NWC 1036

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study

By Douglas N. Hime, JMO Faculty

June 4, 2010

ii

Acknowledgements

Several important participants, experts, critics, and editors provided commentary

and corrections during my compilation of this case study, and I would be remiss if I did

not acknowledge the tremendous insights they provided. In particular, I would like to

thank CDR Angus K. Ross, RN (Ret.)., CDR Neil J. Thompson, OBE RN, CDR

Guillermo Repetto, Argentine Navy, CDR Alberto A. Soto, Chilean Navy, CAPT

Michael Critz, USN (Ret.), Dean Robert C. Rubel, College of Naval Warfare Studies of

the Naval War College and Professors Milan N. Vego and Albion Bergstrom of the Joint

Military Operations Department, Naval War College.

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Contents

Initial Argentinean Planning ……………………………………………………………...1

South Georgia Incident …………………………………………………………………...2

Operation ROSARIO ……………………………………………………………………..3

Tensions Escalate …………………………………………………………………………6

Argentina Invades and Britain Responds …………………………………………………7

Operation CORPORATE ………………………………………………………………..11

Argentine Occupation and Preparation for Defense …………………………………….13

The Fighting Begins ……………………………………………………………………..18

Operation SUTTON ……………………………………………………………………..28

The Landings ……………………………………………………………………………31

Goose Green ……………………………………………………………………………..37

Fitzroy and Bluff Cove ………………………………………………………………….42

The Push to Port Stanley ………………………………………………………………...44

Negotiations ……………………………………………………………………………..46

Epilogue …………………………………………………………………………………46

Notes …………………………………………………………………………………….48

1982 Falklands War Timeline …………………………………………………………..57

Order of Battle, British Units in the Falklands War …………………………………….66

Order of Battle, Argentine Units ………………………………………………………...71

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………….75

1

The Falklands-Malvinas Case Study

Ownership of the Falklands/Malvinas Islands since their initial discovery has

always been determined by force, with British control last established in 1833 following

the expulsion of the Argentine gunboat Sarandi and its contingent of soldiers, convicts

from the penal colony at San Carlos, and Argentine settlers. Irrespective of a definitive

conclusion regarding rightful possession, Argentina continued to contest British

occupation and ownership—particularly since the 1959 signing of the Antarctic Treaty,

which demilitarized the Antarctic and froze the competing claims of a number of nations,

including Chile, Argentina, and Great Britain. 1 With resolution of Antarctic claims on

hold, the surrounding waters became more important with regard to exploration for

resources—hence, Argentina refocused on its continental shelf in the sub-Antarctic and

South Atlantic, attempting diplomatically to resolve the dispute over ownership of the

Malvinas beginning in the mid-1960s.2

Nearly twenty years later Argentina was under the governance of a trio of military

service commanders who had ruled since 1976. Part of that leadership changed in

December 1981 when General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Army Commander-in-Chief,

pushed aside former President General Roberto Viola, citing failed national economic

policies; Galtieri would run the country along with the head of the Navy, Admiral Jorge

Anaya, and the head of Argentina‘s Air Force, General Basilio Lami Dozo. In addition to

inheriting a failing economy and facing international condemnation over human rights

abuses, the junta had recently been dealt a blow by the Pope, who had ruled against

Argentina in a territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel—a strait separating

islands of the Tierra del Fuego Archipelago at the southern end of the South American

continent. Needing a quick ‗victory,‘ the junta turned its attention to the only national

policy issue upon which it could take action—the return of the Malvinas.3

Initial Argentinean Planning

Like most militaries, the Argentineans prepared military plans for those scenarios

that they felt were the most compelling for their country. National-level war planning,

however, was not a joint activity—except in times of crisis, and even then joint

cooperation tended to be accomplished by ad hoc committees. For routine planning, each

service prepared its own plans, and Admiral Anaya‘s navy naturally focused on the South

Atlantic, updating plans for the Malvinas that had been around since the mid-‘60s. In

January 1982, however, Admiral Anaya quietly told the new Chief of Naval Operations,

VADM Juan Jose Lombardo, to prepare a plan to take back the Malvinas without

necessarily keeping them. The junta wanted to see the islands returned before the 150th

anniversary of their loss to the British—January 1983. Consequently, 1982 was to be ―the

year of the Malvinas.‖4 Consideration of the Malvinas was immediately given a higher

priority and a joint planning group was established to think about the best way to

reacquire the Malvinas should diplomacy with the United Kingdom continue to be

fruitless. While the Navy had been planning and exercising the Malvinas‘ problem at its

Naval War School for years, few felt that execution of a Malvinas‘ plan would ever be

initiated. Moreover, each plan, regardless of updates, contained the same basic

characteristics—a stated objective of evicting the British in order to restore Argentine

2

national sovereignty and a quick, surprise intervention with no loss of British or Islander

lives. 5

With negotiations between Argentina and Britain scheduled to resume in February

1982, the joint planning group believed it had a few more months to finalize planning

should negotiations fail. An invasion, if it were to occur, was likely to happen between

July and October—the optimum period in the South Atlantic for an incursion—because it

would be much more difficult for the British to expel occupying Argentine forces during

the depths of winter, the annual class of Argentine conscripts would have completed their

training, and the last permanent British maritime presence in the vicinity would have

ended following the departure of the British patrol ship HMS Endurance.6 Since the

British would have only the small Royal Marine garrison left to face an overwhelming

invasion, Argentina hoped that a quick, bloodless capitulation would be followed by

British resignation to a fait accompli and recognition of the futility of mounting an 8,000-

mile maritime expedition during the Southern Hemisphere‘s worst seasonal maritime

weather. Optimistic that the United States would maintain its impartial neutrality, the

junta anticipated that the United Nations would be relieved that the problematic

Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty issue was finally off its dockets. With time apparently on

its side, the planning team assumed that repossession of South Georgia and the Sandwich

Islands would automatically follow suit.7

The South Georgia Incident

Unfortunately, events were soon to escalate—as activities on South Georgia

began to spiral out of control. They began when Constantine Davidoff, an Argentine

scrap-metal merchant who had contracted in 1979 with Christian Salvesen, a Scottish-

based shipping firm, to clear scrap iron over the next three years from four abandoned

whaling stations in the vicinity of Leith, South Georgia—a bleak and remote Falklands

Islands dependency in the South Atlantic—began his efforts in earnest. Though Davidoff

notified the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his working party‘s expedition to South

Georgia in March 1982 aboard the Argentine naval transport the Bahía Buen Suceso, he

did not obtain a landing permit, agreeing instead that his representative would report to

the British Antarctic Survey base at Grytviken, which was roughly 20 miles from Leith.8

Davidoff‘s senior engineer, however, failed to travel to Grytviken to obtain the pass.

While out on a routine survey, one of the Survey base‘s scientists spotted the Argentine

ship, saw the Argentina flag flying over the whaling station, and heard shots being fired

(subsequently claimed to be deer hunting). He reported his sighting and what he‘d heard

to the British Magistrate at Grytviken who in turn notified Governor Rex Hunt, the

British Governor of the Falklands, of the incident. Though the engineer had been told that

a representative must come to Grytviken to obtain a landing permit, equipment and

supplies offloading had been completed, and a harsh South Atlantic gale appeared to be

developing, so the Argentinean flag came down and the Bahía Buen Suceso departed,

leaving the scrap metal workers behind—unaware of the diplomatic storm that was

brewing.9

Governor Hunt, meanwhile, had reported the Argentine territorial infringement to

London, mistakenly noting that Argentine naval personnel were using a scrap-metal

salvage ruse to establish an Argentine presence on South Georgia. Lord Carrington, the

3

British Foreign Secretary, formally protested to Buenos Aires demanding that the landing

party be removed immediately by the Bahía Buen Suceso or else Royal Marines would do

it forcefully. Ordered to turn around and head for South Georgia, HMS Endurance

arrived at Grytviken on 24 March and immediately put its 22 Royal Marines ashore.10

Stung by the harshness of the Carrington ultimatum and suspicious that the British

were orchestrating tension to enhance their negotiating position, Argentina ordered the

armed naval survey ship, Bahía Paraiso, then conducting routine training near the South

Orkney Islands, to land a full marine detachment of fourteen men at Leith to protect the

scrap metal workers. With armed forces from both sides now just twenty miles apart, the

Argentine junta was not about to be humiliated over South Georgia. It decided to

abandon its carefully-planned diplomatic offensive, using this incident of British

unreasonableness as an excuse to occupy the Falklands, which it hoped world support

would recognize as an acceptable resolution of an on-going, intractable, minor territorial

dispute.11

Operation ROSARIO

On 23 March, VADM Lombardo had been directed by the junta to accelerate

planning so that an invasion force could launch within 48-72 hours of notification.12

Because most of their naval transports were occupied supporting South Georgia,

deploying Argentine forces would be dependent upon the surface fleet for movement to

East Falkland Island. The Argentine ‗bloodless‘ plan envisioned persuading the British

governor that there was no point in resisting.13

To ensure they recognized the futility of

resisting, the Royal Marine detachment had to be prevented from retreating into the

interior of the islands where its members could continue resistance indefinitely. That

meant that the marines had to be captured in their barracks or stopped before they could

reach Stanley, with interior routes blocked. To create an impression of overwhelming,

irresistible force, the Argentine concept of operation (Figure 2 and 3) involved a

coordinated amphibious and airborne assault that was preceded by infiltration, with

ground forces converging on Stanley from all directions, quickly gaining control of the

airport, the British marine barracks, the population, and the island‘s communications and

warning systems—all of which required clear but flexible command and control

structures.14

For the initial invasion, the Malvinas Theater of Operations was established, with

General Osvaldo García, the commander of the Army‘s Fifth Corps in Patagonia, as

overall commander (Figure 1).15

Under him were BG Américo Daher, Commander,

Ground Forces (Army), BG Mario Menéndez, the Military Governor-designate of the

Malvinas, and RADM Walter Allara (Task Force 40), who was the amphibious force

commander. Under RADM Allara was naval infantry (Marine Corps) RADM Carlos

Büsser, who was the landing force commander. Protecting the landing forces from a

distance to their north was Task Force 20, which contained Argentina‘s lone aircraft

carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo, as well as four destroyers and a tanker—all under the

command of Captain J.J. Sarcona (TF 20), who reported directly to VADM Lombardo—

as did RADM Allara, despite the stated command arrangements (Figure 2).16

Gen

4

Garcia‘s mission, according to the Campaign Plan, was ―to militarily occupy and

maintain the Falklands islands, South Georgia, and the Sandwich Islands.‖17

The plan had

three phases: preliminary, military strategic maneuver and conquering of the objective,

and maintenance of the objective and military government.18

Despite the plan‘s joint

imprimatur, execution would largely be in the hands of the navy, led by TF 40, under

RADM Allara. TF 40 included the former American landing ship-tank (LST) Cabo San

5

Antonio, which was carrying nineteen amphibious landing vehicles as well as the 874-

man landing force from the Buzo Táctico marine commandos and the 2d Marine Infantry

Battalion, all under the command of RADM Büsser. Additional forces included the

destroyers Santísima Trinidad and Hércules, corvettes Drummond and Granville,

icebreaker Almirante Irizar, the transport Isla de los Estados, and the submarine Santa

Fé.19

As described above in the concept of operations overview (see schematics at

Figures 3 and 4), the Buzo Táctico marine commandos were to be the first to land,

quickly capturing Government House and the Royal Marine barracks at Moody Brook,

followed by the 2d Marines who would come ashore at two points (see Figure 4)—one

clearing the airfield and the second coming directly into Stanley Harbor to provide

overwhelming force should the Buzo Táctico commandos need assistance in convincing

the Brits to surrender. Strict instructions were issued to all forces to ensure there would

be no Falkland civilian casualties. Once the airport runway had been cleared of any

obstacles emplaced by British resistance, the Army‘s 25th

Infantry Regiment and the 9th

Engineer Company would be airlifted in, with the 25th

serving as the occupation force

after the marines were to be withdrawn.20

Task Force 40 departed Puerto Belgrano on Sunday, 28 March, heading south for

what most believed was a planned exercise. Few among the task force‘s senior officers

knew the precise mission or its details because operational security concerns had kept

knowledge of planning to a very limited number of senior officers. En route, on the

second day, the true nature of the operation was revealed to the task force‘s senior

officers, and, while maintaining secrecy was no longer an issue, the remainder of task

force personnel weren‘t informed of the objective until 1 April—the scheduled date of

execution. Fierce weather early in the trip, which lasted for 48 hours, forced a delay, and

Galtieri and Allara agreed upon a new landing date of 2 April. Unfortunately, the delay

necessitated other changes to the execution of Operation AZUL.

6

Tensions Escalate

Meanwhile, the UK Foreign Office had received word on 25 March from the

Endurance that the Bahía Paraiso had anchored at Leith, military landing craft and a

helicopter had been spotted, and that Argentinean warships had departed Puerto

Belgrano. Lord Carrington feared that Argentina might attempt to prevent the Endurance

from evacuating the scrap metal workers or cut off the air service and take other actions

against the Falklands. As unlikely as these measures seemed, the Foreign Secretary

feared that defending the Falklands was impossible. Various compromises were

considered between Lord Carrington and his ambassador in Buenos Aires, and while the

Argentinean Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, seemed open to compromise, he was not a

participant in the junta‘s deliberations.21

The British were concerned about the ability of the Endurance to delay its

departure from the South Atlantic, so the Ministry of Defence dispatched the Fort Austin,

a Royal Fleet Auxiliary to replenish its ice patrol vessel. With the Prime Minister‘s

approval, it also covertly dispatched two nuclear-powered submarines toward the

Falklands to counter any possible Argentine aggression while also avoiding intentional

provocation.22

Unfortunately, a British Independent Television News (ITN) reporter had

viewed a separate British submarine, HMS Superb, leave exercises in Gibraltar, and ITN

subsequently broadcast that this submarine was in fact en route to the Falklands. While

the Ministry of Defence was pleased that this misinformation showed the world that

Great Britain was indeed serious about the sovereignty of its overseas‘ territories, the

Foreign Ministry was embarrassed in its negotiations with Argentina, whose diplomatic

stance immediately hardened.23

7

Galtieri and Anaya had already made up their minds that the Malvinas must be

occupied preemptively before any British reinforcements, possibly already mobilized and

en route, arrived. Closely monitoring the press in Great Britain, the junta was convinced

that the hardliners in parliament, particularly the Falklands Lobby, were swaying the

country‘s debate and that British intransigence was simply a way of gaining time while

its fleet readied for a renewed, perhaps indefinite presence in the South Atlantic.

Convinced that it could co-opt support for diplomatic resolution from both the United

States and the United Nations, the Argentine objective was straightforward—force

substantive negotiations with Britain on the sovereignty of the Malvinas by conducting a

non-violent repossession—a nuance that Great Britain as well as the rest of world would

fail to grasp. A prolonged occupation was neither envisioned nor desired.24

Warned by British intelligence that an Argentine submarine was reconnoitering

landing beaches on East Falkland Island, Governor Hunt broadcast a ―period of tension‖

warning to the populace of Stanley and ordered that the airport runway be blocked. He

also retained the outgoing marine detachment that had just completed its turnover with its

replacement unit—in effect, doubling the Royal Marine presence normally in place in

Stanley. In turn, the Argentine airline office in Stanley relayed to the Argentine

government that the Falkland Islands Governor had alerted everyone that an Argentine

invasion was imminent. Realizing that the British garrison in Stanley knew they were

coming, General Garcia and RADM Büsser quickly began to revise the invasion plan.

The main landing beach was moved to a point further west—Yorke Bay; the direct flight

from the mainland to the airport was cancelled; forces earmarked to capture Government

House were switched to seizing the airport and clearing the runway; the amphibious

commandos were relieved of securing key points in Stanley and instead were tasked to

capture Government House—with a force one-half the size of the army platoon that had

planned that particular takedown; and the Goose Green-Darwin operation was cancelled

(see Figure 3), adding those forces to the reserves for Stanley.25

Despite the imminence of an Argentine landing, the British were hopeful that last-

minute diplomatic maneuvering by U.S. President Reagan would dissuade Galtieri from

launching his invasion. And, while Reagan and Galtieri did speak, the latter was adamant

that what had begun could not be stopped. Indeed, an hour prior to the telephone

conversation between the two leaders, the Buzo Táctico marine commandos were en route

to Mullet Creek.26

In Stanley on 1 April, Governor Hunt upgraded his earlier warning to ―imminent

danger‖ and gave orders that if tactical landings occurred, the invading forces were to be

engaged, but no fighting was to occur in the vicinity of civilian housing. He fully

expected that Argentina would land a token demonstration party who would raise the

Argentine flag before allowing themselves to be captured. In turn, he would give them a

stern warning and a glass of sherry before repatriating them to Argentina.27

Argentina Invades and Britain Responds

Landing around 4:30 a.m. on 2 April, the commandos reached the Moody Brook

barracks 90 minutes later, conducting a full-scale assault—tossing smoke grenades and

raking each room with machine-gun fire.28

Only because the British marines had already

assumed their defensive positions were their lives spared. Finding the barracks empty, the

8

commandos joined the forces sent to capture Government House and the governor. A

fierce gun battle followed that left two Argentineans dead and Government House under

siege but still not defeated. Within the next couple of hours, armored troop carriers and

artillery had arrived with the reinforcements, and Governor Hunt realized that offering

further resistance would be futile. Nevertheless, he attempted to negotiate a truce without

surrendering—to no avail—and he refused to shake the offered hand of General Garcia,

instead donning his ceremonial gubernatorial regalia for the Argentinean C-130 trip to

Montevideo, while the defeated Royal Marines were humiliatingly photographed lying

face-down.29

The next morning the captain of the Bahia Paraiso at Leith, South Georgia,

radioed news of the Falklands surrender to the 23-man British detachment at Grytviken,

urging them to capitulate to avoid further violence. He subsequently sent a corvette and

two Alouette helicopters to Grytviken, where the Royal Marines opened fire with small

arms and 84 mm anti-tank rockets. Their surprise resistance damaged one of the helos

and forced the corvette to retreat hastily. After two hours of heavy fighting, however, the

marines, low on ammunition and facing a far superior Argentine force now established

ashore, surrendered.30

HMS Endurance, at sea nearby, was preparing to come to the

assistance of the marines at Grytviken, but was directed by Fleet Headquarters to refrain

from engaging in offensive action and to conceal its whereabouts until given further

guidance. Frustrated, it consequently turned north to rendezvous with its replenishment

ship, Fort Austin.31

While Argentinean propaganda proclaimed a bloodless victory and neither

Malvinas‘ residents nor British soldiers lost their lives, the real truth was that four

