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Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: Working Well Together?
A Presentation byHenry Sokolski
Executive Director,The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
www.npec-web.org
Aspen Institute Conference“Russia and the West – Resetting the Relationship”
Washington, DC June 11, 2009
More Good News: Declining US/Russian Nuclear Deployments*
Operational tactical and strategic nuclear warheads since 1965
05,000
10,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,00040,00045,00050,000
1965 1985 2007 2012
U.S.Russia
2
The Hope Ahead: 1,000 Warheads On the Road to Zero?
(World with 1,000 US operationally deployed strategic warheads)
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
2008 2012 2020 ?
USRussia
Bad News: Others Are Coming UpOperationally Deployed Strategic Warheads
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
2008 2016 2020
US
Russia
France
China
UK
Israel
India
Pakistan
4
Growing Plutonium Stockpiles for States to Ramp Up or Break Out with
Frank Von Hippel et al., Global Fissile Materails Report 2008
Plenty of Weapons Uranium for Weapons States to Ramp Up
Frank Von Hippel, Global Fissile Materials Report 2008
How Adequate Might US Policies Be?
• CTBT: Do states need to test to get their first bomb and can’t weapons states over engineer to avoid testing?
• FMCT: This leaves existing stockpiles and civilian production of weapons usable fuels untouched
• More START: Will others follow or be goaded on by US-Russian reductions?
States or Regions With Nuclear Power Plants Currently is Pretty Limited
Number of Power Reactors States by 2030 May Not Be
How the Mid-East Nexus Between Reactors and Bombs Has Been Handled Since 1980
13 Military Strikes against IAEA member states’ large reactors since 1980
11 against safeguarded reactors since 19801980 Iran against Osirak1981 Israel against Osirak1980-1985 Seven Iraqi strikes against
Bushehr1990 US against Osirak2003 US against Osirak
2 against IAEA member states reactors1991 1 Iraqi Scud attack attempted
against Diamona2007 Israeli strike against Syria’s
Reactor
1010
US Policies: Again, How Effective?
• Strengthen the NPT: But we claim NPT protects countries’ right to get to the brink of making fuel (aka. bombs).
• Strengthen IAEA: But IAEA favors spreading nuclear technology and given the laws of physics is incapable of detecting covert plants or assuring timely warning of military diversions from declared plants
• Create an international fuel bank: Will this prompt more “rightful” nuclear fuel making or will it be irrelevant?
• Take back exports from nuclear violators: But how?
• More cooperative threat reductions: But with whom?
Current Proliferation Seems Manageable(With DPRK Disarming and Iran Nonnuclear)
Where We Are Headed
“The regime will not be sustainable if scores more States develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice – and, of course, each individual State which does this only will leave others to feel that they must do the same. This would increase all of the risks – of nuclear accident, of trafficking, of terrorist use, and of use by states themselves. To prevent that, you must find durable ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses with the imperative of non-proliferation. ” Sec. Gen. UN, NPT Review Conference, 5/2/05
13
Catalytic Escalation
“If not constrained, this proliferation could prompt nuclear crises and even nuclear use at the very time that the United States and Russia are trying to reduce their nuclear weapons deployments and stockpiles” WMD Commission
- e.g., Mumbai attacks, “Cold Start”miscalculations, etc.
With More Nuclear-Ready States: Ramp Up to a Nuclear 1914?
16
New Nuclear Reactor Prices: Industry Estimates Are Still Rising
New Power Reactor Construction Cost Projections(Overnight nominal $ /kwe installed, exclusive of
financing costs)
01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,000
2004 2005 2007 2008
U. of C/DoENEIUnistarConstellationKeystone3-D Column 6E. ONFPL Turkey Pt.
17
Nuclear Power As A Carbon Abater Appears More Costly than Many Alternatives
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4 Minimal Suggestions• Distinguish between what can be safeguarded vice what can merely be monitored
• Discourage use of financial incentive in the promotion of nuclear power (e.g., loan guarantees, cheap developmental bank loans, etc.)
• Fortify the IAEA where it can be improved through more funding and authority (e.g., near-real time surveillance, safeguards fee, WAS unit, etc.)
• Constrain the stockpiles of nuclear weapons states other than US and Russia.
18
Two Additional Suggestions
• Reinterpret Article IV
• Require full transparency of large energy project costs and open international bidding that as is required by the Energy Charter Treaty and the Global Energy Charter for Sustainable Development; consider having the World Trade Organization assume enforcement and making this a requirement of any follow-0n to Kyoto Protocols.
19
Backup Slides
Hardly Proliferation Resistant Enough: Estimated Yields for Different Bomb
Technologies Using LWR Pu(Hubbard)
02468
101214161820
TrinityShot
TrinityWGandLWRPu
Trintiyx2
Trinityx3
Trinity Shot, super-grade Pu, 1% 240content
Weapons Grade, 6%240 Pu content
One-cycle LWR Pu,14% Pu 240 content
21
But Can’t the IAEA Safeguard Systems Prevent Fresh and Spent Nuclear Fuel
Diversions?
22
Problem: Time It Takes to Make A Bomb Is Shorter than the Period between Inspections
MATERIAL
Official IAEA Conversion Times
Official IAEA TimelinessDetection Goals
NRDC Conversion Estimates
Pu, HEU, U233 in metal form
7 to 10 days One month days
Pu In fresh MOX
1 to 3 weeks 1 month 7 to 10 days
PU in irradiated spent fuel
1 to 3 months 3 months 7 to 10 days if covert recycle
Low enriched uranium
3 to 12 months 1 year 1 to 30 days if covert enrichment
23
24
Not Unless They Are Upgraded • Of IAEA’s ~1,200 remote nuclear inspection cameras, nearly 800
still have no near-real-time feedback. Virtually all of the countries of concern have no near-real-time feedback
• IAEA internal review of May 2005 found in that “Over the past 6 years, there have been 12 occasions when facility lights were turned off for a period greater than 30 hours” See http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070731-NPEC-ReportOnIaeaSafeguardsSystem&PDFFolder=Reports
• Of those ~ 400 IAEA cameras that have near-time feedback today, many depend on internet connections that can be interrupted
• US State Dept. officials requested NPEC self-censor 2 scenarios for spent fuel rod diversions that could evade IAEA detection entirely. Similar scenarios, it turns out, were described elsewhere on the web by IAEA’s own Safeguards advisory group chairman. See http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20041022-GilinskyEtAl-LWR&PDFFolder=Essays 24
Problem: MUF at Declared Nuclear Fuel Plants Has Exceeded Many Bombs Worth• Sellafield (Euratom safeguards meeting IAEA criteria)
– 29.6 kgs pu MUF (Feb. 2005)– 190 kgs pu in “leak” undetected for 8 months
• Tokia Mura– MoX, 69 kgs pu MUF (l994)– scrap 100-150 kgs pu MUF (1996)– Pilot reprocessing 206kgs – 59 kgs pu MUF (2003)– Commercial reprocessing 246 kgs/yr pu MUF (2008?)
• Cogema-Cadarache reprocessing plant – Euratom report 2002, “unacceptable amount of MUF”, 2 yrs to resolve
• Similar MUF challenges at centrifuge enrichment plants seehttp://www.asno.dfat.gov.au/publications/addressing_proliferation_challenges_from_spread_enrichment_capability.pdf
25