Nuclear Diplomacy: A Case Study of French and Pakistani Behaviour Humaira Dar

Abstract “A new thing had been born; a new control; a new understanding of man; which man had acquired over nature”1

It was American scientist‟s impression on the first atomic explosion on 16

July 1945, but the use of this new thing and new control was still a mystery for the coming generations. First negative outcome of this control was witnessed by the world on Japan2 which turned this new thing a deterrence force for the rest of the world. After Americans use, nuclear deterrence has turned into an instrument of diplomacy because no state could dare to put the world into the threat of extinction.

In the arena of nuclear diplomacy in coming years, nuclear weapon is treated as an instrument to achieve diplomatic goals. These non- military potential goals can be political and economic but directly or indirectly they link to the security of the concerned state.

This article is divided into two sections. Section A is comprised into French and Pakistani efforts for their nuclear development and in Section B it is discussed how did they use this power in diplomatic arenas. The reason to focus on French and Pakistani nuclear development is based on the commonality of regional and international events and circumstance which led them to achieve and use this power as an instrument of diplomacy.

Unreliability of Allies assistance (Anglo-Saxon for both) at the time of need forced both states to search those options which made them independent from dependent security guarantees. Suez crisis (1956) and Dien Bien Phu fall (1954) for France and American sanctions and indifferent behaviour during Indo-

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Pakistan war in 1965 and the fall of Dhaka in 1971 for Pakistan were the events which transformed the psychology of the both states decision makers. British nuclear explosion in 1952 and Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 stamped that Psyche; consequently, both have no option other than being nuclear powers.

After achieving the nuclear power how they (France and Pakistan) use it, depends on the level of security threats they have to face in their regional and international circumstances. French were more passive and Pakistanis were pro-active in the practical use of nuclear power to achieve those diplomatic goals which are impossible to attain without that power.

Section A: France and Pakistan Acquired Nuclear Power National humiliation, international isolation and national identity3 are three

underlined theme which commonly forced the two states, Pakistan and France to face global pressure to pursue their nuclear objectives for the national interest.

French Road to be a Nuclear Power Among the existing nuclear power,4 French has quotable civil nuclear

program at present5 but their history as being nuclear power was the untoward one.

French scientists‟ prewar atomic research‟6 had all the necessary elements to move forward like, uranium, heavy water and excellent nuclear scientists but the calamity of war (Germen occupation of France in 1940) forced them to shift their research and linked material in diverse destinations.7 This set back left French many decades behind in nuclear research. Consequently, even after independence, they took nearly, fifteen years (1960) for their nuclear explosion.

The establishment of Atomic organization named as Commissariat à l'énergie atomique (CEA) in 1944 by de Gaulle was a proof that French felt the significance of Nuclear Research even in the disastrous years after WWII. The years of Germen occupation (1940-1944) could not restrict French efforts towards nuclear research. Directly or indirectly, they were part of nuclear research which was going on in Canada and America, in the name of Manhattan Project.8

These French efforts of nuclear research could not get immediate fruit after the Independence from Germens (1944). Their loss of time and resources due to Germen Occupation when coupled with the political instability and financial weakness of Fourth Republic (1946-1958)9 caused a delay in their march towards the nuclear explosion.

The resistance of Anglo-Saxon towards French effort to create a nuclear program was another source of delay. Both tried to keep the spirit of Quebec

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agreement which prohibited them to “share” knowledge to third state and France in spite of being an ally, not a part of that agreement which was signed in 1943.10 The result was that French had to pursue their nuclear search alone which caused the postponement of nuclear explosion until February 1960 after United States (USA), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Britain.11

French Nuclear Program From Experimental Phase To Nuclear Explosion

In the early phase of French nuclear program, when CEA – under the guidance of the Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie and his team,12 developed the first nuclear reactors, they had peaceful objectives in mind. According to Maurice Vaïsse, this early French pacifism in nuclear field was linked with two major factors, the political and financial dependence of the American and the communist influence in the French nuclear hierarchy, Particularly, Joliot curie‟s communist links. He was staunch supporter of anti-American and pro-communist policies.13 According to him, French nuclear weaponization could become a support for Americans and threat for communists.

Comparatively slow nuclear development due to lack of allies (Anglo-Saxon) assistance, the absence of raw material either, uranium or plutonium, and the political instability of French Governement put French Nuclear program on Experimental phase. First, French tired to go with plutonium route for nuclear research like the rest of the nuclear powers but their early unsuccessful efforts forced them to go with Uranium route which they found with in France. 14

In 1951, French scientists had a breakthrough in nuclear development when they succeeded to extract one hundred milligrams of plutonium for research. This success revolutionized French nuclear program and once again, it had transformed the route of French nuclear program towards plutonium from uranium.

After this development, the pacifism of French nuclear program was also ended and they had adopted a weaponization tone. International situation like the British nuclear explosion (1952) and change of NATO defensive strategy towards flexible response,15 and the Issue of EDC (Germen weaponization issue) and the failure of French conventional armies in Dien Bien Phu and Suez16 had played a significant role for creating that weaponization tone in French nuclear program.

The re-arrival of De Gaulle in French decision making hierarchy changed the total orientation of French nuclear program. He declared it as symbol of French grandeur and its old historical greatness. He had delinked all the trilateral and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements17 because according to his perception –sovereignty could not be shared and nuclear bomb was a synonym of French

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sovereignty. So he not only confirmed but also ensured the implementation of April 11th directive in which Flex Gaillard –last Prime Minister of Fourth Republic signed the official directive on April 1958, “ordering the construction of a [nuclear] device, to be tested in the first quarter of 1960”. 18

France had denoted its first nuclear device19, on 13 February 1960, 7, 04 GMT, named as Gerboise Bleue in Reggane, in Sahara. This blast was the symbol that France had– showed of its force and determination, to establish its might as a nuclear power.20

The blast had provided a great sense of confidence and security to France which could be judged through the statements of de Gaulle., First he said, “Hurrah for France! … Since this morning France is stronger and prouder”.21And after two weeks he made another declaration–France has no need of a protector.22 Later Chirac voiced with de Gaulle and indicated it as –weapon which had given France “the ability to keep our freedom to act, to control our policies, to ensure the durability of our democratic values”.23

France had acquired its nuclear deterrence but to compete and reach a super power position– a long way was still needed to go. This test was primarily– a weapons test– to examine the effects and detonation of nuclear capabilities. It was first in the series which counted nearly 210 tests, in Sahara and Moruroa, later. After the Gerboise Bleue, France had made two more tests in 1960 named as Gerboise Blanche in April 1, 1960 then Gerboise Rough in 27 December 1960.