Argentinean military personnel had perished in the fighting and several more had been

wounded.32

Nevertheless, in Buenos Aires, the populace was jubilant as an emotional

Galtieri broadcast Argentina‘s great victory, reassuring the people of Argentina that he

was simply accomplishing their will, while promising the people of the Malvinas that

there would be no disruption of their lives and no breach in heretofore good relations

with Great Britain. On 2 April, General Garcia issued four decrees to the people of the

Malvinas: (1) asking for their cooperation with their nearly-appointed government

officials, (2) notifying them that their former colonial authorities had been relieved of

their governing responsibilities, (3) providing interim instructions to ensure their public

and personal safety, and (4) guaranteeing them all of the freedoms promised in the

Argentine National Constitution. A separate communiqué announced that BG Benjamin

Menendez had been appointed as the new governor of the Malvinas.33

In London on 2 April, first news of the invasion trickled in via the BBC, which

had picked up a British Antarctic Survey transmission that the Falklands had been

occupied by Argentine military force. Unfortunately, the Foreign Office had only

moments before informed the House of Commons that it appeared the Falklands had

fallen. Conservative party members in the Commons immediately had Prime Minister

Margaret Thatcher and her War Cabinet on the defensive over the extent of the surprise

her administration had failed to foresee. Even by late in the evening on 2 April, there was

still no official confirmation on the level of resistance, casualties, or damage—―for a

crucial eight hours, they could offer the nation neither comfort nor leadership. . . . It was

a classic demonstration of the hiatus in authority which can follow a failure in

communications at the outbreak of war.‖34

Nevertheless, knowing that a UN resolution of

9

condemnation was being drafted and upon the advice of the Chiefs of the Air and Naval

Staffs, Mrs. Thatcher and her War Cabinet agreed to send a Task Force—a decision taken

as ―a reflection of genuine indignation at the Argentine act of aggression and a

determination to demonstrate that the Government was not completely helpless.‖35

Suddenly, the United Kingdom was embarking on a war over a territory that most

of its citizens couldn‘t find on a map, at a time when it was well into the process of

dismantling its navy and divesting itself of overseas territorial possessions. Why? In the

foreword to Admiral Sandy Woodward‘s One Hundred Days, the Rt. Hon. Margaret

Thatcher offers the following observation:

It was not very easy to take a decision which commits your country to

fight a war eight thousand miles from home. At such times it is impossible

to clear the mind of the inevitable heartbreak of war—all wars—and the

grief of those families who suffer loss. But on Friday, 2 April 1982,

Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. . . . As the news hardened, I called

several people together, ministers and advisers. If the islands were

invaded, I knew exactly what we must do—we must get them back. Their

people were our people. Their loyalty and devotion to Queen and Country

had never faltered. As so often in politics the question was not, what

should we do? But, how could it be done?36

While there were no doubt many factors that contributed to Mrs. Thatcher‘s

decision, the two most clearly stated: 1) were the right of self determination for the

people of the Falklands, and 2) recognition that ―aggression must not be rewarded.‖37

More importantly, by arguing these two principles before both the public and parliament,

the Thatcher government quickly forged the bipartisan and popular support it needed to

achieve for consensus on action. Additionally, on 3 April, the UN Security Council

provided further support to Great Britain when it passed Security Council Resolution

502, which demanded: 1) the immediate cessation of hostilities, 2) the immediate

withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands, and which (3) called upon the

governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom to seek a diplomatic solution and to

respect the UN Charter.38

As it prepared to respond to the predicament in the South Atlantic, the Thatcher

War Cabinet struggled with a national planning process that had atrophied in the nearly

thirty years that had passed since its last international security crisis. Lord Carrington, the

Foreign Minister, resigned over what was perceived to be a diplomatic failing that had

allowed the crisis to escalate to the brink of war. He was replaced by Francis Pym. Other

members of the War Cabinet (as it was known) included the Prime Minister (Mrs.

Thatcher), the Home Secretary (Sir William Whitelaw), the Secretary of State for

Defence (Sir John Nott), the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Paymaster

General (Cecil Parkinson), who was responsible for public relations. Notably absent was

the Chancellor of the Exchequer (responsible for collecting taxes and managing public

spending), because the Prime Minister didn‘t want to be hamstrung over financial

concerns. Mrs. Thatcher, of course, dominated the Cabinet‘s debates, and while reluctant

to challenge military advice, she showed no hesitation in challenging diplomatic

recommendations; she did, however, listen carefully to all sides before making a

decision. Though not a member of the War Cabinet per se, the Chief of the Defence Staff

(CDS), Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, was the principal military advisor to the Secretary of

10

State (for Defense), and the Chiefs of Staff Committee that he chaired became the forum

for forging military advice to the War Cabinet.39

The military chain of command went from the Prime Minister directly to the

CDS, bypassing the Secretary of State for Defence, and then on to the Commander-in-

Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, who was designated the

commander of the Task Force (see Figure 5). His Land Deputy would be MG Jeremy

Moore and his Air Deputy would be Air Marshall Sir John Curtiss. Immediately below

Admiral Fieldhouse , at least initially, was the Flag Officer First Flotilla, Rear Admiral

John ‗Sandy‘ Woodward, who had operational control as the Combined Commander of

all surface ships, land, and air forces as Combined Commander of the expeditionary force

(CTG 317.8). Below Woodward, or so it appeared, there were three Commander Task

Units (CTUs), with Woodward in command of the Carrier Battle Group (CTU 317.8.1);

Commodore Amphibious Warfare (COMAW), Commodore Michael Clapp, in command

of the Amphibious Task Force (CTU 317.8.3); and Brigadier Julian Thompson, Brigade

Commander No. 3 Commandos in charge of the landing Group (CTU 317.8.4).

Submarine operations would not be part of RADM Woodward‘s responsibilities; they

would be tasked from Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) at Northwood, Vice Admiral

Peter Herbert.40

After April 9, for reasons that are not entirely clear, Admiral Fieldhouse amended

his earlier version of the command structure. Whereas the first structure (Figure 5), had

all three groups as separate but equal—under Woodward, who doubled as the

Commander Task Group—in the second command structure (Figure 6), all groups appear

equal. Despite Admiral Fieldhouse‘s second command structure, Woodward was still

considered the ‗Senior Task Group Commander,‘ and he was a two-star flag officer,

whereas Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson were both one-star officers. This

11

ambiguity came to a head with the arrival of MG Jeremy Moore on 30 May. Moore was

above both Brigadier Thompson and Brigadier Wilson of 5 Infantry Brigade, though the

relationship between Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson—as Commander,

Amphibious Task Force and Commander, Landing Force, respectively, was as defined in

UK amphibious doctrine. While MG Moore was able to provide support for Brigadier

Thompson upon his arrival in the South Atlantic, the lack of an in-theater overall

commander, capable of assessing priorities and dealing directly with Northwood arguably

impeded smooth command and control.

Operation CORPORATE

As Prime Minister Thatcher noted, putting together a maritime task force was no

small task. In 1982 the Royal Navy was a force designed primarily for anti-submarine

warfare against the Soviet Union in the north Atlantic. Now it was being challenged to

stretch its logistics pipeline 8,000 miles without shore-based air support, well outside of

its assigned North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area, to fight against an enemy

and in an area about which it knew little, without a plan or concept of operations.41

In

fact, the Task Force 317‘s mission, as laid out in ADM Fieldhouse‘s directive, was ―to

proceed for such operations in the South Atlantic as may be ordered.‖42

The rapid nature of Britain‘s response precluded detailed planning, except in the

broadest sense, and while the Defence staff hoped for a diplomatic solution, its initial

thoughts were that if military action ensued, as unlikely as that seemed, it would involve

isolating the Argentine garrison in the Falklands through a blockade, followed by an

amphibious landing to recover Britain‘s sovereign territory.43

The UK‘s two carriers,

HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, were both in Portsmouth, as were its two assault

ships, HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, though Invincible and Intrepid were being

12

destored in preparation for mothballing, while the Hermes was in the early stages of

maintenance. Loaded to capacity and carrying the only relevant Fleet attack aircraft—the

Sea Harrier—the two carriers would provide minimally-credible air support for any

landings, but would still need air defense protection.44

The Type 42 destroyers were

Britain‘s most modern air defense ships—armed with Sea Dart, and three were near

Gibraltar with RADM Woodward participating in Exercise SPRING TRAIN—HMS

Coventry, HMS Glasgow, and HMS Sheffield. For close defense, the UK depended on

Sea Wolf-equipped Type 22 frigates, three of which were also with Woodward.45

On 2 April ADM Fieldhouse alerted the two carriers (with 20 Sea King troop-

carrying helos and 20 Sea Harriers between them) and HMS Fearless, Alacrity, and

Antelope as well as Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) Resource and Stromness that they were

on a four-hour tether. Additionally, 3 Commando Brigade was brought to 72-hour notice,

with 3 Para added the next day.46

Supplementing Fearless for amphibious lift would be

five LSLs—Sir Galahad, Sir Geraint, Sir Lancelot, Sir Percival, and Sir Tristram (this

last ship was ordered to steam from Belize directly to Ascension). A few hours later on

the same day RADM Woodward was directed to proceed covertly to Ascension Island

with HMS Antrim, Glamorgan (both County class destroyers), Glasgow, Coventry,

Sheffield (Type 42 destroyers), Brilliant and Broadsword (Type 22 frigates), Arrow,

Plymouth, Yarmouth and RFA tankers Appleleaf and Tidespring.47

Other British ships

participating in Exercise Spring Train but not tasked to head to Ascension ‗crossdecked‘

all of the surplus food, spare parts, and ammunition they had available to those vessels

headed south as part of TF 317.48

Cheered by large crowds on shore, HMS Hermes and

Invincible and RFA Olmeda departed Portsmouth on 5 April, preceded earlier that

morning by the quieter departures of HMS Alacrity and Antelope and followed on 7 April

by HMS Fearless, four LSLs, RFA Pearleaf and Stromness. Two days later MV Elk

sailed from Southampton followed later that evening by the Peninsular and Oriental

Steam Navigation Company (P&O) cruise liner SS Canberra, which had been

requisitioned by the Ministry of Defence as a troopship through the STUFT system

(Ships Taken up from Trade).49

Later on, additional ships requisitioned through STUFT

and sent south would include the sister roll-on, roll-off container ships (Ro-Ro) Atlantic

Causeway and the Atlantic Conveyor as well as the ocean liner Queen Elizabeth II (QEII)

and another P&O liner, Uganda, which was refitted and declared to the Red Cross as a

hospital ship.50

Though located 3,770 nautical miles from Great Britain and nearly the same

distance from the Falklands, Ascension Island was the UK‘s only option for a forward

staging base. The haste with which the Task Force was assembled created a multitude of

additional problems, not the least of which was administratively-loaded ships.

Commodore Clapp, in particular, commented on how ―a lack of clear operational

objectives aggravated [loading because] he had not had the opportunity to assess a

concept of operations in any depth . . . . ‗We have basically managed to squeeze what we

considered essential into the given space.‘‖51

Major General Moore would later comment

that the assault force would have been better served and equally responsive had it been

tactically loaded and sailed two weeks later—avoiding the wasted efforts involved in the

re-stow at Ascension. What little planning that did occur seemed more focused on the

most optimum environment rather than the most likely.52

13

The destroyer HMS Antrim, the frigate HMS Plymouth, and the tanker RFA

Tidespring—all assigned to retake South Georgia—were the first ships to arrive at

Ascension on 10 April, where they picked up commandos and Special Forces troops

flown there to meet them. The next day the destroyers HMS Glasgow, Sheffield, and

Coventry arrived, along with frigates HMS Arrow and Brilliant. Several days later the

two carriers arrived followed a day later by the amphibious force, which included HMS

Fearless, Stromness, and the five LSLs. The carrier force was the first to depart on 18

April, along with a destroyer, two frigates, and two auxiliaries, but the amphibious group

needed more time to assemble fully, with the main body not departing until 7 May.53

In

all, there were 65 ships—20 warships, 8 amphibious landing ships, and nearly 40

auxiliaries carrying supplies for 3 months and roughly 15,000 troops of which nearly

7,000 were part of the landing and ground forces.54

The Task Force en route to the Falklands departed with very little intelligence

about its enemy, no doubt partly the result of a defense intelligence architecture that was

heretofore focused on the Warsaw Pact and northwest Europe rather than upon a friendly

nation in the southern hemisphere from whom the British Fleet acquired most of its beef

products. Human intelligence and satellite imagery were particularly austere because

neither Great Britain nor its closest ally, the United States, had dedicated resources for

extensive looks at the southern hemisphere. Such a drastic change in focus meant that

Britain‘s military intelligence staff, particularly the Army‘s Intelligence Corps, which

didn‘t have a central pool of experts to draw upon, had to add linguists, analysts, imagery

interpreters, and tactical experts—no small challenge.55

Extensive signals intelligence

support, however, was supposedly being provided to the United Kingdom by the U.S.

National Security Agency; however, the immense amount of raw data—specifically,

radio traffic—was such that there was insufficient time and analysts to sort through it all.

Nevertheless, an article in a 1984 issue of The Economist claims that 98 percent of British

intelligence on Argentina came from U.S. assistance. While that may be true, from

RADM Woodward‘s perspective, the greatest threat the Task Force would likely face

would come Argentinean air and naval forces, and British data even on the number of

fighter aircraft Argentina possessed was very dated.56

In fact, on 5 April Woodward sent

a signal to Admiral Fieldhouse emphasizing the need for specific information on the

following Argentine capabilities: 1) German-built submarines and their parameters; 2)

Exocet ship fitting numbers, radar parameters, and air-launch capabilities; 3) numbers

and radius of action for Argentinean Mirage 3 and 5 aircraft as well as numbers of which

were night/all weather capable; 4) Canberra aircraft radius of action and armament; 5)

numbers of carrier-capable Super Etendards and radius of action; 6) numbers of Lynx

helicopters and levels of training; and 7) the U.S. assessment of Argentinean aircraft

carriers, ASW, and replenishment at sea capabilities. 57

Some of the requested intelligence was immediately available from both France—

particularly, on the Exocet and Super Etendards, and the United States—despite the

latter‘s public ‗even-handedness‘ toward both Argentina and Great Britain. To

Woodward‘s request for intelligence, Fieldhouse added that they would also need specific

intelligence on those Argentinean forces now garrisoned on the Falklands. It was a well-

kept secret that so little was known about Argentinean military capabilities that the lack

of knowledge itself was considered highly sensitive.58

14

Argentine Occupation and Preparation for Defense

While the original objective of Operation AZUL/ROSARIO had been simply to

land a force on the Malvinas Islands and establish an Argentinean administration, the

junta soon discovered that not only was Britain responding by sending a task force with

four battalion-sized units of professional soldiers trained to NATO standards and at least

one aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, but that the U.S. Government had authorized British

use of its facilities on Ascension Island. 59

Unfortunately, by the evening of 3 April only

half of the original assault force remained on Isla Soledad (East Falkland Island).

Because no plans had been developed to deal with what was felt to be the least likely

scenario—defending the Malvinas Islands—Argentina was ill-prepared for what Britain

was sending its way. In fact in a post-conflict interview, VADM Lombardo offered the

following observation:

They [the junta] couldn‘t believe it. It seemed impossible that the British

would go to so much trouble, to mobilize so many ships and modify so

many merchant ships and liners over such a place as the Malvinas. For

example, when Menéndez was put in charge of the Malvinas with a large

party of senior officers and politicos, no one told him that it would be his

task to defend the Malvinas. I sent him a message on 8 April, telling him I

was coming to see what he was doing in the military sense. Menéndez

said: ‗What the hell are you talking about?‘ His only problems until then

had been to look after the kelpers.‖60

The decision was quickly made to leave only a small garrison of ground troops on

South Georgia since supporting and defending it from an invasion was hopeless.61

15

On 7April, General Galtieri signed National Executive Power Decree No. 700

establishing the South Atlantic Theater of Operations and designating VADM Lombardo

as its commander, with authority to exercise all functions except military governorship,

which would be under BG Mario Menéndez. RADM Alberto Padilla was designated to

be Lombardo‘s Chief of Staff, with BG Julio Ruiz in charge of Land Forces, BG A.C.

Weber in charge of Air Forces, and RADM Allara in charge of Naval Forces (see Figure

7). Interservice rivalry and separate lines of authority from the service chiefs on the

junta, however, precluded any real hopes for joint command, and in reality, lines of

authority occurred as depicted in Figure 8.62

A Military Committee was created that included all of the commanders from the

South Atlantic Theater of Operations and the chiefs of staff of the services, while a

Political Committee, the Malvinas Working Group, included the members of the junta as

well as the Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez. While at the political level differences

tended to be resolved smoothly, communications further down the chain of command

tended to be service-stove-piped, with independent operations that spawned

miscommunication, arguments, and confusion. In charge of the Malvinas Joint

Command, BG Menéndez divided responsibilities as shown in Figure 9. BG Américo

Daher (Commander, IX Brigade) was Chief of Staff; BG Oscar Joffre (Commander, X

Brigade) was Commander of the Puerto Argentino [Port Stanley] Group of Forces, and

BG Omar Parada (Commander, III Brigade) was Commander of the Malvinas Group of

Forces (Goose Green and the whole of Isla Gran Malvinas [West Falkland Island]).63

On 22 April Galtieri visited the Malvinas after receiving word that British ships

had departed Ascension Island. After meeting with BG Menéndez and BG Joffre, Galtieri

agreed to provide an additional infantry regiment; however, upon further reflection when

he arrived back in Buenos Aires, Galtieri decided to send an additional brigade rather

than a regiment to complement X Brigade, which was in the process of being fleshed

out.64

16

Without consulting the other members of the junta, he added III Infantry Brigade,

which was scheduled to arrive in the Malvinas between 24 and 29 April. Unfortunately,

III Brigade had no plans to support the islands and, in fact, had been in the midst of

redeploying to strengthen the contentious shared border with Chile.65

Additionally, the

weather conditions at its home base in Corrientes, where it had trained, were significantly

different than what would be experienced in the Malvinas. Assigned troops had no

Puerto Argentino

GooseGreen

PortHoward

Fox Bay

0 25 50 miles

0 40 80 km

S. Jason Is. Pebble Is.

“Calderon” NavalAir Station

“Condor” MilitaryAir Base

“Malvinas” MilitaryAir Base

Units in Stanley area:

3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, and 25th Rgmts

5th Marine Infantry Bn

3d Artillery Rgmt

4th Air Mobile Artillery Rgmt

B Battery, 1st Marine Field Artillery Bn

601st AA Rgmt

B Battery, 101st AA Rgmt

Part of Marine AA Bn

10th Armored Car Squadron

601st Combat Aviation Bn

10th, 601st and Marine Engineer Cos

12th Rgmt

C Coy, 25th Rgmt

8th Rgmt

9th Engineer Coy

5th

Rgmt

Se

cto

r B

oun

da

ry

Coastal Sector (Agrupacion Litoral)Brig.-Gen. O. E. Parada

Puerto Argentino Sector (Agrupacion Puerto Argentino) Brig.-Gen. O. l. Joffre

Argentine Units in the Malvinas, 30 April 1982

Figure 10. Argentine Units in the Malvinas, 30 April 1982. Source: The Fight for the Malvinas, 58-59.

