Nuclear Outage Management & Health Physics Plant … 2012...By Dr. Kaoru Kikuyama, International Nuclear Energy Public Private Partnership, Japan A Spotlight on Safety Culture 32 By

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Outage Management & Health Physics

May-June 2012 Volume 30 No. 3

Khmelnitsky, Ukraine

ISSN: 2162-6413

MJ12.indd 1MJ12.indd 1 6/5/2012 10:10:09 AM6/5/2012 10:10:09 AM


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Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June 2012 www.NuclearPlantJournal.com 5

Outage Management & Health Physics Issue

®

Articles & ReportsA Cornerstone for Ensuring Safety 22 By Laurent Stricker, World Association of Nuclear Operators

Safety in Post-Fukushima Era 26 By Akira Omoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan We Carry a Huge Responsibility 28 By Dr. Kaoru Kikuyama, International Nuclear Energy Public Private Partnership, Japan A Spotlight on Safety Culture 32 By Diane Sieracki, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reducing the Risk 34 By William Reckley, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Japan's Plant Shutdown 36 Credit: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Japan Chernobyl’s Twenty-Year Experience on Radiation Protection 38 A Report by Nuclear Energy Agency, France

Fukushima Update 42

Industry InnovationsAstrid 45 By Christophe Behar, French Atomic Energy Commission, France

Improved Incore Instrumentation 47 By Mark Coddington, Entergy Nuclear

RCP Seal 50 By Joshua Seales, Southern Nuclear. Plant Profi le Excellent at Outreach 52 By Tatyana Lisitchuk, Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant, Ukraine Departments

Nuclear Plant JournalMay-June 2012, Volume 30 No. 3

Nuclear Plant Journal is published by EQES, Inc. six times a year in January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October, and November-December (the Annual Directory).

The subscription rate for non-qualifi ed readers in the United States is $150.00 for six issues per year. The additional air mail cost for non-U.S. readers is $30.00. Payment may be made by American Express®, Master Card®, VISA® or check and should accompany the order. Checks may be made payable to "EQES, Inc." Checks not drawn on a United States bank should include an additional $45.00 service fee. All inquiries should be ad-dressed to Nuclear Plant Journal, 1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515; Phone: (630) 858-6161, ext. 103; Fax: (630) 852-8787, email: [email protected]. Last 29 year Journal issues are now available online through the Journal website www. NuclearPlantJournal.com (search box on the right-top) for a nominal fee of $25 per issue. Contact: Kruti Patel, email: [email protected]

© Copyright 2012 by EQES, Inc.

Nuclear Plant Journal is a registered trademark of EQES, Inc.Printed in the USA.

Staff

Senior Publisher and EditorNewal K. Agnihotri, P.E.

Publisher and Sales ManagerAnu Agnihotri

Assistant Editor and Marketing ManagerMichelle Gaylord

Assistant Offi ce Manager Kruti Patel

Administrative Assistant QingQing Zhu

*Current Circulation: Total: 12,273 Utilities: 2,904*All circulation information is subject to BPA Worldwide, Business audit

30th Year of Publication

Mailing Identifi cation StatementNuclear Plant Journal (ISSN 0892-2055) is published bimonthly; January-February, March-

April, May-June, July-August, September-October, and November-December by EQES, Inc., 1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515. The printed version of the Journal is available cost-free to qualifi ed readers in the United States and Canada. The digital version is available cost-free to qualifi ed readers worldwide. The subscription rate for non-qualifi ed readers is $150.00 per year. The cost for non-qualifi ed, non-U.S. readers is $180.00. Periodicals (permit number 000-739) postage paid at the Downers Grove, IL 60515 and additional mailing offi ces. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Nuclear Plant Journal (EQES, Inc.), 1400 Opus Place, Suite 904, Downers Grove, IL 60515.

New Energy News 8

Utility, Industry & Corporation 10

New Products, Services & Contracts 15

New Documents 18

Meeting & Training Calendar 19

Research & Development 20

Journal ServicesList of Advertisers 6

Advertiser Web Directory 40

On The CoverOn August 8, 2004 Khmelnitsky 2 was connected to the power grid. Annually, two operating power units of Khmelnitsky NPP generate about 13,5 billion kWh of electricity which is equivalent to 16% of total amount of electricity generated by the Ukrainian nuclear fl eet. See page 52 for a profi le.


6 www.NuclearPlantJournal.com Nuclear Plant Journal, May-June 2012

Nuclear Plant Journal Rapid Response Fax Form

To: _________________________ Company: __________________ Fax: ___________________

From: _______________________ Company: __________________ Fax: ___________________

Address:_____________________ City: _______________________ State: _____ Zip: _________

Phone: ______________________ E-mail: _____________________

I am interested in obtaining information on: __________________________________________________

Comments: _____________________________________________________________________________

List of Advertisers & NPJ Rapid Response

May-June 2012

Advertisers’ fax numbers may be used with the form shown below. Advertisers’ web sites are listed in the Web Directory Listings on page 40.

Page Advertiser Contact Fax/Email9 Aecon Nuclear Samuel Anselm [email protected]

2 AREVA NP, Inc. Donna Gaddy-Bowen (434) 832-3840

11 Birns Eric Birns (805) 487-0427

14 Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Arlene Corkhill (714) 528-0128

17 Day & Zimmermann ECM David Bronczyk (215) 656-2624

4 Diakont Keith Reeser [email protected]

31 Frham Safety Products, Inc. Michael Randall (615) 726-2514

23 GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Michael Tetuan (910) 362-5017

15 Herguth Laboratories, Inc. Linda Perry (707) 554-0109

43 HukariAscendent Robert Plappert (303) 277-1458

45 Illinois Institute of Technology Nilda Cinco [email protected]

7 Kinectrics Inc. Cheryl Tasker-Shaw (416) 207-6532

49 Lockheed Martin Corporation Pat Troy (570) 803-2204

25 Nova, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Claire Dinkel (216) 433-1640

29 Nuclear Logistics Inc. Greg Keller [email protected]

13 ORTEC [email protected] (865) 425-1380

27 Perma-Fix Environmental Services Donald Goebel (865) 539-9868

51 Remote Ocean Systems Sandy Kennedy [email protected]

56 Scientech, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Don Murphy (301) 682-9209

39 Seal Master Thomas Hillery (330) 673-8410

21 The Shaw Group Inc., Nuclear Power Division Holly Nava (856) 482-3155

39 Tri Tool Inc. William Atkinson (916) 351-9125

33 UniTech Services Group Steve Hofstatter (413) 543-2975

41 URENCO Ltd. Please e-mail [email protected]

55 Westinghouse Electric Company LLC Karen Fischetti (412) 374-3244

37 Zachry Nuclear Engineering, Inc Lisa Apicelli (860) 446-8292

3 Zetec, Inc. Ki Choi (418) 263-3742



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New Energy

ChinaAREVA announced the arrival in

China, at the beginning of April, 2012, of the fi rst two steam generators and the pressurizer for Unit 1 on the site of the Taishan EPR™ power plant. This delivery of heavy components for the primary reactor coolant system marks an important step forward in the construction of the fi rst EPR™ reactor in China.

After leaving the port by the AREVA's Chalon-St Marcel plant, these heavy components were fi rst transported to Fos-sur-Mer in the South of France, before being shipped onwards by sea to the Taishan site where they are being kept in storage awaiting installation. The two remaining generators and the reactor pressure vessel internals are currently being transported to the site where they are expected to arrive in the coming weeks.

Completed in record time, the manufacturing of the steam generators has benefi ted from the experience gained by the AREVA's Chalon-St Marcel plant in the supply of heavy components for EPR™ construction projects. The manufacturing time for these generators, which are 25 meters (82.02 feet) long and weigh 550 tons each, has been reduced by nearly 40 % compared to those manufactured previously for other EPR™ reactors.

Contact: Patricia Marie, telephone: 33 1 34 96 12 15, email: [email protected].

JordanJAEC (Jordan Atomic Energy

Commission) has completed its evaluation to select a technology in order to build the fi rst nuclear reactor in Jordan. JAEC has conducted, since the last two years, a methodical scrutiny of three technologies regarding nuclear power plant technology.

The evaluation has been performed with the objective of selecting the most appropriate technology fi tting best Jordan needs and most appropriately ensuring the highest possible safety levels.

It concluded that ATMEA1 technology, developed by the French-

Japanese team, made up of AREVA, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and their 50/50 joint-venture ATMEA, is well fi tting Jordan needs and requirements both in technical and economical terms. This decision represents a signifi cant milestone in the technological development of ATMEA 1, a new world-class model of 1,100 MWe nuclear power reactor.

However, JAEC also decided to continue discussions, during the next phase of its evaluation, with two qualifi ed bidders, including AREVA-MHI-ATMEA. During that phase some outstanding topics will be reviewed in more detail and specifi c information from selected site and from operating company will be integrated.

This is a key achievement made by JAEC in the process of providing Jordan with a competitive and stable source of energy, allowing the Kingdom to enter into a new phase of its development.

Contact: Patricia Marie, telephone: 33 1 34 96 12 15, email: [email protected].

CanadaThe Federal Government has

responded to the recommendations of the Joint Review Panel and approved the Darlington New Nuclear Project Environmental Assessment (EA).

“OPG (Ontario Power Generation) is pleased with the Federal Government’s decision,” said Albert Sweetnam, OPG’s Executive Vice President, Nuclear Projects. “We were confi dent in the conclusions of our extensive studies, however independent review and confi rmation provides added assurance that the project will not result in any signifi cant adverse environmental effects, given mitigation.”

OPG now awaits a decision by the Joint Review Panel, as a panel of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, on the next key milestone: the issuance of the site preparation license. The site preparation license is the fi rst of three licenses required to build and operate a new nuclear facility in Canada.

Contact: telephone: (416) 592-4008.

V.C. SummerSouth Carolina Electric & Gas

Company (SCE&G), principal subsidiary of SCANA Corporation, and Santee

Cooper, South Carolina’s state-owned electric and water utility, have received approval for combined construction and operating licenses (COLs) from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for two new nuclear units at V. C. Summer Station in Jenkinsville, South Carolina.

“Receiving approval of our licenses to construct and operate units 2 and 3 at V.C. Summer is a signifi cant event for our company and marks the culmination of an intense review by the NRC,” said Kevin Marsh, chairman and CEO of SCANA. “We look forward to building these two new nuclear units to enhance our ability to meet the energy needs of our customers.”

About 1,000 workers are currently engaged in early-site preparation work at the V.C. Summer construction site. The project will peak at about 3,000 construction craft workers over the course of three to four years. The two units, each with a capacity of 1,117 megawatts, will then add 600 to 800 permanent jobs when they start generating electricity.

Contact: Rhonda O’Banion, telephone: (800) 562-9308, email: [email protected].

Watts BarThe Tennessee Valley Authority

board of directors on Thursday approved continuing with construction of the second generating unit at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in accordance with a revised estimate, furthering TVA’s progress toward its vision to be a leader in providing low-cost, reliable and cleaner energy.

The revised estimate for completing Watts Bar Unit 2 was announced in early April after TVA put new leadership in place and conducted a seven-month, top-to-bottom analysis of the construction project. The assessment identifi ed corrective actions for project management and a high-confi dence cost estimate and milestone schedule. The revised estimate includes additional funding of $1.5 billion to $2 billion, bringing the total cost to complete the unit to the range of $4 billion to $4.5 billion, with the most likely estimate of $4.2 billion. Estimated completion is between September and December 2015. Improvements in how the site is managed and work is done are already under way.

Contact: Barbara Martocci, telephone: (865) 632-8632. �


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Utility, Industry & Corporation

UtilityI&C

ASN (the French Nuclear Safety Au-thority) considers that the changes EDF has made to the instrumentation and con-trol (I&C) architecture of the Flamanville 3 EPR, France, are satisfactory and en-able it to lift the reservations it expressed in October 2009. This position is based on the analysis by its technical support organization, IRSN, and the opinion of the Advisory Committee for nuclear re-actors.

EDF has been carrying out considerable work to comply with the ASN requests and fi nally, as requested by ASN, has implemented an I&C architecture modifi cation designed to improve robustness and enable the SPPA-T2000 platform to be used for the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor. This modifi cation consists in duplicating some of the SPPA T2000 platform’s reactor protection functions on the Téléperm XS platform. The aim is to improve I&C robustness in the event of failure of the SPPA-T2000 platform combined with certain accident situations.

Following the IRSN analysis of these modifi cations and the 16th June 2011 opinion from the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors, ASN considers that the I&C architecture of the EPR reactor proposed by EDF is such as to be able to guarantee the safety of the systems used to manage incident or accident situations and their independence from the control systems used for normal operation of the plant. EDF may thus continue with deployment of this system, the detailed design of which will be analyzed by ASN prior to the commissioning authorization.

Credit: The Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN).

SPOTC TitleFor the seventh consecutive year,

Bruce Power’s Nuclear Response

Team’s competition team has claimed top spot at the Security Protection Offi cer Team Competition (SPOTC), held at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina in late-April, 2012.

Bruce Power’s team claimed fi rst place in eight of nine events, receiving 990.5 of a possible 1,000 points. The SPOTC is a competition for the U.S.-based Department of Energy (DOE) security forces, but is also open to US military and police SWAT, as well as Canadian and U.K. teams, which compete in the non-DOE category. Bruce Power was represented by Offi cers Jordan MacDougall, Mike McFarlane, Rob Bosman, Sam McCulloch, Kyle Roulston and Jeff Steven.

The nine events are designed to test tactical, physical, and fi rearm profi ciency, while focusing on speed, strength, agility and teamwork.

Contact: John Peevers, telephone: (519) 361-6161, email: [email protected].

IndustryISOE

Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE) was created in 1991 to improve the management of occupational exposures at nuclear power plants through the collection and analysis of occupational exposure data and trends, and through the exchange of lessons learned among utility and national regulatory authority experts.

The system has grown continuously and now provides participants with a comprehensive resource for optimizing occupational exposure management at nuclear power plants worldwide.

Membership in the ISOE program is open to nuclear utilities and to radiation protection regulatory authorities.

The ISOE database itself contains information on occupational exposure levels and trends at 482 reactor units in 29 countries covering about 91% of the world’s operating commercial power reactors.

Contact: website: www.isoe-network.net.

NRCThe Nuclear Regulatory Commis-

sion staff issueed Orders on March 12,

2012 to U.S. commercial nuclear reac-tors. This action begins implementation of several recommendations for enhanc-ing safety at U.S. reactors based on les-sons learned from the accident at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

Two of the Orders apply to every U.S. commercial nuclear power plant, including those under construction and the recently licensed new Vogtle reactors. The fi rst Order requires the plants to better protect safety equipment installed after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and to obtain suffi cient equipment to support all reactors at a given site simultaneously. The second Order requires the plants to install enhanced equipment for monitoring water levels in each plant’s spent fuel pool.

The third Order applies only to U.S. boiling-water reactors that have “Mark I” or “Mark II” containment structures. These reactors must improve venting systems (or for the Mark II plants, install new systems) that help prevent or mitigate core damage in the event of a serious accident. Plants have until Dec. 31, 2016, to complete modifi cations and requirements of all three Orders.

The Orders and the information request dated March 12, 2012 are available on the NRC’s website. These actions address what the NRC determined to be the highest-priority recommendations from the agency’s Japan Near-Term Task Force. The Task Force issued its report in July 2011. The NRC staff continues to examine how to best address the remaining Task Force recommendations, as well as additional topics raised during the early implementation effort.

Contact: website: http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/japan-activities.html

CorporationVersatile Measuring Instruments

Curtiss-Wright Corporation has acquired the Versatile Measuring Instruments (VMI) and Lisle-Metrix (L-M) product lines from the Amidyne Group for approximately $7 million. The VMI and L-M product lines serve the commercial nuclear power market, and consist of original equipment and re-engineered replacement products for obsolete



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equipment. The company will integrate both product lines into its Flow Control business segment.