The critical issue in all these testing was that they were atmospheric (means not underground). France was being pressured a lot from the world community and also had to face a “widespread international condemnation”24 to move towards underground testing and avoid atmospheric testing but until 1974– France continued this practice.

French Nuclear Explosion and Super Powers French nuclear explosion, during the height of cold war, had broken the

statuesque which Americans and Soviets had imposed on nuclear testing, unilaterally since 1950.25 Soviet Union response was reactionary because it had announced on December 30, 1959 –it will resume test unless the West does.26 It took French explosion as the western camp violated that moratorium on nuclear testing. It was also considered that French explosion as the addition of a nuclear power in its rival camp although France was alone in its struggle to be a nuclear power. Consequently, Soviet Union had restarted its testing immediately and had tested nine different weapons including Tsar Bomba, (king of bombs)27 on 30 October 1961 even before American were ready to respond.

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American attitude was quite passive on French nuclear blast because they were expecting it for some time due to their intelligence reports. Their media was not interested to present the event as publicity issue.28 Their congress was also not agreed to waive McMahon Act sanction in spite of French industrial development and two Atomic explosions.29

Among the four nuclear powers, three were already proved their thermonuclear capability until mid 1960s when China joined the nuclear club in 1964. Initially, France had not shown much interest to be a thermonuclear power due to certain technical issues which needed to be solved and lack of necessary equipment.30But in 1966 de Gaulle had become impatient about the thermonuclear blast and asked Alain Peyrefitte that he wanted the first (thermonuclear) experiment to take place before he left.31

France had made its first thermonuclear test, codenamed Canopus, on 24 August, 1968; de Gaulle called it, “a magnificent scientific, technical and industrial success, achieved for the independence and security of France”.32 In reality, it was proved to be an environmental disaster– because the area in which it was done– banned for humans for next six years.33 After this achievement, France had continued to nuclearize three of its forces throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s under the pretext of force de frappe.34

French Nuclear Program towards Quite Revolution The end of cold war and change of international situations in 1990s

transformed the tone of French defensive policy so, the white paper for defense in 1994 outlines that, “France does not currently have any specified adversaries. Its strategy remains essentially defensive. The refusal to resort to conventional and nuclear war upon which the dissuasion doctrine is based will continue to be its inspiration. 35 (Italic added)

The eliminated communist threat from the western European frontiers even diminuend the presence of unequalled Russia in Europe with still hegemonic tendencies,36 Chinese, with its impressive territorial, demographic and economic resources could become a threat but there was no immediate chance of war with them. In spite of these diminishing pressures, the emerging threats of nuclear proliferation and international terrorism were such intangible dangers– which France could not ignore. To meet them, again nuclear deterrence was a great equalizer.

This approach of decreased threat had led France on the road which analysis‟s called as a “quiet revolution,”37 it was the second name of the French unilateral nuclear disarmament. The practical implication of this approach was visibly witnessed by the world through the reduction of French nuclear spending since 1991. Mitterrand had started the process; Chirac escalated and Sarkozy

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heightened it. Since 1991, France reduced its spending on nuclear weapons programs was more than 50%, it also eliminated its land-based nuclear missiles, and decreased the number to four of six of a plan, to build new ballistic missile sub-marines.38

Chirac announced in1996 that France „would be champion of nuclear disarmament”39 and apparently it proved but before reaching that level, France made its last series of blast in Pacific in 1996 among a huge hue and cry against them but nothing could stop it. Another observation linked to this non-proliferation and disarmament policy had financial shade and some commentators linked it with French economic crisis in the post cold war era which was also played an important role in this decision.40

The terrorist attacks on America in 2001 and Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bomb blast brought that terrorist threat at French doorsteps and forced it to change its policy concerning the nuclear deterrence. So the process of change in nuclear deterrence which started in 2001, completed with the Jacque Chirac‟s 2006 speech in which he indicated, “to regional powers by making clear that it [France] has developed more employable nuclear options”.41

In this speech, Chirac had extended French nuclear doctrine and included in it some new elements. Now France focused in deterring state sponsors of terrorism that could threat its „strategic supplies‟ importance for potential vital interest. Chirac also presented its nuclear deterrence as the foundation of a strategy of prevention including the fact of conventional military intervention whenever necessary”.42 Before 2006, France was reluctant to define its vital interest43 because it was believed that ambiguity helped to create a credible deterrence which at some extent is true.

France assured that nuclear deterrence was not used against any terrorist group directly but against the states which sponsor terrorism44 –because French nuclear weapons were always viewed as “instruments of diplomacy” not a battlefield weapon.

In 2008, the French white paper on defense and national security precisely explained the French Nuclear policy. They are these; -maintaining a policy of dissuasion -refusing to resort to nuclear war, -creating a linkage between French nuclear weapons and European defense, -working actively towards nuclear disarmament.45

Pakistan Nuclear Program

“Pakistan is highly motivated to develop at least a potential nuclear capability, in part for prestige purposes but more strongly because it genuinely believes its national

security could ultimately be threatened by India”.46

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In 1972, William J. Barnds had visioned four options for Pakistan as dramatic and unfavorable effect of Indian test on Pakistan nuclear weapon program, according to him, Pakistan had: (a) To accept Indian hegemony, (b), to seek great powers guarantee, (c), to get Chinese nuclear protection or (d), to develop its own nuclear weapons. 47 Coming years proved that his observation proved true as Pakistan adopted the “most likely course of action” and rejected the intolerable (first one) and impossible (second one) options.48

The colossal task of creating defense equilibrium with India was a priority for the political leadership of Pakistan since 1947. They had two main hurdles to achieve this task – the establishment of the political, economic and defense infrastructure from the scratch – and the limited approach of its decision makers did not even allow them to think about nuclear option. The one and the only choice they had in mind, to have a conventional military equilibrium with India which was apparently impossible to achieve due to its territorial and resources supremacy.49

Consequently, the roots of Pakistan‟s nuclear program can be derived from the Eisenhower‟s Atom for Peace program in 1953, six years after its birth. It is also said that if that announcement (Atom for Peace) was not made, it (nuclear program) might be taken a decade more to be born. This American offer reminded Pakistani policy makers, their lack of interest in the nuclear field which was acknowledged by its Foreign Minister, Zafarullah (27 December 1947 – 24 October 1954). He said that “Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bomb” while he was appreciating the American proposal.50

After the announcement of Atom for Peace Program, Pakistani government awoke from deep slumber and decided to establish an Atomic organization in October 1954. An atomic institute and a twelve member committee were established in 1955 under the command of Dr. Nazir Ahmed. This committee expected to lay the foundation stone of Pakistan‟s nuclear energy program in five major areas; Formulate an atomic energy program; Estimate the needs of its organization; Identify personnel needs; Survey radioactive material; Advise the government on any issue relating to nuclear research and its peaceful use.51

