtothebattledesksofallbattlespaceownersalongtheconvoyroute.

Additionalcoordinationwasneededwhenconvoyscrossedregionalcommandsbecausetheseconvoyswereviewedasjointregionalcommandoperationsandrequiredtheregionalcommander’sapproval.Toobtainthisapproval,CONOPswereverifiedandforwardedtoregionalcommands.

Duringtheexecutionofconvoys,the45thSustain-mentBrigademonitoredalltheater-levelsustainmentlogisticsconvoysacrossAfghanistan.Asatheaterlogisticsconvoytraversedabattlespace,thebattlespaceownerswereresponsibleforquickreactionforcesandexplosiveordnancedisposalsupportfortheconvoy.

FrictionPointsTheHNTswereinverypoorconditionandunreli-

able.Theycontinuallymissedshowtimesatbases,brokedown,ortraveledatverylowspeeds.Theseproblemsnormallycausedlogisticsconvoystomissexternalsupportlinkupsthatwerereferencedincross-battlespacecoordinationplans.TheHNTswereneededtopromoteanAfghan-firstmethodologyand

toalleviatealargeportionofthelift-capacityburden,buttheycausedtremendousstrainonexternalsup-port,whichusuallywasreservedforblockedtime.Oncethetimelinewasthrownoff,allcoordinationusuallywasnegated.

Aconvoycouldrequireupto16differentrequeststoexecute,includingrequestsforexternalsupportfromfourdifferentbattlespaceownersanddivisionheadquarters,varioustriptickets,andrequiredAfghanNationalPoliceescortsinsomeareas.Eachbattlespaceowner’srequestsvariedinformatandcontent.Theprocessdoubledortripledifaconvoywascanceled,shiftedtimes,orchangedunits.

Withlimitedassetsandresourcesacrossallbat-tlespaces,requestingtoomanyresourcesandchangingthematthelastminutecausedalossincoverageandwastedresources.Sincetheexternalsupport(rotary-wingaircraft)wasdedicatedandthemissionplan-ningwasalreadycompletedtosupportthelogisticsconvoys,thehelicoptershadtofindsomeoneelsetosupportorreturntobase.Thisonlystrainedanalreadystressedasset.

HNTs’maintenance,reliability,andspeedwerealwaysplanningfactorswhenrequestingexternalsup-port.Ensuringthattheappropriateplanningfactors(distance,speed,numberofHNTs)wereconsideredwhenplanningamissionwascrucial.Allrequestshadtobelimitedtoidentifiedthreatareasonly.ResourceswerelimitedandwereonlyrequestedwhentheS−2indicatedanincreasedneed.

AsmoreforcesflowintoAfghanistan,convoyoper-ationscontinuetogrowandthemodelwilltransformtomeettheneedsofthesustainmentbrigadeandbat-tlespaceowners.Thekeytologisticsoperationsman-agementinAfghanistanistoremainflexibleandadaptaslogisticscapabilitiescontinuetoexpandtosupportthewarfighter.TheHNTindustryinAfghanistanwillcontinuetoimproveasinfrastructureisdevelopedandthequalityoftrucksincreases.The82dSustainmentBrigade,the43dSustainmentBrigade,andotherunitstocomewillcapitalizeonlessonslearnedfromtheini-tialtheater-levellogisticsoperations.

maJor miChael J. harris is attenDing the army CommanD anD general staff College. he was the s−3 Chief of operations for the 45th sustainment BrigaDe when he Cowrote this artiCle. he holDs a B.s. Degree in exerCise sCienCe from ColumBus state university anD an m.s. Degree in aDministration from Central miChigan university.

Captain eriC p. roBy, usmC, is the operations offiCer of the marine Corps DetaChment at fort lee, virginia. he was the Deputy Chief of operations for the 45th sustainment BrigaDe when he Cowrote this artiCle. he holDs a B.s. Degree in transportation anD logistiCs from the ohio state university.


romFebruary2009throughtheendofthat year,the45thSustainmentBrigadewasrespon- sibleformanagingalloftheaerialdropsinAfghanistanandsustainingmorethan68,000Soldiers(equivalentto19brigades)withequipmentandsup-plies.Duringthistime,morethan16millionpoundsofsuppliesweredroppedtokeepthewar-fightersus-tainedandtomaintainmomentumonthebattlefield.Thisarticlediscussesthecomplexitiesofpreparingandexecutingthoseairdrops.

Mostofthesuppliesweredroppedfromtheairdropaircraftofchoice,theC−17GlobemasterIIItransport.TheC−17’scapabilitiesmeettheneedsofOperationEnduringFreedominAfghanistan.Successfulairdropmissionstakedaysofplanning,rigging,andcommuni-catingtoensure100-percentsuccess.AcombinationofArmy,MarineCorps,andAirForceunits,commoditymanagers,riggers,andairfieldpersonnelconductedaerialdeliveriesonaregularschedule.

Receivingunitsmustkeepaninventoryoftheirdaysofsupplyandanticipatewhentheywillneedtoberesupplied.Theoverallresupplyprocessmaytakedaysorweeks,dependingonthecommodityandtheamountofitthatneedstobedropped.Oncearequire-mentisvalidatedbytheunit,alogisticsairmovementrequestissentthroughthesupportingbrigadesupportbattaliontothe45thSustainmentBrigadesupport

operations(SPO)officeforprocessing.Oncetherequestisopened,ahostofpeopleareinvolvedintheexecutionoftherequestedresupply.

ArmyandMarineCorpsairdropplannersscheduletheloadsfordeliverywhileAirForcecrewscontendwithterrain,timehacks,andanexhaustivesched-uleastheyexecutedailyairdrops.[“Timehacks”arewhenallpartiesinvolvedinanoperationsetastandardtimethateveryonewillfollow.]Theriggerskeeppacewiththenever-endingdemandforsuppliesthathavetobebundledandriggedforeachdropwhiletheairfieldpersonnelcoordinateactionsaseachplaneisloaded.Riggerstranslatetherequire-mentsintobundlecounts,themobilitycontrolteamassignsamissionnumberorITARS(intertheaterairliftrequestsystem)numberforeachairlift,andtheairmobilitydivisionallocateseachaircraftforaspecificairdropmission.

Dropdayisbusyforthereceivinggroundunitbecauseitmustgatherarecoveryteam,establishcom-municationswiththeaircraft,andsecurethedropzone.Groundrecoveryunitsmustalsocontendwithmountainousterrain,mud,snow,andtheenemyastheycollectthedrops,whichmaytakedaysorhoursdependingontheirsituationontheground.NothingiseasyinAfghanistan.Challengesaresocomplexthatdifferentparachutesystemsaretestedtofindtheopti-

malsolution.Anexampleofgettingtherightparachuteforthemissionwastheresupplyofahigh-altitudesite.

Thesitewasnestledbetween7,000-foot-highmountainsandhadaverysmallpatchoflandforreceivingairdrops,soresup-plyingitonaweeklybasis

Container delivery system bundles airdropped from an Air Force C−17 Globemaster III descend to the drop zone in Afghanistan. The C−17 was the aircraft of choice for aerial resupply. (Photo by SSgt Angelita Lawrence, USAF)

45thSustainmentBrigade:AerialDeliveryinAfghanistan

by Chief Warrant offiCer 2 MiChelle G. CharGe

F

17

18 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

wasdifficult.ThelogicalchoiceforaparachuteshouldhavebeentheGlobalPositioningSystem-guidedJointPrecisionAerialDeliverySystem(JPADS),whichcanensuretheaccuracyofeachdrop.

JPADSwasdesignedtobepreciseonlandingandshouldeasilylandatthesite’sdropzone,butthecloseproximityofthesurroundingmountainsinter-feredwithitsabilitytomaneuvertheparachutetoitsintendeddestination.Theconventionalhigh-velocityparachutesystemprovedtobethebetterandmoresuc-cessfulchoiceforresupplyingthesite.ThissituationillustrateshowterrainplaysakeyroleindeterminingwhichparachutetouseinAfghanistan.

ToimproveJPADSforuseinAfghanistan,aJointUrgentOperationalNeedsStatementhasbeensub-mittedtorequestsoftwareupgradesthatwillbetternegotiatecomplexcontoursandimproveairdropsbyreducingdeliveryerrorstowithin25metersoftheirtargets.Inthefuture,JPADSmaybetheparachuteofchoiceformountainousterrainwithsmalldropzones.Butfornow,theconventionalhigh-velocityparachutesystemsareaccomplishingthemission.

InanexhaustiveefforttoreachthewarfightersnomatterwheretheyareinAfghanistan,the45th

SustainmentBrigadealsocontractedforCASAC−212airplanestodeliverthesmallerlow-cost,low-altituderesupplybundlestoremoteFOBs,convoys,andevenpatrolsonthemove.Donewithlaser-precisionaccuracy,suppliesaredroppedfromvaryingaltitudes.Theseaircrafthavetheabilitytodeliver2,200poundsofsuppliestolocationswherelargeraircraftareunabletogo.ThesecontractedaircraftwerecriticaltosustainingthesmallunitsinAfghanistan.

Withthe45thSustainmentBrigaderedeployedtoitshomedutystationatSchofieldBarracks,Hawaii,itcanlookbackknowingthatitair-serviceditscoalitionforcestothebestofitsability.Thebrigadeprovidedthemwithwhattheyneededinordertopre-servemomentumonthebattlefieldandtoserveandprotecttheAfghanpeople.AerialdeliveryremainsahugecapabilityinsupportingthewarfighterinAfghanistan.

Chief warrant offiCer 2 miChelle g. Charge was the support operations aerial Delivery operations offiCer for the 45th sustain-ment BrigaDe at Bagram airfielD, afghanistan. she is pursuing a B.s. Degree in soCial sCienCe.

Low-cost-low-altitude resupply bundles land inside the drop zone during an aerial resupply mission in Afghanistan. The 45th Sustainment Brigade contracted for CASA C−212 airplanes to deliver these smaller bundles to remote forward operating bases, convoys, and patrols. (Photo by SSgt Angelita Lawrence, USAF)


hehardworkofU.S.ArmyCentralCommand logisticiansonthebattlefieldisoftenunnoticed becausetheireffortsareconsideredsimplyrou-tine,everydayactivitiesforlogisticspersonnel.ButthoselogisticiansarethelinchpinoftheresponsibledrawdowninIraqandthebuildupinAfghanistan.

SupportingLogisticsConvoysOnesimplebutinnovativetechniquethatlogisti-

ciansemploytoachievesuccessonthebattlefieldistheconvoysupportteam(CST).PersonnelassignedtothesustainmentbrigadeinKuwaitanditssubordinatetransportationbattalionsdonotseetheCSTasdifficultorremarkablebecausethistechniquehasexistedformanydeploymentcycles.Butsomeforward-thinkinglogisticianinthesustainmentcommunityhadareasonforrethinkingArmyproceduresanddevelopingthismechanismtoaccomplishthemission.

ThesustainmentbrigadeinKuwaitexecutesacompositetechniquetoaccomplishthesustainmentmission.ThetechniqueinvolvesCSTsandlogisticsconvoys.TheCSTsarelocatedatoutlyingforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)andhavetheprimarypur-poseofassistinglogisticsconvoysinmakingtheroundtriptowithdrawequipmentandcargofromIraq.CSTsaredetachmentsthatconsistofaboutthreetofivepersonnelwhocoordinatemaintenanceofbroken-downvehiclesandlifesupport,includingovernightlodgingandFOBtransportation(suchasbetweenlodginganddiningfacilities),forthecon-voymembers.

MaintenanceSupportThebiggestchallenge—andcertainlyamajorsuc-

cess—fortheCSTismaintenancesupport.CSTsattheFOBshavebenchstockclassIX(repairparts)formechanicstouseforpreplannedorforecastedrepairs(basedonhistoricaldata),buttheseCSTsdonothaveanyassignedmechanics.TheunitmechanicsarelocatedinKuwaitbecausethenumberofmechanicsislimitedandmostofthemarethoroughlyoccupiedwithunitorganizationalmaintenanceoperations.

TheCSTsareprovidedwithbenchstockateachFOBbecausetheydonothaveunitidentificationcodesorDepartmentofDefenseactivityaddresscodes.TheCSTsalsodonothaveaprescribedloadlist(PLL)toensurethattheirpartsaredelivered,sotheymustcoordinatewiththesustainmentbrigade’scommandandcontrolelementstosynchronizedeliv-eryofparts.

Thebattalionmaintenanceofficer(BMO)providesonemechanictorideineachlogisticsconvoyincaseofanyunforeseenbreakdowns.Upto35convoysmaybetravelingonthemainsupplyrouteatanygiventime,limitingthenumberofmechanicsavailabletomaintaintheunit’svehiclesattheFOB.

TheCSTssupporttheBMObyprovidingforwardsupportandhaveoversightattheFOBtocoordinateforothermechanicstoperformtheactualrepairs.TheCSTscoordinatewiththeFOBmayor’scellforlifesupportandthedirectorateoflogisticsformaintenancesupportbutusetheFOB’sassetstoaccomplishthemaintenancetaskswithouttaskingmechanicsunneces-sarilytosupporttheconvoys.

Anextensivespreadsheetismaintainedformanag-ingclassIXandincludesthepartsforbothtruckbat-talionsinthebrigade.Therepairpartsaretakenfromthesustainmentbrigade’sPLLandsenttoIraqwiththeconvoysonaroutinetimeline.PartsforallvehiclesaremaintainedasbenchstockatallCSTlocationsandaretrackedbythebrigadewithguidancefromthetwoBMOsinKuwait.

TheCSTconceptisuniqueandcanbeexecutedwithoutreorganizingaunit’stableoforganizationandequipment.Manyunitsshouldconsiderthisoptioninfuturelogisticsplanning,especiallyinremotelocationssuchasareasinAfghanistan.Thistypeofforwardthinkingandexecutionisexactlythetypeoflessonslearnedthatweneedtopassontoourmilitaryleadersforuseinfutureconflicts.

Justasairlinepassengersmaytakeforgrantedthehardworkthatairlinepersonnelputintotransportingpassengersseamlesslyfromplacetoplace,anArmylogistician’scomplexoperationofmovingsuppliesmaygounnoticed.ItmayseemsimpleandroutinetoemploytheCST,butthistechniquehassavedtheArmymoney,lives,andresources.

lieutenant Colonel steven l. upDike, usar, is assigneD to the Center for army lessons learneD as a theater oBserva-tion DetaChment offiCer at the 1st theater support CommanD in kuwait. he is a graDuate of the naval CommanD anD staff College, air CommanD anD staff College, army CommanD anD general staff College, Defense strategy Course, anD assoCiate logistiCs exeCutive Development Course. he has a BaChelor of sCienCe Degree in eConomiCs from the university of missouri-rolla anD a masters of arts honors Degree in transportation anD logis-tiCs management from the ameriCan military university.

ConvoySupportTeamsby lieutenant Colonel Steven l. upDike, uSar

T

20 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

he402dArmyFieldSupportBrigade’s(AFSB’s) Acquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirector- ate(ALT−D)hastheuniquemissionofintegrat-ingandsynchronizingacquisitionandtechnologysup-portwithaccountabilityandsustainmentinsupportoftheMaterielEnterpriseinthebrigade’sareaofresponsi-bility(Iraq,Kuwait,andQatar).Nowthatthetheaterisdownsizing,ALT−D’smissionhasexpandedtoincludesynchronizingaccountabilityoftechnologyinsertionduringretrogradeoperationstopreventlossordestruc-tionofequipment.

Inordertoaccomplishitsmission,ALT−Dhasbuiltstrongpartnershipswithin-theaterprogrammanagers(PMs),theResearch,DevelopmentandEngineeringCommand(RDECOM)seniorcommandrepresentative(SCR),andtheotherlife-cycleman-agementcommand(LCMC)representativesinthebrigade.ThesepartnershipsstrengthentheMaterielEnterpriseandcreatesynergyamongtheLCMCs,RDECOM,andthe402dAFSB.

WorkingWiththeSCRWithintheAFSB,thepersonnelinALT−Dwork

closelywiththeRDECOMSCR.TheSCR(whoresidesinthebrigadeheadquarters)isresponsibleforcoordinatingwithallRDECOMagencies,laboratories,andcentersandforcollectingdataonvehicleswithinthetheaterforhisparentagency,theArmyMaterielSystemsAnalysisActivity.

The402dAFSB’sscienceadvisercomplementstheSCR’seffortsbyapplyinghisexpertise;thesci-enceadviserdoesthisthroughdirectcoordinationwithsupportedunitsonvarioustechnologicalchal-lengesthroughoutthetheater.ThescienceadviserandtheSCRworktogethertogatherSoldiers’requirementsandresolvemanyunforeseenprob-lemswiththenewtechnologiesthatsupportthewarfighters.

OneexampleofhowtheSCRandthescienceadvisercollaboratedwaswhentheyassistedanengi-neercompany(Stryker)deployedfromFortLewis,Washington,indevelopingalightingkitthatprovided

bettervisibilityduringnight-timerouteclearancemissions.Oncethiscapabilitygapwasidentified,theSCRandthescienceadviserworkedquicklytomeettheSoldiers’requirement.Inconjunctionwithdevelopingadesign,theyalsosubmittedarequestforinformationtobothRDECOMheadquartersandPMStrykertoassistindevelopinganArmy-fundedlight-ingsystem.

ThescienceadviserandtheSCRusedthecapabili-tiesoftheweldingshopofthe1stBattalion,402dAFSB.ThetwomenprovidedtheweldingteamwithdiagramsandtemplatestobuildthenewStrykerlightingbracketset.Theselightingbracketsweredesignedtosupportanexistinglightingsystemusedbytheengineercompany.TheengineersareusingthesebracketsonalimitedbasisuntilPMStrykerdevelopsalightingkitthataddressestheunit’srequirements.

Duringasubsequentvideoteleconference(VTC)withRDECOMheadquarters,thescienceadviserinformedtheparticipantsthatthelightingbracketshadbeencreatedanddistributedtotheengineercompanyinIraq.Sincethe402dAFSBhadalreadydevelopedthelightingbracketprototypesforStrykervehicleswithandwithoutslatarmor,theTaskForcePaladinliaisonofficer,whowasaparticipantintheVTC,requestedthattheAFSBhelptodevelopabetterStrykerlightingsystemforunitssupportingOperationEnduringFreedom.

Thefollowingday,theRDECOMSCRemailedtheengineeringdrawingsandshippedprototypebracketsdirectlytothe401stAFSBinAfghanistanforfabrica-tionanddistributiontoTaskForcePaladin.Currently,RDECOMispreparedtoproducemorelightingbrack-etstosupportthedemandfromboththeaters.

CoordinatingWiththeSTATThelightingkitillustratesthepartnership

betweentheAFSBandRDECOM.ThispartnershipisfurtherenhancedthroughthesupportprovidedtoRDECOM’sScienceandTechnologyAssistanceTeam(STAT).

AFSBsandRDECOM:StrengtheningtheMaterielEnterprise

by MaJor o’neal a. WilliaMS, Jr.

T

Army field support brigades work with the Research, Development and Engineering Command and other partners in theater to meet Soldiers’ materiel requirements.


The402dAFSBhasanagreementwithRDECOMtosupporttheSTATwithlifesupport(suchashous-ing,useofvehicles,accountability,computers,andphones)andofficespace.NotonlydoestheAFSBsupporttheSTATadministratively,italsosupportstheteaminitsmissiontoassistthewarfightersinarticulatingtheirrequirementstoDepartmentoftheArmyheadquarters,RDECOM’slaboratoriesandcenters,andtheAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology(ASA[ALT])community.

TheAFSBassiststheSTAT’soperationaleffortsthroughthebrigade’sscienceadviser.AlongwiththeScienceandTechnologyAcquisitionCorpsadviser(STACA),theAFSBandthescienceadvisercanvastheentireIraqitheatertoaddressSoldiers’requestsforinformation,challenges,andimprovementsatthecom-pany,brigade,anddivisionlevels.Thisgroupofhigh-lytrainedindividualsalsofieldsquestionsandacceptschallengesfromotherservices,deliveringsolutionstothewarfightersquicklyandacrossallphasesofanoperation.

PartneringforTheaterSupportHowisitpossibleforasciencecoterietoaddress

technologyissuesacrossanentiretheater?Theanswerisnotascomplicatedasonemightthink.TheAFSBscienceadviser,theSTACA,thecorpsscienceadviser,andtheSTATcoverspecificareasonthebattlefield,andeachhasspecificresponsibilities.Onspecialoccasions,eachofficerhastheabilitytocoveranotherofficer’sareaofresponsibility.

Toassistinthisoveralleffort,theAFSBscienceadviserisresponsibleforgatheringrequirementsthroughlogisticssupportelementsandbrigadelogistics

supportteams.Workingwiththeseelementsallowsthescienceadvisertogatherrequirementsfromallcombatunitsonthebattlefieldthroughsustainmentandmaintenancechannels.

TheSTATisembeddedinthedivisionheadquar-ters,whichgivesitdirectaccesstodivisionalunits.However,itsreachgoesfartherthanjustthedivi-sion;theSTAThasamedicaladviserwhocangatherrequirementsfromallmedicalfacilitiesinthetheater.

ThecorpsscienceadviserandtheSTACAworkcloselytogethertofieldrequirementsanddirectthoserequirementsthroughcorpsleadersforapprovalandexecutionwithcommandemphasis.Althoughtheybothresideinthecorpsheadquarters,theyhavedif-feringroles.

Sincethecorpsscienceadviser(whotypicallyresidesintheC−3/J−3ForceManagementDirector-ate)caninterfacedirectlywiththecorpscommanderandcorpsstaffsections,hehasthebackingtoinflu-encetheeffortsofexternalsupportingagencies,suchastheRapidEquippingForce,theArmyTestandEvaluationCommand,andscienceandtechnologyagencies(RDECOMheadquartersandresearchanddevelopmentcenters).Thecorpsscienceadviserisalsothefocalpointforalldivisionalrequirements.(TheSTAThasaccesstoonlyonedivision.)Withallthesemovingpieces,anelementthatcanunifyalltheseeffortsisneeded.

TheSTACAisthatunifyingagent,providingsyn-ergytoallscienceandtechnologyeffortsinthethe-ater.Sinceheresidesonthecorpsstaff,theSTACAuseshispositiontoorganizerequirementsfromtheSTAT,thecorpsscienceadviser,andtheAFSBsci-enceadviser.Thisallowsforsynchronizationofeffortandreducesredundancyinsubmittingopera-tionalneedstatements,formalrequestsforinforma-tion,andotherrequirementsdocuments.

Thecoordination,levelofcommitmenttoSoldiers,andconsistentdialogamongkeyRDECOMagenciesandorganizations,theSTAT,theSTACA,scienceadvisers,PMs,AFSBs,andtheASA(ALT)demon-stratehowtheMaterielEnterprisesupportsthewar-fightersinthefield.FromtheAFSBstoRDECOMtothePMs,theseentitieshaveforgedanalliancethatconvertsSoldiers’requirementsintomaterielsolu-tions,thusincreasingtheirsurvivability,lethality,andmobilityonthebattlefield.

maJor o’neal a. williams, Jr., is the BrigaDe sCienCe aDviser of the 402D army fielD support BrigaDe. he holDs a B.s. Degree in eleCtriCal engineering from howarD university anD a level-2 CertifiCation in systems planning, researCh, Development, anD engi-neering anD is a lean six sigma green Belt.

How is it possible for a science coterie to address technology

issues across an entire theater? The answer is not as complicated

as one might think. The AFSB science adviser, the STACA, the corps science adviser, and

the STAT cover specific areas on the battlefield,

and each has specific responsibilities.

22 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ntoday’sbattlefield,havingasingleinterface forsustainmentlogisticsoperationsbetweenthe fieldandthematerieldeveloperisofimmeasur-ablevalue.Thisinterfacenotonlyprovidesastand-alonelogisticscapabilitythatsupportsthewarfighter,butitalsoputsintoeffectamaterielenterpriseconceptthatintegratesacquisition,logistics,andtechnologytoprotect,equip,andsustainjointandcoalitionforcesinsupportofthetheaterofoperations.

IntheIraqitheater,the402dArmyFieldSupportBrigade(AFSB)isthatinterface.Usinganinter-nalassetknownastheAcquisition,LogisticsandTechnologyDirectorate(ALT−D),theAFSBcancoordinatebetweenthewarfighterandthematerieldevelopertofacilitateallfieldingtasksandcoordi-natewithexternalentities.TheALT−Dhasseveralfocusareas,butoneofitsprimaryareasofresponsi-bilityistosupporttheintegration,accountability,andsustainmentofnewlyfieldedequipmentwithintheareaofoperations.

Thedirectorate’seffortshavemanymovingpieces,includingplanningandcoordinatingforlifesupport,facilities,andcommunications;shippingandreceiv-ingequipment;personnelsupport;andsustainmentplanning.ALT−D’sabilitytoorchestratetheseactionsnotonlyprovidesasubstantialbenefittoU.S.Forces-Iraqbutalsoprovidesprogramexecutiveofficers(PEOs)andprogrammanagers(PMs)a“nocost”ini-tialentrypointforcoordinatingessentialfielding.

CoordinatingFieldingsAllfieldingswithintheaterbeginandendwith

theU.S.Forces-IraqJ−3ForceModernizationDivi-sion,whichdirectlycoordinateswithU.S.divisionstoensureappropriatesynchronizationinsupportofthewarfighter’smission.Fieldingcoordinationisiniti-atedwithanotificationofintentissuedbythePMtotheIraqitheater.ThisactiontriggerssubsequentplanningmeetingsthatincludeU.S.Forces-Iraq,theAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyliaisonofficer,andtheAFSBALT−D.

Onceplanningbegins,severalkeytasksandcom-monissuestendtoarise.(Seechartatright.)ByusingtheAFSB,thePEOandPMcansupporttheoverallintent—tomeetthewarfightingcommanders’require-ments—whilefillingresourcegapsthroughthereceiptandretentionofessentialassets.

Pre-ExecutionDocumentationEssentialpre-executiondocumentationisneeded

tosupportasuccessfulfielding.Thisdocumentationincludesthefollowing:oAtechnologydevelopmentplan,whichisprovided

bythePMtoensurethatessentialfieldinginforma-tionisavailable.

oAmemorandumofnotification,inwhichthespe-cificfieldingrequirementsareoutlined.

oAdistributionplan,whichprovidesapictureanddescriptionofthesystembeingfielded,asummaryofthefieldingplan(includingsustainmentrequirements),andtheprioritizedunitanddivisiondistribution.Oncethisinformationhasbeenprovided,afield-

ingscheduleisdeterminedandcoordinatedamongthevariousU.S.divisions.

AccountabilityAccountabilityoftheater-providedequipment

(TPE)ismanagedbythetheaterpropertybookoffice(TPBO).TheTPBOcelliscolocatedwiththe402dAFSB’s2dBattalionandincludesachiefwarrantofficerastheaccountableofficer,aGovernmentcivilianemployeeappointedasthedeputyaccount-ableofficer,andcontractedPropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhanced(PBUSE)technicians.Currently,13theaterpropertybook(TPB)teamsarelocated

NewEquipmentFielding:WhatCananAFSBDoforMe?

by MaJor CaMilla a. WooD

O

NewEquipmentFieldingKeyTasks

oIdentifynewfieldingefforts(fromJointImprovisedExplosiveDeviceDefeatOrganization,RapidEquippingForce,programmanagersandprogramexecutiveofficers).

oAssessadequacyofsustainmentplans.oIdentifyandplansupportrequirementsfor— −Accountability(theater-providedequipment). −Facilities. −Equipment. −Lifesupport. −Contractedlogisticssupportmanagement. −Transportation. −Rangesupport.oDevelopconceptofsupportplans.oDevelopandpublishfieldingandsustainmentorders

(fragmentaryorders).


throughouttheIraqitheatertosupportunitswithTPEpropertyaccountability.

AllTPEmustbedocumentedontheTPB,andPMsarerequiredtoestablishahand-receiptaccountwithinPBUSE.Beforeequipmentisbroughtintothetheater,itisimperativethatPMspopulateequip-menttobefieldedintoPBUSEusingderivativeunitidentificationcodes.TheTPBOisatremendousassetandcanprovidealistofunitTPBaccounts;asampleDepartmentoftheArmyForm3161,RequestforIssueorTurn-In;andapointofcontactlistforallTPBOsincountry.

