Nuclear Power Facts and Figures

7/30/2019 Nuclear Power Facts and Figures

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Nuc lear pow er

Only problem sNo solut ions

Facts and fgures

about nuc lear pow er


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The nuc lear c hain(summar ised)

The nuclear chain (from uranium mining to waste storage) is the most complexand extensive of all energy systems. Note: every arrow means transport

Nuclear waste Uranium mining

(Uranium ore)

Nuclear waste

Nuclear waste

Nuclear waste

Nuclear waste

Nuclear waste

Uranium milling

Uranium conversion

(Yellowcake)

(Uranium Hexauoride)

Uranium Enrichment

(Depleted Uranium) Partly re-enriched for fuel

Depleted Uranium weapons(Enriched Uranium)

(Highly enriched Uranium)Fuel fabrication plant

(Fuel Assembly)

Nuclear reactor(Some reprocessed fuel can bereused in nuclear power plants)

(Some spent fuel and `fertile`material is reprocessed)

Nuclear weapons(Plutonium from reprocessedfuel used in nuclear weapons)

(MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel createdfrom obsolete nuclear weapons)

Low Level

Waste

Reprocessing

Plutonium

Medium LevelWaste

High Level

WasteReprocessedUranium

Temp.

Storage

Temp. Storage Liquid storage Temp. Storage ProductionMOX

NuclearMOX reactor

Conditioning Packaging Vitrication Conditioning TransportMOX waste

Temp.

storage

Temp. storageTemp. storage

Abovegroundstorage

(non-nal)

Final storage

(non-existent)

Final storage(non-existent)

Final storage

(non-existent)

Final

storage(non-existent)


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Nuc lear pow er :Only problem s - No solut ions

Sometimes, it is important to restate the obvious.

Why is smoking bad for you? Because it causes cancer.

Why is it not a good idea to drive drunk?Because it can lead to serious accidents.

Why should we get rid of nuclear power?Because it is dangerous, expensive, dirty and not helpful.

Although for decades the arguments against nuclear power have been and still are- strong and valid,there is an increasing group of nuclear companies supported by scientists and politicians, who say weneed nuclear power to ght climate change and to be independent. They also claim that all the problems

associated with nuclear power are almost solved or solved.Why do they say this? Because for them, nuclear power means prots, power and politics.

In March 2007 on the 50th birthday of the Euratom Treaty, more than 600,000 Europeans and 800European organisations demanded that European leaders phase out nuclear power, end the EuratomTreaty and massively invest in energy saving, efciency and renewable energy.Why do they say this? Because for them safety, sustainability and social behaviour are important.

In this booklet, we restate the obvious by listing many hard, recent and Europe-related facts on thefailures and dangers of nuclear power. All information comes from renowned and/or independent sources.

We look at the impossibilities of permanent storage of nuclear waste, the nancial and technical problemsof building new nuclear power plants, the impacts of dirty uranium mining, the numerous and seriousnuclear accidents that have taken place recently, the dangers of proliferation, and the data that show thatnuclear power does not help to save the climate.

To us, these facts lead to one obvious conclusion: nuclear power has no future.

European Petition Campaign against Nuclear Power

atomstopp (Austria)

Friends of the Earth Europe (EU/Brussels)

GLOBAL2000 (Austria)Rseau Sortir du Nuclaire (France)

WISE - World Information Service on Energy (Netherlands)

Women against Nuclear Power (Finland)


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1 Nuclear power still creates

Nuclear power produces nuclear waste that is highly radioactive. What

exactly is radioactivity and what is radiation? What radiation can do to livingorganisms was clearly illustrated when the Russian former KGB spy AlexanderLitvinenko was poisoned with a tiny dose of polonium-210. It killed him ina few days. Nuclear radiation occurs when unstable atoms decay. It disruptsthe functioning of the cells that make up our bodies. High levels of radiationkill cells, resulting in radiation burns, sickness and death.

claim that the waste is still radioactive (far abovefree release limits) after 240,000 years. The nuclear

industry proposes long-term waste storage sitese.g. in bunkers or in deep rock formations, but hasfailed to realise such a long-term disposal site. It isimpossible to guarantee the isolation of waste forhundreds of thousands of years. Once the waste isburied, there is no longer a possibility to check forand repair leakages. Leakages are simply a matter oftime, i.e. the containers denitely will leak sometimein the future, releasing the radioactivity they contain.