Contact: Jim Ryan, telephone: (973) 541-3766.

Isolation ValvesFlowserve Corporation, a provider

of fl ow control products and services for global infrastructure markets, announced that it has shipped the fi rst of several main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to the Sanmen Nuclear Power Plant, located in the Zhejiang Province of China. The MSIVs will be installed in Unit 1 of the plant, the fi rst Westinghouse AP1000®

nuclear power plant ever built. The shipment relates to several multi-million dollar valve orders for the China nuclear market that Flowserve has booked since early 2010.

The MSIV utilizes a Flowserve Edward gas/hydraulic actuator. As part of the secondary system of the pressurized water reactor (PWR), the MSIV isolates the main steam line between the steam generator and the turbine. The total assembly of the valve and actuator

together stands more than 6.1 m (20 ft.) tall and weighs more than 25,900 kg (57,000 lbs.). The MSIV is designed to close within 3 to 5 seconds, which can be critical in the event that plant operations need to be shut down quickly.

Contact: Steve Boone, telephone: (972) 443-6644.

UK PlutoniumWith the U.K. government looking

at ways to address its growing stockpile of civil plutonium, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with National Nuclear Laboratory Ltd. (NNL). NNL will provide expert technical input to the potential U.K. deployment of GEH’s innovative PRISM reactor, which would be specifi cally designed to dispose the U.K.’s plutonium while generating 600 megawatts of low-carbon electricity.

GEH also met with a number of skilled nuclear workers in West Cumbria to learn how they could work with GEH on PRISM’s potential deployment.

The country is currently storing more than 87 metric tons (and growing)

of plutonium at the Sellafi eld nuclear complex in West Cumbria, England. The U.K. government confi rmed its intention to reuse this plutonium in December 2011, declaring that it “remains open to any alternative proposals for plutonium management that offer better value to the U.K. taxpayer.” The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) recently announced in February 2012 that it is seeking proposals for alternative approaches to manage the U.K.’s plutonium stockpile.

Should PRISM be approved for construction, in addition to creating about 900 permanent jobs and thousands of expected indirect jobs for the local community, this multibillion-pound investment would stand to create a range of opportunities for suppliers while continuing to develop the country’s nuclear energy skills base and reaffi rming Cumbria’s position of nuclear excellence with “Britain’s energy coast.”

Contact: Michael Tetuan, telephone: (910) 819-7055, email: [email protected].

(Continued on page 12)



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Equipment SupplierNuclear Logistics Inc. (NLI), has

been acquired by AZZ Incorporated. NLI is one of the largest equipment suppliers exclusively serving the nuclear industry. AZZ is a specialty electrical equipment manufacturer serving the global markets of industrial, power generation, transmission and distributions, as well as a leading provider of hot dip galvanizing services to the North American steel fabrication market. AZZ’s signifi cant presence in the power industry, coupled with NLI’s nuclear focus, will allow NLI to better serve clients while growing to meet the changing needs of the nuclear industry. Both NLI and AZZ are headquartered in Fort Worth, TX.

Contact: Craig Irish, telephone: (978) 250.1684, fax: (978) 250-0245 email: [email protected].

Certifi cationSCHOTT Electronic Packaging

has announced at Nuclear Industry China 2012 in Beijing that it has received the nuclear ASME-NPT and Material Organization certifi cations for its plant in Landshut (Germany), producing hermetic glass-to-metal sealed Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPA). Safety is vital in the nuclear industry and suppliers are required to comply with the highest standards.

This certifi cation allows SCHOTT to supply Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) as quality assured materials to nuclear power plants programs globally. Many countries follow the ASME world-class standards, providing compliance for all international markets whose standards mirror ASME’s requirements.

Contact: Barbara Augenblick, email: [email protected].

PRAURS Corporation, a global provider

of engineering, construction and technical services and Scientech, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company, have reached an agreement to jointly provide seismic, external fl ood and other

external hazard evaluation and PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) services to the U.S. nuclear power sector. These organizations are working together to provide utilities with quality solutions to emerging needs and new regulatory requirements.

With full capabilities to address all external hazards, the URS/Scientech team can provide utilities with quality solutions to emerging needs and requirements, including responding to near- term task force recommendations, requirements of Generic Issue 199 (Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plants), Post-Fukushima requests meeting NRC’s Regulatory Guideline 1.200, Rev. 2 expectations, and the ASME/ANS PRA Standard (RA-Sa-2009).

Scientech has provided exceptional quality PRA services for more than 25 years. Its parent company, Curtiss-Wright Corporation (CW), is a publicly held company founded in 1929 with over 7,500 employees worldwide. Scientech is an industry leader in PRA and has long and extensive experience in performing all aspects of PRA analyses for U.S. and international nuclear plants (www.scientech.cwfc.com).

Contact: Bruce Ross, telephone: (212) 768-1155, email: [email protected].

Fuel AssembliesWestinghouse Electric Company

has completed fabrication of all 157 fuel assemblies and related components needed to operate the fi rst-ever AP1000® nuclear power plant, Sanmen Unit 1, in Zhejiang province, China.

Completion of fabrication is a major milestone for Westinghouse and its Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility in Columbia, South Carolina, where the fuel assemblies were completed and delivered to the Sanmen Nuclear Power Company (also in Columbia) for later shipment to China. Sanmen Unit 1 is scheduled to begin generating electricity in 2013.

Contact: Scott Shaw, telephone: (412) 374-6737, email: [email protected].

Reactor Coolant PumpWestinghouse Electric Company,

Curtiss-Wright Corporation, and the State Nuclear Power and Technology Corporation (SNPTC) of China announced the successful completion of the design, manufacture and qualifi cation of the lead AP1000® Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). Curtiss-Wright successfully performed qualifi cation of the RCP at its Flow Control business segment’s Electro-Mechanical Division (EMD) facility in Cheswick, Pennsylvania.

The conclusion of qualifi cation testing of the AP1000 RCP, including 50 service cycles and more than 500 total operating hours, clears the way for installation of the RCPs at Sanmen Unit 1 in China, the fi rst AP1000 reactor to be built in the world. The shipment of the fi rst two RCPs for Sanmen 1 is expected to occur in the second quarter of 2012.

Contact: Scott Shaw, telephone: (412) 374-6737, email: [email protected].

SMRWestinghouse Electric Company

and Ameren Missouri have entered into an agreement to respond collaboratively to the United States Department of Energy (DOE) Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) for developing and licensing the Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor (SMR).

Under the terms of the agreement, Ameren Missouri will become part of and co-chair a Westinghouse-led Utility Participation Group (UPG) made up of Missouri utilities, non-Missouri utilities and industrial fi rms interested in seeking the DOE funds to develop and license the Westinghouse SMR technology, which includes a phased economic development approach associated with the SMR program for the State of Missouri.

Upon securing DOE support, Westinghouse and Ameren Missouri will then work collectively to seek Design Certifi cation of the Westinghouse SMR and a combined construction and operating license with the U.S. NRC for the Westinghouse SMR at Ameren Missouri’s Callaway site.

Contact: Scott Shaw, telephone: (412) 374-6737, email: [email protected]. �

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New Products, Services & ContractsNew ProductsBloxR

A Salt Lake City, Utah based innovative shielding and design company, Bloxr Corporation, has developed a revolutionary new attenuation sheet called BloxR. In laboratory testing utilizing a Cobalt-60 source, BloxR attenuation sheets performed better than comparable lead shielding products at less than 70% of the weight. BloxR is fl exible, light weight, and contains no hazardous constituents. Search BloxR on YouTube.

The company is currently performing a wide variety of fi eld and laboratory tests seeking to measure performance results commonly required by the nuclear industry. The Company is also seeking input from the industry regarding bench tests and desired applications. BloxR is expected to be manufactured in sheets, powder, fl owable fi ll, resin, paint, and other physical forms.

Contact: Bryan Melchior, telephone: (801) 230-7886.

Casks and ContainersSiempelkamp Nukleartechnik,

Germany, develops and manufactures transport and storage casks and containers for the nuclear sector for the handling of radioactive materials.

The range of materials extends from a range of casting qualities to granulate concrete and steel.

The range of services is completed with authorization to conduct design pattern testing at Siempelkamp. The required verifi cations of suitability for transport and storage of casks have been successfully completed at manufacturing sites for over 30 design patterns.

All cask and container types can also be manufactured with the addition of recycling material from the CARLA melting plant in Germany that has been recycled from nuclear dismantling. This highly economical form of recycling is an ideal way to combine savings on resources and savings on interim storage and fi nal disposal volumes.

Contact: John Mageski, telephone: (925) 932-4000, email: [email protected].

Shielding DevicesSiempelkamp’s scope of delivery

includes stationary shielding such as TX1S shielding components, cascades and shielding slabs, raising and sliding partitions, shielding doors, gates, barriers and partitions, in addition to shielding bells as shipping casks for fi lling with dismantled core units. Siempelkamp manufactures customer-specifi c designs from cast iron and steel in desired dimensions and thicknesses. The shields can also be plated with high grade steel. An optimal shielding effect is aimed for plant-specifi c design using recognized software.


ServicesNuclear Projects

Aecon’s experience in the Canadian nuclear power sector stretches back to the early 1970s. Since then, Aecon has successfully executed a broad spectrum of projects, including construction of Ontario’s Bruce ‘B’ Heavy Water Plant and the Darlington Used Fuel Dry

Storage project...all within a safe, zero-injury culture.

This kind of experience and track record has made Aecon a trusted supplier to nuclear power producers. It’s also helped us secure several long-term master service agreements with many longstanding clients in key sectors of the Canadian economy. In the nuclear power sector, these trusted partnerships are especially - and increasingly - important.

Aecon maintains a NUC-C nuclear quality management system certifi ed to CSA N285.0, and in compliance with CSA N286.1, CSA N286.3 and CSA N286.4 requirements. Aecon is also ISO 9001:2000 certifi ed and recently received N-Stamp certifi cation from the ASME for the fabrication of nuclear components for the U.S. and world markets.

Some of Aecon’s capabilities are: full EPC construction services, outage support and maintenance services, refurbishment solutions, fabrication of process piping, steel solutions, and data acquisition and control systems.

Contact: James Gandhi, telephone: (519) 740-7477, email: [email protected].






http://www.herguth.com


Services...Continued from page 15

NDEAnatec-LMT performs testing

and inspection services for commercial nuclear power plants to ensure safety, operational soundness and compliance with regulatory codes.

Anatec-LMT provides technologies and techniques for non-destructive examination (NDE) and testing of systems and components in nuclear power plants. NDE services support both in-service inspections to satisfy regulatory requirements and decision-making by nuclear plant operators concerning the on-going reliability, operability and safety of nuclear systems and equipment. Anatec-LMT services also include quality control inspections, development of programs in support of ASME Code compliance, and training and qualifi cation of NDE technicians.

Contact: Sharon Dey, telephone: (703) 286-2011, email: [email protected].

TestingEdgen Murray Nuclear uses

surveyed and approved state-of-the-art subcontracted laboratories for all testing on Commercial Grade Dedication and ASME Code Upgrade materials. Edgen Murray Nuclear also offers Niton XL3t 900S Alloy Analyzer technology, verifying that materials are in compliance with applicable specifi cations.

A member of several key industry organizations, Edgen Murray makes it a priority to stay abreast of codes and standards that can change quickly, as well as global infl uences on the nuclear market.

Contact: Adam Strange, telephone: (225) 756-9868, email: [email protected].

Environmental ServicesPerma-Fix Environmental Services,

Inc. is a nuclear services company and provider of nuclear waste management services. The Company’s nuclear waste services include management and treatment of radioactive and mixed waste for the commercial nuclear industry. The Company’s nuclear services group provides project management, waste

management, environmental restoration, decontamination and decommissioning, new build construction, and radiological protection, safety and industrial hygiene capability to our clients. The Company operates four fi xed based nuclear waste treatment facilities and provides the most comprehensive mixed waste management services nationwide.

Contact: Anne Smith, telephone: (865) 342-7668, email: asmith@perma-fi x.com.

Waste HandlingSiempelkamp supplies plants and

facilities for the handling of solid, liquid and gaseous radioactive waste.

Siempelkamp’s service package is customer-specifi c and includes the plan-ning and conceptualization, the licensing procedures, the manufacturing, delivery and installation, cold and hot commis-sioning, service and documentation of the system.


ContractsFuel Assemblies

AREVA and EDF have signed an agreement for the supply of fuel assemblies and related services for 2013 and 2014.

The two groups have also decided to negotiate a medium to long-term framework agreement on the production of fuel elements that reinforce the strategic partnership between AREVA and EDF in the supply of nuclear fuel.

The agreement signed and the one currently under negotiation provide AREVA with a clearer picture of its future production program.

Contact: Patricia Marie, telephone: 33 0 1 34 96 12 15, email: [email protected].

Waste Isolation PlantThe Babcock & Wilcox Company

(B&W) announced that Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC has been awarded a contract from the U.S. Department of Energy for management and operations at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Group, Inc. (B&W TSG) is a team member of Nuclear Waste Partnership, which is led by URS.

The contract has an estimated value of $1.3 billion over a 10-year period, which includes an initial fi ve-year

period in addition to a potential fi ve-year extension.

The overall mission of the WIPP is to protect human health and the environment by safe management, retrieval, characterization and disposal of defense-related wastes.

The contract is expected to begin October 1, 2012, following a transition period.

Contact: Aimee Mills, telephone: (434) 522-3802, email: [email protected].

Simulator UpgradeL-3 MAPPS has won a contract

from Pacifi c Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) to upgrade the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Operator Training Simulator (OTS). Work is underway now, with project completion expected by the fourth quarter of 2013.

The Diablo Canyon OTS upgrade project involves rehosting the legacy simulation models to modern simulation servers based on PC/Windows technology with L-3’s Orchid Simulator Executive to manage the models.

Contact: Sean Bradley, telephone: (514) 787-4953.

Underwater Laser Beam Welding

Westinghouse has been awarded a contract to apply the Underwater Laser Beam Welding process (ULBW) at Progress Energy’s Robinson Nuclear Plant in Hartsville, S.C. This will be the fi rst application of the ULBW process, which has been applied previously in Japan, at a U.S. nuclear plant.

Developed jointly by Westinghouse and majority owner Toshiba Corporation in a collaborative effort, the ULBW process applies stress corrosion, cracking-resistant weld metal – under water – onto the inside diameter surface of aged components, serving as a method of mitigation and repair. The laser beam’s precise heat and dilution controls result in consistent weld quality and high deposit purity.

At Robinson Unit 2, the process will be applied to reactor vessel nozzle dissimilar metal welds during the fall 2013 outage.

Contact: Scott Shaw, telephone: (412) 374-6737, email: [email protected]. �








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New Documents

EPRI1. Utilization of the EPRI Depletion Benchmarks for Burnup Credit Validation. Product ID: 1025203. Published April, 2012.

Pressurized water reactor (PWR) burnup credit validation is demonstrated using the benchmarks for quantifying fuel reactivity decrements, published as Benchmarks for Quantifying Fuel Re-activity Depletion Uncertainty, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report 1022909. This demonstration uses the depletion module TRITON (Transport Rigor Implemented with Time-Depen-dent Operation for Neutronic Depletion) available in the SCALE 6.1 (Standard-ized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluations) code system, followed by criticality calculations using KENO-V.a and MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System).

2. Plant Engineering: Advanced Nuclear Plant Cable System Design and Installation Concepts to Assure Longevity. Product ID: 1025066. Published April, 2012.