TherelationshipbetweenthewarfighterandAFSBprovidesPEOsandPMswithtimelyandmanageableaccountabilityoffieldedequipment,thussupportingtheirabilitytomeetscheduleandcostrequirementsflawlessly.

ExecutionSupportTheavailabilityofsupportduringthefieldingpro-

cessisatoppriorityformanyPMoffices.Theques-tionsmostPMswanttohaveansweredconcernthelifesupportandresourcesavailabletosupporttheneedsoftheirtheaterrepresentatives.AFSBpersonnelunder-standthatresourcesoftencanbethedeterminingforceinthesuccessorfailureofaparticularfielding,sotheAFSBisposturedtoprovidecoordinatedsupporttoavarietyofareas.

Life support. HowwillPEOandPMpersonnelbesupported?TheAFSBstaffisavailabletocoordinateforlifesupportandhousingonforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)thathaveapermanentAFSBfootprint.Existinghousingisprovided,asspaceisavailable,forshort-durationprojectswithsmallnumbersofpeople.Forlargeorlong-termprojectswhererequirementsexceedavailablespace,theAFSBcancoordinateforhousinginsupportofthePEOandPM.

Oncelargeorlong-termprojectcoordinationiscompleted,theprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM),basedontheaterfiscalpolicies,mayberesponsibleforprovidingfundingtopurchasethehousingunitsidentified.ThesehousingunitswillbemanagedbytheAFSBandwillbeavailableforreallocationorreas-signmentfollowingcompletionoftheproject.

OnFOBswheretheAFSBdoesnothaveaperma-nentfootprint,thebrigadehasestablishedlogisticssupportelements(LSEs)andbrigadelogisticssup-portteams(BLSTs),whichareresponsibleforcoor-dinatinglifesupportwiththetenantoperationalunitormayor’scell.

Facilities.WherewillPEOandPMpersonnelwork?TheAFSBalsocoordinatesfacilitiesforinstallationfieldingmissionsthroughoutthetheater.Thebrigadeusesexistingfacilitiestomeetmissionrequirementstothemaximumextentpossibleatnocosttotheprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM).TheAFSBiscapableof

coordinatinglandacquisitionandfacilityconstructionifexistingfacilitiesarenotavailableordonotmeetmissionrequirements.Basedontheaterfiscalpolicies,theprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM)mayberespon-sibleforprovidingfunding.

Special equipment.IfthePEOorPMhasspecialequipmentrequirements,howwilltheybesupported?TheAFSBcanobtainspecialequipment,suchasfork-liftsandoverheadlifts,forfieldingmissionsthrough-outthetheater.ThebrigaderecognizesthatthePEOorPMisresponsibleforensuringthatitspersonnelaretrainedandlicensedtooperateanyspecialequipmentrequiredtocompletethemission.

TheAFSBusesexistingequipmenttomeetmis-sionrequirementstothemaximumextentpossibleatnocosttotheprojectsponsor(thePEOorPM).Ifexistingequipmentisnotavailableordoesnotmeetmissionrequirements,theAFSBwillcoordinatefortheacquisitionofthespecialequipmentatacosttotheprojectsponsor.Thebrigadeisposturedtomanageallspecialequipmentandcanensureitsreallocationorreassignmentfollowingtheproject’scompletion.

Communication support.HowwillthePEOorPMcommunicatewithitspersonneloncetheybeginfieldingtothewarfighter?CommunicationsupportisavailablewithpropercoordinationonFOBswheretheAFSBhasapermanentfootprint.Thebrigadehasanumberofphonesandcomputersthatcanbeusedonashort-termbasisbyprojectpersonnelwhenresourcesareavailable.

IndividualschoosingtousetheArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)networkmusthaveatleastafavor-ablenationalagencycheckonfileinordertoobtainaNIPRNET(Non-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork)accountandasecretclearanceifaSIPRNET(SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork)accountisrequired.PEOandPMpersonnelmaychoosetobringtheirowncomputers(desktoporlaptop),buttheymust

Equipment shipping and receiving is

an important part of the entire fielding

process. As equipment is processed into the theater, it is imperative that it

is tracked down to the lowest level

of command.

24 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

understandthatconfigurationcontrolwillremainwiththeAFSB.

Equipment shipping and receiving.WhodoesthePEOorPMcoordinatewithtoensureequipmentisreceivedasitcomesintothetheater?Equipmentship-pingandreceivingisanimportantpartoftheentirefieldingprocess.Asequipmentisprocessedintothetheater,itisimperativethatitistrackeddowntothelowestlevelofcommand.Transportationcontrolnum-bersandradiofrequencyidentificationtagsallowtheAFSBtotrackandidentifythelocationofequipmentasitisbeingprocessedintothetheater.

AFSBpersonnelcancoordinateshipping,receiving,andtemporarystorageofequipmentthatisusedforfielding,equipmentupgrade,orsustainmentoperationswithinthetheater.Thissupportiseasilymanagedat

locationswheretheAFSBhasapermanentfootprint.ForthoselocationswhereanAFSBfootprintisnotestablished,thebrigadeispreparedtocoordinatenec-essarylogisticssupport.

Personnel transportation. Whattypeoftransporta-tionsupportisavailableaspersonneltravelthroughoutthetheaterinsupportofanupcomingfielding?Per-sonnelsupportinganAMCmission(fielding,training,sustainment,orliaisonvisits)cancontacttheAMCliaisondeskuponarrivalatAliAlSalemAirBaseinKuwaittocoordinatetransportationintothetheater.

Inthe402dAFSB,twoemergencyoperationscen-tersinIraq(onelocatedinBaghdadatVictoryBaseComplexandoneatJointBaseBalad)canprovidemovementassistance.Theadministrativesupportper-sonnelwithintheLSEsandBLSTsalsocanassistinarrangingtransportationtothevariousFOBlocationsoncepersonnelareinthetheater.

NewEquipmentTrainingBeforeequipmentisofficiallysignedovertoaunit,

newequipmenttraining(NET)mustbeconducted

inconjunctionwiththematerielfielding.NETistheresponsibilityoftheappropriatePEOorPMandfacilitatesthetransferofknowledgeaboutequipmentuseandsupportrequirementsfromthematerieldevel-opertotheusers,trainers,andmaintainersofthenewequipment.

ThePEOandPMNETteamscancoordinatewiththeAFSBtoarrangeNETsupporttothegainingunitsforbothoperationandmaintenancetraining.NETteamsareattachedtotheAFSB,effectivewhentheyarriveattheairportorseaportofdebarkation,forpersonnelaccountability,tacticallogistics(includingmovement),lifesupport,andintegrationintothelocalforceprotectionorsecurityplan.

TransitiontoSustainmentSustainmentsupportshouldbeanintegralpartof

anyfieldingprocess.WiththeAFSB’sassistance,PEOsandPMscanuseexistingmaintenanceandsustainmentcontractvehicleswhenplanningforlong-termsustainment.Inmanyinstances,limiteddepot-levelrepaircapabilitiesexistatseveraloftheforwardrepairactivities.Itcanbeverybeneficialtoplanforlimiteddepot-levelsustainmentinthetheaterratherthanhavingtotransportallitemsrequiringdepot-levelrepairbacktothecontinentalUnitedStates.

TheAFSBcanassistincoordinatinglong-termsustainmentsupportwiththelife-cyclemanagementcommands.Itcanalsoaidindevelopingasustainmentplanthatisresponsivetowarfighterneedsbasedontheuniqueoperationalconstraintsthatexistinthethe-ater.TheAFSBalsoprovidespersonnelwhofunctionascontractingofficer’srepresentativestoprovidein-countryoperationaloversightofsustainmentcontractsandfieldservicerepresentatives.

TheAFSBprovidesmanysupportcapabilitiestoPEOsandPMs.Theextensiveprocessneededtofieldanindividualpieceofequipmentrequiresasystematicapproachthatincludeseverythingfromaccountabilityandfieldingcoordinationtosustainmentrequirements.ThistypeofknowledgeandexpertiseprovidesPEOsandPMs,thewarfighter,andU.S.Forces-Iraqacom-bined“one-stopshop”forfindingsubject-matterexpertsandfieldingpointsofcontactwhocananswersthewho,what,when,where,andhowquestionsthatinevitablyariseduringnewequipmentfielding.

maJor Camilla a. wooD is the assistant DireCtor of aCQuisi-tion, logistiCs, anD teChnology in the 402D army fielD support BrigaDe. she is level-3 CertifieD in program management anD previously serveD as assistant program manager for the patriot aDvanCeD CapaBility-3 program offiCe anD non-line of sight launCh system proJeCt offiCe. she holDs a B.a. Degree from south Carolina state university anD an m.s. Degree in aDminis-tration from Central miChigan university.

NET is the responsibility of the appropriate

PEO or PM and facilitates the transfer

of knowledge about equipment use and

support requirements from the materiel

developer to the users, trainers, and maintainers

of the new equipment.


fyourunitispreparingtodeploy,hasdeployed, orisinanyotherphaseoftheArmyForce Generationprocess,termslikeONS,JUONS,REF,FOA,OPNET,andFLMNEThavebecomeapartofyourdailyvernacular.Whatcanyoudotounderstandthisstrangecollectionofacronyms?Whatabouttheinevitablefielding,sustainment,andsupportstrategyrequirements?Istheresomeoneorsomeorganizationtohelpyoucompletethetasksassociatedwithcoor-dinatingandsynchronizingtheseefforts?

AnArmyfieldsupportbrigade(AFSB)canhelp.SevenAFSBsoperateinthecontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)andoutsideCONUS.TwooftheAFSBsareforwarddeployedtoSouthwestAsia,oneinsup-portofOperationIraqiFreedomandtheotherinsupportofOperationEnduringFreedom.TheAFSBsareassignedtotheArmySustainmentCommandandperformacriticalroleastheArmyMaterielCom-mand’sfacetothefield.TheyroundouttheMaterielEnterpriseattheoperationallevel,providingtacticalcommanderswithlogisticsandsustainmentsupportnottypicallyprovidedbysustainmentbrigadesorexpeditionarysustainmentcommands.

EachAFSBmodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentincludespositionsforoneareaofconcen-tration(AOC)51Z(acquisitions)acquisitionofficer(O−5),oneAOC51A(systemsdevelopment)acquisi-tionofficer(O−4),andoneAOC51S(researchandengineering)scienceandtechnologyofficer(O−4).Thesethreeofficersformthecoreofwhatisusuallycalledtheacquisition,logistics,andtechnologydirec-torate(ALT−D).

Thisdirectorate’smissionandcorecompetenciesvaryfromAFSBtoAFSBdependingontheoperatingenvironment,supportedunits,andcommandfocus.Buttheyalwaysincludeintegratingandsynchroniz-ingwiththeAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnology(ASA[ALT]),programexecutiveofficers(PEOs)andprogrammanagers(PMs),andthewarfightertoensurethatfielding,operationalassessments,andotheracquisi-tion-centricactivitiesaresuccessfulwithinsupportedunits.TheofficersandstaffintheALT−Dcanpro-videdirectsupportandstaffcoordinationforyourunit’sacquisition,logistics,andtechnologyefforts.

OperationalNeedsStatementsIdeally,yourunitwillhavealltheequipment

itneedstoaccomplishitsassignedmission;themission-essentialequipmentlist(MEEL)willbe100-percentsourced,andyouwillbeabletoeffi-cientlyandeffectivelycoveryourbattlespace.Unfor-tunately,thisistheexceptionratherthantherule.ConstantlychangingoperationalenvironmentsandevolvingmissionsetsrendereventhebestMEELsinadequateinsomecriticalareas.Theseinadequaciescancausecapabilitygapsthatcanadverselyaffectaunit’sabilitytoaccomplishthemission.

Thefirstconsiderationwhentryingtoovercomeagapshouldbereallocationofequipmentwithinyourcommandorthenexthighercommandtomakeupforanyshortages.Ifthisisnotaviableoption,anopera-tionalneedsstatement(ONS)orjointurgentopera-tionalneedsstatement(JUONS)(thelatterifyouareinajointbattlespace)isthenextstepinattemptingtomitigatethecapabilitygap.

Eachcommandhasslightlydifferentprocessesforcompiling,staffing,andforwardinganONSorJUONS.YourAFSB(whetherinsideoroutsideCONUS)canassistindeterminingifanotherONSorJUONSalreadyexiststhatdescribesyourcapabilitygap,iftechnologyexiststhatcansatisfyyourrequire-ments,andifyourONSorJUONScontainsthecriti-calelementsforacceptance.ONSandJUONSeffortsareusuallyassignedtothescienceandtechnologyofficerintheAFSB.

SubmittingatechnicallycorrectONSorJUONSisacriticalstepandwilleliminatestop-and-gostaffdelaysthatcouldpreventyourunitfromreceivingneededequipment.AlthougheveryeffortwillbemadetosatisfyanONSorJUONSasquicklyaspos-sible,itcansometimestakeweekstoreceiveequip-mentthatsatisfiesyourrequirement.Ifyourneedisurgent,considerusingtheRapidEquippingForce(REF).

RapidEquippingForceAnalternativetotheONSorJUONSistheREF

andits10Linerrequirementsdocument.Don’tcon-fusetheREFwithRFI,theRapidFieldingInitiative.TheREFisanorganizationcharteredtoconduct

TheCapabilitiesoftheArmyFieldSupportBrigade’sAcquisition,Logistics,andTechnologyDirectorate

by lieutenant Colonel Steven G. van riper

I

26 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

pinpointfieldingsofcriticalequipmenttodeployingordeployedunits.The10-LinerisadocumentusedbytheREFtocaptureaveryspecificrequirementfromdeployingordeployedunits.Thescienceandtechnologyofficercanreviewthe10-Linerandcom-municatewiththeREF.

Afterreceivingthe10-Liner,theREFwillattempttosatisfyyourrequirementsbyusingcommercialoff-the-shelf(COTS)ormodified-COTSsystemsorequipment.TheREFcanpotentiallymeettherequire-mentinamuchshortertimethanthe“normal”acqui-sitionprocess.

EquipmentprovidedbytheREFisnotfree,soyoushouldexpectthegeartoshowuponyourpropertybook.TheREFwillusuallyissueequip-menttobrigade-sizedorsmallerunits;insomecases,itwillissueitemsingreaterquantities.TheREFmayrequestyourparticipationinaforwardoperationalassessment(FOA)torecordyourcom-ments,asanenduser,ontheequipment’seffec-tiveness.InordertoassistyourunitduringaREFfieldingandFOA,theALT−DcancontinuetoliaisewiththeREFteamandcanactasacollectionpointforFOAquestionnaires.

Insomecases,aREF-fieldeditemcanbetransi-tionedintowhatiscalleda“programofrecord.”ThiscanhappenwhentheFOAisexceptionallyfavorableorwhendemandbecomessolargethatREFmanage-mentandfundingbecomesinadequate.Whenthisoccurs,theprogramisassignedtoaPM,providedafundingline,andsubjectedtotheadministrativerequirementsoftheformalacquisitionprocess.IfaREFinitiativeachievesprogramofrecordstatus,theALT−DcancomplementPMactivitiesbysynchro-nizingthefieldingplanwithoperationalcommit-mentsandschedules.

FieldingPlanFromthegainingunit’sperspective,thefielding

planisprobablythemostimportantcomponentofthe

acquisitionprocess.Thegainingunitisreallynotinter-estedinthechallengesthePMfaceswithcontracting,designing,producing,anddeliveringthenewsystem.Whattheunitdoescareaboutiswhenitwillbereceiv-ingtheequipmentandhowmanyitwillreceive.

Dependingonprocessesusedbyyourhigherhead-quartersandyourassignedAFSB,thefieldingplanmaybeastand-alonedocumentordistributedasanopera-tionorder(OPORD)orfragmentaryorder(FRAGO).Ineithercase,theALT−Dcanprovidevitalinputthroughnormalstaffingorthroughimmediatecommunicationtoensurethatunitfieldingexpectationsandrequirementsaresynchronizedwiththesystem’sproductionrate,deliveryschedule,anddistributionplan.

TheALT−Dwillcoordinatewithappropriatehigh-erheadquartersstaffsectionsandthePMtoensurethatessentialelementsofthefieldingplan(sched-ules,issuelocations,gainingunitresponsibilities,andtransportationrequirements)areincludedintheinstructionsprovidedtothereceivingunit.

Fieldingsseldominvolvesingle-pointdistributionfromafullyequippedwarehouseordeprocessingsite.Theytypicallyincludeseveralgeographicallydis-persedfieldingsites,differinglevelsofinfrastructure,andvaryingquantitiesforissue.TheALT−DandthePMcanmanagethesefieldingnuancesandgreatlysimplifytheprocessforthegainingunit.

TheALT−Dalsocanassistwithassetvisibilityandpropertyaccountability,ensuringthatPMscom-plywithallPropertyBookUnitSupplyEnhancedrequirementsforequipmentissueandtransfer.TheALT−Dcancoordinatetoensurethatfieldservicerepresentatives(FSRs)arepresenttoassistinaccep-tanceinspectionsandfinalissueoftheequipment.

Theexecutionofthefieldingplansetsthecondi-tionsforallfollow-onactivitiesassociatedwithanewsystem.UsingtheALT−D’scapabilitieswillensurethatthefieldingplanissynchronizedwithyourunit’sexpectationsandrequirements.Second,ifnotequallyimportantintermsofunitpriorities,isnewequipmenttraining(NET).

NewEquipmentTrainingItseemsobviousthatNET,specificallyopera-

tornewequipmenttraining(OPNET)orfield-levelmaintenancenewequipmenttraining(FLMNET),wouldberequiredasaunitreceivesnewequipment,butsomeunitsdonotsynchronizeNETwiththeirdailytasksandbattlerhythm.NETisanessentialpartoffieldingandmustbedonerightthefirsttime.WithoutNET,newequipmentcaneasilybecomepaperweights,motorpoolqueens,orjustlabeled“toohardtouse”bySoldiers.

TheALT−DcanensuretheNETisbothefficientandeffectivebyforwardingunitexpectations,timeavailable,andotherunit-uniquetrainingrequirements

NET is an essential part of fielding and

must be done right the first time. Without NET, new equipment can easily

become paperweights, motor pool queens, or just labeled “too hard

to use” by Soldiers.


directlytothePM.ThesectioncanalsoprovidethePMwithunittrainingschedulesortimelinesthatmayrequirechangestoNETtimesandlocations.

TheALT−DcanverifythattheNETplanisincludedinanyOPORDorFRAGOthatprescribesfieldingandwillfacilitateuniqueNETrequirements,likewarehousestoragespace,classroomcoordina-tion,housing,andinstructoraccountability.WhenconductingNETinadeployedenvironment,theALT−Dcantrackaninstructor’scountryclearanceandcallforwardrequestsandarrangeforhousingandintertheaterandintratheatertransportation.

ChallengesinevitablyemergeduringeventhebestplannedNETevents.TheALT−Dcan“runinterfer-ence”withthePMtomitigateanyproblemsthatmayarise.ThisunburdenstheunitacceptingthefieldingandallowsittostayfocusedonthemanyongoingpredeploymenttrainingactivitiesthatarenodoubtoccurringatthesametimeastheNET.Problemscanbeastrivialasnothavingenoughhandoutsorasseri-ousasrealizingthewrongsoftwareversionisloadedintoanewcommunicationssystem.

Inrarecases,communicationbetweentheALT−DandthePMisnoteffective.Ifthisoccurs,theAFSBcommandercanengageseniorleadersintheMate-rialEnterprisefordirectassistance.Inanyevent,theALT−DwillbethesinglefacetoyourunitforNETandothertrainingactivities.AfterasuccessfulinitialfieldingandNET,theALT−DwillbeginworkingwithyourunitandPMtoensureaneffectivesupportstrategyisimplemented.

SupportStrategyIftheprogrammanagementoffice(PMO)has

doneitshomework,yournewgearshouldeitherbefullysupportedbyfield-levelmaintenanceandtheArmysupplysystem,comewithFSRsaspartofacontractorlogisticssupport(CLS)program,orfea-tureacombinationofArmymaintenanceandFSRsandCLS.

IfFSRsandCLSareinvolved,theAFSBcanprovideagreatdealofassistancewithtracking,managing,

andgeneralsupportoftheFSRsandtheiruniquetoolandfacilityrequirements.SincetheALT−Dcaninter-facedirectlywithyourstaffofficersandtheend-userSoldiers,thesupportstrategywillbetailoredtoyourspecificneedsandoperationalenvironment.ThisinteractionallowstheAFSBtoworkwiththePMOasthesupportstrategychangesovertime.

Asyourunitusesthenewequipmentmore,usability,reliability,andmaintainabilityissuesundoubtedlywillemerge.TheALT−DcanactastheconduitbetweenyouandthePMOtoensurethatanysuggestionsforimprovementsareproperlypreparedandpresented.Inmanycases,thePMOwillsendanassistantprogrammanagertomonitortheinitialfieldingandrecorduserfeedback.TheAFSBcanprovidesupporttotheassistantprogrammanagerinthesamewayitsupportsFSRs,therebyreducingtheburdenonyourcommand.Thissynchronizedeffortamongthecustomerunit,theAFSB,thePMO,andFSRsisessentialtoensuringthattheweeksandmonthsfollowingtheinitialfieldingareapositiveexperienceforeveryoneinvolved.

TheALT−DintheAFSBprovidesauniqueser-vice.Havingabasicunderstandingofthecorecom-petenciesoftheALT−Dwillallowcommandersandstaffofficerstomaximizetheirabilitytoeffectivelystateoperationalrequirements,choosethebestfield-ingandtrainingplans,andensureapropertransitiontosustainmentoperations.

TheALT−D’scapabilitiescanbeappliedtothetactical,operational,andinsomecases,strategiclevel.Tacticalunitsseekingamaterielsolutionforacapabilitygapcanleveragetheskillsetsofthesci-enceandtechnologyofficerforliaisonwiththeREFteamsandfollow-onONSdevelopment.Operationalcommanderscanunburdentheirstaffsbyempower-ingtheAFSBtoconductthedetailedPEOandPMcoordinationtasksnecessaryforsuccessfulfieldings.Lastly,atthestrategiclevel,theALT−Dcanperformacquisition-andtechnology-relatedliaisontasks.

YoushouldincludetheAFSBwhenyourbattalion,brigade,ordivisionisconsidering,orisinthemiddleof,requirementsgeneration,fieldings,orliaisonwithPEOsorPMs.EngagingtheAFSBALT−D’scapabili-tieswilllinkyourcommandwiththeMaterielEnter-priseandenablesuccessfulacquisition,logistics,andtechnologyactivities.

lieutenant Colonel steven g. van riper is the DireCtor of aCQuisition, logistiCs, anD teChnology in the 402D army fielD sup-port BrigaDe. he is CertifieD as level iii in program management anD level ii in systems planning, researCh, Development, anD engi-neering-systems engineering. he holDs an m.s. Degree from the naval postgraDuate sChool anD is a memBer of the army aCQuisi-tion Corps. he was previously assigneD as an assistant program manager in the teChnology appliCations program offiCe.

The ALT-D can act as the conduit between you and

the PMO to ensure that any suggestions for improvements are

properly prepared and presented.

28 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

nAugust2008,the2dBrigadeCombatTeam (BCT),4thInfantryDivision,deployedfromFort Carson,Colorado,toIraqforOperationIraqiFree-dom(OIF)08–10.Thebrigadeexpectedtobeexecut-ingcombatoperationsbutinstead,becauseoftheoperationalenvironment,beganstabilityoperationsintheMulti-NationalDivision-Central(MND–C)areaofoperations.

MND–C,whichwasredesignatedasMulti-NationalDivision-South,wasanareathatspannedIraqfromthesouthernpartofBaghdadtoBasranearthebordersofKuwaitandIran.The2dBCTestablishedoperationsinnumerouslocationsthatrangedfrombuilt-upareaslikeKalsu,Echo,andBasratosmalloutpoststhatwereconstructedwhileplatoon-andcompany-sizedunitsweremovingintothearea.Inthisenvironment,the204thBrigadeSupportBattalion(BSB)conductedsus-tainmentsupportoperationsforthe2dBCT.

MND–C’snonlinear,contiguousoperationalenvironmentchallengedtheBSB’slogisticscapa-bilities.AlthoughthemodularstructureoftheBSB(withitsforwardsupportcompanies[FSCs]attachedtotheBCT’smaneuverbattalions)provid-edtheenhancedcapabilityandflexibilityrequiredtosupportthedynamicnatureoftheBCT’smis-sions,theBSB’slogisticianshadtoworkthroughsomeuniquechallenges.

SplitOperationsIntheinitialstagesofthedeployment,the204th

BSBsupportedthe2dBCT,whichhadover4,500personnelinover10locationsthatwerespreadacross13,500squaremilesinmultipleprovinces.Theasym-metricalnatureoftheareaofoperationsrequiredsplitoperations,withtheBSBatForwardOperatingBase(FOB)Kalsusupportingoneorganic2dBCTbat-talionandover15area-supportorganizations.ABSBlogisticstaskforce(LTF),consistingofelementsofthebasecompaniesoftheBSBandthemedicalcom-pany,waslocatedatCampEchoalongwiththeBCTheadquarters,twooftheBCT’sbattalions,andarea-supportunits.

ThesplitoperationsoptimizedthecapabilitiesoftheBSBtomitigatethecomparativeweaknessesintheIraqisustainmentsupportinfrastructure.However,thesplitoperationsplacedstressontheBSB’spersonnelandequipmentavailability,especiallyinthebegin-ningstagesofthedeployment.TheyrequiredtheBSBtooperatemultiplelogisticsnodes,includingclassI(subsistence)warehousesandfieldfeeding;classesII

(clothingandindividualequipment),IV(constructionandbarriermaterials),andIX(repairparts)operations;ammunitiontransferholdingpointoperations;andcentralreceivingandshippingpointoperationsatbothKalsuandEcho.

WhileatKalsu,theBSBoperatedasupplysup-portactivity(SSA)withover6,000itemsworthmorethan$40million;itwasoneofthelargestSSAsinMND–C.TheBSBalsooperatedalevelIImedicalfacilityatCampEcho.

RealignmentsandRelocationsBecauseachangingenvironmentandanadaptive

enemynecessitatedchangesinlinesofoperationsandrealignmentof2dBCTforces,the204thBSBassistedintherelocationofequipmentandpersonnel.Italsocontinuedsustainmentreplenishmentoperationsdur-ingrealignments,closures,andtransfersofoutlyinglocationstotheIraqisandfollow-onforces.Thenewlocationsrequiredincreasedsupplystockstoensurecontinuingsustainmentsupportwhentheweatherorthethreatofenemyattackpreventedthedispatchoflogisticsconvoys.

Throughouteachrelocation,theBSB’splanningandexecutionofsustainmentoperationsensuredthateveryBCTunitorarea-supportunitreceivedthesustainmentsupportneededtoaccomplishitsoperationalmis-sion.TherealignmentoftheBCTtoBasraprovincerequiredtheBSBtorelocateinitiallyfromFOBKalsutoCampEchoandthentoBasra.ThesustainmentoftheBCTandtheBSBduringtheserelocationswasfacilitatedbythedoctrinaluseoftheLTF,whichini-tiallyrelocatedfromCampEchotoContingencyOper-atingBase(COB)Adder(Tallil)andthentoBasra.

In“leapfrog”fashion,theBSBrelocatedtoEchowhiletheLTF,establishedatEcho,continuedtoprovidesustainmentsupporttoallBCTandarea-supportunits.OncetheBSBwasestablishedatEcho,theLTFrelocatedsouthtoCOBAdder,whereitestablishedlogisticsoperationstoensurecontinu-ityofsustainmentsupport.Finally,8monthsintothedeployment,theBSBandLTFwerebothestab-lishedatBasra.

TherelocationtoBasrapresentedgreaterlogisticschallengesastheBSBtookonanevenhigherhead-count,morelogisticsnodes,andmoreoutlyingloca-tionstosupport.Atitspeak,duringatransitionofforcesbetweenBritishunitsandthe2dBCT,theBasraclassIwarehousesupportedanoverallheadcountof8,500personneland17outlyinglocations.