Aboveground storage cannot be consideredsafe either. Although there is a possibility to controland repair the waste containers, mankind will beresponsible for its management forever. Containers

o

Lower levels of radiation cause mutations, whichcan result in cancer and inheritable genetic dam-

age. These effects are unpredictable. Like withsmoking, we know there is a direct relation but itoccurs at random. If a large number of people areexposed to radiation, for example as happenedafter the Chernobyl accident, we know that somepeople will get cancer and some women will givebirth to children with genetic defects, but we cannotpredict who will be affected. Also the effects canbe delayed, with cancers or birth defects occurringmany years after exposure to radiation.

High levels of radiation are very dangerous. Thenuclear industry believes that high-level waste canbe stored relatively harmlessly. Most other sources

GermanpolicemenguardaCastortransportofnuclearwaste,

November1997


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dangerous waste

have to be replaced and the storage facility mustbe protected against war, terrorism and otherpotential dangers.

A study published in January 2007 in Naturecasts new doubt on nuclear waste storage safety.Synthetic material that scientists had hoped wouldcontain nuclear waste for thousands of years maynot be as safe and durable as previously thought. Itshowed that this material (zircon) is susceptible todegradation faster than expected and may not beable to contain the waste until it becomes safe. Thendings are particularly important for long-lived iso-topes such as plutonium, uranium and neptunium.

The following case shows some of the problemsrelated to underground storage. The true but un-believable storage of the Asse salt mine startedwhen until 1978, 124,000 barrels of low and inter-mediate radioactive waste (including 24 kg of plu-

tonium) were stored in a former salt mine in Asse,Lower Saxony, Germany. The waste was supposedto be stored forever in dry salt. Recent researchshowed that since 1988, salt lye water has been

owing freely into the mineshaft daily (11.5 m perday in November 2006), causing the waste drumsto rust. In total, 52 million litres have entered over 18years. The former salt mine consists of open spac-es (for transport and storage), and is now subsid-ing, with risk of collapse. An October 2006 surveyshowed that the combination of rust and radioactivewaste could produce inammable or explosive gas-es, which build up pressure, pushing up radioactivematerial, possibly into the groundwater system. In

reaction to the rst signs of leakages, the Germangovernment started to stabilise the mine in 1995by lling it with 2.5 million m of salt (in 15 years).According to the Ministry of Science & Technologythese costs amount to several hundreds of millionsof Euros to be paid by the government.

Sources:- Ian Farnan, Herman Cho en William J. Weber:

Quantication of actinide alpha-radiation damage in minerals and ceramics Nature, January 11, 2007- Basics of radiation and radiation protection International Atomic Energy Agency

and World Health Organization 00- Prof. Dr. Rolf Bertram Ein nicht rckholbares atomares Endlager vor unserer Haustr - Der Skandal um ASSE,

Institut fr Forschung und Bildung Gttingen October 2006- Prof. Dr. Rolf Bertram Wie sicher ist ein Atommll-Endlager in einem Salzstock? - ASSE II suft ab

Institut fr Forschung und Bildung, Gttingen November 2006


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2 Nuc lear pow er is ver y ex peo

It costs a lot of money to build a nu-clear power plant. In a competitiveelectricity market companies will have

difculties nding investors for sucha risky, long-term, politically sensitiveproject. Private banks withdraw theirsupport and doubtful and disputedpublic money is used to ll the gaps.

Construction of the Bulgarian Belene nucle-ar power plant started in the 1980s, but due toenvironmental protests and economic doubts theproject was stopped in the 1990s. The Bulgarian

government brought up the Belene project againin 2003 after having agreed to close down fourblocks of another nuclear power plant as condi-tion for EU accession. A consortium of RussianAtomStroyExport and French-German ArevaNPoffered to build two reactors for the price ofapproximately 4 billion Euros. Bulgarias NationalElectric Company (NEC) aims to keep at least

a 51% share in the new plant and seeks a strategicinvestor for the remaining part. NEC expected to

get funding from the export agencies of the chosenbuilders Russia, France and Germany, EURATOM,the European Investment Bank and leading globalinvestment banks.

In 2006, the UniCreditGroup, HVB and DeutscheBank withdrew their supportafter public protests from

customers. The banks ap-pear to be aware of the eco-nomic risks and of the fact thattheir customers do not wantany involvement in nuclear in-

vestments. Around the sametime investment consultancy

Standard and Poors down-rated NEC from develop-ing to negative on their

corporate rating because ofits participation in the project.