Although the electrical cable systems for existing nuclear power plants have functioned well for up to 40 years, the desired service life for new plants is 60 or more years. Experience with existing plants indicates that relatively small changes during the design and construction of nuclear plants will lead to longer cable system lives and greater ease of testing and assessment of cables to verify their remaining service life. This report describes those changes and provides recommendations for their implementation. The report is not a standalone guide for the design of nuclear plant cable systems.

3. Carbon-14 Dose Calculation Methods at Nuclear Power Plants. Product ID: 1024827. Published April, 2012.

Carbon-14 (C-14) is a naturally occurring isotope of carbon produced by cosmic radiation interactions in the upper atmosphere. Nuclear weapons testing in the 1950s and 1960s signifi cantly increased the amount of C-14 in the atmosphere. C-14 is also produced in commercial nuclear reactors, but the amounts produced are much less than those produced naturally or from weapons testing. C-14 is released through permitted effl uent pathways of a nuclear power plant. This report provides the current industry best practices for the estimation of site-specifi c dose to the public from C-14 in nuclear power plant gaseous effl uents.

4. Advanced Technology for Groundwater Protection: Automatic Tools and In Situ Sensors for Groundwater Monitoring. Product ID: 1024829. Published April, 2012.

This report documents the evaluation of automatic and in situ groundwater monitoring technologies for application at nuclear power plant (NPP) sites. The project studies the state of technology of automatic and in situ groundwater monitoring technologies and assesses whether they can be used to enhance the current groundwater monitoring capabilities at NPPs. Technologies for automatically detecting tritium and technologies that monitor non-radiological groundwater characteristics were explored. The ability to monitor using real-time technologies or automated sensors would enable NPPs

to identify and respond to potential releases by augmenting the traditional monitoring methods currently used.

The above EPRI documents may be ordered by contacting the Order Center at (800) 313-3774 Option 2 or email at [email protected].

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NUREG1. NUREG-2117, Practical Implemen-tation Guidelines for SSHAC Level 3 and 4 Hazard Studies. Published April, 2012.

The information in this NUREG is based on recent efforts to capture the lessons learned in the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) studies that have been undertaken using the SSHAC Guidelines. As a companion to NUREG/CR-6372 (Recommendations for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis: Guidance on Uncertainty and Use of Experts), this NUREG provides additional practical implementation guidelines consistent with the framework and higher-level guidance of the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Guidelines.

2. NUREG-2150, A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework. Published April, 2012.

The report describes a proposed risk management regulatory approach that could be used to improve consistency among the NRC’s various programs and discusses implementing such a framework for specifi c program areas.

The above NRC documents can be obtained from the NRC Public Document Room, telephone: (301)415-4737, fax: 301-415-3548, website: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/pdr.html. �


http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/pdr.html


Meeting & Training Calendar 1. Web-Based Radiation Course, July 9,

2012, Contact: Nilda Cinco, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, telephone: (630) 682-6035, email: [email protected], website: pl.iit.edu/radiation.

2. 53rd Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management INMM, July 15-19, 2012, Orlando, Florida. Contact: telephone: (847) 480-9573, email: [email protected].

3. U.S. Women in Nuclear, July15-18, 2012, Swan and Dolphin Hotel, Orlando, Florida. Contact: Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8000, email: [email protected].

4. Electric Power Research Institute Boiling Water Reactor and Pressurized Water Reactor Materials Reliability Conference and Exhibit, July 16-19, 2012, National Harbor, Maryland. Contact: Linda Nelson, telephone: (518) 374-8190, email: [email protected].

5. 8th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Plant Instrumentation, Control, and Human-Machine Interface Technologies, July 22-26, 2012, The Westin San Diego, San Diego, California. Sponsored by: American Nuclear Society. Contact: website: npic-hmit.ans.org.

6. American Society of Mechanical Engineer’s 2012 International Conference on Nuclear Engineering (ICONE), July 30-August 3, 2012, Anaheim, California. Contact: telephone: (212) 591-7786.

7. Nuclear Fuel Supply Forum, July 31, 2012, The Westin Georgetown Hotel, Washington, D.C. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

8. Radiation Protection Forum, August 5-8, 2012, The Westin Boston Waterfront, Boston, Massachusetts. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

9. International Youth Nuclear Congress. August 5-8, 2012, Westin Charlotte, Charlotte, North Carolina. Contact: Linda Wells, Nuclear Energy Institute, telephone: (202) 739-8039, email: [email protected].

10. 2012 Nuclear Information Man-agement Conference, August 12-15, 2012, JW Marriott Resort and Spa, Summerlin, Las Vegas, Nevada. Con-tact: Jane Hannum, telephone: (603) 432-6476, email: [email protected].

11. Topfuel 2012, September 2-6, 2012, Manchester, United Kingdom. Contact: Kirsten Epskamp, European Nuclear Society, email: [email protected], website: www.euronuclear.org/events/enc.enc2012.

12. 12th International Conference on Radiation Shielding and 17th Topical Meeting of the Radiation Protection and Shielding Division of ANS, September 2-7, 2012, Nara, Japan. Contact: Atomic Energy Society of Japan, email: offi ce@icrs12.

13. 6th Annual RadWaste Summit, September 4-7, 2012, Las Vegas, Nevada. Contact: Exchange Monitor, telephone: (877) 303-7367.

14. 37th World Nuclear Association Annual Symposium, September 12-14, 2012, Central Hall, Westminster, London. Contact: telephone: 44 0 20 7451 1520, fax: 44 0 20 7839 1501.

15. Electric Power Research Institute International Decommissioning and Radioactive Waste Management Workshop, October 23-25, 2012, Rome, Italy. Contact: Linda Nelson, telephone: (518) 374-8190, email: [email protected].

16. 2012 American Nuclear Society Winter Meeting, November 11-15, 2012, Town & Country Hotel & Resort, San Diego, California. Contact: website: www.new.ans.org/meetings.

17. European Nuclear Conference, December 9-12, 2012, Manchester, United Kingdom. Contact: Kirsten Epskamp, European Nuclear Society, email: [email protected], website: www.euronuclear.org/events/enc.enc2012. �

January-FebruaryInternational Trade & Waste & Fuel Management

March-AprilPlant Maintenance & Plant Life Extension

May-JuneOutage Mgmt. & Health Physics

July-AugustNew Plants & Vendor Advertorial

September-OctoberPlant Maintenance & Advanced Reactors

November-December Annual Product & Service Directory

Contact: [email protected]: (630) 364-4780

AnnualEditorial

Schedule


http://www.pl.iit.edu/radiation



http://npic-hmit.ans.org


mailto: office@icrs12

http://www.new.ans.org/meetings

http://www.euronuclear.org/events/enc.enc2012


Research & Development

3D Job Planning and Dose Estimation Prototype

EPRI is integrating a three-dimensional radiological algorithm with commercial imaging platforms to develop a tool that will help plan nuclear plant outage activities and minimize worker dose.

Nuclear plant radiation surveys are used by the radiation protection group to develop worker dose estimates, establish control measures, and brief workers on the radiological conditions they will encounter when entering the work environment. These surveys, however, are usually limited in scope, confi ned to two dimensions, and provide little information about dose variations with elevation. Using a variety of advanced technologies, three-dimensional information can now be estimated to enhance the value of typical radiation surveys.

EPRI has developed a subroutine using the three-dimensional aspects of radiological conditions to estimate dose rates for locations where workers will be standing. The subroutine is not a standalone application; its full benefi ts will be realized when it is integrated with third-party simulation software packages.

The project team – comprising EPRI, utility experts, FIATECH, and several software vendors – has developed three versions of a 3D imaging-based prototype for accurately planning work and estimating worker dose. The 3D imaging platforms in these prototypes incorporate the EPRI dose rate algorithms, which use precise worker positions, task durations, survey data, and technician knowledge of areas with sources of radioactivity to estimate the dose rates and dose for various work activities. The EPRI algorithm is intended for use with traditional survey or real-time dose rate data and mild to signifi cant dose gradients. EPRI validated the algorithm in a 2011 pilot-scale demonstration using data from a Midwest nuclear plant, and more recently, the 3D software vendors

validated the integration of their individual products with the algorithm.

Contact: Phung Tran, telephone: (650) 855-2158, email: [email protected].

Nondestructive Evaluation Modeling and Simulation Center

The center is applying advanced modeling and simulation techniques to address complex inspection reliability issues, such as the need for a qualifi ed procedure for tapered dissimilar metal weld geometries.

The new capabilities being developed through the Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Modeling and Simulation Center are expected to reduce the time, cost and complexity of approaches used to develop and demonstrate NDE techniques to meet regulatory requirements and industry commitments.

One of the ways in which modeling and simulation can improve inspection procedures is by condensing the number of physical parameters that need to be investigated. A few of the key elements that typically need to be defi ned in a single examination procedure include: inspection method, probe, wedge, beam angles and skews, time response window, inspection path and direction. Modeling and simulation can assess many combinations of these to determine the optimum confi guration, without the need for a range of time-consuming experiments. In addition, modeling and simulation can be used to extend procedures qualifi ed for one component to other similar components, eliminating the need to build mockups that can cost millions of dollars.

The NDE Modeling and Simulation Center used mathematical tools to augment an existing, qualifi ed EPRI procedure for non-tapered DMW components. EPRI analysis also helped in selecting transducers, wedges and other essential parameters to achieve the optimum qualifi cation and fi eld application methods. This approach avoided possible failed empirical trials that could impact inspection schedules.

Contact: Mark Dennis, telephone: (704) 595-2648, email: [email protected].

Dedication Methodology for Computer Programs

The guidance document, available by summer 2012, is expected to receive regulatory endorsement for use in the acceptance of design and analysis software.

EPRI is fi nalizing a guidance document for the acceptance of computer programs using commercial grade item dedication methodology. This is the fi rst EPRI document to specifi cally address the use of dedication methodology to accept products that are not plant structures, systems or components (SSCs). The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) plans to submit the document to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for endorsement because it addresses current regulatory expectations for the acceptance of design and analysis software.

The methodology is based on previous EPRI guidance for the dedication of commercial grade items and for accepting commercial grade digital equipment for use in safety-related applications. The document also builds on guidance from NEI’s Nuclear Information Technology Strategic Leadership group, which forms the basis for many utilities’ current software acceptance programs.

Important new concepts include changes in the terminology used to classify software, and a description of elements of the dedication technical evaluation process that may not be included in verifi cation and validation programs previously used to accept computer programs. Some existing programs may require changes to effectively implement the new guidance.

In addition to providing commercial grade dedication techniques for accepting safety-related design and analysis computer programs, the EPRI document includes guidance for determining the safety classifi cation of computer programs used in the design and analysis of safety-related plant SSCs. The safety classifi cation methodology can potentially reduce the scope of programs that require acceptance via the dedication process.

Contact: Marc Tannenbaum, telephone: (704) 595-2609, email: [email protected].

Source: Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI) Nuclear Executive Update, March, 2012. �



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A Cornerstone for Ensuring SafetyBy Laurent Stricker, World Association of Nuclear Operators.

Laurent StrickerLaurent Stricker was elected chairman of the WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) Governing Board in January 2009.

Laurent Stricker has been Head of Nuclear Operations (CNO) at EDF for six years from 1999 to 2005. He was responsible for the operation of the French nuclear fl eet – 58 nuclear units, representing a generating capacity of approximately 63,000 MW – with a staff of about 20,000 people.

An Interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal at the JAIF Annual Conference in Tokyo, Japan, on April 20, 2012.

1. What new ideas have been introduced by WANO since the Shenzhen, China Biennial General Meeting (BGM) in October 2011?

Through the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum 2012 Conference, participants

from suppliers, opera-tors and other organi-zations from all over the world have come together to discuss and decide how we can recover the trust of the people and how to safely restart nuclear power plants currently in shut down in Japan.

Taking such factors into account, WANO will keep on improving its approach decided at the Shenzhen conference in

China in October 2011 in cooperation with the IAEA, Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC), and other international institutions.

The resilience of the plants is as important as its safety. Resilience implies that in case an accident occurs and the core is damaged, then it should be contained without severe consequences affecting the public.

2. What progress has been made by WANO since the BGM ?

Signifi cant progress has already occurred. Twelve individual projects are underway to implement the fi ve recommendations, all led by a WANO Regional Directors or London Programme Director. Project teams have been formed to help implement most of these projects. The project teams consist of executives and managers from WANO’s members and experienced WANO staff. Progress on all project areas is being monitored by a Governing Board oversight committee.

One project is to conduct an assessment of each WANO Region and London. This project is well underway with one Regional Centre assessment already complete (Atlanta Centre). All fi ve assessments will be completed in 2012.

The WANO goal for all of the Commission recommendations is to demonstrate signifi cant progress by the May 2013 BGM in Moscow, and complete implementation by the 2015 BGM.

3. What is the structure of cooperation between WANO and IAEA?

During its June 2011 General Conference one of the 12 IAEA action plans items, decided by IAEA members, is to have a strong cooperation with WANO. IAEA has a leading role in ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants in the world. In my view, IAEA is the best placed organization to check the specifi c regulator’s quality of work. There is no other organization which is capable of checking the work of the regulator of a specifi c nation. IAEA has a binding role in case of nonproliferation; however, it is not so in case of ensuring safety of nuclear power plants.

WANO’s membership is voluntary for the utilities; however, all utilities all over the world are currently members of WANO. Members have obligations to WANO. Members are obligated to provide information to WANO and cooperate in the peer review by WANO. In case of lack of cooperation with WANO, a member is liable to lose its membership. WANO is an association of its members and its members are obligated to follow its rules. This guideline has been mandated in voting at the Shenzhen conference in 2011.

4. The organizations guardians of safety are INRA, WENRA, IAEA, and WANO. How will WANO coordinate with these and other organization to ensure harmonization and benchmarking?



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A Cornerstone...Continued from page 22

WANO’s primary coordination is with IAEA as described below. The IAEA is in the best position as a government organisation to coordinate with national regulators. However, WANO is communicating frequently

with national regulators and regulators’ organisations like INRA to describe who we are and what we do, but not to share confi dential member performance information.

5. How does WANO plan to ensure that individuals utilities worldwide develop a healthy “safety culture”?

WANO’s Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture provides an important framework for discussions and assessments of a plants’ safety culture. WANO encourages the benchmarking

of best nuclear safety culture practices amongst members. Through WANO, members are encouraged to exchange useful concepts, approaches and tools that can help support efforts to improve the nuclear safety culture at stations

and corporate headquarters. Essentially every WANO activity looks at safety culture in one way or another. Peer reviews, which form the backbone of WANO programmes, pay particular attention to safety culture during their thorough on-site reviews. The WANO corporate peer review is also an effective and important tool to assess the infl uence that the corporate organisation has on the safety culture of the entire organisation.

6. What is WANO’s plan to ensure transparency from each of its members, in view of Fukushima, to ensure that every plant worldwide is operated safely?

Recommendation 4 of the Post-Fukushima Commission deals with Visibility and Transparency. A project team has been established to focus on how WANO will increase both its public visibility, and transparency among members. WANO faces the challenge of balancing the need for confi dentiality with the need to be more publicly visible. The work of this project team is well underway and the fi rst edition of a new report detailing members’ participation in WANO activities is expected to be available in early 2013.

7. What is WANO’s focus on mitigation of an accident?

In Shenzhen, it was also decided to focus on mitigation of an accident in addition to the safety of nuclear power plants.

For mitigation, WANO has to focus on emergency organizations, and our team of experts is ready to check the procedure and to check the quality of training. WANO will also set up an organization in collaboration with IAEA, INPO, organizations in Japan, and in other countries in order to provide equipment and to provide experts from the operators.