17

training for the desolate conditions they would likely meet in the Malvinas, and little

thought was given to the logistics support they would need. By committing a second

brigade, however, Galtieri had changed the nature of the conflict—a war planned and

started by Navy forces would now see the burden of defense shift to the Army.66

The first unit of X Brigade to arrive was an advance party from 3d Regiment and

their initial impressions were grim—their forces would be inadequately dressed for the

harsh, unforgiving climate; there was no cover to conceal their positions; and the soggy,

peaty, rocky soil was unsuitable for digging defensive trenches—the entire brigade would

be defending on open ground in various defensive sectors around Puerto Argentino.

There were also command and control challenges. BG Menéndez, though in charge, was

the most junior of three Army brigadier-generals, Daher and Joffre being the other two.

Realizing that Joffre‘s brigade outnumbered units from his brigade, Daher proposed

consolidating the land forces under one Land Forces Commander and asked BG

Menéndez to decide. Joffre was chosen, so Daher returned to Buenos Aires only to come

back shortly thereafter as Chief of Staff to Menéndez. The arrival of III Brigade further

complicated command and control. BG Menéndez decided he would be the Land Forces

Commander and Joffre would command the units around Puerto Argentino (Agrupación

Puerto Argentino), while newly-arrived BG Parada‘s III Brigade would be responsible for

the rest of Isla Soledad, including Goose Green, and the whole of Isla Gran Malvinas

(West Falkland Island), later designated Agrupación Litoral (Figure 10). Told that

advance parties of British forces could arrive as early as April 18, Joffre‘s land forces dug

defensive positions around Puerto Argentino and began their long, uncomfortable wait.67

Because the decision to recapture the Malvinas had been kept secret from most of

the Argentine military staff, the intelligence community first learned about the invasion

when it was announced on public radio on April 2. Nevertheless, on that same day,

Argentinean military intelligence was asked to project the likely British response. And,

although military and technical intelligence on Great Britain was reasonably current, little

was known about the UK‘s sociological, political, or economic wherewithal.

Nevertheless, intelligence experts were fairly certain that U.S., NATO, and international

support—particularly in light of the recently approved 3 April UNSCR—would give

Great Britain considerable freedom of action, and that she was likely to send her best

troops south, first to occupy South Georgia followed by landings on East Falkland Island,

though the main forces would arrive no sooner than mid May.68

Chosen to govern the Malvinas because of his conciliatory temperament, BG

Mario Menéndez was an unlikely choice to command the Malvinas defenses.

Furthermore, as he was departing Buenos Aires, VADM Lombardo more or less told him

that defense was his responsibility and that he (Lombardo) ―didn‘t want to get

involved.‖69

And while several Falklands-Malvinas historians have commented that

neither Lombardo‘s nor Menéndez‘ headquarters conducted much post-invasion military

planning beyond the distribution of troop concentrations around the Malvinas, BG

Menéndez did in fact issue Operations Order No. 01/82, dated 7 April 1982, from Moody

Brooke Army barracks, with the following mission statement: ―The task forces of the

Ground Command, Atlantic Theater of Operations will defend the island territories

recently occupied, as of this moment, to repulse any offensive intent on the part of Great

Britain in order to preserve the National Sovereignty and the integrity of our territory.‖70

It also included an operational concept and several annexes. On 12 April, VADM

18

Lombardo‘s headquarters issued Plan Esquematico No. 1/82 ―S‖—a South Atlantic

Theater of Operations Schematic (Operations) Plan with annexes that outlined a general

scheme for defense and provided tasks for component commanders, with the following

mission statement: ―Consolidate the reconquered zone, prevent its recovery by the

opponent and support the actions of the Military Government, in order to exercise

Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas Islands, Georgia and South Sandwich and

contribute to assuring its full exercise in the South Atlantic.‖71

While the quality and

thoroughness of Argentinean planning as well as how well the plans were followed may

be open to criticism, to argue that little planning was done is both unfair and incorrect.

As the Argentines prepared their defenses in the Malvinas, marine engineers put

minimal effort into fortifying the beaches around Puerto Argentino because their

experience led them to believe that its beaches were insufficient to support much

amphibious activity. Instead, their efforts focused primarily on laying mixed anti-

personnel and anti-tank minefields to the west of Stanley. In addition to two brigades of

Army infantry troops noted earlier, several propeller-driven, ground-attack aircraft were

dispersed among Stanley airport, the grass strip at Goose Green (later designated Base

Aérea Militar Cóndor), and at Pebble Island (Base Aérea Naval Caderón); however, what

wasn‘t done and perhaps should have was temporarily lengthening the runway at Puerto

Argentino so that it could accept fighter aircraft, which would have significantly

extended their range—a challenge the British task force would have found daunting.

With a variety of helicopters from all services as well as two Coast Guard transport

aircraft, the total air strength in the Malvinas came to roughly fifty aircraft by the end of

April, giving BG Menéndez a capable force of ~13,000 ground troops, with locally-

based, ground-attack aircraft and air defense artillery. Beyond a small oil-rig tender and

two small Coast Guard vessels to transport supplies between various garrisons, however,

―the Navy provided no additional warships to defend the island it had captured earlier in

the month.‖72

British establishment of the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) on 12 April was

viewed by the Argentines as very credible given reports that at least two British nuclear-

powered attack submarines (SSNA) had begun heading south at the beginning of the

month and were likely to be in place by the 12th.73

The declaration that any Argentine

ships entering the zone would likely be attacked had a very sobering effect on Argentine

maritime operations, and while the junta initially decided to keep the remainder of its

transports tethered to the mainland, it later reluctantly allowed the transports to sail

independently—unescorted and unarmed. Even then, III Brigade‘s equipment never

arrived and two other transports that reached Puerto Argentino were unable to depart the

Malvinas before hostilities started. An ‗air bridge‘ supplemented what little the sea

transports were able to supply, but the garrisons on Isla Soledad (East Falkland Island)

were still left with grave food and equipment shortages.74

The Fighting Begins

While the Argentine Navy wasn‘t heavily involved in preparing the defenses of

the Malvinas, Admiral Anaya saw to it that the Navy dispatched a composite Marine

platoon of approximately 40 men aboard the obsolete submarine Santa Fé to reinforce

Argentine forces on South Georgia and make a stand if the British attacked.75

Their

19

orders were to put up a stiff resistance and then surrender if British might proved to be

overwhelming. Admiral Anaya‘s hopes were that an easy UK victory would appease

British honor and perhaps delay further violence while diplomacy was worked more

earnestly. Such was not to be the case.76

The British quickly routed the Argentine

garrison with gunfire support from British warships and helicopters on 26 April in

Operation PARAQUET. Though they lost two helicopters in a blinding snow storm, the

Brits captured 180 Argentine prisoners, seriously wounding one Argentine sailor and

killing another who was thought to be attempting to scuttle the Santa Fé after its capture.

As it was, the Santa Fé was so heavily damaged that it was beached and abandoned—the

first ship lost to either side in the war.77

Throughout the remainder of the month of April as BG Menéndez deployed his

ground forces to their battle positions (Figures 11 and 12)—25th

Infantry Regiment and

Marine battalion around Puerto Argentino, 12th

Infantry Regiment helicoptered to Darwin

(Goose Green) along with a battalion from the 25th, and the 8th

Infantry Regiment to

Puerto Mitre on Gran Malvinas (Fox Bay, West Falkland)78

—Argentine naval and air

units exercised and practiced attacks on ships, but only in water too shallow for Britain‘s

submarines to enter. The lone operational Argentine diesel submarine San Luis, however,

entered the MEZ and established a patrol area just north of Puerto Argentino on 29

April—the same day an Argentine fishing trawler spotted the British task force en route

from Ascension. The next day, 30 April, the United States ended its shuttle diplomacy of

attempting to dissuade both countries from pursuing a violent conflict, declaring its

allegiance firmly behind the United Kingdom—a diplomatic blow to Argentina‘s last

hopes for a peaceful settlement. In turn, the British now declared that the Maritime

Exclusion Zone would be a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), warning that both Argentine

ships and aircraft were subject to attack under the UK‘s right of self defense in

20

accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. In fact, the implication was that any ship

or aircraft approaching the TEZ might now be considered a threat. For Argentina, a new

fear was that Britain would use its declaration as justification to attack the Argentinean

air base at Río Grande in an attempt to preclude Exocet-equipped Super Étendards from

threatening its task force.79

Admiral Fieldhouse‘s plan split the ships heading south from Ascension into five

separate groups to achieve the following four main purposes: 1) establishment of a sea

blockade around the Falklands, 2) the repossession of South Georgia, 3) establishment of

sea and air supremacy around the Falklands, and 4) the eventual repossession of the

Falklands.80

While the Argentine surface fleet was not considered to be a major threat,

Fieldhouse and Woodward were both concerned that if the Task Force could be found, its

greatest threats would come from submarines or aircraft—particularly, land-based Super

Étendards equipped with Exocet AM39 missiles, and air attack was considered the most

likely and most dangerous threat. Of Argentina‘s 300 aircraft, 175 were estimated to have

combat potential, of which 60 were believed to have sufficient range to pose a realistic

threat. While the Exocet was a dangerous prospect, Britain‘s military leadership was

reasonably convinced that its Sea Harriers were an adequate match for the air-to-air threat

that Argentina could pose, and as long as the Task Force could keep its distance from the

Argentine coast, its ships would be relatively secure.81

With regard to planning for an amphibious landing, one of the Task Force‘s

concerns was safety of the local population should an assault on Stanley be required.

Additionally, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Edwin Bramall, was concerned

about the inadequacy of planning, particularly since the Task Force did not have a ground

concept of operations. Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson were also concerned,

but more so because there had been insufficient time to train for an amphibious assault

and because all of their equipment needed to be re-stowed before departing Ascension.

Clapp was also concerned about potential landing sites and the vulnerability of his ships.

21

Stanley had been ruled out as too dangerous as had West Falkland Island because of its

vulnerability to air attacks and the challenge of having to across the Falkland Sound with

a second landing on East Falkland. There were also tensions between RADM Woodward

and his amphibious leaders, Commodore Clapp and Brigadier Thompson. Clapp had been

told that he would be in charge of the amphibious assault, but Woodward was

considering using some of the assault shipping in a feint. Neither Clapp nor Thompson

wanted their command ship involved in decoy operations while preparing for an

amphibious assault.82

Thompson described the tensions in his memoir:

The responsibility for the ensuing acrimony rests largely with Northwood.

It is simply not good enough to promulgate a structure of three co-equal

commanders, and then arbitrarily, and without ever telling the other two,

treat one of the commanders as he was the overall boss on some occasions,

which they did a number of times.83

Woodward, of course, was more concerned with local air and sea superiority and

what he felt were overly-restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), and Clapp and Thompson

were anxious about picking the best landing site for an amphibious assault that would be

followed by land operations. Woodward‘s concerns were made clear in a message his sent

back to Fieldhouse:

My unequivocal military advice from the sharp end is that . . . present

ROE allow the battle to be fought in one area but not in another unless the

Args choose, thereby optimising their capability while minimising mine.

This is military nonsense. . . .84

While the carrier battle group would be in the TEZ on 29 April, the amphibious

force would not arrive until ~16 May. These concerns were arguably minor when

compared to other challenges presented by operating in the South Atlantic, not the least

of which was logistics. With 5,600 men in 3 Commando and 2 Para combined and no

permanent accommodations available on East Falkland Island, most of these troops

would need to be housed under canvas, supplied sufficient quantities of potable water as

well as necessities for drainage, sanitation, electricity, food, and other provisions—all by

sea and air. Maintenance and servicing would be limited, so equipment would degrade

with time while supply shipping would need to stay in unprotected anchorages. With an

Antarctic winter approaching, the passing of each day would make the overall operation

more hazardous and less effective.85

While RADM Woodward was contemplating his next moves, Air Chief Marshal

Beetham and the Royal Air Force (RAF) were contemplating the RAF‘s role in the

upcoming conflict and what help it could offer in support of an operation 8,000 miles

away for which there were very limited forward basing options. The only RAF strike

aircraft with sufficient range was the Vulcan bomber—an aircraft due to be phased out of

the British inventory by end of June 1982, which hadn‘t used its air-to-air refueling in

twenty years, and which was configured only for nuclear weapons. Arguing steadfastly

the merits of ―strategic attack,‖ the RAF convinced the War Cabinet that Vulcan bombers

carrying 1,000-lb. bombs could crater the runway at Stanley with a 90 percent

probability. Of course, to do so would require ten Victor tankers to air-refuel each Vulcan

bomber. 86

Irrespective of the ‗strategic‘ merits of employing Vulcan bombers, the debate

among lower-level planners revolved around whether Vulcan bombers could do anything

not already available from in-theater, carrier-based Sea Harriers. The RAF argued that

22

Sea Harriers were not well-suited for attacking runways, and employing all-weather

Vulcans would conserve these scarce resources for more appropriate missions such as

post-attack reconnaissance. Though the RAF arguments won the debate, the Task Force

quickly found out that Sea Harriers were equally ill-suited for aerial reconnaissance,

which, of course, was in high demand immediately following each Vulcan sortie.87

Operation BLACK BUCK launched two Vulcan sorties and 11 air-refueling

tankers (not including spares) from Wideawake airfield on Ascension just before

midnight on 30 April with the intention of denying the use of the Stanley Airport runway

by high-performance Argentine aircraft. Unfortunately, one of the two bombers had a

cabin pressurization malfunction and had to return to Wideawake. The other bomber

released all 21 of its 1,000 lb. bombs as planned, diagonally across the runway to ensure

at least one weapon would crater it. At best, one struck the runway, doing minimal

damage, while another appeared to have caught the edge, with the remainder doing some

damage to other airport facilities—one warehouse and one full tank destroyed. Four of

the 21 bombs were later discovered by the Argentineans unexploded and resting in peat

bogs.88

Additional BLACK BUCK Vulcan sorties occurred over the next few days,

including at least one involving the launch of U.S.-made, AGM-45 air-to-ground

precision Shrike missiles against the Westinghouse surveillance radar at Port Stanley.

Two missiles were fired and neither came closer to the intended target than 10-15 yards.

While the significance of the Vulcan raids remains controversial, they did telegraph an

important message to Argentina—that Britain could launch such raids from extended

range and that therefore targets on the mainland could be held at risk. As a result, the

Argentineans redeployed their Mirage III fighters away from possible offensive

operations in the Falklands, instead to be dedicated to the defense of the mainland.89

The 1 May Vulcan attacks, however, were simply the first salvos of what would

be a busy day for the attacking British forces. Following the Vulcans soon after dawn was

a group of Sea Harriers that attacked Stanley airfield setting a fuel store on fire. And,

although the local Argentine Air Force headquarters reported that defensive forces had

downed two Sea Harriers and had crippled a third, the minor damage one sustained was

immediately repaired. Other Sea Harriers destroyed three Pucarás at Goose Green and

cratered the grass airstrip, while British warships carried out two operations—one

unsuccessfully conducting submarine sweeps near the San Luis and the other wearing

down Argentine defenses along the south coast of Stanley in a preparatory landing feint.

The presence of British warships so close to Stanley drew an immediate Argentine

response, and the 5th

Fighter Group sent four A-4Bs, the 8th

Fighter Group sent four

Mirage III As, and the 6th

Fighter Group sent four Dagger I A Is. While all 12 aircraft

reached the Falklands, neither the A-4s nor the Daggers found targets for their weapons,

whereas the Mirages launched a couple of unsuccessful missile attacks at Sea Harriers.

Later that same day a number of anti-ship sorties were launched from the Argentine

mainland, and though no British ships were damaged, their captains quickly realized how

vulnerable they were when positioned close to enemy-held land. Later on, 24 Skyhawks

equipped with bombs mistakenly attacked the Argentine ELMA merchant Formosa,

scoring two direct hits. One bomb bounced off the deck and fell into the sea and the other

failed to detonate. A final anti-shipping air attack involved six Canberra against British

war ships. One flight was intercepted by two Sea Harriers, which resulted in one downed

Canberra. In air-to-air activity, a pair of Mirages in a 2-v-2 engagement with a pair of Sea

23

Harriers resulted in both Mirages being hit. One crashed into the sea and the other was

shot down by Argentine air defenses as it attempted an emergency landing at Stanley

Airport. Though it had been a relatively uneventful day for Great Britain, Argentina had

two ships damaged—one by its own aircraft, two runways cratered, four aircraft downed,

17 troops killed, and twenty-eight wounded. British casualties included minor damage to

two ships and a repairable hole through the vertical fin of one Sea Harrier; however, from

Argentina‘s perspective, it thought its air defenses had downed two Sea Harriers and its

aircraft had seriously damaged at least one British warship. And, unlike the British, it

knew for certain that its runway at Puerto Argentino was still operational.90

While Task Force 317 had defeated the first day‘s Argentine air assault, it had yet

to encounter any Argentine ships, though Woodward suspected that RADM Allara was

preparing an attack with his forces based upon intercepted communications from

Lombardo to Allara giving the latter complete freedom of action. A second intercept was

Allara‘s order to his fleet directing the Veinticinco De Mayo carrier and escort groups

(Task Groups 79.1 and 79.2) to launch air attacks at dawn while two surface groups, Task

Groups 79.4 and 79.3, the latter including the Belgrano and its Exocet-carrying

destroyers, were to position themselves northwest and south, respectively, for attacks

against British ships dispersing as a result of Argentine carrier aircraft attacks against the

British fleet (Figure 13). Based upon this information, reported radar contacts to the

northwest, and the position of the Belgrano group, which was being tracked by the

submarine HMS Conqueror, RADM Woodward suspected that the Argentine fleet was

positioning for a double pincer. Of particular concern to Woodward was the Belgrano

group because it appeared to be preparing for a track north across the Burdwood Bank

submerged ridge in the southern half of the TEZ, which was too shallow to allow HMS

24

Conqueror to follow and remain undetected. Losing track of the Belgrano under the

circumstances was a risk RADM Woodward was unwilling to take.91

Consequently, he

ordered HMS Conqueror to attack the Belgrano—an order for which he had no authority

and which was immediately vetoed by the FOSM, Vice Admiral Herbert. As anticipated

by Woodward, however, his order also prompted immediate intervention by the Chiefs of

Staff, and Admiral Lewin sought permission from the War Cabinet to allow attacks on

any Argentine naval vessels outside of the TEZ (which had already been authorized for

the Argentinean carrier). The change was approved, but only for Argentine warships.92

While the British had correctly interpreted RADM Allara‘s plans for a double

pincer, they did not know that the winds had dropped off in the north and so, unable to

launch its aircraft, the Veinticinco De Mayo was directed to cancel its attack and

withdraw to a safer position farther west. In fact, RADM Allara had directed all of his

task groups to return to their pre-attack locations, which meant the Belgrano was also

turning to the west. Though it was known by both ADM Herbert in Northwood and by

the Conqueror‘s skipper that the Belgrano had avoided the TEZ and was in fact moving

west, VADM Herbert knew that at some point the Belgrano would likely resume a track

toward Task Force 317—very likely again through Burdwood Bank. Consequently, the

changed ROE was considered a necessary action in anticipation of a subsequent

inevitability. After considerable maneuvering to achieve an optimum attack position, at

mid-evening on 2 May, HMS Conqueror attacked the Belgrano with three torpedoes

fired from 1400 yards scoring direct hits. Seriously damaged and on fire, the Belgrano

was abandoned, eventually sinking. In all, 321 men aboard the Belgrano lost their lives.