This committee and an agreement which was signed with Americans for nuclear cooperation52 had consequently resulted to the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956 as Dr. Nazir (1956-1960), its chairman. PAEC had a wing designated for research named as nuclear Research Council, to implement this agreement but literally its performance was existed on papers until 1960. A new life in the sluggish activities of PAEC was created when in 1960; it came under the headship by Dr. Ishrat Usmani (1960-1972). He vitalized the nuclear research in Pakistan. Uranium deposit were discovered, regional centre like Atomic Energy Mineral Centre in Lahore in 1961, and

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Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology (PINSTECH) in Islamabad in 1963 were established. To run these institutes, Pakistan had to need a full infrastructure of expert manpower. Scientists, mostly belong to Government College, Lahore (presently GCU, Lahore) 53 were sent to America, and Europe (generally in Britain and France) for the training, to meet this deficiency.54

These initial struggling years of nuclear program received two types of attitude from political circles, General Ayub Khan and his team considered peaceful tone of nuclear program best for the state. So in spite of reluctant attitude toward nuclear weaponization, they decided to have nuclear reactor and a heavy water. For the nuclear reactor, Pakistan signed a deal with America in 1962, named as PARR1, a light weight research reactor (critical in 1965). Pakistan also signed an agreement with Canada in 1964, for the construction of a Heavy water plant at Karachi, named as Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). It was under the safeguards of IAEA.

The fateful five years of 1965 -1970 changed the course of Pakistan nuclear program. Indo-Pakistani clash in 1965, unsatisfied Tashkent Treaty in 1966, Indian efforts to be nuclear power and a civil unrest in East Pakistan which resulted the dismemberment of Pakistan created a nuclear nationalism55 which spread like virus through Bhutto‟s fiery speeches within Pakistan. This nuclear nationalism changed the pacifist tone of the program into weaponization one.

Nuclear Nationalism The arrival of Bhutto in Pakistan political hierarchy in 1972 vitalized

Pakistan‟s nuclear program and he, during, a secret meeting of Scientists in Multan,56 a region in Southern Punjab, had given task to the scientists– to fabricate the nuclear bomb in three years for Pakistan.57 To achieve this task, Dr. Munir (1972-1991) was appointed as the head of the PAEC.

Pakistan due to Atom for Peace program, had already succeeded to acquire the ability to convert, nuclear technology, to weapon grade58 –but the great puzzle in this nuclear chess was, still missing– the availability of raw material, either the pure plutonium or highly enrich uranium, to complete the nuclear process.

Initially, Pakistan decided to adopt the plutonium route59 like India and rest of the nuclear world. This process had needed two basic elements, pure plutonium and reprocessing plant, and Pakistan had none. Pakistan had only one heavy water plant in Karachi under IAEA surveillances. It was the same type of plant which used fuel helped India to explode its bomb in 1974. The prospects for Pakistan were also existed although the time and international surveillance and over-consciousness turned it to hard nut to crack.

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Pakistan was still searching its options for nuclear technology, when India exploded its nuclear bomb in May 1974, calling it “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE).

This Indian explosion turned the attention of whole world towards the intentions of Pakistan to be a nuclear power to equalize Indian might. It is true that it enhanced Pakistan‟s sense of insecurity vis-à-vis India but the world which reacted mutely on Indian blast had begun to pressurize Pakistan, – to not to follow Indian example and “avoid” to adopt nuclear way for its protection. Pakistan paid no heed to all these pressures because of the unavoidable need of nuclear weapon for its security and survival as a state.

While Pakistan was making efforts to achieve infrastructure to complete nuclear cycle like a nuclear fabrication plant,60 a heavy water reactor, and a nuclear fuel processing plant even with IAEA safeguards, the campaign against non-proliferation was raising its ranks high among global decision maker circles. This tightening rope of non-proliferation forced Pakistan to think other options, also. This era of disappointment for nuclear development produced a ray of hope when Pakistani Governement decided to go with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan61 (A.Q. Khan)‟s proposal to adopt uranium route for making the nuclear bomb. 62 It was an unpredictable proposal to reach the object at that time because Pakistan did not have any infrastructure for the proposed project. But Prime Minister, Bhutto had decided to opt it as an alternative source. So Pakistan after 1975, decided to run two parallel programs for nuclear technology, one under PAEC via plutonium and second under A.Q. Khan via uranium. After the mid 1970s, Pakistan was busy in establishing centrifugal structure under Engineering Research laboratories (ERL) guided by AQ Khan.63

Pakistani Nuclear Program: Road from Invisibility to Visibility Pakistani nuclear program is always bone of contention between Americans

and Pakistani policy makers but it is said, “This is the age-old problem with Pakistan and the Americans, other priorities always trump the Americans from coming down hard on Pakistan‟s nuclear proliferation,” 64 David Albright, A nuclear expert

All international pressures suddenly came under a smoke screen after December 1979, when Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan. Consequentially, American temporarily again accepted Pakistan as an ally against Soviet empire65 and ignored Pakistan‟s nuclear program. During that period, Pakistan raised, improved and achieved its nuclear abilities and it had made many cold tests.66

The end of cold war turned Pakistan nuclear program towards limelight, once again and Americans imposed sanction on Pakistan under the pretext of Pressler Amendment of 1987.67 But these sanctions made no effect on the

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development of nuclear program. Pakistan had moved ahead in nuclear progress, from fabrication of nuclear bomb to the delivery system of nuclear material. Pakistan decided to go for missile technology and in result a missile race had began in South Asia.68

Missile race as nuclear weapon delivery system, between India and Pakistan was continued when French resumed their nuclear tests in 1996. It had given birth some strong assumptions about Indian resumption of nuclear testing nearly after 20 years although Indians continuously denied this possibility yet this denial proved wrong when they had exploded again their nuclear device in early May 1998.

Pakistani Government, once again came under international pressure to avoid following Indian footsteps but Pakistan repudiated the world pressures that activated only against it– and announced its nuclear capability and scientific expertise through blasting nuclear material at Chaghi, in Baluchistan on 28 May 1998.69 With this nuclear explosion, Pakistan also imposed a nuclear moratorium on testing and decided to participate in fissile material cut off treaty in UN.