8. What is the scope of “mitigation” activity, which I believe has been added to WANO’s scope of work after Fukushima?

Several of the projects that are underway deal directly with expanding WANO’s scope to include mitigation. There is a project team addressing how to add emergency preparedness to all four of WANO’s programmes, for example. In addition, a second project team is looking into how WANO will ensure the severe accident management lessons from Fukushima have been adopted by all members. Finally, several

This refers to the complementary nature of all organisations that play a role in ensuring safe and reliable nuclear plant operation. These include the national regulators, international organisations mainly like the IAEA, and WANO. Nuclear safety is best served when all of these organisations are strong and work in harmony.



of the WANO Signifi cant Operating Experience Reports (SOERs) deal directly with implementing mitigation lessons learned.

9. Does WANO plan to have a decentralized operation through its regional centers, or centralized operation or a combination of both?

WANO’s operation will be a combination of both. WANO needs to have regional centers to take into account the region’s culture, at the same time WANO needs to improve the consistency between the different regions in order to have the same level of quality at all regions. As I said, WANO has started the assessment of the four centers and the London offi ce and we plan to complete the assessment by end of this year in order to see the strength

and the weaknesses of different regional centers.

Our organization is recognized as an important organization by the operators because at the end of the day the nuclear safety responsibility lies with the operators. Secondly it is desired that the international cooperation increase and thirdly the commitment of the CEOs is the cornerstone of ensuring safety of nuclear power plants worldwide.

10. What is WANO’s plan to ensure that the nuclear power plants worldwide are operated only by qualifi ed and experienced staff?

Every WANO peer review assesses the training, experience and profi ciency of plant staff, and identifi es any areas of concern for the plant to address. This

assessment is particularly important during pre-startup peer reviews, where the primary goal is to ensure operators are thoroughly trained and qualifi ed to run the new plant or unit safely.

An extremely important aspect of this training is the transfer of operating experience as the older generation retires from our nuclear plants and is replaced by a strong and capable younger workforce, who has not experienced the same lessons from the past.

We have an obligation to this younger generation to make sure they do not repeat the mistakes we made.

Contact: Claire Newell, World Association of Nuclear Operators, telephone: 44 (0) 20 7495 9242, email: [email protected]. �

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Safety in Post-Fukushima EraBy Akira Omoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology.

Akira OmotoAkira Omoto is the Project Professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology and the Commissioner of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)of Japan. Before assuming the current position, he was Director of the Division of Nuclear Power of the IAEA. Before that, he had served for TEPCO.By education, he is a nuclear engineer. He graduated from the University of Tokyo and received his doctoral degree from the same university.

An Interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal at the Atomic Energy Commission, Japan's headquarters in Tokyo, Japan on April 17, 2012.

1. Based on Japan’s Fukushima experience and based on your international experience at IAEA, how can the Japanese regulatory agency help build public confi dence?

The AEC is not a regulatory body and, by statute, its function does not include safety-related activities.

New regulatory position is formulated for protection against natural hazard, Station Blackout, and Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink, and for improvement of Severe Accident Management in the light of Fukushima accident. Also,

the country is taking steps to gain public trust to nuclear safety regulation by separating Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) from Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and giving independence from promotional side as well as from political pressure.

One important issue will be tech-nical expertise of

the staff members of the new regulatory body so that the new Agency will be able to make informed decision by giving top priority to safety, since, in the Japanese Government system, staff members ro-tate frequently. Changing this system or cooperation with and support from Technical Support Organization (TSO) will help alleviate this competence issue. Nevertheless, it is clear that outsourcing to TSO does not solve everything.

2. Any accident anywhere in the world, affects the entire industry worldwide. How you believe the “new countries” interested in nuclear energy can be made to ensure the safety of their power plants, despite their new regulatory agency and despite their lack of experience?

The accident at the Fukushima NPP has shown, unfortunately once again, the magnitude of socio-economic impact of nuclear reactor accident. I guess the “new countries” understood what is meant by “responsible use” very well from this accident.

The international nuclear community, including governmental organizations and industry of nuclear power countries, as well as IAEA and WANO, is expected to further strengthen their support to newcomers in helping infrastructure-building, including Human Resources, for safe and reliable operation of NPPs.

3. How will the IAEA be able to enhance safety of nuclear power plants worldwide in post-Fukushima era?

I think the IAEA’S comprehensive action plan endorsed by the last General Conference described how it intends to enhance nuclear safety globally. This plan includes a wide spectrum of measures including safety standards, emergency preparedness, legal framework, dissemination of information and others.

In direct relevance to your point on plant safety, my personal view is that the IAEA will specifi cally be able;

a) To promote review of standard designs such as GRSR (Generic Reactor Safety Review).

b) To strengthen its role in the review of specifi c sites and designs of the new plants to be built in new nuclear countries.

Since such review missions are invited by host countries, the IAEA cannot force those newcomer countries to do so. It will be benefi cial to create an atmosphere that newcomer countries really recognize benefi ts from inviting such international missions for confi dence building with the neighbors as well as within the country.

4. Can the IAEA become an International Regulator?

I do not think so. Unlike safeguard, nuclear safety belongs to national responsibility. It is the national regulators, not the IAEA, that protect the public and environment of the nation from harmful effect of radiation through day-by-day activities such as setting regulatory standards, licensing, inspection and others. In my memory, there had been a discussion about super regulator, beyond national regulators. However, I do not think this is possible. Instead, the IAEA is helping strengthen the effectiveness




of national regulatory bodies through IRRS (Integrated Regulatory Review Services), establishing safety standards expecting Member States to adopt.

5. How can the international industry collaborate to ensure safety of nuclear power plants worldwide?

There are two elements; competition and cooperation, but, without cooperation for better safety, the industry as a whole will not be able to survive.

Collaboration is possible in many ways and is ongoing such as establishing consensus standards by experts such as ASME/ANS standards. The IAEA Safety Standards including guides are vehicles for sharing good practices.

6. What role can be played by INRA, WENRA, WANO, IAEA, different owners groups, and other organizations to ensure safety of nuclear power plants worldwide?

Depending on specifi c statute, they can play different roles by not duplicating each other. Maybe important thing is sharing information. I know an example of IAEA and WANO.

7. What is your proposal for an international regulatory enforcement structure so that all the plants all over the world are cognizant of the “best practices” and are encouraged to implement these?

The IAEA action plan is built to serve this purpose.

8. How is Japan implementing a new “safety culture”, which was indicated as a lesson learnt in its report to IAEA, which was submitted in September 2011.

One example is creation of a new Industry organization like US INPO replacing Japan Nuclear Technology Institute (JANTI) was announced in Feb. 2012, which I hope will work to rebuild safety culture in the Industry/Utility. Nevertheless, a new organization is just a vehicle. What it will do based on what fi ndings on safety culture problems by scrutinizing Fukushima accident is critically important. This is yet to be seen.

New regulatory agency will see its implementation. In some countries (especially Nordic), safety culture is a part of oversight by the regulatory body in my understanding. Creation of new regulatory body by transferring organizations (NISA from METI and NSC) to MoE and functions (such as security from AEC) is planned, waiting for enacting in the Diet.

9. Concluding remarks.I think the IAEA has established

a very good, comprehensive plan to improve safety globally. I expect the nuclear safety will be improved by implementing recommendations or action plans endorsed by the IAEA member countries. The practical actions are already in place in many areas by learning from other country’s good practices and learning lessons from Fukushima. But at the same time, as the coordination of various organizations will be important. Key issues will be how to enhance defense-in depth, especially in level 4 and 5, Protection by design and

SAM (Severe Accident Management) against natural hazard, SBO (Station Blackout), Loss of UHS (Ultimate Heat Sink), and Terrorist attack as well as enhanced Safety culture. Nevertheless, the next severe accident, if it occurs, will not duplicate the same pattern. Human wisdom is expected to preemptively address vulnerabilities by investigating the root-cause of the accident and by using tools such as PSA to avoid accident.

Regulation does not solve everything. Safety is a primary responsibility of Operator. Operator’s effort, by understanding responsible use and risk management, is of paramount importance.

Contact: Akira Omoto, Room 777, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Government Building No. 4, 3-1-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, 100-8970; email: [email protected]. �



We Carry a Huge ResponsibilityBy Dr. Kaoru Kikuyama, International Nuclear Energy Public Private Partnership.

Kaoru KikuyamaDr. Kaoru Kikuyama is Chairman of Board, International Nuclear Energy Public Private Partnership (INEP³) since June 2011. INEP³ has been formed in response to post Fukushima, consisting of associate companies and individuals. She is a Business Development Executive for nuclear business at IBM Japan. Prior to joining IBM, Dr. Kikuyama served in various positions at Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, including the representative at the Washington offi ce, Senior Director for International Program, etc.. She is a security and non-proliferation expert by training, and she also specialized in communication and climate change throughout her career with JAIF.

This article is based on an Interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal in Tokyo, Japan, on April 19, 2012.

INEP³ (International Nuclear Energy Public Private Partnership) was formed in June 2011 when we realized that we needed to do something to deal with post-Fukushima. Obviously in my view, everything was a mess. It created chaos. The nuclear industry lost public

confi dence in Japan and they never faced that kind of disaster in a lifetime so they didn’t know what to do and the Japanese government side had so many issues to deal with and seemed to be inexperienced dealing with the issue of this magnitude. The world is watching

and expects the Japanese nuclear sector to take the fastest remedy to revive public confi dence as quick as possible. In reality, the government nor industry has been unable to improve the damage at the speed they were expected. Meanwhile, our reactors have to shut down one after another for the periodic inspection. I knew once they shut down, they wouldn’t come back for long.

In Japan, when you re-open a reactor after the inspection, you need a local approval, which is a very unique system. I felt that the industry needs to take action to avoid the worst case scenario and also the government needs to bring back the public trust. Because of those situations, I was thinking that having known people in the nuclear industry for a long time and knowing the nuclear industry and government’s both weak and strong side, if we could create some mechanism to facilitate the public private partnership to address requirements, maybe things could get better. From my experience.

I thought if we need to help the Japanese industry, I thought I have to rely on the collaboration with the American

nuclear sector under the framework of public private partnership. Therefore, I decided to bring in my old friends and colleagues from the U.S. side to form INEP³. We started discussing with the government, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and others, while talking to Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan (FEPC), Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). We tried to identify where the biggest issue was. Obviously I knew and we found out that the basic area was the emergency management. Also the regulatory issue was another challenge. Japanese regulatory system is more than 40 years old. It hasn’t changed much. It’s very old fashioned. So we need to modify our system, while we also found out how poor the communication was during the crisis. So we proposed that we could bring in U.S. expertise in public communication in a crisis, regulatory system, and emergency response. Those pillars are the major subjects that INEP³ has been focused on. It’s almost been one year since we started. This is not only a Japanese issue.

There are several countries which may need our help in the very same fi eld even though they didn’t experience a big disaster like we did. Countries, including those introducing nuclear energy, require quite an effective communication system and very effective emergency preparedness. Those are the countries we try to help. I’m afraid that in Japan things are moving so slowly. I have IT background so I realized that the speed is so different in the nuclear industry compared to others. I’m so concerned with the very slow, tedious process in changing the course. For example for the government side, they are trying to build a new regulatory body which has been delayed because of the involved politics. But without a new regulatory body how can we start re-opening nuclear reactors. Everyone is concerned about the electricity shortage in this summer. People working for the nuclear plants




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such as subcontractors are going to lose their jobs. Those engineers can be at risk to lose their technical edge if the situation sustained. We have been such a leading nuclear country, and we were so proud of our technologies, but now no single reactor is in operation. The longer the reactors are taking to get re-opened, the worse outcome we can expect. The industry doesn’t seem to be taking enough action to make things move faster either. INEP³ believes that the Japanese nuclear industry should be more aggressive. We cannot just rely on the government to fi x the problem. Even though the industry and government is in a confl ict, it is the industry that has the signifi cant expertise in nuclear. The industry needs to bring in their precious knowledge and experience to be refl ected in a regulatory decision, just like they do in the United States. We have to be mature in the collaboration with the government and both parties should share the sense of urgency in restarting reactors as the common agenda under the circumstances. We cannot let the public decide if they need nuclear or not. We have to be proactive to make them decide. They know that Japan needs nuclear to save their local economy and to keep the national GDP. For that, we try to assist. That’s our mission.

The accident was way beyond what the Japanese nuclear engineers experienced. We appreciate the commitment of people from INPO, NRC, Exelon, AREVA, to name a few, stationed in Japan for restoring the situation at Fukushima for months.

For INEP³, we are focused on the political or public communication aspect. So we did not think enough in the engineer’s role. As I said, since we’ve been focused on three items which do not necessarily involve engineering skills directly, but which indirectly relate to them, needless to say. We are going to provide a training course to regulatory people and site managers for example.

Every nuclear engineer needs to communicate with the public one way

or another. That’s what we strongly recommend. But there is always an issue that if you communicate with the public, you have to be very careful with the language you use. That’s something that formed our training course. I often say in my presentation that the language and technical terms you are using, if the public does not understand, then that would be very counter effective. The communication means it’s not the one sided message. The communication means that you make sure the other party is listening to you and understands what you are talking about. That was apparent when Fukushima happened. The industry and government explained every detail of degrading reactors condition, but unfortunately those are too complicated for the general public. So that made the public more anxious about the situation. So the engineers needs to be trained how to communicate. At the same time, an engineer should be aware that every one of them represents the nuclear industry.

For example, I was talking to the industry in India recently that if you are a local community member and you have an issue with your plant, you have to step forward. Don’t be shy, or hide yourself behind the door. The CEO of the company cannot come to the village every single day to explain to the community or build the relationship with them. You are the one who is representing the company there in a sense. So you better learn how to communicate and be proactive in connecting to the local people. That’s the only way the public will start having confi dence in you and start having confi dence in the nuclear industry. Also, make the media as your neutral confi dant if not your friend. The third party messages tend to carry truths much louder than ours for both negative and positive natures.

These all require skills based on the trainings, we have an associate member specialized in a professional communication training. This company has a major share in training in the U.S. nuclear industry. They are going to be working with us so we are in good shape.

If you want to build new reactors in both developing and developed countries, you would face exactly the same issue.

People are going to ask you what your emergency response is. Where is your proper regulatory system in preventing and dealing with every sever accident? How is the nuclear engineer going to explain to them what they are doing? Under the big emergency situation, how can they bring our confi dence up in nuclear? Every vendor, manufacturer, utility and government is prone to submit to the same challenges after all.

I think the most important thing which has been missing in Japan is the attitude to learn from the lessons. In the U.S. nuclear industry, you have a corrective action program. In Japan we do, but it is not effective enough. It is hard for people to admit their mistakes, which are the basis for the every industry and sector to survive. The nuclear industry’s regulation needs to be very tight and strong because if anything goes wrong, it affects not only the local but global population. We in the nuclear sector carry huge responsibility in every safety and operation issue.

What is most important about Fukushima for not only the Japanese but the global industry is that we have to learn from the lesson. If we try to dismiss or neglect the signifi cance of this experience, that’s not right at all. Learning lessons depends on the people’s perception and background. Unless we are open to those lessons, we can never get the public confi dence back. We need to be much more sincere and we need to have much broader views in tackling the situation. You need to learn from other countries' best practice, and also you need to communicate with the people from different industries. Communicate with the public, communicate with other industry people because they have a variety of thinking and totally different training based mind. If we are confi dent enough ourselves then the public will give you the confi dence. Now the nuclear people are totally shaken up and the public senses it. Be more proactive. In order to get your confi dence back, you cannot do just business as usual, you have to change.

Contact: Kaoru Kikuyama, INEP³, email: [email protected]. �

We Carry...Continued from page 28



A Spotlight on Safety CultureBy Diane Sieracki, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Diane SierackiDiane Sieracki is a Senior Safety Culture Program Manager in the Offi ce of Enforcement (OE) at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). She functions as the lead for the safety culture efforts related to the external regulated communities in the NRC’s Offi ce of Enforcement. Ms. Sieracki led the efforts for the development and publication of a Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS) applicable to all licensees, and continues to coordinate the efforts to continue dialogue and education with external stakeholders with respect to the SCPS based on Commission direction. She is Involved in International safety culture efforts with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) and is currently assisting with development of a Technical Document related to Oversight of Safety Culture as well as other Report Series documents related to safety culture.