As soon as he heard the news, RADM Woodward directed the immediate withdrawal of

naval gunfire support (NGS) ships en route to bombard Stanley in anticipation of an

Argentine counterattack.93

Later on 2 May, following the sinking of the Belgrano, two Lynx helicopters from

HMS Coventry and HMS Glasgow, when fired upon by 20-mm cannons from the

Argentine patrol craft Alférez Sobral, each fired two Sea Skua missiles in response badly

damaging the Sobral. Now that it had lost two vessels, the Argentinean navy was ordered

to return to the shallow waters of the mainland and ceased to be a factor in the remainder

of the conflict.94

Though bad weather precluded much flying activity on 3 May, the

Argentinean Air Force was still preparing to engage the British task force.95

Five Super

Étendards had been sent south to Río Grande from where, refueled by an HC-130

Hercules tanker, they could operate far out to sea. And, though a NATO-imposed

embargo had precluded more shipments of missiles and assistance from the French in

helping train Argentinean Navy munitions technicians in arming and maintaining their

five French-made, newly-acquired Exocet anti-ship missiles, the Argentineans had

figured out jerry-rigged arming procedures for themselves. Following another attack on

Puerto Argentino airport by British Vulcan bombers earlier that morning, two Exocet-

equipped Super Étendards from Rio Grande Naval Air Station, vectored by a Neptune

reconnaissance aircraft, fired two missiles at HMS Sheffield from 25 nautical miles (NM)

early in the afternoon on 4 May, while it was operating as one of three British ships

serving as a forward air-defense screen for Task Force 317. One Exocet struck HMS

Sheffield and though its warhead didn‘t detonate, it nevertheless did extensive damage

killing 20 and injuring 26 of the 281-person crew. After an unsuccessful hour of

25

firefighting, the ship had to be abandoned, and it later sank on May 10 after fruitless

attempts to tow it to South Georgia for repairs.96

News of the loss of HMS Sheffield back in Great Britain brought home the

seriousness of war and the realization that ships, aircraft, and lives would be lost. The

British public learned of the loss of HMS Sheffield while in the midst of celebrating the

sinking of the Belgrano. As Rubén Moro notes in The South Atlantic Conflict,

The hot gush of popular enthusiasm was turned to a cold drip at the news

from the front. From that moment on, the heady euphoria of self-righteous

indignation that had buoyed the public as they saw the task force off at the

piers gave way to gnawing anguish and dread over the fate of those who

had sailed away so bravely.97

Nevertheless, Thatcher‘s War Cabinet was steadfast in their resolve, which Foreign

Secretary Pym relayed to Parliament—until Argentine troops agreed to withdraw with no

preconditions regarding the sovereignty of the Falklands—Task Force 317 would stay

engaged until sovereignty was returned to this remote South Atlantic territory.98

RADM Woodward, however, on-scene in the TEZ remained concerned about

future naval battles and TF 317‘s vulnerability to additional Exocet attacks, especially

now that the Argentineans had apparently mastered air-refueling Super Étendards,

extending their range significantly. He knew that if he lost one of his two aircraft carriers,

the war was over. Moreover, it was soon discovered that the second Vulcan attack on

Stanley‘s airfield had missed the runway, a Sea Harrier had been shot down in an attack

on the airfield at Goose Green killing the pilot, and another two Sea Harriers had failed to

return from a mission on 6 May.

In London, the War Cabinet was likewise fretting about the vulnerability of TF

317‘s aircraft carriers, and after much internal debate issued a warning on 7 May to

Argentina through the Swiss notifying them that any Argentinean warships or combat

aircraft discovered to be beyond 12 NM of the Argentine coast would be liable to attack

by Great Britain. Though not intended as such, Argentine and indeed worldwide

perceptions were that Britain had extended its TEZ to the Argentine coast, which brought

immediate protests from both Chile and Uruguay followed by a protest from Brazil who

warned that any attack against the Argentine mainland would inflame the entire

hemisphere. Even within the European Community protests of consternation and

condemnation were registered. In response, the UK ambassador to the UN, Sir Anthony

Parsons, personally assured UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar that rumors of an

impending attack against the Argentine mainland were simply not true and, in fact, would

not happen.99

Having given Argentina fair warning that its combat vessels were now fair game

if detected anywhere east of the mainland, the Task Force planning now turned toward

what Woodward called ‗Enclave Theory‘—a forward operating base from which it could

pursue repossession of the Falklands with its ground forces. An enclave, however,

requires a defendable airstrip of sufficient size to allow operations both for transport and

fighter aircraft as well as a harbor deep enough to allow resupplying, maintenance, and

repair.100

The problem was finding a suitably-protected site that could support an enclave.

A large part of that challenge would be minimizing the landing force‘s vulnerabilities to

air attack. Roughly 5,000 soldiers, all of their equipment and supplies, ammunition, and

amphibious shipping would be exposed to attack by a land-based Argentinean Air Force

26

that was 200+ strong—a daunting force protection challenge that would fall on 21

remaining Sea Harriers, possibly supplemented by another 14 en route. Unfortunately,

Northwood was envisioning a larger problem. With word that the Army‘s 5th

Brigade was

en route aboard the Queen Elizabeth II, it appeared that a straight amphibious landing had

become part of the ‗repossession‘ strategy rather than an enclave. Prospective beachheads

were evaluated in terms of their defensibility from land, sea, and air attack—both surface

and subsurface; whether or not their approaches have been mined; the slope of the sea

beds and their depth; the closeness of sheltering hills that would complicate incoming air

attacks—a dual-edged blessing that restricted visibility on both sides; and so forth. At this

point in the Task Force‘s planning, San Carlos appeared to be the best option.

Complicating the planning calculus, however, was the presence of a shadowing

Argentinean fishing trawler, the Narwal, suspected of being an intelligence gatherer. The

last thing the amphibious force needed was its position telegraphed by Argentine

intelligence gathering platforms. Though his ROE expressly forbade him from attacking

fishing vessels and time was too short to get permission from above, on 9 May

Woodward ordered two Sea Harriers to immobilize the Narwal. Subsequent boarding by

Special Forces personnel confirmed the presence of an Argentinean naval lieutenant

commander with code books, charts, and military radios. Prisoners were taken and the

vessel was allowed to sink.101

Unfortunately, the day‘s combat activities were not over, though relatively minor

attacks between the two disputing countries would continue over the next several days.

While bombarding shore targets in the vicinity of Stanley on the afternoon of 9 May, the

destroyer HMS Coventry and the frigate HMS Broadsword were jumped by Argentine

Skyhawks launched from San Julián on the mainland. Of the fourteen aircraft sent to

attack the two British ships, ten turned back because of bad weather, but a flight of four

continued. The British ships attempted to engage the aircraft at maximum range with Sea

Dart and Sea Wolf missiles, but were unsuccessful. Two of the Skyhawks nevertheless

perished before returning home—one crashed into the cliffs of a small island and the

other apparently flew into the sea because of bad weather. Later that same afternoon an

Argentine Puma helicopter from Stanley, believed to be searching for the Narwal, was

shot down by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Coventry. The next evening RADM

Woodward ordered HMS Alacrity to test passage through Falkland Sound, the 60-mile-

long channel between East and West Falkland Islands. Halfway through her trip in the

midst of heavy rain, HMS Alacrity’s radar detected another vessel approximately six

miles southwest. She engaged the Argentine naval transport Isla de los Estados with

high-explosive shells, eventually sinking it—the only surface action that would occur

between the two sides during the Falklands-Malvinas Conflict.102

HMS Alacrity completed the remainder of her passage through Falkland Sound

uneventfully, joining up with her sister ship HMS Arrow and quickly zigzagging to the

east. Unbeknownst to either ship, they both passed within striking distance of the San

Luis, which attempted to manually fire two torpedoes at HMS Alacrity—the first failed to

fire and second‘s wire guide broke causing it to miss and detonate along the sea bottom

or against the coast. The subsequent afternoon, 12 May, HMS Glasgow and HMS

Brilliant, having replaced HMS Coventry and HMS Broadsword’s bombardment

positions off the coast of Stanley, were attacked by two flights of 4 each Skyhawks from

Rio Gallegos. While HMS Glasgow’s Sea Dart system failed, HMS Brilliant shot down

27

two Skyhawks with Sea Wolfs, while a third crashed either attempting to outmaneuver

the missiles or because of fragmentation from one of its exploding colleagues. Unaware

of the first flight‘s fate, the second tranche of Skyhawks engaged and survived, scoring a

direct hit on HMS Glasgow.103

While the damage was serious enough to prevent Glasgow

from participating in the remainder of the conflict, the bomb went through the ship

without exploding. The British Task Force had been successful in drawing out

Argentinean aircraft from the mainland, but it had lost two of its three Type 42 air

defense ships with landings still yet to occur. From henceforth there would be no further

daylight shelling by ships so close to Stanley.104

While the next two days were relatively uneventful for both sides, HMS Hermes

and HMS Glamorgan slipped away from Task Force 317 on the evening of 14 May to

helo in Special Air Service (SAS) commandos for a raid against the small Argentine Base

Aérea Naval Calderón on 18-miles long Pebble Island, located at the north-central end of

West Falkland Island (see Figure 14). RADM Woodward and his amphibious

commanders were concerned that the small detachment of Turbo-Mentors and Pucarás

stationed on Pebble Island could threaten amphibious landing forces at San Carlos, less

than 50 miles east. While HMS Glamorgan provided covering fire, two Sea King

helicopters delivered forty-five SAS troops who quickly destroyed all 11 Argentine

aircraft before withdrawing safely back to the two warships before sunrise on 15 May.

Though a few men on both sides were wounded, neither side suffered any fatalities, while

the airfield was knocked out of commission for the duration of the conflict.105

28

Operation SUTTON

While the actions just described were occurring throughout the month of May

1982, planning continued both in the Task Force and at Northwood for the anticipated

amphibious landing that would eventually take place. Foremost among concerns was the

air threat that the Argentine Air Force and Naval Air posed to an amphibious landing.

While achieving air superiority prior to attempting a landing was an assumed

prerequisite, an analysis by RADM Woodward‘s task force indicated that the likelihood

of accomplishing such was slim. Admiral Fieldhouse proposed cross-decking the landing

forces from HMS Canberra to disperse vulnerable troops and equipment among several

ships before the assault. RADM Woodward‘s counter, which included the advice of both

BG Thompson and Commodore Clapp, was that cross-decking was a hazardous

proposition in stormy seas, and doing such would become more perilous if cross-decking

vessels were caught in an air attack. Even if a beachhead could be established before

daylight, soon after sunrise, the landing force and any ships still tethered nearby would be

exposed (landing sites considered can be seen in Figure 15). Moreover, everyone clearly

understood that once the main body of the amphibious group arrived in the South

Atlantic, it would become the central focus of Argentine air forces. Among the

alternatives considered and discussed, and one certainly pushed by BG Thompson, was

attacking mainland Argentine aircraft on the ground, a politically-sensitive and equally, if

not more risky, option. In addition to requiring a dramatic change in ROE, the simple

physics of pulling off such a raid were daunting. Air-refueling Vulcan strikes were

considered and quickly discarded, and carrier-based airstrikes were never really

considerable viable. All that seemed left were Special Forces, which, it was argued, could

be inserted into the Tierra del Fuego Rio Grande base that was serving as home to the

deadly Super Étendards. This is precisely what CDS Admiral Lewin proposed—a two

stage operation consisting of reconnaissance to gather the necessary intelligence,

followed by insertion of an SAS team close to Rio Grande to destroy the Super

Étendards—and the War Cabinet approved on 14 May.106

29

On 16 May an eight-man Special Air Squadron (SAS) team was detached to HMS

Invincible to be airdropped by a Sea King into Chile close to Rio Grande Air Base, where

it would cross the border, sink the helicopter, carry out its mission, and exfiltrate

surreptitiously on foot. HMS Broadsword and HMS Invincible departed the Task Force

on 17 May for execution of this bold but risky mission. Unfortunately, bad weather,

which had plagued the South Atlantic for much of the month of May, remained a

challenge, and the Sea King crash-landed a few miles from the Chilean port of Punta

Arenas, which was 50 miles from its objective, and the mission was scrubbed. The

Chileans soon discovered the burned-out hulk of the Sea King and protested the British

incursion into its sovereign territory, exposing the surprise the British were hoping to

achieve. While Task Force 317 expected and prayed for another opportunity to take out

the Super Étendards, when it became clear that Argentina had stepped up its air base

defenses, further raid planning was abandoned.107

Though still awaiting Britain‘s main gambit, Argentine military forces had a fairly

accurate picture of what they suspected was the British strategy—to soften the

battlespace with air attacks and SOF incursions focused on reconnaissance and sabotage,

followed by an amphibious assault against an undefended area while under the protection

of carrier-based air. Precisely when or where this would occur was of course unknown,

but defending Argentine forces knew the arrival of the amphibious group was

imminent—most likely south of Stanley, but possibly at Uranie Beach on Berkley Sound;

San Carlos was considered too far west of Stanley. Command of Argentine air defenses

were to be divided; mainland air attacks would control attacks on British ships while Air

Force South would coordinate attacks on ground forces. The junta believed that the

British planned an invasion as opposed to a siege of the islands, consequently the

Argentine strategy was to avoid risky, premature engagement until its forces could

engage the invaders at their most vulnerable point—during the amphibious landings—

imposing costs that would force Britain to either return to the negotiating table or that

would make the Thatcher government fall.108

After the semi-successful British naval shelling, Vulcan, and Sea Harrier raids of

the first day, which cratered the edge of the Puerto Argentino runway and destroyed three

Pucarás at Goose Green, Argentine ground-based air defenses forced attacking aircraft to

seek the safety of higher altitudes. This hostile air environment also meant that there

would be no helicopter spotters—all of which resulted in diminished accuracy of

subsequent British bombing efforts and little damage to Argentine defenses. Similarly,

the loss of HMS Sheffield to Super Étendard-launched Exocets had restricted Task Force

17‘s maneuver options for approaching the Falklands. On the ground, Argentine troops

easily outnumbered the anticipated British landing forces, though BG Menéndez had

them spread around Isla Soledad in static, fixed positions, with the preponderance of

soldiers defending Puerto Argentino. Isla Soledad‘s long and irregular coastline, with

numerous possible landing sites, rendered it impossible to maintain ground defenses at

every point of possible entry. Menéndez also positioned a detachment of defenders near

the airstrip of Goose Green with small groups deployed in secondary sectors to provide

early warning. There was also a very robust air defense network around the Puerto

Argentino, and on the mainland Argentine air forces remained unscathed and ready for

the landings to begin.109

30

Waiting out the British until they committed to an amphibious assault had its

biggest risks for Menéndez‘ defending ground forces because imposition of the TEZ had

effectively stopped resupply. The British Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) estimated that

unreplenished Argentine ground forces would likely run out of adequate ‗normal‘ rations

around the middle of May, though combat rationing and the slaughter of local sheep

might delay culmination of rations for a few weeks longer. The JIC also guessed that a

static defense was most likely, given the lack of a robust road network and the isolation

of the Argentine garrison, which had undoubtedly suffered the effects of constant

bombing, nasty weather, and a blockade that had closed the flow of resupply. Once

Argentina knew the amphibious ships were nearing the TEZ, the ‗Air Bridge‘

discontinued on 29 April was resumed, and the Pucarás lost to the British raid on Pebble

Island were replaced by another dozen flown into Puerto Argentino. While the navy had

apparently sidelined itself, the status of Argentina‘s submarines remained an unknown

factor. The Task Force was nevertheless fairly confident that its ASW assets were up to

whatever challenge enemy submarines might pose.110

Early in the planning process, the sheltered waters of San Carlos had emerged as

one of the leading contenders for the British amphibious landings, but on 10 May it was

confirmed and on 12 May Admiral Fieldhouse, CINCFLEET, issued Operation Order

3/82 for Operation SUTTON, which specified a six-phase operation: Phase I, CTG 317.8

maintains blockage within the TEZ; Phase II, CTG 317.8 conducts SF reconnaissance

and direct actions prior to main landing; Phase III, CTG 317.0 with 3 Commando

embarked, conducts main amphibious landing; Phase IV, 3 Commando conducts land

operations prior to arrival of Commander Land Forces Falklands Islands (CLFFI – MG

Moore) and 5 Infantry Brigade; Phase V, establishment of CLFFI in HMS Fearless and

landing of 5 Infantry Brigade; and Phase VI, Repossession of the Falklands Islands by the

landing forces, supported by TG 317.8 and TG 317.0:

Tactical command of the amphibious task group was delegated to

COMAW [Commodore Clapp]. In Phases III and IV, Brigadier Thompson

was nominated as the Commander of the Landing Force and was

responsible for operations ashore during the landing phase. Major General

Moore was nominated as CLFFI. On arrival Moore was to assume

responsibilities of the Commander of the Landing Force for Phase V and

VI and operational control of formations established ashore. Woodward

would remain Tactical Air Controller.111

Moore gave additional guidance to Thompson tasking him to secure a bridgehead into

which reinforcements could be inserted and to push inland as far as maintenance of

security allowed, retaining operational control until relieved by Moore aboard HMS

Fearless. What wasn‘t specified was the role 5 Infantry Brigade was to play or the

distance ―inland‖ Thompson was to push toward.112

From his perspective, Brigadier

Thompson was concerned about the acknowledged lack of air superiority—a supposed

precondition for landing that everyone agreed simply couldn‘t be achieved, though which

no one would openly admit:

It would have been less confusing if all concerned had been told from the

outset that the landing would go ahead anyway; since this was obviously

the intention. . . . The operation would have been better served had there

been more frankness from the beginning. . . . Plain speaking would have

31

avoided misunderstandings about how quickly Rapier firing posts would

have been in action. It was exactly the situation, among others, that called

for a higher level overall commander forward with the three task

groups.113

Final approval for D-Day occurred two days prior to the 21 May scheduled landings,

which were to begin at 0230 in the morning.