SustainingaBCTinSouthernIraq

Iby lieutenant Colonel MiChael b. SieGl


TheBSBoperatedonediningfacilitythatsupported7,500personnel.TheBSBalsoinventoriedandsignedforanSSAtosupportallBCTandarea-supportunits.Forthisendeavor,theBSBrelocatedtheBuccaSSAtoBasra.Themoverequireddedicatedline-haulassetsfromthesustainmentbrigadetorelocatetheautho-rizedstockagelistandtheSSA’sstructuralanddigitalequipment.Within2weeksofrelocatingtheSSA,theBSBestablishedSSAoperationswith2,500lineitemsworthover$18million.

SPOOrganizationThesupportoperations(SPO)officerwasplaced

inchargeoftheLTF,whichestablisheditselfinitiallyatEchowiththeBCTheadquarterswhilethemajori-tyoftheBSBremainedatKalsu.TheLTFoperationscellwascomposedprimarilyofafewSPOperson-nelandsomenoncommissionedofficers(NCOs)andSoldiersfromthebasecompaniesthatformedtheLTF.Essentially,theLTFoperationscenterbecametheBSB’sforwardoperationscenter.However,theBSB’sautomationarchitectureandmodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentdidnotfacilitatetwooperationscenters.

Reorganizationandcross-trainingofpersonnelintheSPOsectionwerenecessarytofacilitatethedualoperationsatKalsuandEcho.Unfortunately,becausesplitoperationswerenotconsideredfortheSPOsec-tionwhileathomestation(inpart,becausethebat-taliondidnotknowthefinalforcearrayforIraquntiltheBCTarrivedintheater),theSPOsectionhadonlyreceivedminimalcross-training.

Thelackofcross-trainingwasexacerbatedbythefactthatmanyofthepersonnelintheSPOsectionwerenewtotheirpositions.Sothefocuswasonget-tingthepersonneltrainedfortheirassignedpositions.On-the-jobtrainingandmaximizingthetalentsofthepersonnel,evenifthetaskswereoutsidetheirmili-taryoccupationalspecialties(MOSs),werecriticaltoaccomplishingthemission.

TransportationandLogisticsConvoysIngeneral,the204thBSBanditsFSCsexecuted

logisticsasoutlinedincurrentdoctrine.TheFSCswereabletosupporttheoutlyinglocationswithminimalsupportfromtheBSBaccordingtotheBCTconceptofsupport.However,someadditionalorganictransportationequipmentwasneededsotheBCTcouldmoveclassVII(majorenditems)aroundtheareaofoperations.

TheBSBandFSCsdidnothaveallofthetrans-portationequipmentneededforoperationsinIraq.Heavyequipmenttransport(HET)vehiclesandtrail-erswereessentialinfacilitatingtheBCT’smanyrelocations.Theaterlogisticsunits(thesustainmentbrigade)andlocalcontractorsprovidedmanyofthe

heavy-haultrucks,buttheyhadtroublefillingtheBCT’snumeroustransportationrequirements.SotheBSBobtainedHETsthroughtheater-providedequip-ment(TPE)sothatitcouldprovideresponsivetrans-portationsupportfortheBCT’srelocations.HETsshouldbeanorganicBSBassetineveryheavyBCT.

AlthoughtheBSBandFSCswereabletoreceivesomeTPE,someitems,suchaspalletizedloadsys-temflatracks,weredifficulttoobtain.TheBCTattemptedtobringallofitsflatracksfromhomesta-tion,butonlyaportionoftheflatrackswereapprovedfordeploymenttoIraq.Therationalewasthatfla-trackswereavailableintheater,butittookmonthstoacquireenoughflatrackstomeettheBCT’srequire-ment.Thisdelayhinderedlogisticsoperations,espe-ciallybecauseunitscouldnotdoflatrackexchangesof20-footMILVANs[military-owned,demountablecontainers].Unfortunately,MILVANscannotbeplacedoncontainerizedroll-in/roll-outplatforms,whichwerereadilyavailableintheater.

Nothavingenoughflatracksforflatrackexchang-esmeantthattheBCThadagreaterrequirementformaterials-handlingequipment(MHE),espe-ciallyrough-terraincontainerhandlers(RTCHs)andcranes,tomoveMILVANsonandofftheflatracks.TherequirementforMHEwasespeciallycriticalinoutlyinglocations.Partofthesolutionwastocon-tractforMHEwithlocalvendors.TheBSBSPOsectionservedasthecontractingofficer’srepresen-tativefortheMHEcontractinBasra.InlocationswherenoRTCHsorcraneswereavailable,unitsmaximizedtheuseofthecontainerhandlingunitandsometimestheM88mediumrecoveryvehicletomovecontainers.

Earlyinthebattalion’sresetbeforedeployment,theBSBcommanderdecidedtocreateaconvoysecuritydetachment(CSD)thateventuallybecamea45-personplatoonwith3squads.Eachsquadcon-sistedoffourguntrucksthatoperatedasateamtoprovidesecurityforthebattalion’slogisticsconvoys.

TheinitialtrainingfortheCSDoccurredinDecember2008athomestation,withateamfromFortKnoxfacilitatingtheguntrucktraining.ThistrainingenabledtheCSDtolearntheessentialskillsofmaneuvering,communicating,andshooting.BecauseallBSBconvoysweresecuredbytheCSD,theformationoftheCSDanditstrainingwascriti-cal.Infact,theBSBconvoysweremoreoftenlimit-edbytheavailabilityoftheCSDtoprovidesecuritythanbytheavailabilityoftransportationassetstohaulsupplies.

DigitalSystemsandEnablersTheBattleCommandSustainmentSupportSystem

(BCS3)isintendedtoprovideandmanagethelogisticscommonoperationalpicture(LCOP)intheBCT.One

30 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ofBCS3’sfunctionsistocapturethelogisticsstatusofsubordinateunitsandprovidesituationalawarenessofthestateoflogisticssupplieswithinbattalions.

However,BCS3wasnotusedinMND–Cbythe2dBCT,thesustainmentbrigade,ortheexpeditionarysustainmentcommand.TheLCOPfortheBCTsus-tainmentcellandSPOsectionwasmanagedthroughordinarycomputerswithSecretInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(SIPRNET)andNon-SecureInternetProtocolRouterNetwork(NIPRNET)connectivityandprocessedandtransmittedaslogisticsstatusreportsthroughMicrosoftOfficeprograms.

Beforedeploying,theBCTcommandhadempha-sizedtheuseofBCS3astheArmylogisticsmanage-mentsystem.However,twofactorspreventedtheBCTfrommaximizingtheuseofBCS3inIraq.First,BCS3isnotuser-friendlyorveryintuitive.Second,higher-levelunitsdidnotemphasizetheuseofBCS3.BecausesubordinateunitswerenotrequiredtouseBCS3,theyrevertedtousingreportsthatweremoreuser-friendly.

OneoftheBCT’sautomationcapabilitygapswastheshortageofbothSIPRNETandNIPRNETlaptops.Sincealllogisticsreportingwasconductedthroughcomputers,computersandconnectivitywereessentialforlogisticsoperations.

BothSIPRNETandNIPRNETInternetconnectivityfortheLTFwasfacilitatedbythelocaldirectorateofinformationmanagementatCampEcho.Ifthatcon-nectivityhadnotbeenpresent,theLTFwouldhavehadtorelyonlinkingwiththebattalionorBCThead-quarterslocatedatEchoforJointNetworkNodeorCommandPostNode(CPN)capabilitysincetheBSBonlyhadoneCPN.ThiswouldhaveseverelylimitedthecapabilityoftheLTFsincemostactionswerecon-ductedovertheInternetandthetacticalnetworkhadlimitedports.

SustainmentSupportfortheBCTDoctrineprovidesaframeworkforactionthathelps

mitigateuncertaintywithouteliminatingit,butitcan-notanticipatethedynamicresultsoftheinteractionofforceswithinanareaofoperations.Doctrinecannotbeprescriptive;itwillnotaccuratelyreflectanevolving,chaotic,nonlinearenvironment.Nevertheless,doctri-nalprocesseshelpformulateconceptsofsupportandplansthatmatchthecontextandcircumstanceswithinaunit’sareaofoperations.

ChangestotheBCT’sorganizationandthemovetowarddistribution-basedlogisticswithpulsedopera-tionsforreplenishmenthavemodifiedtheBCT’slogisticsinfrastructure.However,FOBoperationsandhowforcesarearrayedwithinanonlinearenvironmentprecludethesoleuseofdistribution-basedlogisticsattheBCTlevel.Supply-pointdistributionwasusedintheFOBenvironmentquitefrequently.

Oneofthe204thBSB’sprimarytaskswastodevelopaconceptofsupportthatsustainedthecom-batoutposts(COPs)andjointsecuritystations(JSSs)intheareaofoperations.Whilesomeoftheseloca-tionswereresuppliedbytheFSCs,otherswereresup-pliedbytheBSB.AcquiringservicesandequipmentforimprovingthequalityoflifeatCOPsandJSSsbecametheresponsibilityofboththebrigadeS–4andSPOsections.

Intheinitialstages,astheS–4sectionrespondedtothelargecontractualrequirementsofsupportingtheoutlyinglocations(aswellasthemainFOBlocations),theBSBprovidedmanyofitsownorganicelectric-itygeneratorstothemaneuverunitstobridgepowergenerationgaps.TheBSBalsoprocuredwaterandfuelbagstohelpbuildupstoragecapacitiesattheCOPsandJSSstoreducethefrequencyoflogisticsconvoystothosesites.

ContractingtofillcapabilitygapswascriticalandrequiredeithertheSPOorbrigadeS–4sectiontohavepersonnelwithtrainingincontracting.WhilethebrigadeS–4procuredthereefers[refrigeratedvans]fortheBCT,theBSBensuredthatthereeferswereequitablydistributedandfullysupportedthefieldfeedingplan.

ThebaselifesustainmentoftheCOPsandJSSswasanorganizedeffortbytheBCT’sforceprotectioncell(brigadeengineers),S–4,andBSB(primarilyfortransportationsupport).BecauseCOPsandJSSsmaybelocatedincities,buildingupsustainmentstocksattheselocationstoreducethefrequencyofresup-plywasthebestmethodtolowerthevisibilityofthecoalitionpresenceinthecities.TheBSBplannedona5-to-7-daycontingencystockageofmostsuppliesatthelocations.Thisensuredcontinuityofsuppliesintheeventofcontingenciesandemergencies,suchaswhenresupplyoperationswerehinderedbyweatheroroperations.

However,stockageatsomeofthelocationswaslimitedbyspaceandequipment.Forrations,reefercapacitywasthebiggestlimitingfactor.Insomelocations,20-footreefersweretoolarge.Inthosesit-uations,unitspurchasedsmallerfreezersandrefrig-eratorslocallytomaximizetheavailablespace.

TheBSBoriginallyusedasynchronizationmeet-ingtocoordinatesuppliesandlogisticsconvoysched-ulesbasedonoperationsandintelligenceupdates.WhensplitoperationswereconductedatKalsuandEcho,theamountofinformationthathadtobedis-cussedandsynchronizedwasmanageablewithinthetimeallottedforthesynchronizationmeeting.How-ever,whentheBSBconsolidatedatBasraandallunitsweresupportedoutofonelocation,theconvoysynchronizationmeetingbecameimmersedindeter-miningsustainmentrequirementsandlessfocusedonoperationsandintelligence.


Asaresult,theBSBcreatedthecommoditiesmeeting.Thisensuredthattheconvoysynchroniza-tionmeeting(heldimmediatelyafterthecommoditiesmeeting)remainedfocusedonoperations.Thecom-moditiesmeetingwasdedicatedtodeterminingunits’supplyandservicerequirementsoutto7days.Likeatrainingmeeting,theintentwastoidentifyrequire-mentsandapplyresourcesandcapabilitiestothoserequirements.Inthiscase,themeetingfocusedonsup-pliesandtransportationassets.

ClassIOperationsOneofthe204thBSB’smajorchallengeswith

fieldfeedingoperationsinBasrawasthesheersizeofthetask.Atitspeak,thenumberofmouthstofeedwas8,500—doublethesizeofwhattheBSB’sclassIsectionnormallysupported.Manyoftheperson-nelwerenewtothefieldfeedingsectionrightbeforedeploymentandhadnotbeentrainedinclassIopera-tions.MostoftheMOS92As(automatedlogisticalspecialists)hadpreviouslyworkedonlyinclassIXoperations,soclassIoperationswerenewformanyofthem.

Becauseoftheenormousrequirement,theclassIsectionwasaugmentedwithSoldiersfromothersec-tions.Iffieldfeedingoperationshadrevolvedaroundmodularboxesofmealsready-to-eatandunitizedgrouprations,theclassImissionwouldhavebeenmucheasier,despitetheheadcount.However,thefieldfeedingsectionhadtofillrequirementsforavarietyofsupplementsandmenuoptionsthatrivaledthoseaton-postdiningfacilities.MOS92ASoldiersshouldreceivemorein-depthfieldfeedingtrainingatadvancedindividualtrainingandotherArmyTrainingandDoctrineCommandschoolsandshouldcross-trainwithMOS92G(foodservicespecialist)Soldiers.

OtherprimaryobstaclestotheclassImissionwereashortageofreefersandinsufficientreefermainte-nance.Althoughtheprocurementofreeferswasiniti-atedbeforethebrigadeenteredIraq,ittookseveralmonthstoreceivethematCampEchoandFOBKalsu.Manyofthereeferswerelocallymadeandsubstandardandrequiredconstantmaintenance.Becausethereeferswerelocallyproduced,theArmymechanicsinitiallyhadadifficulttimemaintainingthembecauseofalackofmanualsandpropertools.

EachBCTshouldhaveafleetofreefersandorganicArmymechanicstrainedinreefermaintenancerobustenoughtofillrequirements.Thisfleetofreeferswouldprovidetheinitialcapabilitytoholdfrozenfoods,freshfruitsandvegetables,andice.

MaintenanceThe2dBCT,likeallbrigadeswithmine-resistant

ambush-protectedvehicles(MRAPs)inIraq,hadprob-lemswiththeMRAP’sfiresuppressionsystem(FSS)

bottles,sensors,andpowerbackups.WhilesomeofthoseproblemshadtobeaddressedattheArmylevel,the204thBSBensuredtheoperationalreadinessofthe2dBCT’sMRAPs.Specifically,theBSBworkedtodevelopanorganiccapabilitywithintheunittorefillMRAPFSSbottlesinsteadofrelyingsolelyontheArmyMaterielCommand’srefillstations.The204thBSBwasthefirstunittohavesuchacapabilityinMND–C.

HavingtheorganicrefillcapabilityallowedtheBSBtohelptheBCTtomaintaincombat-readyplatforms.TheBSBsharedthisknowledgewithotherBCTstoensuretheoperationalreadinessofallMRAPsinMND–C.Nevertheless,supplypartsfortheMRAPs,especiallysensors,FSSbottles,andpowerbackups,continuedtobeaproblemsinceMRAPpartssupplywasstillcontractedandthoseitemswerenotavailablethroughtheArmysupplysystem.

TheBSBworkedwithrepresentativesfromtheDefenseLogisticsAgencytoget100refillkitsshippeddirectlytotheBSB.Oncetherefillkitswerereceived,theBSBwasabletomaketheMRAPsfullymissioncapable.Beforeattemptinganytypeoffiresuppres-sionrecharging,personnelmustreceivepropertrainingbyexperiencedtechnicians,andthelocalfiredepart-mentshouldapproveFSSrechargingstationsbeforerefilloperationscommence.

Duringitsdeployment,the204thBSBcompletednearly1,000sustainmentmissionsthatcoveredapproximately39,000miles.TheBSBanditsFSCsconductedsustainmentreplenishmentoperationstodelivermorethan1.1milliongallonsofwater,200,000poundsofice,300,000gallonsoffuel,40tonsofammunition,and482palletsofclassIX.

The2dBCTdealtwithmultiplerelocationsandsupportrequirementsthatgreatlyexceededthosetypicalforaheavyBCT’sBSB.Butthe204thBSBintegratednondoctrinalanddoctrinalsolutionstoovercomeobstaclestosustainmentsupportoperationsfortheBCT.TheconstraintsoftheareaofoperationsrequiredtheingenuityandflexibilityoftheBSB’sleadersandSoldiers.TheteamworkexhibitedbyallofthelogisticsplayersintheBCTensuredthatsustain-mentsupportoperationscontinuedunabatedthroughalloperations.

lieutenant Colonel miChael B. siegl is the Deputy g–4 of the 2D infantry Division at Camp reD ClouD, repuBliC of korea. he was the exeCutive offiCer anD support operations offiCer of the 204th BrigaDe support Battalion, 2D BrigaDe ComBat team, 4th infantry Division, During operation iraQi freeDom 08–10. he has a B.a. Degree from stanforD university anD an m.a. Degree from georgetown university. he is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD army CommanD anD general staff College.

32 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ariousmilitarytransitionteamsarepartnered withIraqipolice,airforce,andarmyunitsto developIraqiSecurityForces(ISF)capabilities.However,aleadingchallengeinthecontinueddevelop-mentofISFcapabilitiesrestsinthecoalition’scapacitytoorganizethetrainingandadvisingmissionatthetac-ticalandoperationallevelsunderonecommand.

ThecurrentstructureoftheISFlogisticsdevelop-mentpartnershipcomprisesseveralcommandsatvariouslevels,eachwithadifferentfocus.Althoughthecommandsshareavisionforaself-sustainingISF,theoperationalstrategy,sourcingofadviserskillsets,adviserpreparation,andcommandemphasisdifferbasedontheneedsoftheIraqiechelonwithwhichthetransitionteamispartnered.Despiteuni-fiedaction,theabsenceofunityofcommandlimitstheIraqis’abilitytodevelopinitiativesandsustainIraqilogisticsinthelongterm.

AnAttempttoUnifyEffortInOctober2009,theprimaryunitsassistingwith

IraqiArmylogisticsdevelopmentintheBaghdadareaofresponsibilitywereMulti-NationalCorps-Iraq(MNC–I),Multi-NationalDivision-Baghdad(MND–B),Multi-NationalSecurityTransitionCommand-Iraq(MNSTC–I),andthe10thSustain-mentBrigade.TheseorganizationshadISFlogisticssectionsandsubordinatetraining,advising,andtransitionteamspartneredwiththeIraqiArmyfromthedepottothefoxhole.AttheMNC–Ilevel,sym-posiumswereheldquarterlytointegratecommandsandtoachieveunityofeffort.

The10thSustainmentBrigadeconductedquarterlyreviewswiththeexpeditionarysustainmentcommand,itshigherheadquarters,toassessmetricsandsharebestpracticesamongthesustainmentbrigade’stransi-tionteams.MeetingswerealsoheldwithinMND–BandMNSTC–Itodiscusschallengesandattainabletargets,butresourcesandeffortsacrossthelogistics-developmentspectrumwerenotsynchronized.AstheIraqiArmywasbeingredeveloped,logisticseffortswerenotalignedwiththedevelopmentandcapabili-ties.Theunityofeffortwasattemptedattheactionofficerandstafflevel,butnotamongcommanders.

CommandRelationshipsAccordingtoFieldManual3–0,Operations,com-

mandrelationshipsprovidethebasisforunityof

commandandunityofeffortinoperations.MND–BwaspartneredwithIraqiArmydivisions.Sustain-mentbrigadeswerepartneredwithIraqiArmydivi-sionsupportmaintenanceunitsandthedivision’smotortransportationregiment.MNSTC–Iwaspart-neredwiththeIraqiArmydepot-andnational-levelentities.Thesecommandsreceivedguidancefromandreportedtodifferentcommanders.

Therelationshipsamongthevariousorganiza-tionswerefurthercomplicatedbythefrustrationofconstantchangesofindividualsandteamsredeploy-ing,whichledtobreaksinmomentumandgapsincontinuity.Thenumerousdifferencesindevelop-mentmetrics,teamcapabilities,andcommander-establishedprioritiesalsocreatedchallenges.

Tomitigatetheselimitations,the10thSus-tainmentBrigade’sISFlogisticstransitionteamsoughttostreamlinetheIraqiArmy’srepairpartsrequisitionprocessandmaintenancedoctrinebysynchronizing,coordinating,andintegratingthepartsdistributionandmaintenanceproceduresfromMND–B-partneredunitsthrough10thSustainmentBrigade-partneredunitsandonwardtoMNSTC–I-advisedagencies.

GainsinIraqiArmyefficiencyandsystemconfi-dencewereminimal.Instead,thegreaterresultsoftheinitiativeweremilitarytransitionteamsunder-miningoutsidecommands,frictionfromtransitionteamswith10thSustainmentBrigadeexpectations,advisoryteamsandunitswithdifferentprioritiesandagendas,andtheneedforunityofcommand.Thecurrentstructuredidnotpromotethedevelop-mentofIraqiArmylogistics.

ANeedforOneCommandCollectively,U.S.transitionteamswerenot

enablingIraqisolutionstoIraqiproblems.Unitsnotsynchronizedandalignedwiththelong-termdevel-opmentstrategyattemptedtofurtherIraqiArmylogisticsbycoordinating,supplying,andbasicallydoingtheircounterpart’sworktowardself-sustain-ment.CoordinationandcooperationtowardcommonobjectivesarenotenoughfortrainingandadvisingorganizationstoeffectivelyengagetheIraqiArmy.

Logisticsdevelopmenteffortsandordersmustbemanagedunderoneresponsiblecommander.Ouradvisers,partneredthroughoutmilitaryandGovern-mentactivities,musthavereportingrequirements,

ANeglectedPrincipleofWarinLogisticsAdvising

by MaJor JaMeS J. ZaCChino, Jr.

V


engagementcriteria,developmentmetrics,partner-shipstandards,trainingresources,andsynchronizedpartnershipdevelopmentanddirectionalignedunderonecommand.Initiativesmustconnecttoeachotherandleadtolong-termgoals.Elementsoftheadvisorymissionmustbesynchronizedinordertocoordinatedevelopmenteffortsthroughoutpartneredechelons.Unityofcommandisfundamental.Thisrelationshipisessentialformaximizinglogisticsdevelopmentefforts.

AsU.S.militarycapabilitieschangewithastrategicreductionofforces,advisingresourcesandrequirementswilladjustinIraq.ThisshiftinU.S.forcesdemandsmorerelianceontheISFtoprovidesecurityandstabilityforIraq’sgovernmentandpeople.TheadvisorymissionwillonlyincreaseastheArmyposturesitselftohelpbuildthelogisticsskillsofotherforeignmilitariesandimprovethestabilityofdevelopingcountries.

Unityofcommandisanecessaryprincipleinsyn-chronizingtheresourcesandeffortsoftheadvisorymission.Thisprincipleofwarmustbeincorporated

inthetacticalandoperationallogisticsdevelopmentstrategy.

TheeffortsoftheU.S.Army’strainingandadviso-rytransitionteamplayanincreasinglycriticalroleaswedevelopthecapabilitiesofforeignforcestowardself-sustainmentandgovernmentstability.Sustainedlogisticsisessentialforanyorganization’slong-termsurvival.Neglectingunityofcommandseverelylimitstrainingandadvisorycapabilitiesinlogisticsdevelopment.

maJor James J. ZaCChino, Jr., is the support operations offi-Cer for the 548th ComBat sustainment support Battalion, 10th sustainment BrigaDe, at fort Drum, new york. he was previously assigneD as a logistiCs transition team Chief During the BrigaDe’s Deployment to iraQ. he holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in eConomiCs anD an m.B.a. Degree from rutgers university. he is a graDuate of the multinational logistiCs Course, Joint Course on logistiCs, petroleum offiCer Course, support operations Course, Conven-tional forCes europe arms inspeCtor/esCort Course, ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool, ComBineD logistiCs Captains Career Course, anD Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course.

This chart depicts the complexity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) development mission and shows the agencies and levels with which the 10th Sustainment Brigade ISF Cell interacts. The way ahead for ISF self-reliance requires a unified effort of constant, consistent advising backed with sound Iraqi doctrine and policies. Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, the multinational divisions, the expeditionary sustainment command, and U.S. agencies, such as the Army Materiel Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and Army Training and Doctrine Command, and contractors all play a direct role in working toward ISF logistics self-reliance. The lines in this diagram separate coalition units from their Iraqi counterparts.

AMC = ArmyMaterielCommandBSB = BrigadesupportbattalionDCOSLOG=DeputyChiefofStaff, LogisticsDLA = DefenseLogisticsAgencyEME = ElectricalandMechanical EngineeringDirectorateGTR = GeneralTransportRegimentHSC = Headquartersandservice companyISF = IraqiSecurityForcesLMAT = Logisticsmilitaryadvisory teamLTAT = Logisticstrainingadvisory teamMiTT = MilitarytransitionteamMND–B = Multi-NationalDivision- BaghdadMNF–I = Multi-NationalForces-IraqMNF–W = Multi-NationalForces-WestMNC–I = Multi-NationalCorps-IraqMNSTC–I = Multi-NationalSecurity TransitionCommandIraqMTR = Motortransportation regimentT/P = TransportationandProvisions Directorate

Legend

34 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

oldiersandDepartmentoftheArmycivilians whooverseecontractorsonthebattlefield mustfullyunderstandthemagnitudeandimportanceoftheirresponsibilities.ArmyMaterielCommand(AMC)contractingofficerrepresentatives(CORs)orcontractingofficertechnicalrepresenta-tives(COTRs),suchasthoseassignedtotheArmySustainmentCommandorArmyfieldsupportbri-gadesandtheirrespectivebattalions,areresponsibleforensuringthatcontractorsstrictlyabidebytheircontractedperformanceworkstatements(PWSs),ful-fillArmymissionrequirements,andupholdGovern-mentinterests.

Todefine,safeguard,andexecutetheircontractoversightrolesandresponsibilities,theseSoldiersandciviliansmustattendtheCORcourseofferedbytheArmyLogisticsUniversityorDefenseAcquisitionUniversity.Likewise,theymustbecomewell-versedintheFederalAcquisitionRegulationandtheDefenseFederalAcquisitionRegulation,whichdefinetheGov-ernment’srulesforcontractedbusiness.

TeamEffortandLoyaltiesBecausetheArmydoesnothavethetotalpersonnel

strengthormaterielcapacitytosatisfyallofitscurrentmissionrequirements,contractorsdelivertherequisitemanpower,equipment,andexpertisetosatisfyArmydemandsandprovidepracticalapplicationstoaccom-plishmilitarysupportandsustainmentmissions.Meld-ingcontractorsintotheArmy’smissionsgeneratesacombatmultiplierthatenablesmilitarypersonneltomeetotheroperationalrequirements.

ThroughtheCORcourse,Governmentemployeesgainanunderstandingofhowtomanagerelationshipswithcontractorsintheworkplaceandduringdeploy-mentsandhumanitarianassistancemissions.TheGov-ernmentemployeeandcontractorrelationshipformstheteameffortrequiredformissionsuccess.Bothenti-tiesmustworkcloselytogetheranddevelopgoodbusi-nessandpartnershippractices.

However,despitetheirmutualmission-focusedapproachtosatisfyingArmyrequirements,contrac-torsandGovernmentemployeeseachhavedifferentloyalties,andtheseloyaltiesarethedrivingforcebehindtheiroverallpurposeandmotivation.Contrac-torsseektosatisfyshareholders’expectationswhilemaintaininggoodworkingandcustomerrelationshipswiththeGovernmentandposturingthemselvesto

bidonandwinthenextcontract.SoldiersandArmyciviliansdefendandupholdtheConstitution(Govern-mentinterests),executemilitaryorders,andsupportthecommander’sintent.AlthoughcontractorsandGovernmentemployeeshavedifferentloyalties,theyarebothchargedandboundtoexecutetheArmy’smissionathand.

ContractOversightontheBattlefield

by lieutenant Colonel peter W. buttS

S


Above: A mechanic washes off an M1151 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle outside the 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field Support Brigade, vehicle maintenance facility at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar.

At right: An auto body repairman and painter from Nepal applies a coat of Tan 686A, a paint meant for desert camouflage, on the wheels of a Stryker armored combat vehicle inside a booth at Camp As Sayliyah. (Photos by Dustin Senger)

36 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

RelationshipandProcessDevelopmentSo,howdoestheGovernmentmonitorandpro-

videvigilantcontractoversightwhileinfluencingthecontractortomaintainateam-effortattitude?First,GovernmentemployeesusethecontractagreementandPWS(whichoutlineswhatthecontractormustaccomplishunderthecontract)toensurethatthecontractorsupportsandsustainstheArmy’smission.Thecontractingofficer(KO)administersthecontract,andtheCORsandCOTRsbecometheKO’seyesandearsinthefieldtoensurecontractorcompliance.Acost-reimbursablecontractisapopularGovernmentcontractandisusedespeciallywhentheendresultortimeneededtomeetmilitarymissionrequirementsisuncertainorhardtodefine.