Ms. Sieracki has a Master Degree in Management and Organizational Behavior.

An Interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal at NRC’s Regulatory Information Conference 2012 on March 14, 2012.

1. How does the U.S. NRC train its staff with Safety Culture?

The NRC’s Offi ce of Enforcement (OE) has the lead for external safety culture efforts with respect to the NRC’s Safety Culture Policy Statement (SCPS) as well as for the Agency’s internal safety culture. We have a safety culture training plan for the staff in OE. Our safety culture training plan includes reading and reviewing a series of safety-culture-related documents followed by a discussion with their supervisor to ensure that there is a complete understanding. We also include formal training such as interview skills

and focus group training along with on-the-job training such as participation in safety culture assessments. Some of the review documents provide a history of safety culture leading up to the efforts involved in the development and issuance of the SCPS. This ensures that the staff will be familiar with what came before the policy statement. Our inspectors receive training related to safety culture, along

with many other topics, in their Inspector Training Qualifi cations. That’s what we do at the agency. The NRC does not have formal training requirements for the licensees in this area. The licensees’ staff would receive any type of training the licensees have through their own training programs.

2. When did the U.S. NRC’s Safety Culture come into being?

This effort began in February of 2008. The Commission directed the staff to consider a safety culture policy statement applicable to materials licensees as well as our reactor licensees. After nearly three years of work, including workshops with stakeholders, the staff published the draft SCPS in the Federal Register on two separate occasions to seek public comments. The staff sent the SCPS to the Commission for approval

in January 2011. The SCPS received Commission approval and it became effective in June of 2011. The defi nition of safety culture and the nine traits that describe safety culture, developed by representatives of our diverse group of regulated communities at an NRC workshop in February 2010, resonates with our stakeholders as evidenced by the support we received through public comments and feedback during outreach activities. Since the SCPC was effective in June 2011, there has been interest in the international community, as well.

3. Has NRC’s Safety Culture benefi tted from other industries experience?

The NRC staff has sponsored a trilateral meeting with other government agencies to share experience in the safety culture arena. We had DOE, NASA, FAA, and a number of other entities in the U.S. participate in this meeting. We followed up with a smaller meeting with NASA and FAA. Each agency provided more detail into what their particular organization was doing in safety culture, so each participant could learn from the others. We plan to do the same later this year now that the SCPS has been published, so we are very active with other regulators.

4. How have we implemented the lessons learnt from other industries in our industry's Safety Culture?

We’ve developed case studies for our licensees to learn from, examining events that have happened in other industries, as well as our own regulated communities. We review the event as well as the reports that were completed by oversight or government agencies and analyze the reports’ conclusions. We look at the traits in the SCPS as they relate to the root causes and contributing factors of those events and we indicate where perhaps there was weak evidence of safety culture traits which could have contributed to the event or where there were evidence of strong safety culture traits that mitigated the consequences of the event or the severity of the event. We have four case studies that have been issued to date and have them posted on the NRC’s safety culture web page. We have also developed a User Guide for the case studies that’s also available on the safety culture webpage. This Guide assists the




reader in understanding the purpose and potential use of the case studies. This is an ongoing project and we will continue to develop additional case studies to learn from.

5. How do you access Safety Culture information on U.S. NRC’s website?

The best ways to fi nd those are on our safety culture web page. The NRC’s home page at nrc.gov includes a link for safety culture on the left side of the page. That link will bring you to the safety culture page which has everything that we’ve done in the area of safety culture in OE.

6. Is the Safety Culture policy statement a required document?

It is a policy statement which is not a regulation. It represents the NRC’s expectations. The NRC’s role is to provide oversight for safety culture. The licensees and certifi cate owners own their safety culture. It’s our expectation that they have a positive safety culture. The same holds true for anyone that they have on site such as contractors, sub contractors, vendors and suppliers. It really is their responsibility to enforce it.

As I mentioned previously, there is broad support for the SCPS within our regulated communities. The February 2010 workshop which resulted in the development of the safety culture defi nition and traits that you see in the fi nal SCPS consisted of a panel of 16 individuals from not only the reactor community, but also from areas such as the medical fi eld, vendors, gauge manufacturers and non-destructive engineering. These representatives from the diverse communities believe in this SCPS and have been instrumental in bringing these concepts into their fi elds. Our NRC staff has been continuing to engage in broad range of activities to provide outreach and education to our regulated communities and feedback has continued to be positive. There is interest and commitment to a positive safety culture. The NRC staff will continue to conduct outreach and education and will also assess the effectiveness of our efforts after an appropriate amount of time. We want our licensees and certifi cate holders to embrace these concepts and our expectations so that we can continue

in our oversight role with our licensees and certifi cate holders taking the lead in ensuring that they have a positive safety culture. So we are doing a lot of communication. It’s not training with a capital T, it’s information sharing and communication of our expectations

7. Concluding remarks.NRC Chairman Jaczko’s opening

remarks at the Regulatory Information Conference 2012, where he discussed the process of developing our SCPS. He supported the extensive outreach with, and engagement of, our licensees in developing the SCPS. The process used, I believe, makes this a very strong policy statement. There was a signifi cant amount of “buy-in” and ownership for those that participated from the various regulated communities. The support through feedback and comments received was overwhelmingly in support of the SCPS defi nition and traits. It should be noted that we are seeing this continued interest and support as evidenced by the reactor community’s involvement in working with NRC staff to further develop the traits to provide a common language to speak from when the NRC and industry are discussing safety culture. Industry and NRC staff have participated in two workshops already and we’re intending to continue to work with them so that our documents can be changed and their documents can be changed so that the language is something that when you walk into a facility and you talk about safety culture you’re talking the same language. We are encouraging other regulated communities to have the same discussions. We realize, and the SCPS notes, that some of the nine traits will resonate with some licensees in a manner that they may not with other licensees or certifi cate holders. Some of these communities may decide to further develop the traits to ensure greater understanding just as the reactor community is doing. The interest level is high and we are encouraged by that.

Contact: Diane Sieracki, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, telephone: (301) 415-3297, email: [email protected]. �

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Reducing the RiskBy William Reckley, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William ReckleyMr. Reckley is currently serving on the Risk Management Task Force being led by NRC Commissioner Apostolakis. Prior to this appointment, Mr. Reckley was a branch chief in the Advanced Reactor Program within the Offi ce of New Reactors, where he was responsible for developing the licensing infrastructure for small and medium sized reactors – including the next generation nuclear plant (NGNP) project. In addition to working on numerous specifi c licensing activities, Mr. Reckley has contributed to various generic projects such as revising emergency action levels, developing the consolidated line item improvement process, and preparing guidance documents for NRC staff, licensees, and applicants.

Mr. Reckley holds a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Maryland.

An Interview by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal at NRC’s Regulatory Information Conference 2012 on March 15, 2012.

1. How did PRA evolve at the NRC?There have been previous initiatives

within the Commission going back to the 80’s and 90’s to increase the use of PRA and other risk assessment tools within the agency. You can actually take it all the way back to the mid 70’s and the reactor safety study. The accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 also highlighted that events that were not modeled explicitly within the design basis calculations should be identifi ed and some measures taken to ad-dress them. PRAs have been increasingly used to supplement traditional design ba-

sis or deterministic assessments and more recently have in some cases been the lead or primary assessment tech-nique for regulatory decisions.

2. Has PRA been applied in other industries?

It has been used in other areas such as the space program and aviation

industries. Obviously those programs had to look for possible failures and what were the consequences of failures. These studies focused on how to prevent them and how to add redundancy and other features to make sure that NASA missions or airplanes operated safely. The nuclear industry, I think it is safe to say, has been a large contributor to the evolution of PRA. While we’re not the only industry to use these techniques, the nuclear industry has been a big part of its development.

3. What is the difference between “Defense in Depth” and “Risk Assessment”?

Defense in depth is a concept or philosophy that is built basically on the premise that you put multiple barriers and actions in place such that should you have an event, there are levels of protections and you’re not reliant on a single activity or single program or piece of equipment to protect the public from the possible exposure to radioactive materials. It’s really a philosophy to look and say what

can we put in place to prevent an accident, mitigate accidents, contain radioactive materials even if the accident continues to progress because of equipment failures, or human errors, or something unexpected occurs. Risk assessments are a way to test whether the actions taken are providing the desired level of protection. Whether you’ve put enough protections in place, whether you need additional equipment, or whether you need additional programs. So they aren’t independent at all, they are very closely related.

4. Defi ne the scope of PRA Level 1, 2, &3.

You can look at them as a progression. Level 1 PRA’s are primarily focusing on the reactor core. Level 2 PRA’s are looking at that radioactive material getting from the reactor cooling system into containment. Level 3 PRA is from the containment into the environment.

5. Has PRA level 3 been applied in the nuclear power industry?

There have been a number of Level 3 PRAs performed. The reactor safety study in 1974 was a Level 3 PRA. It modeled the radioactive material all the way from a possible accident within a plant, to damage within the core, all the way through containment failures and the release of radioactive materials out into the environment and the modeling of the impact on nearby areas. Then in the mid 1980’s there was another series of Level 3 PRAs in the United States. These evaluations were documented in NUREG-1150 (Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants — Final Summary Report), which studied several plants and did the same calculation all the way through. Now the Commission has directed the staff to do another Level 3 PRA and plant Vogtle in Georgia has volunteered to be the subject plant. That is just getting started. Those are the Level 3 PRAs that the NRC has performed. There are a number of other Level 3 PRAs that have been performed by individual companies and in the international arena.




6. Have all questions raised in Commissioner Apostolakis’ presentation at RIC 2011 been answered?

The questions posed during the RIC in 2011 were the initial questions that the task force set up to help defi ne our efforts. We tried to address those questions and others through discussions and the answers or the feedback that we’ve received from both NRC staff and industry, we issued a Federal Register notice asking for comments, it was published in November 2011 and we got responses from several industry groups and individuals. The general conclusion is that the incorporation of risk informed methodologies into the NRC process has generally been successful. To get into discussions whether it’s gone too far or it hasn’t gone far enough is interesting and varies by specifi c individual’s opinion. But the general reaction of everyone has been that it has helped NRC’s programs and it has helped increase the safety of the plants. Overall, one would have to say that it’s been successful to date and that’s why the task force and the Commissioner in his presentation this year said that we really do want to build on that because it’s provided a fi rm foundation to move forward.

7. Is PRA implementation a requirement for the industry?

For operating reactors there is not a specifi c requirement to have a PRA. However, the reactor oversight process includes the signifi cance determination process which uses PRAs to look at the signifi cance of regulatory issues or violations of regulations. So most licensees, if not all, have some form of PRA in order to support themselves in that process. There has been another series of initiatives such as risk informed licensing actions that are supported by licensees’ PRAs. So when an individual plant is making an application for a technical specifi cation change, it’s often supported with justifi cations that are coming in part from probabilistic risk assessment. So they will have a PRA in order to support those licensing actions. If they want to move to the revised fi re protection program under NFPA 805, that also includes having a PRA. It’s a voluntary rule but if you

want to move in that direction, you have to have a PRA. So although operating reactors aren’t required to have one, it’s safe to say nearly all, if not all, do have some form of PRA for their plants. For new reactors – those licensed under Part 52 - the regulations were changed such that they are required to have a PRA and provide a summary of the results in their safety analysis report.

8. What type of system is needed for PRA analysis?

It is not the days when you needed super computers from the national laboratories to do most of this work. It’s not really beyond the scope of most computer systems that utilities and NRC have and routinely use.

9. What is the status of Task Force Report announced at the RIC 2011?

We are actually in the process of fi nishing up and the report should be issued in early to mid April, 2012. [Subsequently issued as NUREG-2150, “A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework”] It will be a data point in which the task force has made some general and some program-specifi c fi ndings and recommendations. From there, if the Commission were to decide to pursue it, then it would go into the normal processes and the staff would have public meetings and additional interactions with industry and other stakeholders.

We as a task force did issue a federal register notice asking for observations and comments. That was issued on November 22, 2011. We did get some responses from utilities and Nuclear Energy Institute and others in the power industry. One difference in our activity is that it went across the breadth of NRC activities so we were also getting comments related to uranium recovery, medical, industrial radiography, so it went across all of NRC activities, not just reactors.

10. What is PRA’s application to SMRs?There are two primary sets of small-

and medium-sized reactors. There are light-water reactor designs, the integral pressurized-water reactors like B&W’s mPower or Nuscale or the Westinghouse SMR, or Holtec’s SMR-160. Given that

they are based on light-water technology, the leap in terms of our regulations is not as wide. Since they are under the new reactor licensing process, they will be required to have a PRA. Beyond that, they will likely have a PRA anyway because in this day and age the PRA is factored into the design process and searching for alternatives to see what is the best way to approach a problem. From our interactions, we think they are using PRA as a tool for both design and licensing. Then there is another set of small reactors that are not based on light-water reactor technologies. These are gas-cooled, molten-salt, and liquid-metal-cooled reactor designs. They use PRA extensively because the NRC’s regulations are based on light-water reactor designs so PRA has been a very useful tool to see how they behave differently and what protections might be more appropriate than those based on the light-water reactor rules that we have. All of the generation IV reactor designs have extensively used PRAs in the design process and to support whatever regulatory interactions we’ve had with them.

11. Concluding remarks.The taskforce envisions that the

proposed risk management regulatory framework is evolutionary in that it builds on previous risk informed and performance based initiatives within the NRC. The process, since it’s evolutionary, we think can continue to make incremental improvements over the next 10-15 years such that the NRC will end up with more effective programs to identify and address the risks associated with the specifi c materials and facilities that are regulated by the NRC.

Contact: William Reckley, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, telephone: (301) 415-7490, email: [email protected]. �

www.NuclearPlantJournal.

com


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Japan's Plant Shutdown

Credit: Japan Atomic Industrial Forum.

1.What is the reason for the shutdown of the most of the nuclear power plants in Japan? (My understanding is that most of these nuclear power plants are shut down to perform “ Stress Tests” to implement the Fukushima “Lessons Learned”?

Currently, most of the plants are shut down due to the legally stipulated periodical inspection outage (that should be conducted within . 13 months). This outage is obligatory irrespective of the “Stress Test (ST)” requirement after Fukushima. So, these plants were not necessarily shut down for ST itself. However, the current situation is that the outage and restart of the plant operation became associated with the implementation of ST.

2. What is the restart licensing procedure (do they have to be cleared by the Japanese government, the Prefecture government or the city authorities) for the nuclear power plants in Japan after they have been shut down for “Stress Test” or “refueling outage”?

Does the local municipality where the nuclear power plant is located also have to approve the restart of the nuclear power plant, after it is shut down?

The current procedure of restart is as follows.

Completion of the ST for a nuclear plant during the periodic inspection ⇒ Submission of the ST results to Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)⇒ Examination by NISA ⇒ Confi rmation by Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) ⇒ Political deliberation by PM and three relevant ministers (METI Minister, Minister in charge of Nuclear Power, Chief Cabinet Secretary) ⇒ Consultation with and deliberation by the local municipalities (Prefecture and hosting town) ⇒ Consent by the municipalities

(Normally by hosting town at fi rst, then by Prefecture) (Note: From the legal viewpoint no approval is needed from municipalities.) ⇒ Political decision by PM and three ministers ⇒ METI/NISA regulatory approval ⇒ Utilities to restart operation.

3. Please provide a tentative schedule for the restart of these shut down nuclear power plants. When is the fi rst nuclear power plant expected to restart?