Global reaction on Pakistan‟s nuclear explosion was as expected, severe bans on military and economic assistance imposed which defiantly affect the already dwindling economy of the country. Britain, Germany, and France unlike Japan, Canada, Sweden and Australian were the countries who refused to follow the American line of action; to impose sanction on Pakistan. According to France, sanctions seldom realize the objective while Germany said, non-proliferation can pursue only through dialogue.70

The announced nuclear deterrence provided a different sense of security to Pakistan and Pakistanis. Being first Islamic country to be nuclear had also given Pakistan, a moral edge in the Islamic world.71

Pakistan established nuclear command and control Authority in 2000. Later on, a nuclear controversy dominated the Pakistani politics for some years but the Indo- American nuclear deal in 2008 once again, changed regional nuclear equilibrium in South Asia.

Section B: French and Pakistani Approach towards Nuclear Diplomacy

The thorny desire to have nuclear bomb put a state into continues tussle of decisions; how to maintain its efficacy, how to secure its proliferation and how to use it to achieve those diplomatic ends which are impossible to have otherwise. American practical use of this destructive power in Japan made it clear for the world that they could not risk the extinction of human race through nuclear war. So this deterrence transformed into a weapon of diplomacy and once again Americans exemplified it during Cuban missile crisis72. Seventeen days of this

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standoff ended what American wished to have – American continent without Soviet and nuclear interference. French and Pakistani nuclear diplomacy based on their regional and international priorities and level of threat in different decades. One can see that when French were moving towards their “quite revolution”, Pakistani were still in dilemma either they announce their nuclear strength or not. This approach was there to formulate their decision towards nuclear diplomacy.

Nuclear Weapon a Source to Raise the Global Influence Since the beginning, French nuclear weapon was not considered as a

battlefield weapon and France always used them as –an instrument of diplomacy.73 Raymond Aron‟s observation summarized the theory, “If General de Gaulle wants to endow France with nuclear force, it is because he has no doubts at all about American protection. The French force, useless against the Soviet Union, is at least a diplomatic trump card against the United States”.74

During de Gaulle era, French nuclear weapon was a symbol of French independence, integrity and sign of being third force in the bloc politics. Initially, France categorically refused to make its nuclear weapon available to a European defense. It was considered against French strategic realities and interests, so in 1972, France declared that “nuclear dissuasion is a purely national issue, at present, the risk is not shared”. 75

Same mentality was continued. Even in 1976, when French chief of staff General Guy Mery had talked about „extended sanctuary for safety‟– there was a huge outcry against this concept and considered it against French national interest.76 In 1984, Mitterrand had also reiterated this policy by declaring that France had not hidden from allies the fact that, beyond protecting its national territory and associated vital interests. It would be unable to take the responsibility for the security of the whole Europe.77

These pronounced rejections contradict with the French Defense White Paper in 1972, in which France indicated the possibility of indirect European protection because it needed some strong footing in European politics. It announced, “Western Europe as a whole cannot fail to benefit indirectly from French strategy, which constitutes a stable and determining factor of security for Europe … our vital interests lie within our territory and the surrounding areas.‟78 For some time, France also played with the idea of in which it declared that the security of West Germany as its vital interest.79 The ambiguity in the doctrine remained because the independence of French nuclear weapon demands, no external commitment but the continuation of leverage within European continent required the extension of the security.

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In Post Cold War Era, France once again tried to Europeanize its nuclear weapon, to maintain its influence in the European affairs first Mitterrand and then Chirac talked about the Europeanization of French nuclear weapon but the policy did not find any „appreciation‟ in other European capitals.80

This idea of Europeanization of French nuclear weapon or the provision of civil nuclear technology to the world are two trump cards of France after 1960s which it successfully used to raise its status in the under developed world and in Europe. French open criticism on American policies in Vietnam, its soft policies towards Soviet/Communist world during the Cold war, in fact a tactic to present itself as a third force in the bipolar world. France partially succeeded to achieve it.

Pakistan like France also used nuclear power to raise its influence among the comity of nations in generally and in Muslim world specifically. The failure of Iraqi and Libyan efforts to get nuclear ability and success of Pakistan in this esoteric technology could facilitate Pakistan to enhance its influence and prestige by being first among its fellow Muslim nations.81 Bhutto believed that among the rich and security conscious Arab states…it [nuclear capability] enhances Pakistan‟s stature and importance incalculably.82 His belief was partially right. Pakistan also highlighted the idea in which Pakistan is considered as nuclear protecting shield not only for its territorial boundaries but also for safeguarding the ideological frontiers of the Muslim world”.83 Pakistan played with this idea in 1970s and in 1980s successfully without any commitment to end its diplomatic isolation of 1950s and 1960s.

Nuclear Weapon as an Instrument of Diplomacy The practical use of nuclear diplomacy depends on the level of threat in

which a state survived so in the course of French nuclear history, one can find that they never threatened any of their enemy for nuclear attack. Why did French adopt this attitude? The answer was that against all existing threats after WWII, they had a sure guarantee of American Umbrella in the form of NATO forces. Centuries-old enmity with Britain had been changed into an alliance, the neighboring threat of Germany was diminished due to its division between East and West Germany after WWII, and against Soviet Communist threat - Americans were there (Europe) for protection. So it is said that the underlined objective of France to have nuclear weapon was that they could force Americans to intervene in any European affair where it was reluctant. 84

But for Pakistan, the story is bit different. So it is reported that, “India had threatened three times for nuclear attack, two times from Pakistan, first time 1987, second in 1990 and once when US threatened to send its nuclear warship in gulf of Bengal”.85

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The hard-core reality of the South Asian politics was that Pakistan could not afford an arm race with India in conventional armament but it was different in nuclear field. The ability to inflict, unacceptable damage, played an important role in creating a successful deterrence. So Nuclear capability was infect, became a weapon for deterrence for Pakistan like France, which designed to reduce the adversary to silence or paralysis its conventional superiority. the conventional war, after the 1998, nuclear blast has become unthinkable between the two old rivals of South Asia.86

According to Iqbal Akhund after Indian explosion in 1974, one of his western colleagues in the UN, said, one would have expected that in this particular field Pakistan would have been first.87 His argument was felt to be justified because being smaller and weaker state – Pakistan had more strategic motive to rely on nuclear weapon to neutralize its disadvantages in size and resources. This discussion also indicated the general prevailed psychology about the nuclear bomb, – a smaller state having a regional and neighbouring rival if wished to sustain as an independent nation had only one alternative– to become a nuclear power. Being a comparatively small and insecure state in the sub-continent, when India exploded its „PNE‟ in 1974, then Pakistan had no option except to nuclearize itself.