Second,sothattheGovernmentcanavoidopera-tionalriskinmeetinguncertainmilitaryrequire-ments,thecontractormaybecontractedtofulfilla“securityblanket”role.However,tooverseeandemploythissecurityblanketandreducefinancial

risk,theGovernmentmustmakesurethatthecon-tractoractuallyanddiligentlyfulfillsthetermsout-linedinthePWS.

Sinceacost-reimbursablecontractprovidesnofinancialincentiveforthecontractortoachievespendingorperformanceefficiencies,SoldiersandArmycivilianswithspecifictechnicalexpertisebecomethehonestbrokersforGovernmentinterests,executecontractoversight,andensurethatthecon-tractorisperforminginaccordancewiththePWS.Withoutthiskeenoversight,Governmentdollars,time,andresourcesaresubjecttowaste.

ThesheriffattheforefrontofthePWSandcon-tractoversightmissionistheunit’squalityassurancerepresentative(QAR).TheQAR,alongwiththeunitCORsandCOTRs,developsthequalityassurancesurveillanceplan(QASP),whichincludesthecontractandthePWSchecklistidentifyingthetasks,policies,andproceduresthatthecontractormustperformandexecutefortheGovernment.

Two mechanics install turret parts inside a vehicle at the 1st Battalion, 401st Army Field Support Brigade, vehicle maintenance facility at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar. (Photo by Dustin Senger)


TheQASPenablesandguidestheunit’sCORsandCOTRstoobserveandvalidatespecificcontractorper-formanceactions.Assuch,CORsissuewarningsorcor-rectiveactionrequests(CARs)thatdocumentcontractordeficiencieswhileperformingor,insomecases,notperformingtasksidentifiedinthePWS.TheseCARsarereportabletotheKOandareregularlyreviewedtodetermineoverallcontractorperformance.TheCARscanaffecttheGovernment’sdecisiontosustainorrelievethecontractorfromthatparticularcontract.

ThePitfalls:FraternizationandComplacencyTwolikelysituationscouldarisefromtheGovern-

mentemployeeandcontractorteam-effortrelationship:fraternizationandcomplacency.ThesetwopitfallscanunderminemissionsuccessorcauseafailureifCORsorCOTRsdonotprovidethecontractoversightneededtosafeguardGovernmentinterests.

FraternizationoccurswhenaGovernmentemployeeandacontractorwhoareinvolvedinthesamecontractcongeniallysocializeinanymanner.DespitethecloserelationshipsthatcandevelopamongGovernmentemployeesandcontractorssupportingtheteameffort,Governmentemployeesmustunderstandthatbefriend-ingorhelpingacontractor,includingevengivinghimarideinapersonalorGovernmentvehicle,couldbemisconstruedaspreferentialtreatmentandcouldcauseabreakdowninthecontractoversightprocess.

Moreover,anoutwardlyawkwardrelationshipcoulddevelopfromcongeniallysocializingandcausetheGovernmentemployeetolosetheabilitytoobjectivelyoverseethecontractor’sperformance.ThisrelationshipcouldresultinunduecontractorinfluenceortheGov-ernmentemployee’sapprehensiontoexecutepropercontractoversight.Stayingpurelyobjectivethrough-outthecontractoversightmissionenablesCORsandCOTRstoexecutetheirindividualrolesandrespon-sibilitiesandkeeptheirmindsontheGovernment’sbusiness.

ComplacencybyeitherthecontractorortheGov-ernmentemployee,orboth,canoccurforvariousreasonsandultimatelycanchipawayatthebedrockofestablishedPWSrequirements.TheGovernmentemployee’sfailuretoremainvigilantandfollowtheQASPcanresultfromsimplytrustingthecontractortoperformandexecutecontractedworkinsteadofapply-ingdiligent,longstandingoversightforthatcontract,asrequired.

InarecentGovernmentcontractsituation,formorethanayear,acontractorhadbeencomplacentandhadnotbeenproperlyfulfillingitscontractualobligations

outlinedinthePWS.Sothecontractedcompany’sleaderssurveyedthesituationand,inconjunctionwiththeGovernment,relieved,suspended,orreassignedmorethan30contractedpersonnel,includingfirst-linemanagersandavicepresident.Thisactionwasexecutedimmediatelytocleanupacontractsituationgoneawryandtofulfillthecontractor’sobligationtotheGovernment’smission.

Thecompletesuccessofacost-reimbursablecon-tractreliesheavilyonGovernmentpersonnelbeingschool-trainedasCORsandCOTRsandhavingafirmunderstandingofhowpropercontractoversightleadstoGovernmentmoneybeingwellspentratherthanwasted.Withoutthisengrainedknowledgeofcontractoversight,theGovernmentcouldbeavictimoffraud,waste,andabuse.

AcontractordependsontheGovernmentforbusi-nessandwantstoperformthejobwelltoretainthecontractandmeetshareholderexpectations.Com-mandersareresponsibleformakingsurethattheircontractsareproperlyexecuted.ArmycommandersareresponsibleformakingsurethattheircontractorsproperlyexecutethecontractaccordingtothePWSandthattheirKOssustainefficientcontractoversight.WhenGovernmentemployeesareCOR-coursetrainedandhaveasolidunderstandingofhowtoexecutetheircontractoversightrolesandresponsibilities,Govern-mentsuccessprevailsandtheteamwins.

lieutenant Colonel peter w. Butts CommanDs the 1st Bat-talion, 401st army fielD support BrigaDe, whiCh oversees army pre-positioneD stoCks 5 at Camp as sayliyah, Qatar. he holDs a Degree in CommuniCations from the university of nevaDa, las vegas, anD a master’s Degree in Business aDministration from Baker university.

A mechanic from Nepal hands tools to a mechanic from India inside the 1st Battalion, 401st Army

Field Support Brigade, vehicle maintenance facility at Camp As Sayliyah. (Photo by Dustin Senger)

38 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

oorlymanagedvehiclebatterymaintenance canleadtoearlyfailureandunnecessary replacementcosts.Itcanalsotakeawaytimefromamechanic’sdailyscheduleandhisabilitytoperformothertasks,suchasgeneraltroubleshootingandrepair.Ultimately,poorbatterymaintenancewillaffectthereadinessofaunit’srollingstock.

AsthesurfacemaintenancemanagerfortheKen-tuckyArmyNationalGuard(KYARNG),Ihaveinstitutedabatterymanagermaintenance(BMM)programwiththeongoingconsultationofaprivatecontractor,PulseTechProductsCorporation.Pulse-Techincorporatesits“smart”chargerandmaintenancetechnologyintotheBMMprogramandprovidesstrongcustomerserviceandsupport.

Theresultshavebeenimpressiveandrewarding.BeforehavingaccesstoPulseTech’ssmarttechnologyandconsultationservices,theKYARNGexclusivelyusedflooded-cell(wet)batteries.Theaveragelife-spanforatypicalflooded-cellbatteryis2yearsontrackedvehiclesand3yearsonwheeledvehicles.IntheKYARNG,whichhas292full-timemaintenancepersonneland40temporaryworkersspreadamong13maintenanceshops,wehadaveragedabout2,000newbatteriesannually.

AgMBatteriesTwoyearsago,webeganswitchingtothenew

Hawkerabsorbedglassmat(AGM)batteriesandinstitutedourBMMprogramwiththehelpofPulse-Tech.Sincethen,wehavehadtoreplacelessthan5percentofourinventoryof2,500Hawkerbatteries,representinga90-percentreductioninyear-to-yearreplacements.Wealsoestimatethatwehavegained1man-yearofavailableproductivetimebecausewespendlesstimereplacingandmaintainingbatteries.AlthoughthecostofAGMbatteriesishigherthanthecostoftheflooded-cellbatterieswepreviouslyused,AGMbatterieslastlonger,performbetter,andcanbesafelyshippedbyair,readytouse.

TokeepthoseAGMbatteriesatpeakperformance,weemployavarietyofhigh-techsmarttools,includ-inganalyticaltestersandchargingsystems,suchasheavy-dutyrollingchargersandpalletchargers.Alongwiththetechnology,wehaveinstitutedaroutine“cradle-to-grave”maintenanceprogramthatclearlydefinesproceduresforhandlingandsafety,

preventiveandcorrectivemaintenance,testinganddiagnostics,charging,andreplacement.

ACustomizedBMMProgramTheKYARNGBMMprogramcoversawidevari-

etyoftrackedandwheeledequipment,includingmultiplelaunchrocketsystems,howitzers,armoredpersonnelcarriers,engineerequipment(bulldozers,scrapers,dumptrucks,andfront-endloaders),heavyequipmenttransporters,palletizedloadsystems,heavyexpanded-mobilitytacticaltrucks,andhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles.Withapproximately3,500vehicles,trailers,andgenerators,weneededamaintenanceplancustomizedspecificallytomatchouruniqueblendofbatteryserviceandmaintenanceequipment,batteryinventory,andvehicleusage.

RoyJohnson,aretiredArmywarrantofficerandPulse-Tech’smilitaryliaisonwhomIfirstmetataconferencein2007,quicklypointedoutthat“onesizedoesn’tfitall”whenitcomestobatterymaintenance.UsingPul-seTech’sArmyBMMprogram,whichthecompanyhasrefinedthroughoutits20-yearpartnershipwiththemili-tary,weworkedforseveralmonthswithRoytocreateacustomprogramthatbestsuitedKYARNGneeds.

Throughcongressionalplus-upfunds,theCommuni-cations-ElectronicsResearch,Development,andEngi-neeringCenterprovidedbatterytestersandchargers,andtheKYARNGpurchasedadditionalequipmenttoroundouttheprogram.Intotal,weacquiredPulse-Tech’sMBT–1batterytester,490PTbatteryanalyzer,PulseCharger/WorldVersion,Pro-HDheavy-dutyrollingcharger,HDpalletcharger,RediPulse

TheBatteryManagerMaintenanceProgram

Pby lieutenant Colonel anthony W. aDaMS, kyarnG

According to the Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, the eight major reasons for premature battery failure include—

l Insufficientruntime.l Batteryself-discharge.l Temperaturefailure.l Dirtybatterycases.l Intermixingofbatteries.l Operatorerror.l Faultyelectricalsystems.l Physicaldamage.


Pro-12charge/maintenancesystem,andotherbatterymobileshopandserviceequipment.However,itwasPul-seTech’songoingconsultationsandseminarsthattaughtusabattery’srealcapabilities.PulseTechprovidedonsite,hands-ontrainingtomaximizethebenefitsofchargingandmaintenanceequipment(evenifitwasnottheirbrand).

Oneofthebestexamplesofbenefitsthroughthiscol-laborationwasthedevelopmentoftheMATES(ManeuverandTrainingEquipmentSite)BatteryRoomGuidebook,whichcoversnewbatteryturn-inprocedures,batteryworksheets,constantchargemaintenance,stateofcharge,typesofequipmentutilized,andhard-to-chargebatteries.

Theguidebookoutlinesourproceduresformain-tainingvehiclebatteries.Forexample,whennewbat-teriesarrive,theyareplacedontheRediPulsePro-12palletcharger,whichdesulfatestheplatesandbringsthebatteriestoacompletestateofcharge.Thentheyarereadyforuse.Twelvebatteriesarekeptchargedatalltimes;whenoneistakenoffthechargertobeused,itisimmediatelyreplacedwithanother.

Whenavehicleisbroughtintotheshop,thebatteriesaretestedtoensurethattheyareholdingachargewithin0.2voltsofeachother.Whenthatisverified,thePro-HDchargerishookeduptothevehicle’sslaverecep-tacle.ThePro-HDreturnsthebatteriestoalike-newstatewithouthavingtoremovethebatteriesfromthevehicle.Oncethebatteriesarecharged,theyarecheckedforserviceabilitywiththeadvancedbatteryanalyzer.Ifabatterydoesnottesttostandard,itisreplaced.Thatreplacedbatterythenstartstheprocessoveragain.

ReducingWasteByusingPulseTechequipmentwithsmarttechnol-

ogy,wecanreducewaste.PulseTechequipmentresultsintherehabilitationandreturntoserviceofmany“bad”batteriesthathadlosttheirchargewhilebeingstockpiledinwarehouses.

Asabatteryagesthroughuseorthroughsittingunusedforalongperiodoftime,leadsulfatecrystalsenlargeandcanbuildupexcessivelytothepointthattheycreateaphysicalbarrieracrossthesurfaceoftheplate.Beforelong,

thisbuildupcanbecomesodensethatabatterycannolon-geracceptorreleaseenergy,soitbecomesadeadbattery.

Inthepast,these“bad”batterieswerestockpiledanddiscardedratherthanevaluatedandrestoredtoservice.Pulsetechnologyhaschangedthewaywelookatbatterylifecycles.

Pulsetechnology,developedbyPulseTechandpat-entedin1989,removesandpreventsthebuildupofdamaginglead-sulfatedepositsonbatteryplatesinanonharmfulwaysothatabatterycanaccept,store,andreleasemaximumpowerallthetime.Whatmakespulsetechnologysouniqueandeffectiveistheappli-cationofadistinctpulsewaveform.Thiswaveformhasastrictlycontrolledrisetime,pulsewidth,frequency,andamplitudeofcurrentandvoltagepulse.Nootherknownbatterychargingormaintenancesystemhasthesespecificcharacteristics.

AlthoughtheKYARNGBMMprogramisessentiallydesignedforkeepinggood,newbatteriesinpeakcondi-tionforalongerperiodoftime,wehavealsolearnedhowtorecoverbatteriesthatwillnotacceptandholdachargeusingconventionalmethodsandequipment.Wedothisusingnewhigh-techbatterychargingandmain-tenancesystemsthatusepulsetechnology.

TheKYARNGnowpaysmoreforbatteries,buttheylastlonger.Wedonotknowexactlyhowmuchlongeryet,butwecanalreadyseethecostsavingsintheamountofmoneyspentonreplacementbatteries.Wealsospendlesstimeworkingwithbatteries,whichallowsmechanicstobemoreproductiveinperformingmechanicaltroubleshootingandrepairs.Andbecauseofthat,ourSoldiershavegreaterconfidenceintheperformanceoftheirequipment.

lieutenant Colonel anthony w. aDams, kyarng, serves as the surfaCe maintenanCe manager for the kentuCky army national guarD. he has a BaChelor of arts Degree in english anD philosophy from Centre College anD is a graDuate of the orDnanCe offiCer aDvanCeD Course, the ComBineD arms anD serviCes staff sChool, the army CommanD anD general staff College, anD the Joint logistiCs Course.

Although the cost of AGM batteries is higher

than the cost of the flooded-cell batteries

we previously used, AGM batteries last longer,

perform better, and can be safely shipped by air,

ready to use.

We also spend less time working with batteries, which allows mechanics to be more productive in performing mechanical

troubleshooting and repairs. And because of that, our

Soldiers have greater confidence in the performance

of their equipment.

40 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

spartofthegreatertransformationeffort conductedbytheArmyinthelastdecade, theArmyMedicalDepartment(AMEDD)cre-atedanewunitcalledthemultifunctionalmedicalbattalion(MMB),whichincludesasupportopera-tions(SPO)section.WethinkthattheMMB’sSPOorganizationisapoorlyunderstoodandoftenunde-rusedstaffsection.AliteraturereviewhasfoundonlytwoarticlesthatdiscusstheMMBSPOsection.Neitherarticleisdedicatedtothisnewstaffsection;theyonlybrieflymentiontheSPOsectionanditscapabilities.Inthisarticle,wewillattempttoexplaintherolesandfunctionsofthenewMMBSPOsectionanddiscussthelessonswelearnedwhileleadingaSPOsectioningarrisonandduringadeployment.

ReplacingStovepipedUnitsTheMMBcomprisesportionsoftheformerarea

support,evacuation,medicallogistics,dental,andveterinarybattalions.TheMMBconceptwasadoptedfromthemultifunctionallogisticsbattalionsformerlyfoundindivisionsandbrigadecombatteams:thefor-wardsupportbattalionandthemainsupportbattalion.

Previously,thestovepipedmedicaldepartmentbattalionsoperatedthesamewayastheoldlogis-ticsbattalions.Ingarrison,thebattalionswerefunctionallyaligned,butamedicaltaskforcewasnormallycreatedduringadeployment.TheMMBwasdevelopedtomakethisadhocdeploymenttaskforceorganizationpermanent,justastheinnovativeforwardsupportandmainsupportbattalionsdid.Thisapproachhelpsfosterstrongerrelationshipsamongthespecialtiesandensuresthatthebattalionheadquarterspersonnelwillbeexperiencedenoughtoproperlycommandandcontrolsubordinateunits,regardlessoftheirspecialty.

TheMMBdoesnothaveasetmodificationtableoforganizationandequipment(MTOE)otherthanthatoftheheadquartersandheadquartersdetachment.TheMMBhasnoletteredsubordinateunits.Allunitsassignedtoitarestand-alone,numberedcompaniesanddetachmentsthatareassignedtotheMMBinatailoredpackageforaspecificdeploymentmission.

Thekeytocommandingandcontrollingthediversenumberandtypesofmedicalcompaniesanddetach-mentsassignedtothebattalionisastaffsectionthat

alsowasoriginallydevelopedinmultifunctionallogis-ticsunits—theSPOsection.

SPOSectionOrganizationTheSPOsectionhasthesamemissionineithera

multifunctionallogisticsormultifunctionalmedicalbattalion:toplan,coordinate,andenabletheexter-nalsupportprovidedbythebattalion’ssubordinateunits.ThetraditionalS-shopstaffsfocusoninternalpersonnel,supply,maintenance,training,andopera-tionsissuesforthebattalion.TheSPOsectionandtheS-shopshavedistinct,separatefunctionsandfocuses,thoughtheyrequireconsiderablecoordination.

TheMMBS-shopsanswertothebattalionexecu-tiveofficer(amedicalservicecorpsmajor),whereastheSPOsectionreportstotheSPOofficer(alsoamedicalservicecorpsmajor).Traditionally,battalionshaveanexecutiveofficer(amajor)andanS–3opera-tionsofficer(amajor),whobothreportdirectlytothebattalioncommander.TheexecutiveofficerhandlesalladministrativemattersforthebattalionwhiletheS–3handlestrainingandplanning.

SPOStaffingTheSPOsectionwasaddedtologisticsunitsto

coordinatetheexternalsupportthatthebattalionpro-vided.Becauseoftheimportanceofthissection,theS–3positionwasdowngradedtoacaptainandtheSPOofficer-in-charge(OIC)wasmadeamajor.ThissamerankstructurewasbuiltintotheMMBs,witheachmajoransweringdirectlytothebattalioncom-mander.

TheMMBSPOsection(with29ofthe77autho-rizedheadquartersandheadquartersdetachmentposi-tions)wasallottedasergeantmajorasthesection’snoncommissionedofficer-in-charge(NCOIC).Previ-ously,operationssergeantsmajorwereonlyautho-rizedatthebrigadelevel,sothisisaverysignificantadditiontoabattalionstaff.Therankprovidesanexperiencednoncommissionedofficer(NCO)whohasgreatauthoritytohelpoverseethediverseandcriticalSPOsection.

TheSPOsectionisstructuredtohaveanassortmentofsubject-matterexpertscapableofprovidingover-sightforanymedicalcompany,detachment,orteamthatcouldbeassignedtotheMMB.Theseexperts’

SupportOperations:LessonsLearnedinaMultifunctionalMedicalBattalion

A

by lieutenant Colonel DouGlaS h. GaluSZka anD SerGeant MaJor DaviD franCo

specialtiesincludemedicalmaintenance,medicalsupply,behavioralhealth,veterinaryservices,patientadministration,opticalfabrication,laboratoryservices,preventivemedicine,dentistry,medicaloperationsandplanning,evacuation,andpracticalnursing.

Therankstructureissetuptoensurethatexperi-encedpersonnelareassignedtotheSPOsection.ThemostjuniorauthorizedrankforSPONCOsisstaffsergeant,andmostoftheNCOslotsaresergeantfirstclass.Alloftheofficerslotsareauthorizedatcaptainorchiefwarrantofficer3.Thisstructureprovidestherequisiteexpertisetoproperlyplanandmanagethesupportprovidedbysubordinateunits.ItalsogivesthestaffofficersandNCOsahighlevelofauthoritywhenprovidingguidanceandenforcingstandards.ThishighrankstructurehasprovencriticaltotheSPOsection’ssuccess.

NamingtheSectionUnitleadersdebatedaboutwhattocalltheSPO

sectionafterourunit,the421stEvacuationBattalion,wasredesignatedasthe421stMMBinJune2007atWiesbadenArmyAirfield,Germany.TheMTOEreferstothesectionasforcehealthprotection(FHP).FieldManualInterim(FMI)4–02.121,Multifunction-alMedicalBattalion,usesFHPtodescribetheoverallmissionoftheMMB:“TheFHPsystemencompassesthepromotionofwellnessandpreventive,curative,andrehabilitativemedicalservices...[and]isacon-tinuumfrompointofinjuryorwoundingthroughsuccessivelevelsofcare.”TheFMIdoesnotcallthe

sectiontheFHP,butusestheterm“medicalsupportoperations.”

Theterm“forcehealthprotection”isconfusingsinceitwascommonlyusedinthepasttodescribepreventivemedicineefforts;outsideunitsdidnotunderstandourcapabilitiesandthoughtweweresolelyfocusedonpre-ventivemedicine.ThetermusedintheFMIwasadopt-ed,buttheword“medical”wasdroppedforconvenienceaswellastoalignuswiththesectioninthebrigadesup-portbattalionsthatcoordinatesexternalsupport—sup-portoperations.ThesectionOICisknownastheSPOandtheNCOICastheSPOsergeantmajor.

TheMTOEandFMIarealsodifferentinwhattheynametheSPOsubsections.TheMTOElistsmedicallogistics,medicaloperations,preventivemedicine,andmentalhealthsubsections,whiletheFMIlistsmedicallogistics,medicaloperations,andclinicaloperationsassubsections.

ThesectionpersonnellistedintheMTOEandtheFMIalsodiffer.Forexample,theMTOEliststhemilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)68WM6,practicalnurse,inmedicaloperations,butintheFMI,thepositionislistedinclinicaloperations.The421stMMBdecidedtousetheFMIstructureofthreesub-sections—medicaloperations,clinicaloperations,andmedicallogistics—withacaptainOICandamastersergeantNCOICforeach.

MTOEDeficienciesTheMMBshouldbeauthorizedaProfessional

FillerSystem(PROFIS)battalionsurgeon(preferably

421stMultifunctionalMedicalBattalionOrganizationChart

BattalionCommander

Chaplain

S–1OrderlyRoom

SupportOperations

MedicalOperations

MedicalLogistics

ClinicalOperations

FoodServices

Maintenance

S–2/3

S–4

S–5

CommandSergeantMajor

ExecutiveOfficer HeadquartersandHeadquartersDetachment

42 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

alieutenantcolonel)forthespecialstaff.Somemis-sionswillnotrequirethispositiontobefilled;oth-erswill.HavingthisauthorizationontheMTOEwouldenablethebattalioncommandertorequestafillwithouthavingtojustifytheneedtotheArmyForcesCommandandArmyMedicalCommand(aswasrequiredforthedeploymenttoIraq).IthasbeensuggestedthatanurseandapharmacistshouldalsobelistedasPROFIS.Theseofficerscertainlycouldmakecontributions,butwiththesergeantfirstclasspharmacytechnicianandmastersergeantpracticalnursetoteamwithaPROFISbattalionsurgeon,thebattalionwouldhavetheexpertiseneededtoaccom-plishitsmission.

TheMTOEhasnoauthorizedtentage,lightsets,orotheritemsneededinfieldoperationsforthe29SPOSoldiers.Itauthorizesonlysix9-millimeterpistolsfortheentireheadquartersdetachment,withonlyoneavailableintheSPOsection.TheSPO,SPOsergeantmajor,andchiefwarrantofficer3shouldbeprovidedpistols.ItisalsoadvisabletoprovideeachofthethreesubsectionOICsandNCOICswithapis-tolbecauseoftheirrankandresponsibilityinordertoalignthembetterwiththeircounterpartsintheS-shops.

Transportationisanotherissue.Currently,onlytwohigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehiclesandtwo2½-tontrucksareauthorized.Evenwiththeidealconfigurationandtypesofvehicles,theSPOsec-tioncouldonlytransporthalfofitspersonnelatonetime—adifficultsituationifthebattalionismaneu-veringduringacampaign.

DevelopingSPO’sRoleintheBattalionTheadditionoftheSPOsectiontotheMMBwas

astepforwardinplanningandoversight,butthetransformationwasnotcompletedatthehigherlevelsofcommand.LogisticsbattalionSPOsectionscoor-dinatewithsimilarlystructuredsectionsinthesus-tainmentbrigade.ThisisnotthecasewiththeMMBSPOsection;noSPOsectionexistsinanymedicalbrigadeormedicalcommand.WhentheMMBSPOsectionneedstocoordinateeffortswiththemedi-calbrigadeormedicalcommand,ithastoworkwiththreeseparatesections:G–3,G–4,andclinicalopera-tions.Thisleadstomanychallengesinconsistencyofguidanceandcoordinationofefforts.

Becausesubordinateunitsandhigherheadquar-tersaremorefamiliarwiththeS-shopsthantheyarewiththeSPOsection,manySPO-relatedissuesarereferredtoandworkedbytheS-shops.TheFMIactu-allycontributestothisconfusion.ItstatesthattheSPOsectionneedstoworkwiththeS-shopsbecausetheS–1willprovidepersonnelcasualtyestimates,theS–2/3willgathermedicalintelligenceandprovideclinicalinputforFHPestimatesandplans,andthe

S–4willprovidesupportforallclassVIII(medicalmateriel)requirements.

CombiningtheSPOsectionwiththeS-shopsdividestheresponsibilityforplanning,coordination,andoversightoftheexternalsupportprovidedbythesubordinateunitsbetweentheSPOsectionandtheS-shopsandonlyleadstoconfusion.TheentirereasonforcreatingtheSPOsectionwastounifythecoordinationofexternalsupportunderonesectionwhereclinical,logistics,andoperationalrequirementscanbeplannedandtracked.HavingitanyotherwaynullifiestheneedfortheSPOsection.

The421stMMBSPOsectionperformedallofthefunctionsmentionedabove.Itfoundthatcreatingclearanddistinctlinesofresponsibilitywasneces-sary.Allinternaladministrative,training,andopera-tionalmatters,suchasawards,evaluationreports,ranges,convoys,unitstatusreports,propertybook,andgroundmaintenance,aretheresponsibilityoftheS-shops.Allexternalsupportprovidedandplannedfor,suchasborrowedmilitarymanpowermemoran-dumsofagreement,expertfieldmedicalbadgetrain-ing,MOS68W(healthcarespecialist)sustainment,medicalmaintenanceoversight,medicaltaskings,medicalsupportplanning,workloaddatacollection,subject-matterexpertguidance,andmedicalmain-tenance,istheresponsibilityoftheSPOsection.Inshort,anythingthatdealsspecificallywithamedicalfunctionorcapabilityistheSPOsection’sconcern;everythingelseisworkedbytheS-shops.

Ingarrison,theSPOsectionneedstoactivelyseekoutprojectstokeepexercisingitsplanningandcoordinatingskills.Inthegarrisonenvironment,theS-shopsnaturallybecomethefocusoftheheadquar-ters’efforts.Personnelandpropertyadministration,equipmentmaintenance,andSoldiertrainingneedtobeconsistentlyexecutedtoensurethatsubordinateunitsarereadytooperateproperlywheninthefield.ButtheSPOsectioncannotbecomemerelyaperson-nelmineforNCOsandofficerstoconductadditionaldutiesandtaskingsbecause,inthefield,theSPOsectionbecomesthefocusoftheheadquarterseffortsandmustbepreparedtomeetthoseresponsibilities.