Unfortunately, there is no clear view of schedule for the restart of the plants. But, taking into consideration the summer time demand for electricity, it is hoped that some of the plants will be back online before July 2012. Specifi cally, Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc.’s Ohi #3&4, about which talks are being held at the municipalities, are being awaited for restart soon.

4. Any additional information related to the currently shut down nuclear power plants will be very helpful.

As of April 24, 2012 as many as 18 reactors have submitted completion of the fi rst-stage tests to NISA. Kansai’s Ohi #3&4 only got approval from NISA and NSC. Talks between METI and local municipalities are being held for their consent for the restart.

Another troublesome situation is that adjacent electricity-consuming Prefectures’ Governors in Kansai area that enjoys much of the electricity supplied from the nuclear power plants located in

Ohi and surrounding municipalities are voicing concern over Ohi reactors, citing unassured safety. Also, the governors called on the central government to draw a defi nite plan for decreasing dependency on nuclear. In these circumstances, Ohi-located Governor sees no immediate approval, demanding the central government to convince the adjacent prefectural governments of the need to restart.

Another reactor, Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.’s Ikata #3, clearance was given by NISA while no deliberation has been made at NSC. �

Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc's Ohi Units 3 & 4.


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Chernobyl’s Twenty-Year Experience on Radiation Protection

Summary of the Report: Stakeholders and Radiological Protection: Lessons from Chernobyl 20 Years After (ISBN 92-64-01085-8) by the Nuclear Energy Agency Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, France, website: www.oecd-nea.org.

IntroductionThis report is a tribute to the people

living in areas that, 20 years after still live with the effects of the Chernobyl disaster. It shares the experiences of radiation protection professionals who reached out to some of those impacted by the Chernobyl accident, engaging to assist them to become knowledgeable and active managers of their own radiation exposure while living in a radioactively contaminated environment. Active stakeholder involvement gave these residents the capability to participate in the decision-framing process to address their issues regarding the rehabilitation of their living conditions in the contaminated territories. This more inclusive approach to decision-framing and issue resolution allowed the affected residents to gain greater control over their future. The report also describes stakeholder involvement initiatives from Norway and the United Kingdom, as examples from countries further afi eld.

In the conduct of ongoing reviews of existing nuclear and radiological emergency protocols and preparing for emerging threats it is important to consider and implement as appropriate the many lessons learnt from the Chernobyl accident.

The lessons learnt in dealing with the aftermath of the accident have broad application to any situation with the potential to expose people or populations

to risk from a release of toxic substances to the environment.

The report also shows the complexity of dealing with long lasting contamination for all parties, and particularly for the radiation protection profession, for which stakeholder involvement becomes a key tool of fi rst consideration in establishing a more inclusive and open decision process to lead to sustainable decisions. Engagement in stakeholder involvement processes however calls for new expertise for policy makers, and radiation protection and other professionals in order to assure its successful implementation.

The introductory chapter positions the report by explaining how it develops Nuclear Energy Agency's (NEA) considerable efforts within its mandate to identify and share the les sons learnt from the accident at Chernobyl (more detail of its work in the fi eld of radiation protection will be found in the report’s Appendices)

Background on the Chernobyl accident

In order to appreciate the context of the rest of the report, it is extremely important to have some understanding of the accident and the scale of its consequences. An overview of the accident sequence and a short description of its effects, including its impacts on people, agriculture, and health in the affected areas, is provided.

From top-down to stakeholder involvement

There was a transition from top-down management, during the early phase of the accident, to the more participatory management of the longer term and rehabilitation phases, using stakeholder involvement in rehabilitation projects. The Chernobyl accident was unprecedented. Millions of people were - and continue to be - directly affected. Beyond the acute effects, chiefl y on emergency workers, the most obvious impact of the accident, other than the physical contamination was the

need for the affected populations to come to terms with living in a contaminated environment in the long term.

The top-down approach by authorities to the response and management of the early phase of the accident was to some extent adequate. Note indeed, that there has been recent fulsome praise from the International Atomic Energy Agency Chernobyl Forum for the emergency response by the Soviet authorities. It is beyond this phase where the problems of a top-down approach manifested. It became apparent in the longer term, during the period following the accident, that this type of “top down” approach was not working; the actions implemented were not effi cient and resulted in a crisis of confi dence for the people living in contaminated areas. A new approach was needed. The ETHOS Project was accordingly established in Belarus based on stakeholder involvement to engage some of the affected population in the decision process. The success of this project has led in due course to its extension to other areas (the CORE Program).

Perspectives on stakeholder involvement

Stakeholder involvement enhanced the lives of various stakeholders in responding to the challenges of living with contamination. By the early 1990s the national radiation protection authorities realized that their anticipated role in handing down information and solutions to the population was not working and that a partnership was needed. These authorities recognized that they did not have all the answers and those they needed to engage stakeholders in order both to understand the scale and scope of issues and to develop workable solutions. By active engagement with the affected people, sustainable quality-of-life improvements increasingly emerged, and the authorities began to rebuild confi dence and trust with the stakeholders.



Establishing a local radiation monitoring capability was critical to addressing stakeholder issues and identifying more effi cient strategies. By developing detailed maps of contamination and having local monitoring capability, people were in a position to make informed decisions on critical issues such as food products, where to graze livestock, milk for children, and areas where children could play.

As a result of stakeholder involvement, doctors found themselves an integral part of a comprehensive effort to engage the local population in the development of a radiation protection culture, which had a positive impact on public health. As food production plays a vital role in the overall picture of public health, stakeholder involvement allowed farmers to understand the radiological condition of their land in greater detail

and thus to take steps to improve the radiological condition of their produce. Stakeholder involvement also resulted in mothers being able to ensure that clean food could be provided for their children. Teachers also expressed support for this involvement process so they could educate the children on the spectrum of issues facing the people, as a consequence of the accident, and teach them about actions that could be taken to manage future radiation exposure.

Local offi cials freely admit that positive experiences with stakeholder involvement have led them to copy this approach and to change their assessment of the willingness and ability of local people to help themselves -not just in relation to radiation protection issues, but also in relation to other issues of interest and concern to the community. As a

result, stakeholder involvement has been shown to have the potential to allow local authorities to make decisions that are sustainable in terms of making a positive contribution to the local economy, local public health and environmental protection. The affected people feel that decisions taking account of their concerns are more acceptable and have the active support of the local community-precisely because they have had an opportunity to participate in the framing of issues and the development of solutions.

Lessons learntThere were many key lessons learnt

in stakeholder involvement arising from post Chernobyl activities; this knowledge is being assimilated into the international emergency exercises devised by the NEA

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Chernobyl's Twenty...Continued from page 39

(part of the “INEX” program). Clearly the Chernobyl accident was unprecedented and created signifi cant challenges and profound questions about the interaction of science and society. Some important lessons emerged from the post-accident rehabilitation effort in some of the territories affected by Chernobyl that have broad application to future situations with the potential for the environmental release of toxic substances. These include a recognition that there is a need in such situations to focus on certain key issues, fi rst amongst which is engagement and involvement of stakeholders in assessing problems and seeking solutions, which in turn leads to a re-emergence of self-reliance and a rebuilding of trust; in short, a more bottom-up approach is suggested. Furthermore, the problems that will be faced are complex and so

require an adequately complex response, built on a multidisciplinary approach and sound science (for which independent validation may be requested), leading to collective learning amongst stakeholders. The output of this approach, with these characteristics, can be sustainable decisions leading to an improved quality of life for the affected population.

It is also useful to consider what it is about such an approach that is particularly valued by stakeholders. They, after all, are the people whom the professionals, authorities and policy makers exist to serve. Their assessment of that service is accordingly of particular importance. In this regard, stakeholders involved in the post-Chernobyl rehabilitation process particularly valued the following features of the participatory approach:

The very fact that they were involved • instead of being passive recipients. Closer and more productive • relationships with professionals and authorities.

The fact that the participatory • approach focused on tangible results.The fact that this approach was well • adapted to individual contexts.

The role of radiation protection professionals and future opportunities

In conclusion, this work emphasizes the role and responsibilities of the radiation protection professionals and potential future opportunities to engage with stakeholders. The Chernobyl accident has revealed local stakeholders to be an indispensable part of the success of the rehabilitation effort, so it is increasingly recognized that they have an important contribution to make in planning for the emergency and rehabilitation phases of any future contamination event, whether associated with an industrial accident or a deliberate release, and whether in a rural or an urban setting. �

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Fukushima Update1. Status of Radiation Around the

Fukushima Dai-ichi Plant As of May 10th, 2012Air dose has been decreasing

gradually after the accident and reached a stable state in all measuring points.

Relatively high level of radiation has been monitored in the area north east of the power station.

Radioactive Cesium was detected in air samples taken from April 22 to April 26, 2012 at the spots beyond 20 km from the power plant. The levels of Cesium are below concentration limit, which is 20Bq/m3 for Cs-134 and 30Bq/m3 for Cs-137.

2. Evacuation StatusNo entry order to 2 municipalities

was lifted on April 1st, 2012 and the residents can return to their homes.

Beyond 30km radius from the Daiichi plant, there are spots where the dose exceeds 20mSv/year. Japan’s central government has recommended a few hundred homes in Date City, Minami Soma City and Kawauchi Village for evacuation.

Current Status of Evacuees In Fukushima Prefecture:• Evacuees from areas where

evacuation orders are still in effect: about 87,000

• Evacuees from areas where evacuation orders have been lifted: about 26,000

• Voluntary evacuees: about 47,000• Total Evacuees: about 160,000

3. Experts on Low-Dose Radiation (The Nippon Foundation) The International Expert Symposium

– Radiation and Health Risks wad held in

Fukushima, Japan, on September 11 and 12, 2011. The purpose of the Symposium was for a group of international and Japanese experts in radiation and health-related fi elds to review the potential health effects of radiation from the Fukushima nuclear accident.

The Symposium was also attended by experts from relevant international, intergovernmental bodies including the United Nations Scientifi c Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by representatives of non-governmental organizations including the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).

The Symposium participants took note of the wide global experience available for assessing the consequences of major releases of radioactive substances into the environment, which have resulted from the international review of the aftermath of large accidents, such as the Chernobyl accident and reached the following conclusions and recommendations: (i) The Fukushima nuclear accident followed a massive earthquake and tsunami that devastated the northeast region of Japan. Countermeasures including evacuation, sheltering, and control of the food chain were implemented in a timely manner. To date there have been no acute radiation injuries from the nuclear accident. It is understood that stable iodine was not generally administered to the public. However, according to the

According to Mr. Makoto Yagi, the chairman of The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan as well as the president and the director of the, Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc. the Japanese utilities are committed to, “never allow a similar accident to happen again.”




reported monitoring results, the thyroid doses were low, not necessarily justifying the administration of stable iodine. Taking these factors into account, together with the magnitude of the reported levels of radioactive substances released into the atmosphere and the ocean, the radiation-related physical health impact on the general public, including evacuees, is likely to be limited and much lower than that from Chernobyl, where the only conclusive radiation-induced health effect was thyroid cancer from children drinking milk contaminated with high levels of radioactive iodine. However, the social, psychological, and economic impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident is expected to be considerable. Because of these impacts, continued monitoring and characterization of the levels of radioactivity in the environment are vital for obtaining the informed consent to the decisions on various issues such as the extent to which populations can return to their homes. (ii) Although Japan has developed one

of the most advanced radiation emergency medicine systems in the world, the nuclear accident occurred as a result of a multidimensional disaster due to the tsunami, the earthquake and human factors that combined to destroy the local infrastructure on which the system depended. Accordingly, adequate means of communication and adequate health care were not always available. Lessons are being identifi ed and solutions suggested to address these problems.

(iii) Health professionals and scientists must seek to explain the possible effects or lack of detectable effects of radiation to the best of their ability to the people of Fukushima and other concerned individuals. Transparency in dose evaluation, risk assessment and decision-making is vital. At the same time, the scientifi c evidence and understanding must be provided to the public in a manner that can be readily understood.

(iv) Social and psychological support must also be integrated within all healthcare provisions.

(v) The Government of Japan and the international organizations should consider how best to benefi t from the lessons learned and being learned so that they can effectively continue stronger coordinated cooperation in the long term. One possibility would be to convene a task force on the Fukushima nuclear accident, which should include participation of national and local governments, other stakeholders, public representatives of the affected communities, and the international organizations concerned. The participants expressed their

gratitude to The Nippon Foundation, the Sasakawa Memorial Health Foundation, and Fukushima Medical University for organizing the Symposium.

4. The recommendations of the ICRP vis-à-vis the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP accident aftermath By Abel J GonzálezAutoridad Regulatoria Nuclear

(ARN) de Argentina, Avenida del Libertador 8250, AR-1429 Buenos Aires, Argentina

4.1. AbstractThe International Commission on

Radiological Protection (ICRP) created a Task Group (ICRP TG84) on the initial lessons learned from the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs vis-à-vis the ICRP system of radiological protection. The ICRP TG84 is expected to compile lessons learned related to the efforts carried out to protect people against radiation exposure during and after the emergency exposure situation caused by the accident and, in light of these lessons, to consider ad hoc recommendations to strengthen the ICRP system of radiological protection for dealing with this type of emergency exposure. The Chairman of ICRP TG84 presents in this paper his personal views on the main issues being considered by the group at the time of the Fukushima Expert Symposium. ICRP TG84 expects to fi nalize its work by the end of 2012.

The nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs (hereinafter, ‘the accident’) was unprecedented in both

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Fukushima Update...Continued from page 43

scale and timeframe. In 2007 the ICRP had issued revised recommendations on radiological protection, which are applicable to protection against radiation exposure from the accident.

At the time of the International Expert Symposium in Fukushima, ICRP TG84

had not yet fi nished its work. However, the author, who is the Chairman of ICRP TG84, intends to present in this paper his personal views on the main issues being considered by the group. The intention is not to pre-empt the work of ICRP TG84 but just to review some of the radiation protection issues that have been discussed by the group. ICRP TG84 expects to fi nalize its work by the end of 2012.

4.2. Preliminary lessons learned from the accident

In relation to the ICRP recommendations, a number of initial preliminary lessons are being learned from the accident.

4.2.1. The ‘detriment-adjusted nominal risk coeffi cients’ are being misinterpreted.

4.2.2. Confusion on radiation protection quantities and units has jeopardized communication.

4.2.3. The sophisticated system for restricting internal exposure may have been misunderstood by the public and media.

4.2.4. There is a lack of ad hoc radiation protection recommendations for rescuers.

4.2.5. The newly recommended concepts of dose limits, constraints and reference levels for public protection have been used by the relevant authorities but are widely misunderstood by the public and their representatives and also by scientists at large.

4.2.6. Parents feel that the children are not properly protected.

4.2.7. The international intergovern-mental agreements on acceptable levels of radioactivity in consumer products are incoherent and in-consistent and are causing serious problems in Japan.

4.2.8. Stigma is appearing on those affected by the accident.

4.2.9. No clear international guidance exists for dealing with the remediation of ‘contaminated’ territories and the disposal of ‘contaminated’ rubble.

4.2.10.There is a lack of international recommendations on environmental monitoring policy following a large accidental release of radioactive materials into the environment.

4.2.11.Communicating radiation protection approaches after an accident continues to be an un-resolved issue.

4.3. OutlookMany lessons can be extracted from

the accident experience. The international radiation protection community has the moral responsibility to learn from these lessons. The ICRP should feedback the fi nal lessons learned into its recommendations. �

NuclearPlantJournal

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For questions, please contact Kruti Patel, [email protected], (630) 243-5130.


AstridBy Christophe Behar, French Atomic Energy Commission.