Although before going to nuclear way, Pakistan tried to get nuclear guarantee from the western nuclear powers and Pakistan Prime Minister, Bhutto and President, Zia repeatedly assured west - if there was no problem in conventional weapon supply than Pakistan could avoid the nuclear deterrence. Bhutto during his American visit in 1975 made a direct link between nuclear program and arms aid and said if Washington met his requirement in conventional arms, he was ready to accept international safeguards for nuclear program88 and Zia, during an interview to American channel said if American continued its assistance, Pakistan would not make the bomb.89

Pakistan‟s nuclear history although started in 1960s but it was able to use its deterrence as an instrument of diplomacy in mid 1980s for the first time. India had planned the biggest army exercise attached with Pakistani border, – named as Operation Brass Tacks.90 Pakistan was under threat then it used its nuclear diplomacy against India for the first time. This deterrence saved the South Asia to be involved in another open war like the previous three ones, in 1948, 1965, and 1971.

In November 1986, when Indian army started a major army exercise on Pakistan border, the threat of war, said to be cancelled due to Pakistani President‟s duel policy, at one side by using cricket diplomacy91 and on the other side “informing Indian Prime Minister about Pakistan‟s nuclear capability”.

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Before the President, A.Q. Khan said to tell an Indian journalist that Pakistan had already achieved nuclear weapon capability.92

After 9/11, when India tried to follow American philosophy of pre-emptive strike and using Indian parliament attack,93 similar to WTC attack, put all its army on Pakistan border, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, during that standoff in 2001/2002, while addressing the nations said, “we don‟t want war. But if war is thrust upon us, we would respond with full might, and gave a befitting reply”.94 In April talking to Germen news paper Der Spiegel, he threatened India the use of nuclear weapon. The interview was widely published.95

Although the retreat from Kargil and unconditional submission of American demand in 2001 put the nuclear deterrence in doubt but its efficacy was still unchallengeable in Pakistani psyche.

Another part of Pakistan nuclear diplomacy based on the rejection of any international pressure which target was particularly Pakistan. As Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said, “We will not accept any pressure (international) which was exclusively directed against Pakistan”.96 That was the reason Pakistan always linked its signature of NPT with the Indian signature.

Conclusion

“A nuclear power plant is coming to be as vivid token of national self-assertion as a flag and a steel mill”.97

French and Pakistani journey towards nuclear development in different

decades more or less tells the same objectives - security, survival as a sovereign state and prestige in the world - behind to achieve this power. International and regional events forced France and Pakistan to transform their pacifist‟s approach of the nuclear power into weaponization one. In case of France, Suez issue, discussions on West germen militarization and Special relationship between Anglo-Saxon, and for Pakistan, the organic security threat from India, the debacle of East Pakistan in 1971, and Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 were the events which provided them (France &Pakistan) bases for the change of tone in nuclear development.

More or less both nuclear programs faced the “partial” attitude of powers – France has to face the three powers hostility and non-cooperation while the whole world generally and nuclear powers specially are not ready to accept Pakistan‟s nuclear capability and it is always a media issue particularly in negative way.

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France and Pakistan both used their nuclear power as a weapon of “diplomacy” not as a battlefield one. Official declarations of both states have created an ambiguity for their original motives because France considers that ambiguity in nuclear deterrence will increase its efficacy and Pakistan seconds its opinion. Leadership of both states, de Gaulle in France and Bhutto in Pakistan used nuclear power to raise the credibility of the state and for their personal prestige within and outside the country.98.

Both states also lure the other states for the provision of nuclear security, France to Europe and Pakistan to the Muslim world, to raise their influence. Off and On political statements were given but no practical commitment was made either of the state with any other state.

Pakistan and France have different approach in the use of their nuclear power. Pakistan used nukes as “first option” but France always kept it in “proportional deterrence”. This difference lies due to that unseen security guarantee which American presence in Europe - has given to France and French has always denied accepting this fact.

Pakistan in conventional way could not face India due to wide difference of resource like in 1985, high years of tussle between the two neighbouring states, Pakistan was spending $2,957 million in comparison to India‟s $8,921 million while it was 6.9% of its GNP while India‟s 3%. It was difficult for Pakistan to maintain this military balance with the rising tension in the region so it was needed an “equalizer”99 more economic and effective. Nuclear power could become that equalizer due to its destructive nature. So Pakistan has it facing all global pressures and used it verbally whenever it considered it necessary.

The quiet revolution which France started in 1990s – decrease of its nuclear expenditure – still a dream in South Asia because it depends on the decrease of security threat for the state, might be future generation will enjoy that environment in South Asia.

Notes and References

1 Daniel Cohen, The Manhattan Project (Twenty-First Century Books, 1999), 10.

2 Hiroshima and Nagasaki, dense with population destroyed immediately. Over 90% building burned and demolished in Hiroshima and 1/3 of all building in Nagasaki was damaged. Of the estimated 300,000 people in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, 140,000 died within hour or in following weeks of attack while in Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, some 70,000 among the estimated 270,000 present died. This immediate death and destruction had started a series of destruction which linked to radiation

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injury from ashes of death or black rain continued later on. For further details see Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science Inc, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc., 1982), 33.

3 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), 7.

4 United States of America, Russia, Britain, China, France, India and Pakistan

5 French received 75% of its electricity from nuclear power which made it among those states which provided cheapest energy to its masses. Électricité de France (EDF), French government owned organization which is running 59 nuclear power plants within France. It is working on third generation nuclear plant. France is also in 7th among those states which provides cheapest electricity to its consumers.

6 The French Nuclear Energy Program, January 28, 1960, http://www.faqs.org/cia/docs/97/0000818750/THE-FRENCH-NUCLEAR-ENERGY-PROGRAM.html.

7 It is reported that Heavy water was shifted to Britain and some of the uranium to Morocco which was left there until the end of the war.

8 The process which started from Einstein‟s letter to Roosevelt about the Germen fear of getting nuclear power ended with the secret project code named the Manhattan project through which American exploded their first nuclear bomb in New Mexico desert. Initially American were working on it alone but after the Pearl Harbor when American joined the war with UK and France, they were also became partners in the project. For details and different aspects of Manhattan project see, Cynthia C. Kelly, Remembering The Manhattan Project: Perspectives on the Making of the Atomic Bomb and Its Legacy (World Scientific, 2004).

9 The Governement which established after the WII in France inherited political and economic weakness due the length of war and being the occupied territory. For the detail study of French Fourth Republic see, Dorothy Maud Pickles, France, the Fourth Republic: With a Postscript Describing the Situation in June 1958 (Taylor & Francis, 1958).

10 This agreement was proposed by the British Governement due to their feeling that fabricating an atomic bomb was beyond their capacity so they decided to share their knowledge with Americans. This agreement was signed by Churchill from Britain and Roosevelt from America. They agreed to share and keep the atomic knowledge to themselves. Original text of the Quebec Agreement see Philip Louis Cantelon, Richard G.

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Hewlett, and Robert Chadwell Williams, The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 30–33.