Bayerische Landesbank andCommerzbank denied in-volvement in the Beleneproject, although the Bul-

garian Energy Minister had mentioned them asinterested. The Belgian KBC Group deniedwanting to nance Belene through its Czech daugh-ter CSOB and the French Societ Gnrale Group

withdrew its Czech daughter Komercni Banka afterreceiving information about the risks attached toBelene. Other banks that withdrew support includeNP Paribas, Credit Suisse, Merrill Lynch & Co., JPMorgan Chase and the Lehman Brothers Bank.

There is a lot of dispute about how much itactually costs to build a new nuclear reactor.Figures are speculative because after Chernobylthe market for nuclear power plants collapsed and

hardly any new ones were built in Europe. Onlyrecently a new building project was initiatedin Finland with the Olkiluoto EPR (EuropeanPressured water Reactor). The construction ofthis EPR by the French Framatome (now renamedArevaNP) and the German Siemens (having a34% share in ArevaNP) started in February 2005.During the Finnish Parliaments discussions on theconstruction of a new nuclear power plant, it wassaid that the EPR would cost 2.5 billion Euro. The

nal contract amounted to about 3 billion Euros.

Financial support for this reactor comes from theFrench export credits agency Coface which gave a

Constructionwork

atTemelinnuclearpowerplant1997.


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nsive

loan guarantee of 610 million Euro (and thus sup-porting Areva with French public money) and a 1.95billion loan against the incredible low interest of2.6% from the German Bayerische Landesbank (in

other words supporting Bavaria-based Siemens).Normal interest rates are in a range from 8% upto 20% for investments with high risk, but becauseCoface guaranteed to take the losses and the buy-er of the plant, TVO, made a xed price contract,there is no nancial risk for the bank should the totalcosts exceed 3 billion Euros. In 2004 the EuropeanRenewable Energy Federation (EREF) led a com-plaint with the European Commission stating that

Olkiluoto would receive illegal state aid through

Coface, putting other energy companies to a disad-vantage. The Commission has accepted the com-plaint but as of 2007 no decision has been taken yet.

On average, building a nuclear power plant takesten years. The Olkiluoto EPR was planned to bebuilt in the extremely short time span of 57 months.However, two years after construction began thereis already an 18 months delay. The plant projecthas been plagued by safety problems and techni-

cal mistakes. The concrete of the base slab of thereactor was found to be too porous. Safety viola-tions were also found in other components, includ-ing the steel container of the reactor. In the caseof a xed-price contract it is to be expected thatmoney becomes the most important criterion inthe selection of a subcontractor. In the subcontrac-tors selection stage, TVO has limited possibilitiesto ensure that quality and safety criteria are givensufcient priority, says the Finnish Radiation and

Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) in a report pub-lished July 2006. During their investigation theyfound 700 reported irregulaties.

Operating income for Arevas nuclear operationsplunged 300 million Euros compared to the rst halfof 2005. Areva indicated that the division respon-

sible for Olkiluoto-3 was by far the worst perform-ing. Due to delays the costs are now more than 500million Euros over budget and the total costs areunlikely to be less than 4 billion Euros. About 600

mostly small Finnish subcontractors are working onthe site. Many of them are in trouble due to the delayand some are considering legal steps against Areva.

The European Union supports the expensive

nuclear industry, notably through the EuratomTreaty. Article 1 of the Euratom Treaty says it shallbe the task of the Community to contribute to theraising of the standard of living in the Member Statesand to the development of relations with the other

countries by creating the conditions necessary forthe speedy establishment and growth of nuclearindustries. The Treaty was signed in March 1957and channels funds to the nuclear power industry.It includes a lending facility with billions of Euros tohelp build or improve nuclear power plants.

All EU Member States are automatically mem-bers of Euratom. This also counts for states thatnever had nuclear power, have phased out nuclear

power or have agreed to do so in the future. Unlikein most other elds of policy making, the EuropeanParliament has no decision-making power over theEuratom budget. The Euratom 2.75 billion Eurobudget for both nuclear ssion and fusion for thenext ve years has hugely increased compared tothe 1.35 billion Euro for the previous seven-yearprogramme. From the same energy budget, the EUwill spend only 1.175 billion on renewable energyand energy efciency in the period 2007-2013.

In Austria, a country that declared itself nuclear-free after a referendum in 1978, a campaign waslaunched in January 2007 to leave the Euratomtreaty unilaterally. Austrians are fed up with paying40 million Euro annually to nuclear developmentsthat they do not agree with.