Christophe BeharChristophe Béhar began his career with the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in 1984 as part of the team in Saclay working on the isotopic separation of uranium. Since April 2009, Mr. Béhar is the Director of the Nuclear Energy Division at the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), in charge of the whole nuclear energy sector (both Research & Development and dismantling).

Mr. Béhar is member of the supervisory board of AREVA, member of the executive board of the companies AREVA TA, STMI and the high performance computing company GENCI.

In parallel to his professional activities at the CEA, Mr. Béhar is a lecturer at the Ecole Centrale de Paris and at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Techniques Avancées.

Mr. Béhar is Chevalier of the Legion of Honour and of the National Order of Merit. He is a graduate of the Ecole Centrale de Paris (1982).

The nuclear energy division ( DEN) develops generation IV systems and more especially fast neutron reactor, in order to offer a better solution to issues such as energetic dependency rate, energy material supply security, and environmental concerns. The new technology allows plutonium multirecycling, and waste production minimization. The goal is to achieve, in 2012, a fi rst assessment of the industrial feasibility of these

systems, reactors and related fuel cycle, in order to build an industrial prototype around 2020. Fuel cycle management scenario is studied consistently along with this prototype development.

CEA is entitled to carry out R&D on innovative nuclear systems, so called GIV systems, which bring

strong technology

improvements as compared to former systems of the same type. It focuses its effort on two different types of fast neutron reactor, sodium cooled, one with the ASTRID (advanced sodium technological reactor for industrial demonstration) prototype, CEA holding the lead, and also has studies (on safety and material of the fuel rod) on gas cooled reactor ,which appears to be a more longer term option.

Astrid is a 600 MWe reactor, large enough to be quoted as an industrial size demonstrator, meeting the generation IV criteria, and encompassing the feedback experience of former worldwide sodium cooled fast reactors. It brings technological breakthroughs with the past reactors of the same type. The fi rst phase of the ASTRID preliminary design has been launched at the end of 2010. It aims to defi ne innovative features, safety options, and to asses investment cost. The staff involved is about 500 people, 60% belonging to the nuclear division of CEA, and 40% from the industry. Whereas the DEN keep the ownership of the overall architecture of the reactor, its core and fuel, other parts have been entrusted


Question by Newal Agnihotri, Editor of Nuclear Plant Journal



http://pl.iit.edu/radiation



to industrial companies : AREVA NP (nuclear island, command control, auxiliaries), EDF (Architect engineering support, operating feedback, safety studies), Alstom Power Systems (water-steam or gas energy conversion devices), COMEX NUCLEAIRE (robotics and maintenance).’1. Has there been any review of Astrid by French Regulatory Authorities?

We are now preparing a safety concept report, to be submitted to the French authorities at the end of 2012. We have not yet started the formal safety review of Astrid with the regulatory body, even though we have already started to speak with them.

2. Is the schedule for the commencement of the pilot project expedited, in view of Fukushima accident?

We have not delayed the schedule of Astrid after Fukushima, sodium coolant is a good fl uid to evacuate residual power.

3. What is the expected fuel life of Astrid before it needs refueling?

This point is still under examination but basically, one core should last for 6 years, with ¼ refueling strategy, which means one partial refueling every 1.5 year.

4. Who has the responsibility to refuel the reactor, the operator or the manufacturer?

This step is under the responsibility of the operator.

5. Has Astrid received any additional funding for its completion in the last two years?

Yes, it has been decided by the French government to include Astrid in the framework of the so-called “big national loan to promote R&D”, and we received 650 M for the 2010-2017 period (design phase).

6. Has the viability of the process for Astrid been achieved on an industrial scale, if not what is the schedule for this project?

It is precisely the goal of ASTRID to demonstrate the industrial feasibility of innovative options, in the fi eld of safety, maintenance, and operation.

7. Has the evaluation of the Astrid technology and its industrial prospects been established as required by the French Government by 2012?

We will submit to the French authorities a preliminary report at the end of 2012, as foreseen.

8. Are there any other countries who have joined the Astrid program? If so what is the division of responsibility between different countries?

We want Astrid be an international project and we are elaborating the model of what should be the international governance of Astrid with possible foreign partners.

9. What are the tools of the 21st century being applied to the design, modeling and analytical methods (computer programs for safety, probabilistic optimization of availability, full lifecycle cost analysis etc.) to Astrid project?

We use of course the most modern computer codes developed by CEA and its industrial partners (thermohydraulics, neutronics, etc.).

10. Elaborate on long life of components, planned to be used in Astrid?

Astrid is both innovative and based on the large industrial experience of Phenix and Superphenix, therefore we expect a longer lifetime but Astrid is a prototype with the goal to demonstrate the industrial feasibility of innovative options.

11. Describe the planned innovations in ensuring safety of Astrid?

The more signifi cant ones are related to safety: For example core safety has been provided in order to manage severe accidents, adapted to the specifi c neutronic pattern or fast reactor. We do also work on avoiding the sodium/water reaction.

12. Has there been a change in the 2020 deadline for fuel loading in Astrid due to Fukushima?

No, the Astrid schedule remains the same. We aim at start-up around 2020.

13. Describe the unique features of Astrid which are not covered in the questionnaire given above.

We consider that Astrid will be the fi rst generation IV sodium cooled fast reactor and as such is a key tool for future sustainable nuclear development.

Contact: Dominique Ochem, CEA- Nuclear Energy Division; telephone: 33 1 6908 2952, email: [email protected].

Astrid...Continued from page 45



Improved Incore InstrumentationBy Mark Coddington, Entergy Nuclear.

Mark CoddingtonMark Coddington is a project manager for the Reactor Services team at Entergy’s Palisades Power Plant in Michigan. He is a graduate of Michigan Technological University with a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering. He came to Palisades in 2002 as a design engineer and has been in project management since 2006. A native of Whitehall Michigan, Coddington notes the support of Entergy and Palisades management for improvements and innovations made by his team.

The team members included Mark Coddington, Senior Project Manager; Don Sonnenberg, Design Engineer; Kristine Madden, System Engineer; Jim Ridley, Emergency Planner; and Greg Daggett, Supervisor, Maintenance Projects.

The OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) incore sheering machine and the associated support for the machine were very cumbersome to install, operate and demobilize. Being on the critical path, the Entergy Palisades team looked for ways to more effi ciently accomplish incore sheering while reducing dose.

Starting in 2007, Mark Codding-ton made a challenge to his team and vendors: Make incore sheering easier, lighter weight and time-saving. Mas-

ter Lee Engineer-ing Services took up the challenge. Working together with Westinghouse and Master Lee, the Palisades team directed design and improvements add-ing a breakthrough idea.

Improvements included eliminating crane moves, saving outage critical path

time and impacting overall radiation exposure with dose savings by 33 percent. The new incore cutter is reliable and simplifi ed which has reduced refurbishment costs of the cutter. The original machine had extensive refurbishment after each outage due to wear.

The new cutter system uses a debris container the size of a fuel bundle that can be stored in the same size location as a fuel bundle. Three 4-foot tall containers stack on top of one another in a 12-foot bundle space. This facilitates an easier transfer of the container.

And the last major improvement is that Palisades created the Improved in-core Instrument (ICI) cutter box to go with the ICI cutter. The ICI is 3/8” in diameter and 38 feet long that contains instruments all along its length. The ICI monitors the neutron fl ux sustained in the reactor or, in other words, it monitors the critical reaction in the core. It is inserted from the top of the reactor through guide tubes into the core. Flexible, constructed similarly to a drainage snake, it is replaced every three years. During a September full mock-up run of the new

sheering instrument, the team realized that a critical piece of the new machine system could be improved.

The power supply and air supply needed to be co-located in one box – and the plug-n-play box idea was born. With a transformer to power cameras, air bottles to run underwater grippers, a monitor, and controls, all of the power sources and components were put in one ICI cutter box.

The ICI cutter box is used on the containment refuel fl oor during ICI cutting operations. It is used in the procedure that safely disposes of incore detectors being replaced by cutting the 36' long detectors into 6” pieces and depositing them into the debris canisters. They are moved from the reactor cavity to the spent fuel pool using the fuel transfer system.

The ICI cutter box is stored when not in use in the radioactive material area on site during on-line operations.

“We took a series of semi-complex things and created one plug-n-play box. Now, you pull the box up to the space and you plug it in to get going. It’s simplifi ed and effective for our outage operation,” said Mark Coddington, senior project manager and team lead.

While Master Lee engineered a lighter, better cutter, Palisades put the crowning jewel on the project improving set-up and de-mobilization, occupational safety and implementing time-saving organization. These are attributes that are valued highly in an outage situation.

Constellation’s Calvert Cliffs was the fi rst plant to purchase the Master Lee new generation incore cutter. Improvements to the debris canisters had to be made to fi t the unique geometry of the Palisades plant. Built in the 1965-1971 era, Palisades has only one elevation in its reactor cavity and not a “deep” end. Therefore, 12' tall debris canisters aren’t used. Palisades uses a 4' tall debris canister that stacks three-high in the same space.

Palisades took that extra time to make the cutter box improvement to the cutter system. While eliminating the crane moves was one milestone in the improvement process, the addition of the ICI Cutter Box was just as signifi cant.





Improved Incore...Continued from page 47

“When the cutter came back lighter, smaller and could be used without cranes, it was a great improvement. We took it a step further and put vital support components in one box. That was a big improvement for our outage operation,” Coddington added.

The improved cutter sits atop a fuel bundle. It uses a container of the size of a fuel bundle that can be stored in the same size location as a fuel bundle. Three, 4-foot tall containers stack on top of one another in a 12-foot bundle space. This facilitates an easier transfer

The initial concept or need for a simple way to mobilize the cutter began during discussions with vendors in 2007. Design and delivery occurred in the 2008 - 2009 time frames with implementation in October 2010.

Palisades did a training video with Westinghouse and Master-Lee to illustrate the incore cutter improvements during the full scale mock up at Palisades in September 2010. When the “plug-n-play” box idea happened during the mock-up, the Palisades team had only one month

to fi nalize the box before the October 2010 outage, and did so.

When talking about handling 20,000 Rem/hr irradiated material underwater, improvements in dose for incore cutting and debris handling is noteworthy. With this simpler, faster way for incore cutting, Palisades recorded dose savings of 1.714 Rem/outage and 1.140 Rem/year representing a 33 percent reduction.

The new cutter is an automated tool that is less prone to in worker errors and the system eliminates occurrence of unanticipated radiation exposure to workers during installation of incore instrument liner in the reactor cavity.

Innovation on this project happened on several levels. Early problem solving with vendors ultimately led to production on a better product. The addition of the ICI cutter box made the improved ICI cutter notably better, safer and more effi cient.

“Being in a challenging environment we are always looking for better ways to work. This time I guess we thought INSIDE the box to come up with a better way to execute ICI cutting,” concluded Greg Daggett, supervisor, maintenance projects.

Contact: Margie Jepson, Entergy Nuclear, 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, MS 39213; telephone: (601) 368-5460, email: [email protected]. �

NuclearPlantJournal

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JFor questions, please contact Anu Agni-hotri, (630) 352-3686, [email protected]

NPJ Editorial Archive ISLAND.indd 1 5/24/2012 4:20:15 PM


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RCP SealBy Joshua Seales, Southern Nuclear.

Joshua SealesJoshua Seales joined Southern Nuclear in 2004 after graduating from The University of Alabama with an Electrical Engineering degree. Joshua started as an I&C System Engineer at Plant Farley before transferring to the corporate offi ce as an I&C component engineer. In his latest role, Joshua has worked as a project manager supporting the Farley Nuclear Plant since 2008.

Nuclear Energy Institute’s Top Industry Practice (TIP) Award’s highlight the nuclear industry’s most innovative techniques and ideas.

This entry was a 2011 NSSS Vendor Award winner.

The team members who participated included Joshua Seales, Project Manager; Andrew Wilkerson, Mechanical Components Supervisor; Kevin Glandon, Mechanical Components Principal Engineer; and Ryan Harlos, RCP System Engineer.

Summary Southern Nuclear championed

Westinghouse’s development of the nuclear industry’s fi rst of a kind shutdown seal (SDS), trademarked as the SHIELD®, for Westinghouse reactor coolant pumps (RCP’s). The SDS provides an effective solution to limitations of the existing Westinghouse RCP seal packages associated with a postulated RCP seal Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) resulting from a loss of RCP seal cooling and seal injection. Based on current the PRA results, RCP seal LOCA scenarios are dominant contributors to risk of many Westinghouse PWRs. The SDS greatly reduces the risk contribution from RCP seal LOCA scenarios by effectively preventing signifi cant seal leakage associated with a loss of all RCP seal cooling event. As a result, installation of the SDS at Farley improved overall plant safety margin

by signifi cantly reducing the estimated risk of core damage by approximately 40%. Further, incorporation of the SDS into the Farley PRA resulted in a greater reduction in core damage frequency (CDF) than implementation of all other previous design changes combined. In addition to the reduction in CDF, NRC Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI) margins were signifi cantly improved for selected MSPI tracked functions compared to the margins without the SDS. The SDS can be used across the industry on Westinghouse 93A type reactor coolant pumps.

Safety ResponseOne of the dominant contributors to

core damage frequency for Plant Farley and most Westinghouse PWRs in general is the RCP seal LOCA which results due to a loss of all RCP seal cooling. To address this issue, the SDS was developed to activate on a loss of cooling to shut off or minimize the leakage through the RCP seal package. The ability for a plant to minimize seal leakage during loss of RCP seal cooling conditions results in signifi cant reduction in CDF and

potentially increased failure tolerance for multiple MSPI systems. Increasing MSPI system failure tolerance by improving plant safety is one of the top initiatives for the Southern Nuclear Corporation (SNC) fl eet and is the primary driver for implementing this modifi cation for Plant Farley as it is expected to provide increased failure tolerance for Component Cooling Water, Emergency Diesel Generators, High Pressure Injection, and Residual Heat Removal.

The CDF reduction percentage that is possible by eliminating RCP seal leakage for all events that result in a loss of all RCP seal cooling is plant-specifi c. Surveys show the reduction could range from as low as 5% to as high as 80% in other industries. The median CDF reduction for those plants is 35% and the mean CDF reduction is 39%. It is noted that the plant which reported only a 5% reduction takes credit for a dedicated seal injection system that automatically starts on a loss of seal injection.

Cost Savings As mentioned above, MSPI margin

improvement (Plant Safety) is one of SNC’s top initiatives for the entire fl eet. Several design changes were being considered to improve the MSPI margin. Some examples of the design changes being considered at Plant Farley, along with their initial estimated cost, are as follows:

Additional Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

Install a new “alternate” motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pump in parallel with the existing MDAFW pump. The new pump will be capable of supplying 100% of the fl ow required to the steam generators for safe cooldown of the reactor system, or 350 GPM. There will be an alternate pump for each unit at Plant Farley. Both pumps will be powered by a dedicated, standby diesel generator, which will be common to both units. The installation of this alternate pump would provide approximately a 10% reduction in CDF at Plant Farley at an estimated cost of $5.5M per unit.

Independent RCP Seal Cooling System

Install an additional independent RCP seal cooling system, which only interfaces with the existing system. The new system would include a motor driven pump powered from a standalone diesel generator. The new pump would supply seal injection rather than thermal barrier cooling. The Reactor Water Storage Tank





(RWST) would be used as the water source and the system could be aligned from the control room within 10 minutes. The installation of an independent RCP seal cooling system would provided approximately a 50% reduction in CDF at Plant Farley at an estimated cost of $8M per unit.

Additional Diesel Generator Install one diesel to power the diverse

auxiliary feedwater pump and the RCP seal injection pumps along with battery chargers for each unit. This diesel would be stand-alone and only provide electrical service to the previously mentioned projects. The installation of the standalone diesel generator is needed to implement the diverse auxiliary feedwater pump and the independent RCP seal cooling system. The diesel would have to be combined with one of the other projects to be able to achieve the reduction in CDF. The estimated cost to install additional diesel generator is $22M.