Itisimportanttoseekouteventstoplanandcoor-dinate,suchasplanningandexecutinganexpertfieldmedicalbadgetrainingevent,conductingMOS68Wsustainmenttraining,orconductingacombatlifesav-erclass.Forexample,whilethe421stMMBsubordi-nateunitswerestillgoingthroughtransformationinGermany,theSPOsectionwastheleadforplanningtherebasing,inactivation,ortransitiontoTDA(tableofdistributionandallowances)missionsformedicallogistics,preventivemedicine,veterinary,andoptom-etryunits.

TheSPOsectionshouldalsobetheplanners,maintrainers,andevaluatorsforsubordinateunitsgoing


throughmissionreadinessexercisesorresetevalua-tions.Theabilityofsubordinateunitstoconducttheirmedicalmissions,whichinvolveallaspectsoffieldcraftandmedicalskills,isnaturallytheresponsibil-ityoftheSPOsectionwithitslargenumberofseniorsubject-matterexperts.

Coordinatingthesubordinateunits’effortswasachallengeinthemonthsfollowingthe421st’sconver-siontoanMMB.Infact,thebattalion’sdeploymentmissionreadinessexercisewasthefirsttimetheSPOsectionplannedandcoordinatedfunctionsforsubor-dinateunitsinthefield.Withthe421stMMBcom-mander’ssupport,theeffortsoftheSPOofficersandNCOsatthemissionreadinessexercisedisplayedthefullcapabilitiesofthisrobuststaffsection.

PreparingforDeploymentThenewSPOandSPOsergeantmajorwere

assignedtothesectioninthesummerof2007.With

adeploymentplannedfor2008,fillingtheautho-rizedSPOpersonnelslotswascritical.TheSPOandbattalionleadersfilledtheseslotsthroughfrequentcommunicationwithpersonnelmanagersatthebri-gade,regionalmedicalcommand,andArmyHumanResourcesCommand.

Fillingthelow-densityMOSpositionswasapar-ticularchallengesincethesepositionsareforseniorNCOsandthiswasanewtypeofunitwithwhichtheywereunfamiliar.ButtheseexpertsweredeemedcriticaltothemissionthattheunitwouldinheritinIraq.Inparticular,theopticalfabricationtechnician,pharmacytechnician,andpracticalnursepositionswere“mustfills”forthedeployment.BythemissionreadinessexerciseinAugust2008,mostoftheposi-tionswerefilled,thoughseveralSoldiersarriveddur-ingthepredeploymentblockleave.

The44thMedicalCommandallottedthe421stMMBaslotonitsIraqpredeploymentsitesurvey

421stMultifunctionalMedicalBattalionSupportOperationsDeploymentOrganizationChart

OfficerinChargeMajorChiefOperationsNCO

SergeantMajor

BattalionSurgeonSpecialStaffColonelandLieutenantColonel

MedicalLogistics MedicalOperations/CivilMilitaryOperations ClinicalLogistics

MedicalLogisticsSergeantSpecialist

MedicalLogisticsSergeantSpecialist

EnvironmentalScienceOfficerFirstLieutenant(1LT)

PatientAdministrationOfficer

1LT

PracticalNurseSFC

DentalNCOSFC

MedicalLabNCOSFC

MentalHealthSSg

MentalHealthSSg

Evacuation/Civilian/MilitaryOperationsOfficer

1LT

SeniorOperationsNCOMSg

MedicalOperationsNCOSFC

SeniorOpticalLabNCOSFC

SeniorVeterinaryNCOSFC

PreventiveMedicineNCOSSg

MedicalOperationsNCOSSg

MedicalLogisticsSergeantSSg

MedicalMaintenanceNCOSFC

StockControlOfficerCaptain

BattalionMaintenanceOfficer

ChiefWarrantOfficer4

SeniorMedicalLogisticsSergeantMasterSergeant(MSg)

PharmacyNCOSergeantFirstClass(SFC)

PlansandOperationsOfficerCaptain

PlansandOperationsOfficerCaptain

RearDetachment

PatientAdministrationNoncommissionedOfficer

StaffSergeant(SSg)

SupportManagementOfficerBudgetOfficer

Captain

VeterinaryNCOMovementControlNCO

SSg

DetailedtoMovementControlCenter

DetailedtoS–4

44 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

team.TheSPOwasselectedtofillthisslot.ThetripgavehimfirsthandknowledgeoftheexactnatureoftheMMB’supcomingmission.Thevisitstohealth,optometry,anddentalclinics;groundambulancesquads;andthebattalionheadquarterswerevalu-able.Thediscussionswiththe261stMMBSPOandS-shopsectionsregardingtheirtrainingadviceandconcernsenabledthe421stMMBtotailoritsprede-ploymenttrainingplantomatchthemissionitwouldexecute.

The421stMMBHeadquartersandHeadquartersDetachmentdeployedtoBalad,Iraq,inthefallof2008.TheSPOOICandtheNCOICofthemedicaloperationssectionwereintheadvancepartytohelpensurethehandofffromthe261stMMBwaswellcoordinatedfromthestart.

421stMMBMissioninIraqSeveralrotationsearlier,thetwoMMBsinIraq

hadalignedtheirmissionsfunctionally.Insteadofhavingsubordinateunitsassignedforallofthespe-cialties,eachMMBwasassignedalloftheunitsofalimitednumberofspecialties,thusenablingtheMMBstafftofocusitsefforts.Thispracticecontin-uedduringthe421stMMBdeployment.Themis-sionofthe421stMMBwastocommandandcontrolfiveareasupportmedicalcompanies,twodentalcompanies,twogroundambulancecompanies,fouroptometrydetachments,andoneheadandnecksurgi-calteam.(Oursisterbattalion,the111thMMB,wasresponsibleforthemedicallogistics,veterinary,com-batoperationalstresscontrol,andpreventivemedi-cinemissions.)

The421stMMB’sunitswerescatteredfromMosulinthenorthtoBasrainthesouthandfromBaghdadtoAlAsadinthewestatatotalof30sites.Althoughthemissionofeachsubordinateunitwasimportant,theprimaryfocusofthe421stMMBwaslevelIImedical,dental,andoptometryclinics.

Tactics,Techniques,andProceduresWiththeSPOsectionbeingsuchaneworganiza-

tionforAMEDD,notwodeployedMMBSPOsec-tionshavebeenstructuredthesame.Eachhasbeen

tailoredtothemissionbasedontheavailableperson-nelandthecomfortlevelofthebattalioncommanderandtheSPO.Inthe421stMMB,weusedtheFMIstructureofthreesubordinatesections—medicaloperations,clinicaloperations,andmedicallogis-tics—ashadthebattalionwereplaced.

Medical operations.The421stMMBvariedfromitspredecessorsbyensuringthatthemedicalopera-tionssectionwasnotintegratedintotheS–3,wherethesetwosectionscouldnotbedistinguishedfromeachother.The421stmedicaloperationssectionwaskeptseparatetoensuretheresponsibilityforplanningandtaskingformedicalmissionswasmaintainedintheSPOsection.

However,theS–3shopissuedallorderscom-ingfromtheheadquarters.WithintheSPOsection,allorderscametothemedicaloperationssectionforreviewand,onceapprovedbytheSPOandSPOsergeantmajor,werepassedtotheS–3forformatreviewandissue.

ThepreventivemedicineofficerandNCOwereplacedinthemedicaloperationssection.Sincethe421stMMBmissiondidnotincludetheaterpreven-tivemedicine,thesepersonnelwereonlyinvolvedparttimeinpreventivemedicineissues.Therestoftheirtimewasspentassistingwithmedicalopera-tionsfunctionsandbattalionextraduties,suchasthesafetyofficer.

Anadditiontothemedicaloperationsmissionwascivil-militaryoperations(CMO).SinceallofthetrainingsupportcoordinatedfortheIraqisbythe421stwasmedicalinnature(wewerenotinvolvedinanymedicalhumanitarianassistanceefforts),CMOwasbroughtintotheSPOsection.Sincethe421stMMBhadnoairevacuationplanningmission,theevacuationpilotofthemedicaloperationssectionwasmadethebattalionCMOofficer.Heworkedcloselywiththecivilian,contractedculturalexpert,whowasanIraqi-Americanphysician.TheeffortsoftheseindividualsmadetheCMOmissionasuccess,particularlyinbuildingapartnershipwiththeIraqiGroundForcesCommandsurgeon’scell.TheymetthegoaloforganizingtwomedicalCMOtrainingeventseachmonth.

The MMB is a modular organization, which is tailored based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. The command will include modular units specifically tailored to provide medical logistics support, Level I and II area medical support, ground evacuation, preventive medicine, combat and operational stress control, dental, and veterinary medicine.

—Major General George W. Weightman


Clinical operations. Theclinicaloperationssectionwasthemedicaladministrationsectionofthebat-talion.Itcollecteddailyworkloadstatistics;updatedandwrotestandingoperatingproceduresonsuchdiversetopicsaspatientsafety,laboratorycontrols,andinfectioncontrol;andwrotefragmentaryordersthatthestaffdraftedintheirareasofexpertise.Thissectionalsoworkedverycloselywiththebattalionsurgeoninthebattalion’sefforttostandardizecareacrossthebattlefield,anever-endingtaskasunitscameandwentinthetheater.

Medical logistics.Themedicallogisticssectionwasresponsibleformedicalsupply,pharmacy,andmedicalmaintenanceoversight.Medicalsupplyper-sonnelassistedwithresearchingrequireditemsanddraftinglettersofjustificationforequipment,assistedwithDefenseMedicalLogisticsStandardSup-portCustomerAssistanceModule(DCAM)order-ingissues,andreviewedthemonthlyreconciliationreports.Thepharmacytechnicianmanagedandsetthestandardsforthepharmacytechniciansworkingintheclinics.ThesurgeonandthisNCOinteractedfrequentlytoensurethattheproperproceduresfornarcoticsstorageandissuewerebeingfollowed.

Medicalmaintenancepersonnelreviewedmedicalequipmentpurchaserequests,arrangedforopera-tionalfloatequipment,scheduledservices,andstan-dardizedequipmentmodelsacrossthebattlefieldtomakemaintenancesimpler.Thissectionalsooversawclinicrenovationandconstructionbyassistingthebasemayor’scellswithlettersofjustification,havingfloorplansdrawn,andvalidatingandarrangingforfurnitureandequipmentpurchases.

SPOBattleBriefTheSPOsectionpreviouslyhadnoforumfor

presentinginformationtothebattalioncommanderregardingthemedicalsupportprovidedbysubordi-nateunits.AbiweeklySPObattleupdatebriefwasdevelopedtopresentplans,taskings,subject-matterexpertissues,andworkloadstothebattalioncom-manderandthesubordinateunitcommandersthroughanonlineAdobeBreezesession.Thisprovedtobeacriticalimprovementforthebattalion.Previously,onlygeneraladministrativeissues,suchasofficerefficiencyratings,awards,andthepropertybook,werediscussedatbattalioncommandandstaffmeet-ings.WiththeSPObattleupdatebrief,informationonmedicalsupporteffortswasshared,andtheimpor-tantmedicalmissionsofthebattalionandthesub-ordinateunitswerebetterunderstoodbyall,whichgreatlyhelpedwithplanninganddecisionmaking.

Duringthedeployment,greatstridesweremadeinstandardizinghealthcarethroughoutthetaskforce’sareaofoperations.Quarterlystaffassis-tancevisits,newstandingoperatingprocedures,an

enhancedpeerreviewprogram,andtheSPObattleupdatebriefingwerethemostpowerfultoolsusedtoraisethequalityofcareandenforcestandardizationintheclinics.

Overall,TaskForce421stMMBsuccessfullyconducted170,000primarycareand54,000dentalvisitsand43,000optometryexaminations;completed6,000radiologystudiesand28,000labprocedures;fabricated36,000pairsofglasses;filled87,000pre-scriptions;providedmedicalsupportfor720logisticsconvoys;andexecuted22CMOtrainingevents.Thiswascertainlyateameffortinwhichallthestaffsec-tionsandsubordinateunitscontributed,buttheSPOsectionplayedasignificantroleineachoftheseachievements.

TheSPOsectionhasprovenitsworthtotheMMBingarrisonandatwar.TheexpertisecontainedinthesectionmakesitflexibleandexperiencedenoughtomeetthediversechallengesthatanMMBmayface.TheSPOsection’svarietyoftasksandrequire-mentsisgreaterthaninanyotherstaffsectioninanAMEDDfieldunit.Thesuccessorfailureofthebat-talionislargelydeterminedbytheperformanceoftheSPOsection.

TheSPOsectionpositions(suchasmedicalopera-tionsofficer,medicallogisticsofficer,andclinicaloperationsNCOIC)shouldbeasvaluedandsoughtafterinthefutureasthetraditionalS-shoppositionsarenow.TheSPOsectionneedstobebetterunder-stood,supported,andvaluedinAMEDD.ThisgreaterunderstandingwillfostermorecapableandbetterintegratedSPOsectionsinalloftheMMBs.

lieutenant Colonel Douglas h. galusZka was the support operations offiCer for the 421st multifunCtional meDiCal Bat-talion while stationeD at wiesBaDen army airfielD, germany, anD DeployeD to Joint Base BalaD, iraQ. he holDs a B.a. Degree in history from miChigan state university, an m.a. Degree in puBliC aDministration from the university of marylanD-europe, an m.h.a. Degree from Baylor university, anD m.m.a.s. Degrees in military history anD theater operations from the army CommanD anD general staff College. he is a fellow of the ameriCan College of healthCare exeCutives anD is a graDuate of the ameDD BasiC Course, the ComBineD logistiCs offiCers aDvanCeD Course, the army CommanD anD general staff Col-lege, anD the sChool of aDvanCeD military stuDies.

sergeant maJor DaviD franCo is the support operations ser-geant maJor for the 421st multifunCtional meDiCal Battalion stationeD at wiesBaDen army airfielD, germany, anD Cowrote this artiCle while DeployeD to Joint Base BalaD, iraQ. he holDs a B.s. Degree in Business management from the university of marylanD-university College anD has Been inDuCteD into the orDer of military meDiCal merit.he is a graDuate of the first sergeant’s Course anD the sergeants maJor aCaDemy.

46 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

perationUnifiedResponseprovidedover- whelmingsupporttoHaitiafterthenation sufferedacatastrophicearthquakeinJanuary2010.OncetheUnitedStatespledgeditssupport,theMilitarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCom-mand(SDDC)GlobalContainerManagement(GCM)Divisionbegantheinitialplanningtoprovidecontain-ersnotonlyforthetransportationofhumanitarianaidbutalsotoserveastemporarystorageandofficespaceforthejointreliefeffortinHaiti.

SDDC’sGCMstaffvisualizedthissupportthroughtheconceptof“OneContainerataTime”.Usingtheconcept,GCMstaffassessedtheusesonecontainercouldprovidewhileonthegroundinHaitiinadditiontoitstraditionaltransportationrole.

GCM,theprogrammanagerfortheMasterContainerLeasingContractfortheDepartmentofDefense,immediatelyactivatedoneofSDDC’slarg-estcontainer-leasingcontractstoobtain1,525dryandrefrigerated20-footcontainers.Thesecontainerswere

ContainersforHaiti:ProvidingTransportationandTemporaryInfrastructure

by thoMaS CatChinGS

O

The Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Global Container Management Division shipped containers with food and supplies to Haiti in support of relief efforts after the 12 January earthquake there. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) turned containers that had been emptied into classrooms. (Photos by Janice Laurente, USAID)


Haitian school children pose outside one of the first newly built classrooms constructed through a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) project. The classrooms took 4 weeks to construct and were built from shipping containers provided by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. Each classroom will last up to 10 years. (Photo by Janice Laurente, USAID)

deliveredtolocationsacrossthesouthernstatestosup-porttheWorldFoodProgram,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,theArmyandAirForceExchangeService,theMilitaryPostalServiceAgency,andnongovernmentalorganizations.

GCMalsosentouta“callforsupport”toallofthearmedservicestofillthecontainerrequirement.InanswertotheGCMcall,theArmymovedmorethan60containersandtheNavysupplied4refrigeratedcontain-ers,1power-supplygenerator,andmorethan30modularcontainersforhousingandofficespacetothePortofJacksonville,Florida.

TheGCMoperationssectionbeganworkingwithJointTaskForce-Haiti(JTF–H)andtheU.S.South-ernCommandtoestablishthreeessentialcomponentsofcontainermanagementduringOperationUnifiedResponse:standingoperatingprocedures,metricsforaccountability,andcontainer-trackingmethods.

GCM’ssystemsectionimmediatelymettheneedforcontainertrackingandcostaccountabilitybyquicklymodifyingtheU.S.CentralCommand’ssystemofrecordforcontainertracking,theIntegratedBookingSystemContainerManagementModule(IBS–CMM).UsingthismodifiedversionofIBS–CMM,GCMsavedtaxpay-ersmorethan$27,000incommercialcontainerfeesandlong-termcostsforsustainingthereliefeffort.

GCMmetthecontainerstorageandtransportationneeds,butitrealizedthatitwouldneedtodeployitsteamforwardtoJacksonvilleandtoHaititoworkwithotherorganizationsinmanagingandtrackingthesecontainers.Onceinitialcoordinationwasmadeand

theequipmentandteamswereinplace,GCMshifteditseffortstothenextcriticalneedforsupport.GCMapproachedthismissioninthesamewayasithasotherdeploymentsandapplieditsexperienceinthemultipleusesofcontainerstomeetHaiti’sneeds.

Acontainerisnotonlythepreferredmodeoftrans-portforsupplies,itisarguablythebestalternativeformobilestorage,office,andlivingaccommodationsinareaswheretheinfrastructureeitherdoesnotexistorisbeingrebuilt.InHaiti,containersarenowprovid-ingtemporaryinfrastructureforoffices,houses,andschools.GCMisworkingwithJTF–H,U.S.Govern-mentagencies,andHaitiangovernmentagenciestomeetthisrequirement.

ThesamecontainersthatwereusedtoquicklygettheessentialneedsforhumansurvivaltoHaitiarenowusedtosupporttheeducationofHaitianchil-dren.ContainersthatbroughtwaterorfoodtoHaitinowholddesksandchalkboards.Approximately300containersremainonthegroundtoprovidetemporaryfacilitiesinsupportofHaitiasitcontinuestorebuilditsinfrastructure.

thomas CatChings is the programs anD system program manager for gloBal Container management with the military surfaCe Deploy-ment anD DistriBution CommanD at fort eustis, virginia. he holDs a B.a. Degree from alaBama state university anD a master’s Degree in Business management with a military foCus from touro university anD is a lean six sigma BlaCk Belt. he is a graDuate of the army Com-manD anD general staff College’s Civilian aDvanCeD Course anD the Civilian eDuCation system founDation anD BasiC Courses.

48 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

embersoftheExpeditionaryContracting Command(ECC)nullifiedpotential problemsduringtheircontingencydeploy-mentinsupportofOperationUnifiedResponse,theHaitihumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefmis-sion.Theydidsobyusinglessonslearnedfrompre-viousdeploymentsaswellasbycapturingnewones.

ThefirstECCSoldierarrivedinHaitiwithin48hoursofthedevastating7.0earthquakeon12January.DuringOperationUnifiedResponse,ECCcontractedforsupplies,services,andequipmenttosupportmili-taryandFederalrespondersaswellasHaitiansaffect-edbytheearthquake.Thecommandhelpedtodelivermorethan15millionmealstotheHaitianpeopleina10-dayperiodandestablisheddistributionpointsforlocalfamiliestoreceive25-and30-poundbagsofrice,beans,andcookingoils.Contractingeffortsalsohelpedturndangerousrudimentarysheltersintosaferareaswithtentsandroutinedeliveryofwaterandmeals.

“Wetookadvantageofalotoflessonslearnedfrompreviousdeployments,”saidBrigadierGeneralJosephL.Bass,commandinggeneraloftheECC.“Wedidn’tdothesetypesofthingsearlyoninOper-ationIraqiFreedomorOperationEnduringFreedom.However,welearnedthoselessonsandbroughtthesecapabilitiestoHaitiearlyon.Wewereveryproactivefromthebeginning,deployingtherightpersonnelmixneededtoprovidequalityassurance,legal,poli-cy,andotherareaswherewecouldaddressissuesonthefrontendratherthanafterthey’vebeendone.”

GeneralBassaddedthatestablishingcontractingreach-backsupportstateside,bringinginLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramplannersinthebegin-ningstages,andworkingwithunitstoestablishcoali-tionandjointacquisitionreviewboardswerelessonslearnedfrompreviousmilitarydeploymentstosup-portoperationsinKuwait,Iraq,andAfghanistan.

TheRockIslandContractingCenterinIllinoisprovidedsupportonanon-callbasis,whichallowedcontingencycontractingofficerstoconcentrateonimmediateonsiterequirementsandleavecomplexactionsforthecontractingcenterstateside.Bytheendofthemission,theECChadcreatedmorethan380contractingactionsvaluedatalmost$12million.

Inadditiontoemployinglessonslearned,con-tractingofficersalsoidentifiedareaswherechal-lengesstillexist.Whencontingencycontractingofficers(CCOs)arrivedinHaiti,theyreliedheavilyonsupportfromoutsideunitsandagenciesforbasiclife-supportservices.Toeasetheinitialburden,theECChasdevelopedpre-positioneddeployableequipmentpackagesforitscontractingteamsaspartofanearly-entryequipmentcapability.

TheECCalsoidentified,basedonpastlessonslearned,thatacontractreviewthresholdneedstobeestablishedearlytoallowCCOstoadjusttotheadministrativerequirementsofcontractingopera-tionsinadeployedenvironment.Thisallowsover-sight,managementcontrol,andqualitycontrolofhigh-dollarcontractactions.

Thefactthatthesimplifiedacquisitionthresh-oldincreasesfrom$100,000to$1millionduringadeclaredcontingencyoperationdoesnotmeanthatallCCOsshouldbeissueda$1millionwarrant.WarrantsneedtobeissuedbasedonCCOexperi-enceandthedollaramountofactionsneededtocompletethemission.

“Justaswegatheredlessonslearnedfromprevi-ousdeployments,wehavegatheredsomefromtheHaitideploymentthatshouldhelpusthenexttimewedeploy,”saidGeneralBass.

Oneofthoselessonsisthatthetrainingandexpe-rienceneededtocreateknowledgeableCCOstaketime.Inordertoimprovethisprocess,GeneralBassandhisstaffwanttocreatestandardizedreach-backsupportforcontingencyoperationsandarelookingtoestablishareach-backcenterofexcellenceforglobalcontingenciesthatwouldaligncontractingcontactsregionallywiththecombatantcommandsandthecontractingsupportbrigades.Thecenterofexcel-lencewouldintegratethereach-backpointsofcontactintotrainingeventsandexercises,createalogisticsplanningteamforcontracting,andprovideassistanceforimmediateorcomplexrequirements.

larry D. mCCaskill is a puBliC affairs speCialist with the army ContraCting CommanD. he is a graDuate of QueensBorough Community College anD has more than 25 years of experienCe as an army puBliC affairs professional.

UsingLessonsLearnedforContractinginHaiti

by larry D. MCCaSkill

M


scriticalcomponentsofcrisisresponse, contingencycontractingofficersareoften calledintohelpwithdisasterreliefoperations,whichwasthecaseimmediatelyafteranearthquakehitthenationofHaitiinJanuary.The410thContract-ingSupportBrigade’s(CSB’s)initialresponsetothedisasterwastonotifyandprovidecommander’sguid-ancetoMajorRalphBarnes,theteamleaderofthe678thContingencyContractingTeambasedinMiami,Florida.Hedeployedwithin24hourstosupportOper-ationUnifiedResponseandwasthefirstcontingencycontractingofficeronthegroundinHaiti.

Thisfastresponserepresentsaparadigmshiftinnotonlythereadinessoftheacquisitioncorpsbutalsothevisibilityofthecapabilitiesofcontingencycontract-ing.TherequestforacontractingofficercamedirectlyfromthecommandinggeneralofJointTaskForce-Haiti(JTF-Haiti),whowasalreadyontheground.Whatfol-lowedwasthefirstdeploymentofExpeditionaryCon-tractingCommandassetssincethecommandachievedfulloperationalcapabilityinOctober2009.

The410thCSB’sabilitytodeployacontingencycon-tractingofficerwithin24hoursindicatesitsfocus.TheteamthatdeployedtoHaitiservedasadirectcontract-ingassettotheJTF-Haiticommanderandasthe410thCSB’sassessmentteamtodeterminefollow-oncapa-bilities.InconjunctionwithdiscussionswiththeU.S.SouthernCommand,andwhileworkingthroughthemilitarydecisionmakingprocess,the410thCSBdecid-edtoadoptaphaseddeploymentapproachwiththeendstatebeingafairlyrobustorganizationalstructure.

TheresultwasthecreationoftheCSBforwardele-mentandtheRegionalContractingCenter-Haiti(RCC-Haiti).Theintentwastoprojectaforwardcommandandcontrolcapabilitythatwouldhaveon-the-groundvisibilityandavoidanumberofcontractingrisksthathaveplaguedpastexpeditionaryoperations.TheCSBforwardelementincludedanArmycolonel,ajudgeadvocatespecializingincontractlaw,andpolicyandqualityassurancepersonnel.Becauseofthisstructure,the410thCSBwasdesignatedtheleadforcontractingandgivenresponsibilityforcoordinatingthejointcon-tractingmissionandpersonnel.

Aswithanycontingency,actionstakenwerebasedmoreonacrisismanagementmodelthanonestablishedprocedures.However,theresultsofoperationswithoutestablishedprocedureswereincompleterequirements,

inefficiencies,andredundancies.Fortunately,thecon-tractingofficers,whohadexperiencefromIraqandAfghanistan,quicklyassessedtheneedtoestablishoperatingprocedures.IncoordinationwithU.S.ArmySouth(theexecutiveagentforlogisticsandfinance),RCC-HaitiassistedJTF-Haitiinestablishingprocessesforcreatingajointacquisitionreviewboardandguid-anceforfieldorderingofficersandpayingagents.Thiswasdonewithinthefirst3weeksofthedeployment—anextraordinaryaccomplishment.

Afterthe410thCSBstructureandprocessesguidedtheinitialcontractingenvironment,the410thquicklyturneditsattentiontoriskmanagement.Mostoftheattentionturnedtoestablishingprogramsforcontract-ingofficer’srepresentative(COR)managementandqualityassurance.

TosupportRCC-Haiti,thequalityassuranceteamontheground,whichconsistedoftheExpeditionaryContractingCommandqualityassurancemanagerandthe410thCSBqualityassurancespecialist,establishedacomprehensiveCORmanagementprogram.TheprogramfocusedontrainingandtechnicalassistancesupportfortheCORsinHaiti.Theteamprovidedtechnicalsurveillanceonnumerouscontractsuntiltheunit’sCORsweretrainedandinplace.Threeformalclasseswerepresented,and67CORssuccessfullycompletedthecourse.TheCORmanagementprogramenabledproperlytrainedCORstoprovideon-the-groundtechnicalmonitoringofthecontracts,ensuringthatSoldiersreceivedcontractedsuppliesandservicestomeettheirmissionrequirements.

The410thCSBcontinuestosupportoperationsinHaiti,andalthoughthebrigadeismakingimprovementsbasedonmanyotherobservations,theserepresentsomelessonslearnedincontractingoperationsinacontin-gencyenvironment.AstheExpeditionaryContractingCommandfocusesonitsfuturecapabilities,theareasofdeployment,integration,andriskmitigationlearnedfromOperationUnifiedResponsewillonlyservetomakefutureoperationalcontractsupportmoreeffective.

lieutenant Colonel ameriCus m. gill iii is a memBer of the army aCQuisition Corps, serves as the s–3 for the 412th Con-traCting support BrigaDe at fort sam houston, texas, anD was assigneD to the 410th ContraCting support BrigaDe when he wrote this artiCle. he holDs an m.B.a. from the university of texas at arlington anD is level-3 CertifieD in ContraCting.

ContractingSupportBrigadeRespondstoHaitiMission

by lieutenant Colonel aMeriCuS M. Gill iii

A

50 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heArmyReservehasaseriousproblem.It faileda2008audit,conductedbythe GovernmentAccountabilityOfficeandtheArmyAuditAgency,ofitsmedicalequipmentmaintenanceprogram.Theprogram’sfailureswerealsothefocusofaRANDCorporationstudythatwaspresentedattheAugust2009FORSCOM(ArmyForcesCommand)CombatSupportHospital(CSH)Conference.ThestudyshowedthatmostofthemedicalequipmentsetsintheArmyReservearenotmissioncapable.