11 It should also be remembered that Britain had the „assistance‟ from Americans due to their „special relationship‟ which France deprived.

12 Team is consisted on six member executive committee of Kowarski, Goldschmidt, Geuron, Irene Joliot-Curie (Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie‟s wife), Pierre Auger, and Francis Perrin. Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 7,11.

13 Maurice Vaïsse, “Le Choix Atomique de La France (1945-1958),” Vingtième Siècle. Revue D‟histoire 36, no. 1 (1992): 23, doi:10.2307/3769082.

14 Bertrand Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals (Rutgers University Press, 1990), 294. The reason of this decision was that imported uranium could be taken from US or UN under international surveillance and guarantees which was not “acceptable” to France. it succeed to get it from La Crouzille near Limoges (Central France) and in Lyonnais mountains near Vichy and Autun region (Southeast of France) P. Mounfield, World Nuclear Power: A Geographical Appraisal (Routledge, 1991), 104.

15 Through this policy of flexible response American created ambiguity for its allies that if any type of nuclear threat their first response should not be nuclear. For the exact word of that Response see Stanley R. Sloan, Nato‟s Future: Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain (DIANE Publishing, 1985), 140.

16 France with the help of Britain and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956. Israel and Britain withdrew from the war at early phase and French remained alone. The attack was done due to the Nationalization of Suez canal by the Egypt. One point of view was that American pressure to its allies was due to Soviet nuclear threat which played a significant role. This soviet nuclear threat when combined with cold war internal French politics, it acted as “brake” rather than as a deciding factor in the nuclear adventure. Vaïsse, “Le Choix Atomique de La France (1945-1958),” 24. French fought their last colonial war in Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu where their armies had to surrender against Vietnam liberation forces. For the detail of events see Clarke W. Garrett, “In Search of Grandeur: France and Vietnam 1940-1946,” The Review of Politics 29, no. 3 (July 1, 1967): 303–323.

17 France signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Israel and joined hands with European Economic Community through EURATOM. All

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these efforts were made to end its diplomatic isolation after the Suez crisis.

18 Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 199.

19 This test was the equivalent of 70 kilotons of TNT, the largest first nuclear test of any nation, past and present.

20 Adam Deyoe, France and Greatness: The Development of the French Nuclear Program, 1st ed. (Adam Deyoe, 2012), 1.

21 Peter Mangold, The Almost Impossible Ally: Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle (I.B.Tauris, 2006), 101.Toledo Blade, “Sahara Success Spurs France to A- Stockpile,” February 14, 1960, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1350&dat=19600214&id=tAgwAAAAIBAJ&sjid=_gAEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7236,9392.

22 Charles de Gaulle, as cited in Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American

strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960-1963 : a Troubled Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 2000).: Baldwin H. Ward, Nostalgia: Our Heritage in Pictures and Words (Crusade Bible Publishers, 1975), 393.

23 “Chirac Reasserts French Nuclear Policy,” Disarmament Diplomacy,, no. No. 82, (spring 2006), http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd82/ 82chirac.htm.

24 “Document 13: French Nuclear Test Plans,” Central Intelligence Agency., February 25, 1960, http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000818751/ DOC_0000818751.pdf.

25 A data which compiled in 1996 on nuclear tests also indicated that only France among the nuclear powers which tested nuclear weapon from 1960 to 1961 no other existed nuclear power did that. Lawson, James E, Catalog of Known and Putative Nuclear Explosions from Unclassified Source, August 5, 1996, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Library/Catalog.

26 “Atomic Age Alamogordo to Sahara.,” New York Times, February 14, 1960, http://0-www.proquest.com.cando.canisius.edu/ (accessed November 21, 2010).

27 For the brief detail of Tsar Bomba see Alan Axelrod, The Real History of the Cold War: A New Look at the Past (Sterling Publishing Company, Inc., 2009), 160.

28 So the New York Times listed the event not as a headline, but a small column and the Times informed its readers that “the explosion marked the

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entrance of France under President de Gaulle into the nuclear club of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain.

29 Sebastian Reyn, Atlantis Lost: The American Experience With De Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 58–59.

30 Colard, Daniel, and Pierre Lefranc, “L‟Aventure de La Bombe: De Gaulle et La Dissuasion Nucleaire, 1958-1969” (Plon: paris, 1985), 130.

31 Alain Peyrefitte, Le Mal français (Fayard, 2006), 81.

32 “France Explodes H-bomb,” Oakland Tribune, Page 1, August 24, 1968, http://newspaperarchive.com/oakland-tribune/1968-08-24/.

33 Robert Stan Norris et al., Nuclear weapons databook, vol. V (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 408.

34 De Gaulle introduced, propagated and idealized this concept. Through it France nuclearized three of its forces, army, navy and air force. French supersonic bombers and missiles were part of French force de frappe, to deliver nuclear weapon to the target. Its major objective was to deter the strategic strike on France.

35 “Livre Blanc Sur La Défense 1994 (France),” Juin 1994, 73, http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/944048700/ index.shtml, http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cgi-bin/ brp/telestats.cgi?brp_ref=944048700&brp_file=0000.pdf.

36 Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe did not mean end of its political and military influence. All the energy pipelines which built during their period have given them a leeway over eastern European energy supply. Its geopolitical position is also a great source for the continuation of its sphere of influence in the neighboring regions. Russian problem with neighboring states, its use of military power in Georgia, due to Ossetia issue in fact a warning for the other. For more detail consult Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia 2004 (Routledge, 2003), 3–10. Maria Raquel Freire and Roger E. Kanet, Russia and Its Near Neighbours (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

37 Bastien Irondelle, “Rethinking the Nuclear Taboo: The French Perspective,” n.d., http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/ 100216_Handout_Irondelle_Taboo.pdf.

38 Bruno Tertrais, “The Last to Disarm? The Future of France‟s Nuclear Weapons,” CNS, July 2007, 254, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=113480.

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39 Boniface, Pascal,, “French Nuclear Weapons Policy After Cold War”,, occasional paper, August 1998, 12, http://www.acus.org/docs/9808-French_Nuclear_Weapons_Policy_After_Cold_War.pdf.

40 It was judged that nuclear share of defense equipment budget has declined from 40% to 20% since 1990 and the nuclear share of the defense budget has been reduced from 16.9 to 8.75% in 1990s.“The Last to Disarm? The Future of France‟s Nuclear Weapons.”

41 David S. Yost, “France‟s New Nuclear Doctrine,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 82, no. 4 (July 1, 2006): 701. for the critical review of the Chirac‟s speech and French nuclear doctrine see Félix Arteaga, “French Nuclear Deterrence According to President Chirac: Reform, Clean Break or Reminder?,” ARI, Real Institute of Elcano,, no. No 11 (January 24, 2006), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/ analisis/905/Arteaga905.pdf.

