Nozick NCOught is “used to express obligation” so the aff burden is to prove that governments have an obligation to ensure food security. The neg must prove that no such obligation exists.

I value morality, since “just” refers to “agreeing with what is considered morally right or good”

All moral theories respect the inherent worth of individuals, otherwise there would be no reason for morality to constrain actions. Individuals are rational agents endowed with self-awareness and free will, giving them inherent dignity. They cannot used as an instrument or resource. Quinn [Quinn, Warren S. Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 98, No. 3 (Jul., 1989). JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185021]

A person is constituted by his body and mind. They are parts or aspects of him. For that very reason, [so] it is fitting that he have primary say over what may be done to them- not because such an arrangement best promotes overall human welfare, but

because any arrangement that denied him that say would be a grave indignity. In giving him this authority, morality recognizes his existence as an individual with ends of his own—an independent being. Since that is what he is, he deserves this recognition. Were morality to withhold

it, were it to allow us to kill or injure him whenever that would be collectively best, it would picture him not as a being in his own right but as a cell in the collective whole.

Only placing side-constraints protects these inherent rights. Nozick 1[Robert Nozick, 1968. American political philosopher, professor at Harvard University. “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” p. 32-33]

Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means;

they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable. More should be said to illuminate

this talk of ends and means. Consider a prime example of a means, a tool. There is no side constraint on how we may use a tool, other than the moral constraints on how we may use it upon others. There are procedures to be followed to preserve it for future use (“don’t leave it out in the rain”), and there are more and less efficient ways of using it. But there is no limit on what we may do to it to best achieve our goals. Now imagine that there was an overrideable constraint C on some tool’s use. For example, the tool might have been lent to you only on the condition that C not be violated unless the gain from doing so was above a certain specified amount, or unless it was necessary to achieve a certain specified goal. Here the object is not completely your tool, for use

according to your wish or whim. But it is a tool nevertheless, even with regard to the overrideable constraint. If we add constraints on its use that may not be overridden, then the object may not be used as a tool in those ways. In those respects, it is not a tool at all. Can one add enough constraints so that an object cannot be used as a tool at all, in any respect?

Second, no one may be sacrificed for a greater good, every individual lives separate lives. Nozick 2[Robert Nozick, 1968. American political philosopher, professor at Harvard University. “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” p. 32-33]Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons. But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne

for the sake of the greater overall good. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other

persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.

Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is

that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person

in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person,"' that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him--least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.

Thus, any just government must abide by side-constraints, where it does not violate rights. This necessitates a minimal state. Nozick 3[Robert Nozick, 1968. American political philosopher, professor at Harvard University. “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” p. 32-33]

Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the

state? The nature of the state, its legitimate functions and its justifications, if any, is the central concern of this book; a wide

and diverse variety of topics intertwine in the course of our investigation. Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, limited to

the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on , is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things , and is unjustified; and that the

minimal state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the

purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.

The standard is respecting negative rights, since the state can have no positive obligations outside protection against force and etc.

I contend that ensuring food security violates citizen’s negative rights

Ensuring food security necessarily entails redistribution, since the state must proactively assist people in attaining food. However, any just distribution must respect people as ends.

Redistribution, through taxation, violates negative rights, since the person is forced to work for another purpose. Nozick 4[Robert Nozick, 1968. American political philosopher, professor at Harvard University. “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” p. 32-33]

Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some persons find this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n

hours labor is like taking 72 hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work 72 hours for another’s purpose. Others find the claim absurd. But even these, if they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person to work five extra hours each week for the benefit of the needy. But a system that takes five hours’ wages in taxes does not seem to them like one that forces someone to work five hours, since it offers the person forced a wider range of choice in activities than does taxation in kind with the particular labor specified. (But we can imagine a gradation of systems of forced labor, from one that specifies a particular activity, to one that gives a choice among two activities, to and so on up.) Furthermore, people envisage a system with something like a proportional tax on everything above the amount necessary for basic needs. Some think this does not force someone to work extra hours, since there is no fixed number of extra hours he is forced to work, and since he can avoid the tax entirely by earning only enough to cover his basic needs. This is a very uncharacteristic view of forcing for those who also think people are forced to do

something whenever the alternatives they face are considerably worse. However, neither View is correct. The fact that others intentionally intervene, in violation of a side constraint against aggression, to threaten force to limit the

alternatives, in this case to paying taxes or (presumably the worse alternative) bare subsistence, makes the taxation system one

of forced labor and distinguishes it from other cases of limited choices which are not forcings .

1. Redistribution occurs at the expense of individuals if food security is treated as a right. People require different levels of food security, and people don't contribute to the services equally, violating self-ownership.

2. States have no positive obligations to provide resources because every person has the equal opportunity to pursue their ends; violating a negative obligation to non-interference outweighs any duty to provide food security because perfect duties override an imperfect duty, which might be good but not obligatory.

3. The well-off have no reason to pool resources with the less well-off since they already have the means to secure food. Affirming conflicts with the will of those who are well-off, violating their freedom, which violates the states obligation to protect citizens from coercion.