ThesustainmentandmaintenanceofReservecomponentmedicalequipmentsetshavetakenabackseattootherprioritiesandhavenotreceivedappropriateattentionandfunding.Moreover,theexistingmedicalequipmentsetsaretoolargeandcumbersomeforunitstomaintainproperly.

OperationalChangesItwasalsonotedduringtheFORSCOMconfer-

encethat,effectiveimmediately,regionaltrainingsites-medical(RTS–MEDs)willnolongerprovidemedicalmaintenancesupporttoCSHs.However,theywillprovidesupporttosmallmodificationtableoforganizationandequipmentmedicalunitsthatdonothaveorganicmilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)68Abiomedicalequipmenttechnicians(BMETs).

Currently,medicallogisticscompaniesaretaskedtoprovidemedicalmaintenancesupporttoCSHsthathaveinsufficientornoBMETsassigned.ThispracticefreesupRTS–MEDBMETstodoabetterjobofsupportingthecollectivetrainingneedsofActiveandReservecomponentunits.

PotentialProblemsUnfortunately,underthecurrentsystem,Reserve

componentCSHsdonothaveaviablewaytorepair

andmaintainmedicalequipmentwithoutRTS–MEDsupport.NotrainingprogramiscurrentlyinplaceforBMETpersonneltoreceiveadditionalMOStrainingaftertheycompletebasicmedicalequip-menttrainingduringadvancedindividualtraining.

Giventhesecircumstances,itisclearthatthecurrentsystemformaintainingbiomedicalequip-mentinfieldunitsisinadequate.TheArmyReservemustestablishasystemthatwillprovidequalityMOStrainingofBMETs.Italsoneedsasystemthatwillallowunitstotrack,repair,maintain,andreplaceunserviceablemedicalequipmenttomeetmedicalequipmentreadinessrequirements.

BasicEquipmentConcentrationSitesToaccomplishthis,theU.S.ArmyReserveCom-

mand(USARC)andtheArmyMedicalDepartmentshouldfollowtheRANDstudyrecommendationsanddevelopnewmedicalbasicequipmentsetsthatarelimitedtotheminimumamountofequip-mentthatunitsneedtoconductmedicaltrainingathomestation.Becauseofconstraintsontrainingandmaintenanceassets,basicequipmentsetsfortheArmyReserveshouldnotexceed20piecesofdurableandnonexpendablemedicalitems.

Tobestmanagecurrentandprojectedmedicalequipmentrepairandtrainingrequirements,theArmyReserveshouldadopttheOrdnanceCorps’modelofareamaintenanceactivitiesandequipmentconcentrationsitesforthemaintenanceandsustain-mentofmedicalequipmentitemsthatarenotpartoftheproposedbasicequipmentsets.Wecouldcallthese“medicalequipmentconcentrationsites.”

Usingthismodel,theArmyReservecouldestab-lishfourmedicalequipmentconcentrationsitesinthecontinentalUnitedStates(twointhe807thMedicalDeploymentSupportCommand[MDSC]

MedicalEquipmentConcentrationSites:AManagementSolutionforArmyReserveMedicalEquipmentRepairandTrainingNeeds

by lieutenant Colonel paul WakefielD, uSar (ret.)

T

The author suggests medical equipment concentration sites as a possible solution to the Army Reserve’s deficiencies found by the Army Audit Agency.


areaofresponsibility,atOgden,Utah,andSeagov-ille,Texas,andtwointhe3dMDSCareaofrespon-sibility,atFortDix,NewJersey,andGulfport,Mississippi).ArmyReservemedicalunitswouldstoreallexistingmedicalequipmentsets(minustheproposedbarebonesbasicequipmentsets)atthesemedicalequipmentconcentrationsites.

SiteStaffingRequirementsThetwoMDSCswouldstaffeachmedical

equipmentconcentrationsitewithfourorf iveActiveGuard/Reserve(AGR)medicalmaintenancepersonnel,threeorfourAGRmedicallogisticssupportpersonnel,threeAGRmaterials-handlingpersonnel,andthreemilitarytechnicianadmin-istrativepersonnel.Thesespaces,intendedtoaugmenttheunitsthatconductthemedicalequip-mentconcentrationsitemission,wouldcomefromauthorizedfull-timeunit-supportpositionslocatedinotherArmyReservemedicallogisticscompa-nies.Troopprogramunit(TPU)medicallogisticspersonnel(MOS68Aand68J,medicallogisticsspecialist)wouldaugmentthisfull-timeunitsup-portstaffonwarriortrainingweekendsandduringextendedcombattraining(formerlycalledannualtraining).

Mostimportantly,eachmedicalequipmentcon-centrationsiteshouldincludeatleasttwoBMETciviliancontractors.Thesepositionsarekeytothesuccessofthissupportconcept.Withoutciviliancontractorsupport,themedicalrepaircapabilitiesatmedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteswillceaseorbecomeunsustainablewhenwemobilizetheAGRorTPUlogisticspersonnelassignedtoconductthemedicalequipmentconcentrationsitemission.ThetotalannualcostforUSARCtofundtwofull-timeciviliancontractorsateachsitewouldbeanesti-mated$640,000to$800,000annually.

SiteFacilityRequirementsEachmedicalequipmentconcentrationsitefacil-

ityshouldconsistofatleast12,000squarefeetofenvironmentallycontrolledwarehousespacewithshippingdockcapabilitiesandanintegratedmedi-calmaintenanceshopdesignedandequippedtosupportthefullscopeofArmyReservemedicalequipment.Themedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteshouldhavethenecessarytools;test,measure-ment,anddiagnosticequipment;materials-handlingequipment;andmedicalrepairpartstoconductpropermaintenanceoperations.

ThesemedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteswouldenabletheArmyReservetoprovideReservecomponentmedicallogisticspersonnelwithqualitymission-relatedMOStrainingopportunitiesdur-ingwarriortrainingweekendsandextendedcom-battraining.BMETpersonnelassignedtomedicallogisticscompaniesthatperformhands-on-trainingmissionswouldalsoreceivetrainingopportunitieswhilesupportingcustomers.

USARCshouldfundandincorporatemedicalequipmentconcentrationsiteswithfull-timenon-deployableciviliancontractpersonnel,whoaresupportedbyAGR,militarytechnician,andTPUmedicallogisticspersonnel.Bydoingthis,medi-calmaintenancereadinesslevelswouldimprovedramatically,andunitscouldfocuslessonmainte-nanceandmoreontrainingrequirements,especiallyduringthecriticaltrain-upphaseoftheArmyForceGenerationcycle.

ThecontractorsupportoptionwouldprovidecontinuityofservicetononmobilizedReservecom-ponentmedicalunitswhenunitswiththemedicalequipmentconcentrationsitemissionmobilize.

Themedicalequipmentconcentrationsitecon-ceptprovidesrealtrainingopportunitiesforallReservecomponentmedicallogisticspersonnel,especiallywhentheconceptisusedinconjunctionwithexistinghands-on-trainingmissionrequire-ments.ThesebenefitsareworththenominaladdedcontractcostsbecausetheprogramwillfixthemedicalequipmentreadinessproblemandprovideawayfortheArmyReservemedicalcommunitytoremaintrained,ready,andrelevant.

lieutenant Colonel paul wakefielD, usar (ret.), is a proJeCt management professional. he was the Chief of the forCe Development offiCe, 807th meDiCal Deployment sup-port CommanD, when he wrote this artiCle. he holDs a BaCh-elor’s Degree in spanish from weBer state university anD a master’s Degree in aDministration anD management from lin-DenwooD university.

The Army Reserve must establish a system that

will provide quality MOS training of BMETs. It also needs a system that will allow units

to track, repair, maintain, and replace unserviceable

medical equipment to meet medical equipment readiness requirements.

52 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heSustainmentAutomationSupportManag- mentOffice(SASMO),615thAviationSupport Battalion,isresponsibleforprovidingdedicatedautomationsupporttothevariouslogisticsautomationsystemsofthe1stAirCavalryBrigade,1stCavalryDivision.SASMOprovidestechnicalassistanceandcustomersupporttosustainStandardArmyManage-mentInformationSystems(STAMISs).[Editor’snote:SASMOwasknownastheCombatServiceSupportAutomationSupportManagementOffice(CSSAMO)untilJanuary.]

SASMOcomprisesSoldiersfromvariousback-grounds,including—oMilitaryoccupationalspecialty(MOS)15T,UH–60

helicopterrepairers.oMOS15R,AH–64attackhelicopterrepairers.oMOS92A,automatedlogisticalspecialists.oMOS88N,transportationmanagementcoordinators.oMOS25F,networkswitchingsystemsoperator-

maintainers.oMOS25B,informationsystemsoperator-analysts.EachSoldierbringsMOSknowledgeandexperiencetosupporteitheraspecificlogisticsautomationsystemortheSTAMISnetwork.

ProblemsDuringOperationsWhenthe615thAviationSupportBattalion

deployedtoOperationIraqiFreedom09–11,SASMOwasstillknownasCSSAMO.Itsabilitytoprovidequalityautomationsupportforthebrigade’ssustain-mentpersonnelwashinderedforseveralreasons,whichwereprimarilyrelatedtothelackofpersonneltosupportsplit-basedoperationsandnewlogistics

automationsystems.Asaresult,thebattalionfacedconsiderablechallenges.

Thebrigadewasrequiredtoconductsplit-basedoperationsatmultipleforwardoperatingbases.ThisconceptofdecentralizedoperationsrequiredCSSAMOtosupportmultiplelogisticsautomationsystemsatvariouslocations.However,CSSAMOwasdesignedforcentralizedoperations.CSSAMO’smanningdoesnotprovideenoughpersonneltosupporttheconceptofdecentralizedoperations.ThedilemmaforthebattalionwashowtoemployCSSAMO’slimitedpersonneltoeffectivelysupportabrigadeoperatingatmultiplelocationsinawidelydispersedarea.

Thebrigadereceivednewlogisticssystemsforcondition-basedmaintenance(CBM)thatenabledavi-ationunitstorepaircomponentsbasedonthecom-ponent’sactualcondition.Unfortunately,theCBMtrainingwentdirectlytothefieldedbattalionwithoutCSSAMOinvolvement.WithouttrainingontheCBMsystems,CSSAMOcouldnotproperlysupportthem.Consequently,thosebattalionsdidnotbelievethatCSSAMOhadtheabilitytosupportthem.

RecommendedImprovementStrategiesInJuly2009,the615thAviationSupportBat-

talion’sleadersdecidedtoimproveCSSAMO.Theyfocusedonthreeimprovementstrategies:involveandempower,fosteranatmosphereofcontinuousimprovementandlearning,andgrowrelationshipsbetweenthebattalionsandCSSAMO.

Involve and empower. ThebattaliondividedCSSAMOintotwoteamstoincreaseSoldiers’involvementinlearningotherlogisticsautomationsystems.EachteamconsistedofamixtureofSol-dierswithdifferentbackgrounds.AvarietyofSTA-MISproblemsweregiventoeachteamtosolve.TheintentofthisstrategywastoproducecompetentandversatileCSSAMOSoldierswhocouldaddressvari-ousissues.

ToempowerSoldiers,decisionmakingauthoritywasdelegatedtoteamleaders.Thisincreasedjuniorleaders’levelsofresponsibilityinsolvingSTAMISproblems.Theempowermentofjuniorleaderswasinstrumentalduringthebrigade’sSTAMISnetwork

ImprovementStrategiesforLogisticsAutomationSupport

by Captain anDreW M. SaWyer, Chief Warrant offiCer 2 roSunG D. petty, anD Staff SerGeant Jonathan C. ShaW

T

The dilemma for the battalion was how to

employ CSSAMO’s limited personnel to effectively

support a brigade operating at multiple locations in a widely

dispersed area.


upgrade.Duringthismission,twonon-signalspecial-istsplannedandconfigured14satelliteterminalstoensureconnectivityforbothaviationandgroundvehiclemaintenance.Thisleaderdevelopmentstrate-gyhelpedtopreparejuniorleaderstomakedecisionsontheirown.

Foster an atmosphere of continuous improvement and learning.TheabilitytoresolvecomplexSTA-MISproblemsrequiredSoldierstohaveknowledgeofSTAMISsandautomationingeneral.Thebattaliondevelopedatrainingprogramthatfocusedoncontinu-ouslearningandimprovementforlong-termsuccess.ThepurposewastobroadenandsustainCSSAMOSoldiers’technicalskills.

Thetrainingprograminvolvedformaltrainingcoursesinconjunctionwithon-the-jobtraining.ThebattalionusedtrainingcoursesfromBaghdadSignalUniversity,theU.S.ArmyCentralCommandSignalUniversity,andtheAutomatedLogisticsAssistanceTeam-Iraq.FromAugusttoDecember2009,CSSA-MOconductedover800hoursoftrainingonvarioussubjectsthatincludedcomputerhardwaremainte-nance,informationassurance,computernetworking,andvariouslogisticsautomationsystems.Crosstrain-ingconductedinsmallgroupsreinforcedtheformaltraining.Thispracticegaveunprecedentedbenefitstothesupportofthebrigade’ssplit-basedoperations.

Asaresultofthetrainingprogram,CSSAMOSol-dierspossessedtheaptitudeandtechnicalexpertisetosupportmultiplelogisticsautomationsystems,ratherthanjustone.Thiswascrucialwhenthebrigadedeployedanaviationtaskforcetoanotherforwardoperatingbase.ItsmissionrequiredCSSAMOtosup-portfivedifferentlogisticsautomationsystemsandestablishaSTAMISnetwork.Traditionally,themis-sionwouldrequireCSSAMOtosendfiveorsixSol-dierstosupporttheaviationtaskforce.Becauseofthetrainingprogram,CSSAMOsupportedtheavia-tiontaskforcewithonlytwoSoldiers.ThetrainingprogramsuccessfullyincreasedCSSAMO’sflexibilityandcapabilitytosupportsplit-basedoperations.

Grow relationships between the battalions and CSSAMO. Thebrigadedevelopedasenseofuncer-taintyaboutCSSAMO’sabilitytoprovideautomation

supportforCBMtechnologies.The615thAviationSupportBattalionembeddedCSSAMOSoldierswiththe1–227AttackReconnaissanceBattalionand3–227AssaultHelicopterBattalion.ThegoalsofembeddingSoldiersweretoprovideon-the-jobexperienceinsup-portingtheCBMsystemsandtobuildtrustbetweenthebattalionsandCSSAMO.

TheCSSAMOSoldierslearnedhowtheCBMsys-temssupportedthebrigade’saviationmaintenancebyworkingfortheaviationmaintenanceofficerofthebattalioninwhichtheywereembedded.TheyalsoworkedwiththevariousCBMtechnicalrepresentativestoprovideassistanceforusers.ThisallowedtheCSSA-MOSoldierstoarticulateandresolvenumerousCBMerrors.AsCSSAMOincreaseditsabilitytosupportCBMtechnologies,thetrustbetweenthebattalionsandCSSAMOimproved.

CSSAMO’ssuccessinsupportinglogisticsautoma-tionsystemswasthankstoleaderscontinuouslyseek-ingwaystodevelopSoldiers.ItsabilitytoprovidededicatedautomationsupportforSTAMISsinfuturefull-spectrumoperationsneedsappropriateSoldierdevelopmentprogramstobesuccessful.

Captain anDrew m. sawyer is the s–6 for the 615th aviation support Battalion at fort hooD, texas. he is prior enlisteD anD a graDuate of the primary leaDership Development Course, the BasiC nonComissioneD offiCer Course, the engineer offiCer BasiC Course, the signal offiCer aDvanCeD Course, anD the information systems management Course. he holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in Computer information sCienCe from ColumBia College.

Chief warrant offiCer 2 rosung D. petty is a supply system teChniCian. he was stationeD with the 675th aviation support Bat-talion when this artiCle was written.

staff sergeant Jonathan C. shaw is the sustainment automa-tion support management offiCe nonCommissioneD offiCer-in-Charge, heaDQuarters support Company, 615th aviation support Battalion, at fort hooD, texas. he is a graDuate of the primary leaDership Development Course anD BasiC nonCommissioneD offi-Cer Course anD holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in Business aDministra-tion from the university of hartforD.

The goals of embedding Soldiers were to provide

on-the-job experience in supporting the CBM

systems and to build trust between the battalions

and the CSSAMO section.

CSSAMO’s success in supporting logistics

automation systems was thanks to leaders continuously seeking

ways to develop Soldiers.

54 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

ayingSoldierstheirdues”isacommon sayinginmilitaryandpoliticalcircles.But whenitcomestoactuallypayingSoldierstheirhard-earnedentitlements,itisoftenextremelyhardtodo,especiallyiftheSoldierinquestionisadeployedReservecomponents(RC)Soldier.

ThecurrentpayprocessfortheArmyNationalGuard(ARNG)andU.S.ArmyReserve(USAR)hasevolvedintoacumbersomeandcomplexsystem,andfew,ifany,personnelinmilitarypaydepartmentsfullyunderstanditsbreadth,scope,andweaknesses.Whatisworse,nei-therSoldiersnorthemilitarypaydepartmentscanexpectguaranteed,timely,andaccuratepaymentsofentitledbenefits.Meanwhile,Soldiersandtheirfamiliesareoftenleftwonderingifallentitledbenefitsarepaid—andthatisneveragoodsituation,particularlyduringthesehardeconomictimes.

PayProblemsThesedeficienciesinpayandallotmentshavebeen

welldocumentedinpastU.S.GovernmentAccount-abilityOffice(GAO)auditsoftheARNGandUSARmobilizationpayprocess.Thepayproblemshaverangedfrompaymentsdelayedover30daystonumerousover-paymentsandunderpaymentstomobilizedmembersoftheARNGandUSAR.

InanARNGstudyreleasedinNovember2003,GAOanalyzedthepayproblemsof481ARNGSoldiersdur-ingan18-monthperiodfrom1October2001through31March2003.Thetotaldollaramountoftheirpayproblemsduringthecourseoftheirdeploymentswasestimatedasoverpaymentsof$691,000,underpaymentsof$67,000,andlatepaymentsof$245,000.Outofthe481Soldiers,450hadatleastonepayproblemduringthecourseoftheirdeployment;thisaccountedfor93.6per-centofthetotalnumberofSoldiersinthestudy.

These481Soldierswerepartof6ARNGunitsthatincluded3SpecialForcesunitsand3militarypoliceunits.Theseunits,eachfromadifferentstate,haddistinctmissionsandweredeployedtovariouslocations(includ-ingGuantanamoBay,Cuba;Afghanistan;Iraq;andtwolocationsinthecontinentalUnitedStates)duringtheirmobilizationperiods.

FixingtheCurrentReserveComponentsPayProcess

Tomakemattersworse,payproblemsassociatedwiththeARNGandUSARpayprocessgrewexponentiallyastheroleofRCunitsincreasedaftertheterroristattacksof11September2001.IntheIraqconflictalone,ARNGandUSARunitshavebeensoheavilyinvolvedthatover18,000ofthe155,000SoldiersintheregioninJanuary2008wereRCsoldiers.

PayrollSystemDeficienciesTheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)andtheArmy

havebeenawareofthesemillion-dollarpayproblemsassociatedwiththeARNGandUSARpaysystemeversincethelargeRCroleinOperationsDesertShieldandDesertStorm.A1993GAOauditfoundmillionsofdol-larsinoverpaymentsandotherproblemsassociatedwithArmypayrollsasRCpersonnelreturnedfromthosemilitaryoperations.AkeyfactorthatcontributedtotheimproperpaymentswasthelargenumberofSoldiersbeingpaidfromtheArmy’sactive-dutypayrollsystem.

Basedonthisstudy,theArmydecidedin1995toprocesspaytomobilizedARNGSoldiersfromtheDefenseJointMilitaryPaySystem-ReserveComponent(DJMS–RC)systemratherthantheActiveArmypay-rollsystem.Althoughthis1995decisionwasintendedtobetemporarypendingtheadoptionofanintegratedsystemtopaybothActiveandRCpersonnel,DJMS–RCisstillusedintheArmy’smilitarypayprocessformobilizedRCSoldiers.UseofDJMS–RCwasbasedon

by MaJor nolanD i. floreS, CaarnG

“P

the classes of Pay PRoblems

class Definition

a a DePaRtment of Defense (DoD) Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) in excess of $1,000,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).

b a DoD Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) of $200,000 oR moRe but less than $1,000,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).

c a DoD Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) of $10,000 oR moRe but less than $200,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).

D a DoD Pay PRoblem that Results in an oveRPayment, unDeRPayment, oR late Payment (oveR 30 Days) of $2,000 oR moRe but less than $10,000 to a unit(s) oR inDiviDual(s).

This author-developed tool (based on Army Regulation 37–104–4, Military Pay and Allowances Policy)

defines pay problems experienced by Reserve component Soldiers. A tool like this should be

used to identify and address pay problems.


thepremisethatitprovidesthebestservicetoRCSol-diers.Nevertheless,significantpayproblemscontinuetoaffectRCSoldierstoday.

LackofProgramIntegrationMostofthepayproblemsareassociatedwiththe

lackofintegratedsystemsintheRCSoldiers’paypro-cess.SinceDJMS–RCdoesnotrecognizetransactionsintheARNGandUSARpersonnelsystems,personneldatainputsthataffectpaytoSoldiersarenotreflectedintheDJMS–RCpaysystem.Personneltransactionsthataffectpaymayincludepromotions,demotions,andmaritalstatus.Thelackofintegrationbetweenpersonnelandpaysystemsresultsinerraticmanualentryoftransactionsintomultiple,nonintegratedsys-temsandnumerousover-andunder-paymentsandlatepaymentstomobilizedRCSoldiers.

DODattemptedtodevelopasolutiontothelackofintegratedsystemsthatcausepaydeficienciesthroughtheproposedDefenseIntegratedMilitaryHumanResourcesSystem(DIMHRS).DIMHRSwasintendedtoprovidethearmedserviceswithanintegrated,mul-ticomponentpersonnelandpaysystem.DIMHRSwasalsosupposedtoaddresstheproblemsthatoccurwhenRCSoldiersarecalleduptoactivedutyandarelostinthesystem.GettinglostinthesystemandinaccurateentriesobviouslyaffectSoldiers’pay,creditforser-vice,andbenefits.However,developmentofDIMHRSencounteredmajortechnicalproblems,andDODcan-celledtheprograminMarch2010.

GAOhasreportedthatseveralorganizationswithkeyrolesinpaymentstomobilizedARNGSoldiershaveissuedtheirownimplementingregulations,poli-cies,andprocedures.TheseburdensomepoliciesandproceduresidentifiedinaGAOauditstudyhavecon-tributedtopayerrorsforARNGSoldiers.Becauseofalackofclearguidance,someU.S.PropertyandFis-calOfficelocationshaveestablishedinformal,undoc-umentedreconciliationpractices.Forexample,sincenowrittenrequirementsexistforconductinganddocu-mentingmonthlyreconciliationsofpayandpersonnelmismatchreports,reconciliationsareperformedadhocorbyinformalmeansbyeachofficelocation.

Short-TermSolutionsMostofthequalityassurancemethodsthatthe

Armyhasinplacearereactivemeasures,suchasauditsandpayandpersonnelmismatchreportscom-pletedafterthefact.Sincemostofthepayproblemsarenotidentifiedbeforehand,itisimportanttohaveastandardized,best-practiceapproachasaproactivemethodforcurtailingpayproblems.Therefore,thetimeittakestoprocessthepayandpersonnelmis-matchreportsneedstobestandardizedacrossall54stateandterritorialU.S.PropertyandFiscalOffices.Timelyreportprocessingalsoneedstobeimplement-

edacrossUSARunitpayoffices.Tobeeffective,mili-tarypaytechniciansneedthepropertrainingbeforethisapproachisimplemented.

Inordertoidentifypayproblems,DODandtheArmymilitarypayfacilitiesneedtoadaptatoolthatclassifiesthetypesofpayproblems.Thistoolshouldallowmilitarypayfacilitiesandauditingagenciestoidentifythetypeofpayproblemtheyarefacing.Thistoolalsowillallowtheauditorandmilitarypayfacilitytoapplytheappropriatefinancialguidelines,depend-ingontheclassofpaydeficiencyencountered.ThechartatleftshowsamodelthatDODcanimplementtoidentifythetypesofpayproblems.

Long-TermSolutionTheArmyshouldconsiderimplementingtheMarine

CorpsTotalForceSystem(MCTFS)asalong-termsolutiontotheproblemofmilitarypaydiscrepancies.MCTFSistheonlyintegratedmilitarypayandperson-nelsysteminDOD.Usingasingletransaction,MCTFSupdatesbothpayandpersonnelrecords.Forexample,whenaMarineispromoted,thesystemprocessingthepromotiontransactionwithinMCTFSincludesalltheprogrammingneededtoensurethatbothpayandpersonnelinformationareupdatedconcurrentlybythesingleinputofthepromotiontransaction.

MCTFSisavastimprovementovertheArmy’stroublesomeDJMS–RCpayrollsystem.MCTFSpaysservicemembersaccuratelyandontimeandcontainsaccuratedataforbothActiveandReserveMarinesinregardtostateandFederaltaxes,residencyinforma-tion,entitlementsandallowances,specialincentivepay,andallotments.Theintegrationofpayandpersonnelmeansfewerresourcesareneededtoperformsimpleinputreportprocedures,payandpersonnelfunctionsareintegratedseamlessly,andseparatesystemshavenosynchronizationproblems.

DODandtheArmytriedunsuccessfullytoimple-mentDIMHRS.WithalltheresourcesandeffortputintoanunprovensystemlikeDIMHRS,DODcouldhaveexpandedontheprovensuccessofMCTFS.TheRCSoldiershavepaidtheirdueswithcommitment,dedication,andsacrifice.ItistimeforUncleSamtopayRCSoldierstheirhard-earnedentitlementswithaccuracyandtimeliness.

maJor nolanD i. flores, Caarng, is the exeCutive offiCer for the heaDQuarters support Company, 640th aviation support Bat-talion, California army national guarD. he holDs a master of military arts anD sCienCes Degree from the army CommanD anD general staff College anD an m.B.a. Degree from the ameriCan interContinental university anD is a graDuate of the human resourCes BasiC Course, the fielD artillery Captains Career Course, the senior transportation offiCer QualifiCation Course, the reserve Component theater sustain-ment Course, anD the army CommanD anD general staff College.

56 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

he2009WarSupplementalAppropriationsAct directedallofthemilitaryservicestopay membersfortimeservedfrom11September2001to30September2009underthestop-lossauthor-itycontainedinTitle10,section12305,oftheU.S.Code.Theretroactivestop-lossspecialpay(RSLSP)claimperiodendedon30September2008;anotherprogramhadpreviouslybeenestablishedtopayclaim-antsforeligibleperiodsfrom1October2008tothepresent.Thoseeligiblereceive$500foreachmonthservedinstop-lossstatus.TheArmyestimatesthat120,000Soldiers,veterans,andsurvivorsqualifyforRSLSP,whichisbyfarthehighestestimatefromanyservice.

TheWarSupplementalAppropriationsAct,passedinJune2009,stipulatedthattheArmyshouldbegintoacceptandprocessRSLSPclaimson21October2009.ThisgavetheCompensationandEntitlementsBranchintheOfficeoftheDeputyChiefofStaff,G−1,just5monthstodesignaprocessforcollecting,reviewing,andpayingclaims.

DeterminingWhoIsEligibleTheArmyfacedanumberofchallengesbeforethe

RSLSPprogramofficiallybegan.Theunderlyingissuewastheverynotionofstop-loss.FromtheArmy’sper-spective,stop-losswasaforcemanagementtool,notacompensationtool.Thatis,trackingindividualstop-lossforthepurposeoffuturecompensationwasnotofparamountimportance.

G−1workedtoestablishalistof“known”stop-lossSoldiersfromtheprescribedperiodtoprovideanesti-mateforCongressandastartingpointfortheArmy’sRSLSPprogram.Whilethe“known”listprovedtobereasonablyaccurate,itdidnotalwaysprovidepreciseinformationfordeterminingthetimeanindividualservedinastop-lossstatus.Inresponse,theArmymovedforwardbyestablishingaspecialprogramman-agementofficetohandleRSLSPclaims.