Those costs in mind, the total cost to implement the RCP SDS at Farley were approximately 20% the cost per unit as the next least expensive option. This design change was signifi cantly less than the other options being considered, and therefore, was a signifi cant cost savings

for SNC. In addition, the RCP SDS design provided a larger improvement to the CDF and MSPI margin, as mentioned above, than some of the other options.

InnovationAs a reference to the original plant

design for Plant Farley, the small break LOCA through the RCP seals that would occur during various design basis accidents is one of the most signifi cant DBA’s in the licensing basis. The postulated leak rates, depending on the accident scenario, range from 21 GPM per RCP (3 RCP’s per unit at Farley) to approximately 400 GPM per RCP. With the installation of the RCP SDS, these leak rates are reduced to 1 GPM per RCP or less. Details of the RCP SDS design are discussed below.

The Shutdown Seal is a thermally actuated, passive device installed into the existing Westinghouse model 93A RCP’s seal between the No. 1 seal and No. 1 seal leak-off line to provide a leak-tight seal in the event of a loss of all RCP seal cooling. Until activated, the seal is completely contained within the No. 1 seal insert and does not alter the space between the No. 1 insert and the shaft. The SDS does not

obstruct the leak-off through the No. 1 seal to the No. 1 seal leak-off line.

The components that make up the SDS consist of a thermal actuator, a wave spring, a piston ring, a polymer ring, and a retaining ring. The thermal actuator holds the piston ring open, allowing the No. 1 seal leak-off to fl ow up the shaft to the No. 1 seal leak-off line. The polymer ring is between the piston ring and the retaining ring. The retaining ring is shrink fi t and retains all of the SDS components. When assembled in the pump, the retaining ring is further retained in place by the RCP seal housing located directly above it. The wave ring is designed to maintain contact between the three rings.

When the fl uid coming through the No.1 seal increases to the temperature that causes the actuator to retract the spacer from the piston ring, the piston ring snaps closed against the shaft or #1 sleeve in the case of Model 93A pumps. The piston ring snapping around the shaft provides a signifi cant fl ow restriction and causes the pressure to build on the back side of the polymer ring. The primary sealing ring is the polymer ring which is made up of a polymer material that, when


Excellent at OutreachBy Tatyana Lisitchuk, Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant.

Nikolay PanashchenkoNikolay S. Panashchenko is General Director of Khmelnitsky NPP. He was born in Irkutks Region, Russia, graduated from Tomsk Polytechnic Institute with a nuclear engineering degree. He started his working career as an engineer at Rovno NPP, Ukraine in 1978. In 2004 he was a scientifi c supervisor for commissioning of two WWER 1000 nuclear units, Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4. The same year he took the lead of labor collective of Khmelnitsky nuclear power plant.

Mr. Panashchenko takes an active public stand; he is a member of WANO MC Governing Board, and a deputy of Khmelnitsky Regional Council. He was awarded the Order “For the Merits” of the 3rd degree, and has an honorary degree of “Distinguished Power Engineer of Ukraine”.

Khmelnitsky NPP (KhNPP) is located in a picturesque forest-steppe area of the Western Ukraine. Favorable condition of the environment is proven by high diversity of fl ora and fauna in the vicinity to Khmelnitsky site, populated by beavers, corncrakes, otters, which are included in European Red List. About twenty species of birds spend winter time on Khmelnitsky NPP pond.

“Energoatom”, National Nuclear Energy Generating Company (NNEGC), is the utility operating four nuclear power plants in Ukraine having 15 power units of

WWER reactor type. Over the past decade the nuclear share of general electricity production is about 50%.

Total design capacity of Khmel-nitsky NPP is 4000 МW. Currently two WWER-1000 (V-320) power units are in operation. This is a unifi ed Russian design of water-moderated water cooled reactor type (WWER-1000/320) developed in 1978. It is an analogue of the foreign PWR re-actor type.

C o n s t r u c t i o n of Khmelnitsky 1 started in 1979, while construction of power units № 2, 3, and 4 started in 1983, 1985, and 1986 respectively. Khmelnitsky NPP has been built to satisfy the needs in electricity of the western part of Ukraine and to export electricity to the Western Europe.

Chernobyl disaster, a nuclear accident of catastrophic degree in the world nuclear power engineering history, which occurred on April 26, 1986 made the mankind ponder over the safe use of atomic energy. Ukraine had been living through hard times when in December 1987 power unit № 1 was put into operation. A moratorium for the construction of new nuclear power plants was put into force under the pressure of massive protests against the development of nuclear energy in Ukraine. Safe operation became a top priority issue for all enterprises related to the use of nuclear energy. Construction of units № 2, 3, and 4 was suspended, by that time the construction of those units was 85%, 40%, and 10% complete correspondingly. Originally, plant infrastructure was

designed for four power units. In 1991 Ukraine became an independent state. The moratorium for the construction was revoked in 1993, and construction activities were resumed at Khmelnitsky 2.

On August 8, 2004 Khmelnitsky 2 was connected to the power grid. Annually, two operating power units of Khmelnitsky NPP generate about 13,5 billion kWh of electricity which is equivalent to 16% of total amount of electricity generated by the Ukrainian nuclear fl eet. Over the course of 24 years of operation the plant has generated more than 200 billion kWh of electricity.

Annual outage is carried out to maintain equipment operable and restore its lifetime in safe and reliable manner. Average outage duration is 52 days. Every four years major overhaul is performed lasting for 65 days.

Coordinated actions of KhNPP staff enabled to complete outage campaigns at both units ahead of schedule in 2011, it allowed to increase installed capacity factor up to 83,2% for unit №1, and 81,8% for unit №2. These are the highest indicators among 15 nuclear power units in Ukraine.

WWER-1000 power unit has two circuits, the primary (hot) circuit is a water circuit transferring heat from the reactor, and the secondary circuit is a water-steam circuit receiving heat from the primary one and using steam energy in the turbine generator.

Light water serves as both a moderator and coolant in water-moderated water-cooled reactors. It is a great advantage of this reactor type to use only water for the above purposes. Water is an easily accessible and cheap material. Industrial grade structural materials can operate safely in contact with fl owing water at high energy parameters over a long period of time given the appropriate quality of water.

Reactor, steam-generators, and other pressurized equipment are placed inside the ferroconcrete containment to prevent radioactive releases into the environment during potential accidents. WWER reactor has a system of physical barriers preventing the spread of radioactive material and ionizing radiation into the environment; the reactor has a self-control feature based on inherent feedback and can be reliably operated.

Each power unit has three-train safety systems which ensure safe reactor shutdown in case of abnormal operation.

Service water supply system is a circulating-type system, main equipment





is cooled down with spray ponds, and auxiliary equipment is cooled down with cooling pond having total area of 22,3 km2. Power units operate on base load. Electricity is transmitted to the grid via 330 kV and 750 kV lines.

Uranium dioxide enriched by uranium-235 isotope up to the level of about 4% is used as a reactor fuel.

Radwaste handling activities are specifi ed by permits and licenses in force and subject to periodical reporting to Regulatory Inspection, Ministry of En-ergy and Coal Industry, NNEGC “Ener-goatom”, sanitary and epidemiological service and local authorities. These ac-tivities are implemented in the frame of general quality management system at Khmelnitsky NPP and aimed at fulfi ll-ment of relevant tasks during all stages of radwaste handling.

KhNPP hosts WANO, IAEA, EU missions on regular basis, the results of these missions prove the compliance of nuclear, ecological, radiation related activities carried-out at the plant with international standards and requirements.

Distributed radiation monitoring system is in place at the plant. Monitoring data prove that plant operation does not have negative impact on the environment. Radiation parameters do not exceed natural values within the buffer area (3 km.), and radiation control area (30km.).

Any industry undergoes continuous improvement and development not only owing to the use of state-of-the-art equipment, but to the upgrade and reconstruction of equipment being already operated. 340 projects on the upgrade and safety enhancement of power units were implemented, namely they were related to the following: replacement of an in-

core monitoring system, replacement of information computer systems, uninterruptible power supplies in both units, commissioning of automated system for monitoring radiation situation, construction and commissioning of backup house transformer, etc.

High level of fi re protection of KhNPP facilities should be pointed out. The State

Fire Brigade is a special department of KhNPP providing for observance of all regulatory requirements to fi re safety in a part of availability of fi re-fi ghting equipment at fi re and explosion hazardous facilities, normal operation premises, and safety trains.

After the Fukushima accident special stress-tests were developed to enhance safety in case of emergency. They include analytical evaluation of plant robustness to external hazards and their combinations which were taken as a basis for the development of safety enhancement measures.

Stress-tests were conducted at all nuclear plants of Ukraine. The Ukrainian NPPs were designed and built to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake at magnitude 6. And, main plant facilities can withstand an earthquake ground motion at magnitude 7. Such earthquake is a low probability in Ukraine.

Currently, Khmelnitsky NPP is a main Ukrainian enterprise where new nuclear production capacities are planned to be deployed.

In 2008 construction activities were resumed at Khmelnitsky 3 and 4. “Atomstroiexport” Russian company won international tender for the design of reactor facility (V-392). Reactor has new advanced safety features such as fast boron injection system, passive

residual heat removal, and additional passive core fl ooding system. Estimated design lifetime of new power units is 50 years. “Turboatom”, a national Kharkov plant will manufacture low-speed steam turbine of K-1000-60/1500-2M type which demonstrated good performance. The turbine will be installed on new turbine island.

Selection of Russian design was stipulated by the availability of all necessary production and engineering infrastructure for WWER technology which has been in operation for a long time in Ukraine. Also, proposed design fi ts well into existing structures of Khmelnitsky 3 and 4.

In 2011 public hearings on the completion of construction of the new nuclear units № 3 and 4 were held in 10 administrative-territorial units located in the vicinity to Khmelnitsky site. About 4 thousand residents took part in the hearings. The necessity to hold public hearings on discussing completion of the facility of state relevance is a requirement of the national law in force as well as a series of international agreements ratifi ed by Ukraine.

One of the priority tasks of Khmelnitsky NPP is raising public awareness. Management of Khmelnitsky NPP makes efforts to openness and constructive dialogue with the public through on-line informing of public, vocational-oriented activities with high schoolers, excursions and lectures, fabrication and dissemination of advertising materials.

Public relation department provides excursions for thousands of visitors to KhNPP site. KhNPP managers hold meetings with public offi cials, representatives of mass media where plant experts provide answers to any questions of interest. Tour program includes visit to the construction site of units №3, 4 as well as to the operating units, the visitors get familiar with electricity production process, and its impact on the environment.

Information center of KhNPP conducts a course of lectures on the topic “Introduction into Nuclear Energy” to high schoolers of the town and region introducing them to the basics of nuclear energy.

Children Arts Contest named “Nuclear Energy and the Community” is conducted for younger children. This contest is of great interest among children of the satellite town, and region in whole as well.

Spray Pond



Excellent at...Continued from page 53

Once a week the plant TV and radio studio broadcast “KhNPP News” TV program to the population of the regional center and district centers located in the vicinity to the site. Detailed information about operation of Khmelnitsky NPP is available at the website: www.xaec.org.ua

KhNPP training center provides basic and advanced professional training to the plant personnel. Training center has all licenses and permits to train plant personnel of all categories. Training facilities were set up owing to the fi nancial assistance of the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany and many other countries.

Nowadays, Khmelnitsky NPP consists of dozens of diversifi ed departments. The management and trade union ensure all necessary conditions to restore and fulfi ll creative and physical potential of their employees. Swimming pool, fi tness groups are available for all

willing workers at the Sports Center. Children of plant employees go in for sports at Physical Culture Club free of charge. Khmelnitsky NPP is justifi ably proud of its achievements in the world of sports. Over the 15-year history of “Energoatom” NNEGC 11 sportsmen were given the highest rank of “Distinguished Master of Sports of Ukraine”; 10 of them are from KhNPP. The trainees of this school, Galina Pundyk and Olga Zhovnir won gold medals in sable fencing at the Olympic Games in Beijing.

Plant employees also devote their time to several sponsored organizations located close to KhNPP site, including a nursing home for disabled and elderly people, residential schools for children with limited abilities.

Great attention is paid to retired employees and veterans. They were set up in a separate structure amounting to nearly 700 people taking active part in the life of the plant team; they organize community work days, go on excursions, hold parties, and take subsidized paid trips to health resorts.

The town has formed itself around Khmelnitsky NPP. Besides the electricity production KhNPP provides for comfort

acted upon by the very high pressure drop induced by the piston ring interrupting the fl ow through the annulus, is constricted around the shaft and upwards against a retaining ring. As the primary sealing ring constricts, it creates a greater pressure drop which in turn further constricts the polymer ring tighter around the shaft and upwards. With the fl ow severely restricted, the pressure at the piston ring reaches the reactor coolant system pressure which forces the polymer ring against the shaft creating a leak-tight seal. Once this seal is activated, it will limit RCP shaft leakage to signifi cantly less than 1 GPM.

When activated, the shutdown seal will limit leakage to less than 1 GPM, provide protection for 28 hours at station black out conditions (570 degrees Fahrenheit/2350 psi), and continue to provide protection for an additional 44 hours at residual heat removal conditions (350 degrees Fahrenheit/375 psi). The shutdown seal provides a total of 72 hours of protection for the core. Providing the plant with 72

hours of protection provides substantial improvement in the nuclear safety risk profi le for Plant Farley, and provides the plant operators with signifi cant additional margin while eliminating the possibility of a RCP seal LOCA in the event of a loss of offsite power.

Productivity/Effi ciency Unlike most design changes that

require extra man-hours, installation costs, and often unforeseen challenges, the SDS allows for no loss in effi ciency with regards to installation. The relatively simple design of the SDS allows it to replace the current #1 insert used in Westinghouse model 93A RCPs. As a result of the same fi t up, the installation process with regards to installing a #1 insert compared to the SDS assembly remains identical. Due to this, utilities are also able to minimize time needed for training individuals currently qualifi ed to install seals in the RCP.

Transferability As stated previously, Westinghouse

now offers a new product to the industry called the SHIELD®. These new shutdown seals can be installed in the 93A model RCP’s, which are common throughout

RCP Seal...Continued from page 51

the nuclear industry. In addition, since this effort was a success, Westinghouse is currently in the process of developing a similar design for other RCP models. For this design, the industry PWROG, which is comprised of several utilities, funded the research for the PRA analysis. This included 16 other utilities. The successful installation of the RCP SDS at Plant Farley will have a signifi cant impact on the other utilities that aided in the funding of this PRA research in deciding to install the RCP SDS. These new seals are currently being utilized by Plant Farley and are scheduled to be installed at Plant Vogtle, which is the only other site within the SNC Fleet to which this design applies.

Contact: Joshua Seales, Southern Nuclear, 42 Inverness Center Parkway, Bin B031, Birmingham, AL 35242; telephone: (205) 992-7602, email: [email protected]. �

conditions to 36 thousand of residents supplying heat and water to the satellite town of Neteshin. Payments done by Khmelnitsky NPP make up 70% of the local budget.

The current legislation of Ukraine provides Khmelnitsky site community for the right to obtain economic and social compensation against the risks of NPP activities, namely the use of one percent of total volume of electricity sold. These funds are invested into the construction of social facilities. In 2011, 21,976,300 of UAH ($2.74 million) were transferred to the budgets of regional, district, and local councils for development of social infrastructures. It will allow commissioning new facilities of social infrastructure for the benefi t of population living next to KhNPP site.

Contact: Tatyana Lisitchuk, Khmelnitsky NPP, Ukraine, Khmelnitsky Region, Neteshin m/b 376; email: [email protected]. �



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