Sources:- STUK Nuclear Reactor Regulation Investigation report 1/06 Management of safety requirements

in subcontracting during the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant construction phase July 2006

- Tekniikka & Talous - Magazin Olkiluoto paisui painajaiseks February 8, 2007- Steve Thomas The economics of nuclear power: analysis of recent studies Public ServicesInternational Research Unit (PSIRU) July 2005

- Lauri Myllyvirta Olkiluoto - Scandal After ScandalJanuary 25, 2007 - UK nuclear build faces uncertain economics Platts, Power in Europe, February 13, 2007


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3 Nuc lear pow er w i l l run outo

Uranium is the sole source of nuclear power. The concentration of uranium

in the earths crust is about the same as that of tin or zinc. Uranium occursin many kinds of chemical compounds, minerals, and in different types ofrocks in the earths crust. In 2005 the world nuclear eet consumed about70,000 tonnes of uranium. About 40,000 tonnes of this amount was actuallymined. The remaining 30,000 tonnes was produced from depleted uraniumand highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons. Within a fewyears these reserves of highly enriched uranium will run out and from then onall uranium will have to be mined. The easily discoverable and extractable ura-nium sources are already known and in production. To date there are no publi-cations which indicate new large rich uranium resources have been found.

Mining and milling uranium removes hazard-ous substances in the ore from their relatively safeunderground location and converts them to nesand and then sludge, making it possible for thehazardous materials to disperse in the environ-ment. The uranium content of the ore is oftenonly between 0.1% and 0.2%. Therefore, large

amounts of ore have to be mined to get at the ura-nium. Piles of so-called waste rock threaten peopleand the environment after the shutdown of a minebecause they emit radon gas and the seepage

When nuclear power rst became an option itwas thought that fast breeders, breeding moreuranium, would lead to a closed fuel cycle and solvethe problem of limited fuel resources. Fifty years ofintensive research in seven countries (USA, UK,France, Germany, USSR/Russia, Japan and India),with investments of many of tens of billions of dollars

have failed to demonstrate that the breeder cycleis technically feasible. The 2003 study The Futureof Nuclear Powerdoes not expect breeders to comeinto operation during the next three decades.

UraniumsludgepondinDolnR

onka,

CzechRep.

Greenpeace/WISE

/Vask


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9

f uranium

water contains radioactive and toxic materials.To keep groundwater out of the mine during ope-ration, large amounts of contaminated water arepumped up and discharged into rivers and lakes.

When the pumps are shut down after closure of themine, there is a risk of groundwater contaminationfrom the rising water level. Uranium mill tailings arenormally dumped as sludge in special ponds orpiles, where they are abandoned and prone to fail-ure. In Saxony, Germany the Helmsdorf pile nearZwickau contains 50 million tonnes of solids andthe Culmitzsch pile in Thuringia near Seelingstdtcontains 86 million tonnes.

On December 24, 2006, a pipe carrying radioac-tive waste from a uranium mill in Jadugoda, Indiato a storage dam burst, discharging highly toxicwaste into a nearby creek. The accident occurredin a small village inhabited largely by displacedfamilies whose lands were acquired to constructtwo of the three storage dams. Similar accidents inother countries show that the negative effects onhuman and environ-mental health will im-

pact not just Jadugoda,but also several down-stream communities,perhaps even hundredsof kilometres away.The toxic sludgespewed into a creekfor nine hours beforethe ow of the radio-active waste was shut

off. As a result, a thicklayer of toxic sludgealong the surface ofthe creek killed scoresof sh, frogs and otherriparian life.

Nuclear mining waste was dumped in the

French environment. Cogema is the French

government-owned nuclear group, one of thelargest suppliers of uranium in the world and the

only company to offer the industry every stage ofthe nuclear fuel cycle: from mining to waste man-agement. Now that Frances most lucrative ura-nium deposits are mined out, Cogemas miningholdings are concentrated in Niger, Canada, andKazakhstan. The south of France suffers fromradioactive pollution as result of waste dumpinguntil 2001 at old uranium mining sites of Cogema.It has left 27 million tonnes of mining waste that willbe radioactive for millions of years. In an attempt to

hold Cogema responsible for cleaning up its waste,Sources et Rivires du Limousin, a independentorganisation of shers in the Limoges region, leda case with the Court of Justice. Although the Courtruled in March 2004 that Cogema had not violatedthe law, the case raised a lot of public attention andmay help to raise the environmental and healthstandards of the way mining waste is handled.