WorkattheRSLSPProgramManagementOffice(PMO)beganinearnestbeforetheofficiallaunchdate.TheArmydevelopedandlaunchedaweb-basede-fileapplicationforthoseeligibletosubmitclaimsandreleased

eligibilityrequirementsthroughanumberofmediaannouncementsandanAllArmyActivitiesmessage.

AccordingtoaG−1factsheet,thoseeligibleinclude—

Servicemembers,includingmembersoftheReservecomponentsandformerandretiredmem-berswho,atanytimebetween11September2001and30September2008,servedonactivedutywhiletheirenlistmentorperiodofobligatedser-vicewasextendedorwhoseeligibilityforretire-mentwassuspendedfromoneofthefollowing:o Contractualexpirationoftermofservice(ETS),expirationofactiveservice(EAS),orReserveendofcurrentcontract(RECC);oro Anapprovedseparationdatebasedonanunqualifiedresignationrequestorreleasefromactiveduty(REFRAD)order;oro Anapprovedretirementbasedonlengthofservice.ServicememberswhoweredischargedorreleasedfromtheArmedForcesunderotherthanhonorableconditionsarenotpermittedtoreceiveretroactivestop-lossspecialpay.

ThePMOestablishedacasemanagementteamtobeginreviewingandprocessingclaimsforpayment.Anumberofissueshavebecomeapparentascasemanagersworktoreconcilepersonnelrecordswithanindividual’sclaimedstop-lossperiod.Issuessuchasextensions,bonuses,andbeneficiarystatus,alongwithothervariables,complicatetheadjudicationprocess.Asaresult,inmanyinstances,casemanagersworkcloselywithclaimantstodevelopandestablishtheirstop-losstimeline.

EncouragingClaimsAsthecasemanagementteamworkedtoprocess

claims,itbecameobviousthattheArmyfacedagreaterchallengethansimplyreviewingrecords.Overthefirst2monthsoftheprogram,about20,000com-pleteclaimswerefiled.However,claimsubmissionsdroppedsteeplyoverthenextfewmonthsandtheArmybegantheprogram’sthirdquarterfarshortofthenumberofclaimsexpected.Giventhelowclaimtotals,

ArmySeeksClaimantsUnderRetroactiveStop-LossSpecialPayProgram

by robert piDGeon

T


theArmyfocusedonidentifyingandnotifyingthoseeligibleforthepay.

AnumberofobstaclescomplicatedtheprocessofnotifyingformerSoldierseligibleforRSLSP.Theprogrameligibilitydatescoveredmostofadecade,andmanyofthosetheArmyneededtoreachhadbeenseparatedorretiredformanyyears.ThePMOdevelopedadirectmailplantosendlettersofnotifi-cationtoover80,000peopleontheknownlistdirect-ingthemtoapplyforthespecialpay.Toensurethehighestlevelofaccuracy,thePMOconductedacom-prehensivesearchtoidentifycurrentaddressesforallthoseontheknownlistandcreatedanenvelopeandletterdesignedtoelicitaresponse.

Inadditiontocreatingandsendingthenotifica-tions,thePMOconceivedauniqueworkflowtopro-cessapplicationsthroughanautomatedweb-basedsystemknownasthe“quickclaim”process.Thechartaboveillustratestheimpactonthenumberofclaimsofthedirectmailcampaignandthequickclaimsubmissionoption.Thequickclaimprocessallowsthosereceivingalettertoenterthesystemthroughaspecifiedwebsitetoexaminetheirstop-lossdatesasprovidedbytheArmy.TheclaimantthencanchoosetoaccepttheArmy’sfindingandbepaidwithoutsubmittingdocumentationorrejecttheArmy’sdeterminationandfileanewclaim.Over40percentofthosesentnotificationshavefileda

claim—themajorityacceptingtheArmy’sdetermina-tionoftheirstop-losstime.

TheRSLSPPMOcontinuestoworktowardidentify-ingandnotifyingthoseeligibleforRSLSP.Alongwiththedirectmailcampaign,theArmyhasworkedcloselywiththeU.S.DepartmentofVeteransAffairsandveteranandmilitaryserviceorganizationstopublicizetheprogram.ThePMOhasalsoworkedwiththeG−1PublicAffairsOfficeandOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforPublicAffairstoestablishastrongsocialmediapres-encefortheprogram.Thesecombinedeffortshavegener-atedover55,000claimsasofAugust2010.Thedeadlineforsubmittingapplicationswas21October2010.

TheArmyhastakengreatcaretoensurethattheRSLSPprogramisasuccess.TherequirementfromCongressistomakecertainthatthemoneyappropriatedforthisprojectreachesthoseforwhomitisintended.ThePMOstrivestobediligentinadjudicatingclaimsandhasgonetogreatlengthstoidentifyandnotifythoseeligible.ThecontinuedsuccessoftheRSLSPpro-gramdemonstratestheArmy’sdedicationtoSoldiers.

roBert piDgeon is the DireCtor of CommuniCations for the retroaCtive stop-loss speCial pay program management offiCe, offiCe of the Deputy Chief of staff, g−1. he holDs a master of mass CommuniCation Degree from the university of south Carolina.

58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT58 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

umerousreportsfrommanyorganizationshavediscussedtheinefficiencyofthemilitary logisticssystem.Inresponsetothesereports,theDepartmentofDefense(DOD)has undertakenmanyinitiativestocreatealogisticssystemthatisbothmoreresponsiveandmoreeffectiveinsupportingajointforcecommander.CreatingsuchasystemwillbecomemoreimportantinthefuturesincewecanexpectadecreaseinDODfundingto3.5percentofthegrossdomesticproduct.1Adiscussionamongprofessionallogisticiansabouttheseinitiativesisneededinordertoidentifypossiblesolutions.

Ibelievethatachievingthegoalofajointlogisticssystemrequirestheestablishmentofanewfunctionalcommand.Toaccomplishthis,thecurrentsupplysystemwillhavetobeover-hauledandserviceparochialismwillhavetobeovercome.SomewouldsaythatthiswillviolateTitle10oftheU.S.Code,whichestablishestherolesandmissionsoftheArmedForces.How-ever,thenewfunctionalcommandwouldbepaidforbyeachmilitaryservicefortheservice(supplychainmanagement)provided.

ConfusionOverDefiningTermsAfterreceivingabriefingonthedraftJointSupplyJointIntegratingConceptfromthe

DefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),IunderstandtherequirementtocreateonesupplyprocessownerforDOD.2Thisrequirementisinlinewiththebestbusinesspracticesoftheprivatesectorandisthelinchpinincreatingafactory-to-foxholesupplychain.3

TheexecutivesummaryofJointPublication(JP)4−0,JointLogistics,states,“Supplychainmanagementsynchronizestheprocesses,resources,andeffortsofkeyglobalproviderstomeetCCDR[combatantcommander]requirements.”4ThisappearstobeinconflictwiththeSeptem-ber2003designationoftheU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANSCOM)asthedistributionprocessownerforDOD.Onitswebsite,TRANSCOMstatesthatitistoserve“asthesingleentitytodirectandsuperviseexecutionofthestrategicdistributionsystem”inorderto“improvetheoverallefficiencyandinteroperabilityofdistributionrelatedactivities—deployment,sustain-mentandredeploymentsupportduringpeaceandwar.”The“sustainment”portionofthisisatleastapartofsupplychainmanagement.

Thisbecomesveryconfusingwhenthedefinitionsofdistributionandsupplychainmanage-mentareputtogether.DODdefinesdistributionasthe“operationalprocessofsynchronizingallelementsofthelogisticsystemtodeliverthe‘rightthings’tothe‘rightplace’atthe‘righttime’tosupportthegeographiccombatantcommander.”5DODdefinessupplychainmanagementas“across-functionalapproachtoprocuring,producing,anddeliveringproductsandservicestocustomers.Thebroadmanagementscopeincludessub-suppliers,suppliers,internalinformation,andfundsflow.”6Thusdistributionandsupplychainmanagementbothsharetheconceptofdeliveringsuppliestosomeone.

WhereAreWegoing?TheFutureofJointLogistics

by MaJor robert p. Mann



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

FOCUS

N

1CurrentDODfundingisapproximately4.8percent.DavisS.Welch,DirectorofInvestmentfortheDeputyAssistantSecretaryoftheArmyforBudget,ArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollegeFuturesDayPanel,FortLeavenworth,Kansas,29October2009.

2ColonelMartinBinder,DefenseLogisticsAgencyJ−314,JointSupplyJointIntegratingConceptPresentationtoArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege,FortLeavenworth,Kansas,22October2009.

3Supplychain:1)startingwithunprocessedrawmaterialsandendingwiththefinalcustomerusingthefinishedgoods,thesupplychainlinksmanycompaniestogether.2)thematerialandinformationalinterchangesinthelogisticalprocessstretchingfromacquisitionofrawmaterialstodeliv-eryoffinishedproductstotheenduser.Allvendors,serviceproviders,andcustomersarelinksinthesupplychain.CouncilofSupplyChainManage-mentProfessionals,Glossary of Terms,http://cscmp.org/digital/glossary/glossary.asp,accessed23October2009.

4IntroductiontoJP4−0,JointLogistics,JointChiefsofStaff,Washington,DC,18July2008,p.x.5JP1−02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,JointChiefsofStaff,Washington,DC,12April2001,asamended

through31October2009,p.167.6Ibid.,p.524.


ItappearsthatDODislookingforasupplychainsupportedbyadistributionsystemtosustainjointforcecommanders.Forthepurposeofthisarticle,Iwillmod-ifytheDODsupplychainmanagementdefinitionasfollows:Supplychainmanagementisacross-functionalapproachtoprocuring,producing,anddeliveringtherightthingstotherightplaceattherighttimetocus-tomers.Thebroadmanagementscopeincludessubsup-pliers,suppliers,internalinformation,andfundsflow.7

Thisdefinitionaddressesthegoaloftryingtoachievethe“perfectorder.”8Italsodeletes“deliveringservices”becausethattermimpliestasksmoreassociatedwithforcestructurethanwithdeliveringacommodity.

ASupplyProcessOwner:USLOgCOMDefiningtheDODsupplysystemasasupplychain

leadstotheassumptionthatthereshouldbeonesupplychainmanagerinordertoconformtothebestbusinesspractices.So,afour-starorganizationshouldberesponsibleforleadingsupplychainmanagement.Thisjointorganiza-tionshouldhaveaformal,approvedstructurewithrepre-sentativesfromeachserviceandnotbeabureauorboardoftheJointStaff.Itshouldoverseeallaspectsofequip-mentandsupplies,fromdevelopmentthroughdisposal.

TheestablishmentofaU.S.LogisticsCommand(USLOGCOM)isoneapproachtothisorganization.

(Seechartatleft.)ThiswouldbeafunctionalcommandandpartoftheUnifiedCommandPlan.USLOG-COM’smissionwouldbetocontrolthebusinesspracticesandlife-cyclemanagementoftheservicesandtodirectdistributionofallsuppliestotheservicesandthecombatantcom-manders.USLOGCOMwouldhavetwomajorcomponents:TRANS-COM,whichwouldbeasub-unifiedcommand,responsiblefordistributionasdefinedinJP1−02,DepartmentofDefenseDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTerms,andintegratedlife-cyclemanagers(ILMs),whowouldprovidethesup-pliesforTRANSCOMtodeliverwhatisneededratherthanwhatisonhand.

TheILMscouldbeorganizedintofunctionalgroups(ground,air,sea,andC4ISR[command,control,

communications,computers,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance])ratherthanbycomponent(Army,MarineCorps,Navy,andAirForce)togainefficien-ciesinmanagementandoversightaswellasprovideastructurethatwouldresultinincreasedinteroperabilityacrosstheservices.Forinstance,ifallcommandandcontrolandautomatedsystemsweredevelopedinoneorganization,thatorganizationcouldprovideacommonarchitectureandcommoncomponentsthatwouldassistinnetworkingandmaintenanceoperations.

USLOGCOMwouldreceiveinputfromaservicewhenthatservicehadidentifiedamaterielshortfall.Theservicewouldpasstherequirements,whetherneworexisting,toUSLOGCOM,whichthenwoulddevelopthematerielsolutionandprovidethecosttotheser-vice.Theservicethenwouldhavetoseekorprovidefundinginordertocontinuewiththedevelopmentandproductionoftheequipment.Ifthematerielsolutionexisted,theILMswouldidentifythesourceofsup-plyandprovideittotheserviceforafee.TheILMswouldberequiredtomanagetheentirelife-cycleoftheequipment,includingtheprocurementandmanage-mentofrepairparts.Thiswouldcreateasingleinterfacebetweensuppliersandcustomers.

Asthesingleinterface,theILMswouldbethesup-plychainmanagersfortheircommodities,analyzing

7Thisdefinitionisinlinewiththedefinitionofsupplychainmanagement(SCM)bytheCouncilofSupplyChainManagementProfessionals:“SupplyChainManagementencompassestheplanningandmanagementofallactivitiesinvolvedinsourcingandprocurement,conversion,andalllogisticsmanagementactivities.Importantly,italsoincludescoordinationandcollaborationwithchannelpartners,whichcanbesuppliers,intermediaries,third-partyserviceproviders,andcustomers.Inessence,supplychainmanagementintegratessupplyanddemandmanagementwithinandacrosscompanies.SupplyChainManagementisanintegratingfunctionwithprimaryresponsibilityforlinkingmajorbusinessfunctionsandbusinessprocesseswithinandacrosscompaniesintoacohesiveandhigh-performingbusinessmodel.Itincludesallofthelogisticsmanagementactivitiesnotedabove,aswellasmanufacturingoperations,anditdrivescoordinationofprocessesandactivitieswithandacrossmarketing,sales,productdesign,financeandinformationtechnology.”CouncilofSupplyChainManagementProfessionals,Glossary of Terms,http://cscmp.org/digital/glossary/glossary.asp,accessed23October2009.

8Binder,22October2009.

60 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

demandsfromacrossDODandthenprogrammingreplenishmentorreplacementfromsuppliers.TheILMswouldneedtheabilitytoshiftDODstocksasneededtomeetrequirements.Thiswouldrequireanaccuratecommonoperationalpicture(COP)sotheILMscouldmakeaccuratedecisionsonsourcingsolutions.TheCOPwouldhavetoextendfromthesuppliers’sourcesofsupplydowntotheendusersinordertoanticipaterequirementsandshortfalls.

TRANSCOMwouldberesponsiblefordeliveringsuppliesthroughthesupplychaintotheservicesandsupportedcommanders.Realistically,thisresponsibil-itywouldnotextendtothe“foxhole.”ItisunrealistictoholdUSLOGCOMandTRANSCOMresponsiblefordeliveringdirectlytothefoxholewithoutgivingthemthecapabilitytocontroltheorganicdistributionofassetsatallechelons.Thisisatopicthatshouldbeaddressedseparately,thoughitisrealistictoexpectthejointforcecommandertodesignatealocationwherethetransferofresponsibilityandaccountabilityoccursasfarforwardaspossible.

TRANSCOMandthesupportedcommanderswouldberequiredtoestablishin-transitvisibilityallthewaytothefoxhole.ThiswouldenableUSLOG-COMandtheILMsto“see”wheresupplieswerelocatedenroutesotheycouldmakeaccuratedeci-sionsaboutwheretodirectshipmentsasprioritiesandrequirementschange.ThiswouldfeedtheILMs’COP.

ImprovingLogisticsInfrastructureDODshouldcontinuetoupgradethelogistics

automationinfrastructure.TheupgradeofDLAnational-levelsystemsandtheintroductionofajoint,Army,MarineCorps,Navy,andAirForceGlobalCombatSupportSystem(GCSS)wouldbenefitalllogisticiansatalllevels.Thiswouldgivetheservicesanditemmanagerstheabilitytomaintainvisibilityofsuppliesmoreefficientlyandeffectively.Whilepro-grammanagerbriefingsandwebsitesdiscussthepro-jectedcapabilitiesofGCSS,onethingmusthappeninordertocreateasupplychain:AllsystemsmustbeabletocommunicateandsharedatasotheILMscanhavevisibilityfromthefactorytothefoxhole.

ForUSLOGCOMtohavetheabilitytodirectthetransferofequipmentandsuppliesamongorganiza-tionsandservices,financialmanagementsystemsmustbeintegratedintoGCSS.Whenarequisitionisplacedintothesupplysystem,thebestsourceofsup-plymustbeidentified.Forexample,ifanAirForceengineerunitoperatingintheaterordersapartforahigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicle,theitemmanagermustbeabletodirectthatacolocatedArmy,MarineCorps,orNavysupplysupportactivityfilltherequestautomatically(basedontheestablishmentofsupportrelationshipsandareferralsystembasedonajointconceptofsupport).

CanWeOvercomeParochialism?Tobeabletoimplementchange,DODmustbea

learningorganizationandovercomeserviceandfunc-tionalparochialism.Itwillbehardforacommanderatmost,ifnotall,levelstotrustanotherorganizationtoprovidesupplychainmanagementandallowittomovesupplieswithinandfromhisorganization.Itwilltaketimeforthesupportedorganizationstotrustandtrulyembracesupplychainmanagement.Itwillalsotakeleaderswhounderstandthatthischangewillallowustomoreefficientlyuseourresources,whichwillbecomeconstrainedinthefuture.

Toachievethistrustmorequickly,wemustlookattheprofessionaldevelopmentoftheindividualschargedwithoperatingaglobalsupplychain.Ibelievethatlogisticiansfromacrosstheservicesmustbegroundedinthedoctrinethatsupportstheirforce.Alllogisticiansshouldtraininjointoperationsandjointlogisticsduringtheircompany-gradeprofessionalmilitaryeducation.FortheArmy,thiswouldgivelogisticiansoperatingintheechelonsabovebrigadeanunderstandingofhowandwhytheysupportjointforces.

Anadditionalsteptowardgivingthesupportedcom-mandersconfidenceinthisprocessistocreatesupplychainmanagercareerprofessionalpositionswithinDOD.Thiscouldbedoneassimplyascreatinganaddi-tionalskillidentifieroraseparatefunctionalarea.Theselogisticiansshouldberequiredtoearnanadvanceddegreeinsupplychainmanagementandachieveaccred-itedstatuswithaprofessionalsupplychainmanagementorganization,suchastheInstituteforSupplyManage-mentorSOLE—TheInternationalSocietyofLogistics.Certificationmustberequiredtoensurethatthecorrectpersonisplacedinsupplychainmanagerpositions.ThiswouldenableUSLOGCOMtomaintainthebestbusi-nesspracticesandrealizethegreatestefficiencies.

DODmustbepreparedtoadoptbetterpracticesinsupportingthewarfighteraswefaceafuturewithreducedbudgetsandconstrainedresources.Areorga-nizationtocreateasupplyprocessownersupportedbyadistributionprocessownerwouldincurashort-termcost,butitwouldachieveanincreaseineffectivenessandefficiencyoverthelongtermbyfollowingbestbusinesspractices.Thecreationofaunifiedcommandthatsupportstheservicesandthejointforcecom-manderwouldnotrequireanactofCongressandcouldbedonebyovercomingservicecultures.Drivenfromthetop,thischangewouldbeacceptedacrossDODandwouldbebeneficialforall.

maJor roBert p. mann is an organiZational integrator in the offiCe of the Deputy Chief of staff, g−3/5/7, Department of the army. he wrote this artiCle while attenDing the army CommanD anD general staff College. he is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course, the ComBineD logistiCs offiCers aDvanCeD Course, anD the logistiCs exeCutive Development Course.


he3dSustainmentCommand(Expeditionary) (3dESC)hasrecommendedthattheArmy CombinedArmsSupportCommandchangethemanningauthorizationsofthebulkpetroleumsectionoftheESC’ssupplyandservicesbranch.TheESCmadethisrequestbecauseitsmodificationtableoforganizationandequipment(MTOE)doesnotadequatelycorrespondtoitsoperationaldemands.

DuringOperationIraqiFreedom,the3dESC’sclassIIIB(bulkpetroleum)sectionoperatedunderthedoctrinalrequirementsforatheatersustainmentcommandpetro-leumsection.Itwasresponsibleforplanning,synchroniz-ing,andcoordinatingallexternalfuelsupportthroughthecommandandcontroloffivesustainmentbrigades,managingfueldistributioninIraqbybalancingtheexist-ingdistributioncapabilitiestomeetcurrentandprojectedoperationalrequirements,andultimatelyprovidingupto2milliongallonsofbulkpetroleumdailytodeployedunits.

TheESC’sbulkpetroleumteamcoordinateddailywiththemobilitysections,themovementcontrolbattalion,thesustainmentbrigades,thesub-areapetroleumofficer(forward),theU.S.CentralCommand(CENTCOM)JointPetroleumOffice,theMulti-NationalCorps-IraqC–4,theDefenseEnergySupportCenter,andseveralotherfuel-communityentities.Thisensuredthecontinuityoffueldistributionandmanagement.

ThesectionwasalsoresponsibleforconductingsitevisitstoensurethataccurateprocedureswerebeingfollowedatthebulkpetroleumfarmsthroughoutIraq.PersonnelhadtobeonsitewhenrequiredbytheESCsupportoperationsofficer,thecommandinggeneral,andonoccasion,atthespecificrequestoftheCENTCOMjointpetroleumofficertoguaranteepetroleumoperationswereconductedsuitably.

Simultaneously,constructionofbolted-steeltankfacili-tieswasinprogressattwoofthedirectsupportlocations,JointBaseBaladandContingencyOperatingBase(COB)Speicher.Theprojectsrequiredvisitsfromasubject-matterexpertfromthebulkpetroleumsectionwhocouldfullyunderstandtheproposedconstructionandensurethatitwouldbesufficientforbulkfuelfarmoperations.TheprojectsalsokeptthesectionengagedwithLogisticsCivilAugmentationProgramcontractorstoensurethatthemissionwascompletedwiththedesiredequipment.ThismissionlaterincludedoverseeingconstructionofabulkfuelfarmatCOBBasrathatsupportedMulti-NationalDivision-Southasitmoveditsheadquarters.

BulkPetroleumManningRequirementsinanESC

by Captain Shari S. boWen

T Otherrequirementsthatreducedstaffavailabilityinthebulkpetroleumsectionwereobligationstoparticipateintheannualfuelsconferenceandrestandrecuperationleave.Toreducesomeburdenonthesection,bulkwaterdutieswereshiftedtotheclassI(subsistence)sectionsincewaterproductionandconsumptionfellundertheclassIrealmofresponsibility.

AccordingtotheMTOE,theESC’sbulkpetroleumsectionstaffshouldincludeacaptainasthepetroleumofficer,asergeantfirstclassasthepetroleumsupplysergeant,andastaffsergeantasawatertreatmentsuper-visor.TheMTOEalsocallsforamajortobethesupplymanagementofficer;however,intheMTOEthispositionbelongstothesupplyandservicesbranchandnotdirectlytothebulkpetroleumsection.

BecauseofthesizeoftheareaofresponsibilityandthenumberofforcesbeingsupportedinIraq,theforceauthorizedtothesectionbytheMTOEwasinadequateforsuccess.TheESC’sbulkpetroleumsectionassumedadditionalpersonnel,includingawarrantofficerpetro-leumtechnician,whobytheMTOEwasassignedtothedistributionintegrationsbranch.

Thebranchhadbeenestablishedwithinthesupportoperationssectiontosynchronizerequirementsbetweenthecommoditiesandtheirfinaldestinations.However,theESCfoundthathavingthesubject-matterexpertsinthedistributionintegrationsbranchinsteadofassignedtospecifiedcommoditieshaddisadvantages.Thebulkpetro-leumsectionalsoreceivedautomatedlogisticalspecialistSoldiers,intheranksofsergeantfirstclassandstaffser-geant,fromothersectionstoguaranteesuccess.

Thevastnumberofdailymissionsprovedtorequirealieutenantcolonel,amajor,acaptain,apetroleumtechni-cian,andfourpetroleumsupplyspecialists(onemastersergeant,twosergeantsfirstclass,andonestaffsergeant)tosuccessfullyachievethebulkpetroleummission.IproposethatbeforeanymoreESCsperformexpeditionarymissions,theirMTOEsbechangedtoensurethatthedistributionoffuel,themostcriticalsupplycommodity,isnotinterrupted.

Captain shari s. Bowen was the petroleum supply offiCer in Charge of the Class iii (Bulk petroleum) seCtion of the 3D sustainment CommanD (expeDitionary) when she wrote this artiCle. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in english from the university of marylanD anD a master’s Degree in instruCtional teChnology from ameriCan interCon-tinental university anD is pursuing a DoCtorate of management in orga-niZational leaDership from the university of phoenix. she is a graDuate of the Quartermaster offiCer BasiC Course.

62 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heflowofclassIX(repairparts)isanintegral partofthemaintenanceprocess.Without parts,faultswillnotgetfixed.Thelongerittakesarepairparttoarrive,thelongerapieceofequipmentisnotmissioncapable(NMC).

MybrigadewaslocatedatForwardOperatingBase(FOB)MarezinMosul,Iraq.MosulislocatedinnorthernIraq,approximately172milesfromLogis-ticsSupportAreaAnacondainBalad,Iraq,and560milesfromKuwait.ThesetwobasesarehubsforclassIX.Mostpartseithercomefromorgothroughtheselocations.

TheaverageamountoftimeittakesforaparttocomefromKuwaitis24days,andtheaverageamountoftimeittakesforaparttoarrivefromBaladis14days.Thishashadanenormouseffectonourcombatpower.Onaverage,NMCequipmentremainsthatwayformorethan20daysbecauseofthesluggishflowofclassIXparts.

Severalthingscanbedonetohelpmitigatethisslowflowofrepairparts.

ShareAmongUnitsTheeasiestwaytospeeduptotheflowofclassIX

inIraqistouseunitresources.Everybattalionmain-tenanceprogramhasabattalionmaintenancetechni-cian.ThiswarrantofficerusuallyhasmanyresourcesavailabletohimbecausetheWarrantOfficerCorpsisverytightlyknit.

The026report(EquipmentDeadlinedOverXXDaysbyBattalionReport)withtheentirebrigade’slistofNMCequipmentisemailedtoeverybattalion.Eachbattalionmaintenancetechnicianshouldreadtheentirelisttoensurethathedoesnothaveapartthatasisterunitneeds.Ifhedoeshaveapartthatanotherunitneeds,heshouldhand-carryormailittothatunit.Whenunitswithinthebrigadelookoutforeachother,theytendtohavesmaller026reports.

ExpeditingClassIXDeliveriesinIraqby firSt lieutenant alexyS M. MyerS

T Hi-PriOthersolutionstothisissuehavegoneupourbri-

gade’schannelstobrigade.Onesolutionthatthesupportoperationsshopusesiscalleda“hi-pri”(highpriority).Ourbrigadestandardistodoahi-priiftheestimatedshippingdateontheinitialdocumentexceeds6months.

Atthatpoint,thebattalionmaintenanceclerkcon-ductsresearchtoidentifythesupplysupportactivity(SSA)thathasthepart.ThisinformationispassedfromthebattalionmaintenancetechnicianthroughthematerielofficerandtheSSAtechniciantotheroutingcodegeo-graphicmanager,whowillthencalluptheSSAtechni-cianatthelocationofthepartanddoarequisition.

Orderingaparthi-priissimilartodoingawalk-throughatanSSAexternaltotheunit.(Note:IfapartisnotlocatedinanyexternalSSAsincountry,thenthebrigadewillnotmarkthedocumentashi-pri.)

LiaisonOfficerArguablythebestsolutiontotheslowreceiptof

repairpartsistokeepaliaisonofficer(LNO)atthehublocation.Mybrigade’sLNOwaslocatedinBalad.ThisLNOshouldbeanoncommissionedofficerorofficerwhoknowsandunderstandsthesupplysystem.Hewouldberesponsibleformailingpartstothebat-talionsinthebrigadespreadacrossIraq.

OnereasonittakespartssolongtogetfromBaladtoMosulisthattheunitsthatpackthecontainersgoingtospecificFOBswaituntilacontaineriscom-pletelyfullofpartsbeforesendingthecontainernorth.(Itisawasteofresourcestoshipahalf-emptycon-tainer.)WithanLNO,however,partscanbewalkedthroughthehubSSAinBaladandmaileddirectlytoapointofcontactatthereceivingunit.ThisprocessundoubtedlyexpeditestheflowofclassIXpartsinIraq.AnLNOshoulddefinitelybeusedbyallunits.