42 Yost, “France‟s New Nuclear Doctrine,” 701.

43 It was the French president which under the French law have the authority to declare which „interests are vital for national security of France”.

44 Chirac pointed out in his November 2001 speech that the nuclear deterrence was never intended to work directly against terrorist groups but designed to apply to states. Jacques Chirac, discoures lors de sa visite a la Marine National, Toulon, 8 November 2001.

45 Nicolas Sarkozy, France. Présidence de la République, and France. Commission chargée de l‟élaboration du livre blanc sur la défense et la

sécurité nationale, The French white paper on defence and national security : [report asked for by the French republic to the Commission to appraise France‟s defence and security strategy], 1 vols. (Paris: O. Jacob, 2008).

46 Jeffrey Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (W. W. Norton & Company, 2007), 338.

47 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger,, 1972), 336.

48 Ibid.

49 According to Gowher Razvi, “even though India. is over ten times larger than Pakistan in size, Population and resource. Pakistan has refused to accept its inferior Status………………..”. Rajpal Budania, India‟s National Security Dilemma: The Pakistan Factor and India‟s Policy Response (Indus Publishing, 2001), 127.

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50 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Development (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 34. US was considered responsible for creating an appetites for nuclear research and development in many countries, including Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan which have no prior nuclear program through Atom for peace program. Another assumption was that this program informed Pakistani scientist how to make the bomb.

51 Hafeez Malik, Soviet-Pakistan relations and post-Soviet dynamics, 1947-92 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1994), 246.

52 US offered Pakistan under the agreement $350,000 aid to procure a pool type reactor. Shahid-Ur Rehman, Long Road to Chaghi (Islamabad: Print Wise Publication, 1999), 22.

53 This was the college where which physics department provided a pool for nuclear physic at initial stage. The noble laureate Dr. Abdus Salam also belonged to the same college.

54 It is reported that nearly 600 people were sent abroad for study from 1960-1967, among them, 106 were returned.

55 Kapur, Pakistan‟s Nuclear Development, 58.

56 Rather make it a secret meeting; Bhutto held the meeting in his special rhetoric style in open place. This Multan meeting had only accelerated the wheel but not forced it to run, it was 1974, Indian explosion raced the program as A.Q. Khan put it, and “1974 was the turning point. It was then Bhutto got really serious”. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (Yale University Press, 2003), 197.

57 James P. Farwell and Joseph D. Duffey, The Pakistan Cauldron: Conspiracy, Assassination & Instability. (Washington D.C: Potomac Books, Inc., 2011), 4. For the detail of the meeting see Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (Times Books, 1981), 44–46.

58 Ashok Kapur, “A Nuclearizing Pakistan: Some Hypotheses,” Asian Survey 20, no. 5 (May 1, 1980): 495.

59 Plutonium is a manmade element; it is created in the core of a nuclear reactor when natural uranium is struck by neutrons. After the uranium fuel is discharged from the reactor, the plutonium can be extracted chemically from the spent fuel by “reprocessing” and then used in weapon. It can be inserted into the core of a bomb in less than a week. Any country with a stock of separated plutonium and person skilled in bomb design can make atomic bombs on short notice. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science Inc, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc., 1982), 61.

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60 A nuclear fuel fabrication plant was discussed with Canada for KANUPP but Canada stopped its transfer at last minute, even it was ready to be shipped. Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2012), 105.

61 Abdul Qadeer Khan was born into a modest family in Bhopal, India, in 1935. He migrated to Pakistan in 1952, following the country's partition from India five years earlier. He graduated from the University of Karachi before moving to Europe for further studies in West Germany and Belgium. In the 1970s, he took a job at a uranium enrichment plant run by the British-Dutch-German consortium Urenco. But in 1976, Dr Khan returned home to head up the nation's nuclear program with the support of then Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. During his work, Dr Khan insisted that the program had no military purpose, but following the 1998 tests admitted: "I never had any doubts I was building a bomb. We had to do it." He went on to work on the successful test-firings of the nuclear-capable Ghauri I and II missiles. In later years, Dr Khan has launched a campaign against illiteracy and built educational institutes in Mianawali and Karachi

62 Gas centrifuge enrichment separates uranium isotopes (uranium atoms that differ from one another by the number of neutrons they contain) by subjecting uranium gas to strong centrifugal forces in a rotating cylinder. Heavier isotopes are forced to the periphery of the rotating cylinder, where they are separated from lighter counterparts. One distinct advantage of this process over the more common gaseous diffusion enrichment process, now used exclusively in the nuclear weapon states, is that smaller, more efficient plant can be built. A relatively small number of centrifuges can be connected into a cascade, which enriches in stages by passing material increasingly connected in uranium 235 through successive centrifuges. Each gas centrifuge, however, can hold only a small amount of uranium gas, requiring many centrifuges to produce enough weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear explosive. David Albright, Pakistan‟s Bomb-Making Capacity (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1987), 30.

63 Pakistan had started its list of shopping for the bomb from Switzerland where it had purchased vacuum pumps from VAT, next from Germany, Hanan Leybold, machines for manufacturing the tubes for centrifuge. Pakistan also bought Maraging steel and heavy water from Germany and prepared tube from Holland from it which delivered to Pakistan later. Nuclear device testing equipment was bought from French scrap. For the further detail of Pakistani version see Rehman, Long Road to Chaghi, 61–66.

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64 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: the World‟s Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global Security (London: Penguin Books Limited (UK), 2008), 289. Observation was right because after 1970s whenever Americans wished to impose sanctions on Pakistan with full vigor for its nuclear program, it needed its unconditional support. First time, it was happened in 1979 when they wished to turn Afghanistan as “Russian Vietnam”. Next time, when after nuclear explosion in 1998, Pakistan had the status of the most sanctioned ally of America; it had temporarily withdrawn its sanctions again under the pretext of war on terror in 2001.

65 First time in 1950s and 1960s through SEATO, CENTO, Americans joined hand with Pakistan against Communism.

66 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, “Sasikumar, Karthika, „Crisis and Opportunity: The 1990 Nuclear Crisis in South Asia‟,” in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb (Routledge, 2008), 82.

67 Pressler amendment had created a gulf in Pakistan and American relations because according to it, American president had to issue a certificate annually in which he confirmed that Pakistan is not having nuclear arsenals. In the absence of this certificate all Pakistan‟s economic and military assistant has been blocked. For the implication of amendment on Pakistan see Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 64–75.

68 Initially Pakistan wished to use F.16 as a delivery weapon but Pressler amendment and American intentions forced it to find some alternative way. Missile was best substitute.