4. Negative rights to autonomy means providing the ability to choose one's own ends, so maximizing autonomy doesn't link to the standard- even if some people gain more autonomy the tradeoff renders affirming impermissible, 2 wrongs don't make a right

The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing “when all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life”

And, the resolution is an atemporal argument. Proving why ensuring food security is good in specific scenarios fails to affirm, since the resolution asks us to prove a general normative statement true/false. Morality fails to guide action if it’s only proven true/false in a specific scenario

Since inequalities in economic position often have led to inequalities in political power, may not greater economic equality (and a more extensive state as a means of achieving it) be needed and justified in order to avoid the political inequalities with which economic inequalities

are often correlated? Economically well-off persons desire greater political power, in a nonminimal state, because they can use this power to give themselves differential economic benefits. Where a locus of such power exists, it is

not surprising that people attempt to use it for their own ends. The illegitimate use of a state by economic interests for their own ends is based upon a preexisting illegitimate power of the state to enrich some persons at the expense of others. Eliminate that illegitimate power of giving differential economic benefits and you eliminate or drastically restrict the motive for wanting political

influence. True, some persons still will thirst for political power, finding intrinsic satisfaction in dominating others. The minimal state best reduces the chances of such takeover or manipulation of the state by persons desiring power or economic benefits, especially if combined with a reasonably alert citizenry, since it is the minimally desirable target for such takeover or manipulation. Nothing much is to be gained by doing so; and the cost to the citizens if it occurs is minimized. To strengthen the state and extend the range of its functions as a way of preventing it from being used by some portion of the populace makes it a more valuable prize and a more alluring target for corrupting by anyone able to offer an officeholder something desirable; it is, to put it gently, a poor strategy.

T: Single State Plan

A.) Interpretation: “Governments” is the plural form of “government” [http://www.thefreedictionary.com/governments]

B.) Violation: They defend the actions of only one government; (they don’t let me link offense to other countries)

C.) Standards: Textuality: They don’t adhere to the res because they fail to defend multiple countries. The res frames what the debate is about, so if they’re not textual, they aren’t actually affirming so don’t vote off the plan. And, this controls the link to predictability since I can only research arguments that are topical. Predictability matters because we can only have a fair round if both sides are adequately prepared.

Limits: The aff explodes their ground since they can defend any one government and policy with near impunity. They can go all in on one super specific advocacy while I’m forced to research all of them, so they’ll always be ahead. Only multiple governments remedies this, since they’re forced to defend broader positions that are applied to multiple governmets. That means the research burdens are more equal.

Ground: They limit the debate to one tiny part of the res. Even if there are advocates for the opposite, they’ll always be ahead since they just need to research one area. And, they’re able to pick ground that’s skewed in their favor, which means I can never win. Ground matters because both debaters need to be able to generate offense and actually debate the res.

D.) Voter: Fairness is a voter because it’s a gateway issue. The judge can only evaluate who did the better debating if the round isn’t skewed.

Drop the debater to disincentive their practice. Theory is all about setting the best norms for debate, and we only have 2 months for this topic, so only taking away the ballot will force a change in such short time.

Drop the argument for two reasons. First, their argument is abusive and skews the round, dropping it restores the balance since they can’t win off abuse. Second, the res frames what the debate is; if they’re not topical, they don’t affirm so the plan doesn’t matter. No re-evaluating offense under new interp, their entire case is one actor (and probably solvency advocate too).

Prefer competing interps because this is the best way to set norms for debate. Reasonability invites judge intervention because what’s reasonable is arbitrary.The bright line for reasonability is reciprocity. This comes first since only reciprocity can be measured; you either have equal or unequal access to the ballot. All other standards are arbitrary and rely on some subjective evaluation from the judge. (Ground is subjective since nobody knows what is adequate ground and there’s no metric for determining equal ground. Time skew is impossible to evaluate; we have equal times and different distributions but there’s no metric for determining how much compensation is adequate. There’s no bright line for strat skew, me reading an NC technically skews your strategy). They’re not reciprocal because I can only link offense to their standard if it’s specific to the AC, while anything is fair game under the NC. Their standard says that any_______ is bad, but they say no.

No RVIs1. Topicality is a nib for the aff. They don’t win if they’re topical. 2. RVIs incentivize them to run abusive positions and just prep out T. Key to preventing abusive arg proliferation. Also better for them since they forced me to read T, no abuse means no T (and time skew).3. It’s not a no-risk for me since I have to invest time into T. I have to win all parts of my violation to win, whereas they only need to take out one part, that rectifies time skew.

Education is not a voter. 1. The ballot doesn’t say vote for who was more educational, so only fairness matters since that actually prevents the judge from evaluating

2. There’s no bright line for education. I don’t know what is adequate education. And, there’s no distinction between what is educational. And, if education was a voter, we’d just have a 45-minute discussion instead of debating.

3. Rules within a practice are distinct from the principles that justify them. Even if debate is an educational activity, that doesn’t mean the norms should be educational. I might play basketball for fun but that doesn’t mean the rules should promote fun.