The Landings

By 18 May, TG 317.0 (the amphibious group) had joined TG 317.8 (RADM

Woodward‘s carrier battle group) with the Amphib Group poised on the eastern edge of

the TEZ. It consisted of two LPDs (each with 4 LCUs and 4 LCVPs) and an LSL,

supported by 3 RFAs, a water carrier, and 4 escorts. In Woodward‘s carrier group he had

a total of 31 Sea Harriers aboard his two carriers to provide air cover for the landings.

While the plan called for delivering the ground forces in total aboard SS Canberra,

Admiral Fieldhouse in Northwood insisted that ground forces be crossdecked to

distribute 40 Commando to HMS Fearless and 3 Para to Intrepid. Even though good

weather facilitated the transfer, a Sea King carrying SAS troops from Hermes to Intrepid

ditched at sea and 21 SAS troops perished to include their RAF forward air controller and

his laser designator. British Intelligence had confirmed the presence of an Argentine

detachment at Fanning Head, which overlooked San Carlos Water and would need to be

eliminated. Meanwhile, Operation TORNADO, a deception operation reinforced by

spoofed communications, had begun to give the appearance that the major British effort

would occur close to Stanley. This was supported by naval bombardment of Lively Island

near Choiseul Sound by HMS Glamorgan and a second diversion in the Darwin area. The

actual plan consisted of silent landings, with 40 Commando securing the Port Carlos

32

Settlement while 2 Para simultaneously moved to a blocking position in the Sussex

Mountains. Following later in phase 2 would be 45 Commando with 42 Commando

remaining as a floating reserve.114

At 0340L, 3 Special Boat Squadron (SBS) landed to the east of Fanning Head to

deal with the Argentine detachment. Supported by naval gunfire from HMS Antrim and

mortar fire, 3 SBS killed several Argentines and captured others in achieving their

objective while 2 Para was hitting the beach at San Carlos followed by 40 Commando,

who promptly raised the Union Jack. By 0800L, as the sun was rising, 45 Commando and

3 Para landed (see map at Figure 16). While the marines secured an old plant at Ajax

Bay, 3 Para went ashore to secure the landing force‘s northern flank and other troops took

the high ground to set up the 12 Rapier anti-aircraft-missile firing positions. Throughout

the remainder of the day offloading continued while defensive positions were set up. Two

Pucarás taking off from Goose Green were engaged by gunfire from HMS Ardent and

SAS with Stingers, and though both were quickly downed, the Argentine command was

now aware that landings were occurring at San Carlos.115

At 0925L the first wave of nine attacking Daggers were spotted coming in from

the southwest at very low altitudes. They attacked the most accessible ships, HMS Antrim

and Broadsword, taking the former out of action and damaging two Lynx helicopters on

the latter. The next three attacks by Argentine aircraft accomplished little but cost at least

3 aircraft, one of which attacked the already crippled Argentine vessel, Rio Carcarana. A

fourth set of A4s jettisoned their wing tanks and bombs at the sight of Sea Harriers before

two were downed by Sidewinders. Several more attacks occurred periodically throughout

what was a costly day for both sides. None of the attacking Argentine aircraft had come

with their own protective escorts, and targeting appeared more opportunistic than

planned—focusing on escorts rather than the elephant in the room—SS Canberra, which

was anchored close to the western shore. Argentina lost 5 Daggers, 5 A4s, and 2 Pucarás,

while a number of others were taken out of action by small arms fire. Additionally,

whether because of technical problems with bomb fusing or because aircraft attack

profiles didn‘t provide sufficient time for arming, many of the bombs dropped by

attacking Argentine aircraft were duds. All the same, of the seven British vessels that had

entered San Carlos Water, only two were undamaged, while actual landing forces and

their equipment were unscathed—3,000 men and 1,000 tons of stores. HMS Antrim,

Ardent, and Argonaut were badly damaged, 1 Air Force GR3 Harrier and 2 Gazelle

helicopters had been lost, and 27 mariners had perished. Of greater concern to RADM

Woodward, however, was the ineffectiveness of the Sea Wolf close-in-point-defense

missile system when used near the land and the fact that he only had two Type 22s left, at

least one of which he expected to lose in the upcoming days if battle losses continued at

the same rate.116

The British landings had surprised the Argentine High Command, which still

wasn‘t certain whether the assault was a diversionary attack or the main effort. In

anticipation of an invasion, however, which seemed imminent, on 16 May guidance had

been given to BG Menéndez to maintain personal contact with the operational

commanders to ensure more fluid cooperation among the services in defending the

islands. Additionally, the South Atlantic Theater of Operations Command was moved

from Puerto Belgrano to Comodoro Rivadavia to preclude delays executing a defensive

strategy. Additionally, it was determined that General Garcia, the most senior among the

33

operational commanders, would have the decisive voice in making operational-level

decisions (Figure 17).117

Now that the invasion had in fact occurred, BG Menéndez‘

chief intelligence officer concluded that the British had landed less than a full brigade and

that other forces might be landing elsewhere. Because of this uncertainty, the helicopter-

borne reserve company was withheld, though some 105-mm artillery was sent to shore up

defenses at Goose Green. When General Galtieri queried BG Menéndez about the

magnitude of the landing at San Carlos, the latter assured him that there was no worry, ―It

was well within our expectations. They have landed in an undefended place. And well . . .

we are doing what we can.‖118

General Lami Dozo, who had been following the landings

from his Air Force headquarters, attempted to convince the Junta that San Carlos was

indeed the beachhead for the main British landing force. Menéndez, however, was

convinced that San Carlos was merely a diversionary tactic and successfully argued

against sending forces from the Stanley area lest they been needed elsewhere to combat

the main landings whenever and wherever they were to occur. His misperceptions

weren‘t entirely his fault though, because the British had intentionally been targeting

Argentine helicopters at Stanley; they were the only real way of transporting troops

beyond the Stanley area. The resultant confusion though, resulted in piecemeal Argentine

air attacks whose sporadic nature meant that they never overwhelmed British air

defenses. 119

Although SS Canberra had survived the first day unscathed, RADM Woodward

didn‘t want to risk his amphibious ships unnecessarily. Additionally, merchant shipping

could unload at only one-quarter of the pace of RN vessels. Prior to sunrise on 22 May,

Woodward ordered Canberra, Norland, Europic Ferry, and RFA Stromness to withdraw

from San Carlos Water until they could return under the cloak of darkness. Brigadier

Thompson also moved his headquarters ashore instead of staying on board HMS

Fearless. Both Thompson and Commodore Clapp clashed with RADM Woodward over

protection of the landings by Sea Harriers. Naturally, Woodward wanted to keep his

carriers as far from harm‘s way as possible, which meant that Sea Harrier available loiter

time over the fleet they were protecting in San Carlos Water was limited. Clapp and

Thompson wanted the Sea Harriers close enough that they could respond to incoming

Argentine aircraft before they attacked rather than during or after attacks—particularly

since Rapier was proving to be a disappointment.120

34

The second day, 22 May, was comparatively uneventful, though an Argentine

Coast Guard vessel, the Rio Iguazu, was strafed and subsequently beached near Darwin

and the inter-island supply vessel, MV Monsunen, was beached after being fired upon by

HMS Yarmouth. The day also witnessed another clash between Woodward and Clapp

over allocation of Royal Air Force GR3 sorties, prompting an exasperated signal from

Woodward chastising Clapp:

Late change of plan this morning without any explanation or intelligence

support resulted in lost opportunity for first light attack and confusion and

frustration here. This is clearly unacceptable. Request you state reason and

priority for mission in future. I may know something you do not. Your

ground attack assets are ready and willing to help but they require notice,

intelligence and all available targets details to obtain useful benefit.121

Part of this tension between the two commanders was due to an inadequate tasking

system for allocating RAF Harrier missions. Woodward had no RAF liaison on his staff,

and there was no mechanism for resolving conflicting demands between/among the Task

Force‘s three on-scene commanders.122

On the third morning at San Carlos, 23 May, the weather was perfect for flying

and TF 317 had four frigates posted at the mouth of the Water—HMS Broadsword,

Plymouth, Yarmouth, and Antelope, with the damaged Argonaut still anchored nearby.

There was insufficient room in the anchorage for the naval escorts, so most remained in

or around Falkland Sound where there was more maneuver room and space for radar and

longer-range Sea Dart engagements. Once again attacking A4s slipped across Grantham

Sound, splitting into pairs for an attack on the most obvious targets rather than the most

important. Two thousand-pound bombs hit Antelope, though neither exploded as one of

the A-4s plowed directly into the frigate‘s mainmast and crashed. While the ship

remained afloat and still under its own power, the first bomb exploded as it was being

rendered safe by munitions technicians and the vessel was quickly abandoned just before

its magazine exploded. It sank the following day, though it was clear that the cliffs

around San Carlos Water were proving to be a challenge for attacking Argentine aircraft

whose low approaches continued to impede proper arming for the bombs being dropped.

But the pilots were getting better and the attacks persisted, with clear weather continuing

to favor the attackers. The following day, while a flight of Mirages distracted HMS

Coventry and Broadsword, five Skyhawks swooped in low over San Carlos Water to

bomb Sir Galahad, Sir Lancelot and Sir Belvedere. Once again, the weapons striking the

first two vessels failed to detonate while the one that hit the third passed through without

exploding. A later pass by four Daggers that strafed Fearless and Sir Galahad similarly

had their weapons bounce off Sir Lancelot, though the ship did sustain some minor

internal damage. Despite all the duds, RADM Woodward‘s fleet was slowly becoming

depleted and the group led by HMS Bristol with reinforcements was still several days

out.123

The Fleet‘s losses, while minor, were nevertheless cumulative, and Woodward

was still piqued with Commodore Clapp and BG Thompson, both of whom wanted their

ships inshore to unload them over several days before moving them out of harm‘s way.

Thompson, in particular, wanted equipment unloaded in the proper order and proportions

whereas Woodward was concerned about their vulnerability to air attack and simply

wanted to minimize exposure. There was also some uncertainty about how much

35

Argentine airpower had been destroyed in their costly attacks, though British estimates of

Sea Harrier successes were likely over-optimistic. Whatever sanguinity the Fleet felt,

however, would soon evaporate as the events of 25 May began to unfold. At 1419L as the

second wave of two attacking groups of Argentine attack rolled in on HMS Broadsword

and Coventry, Coventry maneuvered into a position that in effect blocked Broadsword

from firing its Sea Wolf. HMS Broadsword was struck by a bomb that ricocheted into its

Lynx and Mk44 systems without exploding but Coventry was strafed portside with

cannon fire followed by three bomb hits, two of which exploded, killing 17 men

immediately and igniting a fire that led to an immediate evacuation before the ship

capsized minutes later. A few moments after Coventry sank, two Super Étendards each

fired an Exocet, both of which veered directly toward chaff being dispensed by HMS

Ambuscade. Unfortunately, the chaff failed to detonate the missiles and after they passed

through the chaff cloud they homed in directly on the Atlantic Conveyor, striking her in

her starboard quarter. Fires and dense smoke were so severe that there was little time for

damage control, and the ship had to be abandoned, later sinking and taking with her the

Captain and another 12 souls, 3 Chinooks, 6 Wessex helicopters, tentage for 4,500, and

runway and fueling equipment for the Harrier forward operating base. This had been the

worst day yet for British losses, and Woodward clearly felt that losses were now favoring

the other side.124

Despite the gloom in both London and in TF 317 over their heavy losses, the

battle for San Carlos was essentially over at this point—―all the guns, vehicles and the

bulk of the immediate stores and ammunition were ashore, as were eleven Sea Kings,

four Wessex and one Chinook.‖125

Despite RADM Woodward‘s discomfort, Argentina

had used up all but one of its Exocets and its pilots had run out of both targets and time.

The morale of the Argentine aviators was nonetheless higher than ever, even though

36

ultimate defeat may have been a foregone conclusion, because they had inflicted heavy

damage on the Royal Navy and had denied TF 317 air superiority. By their tally, the

Argentines had inflicted more damage than they had sustained (Figure 18).126

While the Argentine media in Buenos Aires trumpeted the successes that had

occurred on their National Day, the Junta met to assess the on-going military situation

and the need for better operational-level decision making. Building upon its decisions a

week prior, the Military Committee decided to place General Osvaldo García, who had

commanded the initial invasion forces, back in charge on 23 May, with unified command

below him (a first)—both for combat operations and logistics. Information and requests

from subordinate commands would come through the Centro de Operacións Conjuntas

[Joint Operations Center] (CEOPECON) to Gen García, ensuring that the Military

Committee was kept informed. Military Committee approval of decisions wasn‘t

required, but they would become involved in requests for additional resources and

resolution of major issues (Figure 19). One of the first orders to come out of

CEOPECON was guidance to BG Menéndez to provide an assessment so plans could be

made for subsequent actions. Based upon reports that the consolidated beachhead had

been established at San Carlos and that the landings there had been more than a diversion,

the Air Force argued that attack priorities should remain 1) the aircraft carriers, and 2) the

logistics chain from Ascension Island—as opposed to the beachhead itself. Additionally,

BG Menéndez was chastised for his inactivity:

The Army seems to have only an attitude of static defence which, should it

continue indefinitely, will make the men wilt in their own positions even

before being able to engage in combat with the mass of enemy troops. . . .

In your hands and in your future decisions rests the honour of the

Argentine Army.127

Directed to adopt a more offensive attitude, Menéndez simply could not do what was

being asked. It was 56 miles between Stanley and San Carlos, and there was no road

between them. He didn‘t have sufficient helicopter lift to move forces and the 8-day

37

journey by foot would require traveling over the wet, barren land that would expose his

troops to attacks by British aircraft. They would also be limited to whatever ammunition,

tenting (which they didn‘t have), water, and food they could carry on their backs and then

be expected to counterattack. Menéndez felt the request was so foolish that he threatened

to resign rather than implement it. As an alternative, he proposed sending reconnaissance

patrols and commando units to infiltrate behind British lines while reinforcing the

Darwin-Goose Green area. He also had the temerity to remind Gen Galtieri that the

British would have to come to Stanley and fight—through the hardened defenses

established there—a plan Galtieri himself had approved.128

Goose Green

In a near-similar fashion, Brigadier Julian Thompson was also getting criticism

because the British Chief of Staff had promised the War Cabinet that once British forces

were ashore, they would hasten toward Stanley. Now that the landing at San Carlos had

occurred why wasn‘t Stanley under siege? In light of recent losses, particularly, HMS

Coventry and the Atlantic Conveyer, London needed a victory—sooner rather than later.

With his helicopters tied up moving supplies ashore from still-exposed ships in San

Carlos Water and air superiority yet to be established, Thompson felt a more realistic

course of action was to besiege the enemy positions at Darwin and Goose Green, 15

miles marching distance to the southeast and home to several Pucará attack aircraft.

Summoned by Northwood to explain his actions, Brigadier Thompson was told to engage

the enemy at first opportunity. His foremost concern about moving toward Stanley was

that until Mount Kent was secured he didn‘t want to risk what few helicopters he had

delivering troops. That left little choice; an overland march of foot supported by

helicopters for logistics was the only remaining alternative. With little notice, he

summoned his subordinate commanders and directed 2 Para to carry out a raid against

Darwin-Goose Green while 45 Commando and 3 Para, to their disbelief, were to begin

the march to Stanley across the frost-baked peat marshes of East Falkland Island—a trek

they feared would exhaust their forces before ever engaging the enemy.129

Part of the reason for these differences of opinion was because the Task Force‘s

entire focus had been on getting the assault forces safely on shore. Until now, this had

been a maritime operation, planned and directed from Northwood by CINCFLEET,

Admiral Fieldhouse, and executed by RADM Woodward and Commodore Clapp. There

was no plan for how the Falklands would be retaken once the landings had occurred. And

though the land component commander, Major General Jeremy Moore, remained at

Northwood with ADM Fieldhouse until the landing at San Carlos had been approved, his

orders to Brigadier Thompson had been to secure a bridgehead from which subsequent

operations would be conducted to repossess the Falklands once he and 5 Infantry Brigade

arrived aboard the QEII. Since three more battalions and helicopters would arrive later,

MG Moore saw no urgency for an accelerated breakout. With regard to the role of

Brigadier Thompson and 3 Commando Brigade, once the bridgehead had been secured,

their subsequent role was unclear because MG Moore and 5 Bde would be landing within

a week afterwards and at that time would develop plans for repossession. Had there been

direct communications among and between Fieldhouse, Moore, and Thompson, this lack

of guidance would have been less a problem. However, en route aboard the QEII, MG

38

Moore was essentially incommunicado. Moreover, the D-Day plan for the landing at San

Carlos, which had been approved only two days prior to its execution, reflected no

immediacy for the subsequent breakout toward Stanley.130

Struggling with the loss of helicopters that severely restricted his options,

Thompson was being directed to take actions by superiors who were oblivious of the

logistical challenges he and Clapp shared. Preparing for the assault at Darwin/Goose

Green later that night, 2 Para‘s troops listened as the BBC at 1300L on 27 May revealed

that ―there is something quite big going on. They‘re saying for example that 2nd

Parachute

Regiment has moved South towards the Darwin area.‖131

Thompson passed on his

disappointment and anger to Fieldhouse, who was equally angered and dismayed, but

Thompson decided to continue with 2 Para‘s attacks anyway. And while the Argentine

command had heard the BBC report, it had little effect on their defensive plans for

Darwin/Goose Green.132

British intelligence knew that there was a garrison of some indeterminate size at

Goose Green, and best estimates were that it contained between 300 and 500 troops—

making the planned attacking force of 2 Para‘s 600 men insufficient in terms of the

superiority required for an offensive against fixed defenses. However, 2 Para would also

have some artillery support, both land and naval, as well as air support, and SAS

observations had confirmed the impression that defenses were seemingly light. One of the

challenges Thompson‘s intelligence staff faced in putting together an accurate intelligence

picture, particularly during the early stages of land operations, was that their security

clearances were insufficient in some cases to receive the intelligence they needed to

support planning. In light of some uncertainty about defenses, a helicopter lift to position

forces to the south of Goose Green was considered because defenses were known to be

lighter there. This was dismissed as too risky though, because of helicopter vulnerability

to Pucarás, and a nighttime drop was rejected because few helicopter pilots had been

trained to use passive-light night vision goggles. In the end, 2 Para moved out on foot,

walking to Camilla Creek House—which they found empty—waiting until early morning

to begin their assault.133

Anticipating that a British attack on Darwin was imminent, BG Menéndez had

ordered BG Parada, Commander of 3 Commando Brigade and Agrupación Litoral—the

sector west of Stanley—to move his headquarters to Darwin. The move did not occur,

however, because neither the Air Force nor the Navy would accept orders from Menéndez

without confirmation from their respective service headquarters. By the time the Chinook

crew tasked to transport Parada received approval for the move, the British attack had

begun, which left Lieutenant Colonel Ítalo Piaggi, Commander of 12th

Regiment, in

charge with a reinforced infantry regiment of 643 plus a 43-man combat team and 202 Air

Force personnel manning Condor air base. His mission was to hold the settlements, protect

the airstrip, and provide a reserve battle group—despite lacking the necessary vehicles and

heavy equipment.134

Lt Col Jones, the commander of 2 Para, launched the attack against Darwin at

0230 on 28 May and made good progress until daybreak, when 2 Para‘s advance was

stopped by focused Argentine artillery fire and attacks by Pucarás. Promised air support

by Sea Harriers wasn‘t available because sea mist had reduced visibility below launch

minimums, and a jammed gun precluded naval gunfire support by HMS Arrow. Two of 2

Para‘s four companies were now pinned down and casualties were mounting as

39

ammunition began to run low. In attempting to maneuver to a position from which he

could better observe his two forward companies, Lt Col Jones was killed, and shortly

thereafter two Scout helicopters bringing in ammunition and ferrying wounded were shot

down by Pucarás. Eventually, 2 Para was able to advance and by late morning Darwin Hill

had been secured, at a cost to 2 Para of six dead and eleven wounded, while the

Argentines had lost 18 with 39 wounded. Argentine forces were still occupying key

ground positions, however, and the battle was far from over with defenses proving to be

tougher and artillery fire heavier than anticipated (Figure 20). With one company assigned

to hold Darwin Hill, the rest of 2 Para, under its acting commander, Major Keeble,

progressed slowly, taking heavy casualties as it covered open ground without covering

fire. Losing another officer and two more troops to a white-flag-surrender ruse at the

settlement school by the Argentines, determined troops from 2 Para responded with

ferocious counter fire until the Argentines abandoned the school and withdrew to a

blocking position on higher ground. Meanwhile, Argentine Navy Aermacchis and Pucarás

ineffectively bombed 2 Para positions, with the Pucarás missing a napalm drop only to

lose one aircraft to ground fire. Finally supported by Sea Harriers with cluster bombs, 2

Para outflanked and surrounded Goose Green.135

Pushed back yet not defeated, Lt Col Piaggi nevertheless accepted Major Keeble‘s

surrender ultimatum the next day, realizing his forces couldn‘t hold out indefinitely.

