Nuclear hardening to protect satellites against high-altitude … · 2018-11-08 · LEO lays outside of the NATO member nations' territories = no mutual defence trigger Nuclear hardening

Nuclear hardening to protect satellites against

high-altitude-nuclear-explosions (HANE)

OHB System AG

Johan Ideström, Space Radiation Environment Analyst

ESWW 2018 Leuven, 8th November 2018

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Motivation for this topical discussion meeting

215th European Space Weather, 5th-9th November 2018, Leuven, Belgium

USA, Russia have nuclear harden military satellites, maybe even China(?)

In Europe only military satellites from UK, France and Italy are nuclear harden

Spain is currently working on it

Germany has currently no nuclear harden satellites

Germany military (BW) has two communications satellites, BW-SATCOM 1 and 2

A third, BW-SACOM-3, will be build in the future

There are 3 satellite manufactures in Europe: Airbus, TAS, OHB

OHB counts as a German company and is the preferred partner for German military

Airbus and TAS build nuclear hardened satellites, OHB never did it

The German military might consider to order nuclear hardened satellites in the future

NATO standard AEP-50: „Space and Nuclear Radiation Hardening Guidelines for Military

Satellites: Electronics and Photonics” is applicable for all satellites in the CP-130 program

If German military wants to provide their satellites to NATO CP-130 then AEP-50 is applicable

Nuclear hardening to protect satellites against high-altitude-nuclear-explosions

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space environment challenges counter measurements

15th European Space Weather, 5th-9th November 2018, Leuven, Belgium 3

extreme

Space

Weather

eventssynergy

High

Altitude

Nuclear

Explosions

Electrical

Propulsion

Orbit

Raising

Awareness(Specifications)

Protection(Hardening)

Mitigation

(Deterrent)

Measurements(Sensors)


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Satellite missions are facing new challenges:

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all future (telecom) satellites will use Electrical Propulsion Orbit Raising (EPOR)

Instead of chemical GTO of 14 days, expect electrical GTO of 142~387 days

Total dose example: 200 days EPOR GTO = 6.7 years GEO

Literature: [Horne and Pitchford, Space Weather Concerns for All-Electric (2015)]

150% total dose during mission lifetime of a satellite:

up to 50 % during EPOR GTO

100 % during 15 years in GEO

Not enough data of EPOR GTO region in the models = high uncertainties

Extreme SW events:

Carrington (1859), Quebec (1989), Halloween (2003), CME near miss to Earth (2012)

Literature: [Extreme space weather - impacts on engineered systems and infrastructure(2013)]

High-Altitude-Nuclear- Explosion (HANE): EMP & Radiation belt pumping

Literature: [Collateral Damage to Satellites from an EMP Attack (2010)]



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Natural and man-made threats against satellies


Natrual threats:

Space Weather (Carrington event)

Meteoroids

Atomic oxygen

Natural radiation from the radiation belts, the sun, and cosmic rays

Man-made threats:

Space debris

Jamming

Cyber hacking

Artifical radiation from HANE

Electro magnetic pulse from HANE

This presentation will continue to look more detailed into high-altitude-nuclear-explosions

(HANE)


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high-altitude-nuclear-explosions from 1958 to 1962



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Starfish Prime


1.4 mega tons TNT-equivalent explosion

altitude of 400km

produced an EMP much higher than expected

drove much of the instrumentation off scale

artificial auroral lights in Hawaii (1445km away)

knocking out about 300 streetlights


© OHB System AG915th European Space Weather, 5th-9th November 2018, Leuven, Belgium


09.July.1962

Starfish Prime

1.4Mt nuclear explosion in 400 km

10.July.1962

Start of Telstar into MEO orbit

(952km), the first telecom satellite

32 satellites in earth orbit at the

same time like Starfish Prime



• 8 satellites have been damaged

by Starfish Prime

• of those 7 satellites malfunctioned

within months after Starfish Prime

• 8 of 32 satellites corresponds 25%

of all satellites in earth orbit

• 2018:

• 1181 satellites in LEO

• 25% = 295 satellites• (Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite database,

includes launches through 30th April 2018)

• The satellites back then used 60‘s

electronics, mondern satellites are

now much more sensitive

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Overview of effects of nuclear explosions



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Environments Created By a High-Altitude Nuclear Detonation

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Direct Weapon Emissions

Photons

X-rays

Prompt Gamma Rays

Energetic Particles

Neutrons

Debris Ions

Induced Environments

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)

Energetic Particles

Energetic Heavy Ions

Delayed Gamma Rays

(Delayed) Beta Particles

Nuclear-Pumped Radiation Belts and Other Beta-Particle Effects

Photoemissions Other Than X-rays and Gamma Rays



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Radiation effects on satellites

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instantaneous radiated effects

caused by massive emission of neutrons, X photons, Gamma rays

system damage or destruction following high dose rate events

single-event-effects: upset, latch-up or burn out

System Generated Electro Magnetic Pulse (SGEMP)

only satellites in line-of-sight are affected

effects diminish with 1/r² (inverse-square law)

delayed and persisting radiated effects

affect all geostationary satellites

scintillation effect (ionosphere disturbance), disruption of GPS

electronic enhancement of the Earth belt with trapped electrons

radiation belt pumping = additional total dose

Additional electrons follow the magnetic field lines



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radiation belt pumping

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Orbit Volume of

L-shell

Added

total dose

Duration of

additional

total dose

Direct

attack:

required

rocket range

Indirect

attack:

required

latitude

LEO small large years 600 km 0° ~ 25°

MEO medium medium months 18000 km 45°~ 60°

GEO large small weeks 36000 km 55° ~ 70°



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EMP Conclusions

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All satellites, regardless of orbit, are vulnerable to direct attack