69 Strobe Talbott, who visited Pakistan before the nuclear explosion to persuade Pakistan government for not to make explosion wrote in his book “engaging India” that he received a “bombastic no” from foreign ministry and a “polite no” from the cool customer in Rawalpindi, i.e., Jahangir Karamat. Sartaz Aziz, Between Dreams and Realities: Some Milestones in Pakistan‟s History (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 194.

70 Ibid., 195.

71 Pakistani living in outside Pakistan could verify this expression as in France, meeting with some Maghrabain made me feel that they knew Pakistan only due to its nuclear ability. It is my personal observation.

72

73 French nuclear strategist, since its inception, knew the fact that they could not succeed to achieve victory with their nuclear weapon against any

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aggression from nuclear power - but they hoped to use it to inflict the enemy and act as a trip-wire to trigger off American intervention on

French side. Dorothy Maud Pickles, The uneasy entente : French foreign policy and Franco-British misunderstandings (London: Oxford U.P., 1966), 75.

74 Paul Reynaud, La politique étrangère du gaullisme (Paris: R. Julliard, 1964), 135. Pickles, The Uneasy Entente, 83. Encounter, vol. 20, 1963, 11.

75 Michel Debré and France Ministère d‟État chargé de la défense nationale, Livre Blanc sur la Défense Nationale, vol.1 (paris: 1972).

76 Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant ally : France and Atlantic security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 196.Robbin Frederick Laird, The French Strategic Dilemma, vol. 407 (Naval Planning and Management Division, Center for Naval Analyses, 1984), 7, http://cna.org/sites/default/files/research/5500040700.pdf.

77 Mitterrand speech in Hague, quottes in François Mitterrand, Réflexions sur la Politique Extérieure de la France Introduction à Vingt-Cinq Discours (1981-1985) (Paris: Fayard, 1996). Besides this observation for the detail how Mitterrand tried to enhance Franco-Germen cooperation in defense fields

see Xavier Fraudet, France‟s security independence : originality and constraints in Europe, 1981-1995 (Bern: P. Lang, 2006), 84–87.

78 Debré and Nationale, Livre Blanc sur la Défense Nationale, vol. 1:8–9. Anand Menon, France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981-97: The Politics of Ambivalence (Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 23. For detail of French flirtation on nuclear weapon to European see Philip Gordon, “French Security Policy After the Cold War,” Product Page, 1992, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4229.html.

79 French were identifying their conventional forces with the forwards defense of West Germany. Traditionally they linked their traditional forces with the nuclear weapon. With the formation of rapid reaction force (FAR), Mitterrand administration had underscored the importance of the forward defense of West Germany through conventional means. The decision of Franco-Germen coproduction of a helicopter gunship May be linked with the same idea. Laird, The French Strategic Dilemma, 407:7–8.

80 Chirac in Bonn in 1983 had argued that French nuclear force should be involved in some form of European guarantee to West Germany. Ibid., 407:24. But Genevieve Schemder described the reason in these harsh words, according to her, after cold war, it was difficult for France to maintain simultaneously a national arms industry, strategic and pre-

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strategic nuclear weapon, a navy organized around nuclear aircraft carriers, 350 fighter planes with the range of 1000km, etc. most importantly, maintain solider abroad and develop new and flexible and sophisticated weapon, considered necessary for national interest. Michel R. Gueldry, France and European Integration: Toward a Transnational Polity? (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001), 162.

81 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan‟s Security Under Zia (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 114.

82 Salmaan Taseer, Bhutto, a Political Biography (Vikas Pub. House, 1980), 154.

83 Farzana Shaikh, “Pakistan‟s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 78, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 48.

84 Americans has the worst fear that WWIII was triggered by the European generally and French particularly - there early opposition of French nuclear program based on that hypothesis. For detail of the concept see, Carsten Holbraad and Australian National University Dept of International Relations, Super Powers and World Order (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1971).

85 “Bharat Teen Bar Atmi Hamly Ki Dhamki Ka Shikar Hova/three Times in the Past India Had Been Threatened for Nuclear Attack,” August 2012, http://express.com.pk/epaper/PoPupwindow.aspx?newsID=1101601877&Issue=NP_LHE&Date=20120824.

86 John F. Burns, “On Kashmir‟s Dividing Line, Nuclear Fears Enforce Calm,” New York Times, June 14, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/14/world/on-kashmir-s-dividing-line-nuclear-fears-enforce-calm.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm; Steve Coll, “The Force of Fear in South Asia,” The Washington Post,, June 8, 1998.

87 Iqbal Akhund, Memoirs of a Bystander: A Life in Diplomacy (OUP Pakistan, 1997), 261.

88 Niloufer Mahdi, Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy 1971-1981: The Search for Security (Lahore: Ferozsons (Pvt.) Limited, 1999), 160.

89 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan‟s Arms Procurement and Military Build-Up 1979-99: In Search of a Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 95.

90 A plan was put into operation in the fall of 1986 to intimidate and embarrass Pakistan on the battlefield. Apparently, India planned to convert its triennial military exercise, code name Brass tacks, into an an

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actual military action against Pakistan‟s Sind and then follow it up with Trident, the operation to free Pakistan held Kashmir. But Pakistan army also started to move troop with the Indian army movement. But crisis was averted due to Pakistani leadership‟s diplomacy of cricket. Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing Search For Nationhood, 2 Rev Upd (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 194.

91 In 1986-87, under the severe military tussle between the India and Pakistan prevailed and young Indian prime Minister could not afford to visit Pakistan or invited Zia to come to India. Pakistani general used the chance of India/Pakistan cricket match and visited India which broke the ice which covered the relations. Anthony Hyman, Muhammad Ghayur, and Naresh Kaushik, Pakistan: Zia and After (Abhinav Publications, 1989), 63.

92 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, 1st ed. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 284–285.

93 On 13 December 2001, few terrorists attacked Indian parliament when the parliament was in session. One civilian and dozens of other were killed. India blamed some banned Pakistani organization for the attack and massed up its army on Pakistani frontiers. It created a nuclear standoff between the neighboring powers.

94 “Pakistan: We Don‟t Want War,” The New York Times, May 28, 2002.

95 “Musharraf Ready to Use Nuclear Arms,” The Guardian, April 6, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/06/pakistan.rorymccarthy.

96 “Le Pakistan Dément Avoir La Bombe Atomique,” Le Monde, August 4, 1993.

97 Michael Mandelbaum, A Nuclear Export Cartel, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc., 1977), 42.

98 Bhutto wished to use this diplomacy to be world leader. Niazi Kausar, Last Days of Primer Bhutto, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991).

99 Sumit Ganguly, India‟s Foreign Policy Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 13.