Establishing contact through the Island civil radio net, Piaggi and two other Argentine

commanders formally surrendered at midday, releasing 112 civilian prisoners unharmed. 2

Para had lost 16 men in all with 36 wounded, but captured a surprising total of 961

Argentine prisoners that included 81 held at Camilla Creek House. At Northwood,

Admiral Fieldhouse sent his congratulations to the acting Commander of 2 Para and

expressed his relief that Britain‘s first land offensive had been successful. Though its

40

improvised execution accomplished its objective, 2 Para had been very lucky that it had

not faced a more determined adversary. In hindsight, Thompson commented that he

should have taken his own tactical headquarters and mounted a two battalion attack—

supported by Scorpion and Scimitar light tanks—which arguably would have

accomplished the mission in one-half the time and with half the casualties. The real

problem was that Thompson hadn‘t fully appreciated the strategic importance Northwood

had placed on Goose Green, which he considered a diversionary attack. Though he was

aware of what Northwood had ordered, he didn‘t understand the reasoning behind Admiral

Fieldhouse‘s demands.136

While 2 Para was securing Goose Green, 45 Commando and 3 Para were reaching

their first objective at Teal Inlet and Douglas settlement in the north, while an SAS

squadron was approaching the slopes of Mount Kent, which it reached on 31 May. Mount

Kent had previously been occupied by an Argentine detachment, but BG Menéndez had

ordered them to Goose Green a few days prior, leaving this critical piece of high terrain—

12 miles west of Stanley/Puerto Argentino—defended by only 200 troops. Upon learning

that Goose Green had fallen, Menéndez repositioned 4th

Infantry Regiment to occupy two

smaller peaks southeast of Mount Kent—Two Sisters and Mount Harriet—in order to

defend against a likely attack from the southwest. He did send out reconnaissance patrols

to discern precisely what the British were doing; however, in several small skirmishes the

patrols lost half their strength as Menéndez and the bulk of his remaining forces dug in for

the anticipated siege at Puerto Argentino.137

In Comodoro Rivadavia CEOPECON reassessed provisions in the Malvinas and

ordered two naval auxiliaries to resupply Puerto Argentino with food and ammunition on

30 May, while ordering air force and naval aviation air strikes against the British—

particularly, against HMS Invincible.138

Two Super Étendards, one carrying the lone-

remaining Exocet, and the other accompanying for its extra search radar, were dispatched

on 30 May along with four bomb-carrying Air Force Skyhawks. The Skyhawks were to

follow the Exocet attack dropping their 500-lb. bombs. As planned, the missile was

launched beyond visible range and the Super Étendards peeled off, while the Skyhawk

pilots claim that shortly after missile launch they saw the Invincible directly in front of

them. As they lined up on it, two Skyhawks were shot down while the other two released

their weapons against the carrier in a midst of smoke—convinced they had scored direct

hits. HMS Invincible, however, was at least thirty miles away. What the Skyhawks had

attacked was HMS Avenger, a Type 21 frigate, whose actively-firing 4.5-inch gun was

providing ―the smoke.‖ The Avenger crew claims that both the Exocet and the bomb

attacks missed completely, while it shot down at least one of the Skyhawks.139

Other Argentine air activity occurred only periodically, because its air force simply

no longer had the capacity to conduct the intensive attacks that it accomplished prior to

and during the landings at San Carlos. However, two C-130s, attempting to drop bombs on

a British tanker they located on 29 May, did score one direct hit, though the weapon failed

to explode. And two days later, another C-130 from the same unit was shot down by two

Sea Harriers in a missile and cannon attack while conducting reconnaissance. The

Argentines also lost one of four Lear jets on a reconnaissance flight the following week

when it was engaged by a Sea Dart missile from HMS Exeter. That same week, 500 miles

northeast of the Falklands, in a more bizarre attack, two Argentine Canberras bombed

what they believed was a fuel tanker en route to support the British. In fact, it was the

41

Liberian supertanker Hercules, which was sailing to Alaska around Cape Horn. Only one

bomb struck it—yet another dud—but the owners and insurers later decided to scuttle the

Hercules rather than risk attempting to remove unexploded ordnance in the midst of all

that highly volatile fuel.140

With respect to ground activities, MG Moore arrived in the theater on 27 May,

transferring first from QEII to HMS Antrim and then to HMS Fearless on 29 May,

establishing his headquarters in the spaces vacated by HQ 3 Commando Brigade. His

arrival once again changed

command relationships on the

ground (Figures 21 and 22).141

From Admiral Fieldhouse‘s

perspective, however, he now

felt he had a commander on

the ground who fully

appreciated the constraints

under which the British

military was operating and

who would know how to

communicate with

Northwood. Replacing MG

Moore on the CINCFLEET

staff was Lt Gen Richard

Trant, and he would serve as

Moore‘s communications

conduit with Northwood, running interference as necessary for MG Moore.142

On 1 June MG Moore issued his operations order for the recapture of Port Stanley.

3 Commando Brigade would

advance on Teal Inlet to Malo

Bridge to Mount Kent—which it

was already in the process of

doing—while 5 Infantry Brigade

would approach from the south

starting at Camilla Creek House

and moving to March Ridge,

Bluff Cove, and Mount

Challenger, before linking up

with 3 Commando Brigade. They

would subsequently attrite

Argentinean forces as much as

necessary before capturing

Stanley. Meanwhile, 40

Commando would take responsibility for securing the bridgehead at San Carlos lest the

Argentines attempt to attack British forces from West Falkland Island.143

42

Fitzroy and Bluff Cove

Keeping 3 Commando Brigade supplied and fed meant that MG Moore didn‘t have

sufficient helicopters left to support moving 5 Brigade forward up the southern flank to

Port Stanley via Fitzroy Settlement from Goose Green. The only settlement between

Goose Green and Fitzroy was Swan Inlet House, believed to be deserted, though its

telephone lines were thought to be operative. On 2 June Major Keeble of 2 Para suggested

that five available Scout helicopters of 656 Squadron be used to lift a small party to Swan

Inlet House, where the party could call ahead to Fitzroy to verify whether Argentineans

were present. Brigadier Wilson, Commander, 5th

Infantry Brigade, approved, and if

Fitzroy was clear, his plan was to move 2 Para forward using the Scouts and the one

Chinook that happened to be available on this particular day. Unfortunately, Brigadier

Wilson did not inform MG Moore of his plans. The team arrived at Swan Inlet House,

found an operative phone line, called the Fitzroy manager, and confirmed that the

Argentineans had abandoned their positions at Fitzroy. By nightfall that day, two

companies and the headquarters of 2 Para had been repositioned to Fitzroy.144

As one would expect, MG Moore was more than a little dismayed that Brigadier

Wilson had moved 2 Para forward without supporting artillery, air defense, or the

necessary logistics to support or supply them. Moreover, sufficient helicopter lift to move

the rest of 5 Brigade forward simply wasn‘t available. Sealift, on the other hand, was

accessible but there were concerns about its vulnerability so near to Port Stanley and

outside the existing air defenses at the San Carlos anchorage. After 5 Brigade‘s newly-

arrived Welsh Guards abandoned their march over the rocky terrain between San Carlos

and Goose Green, however, it became obvious that moving 5 Brigade from Goose Green

forward was going to demand lift of some kind, and the only lift available was sealift. The

compromise solution reached was to use the amphibious ships, HMS Intrepid and HMS

43

Fearless, on separate nights, having them make the journey only halfway to Bluff Cove,

where they would then transfer units to landing craft for the remainder of the trip to

Fitzroy (Figure 23).145

The trip with HMS Intrepid was successful despite dour weather that included 70

knot winds which slowed landing craft to 2 knots for their long, rain-soaked journey to

Fitzroy. An additional complication involved communications, or lack thereof—neither

MG Moore‘s headquarters aboard HMS Fearless nor BG Wilson‘s headquarters at Goose

Green had direct communications contact with the units at Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. And,

since 5 Brigade had no naval liaisons attached, when one of the Gazelle helicopters

carrying 5 Brigade Signals officers was dispatched to Fitzroy to establish communications,

HMS Cardiff, standing by to provide gunfire support against Argentinean targets if

necessary, mistook the Gazelle for an Argentine supply helicopter and fired two Sea Darts,

killing all aboard. After HMS Fearless made a semi-successful second trip on the night of

August 6, leaving only half of the Welsh Guards, Admiral Fieldhouse at Northwood

intervened with an order not to risk the large amphibious ships in such a perilous manner.

As an alternative, Commodore Clapp proposed using the smaller and slower Sir Tristram

and Sir Galahad instead, departing San Carlos at dusk so as they could be anchored at

Fitzroy before dawn.146

On 7 June Sir Tristram made its trip and emptied its stores uneventfully, but Sir

Galahad’s departure from San Carlos was delayed several hours because of shortages of

helicopters and landing craft. When it arrived at Fitzroy‘s Port Pleasant with the Welsh

Guards, their equipment, and ammunition, four of the landing craft that had assisted Sir

Tristram’s unloading had departed and the one remaining vessel had a broken landing

ramp. The malfunctioning ramp precluded moving the Welsh Guards‘ heavy equipment,

and the Guards refused to leave the ship without their equipment. In light of their earlier,

unsuccessful attempted march to Goose Green, they were less than enthusiastic about the

five mile jaunt to Bluff Cove, and were more than a little suspicious that their equipment

might take several days to catch up with them. Unfortunately, the weather was magnificent

for flying and the open presence of two ships anchored near Fitzroy were engaging targets

for Argentina‘s otherwise currently quiet Air Force. Based on sightings by nearby

Argentinean troops, eight Skyhawks from Río Gallegos and six Daggers from Río Grande

were launched. En route to Fitzroy they spotted the British frigate HMS Plymouth in

Falklands Sound, which they hit with four bombs, none of which exploded. Though there

were no warships at Fitzroy, the British did have two Sea Harriers pursuing the Argentine

aircraft, and both Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad had Blowpipe teams and Bofors guns—

neither of which is terribly effective against attacks by multiple aircraft. And, while four

Rapier missile launchers had arrived that morning aboard Sir Galahad, they were

protecting the supply base and 5 Brigade Headquarters. Partially sheltered because it was

anchored under an overhanging cliff, Sir Tristram was struck by two bombs doing minor

damage, but Sir Galahad received three direct hits—on its tank deck, in the engine room

and galley area, and in the officers‘ quarters. The resultant fires, particularly on the tank

deck, ultimately killed forty-eight men, thirty-two of which were from the Welsh Guards,

before Sir Galahad was towed out to sea to burn out and sink. There were subsequent

Argentine forays into the Fitzroy/Bluff Cove area with Skyhawks and missile-armed

Mirages, one of which destroyed a British landing craft, but Sidewinder-equipped Sea

44

Harriers shot down three Argentinean Sky Hawks in what would be the last air-to-air

engagements of the war. 147

The Push to Port Stanley

Despite setbacks for both sides, the final battle of the war had yet to occur, and BG

Menéndez still had the British outnumbered with ~9,000 men in prepared defenses around

Puerto Argentino. Anti-aircraft batteries, however, didn‘t reach much beyond the city and

its airfield, mainland air units had been decimated, and there were no ground attack aircraft

left operable. Because he didn‘t know whether the British main effort would be from the

west or south, Menéndez had his troops spread across a broad front, though in small

groups, with no forces dedicated as a reserve. Small arms ammunition was plentiful, but

artillery rounds were in short supply, and troop morale was waning as winter approached

and temperatures continued to drop. Moreover, promised rotations with mainland forces

had failed to materialize, and Argentine ground forces were beginning to realize that

reports of major British setbacks and losses had been greatly exaggerated. Menéndez‘ ‗ace

in the hole‘ was heavy reliance on carefully-positioned defensive minefields to inhibit the

British approach toward Puerto Argentino.148

As of 11 June British forces were positioned for advances that would essentially

surround Stanley, with 3 Brigade now consisting of 42 and 45 Commando, 2 and 3 Para, 1st

Battalion Welsh Guards supplemented with two companies of 40 Commando. After the

losses sustained to 5 Brigade at Fitzroy, MG Moore had lost some confidence in Brigadier

Wilson‘s performance and in 5 Brigade as an organization, so he placed the Welsh Guards

and 2 Para under Brigadier Thompson. Additionally, he felt more weight needed to be

placed on 3 Brigade‘s attack. His plan consisted of a series of three night assaults against

Stanley‘s outer perimeter—at Mount Longdon, Two Sisters, and Mount Harriet—which

would be accomplished by 3 Para, 45 Commando, and 42 Commando respectively, with 2

Para and the Welsh Guards in reserve. Argentine defenses consisted of one company on

Mount Longdon, with two companies each on Mount Harriet and Two Sisters (Figure

24).149

45

The fighting on Mount Longdon was the fiercest, with 3 Para taking the most

casualties of the British units participating in the 3-pronged attack. However, after an all-

night, 10-hour battle, Mount Longdon was overtaken by 3 Para. Two Sisters, on the other

hand had been defended by late-arriving Argentine forces in makeshift defenses that

quickly wilted under fire. And the defenders on Mount Harriet, though better prepared for

an anticipated assault, were quickly overwhelmed by a surprise attack from the rear that

had avoided their main defenses and left them with little choice but to surrender. British

losses for the night‘s activities were 24 dead and 65 wounded, but they had killed 85

Argentine defenders and captured 420. Some of the Argentine forces had fought valiantly

and well, but once forced out of their prepared positions, they were generally ill-prepared

for successful counterattacks. The next day and evening, 12 June, were spent by the British

restocking their ammunition and conducting reconnaissance, with the final assault planned

for the night of 13 June.150

The British plan for the 13 June attacks had 5 Brigade, now consisting of 2d

Battalion Scots Guards, 1st Battalion Welsh Guards, and 1

st Battalion Gurkha Rifles,

attacking Tumbledown, while 2 Para attacked Wireless Ridge and the remaining Gurkhas

attacked Mount William (Figure 25). Though the defenses at Tumbledown were among

Argentina‘s most effective and well-prepared, the three-pronged attack, supported by

overwhelming artillery support proved too much for the defenders, and after several hours

of fighting they withdrew back to Sapper Hill. At Wireless Ridge, 2 Para, supported by

light tanks, Harriers, and artillery, faced fatigued and demoralized Argentine troops whose

resistance wilted after only a few hours of assault. At Mount William, the Gurkhas, who

waited until Tumbledown had been secured, attacked in daylight and watched their

opposition dissolve in front of them. British forces were now positioned on the outskirts of

Stanley, as 45 Commando conducted a final skirmish to take Sapper Hill. While they were

46

preparing for their final assault, the British forces were notified that a ceasefire had been

ordered. The only person who continued advancing was the journalist Max Hastings, who

walked into the journalistic ―scoop of a lifetime.‖151

Negotiations

BG Menéndez knew that his forces could no longer successfully defend Stanley and

further resistance would only lead to unnecessary loss of life. He called Galtieri to make

clear his plight, but Galtieri was unwilling to accept defeat. Menéndez explained that he

didn‘t have sufficient troops or ammunition to continue, and all of the high ground was

now occupied by British Forces. Begrudgingly, Galtieri acquiesced, allowing Menéndez to

begin negotiations, ―you are the commanding officer, you are the commandant. You have

norms to follow, rules to obey and a mission to accomplish. You have your personnel, you

have the military code and you have the authority to resolve and decide. From up here, I

can do nothing but suggest modes of action, but the responsibility today is with you, the

Commander of the Isla Malvinas. Over.‖152

In anticipation of an Argentine surrender, the British forces struggled with a plan to

ensure such could be accomplished without further bloodshed. It was finally decided to

allow Lt Col H. M. Rose, Commanding Officer of 22 SAS Regiment, who had experience

in tactics used to persuade terrorists to surrender, to contact the Argentineans though the

civilian medical net, since telephone contact with the Argentine Military Headquarters

could not be established. He contacted Captain Melbourne Hussey of the Argentine Navy,

BG Menéndez‘ chief administrative officer, who arranged a meeting for Rose with

Menéndez at the Secretariat building in Stanley. Rose maintained contact directly with

Admiral Fieldhouse in Northwood and his superiors aboard HMS Fearless through the

SAS communications link, and explained to Menéndez that the British demanded an

unconditional surrender. BG Menéndez left the room presumably to consult with his staff

before returning to agree. He noted, however, that he could not speak on behalf of the

Argentine Navy and Air Force. Fieldhouse directed MG Moore to accept Menéndez‘

formal surrender, which he did at 2359Z on 14 June. Later that morning (just after

midnight), Moore signaled Northwood with the following words:

Major General Menéndez surrendered to me all the Argentine armed

forces in East and West Falkland together with their impedimenta.