Ground control stations for satellites are subject to direct attack by EMP or any other means

An attack on MEO or GEO satellites by high latitude detonations for the purpose of populating

electron belts at those altitudes would require large yields (> 10 Mt)

Satellites in MEO or GEO are not at risk to immediate loss from radiation damage resulting

from a credible EMP attack anywhere on Earth

All satellites in LEO are at risk to serious damage from line-of-sight or enhanced radiation belt

exposure resulting from EMP attacks over many geographical locations of the Earth



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Cold War versus Satellite Age



Cold War Satellite Age

Nuclear Deterrence Satellite Deterrence

Mutal Assured Destruction Mutal Assured Vurnability

Nuclear Winter Dead Zones

(radiation belt pumping / Kessler Syndrome)

cities are hostages in a nuclear war satellites are hostages in a space war

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HANE


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NATO mutual defence trigger in space ?

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Article 5 = Casus foederis (mutal defense trigger)

Article 6 = For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is

deemed to include an armed attack… on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North

America … in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer …

The following places are not covered by Article 5 and Article 6:

Hawaii

Guam

French-Guayana

Falkland Islands

LEO

MEO

GEO

Moon

Mars

Ganymede

LEO lays outside of the NATO member nations' territories = no mutual defence trigger



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Threat scenario through North-Korean HANE

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North-Korea performed so far only under ground nuclear tests

It has to prove that it can perform nuclear explosions as well above ground

Exo-atmospheric test is much cleaner than surface test

Scenario: North-Korea performs a test in the Pacific in international no-man‘s land

HANE explosion in LEO

Demonstration of nuclear capability, and no human has been harmed

If no human has been harmed = no retaliatory attack

HANE in LEO = no NATO mutual defence trigger

All satellites in LEO are affected

direct effect: destruction of satellites

indirect effect: life span of other satellites is shorten massively

perfect for North-Korea which owns no satellites on their own

typical asymmetric conflict



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Strategies for nuclear hardening of satellites

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No retrofit upgrade of old satellite designs

New design with nuclear hardening in mind from the beginning

Higher radiation requirements in the specifications:

make AEP-50 applicable (or other standard if AEP-50 is not available)

more demanding space environment definition (dose-depth-curve and so on)

mandatory usage of RadHard EEE-parts

mandatory usage of spot shielding for all EEE-parts

mandatory sensor/monitor for total dose and charging

shielding analysis: mandatory use of Monte-Carlo calculations instead of ray-tracing

Optimization of the satellite architecture:

Usage of a „radiation vault“ where all units are placed in

low-Z/high-Z/low-Z graded shielding (e.g. high-Z coating on Aluminium panels)

EMP-hardening: “nuclear event” detector & quick turn-off / turn-on process

for direct effects: a “sacrifice skin” to absorb the energy and impact of the direct explosion

Paradox: LEO is most affected, but nuclear hardening is only considered for GEO



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Conclusion

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GEO satellites are more affected from HANE than LEO satellites

Nuclear hardening of GEO satellites is cheaper than hardening of LEO satellites

With only 5/10/20/? % additional cost you can shield the satellite against most effects

In GEO are indirect effects much more likely than direct effects

Space environment sensors/monitors for total dose and charging are absolutely necessary

With a total dose sensor (external & internal) you can measure how much additional

radiation you are exposed to after a HANE and you don‘t need to guess

Synergy effects in hardening, by harden against

Space Weather(Halloween storm 2003, Carrington Event 1859)

HANE

Electrical propulsion orbit raising (EPOR)

Worst case scenario:

HANE during a 200 days EPOR period („sitting duck slow moving duck scenario“)

You can’t “duck and cover” during an EPOR period

Quicker EPOR trajectories which avoid the inner (proton) belt are needed



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Open discussion points:


is it possible to simulates HANE effects in SPENVIS or OMERE?

could the simulation of solar proton event (SPE) in SPENVIS or OMERE emulate the effects

of HANE?

are GEO satellites already indirectly hardened? (since the radiation belt pumping effects due

to HANE in GEO orbit would decay within weeks)

are synergies in hardening against EPOR/Carrington/HANE to be expected?

can lessons of Jupiter missions applied to nuclear hardening?

how to raise awareness about HANE and radiation belt pumping?

Cost estimate: how much additional budget is necessary is necessary for nuclear hardening?

Is the AEP-50 standard still up to date? Do we need a new standard?


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Additional slides added on 21st November 2018





More detailed Literature to this topic:

Collateral Damage to Satellites from an EMP Attack

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531197.pdf

High Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND) Against Low Earth Orbit Satellites ("HALEOS")

https://fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/haleos.pdf

Extreme space weather: impacts on engineered systems and infrastructure

https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/space-weather-full-report

SPACE AND NUCLEAR RADIATION HARDENING GUIDELINES FOR MILITARY

SATELLITES: ELECTRONICS AND PHOTONICS AEP-50

https://standards.globalspec.com/std/1678569/nato-stanag-4636

please contact your NATO national delegate to gain access to that NATO standard

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Drawing from the 1990‘s

how they imagined nuclear

hardening would be in the 2010‘s

15th European Space Weather, 5th-9th November 2018, Leuven, Belgium 32

Awareness(Specifications)

nuclear hardening for dummies …

... welcome to the dark side

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back-up slides



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Nuclear hardening to protect satellites against high-altitude … · 2018-11-08 · LEO lays outside of the NATO member nations' territories = no mutual defence trigger Nuclear hardening