Sources:

- Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power, USA 2003- Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen Energy from uranium Ceedata Consulting 2006- Sources et Rivires du Limousin - Peter Diehl Uranium mining and milling- Nuclear energy, a dead end- WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor # 537, November 2000


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4 Nuc lear pow er c auses ser io

Accidents with nuclear installationsare not something from the past. Nordo they only occur in old reactors likethe Chernobyl reactor that burneddown in 1986, spreading a cloud ofradioactivity over half of Europe.Accidents happen with all types of nu-clear power plants, all over the world.

After the Chernobyl disaster the InternationalNuclear Event Scale (INES) was introduced bythe International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in

order to enable prompt information in case of nu-clear accidents. There are 7 levels on the INESscale indicating the seriousness of an event. Sincethe introduction of INES there have been manyincidents that were rated as level 3 or 4, whichindicate a serious accident. In many cases, designaws, a sloppy safety culture, poor judgment un-

der stressful conditions and a naive faith in a highlysensitive technology lead to a chain of events thatonly by sheer luck did not end in a major disasterinvolving public exposure to radiation and healthand environmental effects. Commercialisation ofelectricity production has increased dangers be-cause now production often goes before safety.Three European incidents, all classied on the INESscale as Level 3 accidents, are described here.

In the spring of 2003 one of the four Russiandesigned VVER 440-213 at Paks, Hungary, wastaken ofine for its annual refueling and mainte-nance period. Parts of the fuel elements were to becleaned with a new system, hired from Framatome

ANP (a joint venture of French ArevaNP andGerman Siemens which is now trying to building thenew European nuclear reactor in Finland). At onemoment during this operation, radioactive gas dis-

charges were detected as coming from the clean-ing system. The discharges were probably due toinsufcient cooling of the 30 highly radioactive fuelelements inside the system. This brought the cool-ing water in the cleansing tank to boil, then boiledaway all the water, heated up to 1200 degreesCelsius, and nally the tank crumbled like porcelainas the operators, in an attempt to avoid disaster,unleashed a torrent of cold water over the fuel ele-ments. According to reactor physicists, a nuclear

explosion, i.e. a limited but uncontrolled chain reac-tion, could have occurred. Radioactive gas owedinto the reactor room, from which the operators haded in panic. The gas was later blown unlteredinto the outside air at full ventilator strength for14 hours to make the room accessible for person-nel in radiation protection gear.

The incident was initially classied at level 2(incident) of the International Nuclear Event Scale

(INES), but later reclassied to level 3 (seriousincident). The Hungarian Atomic Energy Agencyinitially hesitated to upgrade the incidents classi-cation to level 3 because it feared that such a ratingcould cause unwarranted public excitement. Afterthe incident a number of violations of the safetyculture were identied, including improper manage-ment of cleaning works and lack of proper trainingof personnel operating the cleaning.

In April 2005 a leak was detected in the THORPreprocessing plant at Sellaeld, UK. The leak

was caused by a broken pipe at a point where thepipe work feeds into one of two accountancy tanks.Then in-cell cameras pinpointed the source andextent of the leak. According to the owner of theplant 83 m3 of dissolved reactor fuel and nitric acidincluding some 160 kg of plutonium leaked on theoor undetected from July 2004 to April 2005.

The THORP reprocessing plant was com-missioned in 1994 and was expected to oper-ate for at least 25 years. THORP has contractsto reprocess spent fuel from the UK, Japan,Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Italy and

n exploded pipe inside the Brunsbttel nuclear reactor in Germany14 Dec. 2001. Greenpeace Germany


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ous ac c ident s

the Netherlands which is brought in by ships andtrains. THORP is failing to meet these contracts. InApril 2005, THORP had reprocessed 5729 tonnesof fuel out of the 7000 tonnes, which should have

been completed by 2004.

The repair of THORP involves bypassing thedamaged pipe work and its associated account-ancy tank and using the second tank and pipe sys-tem instead. The inability to physically check thesecond system because of the dangerously highradiation levels within the cell will make it impos-sible to guarantee that this alternative route is safeand t for use. It is doubtful that the repair will fully

satisfy safeguards required by Euratom inspectors.

Plant owner BNG (British Nuclear Group) esti-mates radioactivity levels in the liquid to be around100,000 TBq (Chernobyl released 89,000 TBq)though some believe this to be a highly conserva-tive gure. BNG was ned 500,000 ( 750,000)for the accident. THORP faces yet another crisisin the form of who will be paying the conserva-tively estimated 50 million ( 75 million) costs of

the leak accident. Reprocessing customers fromGermany are seeking to prevent being charged forthe costs of the THORP accident. THORP ownerNDA (Nuclear Decommissioning Authority) is also

claiming costs from its insurers for the breach ofcontracts due to the accident costs.