TheflowofclassIXpartscanbeincrediblyslowinIraq.However,manysolutionsareavailabletohelpmitigatethisproblem.Beforedeploying,considerthatthismightbeanissueandthinkofwaystohelpyourunit.Maintainingequipmentisanextremelyimportantpartofmissionsuccess,andmaintenanceisincompletewithoutclassIXparts.

first lieutenant alexys m. myers is the maintenanCe Con-trol offiCer for the 1st Battalion, 9th fielD artillery regi-ment, 2D heavy BrigaDe ComBat team, 3D infantry Division. she was DeployeD to iraQ when she wrote this artiCle. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in frenCh anD spanish from the uniteD states military aCaDemy.

One reason it takes parts so long to get from Balad to Mosul is that the units that pack the containers going to specific FOBs wait until a container is completely full of

parts before sending the container north.


epartmentoftheArmy(DA)logisticsinterns neverknowwhattasksmaymakeuptheir trainingday.Oneminutetheymaybeworkingatadesk,andthenextminutetheycouldberidinginaBradleyinfantryfightingvehicleorjumpingoutofanairplane.Nomatterwhatdailytaskstheyundertake,theyaregainingvaluablehands-onexperiencewhilelearningmoreabouttheircustomer—theSoldier.

WeareDAlogisticsmanagementspecialistinternswhowereassignedtoYumaProvingGround,Arizona,aspartofouron-the-jobtraining(OJT).DuringourOJT,wereceivedlogisticstraininginsupply,maintenance,andtransportation.On3Feb-ruary2010,wealsoparticipatedinatandemjumpattheMilitaryFreefallSchoollocatedatYumaProvingGround.TheMilitaryFreefallSchool,partoftheArmyJohnF.KennedySpecialWarfareCenterandSchool,isajointforcesfacilityandthepremiertrainingsiteforhighaltitude-lowopening(HALO)parachutingtechniques.ThisiswhereU.S.SpecialOperationsForcespersonnelgotoqualifyashigh-altitudeparachutists.

BeforeheadingtoArizonaforactualairtime,Sol-diersbeginclassesatFortBragg,NorthCarolina.Inthefirstweek,theylearnhowtopackaparachute,rigextraequipment,and“fly”inaverticalwindtunnel.Thiswindtunnelteachesthemtheproperbodyposi-tionthatisneededforfreefallandthebasicsofpara-chutecanopycontrol.

Havinglearnedthebasictechniques,theyheadtoYumaProvingGroundformoretraining,whichincludesactualairtime.Eachinstructorisresponsiblefortwostudentswhoarerelativelycloseinbodytypetohisown.Whilegravityaffectseverythingatthe

ADayintheLifeofaDALogisticsIntern

by aliSon Silverio anD SuSannah tobey

D samerate,differentbodytypesfallfasterthanothersbasedontheirweightandexposedsurfacearea.

ForSoldiers,thetrainingculminatesinthefourthweekwithafreefallsimulatingacombatmission.WeobservedSoldierswhohadneverjumpedbeforeprogresstobeingabletojumpwithagroupof7or8othersfrom12,500feet,atnight,withaweaponandcombatpack.OncetheSoldiersopenedtheirparachutes,theyflewinaformationandlandedtogether—justastheywouldincombat.

AfterobservingtheSoldiersjump,wejumpedintandemwithinstructors.Weusedthesamegear,sig-nals,andtechniquesthattheSoldiersnormallydobutinatandemmode.Sincewewereuptoit,theinstruc-torsmadethejumpalittlemorechallengingbydoingabackwardsflipaftertheywereoutoftheairplane.

Foroveraminute,wewereinthefreefallposition,withourarmsoutandourlegsbentup,tocreateanevensurfaceagainsttheforceofthewindpushingagainstus.Atabout6,000feet,thetandemjumpmasterspulledthechute,andwewereabletogentlyfallwhiletakinginagreatpanoramicviewofthebeautifulmountainsanddes-ertlandscapethatmakeupYumaProvingGround.

Welandedsafely,andalthoughwehadbeenappre-hensiveaboutjumpingoutofanairplane,weagreedthatitwasthemostadventurousandexcitingexperi-encewehadeverhad.ThetandemjumpgaveusacloserlookatandagreaterappreciationfortheworldofSpecialOperationsForces.

ThisisjustoneexampleofaDAlogisticsintern’sexperience.MoreinformationontheDALogisticsInternProgramisavailableontheCivilianLogisticsCareerManagementOffice(CLCMO)websiteathttp://www.cascom.lee.army.mil/CLCMO/orbycon-tactingtheCLCMOofficeatlinda.sawvell@us.army.milorbyphoneat(309)782–7986.

alison silverio is a Department of the army (Da) logistiCs management speCialist intern. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in puBliC aDministration with a minor in spanish from virginia state university. she is a graDuate of the intern logistiCs stuDies pro-gram anD is Currently working on a Defense aCQuisition university (Dau) level 1 CertifiCation.

susannah toBey is Da logistiCs management speCialist intern. she holDs a BaChelor’s Degree in international Business anD rus-sian from the university of wyoming. she is a graDuate of the intern logistiCs stuDies program anD is Currently pursuing a Dau level 1 CertifiCation.

We observed Soldiers who had never jumped

before progress to being able to jump with a group

of 7 or 8 others from 12,500 feet, at night,

with a weapon and combat pack.

64 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

heArmyisimplementingarevolutionary systemthatallowscommandersandlogistics Soldiersatalllevelstoseeinrealtimewhattheyhaveandwheretheyhaveit.TheLogisticsReportingTool(LRT)cantrackeverythingfrombottledwatertomissilesandnonstandardequipment(suchassportutilityvehicles)tobarracksoccupancy.Softwaredevelopersrefinedthetoolaroundtheneedsoflogisticians(asdefinedbythem)anddeliveredsolutionstofitthoseneeds.

TheefforttohaveLRTwidelyembracedbytheArmyisbeingspearheadedbythe1stInfantryDivisionG–3inIraq.Thesectionbegantheeffortbycoordinat-ingwithboththe36thSustainmentBrigade,whichwasresponsibleforlogisticsthroughoutsouthernIraqwhenthe“BigRedOne”cametothetheater,andthe13thExpeditionarySustainmentCommand(ESC),whichwasthetheater-levellogisticscommand.The1stInfan-tryDivisionassumedcommandandcontrolofU.S.Division-Southon1February2010,andinMarch,Cap-tainDavidShafferbeganworkingtoputLRTintousebythedivisionanditssubordinateunitsintheater.

LRTisasmallpartoftheBattleCommandSustain-mentSupportSystem(BCS3),whichhashadmixedreviewsbecauseofexperiencesSoldiershadwiththeearlier,unrefinedversionofthesystem.BCS3isnowmanagedbytheBoeingsubsidiaryTapestrySolutions,Inc.,anditisafarcryfromthesoftwaremostSoldiersremember.However,convincingSoldiersofthishasbeenabitofabattle,accordingtoShaffer.

Initially,ShafferwasalsoskepticalbecauseofanencounterhehadwithanearlierversionofBCS3in2006.Shortlyaftertakingontheproject,hecalledLarryWise,afieldserviceengineer(FSE)forTapestrySolutions,Inc.,andaretiredArmycommandsergeantmajor.Accordingtothetwo,theirfirstmeetingwastheresultofa“heateddiscussion”andachallengefromWiseforShaffertovisitContingencyOperatingBaseAddertohavesomeofhisperceptionscorrected.

OnceWisehadthechancetowalkShaffer,anexperi-encedlogistician,throughthetremendousfunctionalitytheprogramoffered,ShafferbecameanLRTbeliever.Shaffer,Wise,andeveryallytheycouldfindthenworkedtogainacceptanceofLRT.Thekeytoprogresscamefromwork-ingdirectlywiththelogisticianswhoneededtousethesoftware.“Yougettheminthere,andyougetthemtostopthinkingabouteverythingtheydon’twanttodoandgetthemlookingatwhattheyneedtodo,”Wisesaid.

ChiefWarrantOfficerKristie-MarieDean,thesus-tainmentautomationsupportmanagementchiefforthe

1stInfantryDivisionRecognizesBenefitsofLogisticsReportingTool

by SerGeant benJaMin kibbey, uSar

T 36thSustainmentBrigade,saidthatthecurrentLRTisnotablydifferentfromtheoriginalsoftware.“It’smorefunctional,easiertoputitonline,[does]not[have]somanysteps,[is]moreuser-friendly,andusestermsthatdealmorewithmilitarytermsandnotcivilianterms,”saidDean.

ColonelSeanRyan,the36thSustainmentBrigadecommander,isfamiliarwiththeissuesShafferandWiseencountered.Asacivilian,Ryanworkswiththeimple-mentationofsoftwareincorporateenvironments.WhenhefirstencounteredtheLRTduringthe36thSustain-mentBrigade’smobilization,Ryanimmediatelysawtheusefulnessoftheprogram.“Ihadtodoalotofconvinc-ingthatweweregoingtodothis,”Ryansaid.“Having[Shaffer]comein,andhavingthatsupportfromthedivision,gavemethemomentumthatIneededtopushitforward.”

Ryannotedthatheknowsfromexperiencethatanysoftwareisgoingtohaveissueswhenitisfirstfielded.Theonlyansweristogetintotheprogramandidentifythebugs.“We’vespentmillionsofdollarstofieldthesesystems,andIjustfeltitwasmydutytodoaproofofconcepttostartreallyunderstandinghowtoutilizeit[and]figureoutwhatthetrueshortfallsare.”

GregMiller,aretiredlogisticssergeantmajorandtheBCS3FSEembeddedwiththe13thESC,saidtheLRThascomealongwayfromtheoriginalsystemintro-ducedin2004.“It’sanoutstandingtool,”Millersaid.“Itstartsfromthebottomendwiththeuser,andassoonastheuserinputs,everybodycanseeit.”TheinformationenteredatthefieldlevelisviewableallthewaybackintheUnitedStatesonlysecondslater,givingcommandersatalllevelsanimmediateandrealisticpictureofwhatisontheground.

MillersaidLRTalsosavestimeandeffortandputslogisticiansbacktoworkdoinglogisticsworkinsteadofPowerPointslidesandExcelspreadsheets.“Dependingontheleveloftheunit,theunitsprobablyspend3to4ormoreman-hoursperdaycollectingtheirreports,”Millersaid.“That’s28man-hours[aweek];that’sahalfapersonthatyou’vegivenbacktotheunit.”

“It’sgoingtofree-upalotoftimeforSoldiers,”saidChiefWarrantOfficerDean.“It’sgoingtotakethetimedownbelowtoenterthedata,butoncethatdataisentered,itjustbecomesalogisticaltoolforustoanalyze.”

sergeant BenJamin kiBBey, usar, is a memBer of the 367th moBile puBliC affairs DetaChment, army reserve. he was assigneD to multi-national Division-south in iraQ when he wrote this artiCle.


ChiefofStaffEmphasizesImportanceofPropertyAccountability

TheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,GeneralGeorgeW.Casey,Jr.,hasdirectedthatapropertyaccount-abilitycampaignbeconductedtoensurethatacultureofgoodsupplydisciplineandpropertyaccountabilityexitsacrosstheArmyateverylevel.TheChiefofStaffchargedtheDeputyChiefofStaff,G−4,DepartmentoftheArmy,withdevelopinganenduringcampaign.

Inhismessageestablishingthecampaign,GeneralCaseystated,“Propertyaccountabilityiseverycom-mander’sresponsibility.AswefocusonexecutingtheIraqdrawdownandbuild-upinAfghanistan,aswellascontinueddeploymentsworldwide,itisimperativethatwemaintaingoodaccountabilityofallArmyproperty.Wemustknowwhatwehaveandwhereitis—withoutexception.”

Thekeytasksofthecampaignareto—oReinforceexistingpoliciesanddirectiveswith

subordinates.oReestablishcommanders’organizationinspection

programs.oMentorleadersateverylevelongoodsupplydisci-

plineandpropertyaccountability.oRedistributeorturninexcessmateriel.oEstablishmechanismstomonitorcompliancewith

goodsupplyprocedures.ThedesiredgoalisforallArmypropertytobe

accountedfor,excesspropertytobeturnedinandredistributedtoimprovereadiness,andprogramstobeinplacetoinspectandmonitorcompliance.

Formoreinformationonthepropertyaccountabilitycampaign,visithttps://forums.bcks.army.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=1143486.

InteragencyLogisticsSymposiumHighlightsDisasterReliefSupport

ThebiennialInteragencyLogisticsSymposium,heldinJuneattheU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANS-COM)headquartersatScottAirForceBase,Illinois,focusedonlogisticsrelatedtohumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefefforts.Participantsincludedmorethan140individualsfrom50organizations,includingGovernmentandnongovernmentalagencies,combatantcommands,industry,andacademia.

PersonneloftheU.S.SouthernCommand,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment,theFederalEmergencyManagementAgency,andtheU.S.Embas-syinHaitidiscussedtheirexperiencesandlessonslearnedinrespondingtothedevastatingJanuaryearth-quakeinHaiti.

Thesymposiumalsofeaturedasupply-chainmodelingandsimulationexercisethatusedashared-workspacecapabilitycalledtheSmallGroupScenarioTrainer(SGST).Attendeesplayedtherolesofdifferent

stakeholdersconfrontedwithadisasterscenariobor-rowedfromtheMilitarySealiftCommand’sSealift2010exerciseandusedSGSTtoplanandexecuteacoordinatedinteragencyresponse.

“Theeventwasveryinformativeandprovidedauniqueopportunitytounderstandinteragencychal-lenges,”observedAdamYearwood,assistantforsealiftandmobility,OfficeoftheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforTransportationPolicy.“Akeytake-awayisthatweneedtoimprovecollaborationbetweenallstakeholders.”

NewStrategyWillguideAcquisitionofTacticalWheeledVehicles

TheArmyhassenttoCongressareportdetailinganacquisitionstrategyfortacticalwheeledvehicles,includingmine-resistantambush-protectedvehicles,through2025.

Accordingtothereport,“Findingtherightbalanceandmixof[tacticalwheeledvehicles]requirestheArmytocontinuallyassessandadjustinvestments.Managingthisfleeteffectivelygoesbeyondsimplybuyingnewvehiclesastheexistingvehiclesagebeyondtheiruse-fullife.Wewilluseacombinationofnewprocurement,repair(sustainment),recapitalization(recap),anddives-turetoachieveourstrategicobjectivebyaddressingthereadinessandmissionissuesofthefleet.”

Theacquisitionstrategycallsforsustainmentandrecapitalizationof50,000up-armoredhigh-mobilitymultipurposewheeledvehicles(HMMWVs)andthedivestitureofupto50,000agingHMMWVs,whichwillbereplacedbynewjointlighttacticalvehicles.

TheArmywillalsocontinuetobuynewtrucksinthefamilyofmediumtacticalvehicles,while44,000truckswillbesustainedthroughresetandupto28,000agingtruckswillberetiredordivested.ThestrategycallsfordivestitureofallM352½-tontrucksbytheendoffiscalyear2011.

Thereportoutlinesalong-termarmorstrategyunderwhichtacticaltruckswillbebuiltusinganA-kit/B-kitmodulararmorapproach.Thisapproachwillmeettheneedtoprotecttrucksonnonlinearbattlefieldswhereallvehiclesarenowtargetsofenemyfireandimprovisedexplosivedevices.TheA-kit/B-kitapproachwillallowprotectionoftruckstobeadjustedaccordingtothepotentialthreatstheywillface.

Asthereportdescribestheapproach,“TheA-kitisdesignedtoacceptadditionalarmorintheformofaB-kit.TheA-kit/B-kitconceptallowstheArmyflex-ibilityinseveralareas:thearmorB-kitcanbetakenoffwhennotneeded—reducingunnecessarywearandtearonthevehicles;theArmycancontinuetopursueupgradesinarmorprotection—adaptingB-kitstomatchthethreat;andtheversatilityoftheB-kit



HEADLINES


COMMENTARY

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66 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

enablesthetransferofarmorfromunittounit[which]makesarmorrequirementsaffordablebypoolingassetsversusbuyingarmorthatisonlyforonevehicle.”

Theoveralltacticalwheeledvehicleacquisitionstrategyisdesignedtoprovidemaximumflexibilitytorespondtochangesincombatcircumstances,incorpo-ratetechnologicalchanges,andbuynewermaterials.

AirdropsinAfghanistanBreakRecordsAirdropmissionsinAfghanistancontinuetobreak

recordsasmoreU.S.unitsarriveinthecountry.Inspiteofcommunicationglitchesandotherproblemsencounteredonthesemissions,duringa12-weekperi-odearlythisyear,500bundlestotaling450tonsweredroppedeachweek.

InApril,unitssetarecordwiththedeliveryofmorethan2,700bundles.On7April,unitssetasingle-dayrecordof200bundles,totaling160tonsofsuppliesdelivered.Forcomparison,duringtheDecember1944BattleoftheBulgeinWorldWarII,482tonsofsup-pliesweredroppedina2-dayperiod.InVietnam,dur-ingthebattleofKheSahn,294tonsweredroppedina77-dayperiod.

AccordingtoAirForceColonelKeithBoone,whohasmanagedAfghanistanairdropssincelastyear,air-portrates“havebeensteadilyincreasingsincesustain-mentairdropoperationsbeganin2005.”BoonesaysthatthismakesthemissioninAfghanistanthelongestaerialdeliverymissioninthehistoryofmilitary

operations.“Withtheexceptionofabout5days,wehavehadatleast1dropeverydaysinceIhavebeenhere,andIsuspectthatistrueforthepast2years.”

“Lotsofgreatinnovations[are]happeningintheater,”saidAirForceBrigadierGeneralBarbaraFaulkenberry,whorecentlyservedasdirectorofmobilityforcesandcommanderoftheAirMobilityCommand’s15thExpeditionaryMobilityTaskForce.“Theendresultiswe’reprovidingwhatthewarfighterneeds,whenheneedsit,andwhereheneedsit.”

Amongthoseinnovationsarethejointprecisionairdropsystem(JPADS),theimprovedcontainerdeliverysystem(ICDS),andthemostrecentdevel-opment,theC–130-based“low-cost,low-altitude”(LCLA)combatairdropusedtoresupplySoldiersatforwardoperatingbases.

JPADSusesaglobalpositioningsystem,steerableparachutes,andanonboardcomputertoguideloadstoadesignatedpointonadropzone.ItintegratestheArmy’sprecisionandextendedglideairdropsystemandtheAirForce’sprecisionairdropsystemprogram.ICDSallowsforimprovedprecisionbyfactoringinaltitude,windspeed,winddirection,terrainandothercircumstancesthatmightaffectthedrop.Alow-cost,low-altitudeair-dropisaccomplishedbydroppingbundlesweighing80to500pounds,withpre-packedexpendableparachutes,ingroupsofuptofourbundlesperpass.

“TheLCLAdropswillmeettheneedsofasmallersubsetoftheunits,”Boonesaid.“Thisisasignificant

Army Receives First Palletized Load System A1s

In August, the Army received its first shipment of the palletized load system (PLS) A1s from Oshkosh Defense, a division of the Oshkosh Corporation. The vehicles feature design improvements that make it more secure and robust than its predecessor. The Army is slated to receive 725 PLS A1s by September 2011. (Photo by Oshkosh Defense)


stepforwardinourabilitytosustainthoseengagedincounterinsurgencyoperationsthroughoutAfghanistan.”

AircraftthatlandandoffloadsupplieswillcontinuetobethemainmethodofsupplyingSoldiers,accord-ingtoBoone.Butwherethistypeofoperationisnotpossible,supplieswillbedeliveredthroughcontainerdeliverysystemairdrops.

U.S.CentralCommandCombinedAirandSpaceOperationsCenterofficialssay97percentofairdropshavebeenontargetasofJuly2010.

“Tacticalairlifthasneverbeensoresponsive,soagileinour[tactics,techniquesandprocedures],andcriticalinafight,”Faulkenberrysaid.“Airdropisenablingthesmall,dispersed[counterinsurgency]unittoengageandoperate.ThisApril,wedropped4,860,000poundstogroundforceswhoneededthefood,fuel,orammo.Itistakingair-groundteamworktosucceed,andtogether,we’remakingourhistory.”

ArmyHoldsFirstMobilitySystemsConferenceMorethan280attendeestookpartintheArmy’s

firstmobilitysystemsconference,heldfrom5to7AprilinNewportNews,Virginia.TheArmyproductmanagers(PMs)fortransportationinformationsys-tems,joint-automaticidentificationtechnology,andtheMovementTrackingSystemandtheproductdirectoroftheBattleCommandSustainmentSupportSys-tem(BCS3)cosponsoredtheevent,whichprovidedavenuefordiscussionandcollaborationonproductcon-nectivityandsystemcommonalities.

Seventy-fivepercentoftheparticipantswerefromtheusercommunityandreceivedanend-to-enddem-onstrationofinformationflowbetweenthetranspor-tationcoordinators.ApaneldiscussiononcurrentoperationsinAfghanistanwasalsoheld,alongwithworkshopsonairmovementrequestprocedures,auto-maticmovementflowtrackingin-transitvisibility,BCS3trainingsimulation,theCargoMovementOper-ationsSystem,andothersubjects.

EnvironmentalHotlineEstablishedforArmyAviationandMissileCommand

TheArmyAviationandMissileCommand(AMCOM)hascreatedahotlinetoanswerquestionsaboutenvironmentalissues.Thehotlinestaffcaniden-tifycurrentlyapprovedsubstitutematerialsandprovideexpertiseindepotmaintenanceworkrequirementsandinformationontechnicalmanualsandprocesses.

Thehotlinewasputinplacetoresolveissuespertainingtoobsoleteproducts,hazardousmaterialalternatives,regulatoryguidance,andalternativetechnologiestoreducetheenvironmentalburdenonAMCOMmaintenanceorganizations.TheAMCOM

DefenseWorkinggrouponNondestructiveTestingThe58thDefenseWorkingGrouponNonde-

structiveTesting(DWGNDT)willmeetfrom7to9DecemberinFortWorth,Texas.Thisyear’seventishostedbytheAirForceNondestructiveInspectionProgramOfficeatTinkerAirForceBase,Oklahoma.

TheDWGNDTisameetingofengineers,sci-entists,technicians,andmanagersfromU.S.com-mandsandGovernmentactivitiesresponsibleforthedevelopmentandapplicationofnondestructivetest-ingmethodsinresearch,engineering,maintenance,andqualityassurance.AllparticipantsmustbeU.S.citizens.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheDWGNDTwebsiteatwww.dwgndt.org.

DefenseLogisticsandDefenseLogisticsMedicalThisyear,WorldwideBusinessResearchwillhold

itsDefenseLogisticsMedicalconferenceaspartofDefenseLogistics2010from30Novemberto3DecemberinArlington,Virginia.

ThefocusofDefenseLogisticsMedicalistheimprovementofmedicallogisticsprocessestoensuretimelydeliveryofmedicalsupporttothewarfighter.Theconferencewillhighlightcold-chainstorageandtransportationandend-to-endsupplychainmanage-mentchallengesfortheArmy,MarineCorps,andNavycommunities.

DefenseLogisticswillconcentrateonadaptingtoanewbudgetenvironmentwithoutsacrificingsupporttothewarfighter.Formoreinformationortoregister,visittheconferencewebsite,www.defenselog.com.

UPCOMING EvENTS

Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRA-DOC) Pamphlet 525–3–1,TheUnitedStatesArmyOperatingConcept,publishedinAugust,explainshowtocomplywithandexecuteguidancefromtheArmyCapstoneConcept.Thepamphletservesasabridgebetweenthecapstoneconceptandthewarfightingfunctionalconcepts.ItwillalsoguiderevisionstoArmydoctrine,organization,training,materiel,leadershipandeducation,personnel,andfacilities(DOTMLPF)from2016to2028.ThesechangeswillbeneededinorderfortheArmytofunctioninachallengingenvironmentwithjoint,interagency,intergovernmental,andmultinationalpartners,whowillbekeyplayersinfuturewarfare.

ThepamphletisavailableattheTRADOCwebsiteatwww.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf.

RECENTLY PUBLISHED

68 ARMY SUSTAINMENT

EnvironmentalHotlineisavailable24hoursaday,7daysaweek,andcanbereachedbycalling(256)424–[email protected].

ArmyRespondstoFloodsinPakistanTheDepartmentofDefenseannouncedon27

Augustthat10CH–47Chinookand8UH–60BlackHawkhelicoptersfromthe16thCombatAviationBri-gadeinFortWainwright,Alaska,werejoiningreliefeffortstoaidfloodvictimsinPakistan.

TheU.S.militaryinitiallysent15helicoptersand3C–130Herculesaircrafttosupportreliefeffortsthat,asoftheendofAugust,hadtransported2millionpoundsofhumanitarianassistancesuppliesandrescued7,000people.Inthemonthfollowingtheflood,theUnitedStatesprovided$150milliontosupportimmediatereliefeffortsandsetasideanadditional$50milliontore-establishcommunitiesaffectedbythefloods.

HeadquartersforU.S.TransportationCommandReadyforaMovingWorkforce

TheU.S.TransportationCommand(TRANSCOM)hasofficiallyopeneditsnewheadquartersfacilityatScottAirForceBase,Illinois.Theproject,aresultofthe2005BaseClosureandRealignment(BRAC)Commissionrecommendations,colocatestheMili-tarySurfaceDeploymentandDistributionCommand(SDDC)withTRANSCOMandtheAirMobilityCom-mand(AMC).SDDCisnotonlymovinginwithAMC;itisalsoconsolidatingthreeelementspreviously

housedatthreedifferentinstallationsinVirginiatoonecampusandreducingTRANSCOM’sfootprint.

AccordingtoStevenCoyle,TRANSCOMdirec-torofBRACtransformation,themovebringsthecommandasavingsof$1.2billionandrequired$130millioninimprovementsandupgradestocur-rentcommandfacilities.TheupgradesincludeanewfusioncenterthatwillsynchronizeTRANSCOM’sglobalstrategicmobilityoperationsandhousetheJointDistributionProcessandAnalysisCenter.TheheadquartersisalsohometothenewJointIntelligenceOperationsCenterforTransportation,whichwillpro-videin-depthintelligenceanalysisfortheFusionCen-ter.Theintelligencecenterishousedina$20millionadditionfundedbytheDefenseIntelligenceAgency.

TheAcquisitionCenterofExcellenceisalsoapartofthenewheadquartersandincorporatesthecom-mercialcontractactivitiesofTRANSCOM,AMC,andSDDC.AMC’sandSDDC’scontractingfunctionswerepreviouslyconsolidatedandhaveprovensuccessful.Ajointbillingcenterwillalsoimprovesupportbycon-solidatingcomptrollerbillingandcollectionactivities.

OtheradditionstotheexpandingTRANSCOMcampusincludeupgradesandreconfigurationstoScottAirForceBasetohousetheAT21[AgileTrans-portationforthe21stCentury]EnterpriseIntegrationLaboratory.Infiscalyear2012,theGlobalPatientMovementRequirementsCenterandtheDefenseTransportationCoordinationInitiativeOffice/Distribu-tionPortfolioManagementbranchwillrelocatetothecampusfromleasedfacilitiesoffbase.

DefenseLogisticsAgencyRenamesUnitstoHighlightUnityofLogisticsMission

NavyViceAdmiralAlanThompson,thedirectoroftheDefenseLogisticsAgency(DLA),announcedaninitiativeinJulydesignedtocreateunityamongDLAlogisticsunites.Theplan,called“WeAreDLA,”isaunified,single-agencyapproachthatunitesagencysegmentsregard-lessoftheirgeographiclocationandmission.Undertheplan,DLAunitswillassumethefollowingnewnames:

FormerName NewName

DefenseSupplyCenterColumbus DLALandandMaritime

DefenseSupplyCenterPhiladelphia DLATroopSupport

DefenseSupplyCenterRichmond DLAAviation

DefenseEnergySupportCenter DLAEnergy

DefenseReutilizationandMarketingService

DLADispositionServices

DefenseDistributionCenter DLADistribution

DefenseLogisticsInformationService

DLALogisticsInformationService

DocumentAutomationandProductionService

DLADocumentServices

DefenseAutomaticAddressingSystemCenter

DLATransactionServices

DefenseNationalStockpileCenter DLAStrategicMaterials

DLAEuropeandAfrica DLAEurope&Africa

DLACentral DLACentral

DLAPacific DLAPacific

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