In July 2006 a short circuit occurred duringrepair works on an interlocking station adjacent toSwedens Forsmark-1 nuclear reactor. In former

times it was standard precaution to take the nuclearplant off line during such repair works but that wasbefore commercialisation. Taking a reactor off linemeans loss of production and so loss of income.

The short circuit led to a blackout in the nuclearreactors control room. The automatic shutdownsystem of the reactor that should bring activityback to the minimum necessary for its own mainte-

nance, failed to operate. The automatic emergencypower system failed to start operating because itwas interconnected with the blackout line.

For 23 minutes no one in the control room couldbe sure what was happening in the reactor. Thedecision was taken to evacuate all personnel who didnot absolutely have to remain on duty. However, noevacuation took place -- for the simple reason thatthe name system was blacked out too. Eventually,an engineer from Forsmark-2 managed manuallyto get diesel-supported generators to kick in.

According to a former safety chief at Forsmark,

the reactor came close to a meltdown and it wassheer luck that saved the day. According to him,the safety culture in the Swedish nuclear industryis poor, and many nuclear plants no longer havedesign-competent personnel. All too much is leftto trial and error. An internal report on safety atForsmark that was leaked to investigative journal-ists supports this opinion. The analysis includedexamples of known installation errors, diesel fail-ures, workplace hazards, and alcohol and drug

abuse incidents at the plant. Many faults and mal-functions are recorded in the minutes of productionmeetings, but few are communicated upward alongthe chain of command. Nor are such events report-ed to the regulatory authority. After the accident,twin reactor Forsmark-2 and two other nuclearreactors were taken off line just in case they havethe same faulty installation.

INES scales do not tell everything. The

Forsmark accident was rated at 2 on the INES scale.That rating is accurate as no radioactive emissionsoccurred and no functions were permanently dam-aged. But the INES scale says nothing about therisks involved, about the severity of what might havehappened. No one can say just how close Forsmarkcame to a meltdown and explosion comparable tothe magnitude of Chernobyl. The only thing every-one can agree on that it was entirely too close.

Sources:- Charley Hultn Interview with Lars-Olov HglundWISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor # 649, September 6, 2006- Mestelle fr Arbeits- und Umweltschutz (MAUS e.V.) Der Strfall ist Normalfall!August 30, 2006- CORE - Various WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitors www.antenna.nl/wise


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5 Nuc lear pow er m eans nuc lo

Nuclear energy is the civilian spin-off from the early days of nuclear weapons.

A major reason for opposing a nuclear renaissance is that it considerablyincreases the risk of nuclear proliferation. The two most vulnerable stepsin the civilian nuclear chain with regard to nuclear proliferation are uraniumenrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

and/or highly enriched uranium used in atomicweapons. The plant in Iran can be used for theproduction of nuclear weapons. As can enrichmentfacilities in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Japan,

the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom andthe United States. In 1983 military experts alreadycalled for a moratorium on building new enrich-ment facilities. At that time only three commercial-scale enrichments plants existed, all owned bythe German/British/Dutch consortium Urenco. In2006, general director of the IAEA (InternationalAtomic Energy Agency) Mohamed ElBaradei againcalled for a temporary- moratorium (for exam-ple, for 5 or 10 years) for new uranium enrichment

and plutonium reprocessing facilities but onlyfor countries that do not currently have such tech-nologies. This would include a new Iranian facility,but exclude the plans of Louisiana Energy Services,

In line with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT) that encourages countries to develop nu-clear capacity for civilian purposes, Iran is develop-ing a programme for a complete nuclear fuel cycle.

It has essentially completed a civilian nuclear powerreactor at Bushehr. Russia will provide the fuel forthe reactor and will take back the spent fuel forstorage and possibly reprocessing. Iran also ope-rates four small research reactors, three suppliedby China and one supplied by the USA. Two otherfacilities are suspected of being part of a nuclear-weapon programme: a factory located near thetown of Arak and two enrichment plants under con-struction at Natanz.

Enrichment of uranium is a so-called dual-purpose process: it can be used to produce low-enriched uranium for use in nuclear reactors

TheU.S.

DOEPantexplantAmarilloTexas,

TheUnitedStatesNuclearW

eaponsFacility.


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ear w eapons

which is seeking a licence to build an uraniumenrichment plant in New Mexico, USA. The call forthis selective moratorium comes from the sameElBaradei who in a February 2007 speech at the

London School of Economics said: How do theyexpect this system of haves and have-nots to besustainable? How do I go to country X and sayyou should keep your obligation not to develop nu-clear weapons, when the big powers are makingno progress towards their obligations (in the NPT)for disarmament?

Reprocessing plants cannot be safeguardedeffectively. Safeguarding the plutonium in spent

nuclear reactor fuel elements before reprocessingis relatively simple. For many years, the elementsare so hot and radioactive that they are self-pro-tecting because they must be handled with re-mote equipment . However, once the plutoniumis removed from spent reactor fuel elements in areprocessing plant, safeguarding it is quite a dif-ferent matter. Safeguarding agencies claim that acommercial plutonium reprocessing plant can besafeguarded with an effectiveness of about 99%.

This means that, even with the most optimistic as-sessments, at least 1% of the plutonium will beunaccounted for. In Britains Sellaeld reprocessingplant THORP for example large quantities of plu-tonium were unaccounted for over the last years. In1999 24.9 kg plutonium went missing, in 2001 it was5.6 kg plutonium and in 2005 as much as 30 kiloplutonium could not be accounted for. According tothe owners of the plant the gures were estimatesand gave no rise to concern over either safety or

security. But according to independent experts, theloss of enough plutonium for 7 to 8 nuclear bombsis a very serious shortfall. If there is an accountingcollapse with the most poisonous product mankindcan produce, there is reason for serious concern.

A nuclear power plant also produces plutoniumin its normal electricity generating process. It is

generally recognised that nuclear weapons canbe made from reactor-grade plutonium, althoughthose made using weapon-grade plutonium aresomewhat more effective. Only 6 kg of plutonium is

enough to build a simple nuclear weapon.

In 1995 the IAEA established an Illicit TrafckingDatabase to facilitate exchange of authoritativeinformation related to trafcking in radioactive ma-terials. The preliminary 2006 IAEA Illicit TrafckingDatabase reports 85 incidents involving theft orloss of nuclear or other radioactive materials,mainly radioactive sources. In about 75% of thecases, the materials lost or stolen had not been

recovered at the time of reporting. Fifteen moreincidents involved the seizure of nuclear and radio-active materials from individuals who possessedthem illegally, some of them attempting to sell themor smuggle them across borders.

Sources:- Dr. Frank Barnaby Security and nuclear powerOxford Research Group 2005- Dr. Frank Barnaby Irans nuclear activities Oxford Research Group 2006- Mohamed ElBaradei Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Responding to a Changing Landscape IAEA, May 18, 2006- Preliminary 2006 Report from IAEA Illicit Trafcking Database February 1, 2007

Activists bicycle tour against nuclear weapons,Belgium, August 2006, FoE Flanders.


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6 Nuc lear pow er em i t s CO2o

The advantage of nuclear power plants from a climate perspective is that they

do not emit CO2 directly. However, the nuclear system is the most complex andextensive of all energy systems (see p.2). It includes ore mining and process-ing, enrichment of uranium, fuel fabrication etc. , the so-called upstreamfuel-cycle, and downstream (post-plant) activities that are needed to processand store nuclear waste. Because these are complex processes dealing withhighly dangerous radioactive material, lots of facilities and equipment (e.g.robots to demolish decommissioned power plants) are needed. Furthermore,steel, concrete and other materials are necessary for the construction forboth the nuclear power plant and the facilities in the up- and downstream ofthe nuclear fuel system. The energy used for these activities partly comesfrom fossil fuels, which causes greenhouse gas emissions.

to mine usable amounts of uranium. As high-gradeuranium stocks decrease, the CO

related to mining

uranium will increase. Assuming that global gene-ration capacity remains at 2006 levels, after 2016the ore grade of uranium will fall signicantly fromtodays levels and after 2070 nuclear energy will fall

from the energy cliff meaning that the nuclear sys-tem will consume more energy than it will be ableto produce. This effect will occur earlier if the globalgeneration capacity of nuclear power is extended.

In a life-cycle analysis the greenhouse gas emis-

sions and other environmental impacts of differenttypes of energy production can be calculated andcompared. International studies carrying out life-cycle analyses for nuclear energy nd emissionsof greenhouse gases in a range between 30 and

40 up to 120 grams of CO per kWh of generatednuclear electricity. The higher gure is based on theexpectation that the ore grade of uranium will fallrapidly. This means that more energy will be needed

SteamfromcoolingtowersofThreeMileIslandNPPinHarrisburg,

USA


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Nuclear power only uses the electricity it gen-

erates, the produced heat is wasted. Co-genera-tion systems producing both electricity and heatare much more favourable in reducing emissionsthan nuclear enery.

If we want to maximise the reduction of green-house gas emissions, we must reduce cost-effec-tively. A fair comparison of the costs of greenhousegas abatement (avoiding) using nuclear energywith the abatement costs of alternative power gen-eration options must be based on life-cycle emis-sion analyses. Figures from the German ko-Institute show that the greenhouse gas abatement

costs of electricity efciency options and of biogascogeneration are below those of nuclear energy,while wind (offshore) is in the same order of abate-ment costs.

Imagine we start building new nuclear powerplants because a nuclear power plant emits lessCO

that a coal-red plant. To reduce emissions

we will need many more plants than the presentworldwide number of 435 plants

that account for 16% of elec-tricity production. At the sametime, in the next 20 years manyof the present 435 nuclear powerplants will be closed becausethey are past their lifetime or

have technical problems. Until now, the averagelifetime of closed reactors is 22 years. In an opti-mistic scenario which assumes a 40 year lifetimefor existing plants, we would need to build 80 new

plants in 10 years to keep global nuclear productionat present levels. If we want to keep production atpresent levels, in 20 years we would need another200 plants to be built and connected to the gridin 2025. On average building a nuclear power planttakes 10 years and costs about 3 billion euros. Itslifetime is expected to be 40 to 60 years. So, evenif we start building tomorrow and we manage tobuild 280 new plants in the next 20 years, we willstill have only replaced the present nuclear capa-

city and not replaced a single coal-red plant. Inaddition, we will have spent an absurd amount ofmoney for only a small part of a temporary solutionto the climate change problem. We will have causedmany new environmental and security problems.In other words, we can secure the supply of en-ergy and ght climate change much more cheap-ly by investing in energy savings and renewableenergy instead of new nuclear power.

Sources:- Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen Energy security and uranium reserves Oxford Research Group 2006- Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen Nuclear power: energy security and global warming

- A physical view Ceedata Consultancy 2005- Uwe R. Fritsche, Sui-San Lim Comparison of greenhouse-gas emmissions and abatement cost of nuclearand alternative energy options from a life-cycle perspective (updated version) ko-Institute 2006

- Atomkraft: Ein teurer Irrweg. Die Mythen der Atomwirtschaft Bundesministerium fr Umwelt,Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU) March 2006

Figure:Life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions from

electricity generation in Germany..

PV = Photo-Voltaic solar energyHydro ROR = Run-Of-River Hydro-powerICE = Internal Combustion EngineCC = Combined-Cyclecogen = co-generation

(combined electricity and heat)ST = Steam Turbine


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This booklet was made by Wendela de Vries, Peer de Rijk & Frank van SchaikLayout/photos: Mads Eskesen Earth-Vision.bizThanks to: Ilse Chang, Andr Larivire, Martin Leers, Roland Egger, Silva Herrmann, Sonja

Meister and Ulla KltzerPrinted by Albani The Hague 2000 copies March 2007 Please contact WISE for info

Sometimes,it is important to restate the obvious.

Why is smoking bad for you?Because it causes cancer.

Why is it not a good idea to drive drunk?Because it can lead to serious accidents.

Why should we get rid of nuclear power?Because it is dangerous, expensive, dirty and not helpful.

In this booklet, we restate the obvious by listing many hard, recent and Europe-relatedfacts and gures on the failures and dangers of nuclear power. All information comes fromrenowned and/or independent sources. We look at:

the impossibilities of permanent storage of nuclear waste the nancial and technical problems of building new nuclear plants the impacts of uranium mining the serious nuclear accidents that have taken place recently the dangers of proliferation the data that show that nuclear power does not help to save the climate.

To us, these facts lead to one obvious conclusion:

Nuclear power has no future.

European Petition Campaign against Nuclear Power

atomstopp atomstopp.atFriends of the Earth Europe foeeurope.orgGLOBAL2000 global2000.atRseau Sortir du Nuclaire sortirdunucleaire.orgWISE - World Information Service on Energy www.antenna.nl/wiseWomen against Nuclear Power

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Nuclear Power Facts and Figures