Arrangements are in hand to assemble the men for return to Argentina, to

gather their arms and equipment and to mark and make safe their

munitions. The Falklands Islands are once more under the government

desired by their inhabitants. God Save the Queen.153

Epilogue

On 17 June President Galtieri announced his resignation as Commander-in-Chief of

the Army and as President of Argentina. Post-surrender activities lasted for several days

with one of the main challenges being accommodations for soldiers on both sides—many

of whom had been out in the open for several weeks—and winter was now fully upon

them. MG Moore‘s hope was that he could return most of his prisoners to Argentina as

47

soon as possible in order to alleviate the strain that their presence imposed upon his

logistics. And soon the defeated were on their way home to a nation unprepared for the

military collapse that had occurred in their Malvinas. To avoid public embarrassment, the

ships carrying the released Argentine soldiers were quietly docked at La Plata and Río

Santiago—deliberately isolated locations, where no official party welcomed them home. In

fact, most were delayed from meeting with their families while the junta struggled with a

way to release the news of their defeat. The Battle for the Falklands had cost the British

255 lives, with 777 wounded. The Royal Navy had four warships sunk and many more

damaged; the Atlantic Conveyor, Sir Galahad, and one landing craft were also sunk, and

the Task Force lost 24 helicopters and 10 fixed-wing aircraft. For Argentina, combat deaths

were ~746, with another 1,105 soldiers listed as wounded or sick. Their material losses

were also significant—the cruiser Belgrano, one submarine, the trawler Narwal, and

several smaller ships, with aircraft losses in excess of 100.154

Galtieri‘s junta was replaced by a new, transitional military junta, which appointed

retired general Reynaldo Bignone as President; he immediately established the Rattenbach

Commission to determine who was at fault for the failed Malvinas debacle. The

Commission found all of the junta members, every senior officer involved, and the former

foreign minister at fault, and all were charged with various crimes and convicted in a long

procession of court appearances and appeals in the subsequent months and years. All three

of the junta members were convicted and sentenced to prison; however, in 1989, Galtieri

and 39 other officers of the dictatorship received pardons from then-President Carlos

Menem. Galtieri subsequently died in 2003 while under house arrest for civil charges

related to the disappearance of three Spanish citizens while he was president. Admiral

Jorge Anaya suffered a heart attack in November 2006 while waiting to be interrogated by

an examining magistrate investigating charges of human rights abuses; he was never

deemed fit enough to stand trial and died under house arrest in 2008. In 2003 the Spanish

justice system sought the extradition of Lieutenant General Basilio Arturo Lami Dozo to

stand trial in Spain for crimes against humanity committed during the junta‘s reign.155

48

Notes

1 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, xxxii. Initial signatories of the Antarctic Treaty included the

governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,

the Union of South Africa, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Information about and a copy of the Treaty can be

found in the U.S. State Department permanent electronic archive at http://www.state.gov/www/global/

arms/treaties/arctic1.html. 2 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 5. 3 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 2; Ibid., 3-4. 4 Middlebrook, 2. 5 Ibid., 103-5. 6 Scheina, 235. 7 Middlebrook, Task Force, 36. 8 Using naval ships for commercial purposes was a common practice in 1982—not only in Argentina, but

throughout South America. Schiena, 379, note 1. 9 Hastings and Jenkins, 54-55; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 8-9. Davidoff did not accompany

his working part when it traveled to Leith in March 1982. Additionally, though the Bahía Buen Suceso was

an Argentine naval transport, it spent the bulk of its time on commercial charter work, and on this trip to

South Georgia, it carried no Argentine naval personnel. 10 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 10. 11 Ibid., 12. According to former Argentinean Air Force Commodore Alberto Moro, the junta had no

intention of cutting off diplomatic talks with Great Britain or in precipitating a major military

confrontation; it simply wanted the UK to return to the bargaining table with a more ‗serious-minded‘

approach toward negotiating the status of the islands. Moro, 2. 12 Initially planned as Operation AZUL (Blue), the name was changed to Operation ROSARIO on March

31, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 109 and Ruiz Moreno, 21. In the Argentine Army‘s official 1983

critique, Informe official del Ejército Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volumes I and II, there is no

reference to either name. Martin Middlebrook, however, states the reverse in The Fight for the Malvinas, p.

25: ―What the Argentines called Operación Azul—Operation Blue—had already started. (It had been

known as Operation Rosario—Operation Rosary—during the planning stage but this was changed to Blue,

after the robe of the Virgin Mary[—the protectress of the Argentinean armed forces]; the planners were

anxious that the operation should be seen by the Argentine soldiers and public as a semi-religious

crusade).‖ In either case, the religious connotation was clearly important to the Argentines. See also

Middlebrook, Task Force, 16. 13 The initial plan, Directive No. 1/82 contained five assumptions: 1) The operation to recover the islands

would be simple; 2) the defense of the islands and control of public security could be achieved with a few

men; 3) a military reaction by Britain was unlikely; 4) both countries would seek a negotiated settlement;

and, 5) in the event of a military reaction by Britain, the Military Strategic Reserve would be engaged.

Pazos, 9. 14 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 107-8; Schiena, 236; and, Informe official del Ejército Argentino:

Conflicto Malvinas, Volume I, 22. 15 Sources differ on who the commander for the short-lived Malvinas Theater of Operations (TOO)

actually was. Informe official del Ejército Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume I, however, the official

Argentine report on the Malvinas Conflict, reviews the campaign plan, which clearly states that General

Garcia was the Malvinas TOO commander until ―the objective is conquered,‖ at which time the Malvinas

TOO would be deactivated (estimated to occur ~D+5), 22. With regard to the specific boundaries of the

two respective TOOs, none of the sources consulted discussed or provided specific geographic coordinates

or boundaries, though it is reasonable to assume that such must have existed for command and control

purposes. 16 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 15. 17 Informe official del Ejército Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume I, 21. 18 Ibid. 19 Middlebrook, Task Force, 41; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 17. 20 Middlebrook, Task Force, 42.

49

21 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 65. 22 The two submarines dispatched from the UK on 1 April 1982 were HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid;

they were later joined by HMS Conqueror. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign,

Vol. II, 52. 23 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 21; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 75-7. 24 Middlebrook, Task Force, 40; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 73-75, 92-3, 99. 25 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 23-4 26 Ibid., 25-6. 27 Middlebrook, Task Force, 43-4. 28 Accounts differ on what precisely happened at Moody Brook. While all accounts agree that grenades

were launched followed by automatic fire, Middlebrook suggests that the grenades were tear gas and that

when the commandos discovered the barracks were empty, only then did they engage with machine gun

fire—under orders from RADM Büsser to display as much firepower and noise as possible to induce a

quick surrender. See Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 30; Hastings and Jenkins, 73-4; Freedman

and Gamba-Stonehouse, 113. 29 Despite his protestations and refusal to shake hands with General Garcia, Governor Hunt was forced to

surrender. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 113-14; Hastings and Jenkins, 74. 30 Hastings and Jenkins, 74. 31 Middlebrook, Task Force, 61. 32 Ibid., 52. 33 A copy of each of Gen Garcia‘s communiqués can be found in Middlebrook, Task Force, 54-55.

Communiqué #3 specifically directed residents to post a piece of white cloth outside their doors should

they have problems that they wanted brought to the attention of the Argentine military authorities.

Middlebrook notes that nearly everyone in Stanley found a reason to hang a white cloth outside his or his

residence, and without being aggressive, the populace of Stanley let it be known that an Argentine military

occupation was unwelcome. Middlebrook, Task Force, 55; Hastings and Jenkins, 75. 34 Hastings and Jenkins, 75. 35 Freedman, 16. This crisis erupted in the early days of the Thatcher administration, not long after she had

earned the moniker ―the Iron Lady,‖ and her government had been under siege by the opposition Labour

party over dire economic conditions in Great Britain before trouble in the Falklands began. The Chief of

the Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, was in New Zealand during the early days of this

crisis, but kept in touch and was dissuaded from cutting his visit short in anticipation that a diplomatic

solution would be found. In his absence, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, traveled to the

House of Commons to speak directly with Secretary of Defence Nott, who he feared was going to be

reluctant to recommend to Prime Minister Thatcher that Great Britain should respond with force. In his

intervention to Mrs. Thatcher, Leach suggested a full task force, with logistic support and an aircraft

carrier, should and could be put together by the weekend. Ibid., 23-4; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse,

123. 36 Woodward, One Hundred Days, Foreword, xi. 37 Freedman, 18-20. Following the humiliating 1956 Suez Crisis, ―there was a presumption that the time

had passed when the country would engage in military operations in areas distant from the European

continent. . . . Sending a naval Task Force had once been the sort of thing British Governments did

regularly; but it was a long time since anything like this had been attempted, and even longer since an

attempt had been successful.‖ 38 A copy of the entire resolution can be found at http://www.falklands.info/history/resolution502.html. 39 Ibid., 21-24. Other members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee included the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir

Henry Leach; the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Beetham; and, the Chief of the General

Staff, General Sir Edwin Bramall. 40 Ibid., 29-31; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 127. 41 Hastings and Jenkins, 83; Middlebrook, Task Force, 68. 42 Freedman, 50. 43 Ibid., 51-2. 44 As a result of the 1981 Defence Review (also referred to as the Nott 1981 White Paper), the strategic

justification for Britain‘s aircraft carriers had come under scrutiny. While the UK‘s two carriers arguably

provided anti-submarine defense for NATO, Nott‘s white paper argued that destroyers and frigates could

50

more effectively and cheaply perform these same duties. Consequently, HMS Hermes was scheduled to be

scrapped and HMS Invincible had been sold to the Australians. In fact, Nott additionally argued that

amphibious ships were no longer needed for out-of-area landings, which meant that the assault ships HMS

Fearless and HMS Intrepid also were to be decommissioned eventually. Hastings and Jenkins, 11. 45 Freedman, 52; Hastings and Jenkins, 83. 46 Thompson, The Lifeblood of War, 250-51. As early as 31 March, the UK supposedly had information

that Argentina might invade the Falklands, and while some military forces were alerted, according to MG

Julian Thompson, 3 Commando Brigade was not notified until 2 April, a day after HMS Hermes and

Invincible were ordered to be ready for notice to sea. MG Thompson calls such oversight ―unpardonable,‖

and when the unit was given notice, it had 72 to prepare for dispatch: ―At this stage no mission was given,

and the problem of translating political intent into military action, that was to persist until well after the

landing on 21 May, first reared its head. There were no formal plans to cater for the possibility of having to

retake the Falkland Islands after their seizure by the Argentines, or anyone else.‖ 47 Freedman, 52-4. 48 Hastings and Jenkins, 84. 49 Merchant companies, such as P&O insisted upon requisitioning rather than the chartering of their

commercial vessels because of insurance rate issues associated with carrying troops and equipment into

combat zones. Crews had to consist entirely of British citizens, and while ship masters were responsible for

safety, the senior RN officer aboard each vessel was responsible for employment through the chain of

command. Freedman, 55-6. 50 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 129. 51 Freedman, 54. The author also notes in The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, 55, that

it ―was clear . . . that there was no risk of taking excessive supplies—leading to the principle that all

available storage space must be used.‖ In The Lifeblood of War, page 251-2, MG Julian Thompson was

equally critical of administrative loading, ―Loading for an amphibious operation is best carried out in the

following sequence: identify the mission, find out as much as possible about the enemy (intelligence), make

the plan, and stow the ships so that men and loads will come off in the sequence required to meet the plan.‖

Time constraints, however, dictated quick preparations, and, as Thompson notes, ―for lack of anything

better, the plan for the reinforcement of Northern Norway in a time of tension was used as a planning

guide.‖ 52 For example, because the British knew there few roads in the Falklands, they intentionally took along

very few vehicles, assuming helicopters would be used to move men and equipment from offshore shipping

as well as to forward destinations on land. With the subsequent loss of the Atlantic Conveyer with its three

Chinooks and six Wessex helicopters on 25 May, the impact of earlier logistics decisions were severely

felt. Ibid., 55, 487. 53 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 129-30. 54 Middlebrook, Task Force, 83. 55 Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, The British Army in the Falklands, 29. 56 ―America‘s Falklands War: A Relationship Sweet and Sour,‖ The Economist, 3 March 1984, 29; and

Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 130-32. 57 Freedman, 72, 398-99. Freedman describes arrangements for two RAF Canberras, with Chilean markings

that were sent to Chile on loan, with an option to purchase. The Canberras were operated by RAF crews

during the hand-over period while they trained Chilean aircrews and carried out photographic

reconnaissance (398). He also reports on an interview conducted in 1999 with General Fernando Matthei,

who had been the Chilean Air Force Commander-in-Chief in 1982. Gen Matthei described an agreement

with Great Britain through a ―secret agent,‖ who arranged for intelligence on Argentine air movements that

were relayed from an underground command center in Punta Arenas via satellite to Northwood (399). 58 Ibid., 72-4. 59 While Task Force 317 was en route both to Ascension Island and thereafter to South Georgia and the

Falklands, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity, particularly, by then-U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander

Haig. And, while a vitally-important part of this conflict‘s history, those details by design have been

omitted from this Case Study because they are tangential to the operational warfare lessons and discussions

this study seeks to foster. 60 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 48. 61 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 142-4.

51

62 While Figure 7 is offered in the Argentine Army‘s official 1983 critique, Informe official del Ejército

Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, and has been corroborated by other authors, primarily British, Commodore

Rubén O. Moro, the source for Figure 8, was the chief rapporteur to the Argentine Rattenbach Commission,

chaired by Lieutenant General Benjamin Rattenbach, which assessed responsibilities in the Falklands-

Malvinas conflict. The Commission‘s assessments were then used to draw charges against the junta.

Additionally, Commodore Moro chaired the drafting committee for the official History of the Air War in

the Malvinas. Consequently, his assessment, specifically with regard to organization of Argentina‘s air

forces, has significant credibility. Strategic Air Command, established at the same time as the South

Atlantic Theater of Operations (April 5) was in charge of Argentine Air Force offensive operations, which

entrusted implementation of tactical Air Force missions to its subordinate, Air Force South, commanded by

BG Ernesto Crespo and headquartered in Comodoro Rivadavia. Air defense of the mainland was the

responsibility of Air Defense Command, commanded by BG Jorge A. Hughes. Moro, 78-9. 63 Middlebrook, Task Force, 88; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 144-5. 64 The Argentinean Air Force sent an unarmed Boeing 707 on a reconnaissance flight near Ascension on 21

April, and it picked up the British Task Force en route with 2 light aircraft carriers and 8 destroyers. A Sea

Harrier recognized the Argentine Air Force plane, but British rules of engagement at that time prohibited

firing under the circumstances. Galtieri, aware from news reports of the composition of British units aboard

the ships, knew that he would have six conscript units facing at least four attacking professional battalion-

sized British units. Moreover, British helicopters would give the attackers many options. Middlebrook, The

Fight for the Malvinas, 54-55. 65 III Brigade, commanded by BG Omar Parada, manned by conscripts, and stationed near the friendly

border with Uruguay, was determined to be the most easily spared unit, despite having neither the

equipment nor the training for cold-weather operations that would likely be faced in the Malvinas. Its

troops arrived in the Falklands on a day with winds so fierce they were unable to pitch their tents. Most of

their support equipment—radios, digging instruments, vehicles, rifle-cleaning equipment, and reserve

ammunition—were loaded aboard the Ciudad de Córdoba, which turned around before ever reaching Isla

Soledad. Ibid., 56-57. 66 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 146; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 48. 67 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 53-57. 68 Scheina, 244. 69 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 145-47. According to Menendez, he was only prepared to be

governor of the Malvinas—an administrative position as he initially understood it—not responsible for the

islands‘ defense. Carlos H. Turolo, Malvinas: Testimonio de su Gobernador (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana,

1983), 46. 70 Informe official del Ejército Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume II, Annex 9, translated by CAPT

Robert C. Rubel, USN. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, among others, note on page 148 that: ―Neither

Lombardo‘s command in Puerto Belgrano nor Menendez in Stanley acted as if they expected anything

other than a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Little military planning was done.‖ 71 Ibid., Annex 11. While the official Argentine Army report contains both BG Menéndez‘ and VADM

Lombardo‘s base plans, several of the annexes have not been included—in particular, the ―operations‖

annexes. 72 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 62-63. The Argentineans had considered lengthening the

runway at Puerto Argentino, but felt they had insufficient time in which to complete the lengthening given

its heavy use by transport aircraft; moreover, the British sea blockade posed difficulties to Argentine sealift

vessels that would be needed to transport the necessary heavy earth-moving equipment. They also

considered a scheme to use aluminum decking, but that effort was abandoned because of higher priorities

for scarce sealift. See Schiena, 259 and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 326. 73 Ibid., 67. What Argentina did not know at the time was that while the two UK submarines, HMS

Splendid and Spartan, were in fact in place by 12 April, they had not yet received permission to engage

because the British were still holding hopes that a diplomatic solution could be found. 74 Ibid., 69-71. 75 The Santa Fé left Mar del Plata on April 9 for Grytviken, travelling most of the way on the surface

because its batteries were spent. Damaged further by winds and strong waves during the journey east, it

was incapable of achieving the surprise necessary to launch its torpedoes if it had such an opportunity.

Nevertheless, it did safely deliver its cargo of 40 men and their equipment into Cumberland Bay. Attacked

52

by helicopters from HMS Antrim, the Santa Fé limped over to Grytviken where it was abandoned.

Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 222-23. 76 Throughout the buildup period, following the assault to take back the Malvinas Islands, Argentina

ardently worked the UN and the Organization of American States to call the Rio Treaty (the Inter-

American Treaty of Reciprocal Aid [IATRA] for implementation of collective measures. Ultimately, it was

unsuccessful, but for those interested in the details of these negotiations, a summary can be found in Moro,

55-58, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 224-43. 77 The British decision to retake South Georgia was one of the first made by the Thatcher War Cabinet

because it would demonstrate resolve, show the public a quick victory, and hopefully improve Britain‘s

diplomatic position vis-à-vis Argentina. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 218-220; Middlebrook, The

Fight for the Malvinas, 72. 78 Informe official del Ejército Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas, Volume II, Annex 9, Operations Order 1/82,

HQ Malvinas Ground Command. 79 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 74-5. 80 Middlebrook, Task Force, 96. 81 Freedman, 75-79. CDR Angus K. Ross, RN (Ret.) suggests that while the Sea Harrier was an able

dogfighter in a twisting fight at low level (made better by U.S. AIM 9L Sidewinder missiles), it was

outclassed in its anti-air capabilities by Argentina‘s Mirages. Had the Mirages been able to operate without

the constraints on fuel that their distance from the Argentine mainland imposed, the Sea Harriers would

have had a much more difficult task. British air planners fully expected that the Argentineans would find a

way around their range limitations, either by air refueling or extending the length of the runway at Stanley.

Consequently, British emphasis was on protecting these scarce assets from the outset, not in using them to

―sweep the air.‖ 82 Ibid., 80, 199-203. 83 Thompson, 17-18. 84 Freedman, 274. 85 Ibid., 203-5. 86 Burden, et al., 363-95; Freedman, 279-80. 87 Freedman, 282-3. 88 The initial Vulcan mission consisted of a total of 18 sorties flown by 15 Victor tankers, 2 Vulcans and a

Nimrod and involved the transfer of over 2,000,000 lbs. of fuel (925 tons) during 17 separate air-refueling

transfers—all to put one repairable crater in one runway. Middlebrook, Task Force, 120. 89 Burden, et al., 365; Freedman, 285-6; Moro, 95. 90 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 76-93; Moro, 93-116; Middlebrook, Task Force, 126-141;

Freedman, 286-88; Hastings and Jenkins, 143-46; and Woodward, 132-45. 91 From previous naval exercises with NATO forces, Woodward knew it was possible to get within Exocet

launch range of a ―fully-prepared American carrier‖—a situation he was keen to avoid. Woodward, 147-49

and Freedman, 292. 92 Freedman, 290-93 and Moro, 118. British submarines, however, already had ROE allowing attacks on

any submarines encountered because the Argentine 209s were sufficiently quiet that they could sneak up on

a British nuclear submarine and be within torpedo range before being detected. Freedman and Gamba-

Stonehouse, 250-51. While Woodward knew he needed to foil at least one arm of the pincer, the position of

the Belgrano for the moment was known whereas the precise location of the Veinticinco de Mayo was not.

Had HMS Spartan located the carrier, Woodward clearly states he would have asked for permission ―in the

strongest terms‖ to attack both. Woodward, 149-55. 93 Freedman, 296-98; Moro, 121-25; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 96-116; and Woodward,

158-64. The decision to sink the Belgrano remains controversial, with each side offering differing

interpretations—as one would expect. Rubén Moro summarizes the Argentinean perspective and offers no

less than eight conflicting accounts and a set of conclusions regarding the British rationale behind the

sinking of the Belgrano on pages 125-33. Lawrence Freedman offers the British version on 299-300 and in

Chapter 49 of his ‗official history,‘ entitled, appropriately, ―The Belgrano Controversy,‖ 743-53.

Irrespective of the rationale, there were admittedly ―several inconsistencies and inaccuracies‖ in initial UK

Government statements that helped spawn the continuance of this controversy. Freedman, 299. 94 Middlebrook, Task Force, 152-53 and Freedman, 300-301. The Alférez Sobral was about 100 NM north

of the Malvinas searching for survivors of a ditched Canberra bomber that had been downed the previous

53

day. It was one of two ships of Task Force 50, charged with air-sea rescue; the other ship was the

Comodoro Somellara, which was approximately 200 NM from this incident and remained undamaged.

Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 117-18. 95 Though there was little fixed wing air activity for both sides on March 3, a Puerto Argentino-based

Aermacchi out searching for British warships did crash into the sea as it was attempting to return to Puerto

Argentino. Freedman, 301. 96 Freedman, 304-6; Middlebrook, Task Force, 153-66; Woodward, 165-83; and Moro, 143-60. A series of

unfortunate circumstances, left HMS Sheffield more vulnerable to attack than it should have been, given the

circumstances—that the Belgrano had just been sunk and the Argentineans were undoubtedly seeking an

opportunity for revenge. Nevertheless, HMS Sheffield’s anti-air-warfare officer and three of his cell of

eight were either out of the room or away from their stations when HMS Glasgow sent out a warning that it

had picked up radar emissions from the incoming aircraft. Additionally, HMS Sheffield’s HF radio was

unmanned and its UHF failed to pick up HMS Glasgow’s entire warning message. Because its satellite

communications terminal (SCOT) was still being used, information from the ship‘s Electronic Support

Measure (ESM) equipment was unavailable, and by the time the operations team came to enhanced alert,

the SCOT was turned off, and the anti-air-warfare team returned to their stations, there was insufficient

time to prevent missile impact. 97 Moro, 152-3; Freedman, 306. 98 Moro, 153. 99 Freedman, 307-313 and Moro, 153. 100 Woodward notes that blockading the Falklands was a non-starter because: ―a) we were not big enough

to seal the Falklands off; and b) we could not stay out at sea long enough to enforce a starve-them-out

programme, even if such a scheme could be made to avoid, somehow, starving out the islanders at the same

time.‖ Woodward, 185. 101 Ibid., 191-94. 102 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 127-31 and Woodward, 194-98. 103 While the second set of attacking Skyhawks did survive the attacks against HMS Glasgow, on their

return flight one of the Skyhawks flew too close to Goose Green—a prohibited area for Argentine

aircraft—and was shot down by its own Argentine 35-mm Oerlikon air defense artillery killing the pilot.

Ibid., 135. 104 Hastings and Jenkins, 157-59; Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 132-35; and Woodward, 204-

21. 105 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 135-36. 106 Freedman, 431-37 and Woodward, 225-33. 107 Freedman, 437-39 and Middlebrook, Task Force, 192-93. While the 3-man Sea King aircrew was later

captured and repatriated to the UK by Chile, no mention of what happened to the SAS team is made in

Freedman‘s ―official‖ account—an obvious omission; however, Martin Middlebrook speculates on a

―story,‖ which he suggest is plausible—the team partially accomplished its mission (installing mini-video

cameras that transmitted airfield takeoffs) and was engaged by Argentine security forces who killed at least

one and wounded another before capturing the rest. The incident was nevertheless kept quiet because the

team may have been secretly exchanged for LCDR Astiz, the naval officer captured at South Georgia. 108 Freedman, 445, 463; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 335. 109Freedman, 445-46. The ring of air defenses around Stanley consisted of 61 anti-aircraft gun and 7

missile launch batteries. Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 141-42. Despite robust air defenses

around Stanley, SAS reconnaissance observers assessed the mainly conscript ground forces as well-armed

but poorly trained: ―General Menendez‘s army lacked the training and discipline in washing, changing

clothes, keeping dry, looking after each other, which was second nature to the British. . . . the enemy were

unhappy and inadequately fed, unsure of why they were on the Malvinas, poorly equipped to remain there.‖

Hastings and Jenkins, 177. 110 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 142; Freedman, 446-47; and Freedman and Gamba-

Stonehouse, 326-27. 111 Freedman, 449-50. 112 Ibid. 113 Thompson, The Lifeblood of War, 269. 114 Freedman, 467-69.

54

115 Ibid., 469-71. The initial greetings between the native Falkland islanders and their liberators were

exceptionally low key and would remain so throughout the operation. As Captain Roger Williams of 40

Commando observed upon arriving in San Carlos: ―Our chaps surrounded the manager‘s house and Andy

Pillar knocked on the door to ask if there were any Args about. There was some delay and then Mr Short

appeared and said something like, ‗Oh, you‘ve come then‘—a common reaction throughout the settlement.

There were no garlands of flowers or kisses on both cheeks.‖ Middlebrook, Task Force, 210. 116 Woodward, 241-49; Freedman, 471-73; Moro, 211-29; and Middlebrook, Task Force, 206-16. 117 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 337. 118 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 166; quote from Oscar Cardoso, et al., Falklands: The Secret

Plot (London: Preston Editions, 1983), 285; quoted in Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 357. 119 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 357-59. For his part, Menéndez was also hoping that the Argentine

Air Force would have some success against the British carriers, which would help solve some of his

defensive challenges. Freedman, 480. 120 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 474-77. The Rapier high-altitude surface-to-air defense system did

not have radar, and so target acquisition was entirely dependent upon optical tracking. Additionally, missile

equipment had been poorly loaded and hadn‘t made the long journey south without damage. Once ashore,

Rapier units weren‘t placed to deal adequately with aircraft attacks against shipping. 121 Freedman, 479. 122 Ibid. 123Middlebrook, Task Force, 216 and Freedman, 480-81. 124 Woodward, 269-302 and Freedman, 483-90. 125 Freedman, 491. 126 Moro, 237-55. In addition to the Argentine Air Force, Argentine Navy aircraft—specifically, the

Étendard squadron and an A-4 squadron from the Veinticinco de Mayo, operating ashore—had participated

in these attacks. 127 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 362-63. 128 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 176; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 364-65. 129 Hastings and Jenkins, 229-32. In addition to lacking air superiority, each man would be carrying 120

lbs. of equipment on his back, and the journey would be made without what little comfort the lost Atlantic

Conveyer’s cargo of tenting could have provided. 130 Freedman, 450, 554-56. Though ostensibly a joint headquarters, the staff at Northwood ―had always

been a fleet headquarters and [was] never truly joint‖ 556. MG Moore departed Northwood by air and

joined up with the QEII at Ascension. Though the QEII had Satellite Communications terminal, technical

difficulties precluded reliable contact with Thompson and Fieldhouse, so Moore was unable to guide the

interchange of information or to protect Thompson from theater-strategic-level meddling. In fact, at one

point Fieldhouse told Woodward to ―go ashore and shout at Thompson until he moved out of the

beachhead‖ (562). Woodward refused, and so Fieldhouse called Thompson directly and ordered him to

attack Goose Green in a subsequent signal: ―you should do all you can to bring the Darwin/Goose Green

operation to a successful conclusion with Union Jack seen to be flying in Darwin. This . . . will allow us to

claim with justification that we now control large areas of East Falklands. To complete the package you

will understand how important it is to cover ground as quickly as possible to box him in Stanley‖ (563).

See also Julian Thompson, No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic: 1982 (New York:

Hippocrene, 1985), 73-74. 131 Julian Thompson, Ready for Anything: A History of the Parachute Regiment (London: Weidenfeld &

Nicolson, 1989), 332. 132 Freedman, 570-71. In fact, the local commander, Lt Col Piaggi, did hear the BBC report, but assumed it

was a planned bluff and, as a result, took no action to rearrange his defenses. Middlebrook, The Fight for

the Malvinas, 180. 133 Freedman, 566-67; Middlebrook, Task Force, 254-55; and Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 372-73. 134 Moro, 257; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 372; Freedman, 564-65; and Middlebrook, Task Force,

253. In fact, the senior ranking officer at Darwin was Vicecommodoro Wilson D. Pedroza, who, along with

BG Menéndez at Stanley, occasionally interfered with Piaggi‘s decisions despite having less information

upon which to make decisions (Freedman, 564). 135 Freedman, 578-80; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 372-76; and Middlebrook, Task Force, 261-73. 136 Freedman, 567-68, 582.

55

137 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 377-78. 138 Ibid., 378-79. Admiral Lombardo believed there were already sufficient provisions in place in the

Malvinas, and so withheld the two ships from sailing, though they remained loaded and ready to sail when

signaled. 139 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 205-207. Argentina, to this day, claims that the Invincible was

indeed hit and damaged, proven by its three months late return from the war, which, Argentina argues,

occurred while it was secretly repaired because the British wanted to conceal the damage from its public.

Moro offers one such alternative account, 273-79. 140 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 200-201, 208-209. CDR Guillermo Repetto, Argentine Navy,

disputes this portion of the text as having never occurred; however, an article by George Russell, Arthur

White, and Marsh Clark, ―Falklands Islands: Girding for the Big One,‖ Time, June 21, 1982, reports

essentially the same events. 141 Freedman, 598. Although MG Moore arrived in the theater on 27 April, he actually became Task Group

Commander (CTG 317.1) on 20 May, with both 3 Commando Bde and 5 Infantry Bde under his command. 142 Freedman, 33, 586-87. One of the issues with which MG Moore had to deal was Admiral Fieldhouse‘s

lack of confidence in Moore‘s two subordinate brigadiers. Poor performance by 5 Brigade during pre-

embarkation exercises had raised concerns about Brigadier Wilson‘s competence, and Thompson‘s

reluctance to breakout from the beachhead at San Carlos had caused some to be suspect of his intestinal

fortitude—impressions that MG Moore first learned about after he was aboard the QEII en route to the

Falklands (586). 143 Ibid., 587-89. 144 Freedman, 598-600; Middlebrook, Task Force, 296-98; and Hastings and Jenkins, 272-74. Part of the

problem was that because there was no on-scene overall commander, decisions were being made and

coordinated (or not) among different decision makers at five separate locations—Fieldhouse at Northwood,

Moore and Clapp aboard HMS Fearless at San Carlos, Woodward on HMS Hermes, Wilson and 5 Infantry

Bde at Darwin/Goose Green, and 2 Para, with part of the 5 Bde HQ at Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. Moreover, when

Moore found out about Wilson‘s opportunistic move to Fitzroy, he didn‘t immediately share that

information with neither his then-current shipmate, Commodore Clapp, nor RADM Woodward, whose

vessels would be needed to support this southern approach. Freedman, 604. 145 Hastings and Jenkins, 274-75 and Middlebrook, Task Force, 298-99. 146 Middlebrook, Task Force, 304-5. 147 Ibid., 304-9. 148 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 216-17; Middlebrook, Task Force, 315-16; and Freedman and

Gamba-Stonehouse, 395. Of Menéndez‘ 9,000 troops, only ~5,000 were actually combat forces—most

were infantry and most were conscripts—and all were hungry, cold, and wet. Conversely, British forces,

despite being 8,000 miles from home (as opposed to 400 miles for the Argentineans), never faced serious

shortages of essential needs, though they were fearfully close at conflict termination. Much of Britain‘s

ultimate success was due in large measure to the tremendous operational logistics support its forces were

provided by Northwood. Middlebrook, Task Force, 324-25. 149 Middlebrook, Task Force, 325-327; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 395-96; and Freedman, 613. 150 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 395-97; Middlebrook, Task Force, 329-50. 151 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 397-99 and Freedman, 653. Hastings‘ uncontested walk into Stanley

suggests that Argentine defenses there had already dissolved. Nevertheless, MG Moore later noted that

Hastings presence in Stanley could have brought Great Britain significant embarrassment had he been

captured while negotiations were ongoing. Freedman, 653-4. 152 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, 400-405. Galtieri‘s remarks about the military code refer to a section

under the then-Argentine military code under which a commander would not be expected to surrender

―until he had lost half his men and three-quarters of his ammunition. . . .‖ (405). Surrender under conditions

less grim than these would warrant a court-martial offense. Galtieri is already trying to place the blame for

Argentina‘s military failure on the shoulders of BG Menéndez. 153 Freedman, 657-59. In the final surrender document, the word ―unconditional‖ was deleted; however, the

Argentine surrender was ―total and complete with regard to personnel and equipment on East and West

Falkland and all the outlying islands.‖ Freedman, 659. 154 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 277-86; Hastings and Jenkins, 314-24; Moro, 88-92; and

Freedman, 662-72.

56

155 Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 287; ―Pardon of Argentine Officers Angers Critics of the

Military,‖ New York Times, October 8, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/09/world/ pardon-of-

argentine-officers-angers-critics-of-the-military.html. Accessed: 27 April 2010; ―Profile: Leopoldo

Galtieri,‖ Telegraph, 13 March 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1545385/Profile-

Leopoldo-Galtieri.html. Accessed: 27 April 2010; Colin Harding, ―Obituary: Rear-Admiral Jorge Anaya:

Argentine Naval Commander,‖ The Independent, 16 January 2008; Silvana Boschi, ―La Corte, contra un

pedido de Graffigna y Lami Dozo‖ Clarín, 13 April 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/04

/13/elpais/p-01101.htm. Accessed: 27 April 2010.

57

1982 FALKLANDS WAR TIMELINE

A Chronology of Events during the Falklands Conflict of 1982

9 January British Ambassador to Argentina lodges formal protest against Argentine

scrap-metal merchant Constantino Davidoff for unauthorized landing on

South Georgia on 20 December 1981

12 January Argentine Joint Armed Forces committee begins planning military

invasion of Malvinas Islands

2 February Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher makes clear that she regards the Royal

Marine presence in Stanley as sufficient to prevent an Argentine invasion

3 February Britain renews its formal protest at Davidoff's unauthorized landing

9 February Thatcher confirms retirement of HMS Endurance

1 March British and Argentine deputy foreign ministers issue a joint communiqué

praising the ―cordial and positive spirit‖ of sovereignty discussions held in

New York

2 March Argentine foreign minister rejects the communiqué and says that Argentina

reserves the right to ―employ other means‖ if Britain continues to refuse to

cede sovereignty

5 March Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington refuses to send a submarine to patrol

off the Islands and South Georgia

6 March Hercules aircraft operated by Argentine military airline LADE, supposedly

on a mail run to an Antarctic base, lands at Stanley Airport, falsely

claiming a fuel leak, and carrying several senior Argentine officers whom

the local LADE commandant takes on a tour of Stanley and its environs

8 March Thatcher asks the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence for contingency

plans in case of an Argentine blockade or invasion of the Islands

19 March Davidoff sends 40 workmen on naval vessel Bahia Buen Suceso to

dismantle Leith whaling station on South Georgia; the workmen fail to ask

permission to land from the British Antarctic Survey base at Grytviken and

upon arrival hoist the Argentine flag; Britain lodges a formal protest

20 March Thatcher sends HMS Endurance and 24 Royal Marines from Stanley to

South Georgia

23 March Bahia Buen Suceso and 30 workmen sail from Leith

24 March HMS Endurance arrives at Grytviken but earlier instructions to remove

Argentine workmen are rescinded; Argentine naval vessel Bahia Paraiso

puts a large quantity of stores ashore at Leith together with a marine

detachment under the command of Captain Alfredo Astiz

26 March Argentine government says it will provide all necessary protection to the

workmen on South Georgia; British intelligence source in Buenos Aires

warns that an Argentine invasion of the Islands is imminent, but British

government dismisses the warning; Argentine navy sets out on scheduled

58

maneuvers with the Uruguayan fleet; Argentine junta brings forward its

invasion plans for Operation ROSARIO because of the South Georgia

crisis and the worsening economic turmoil and civil unrest;

British Ministry of Defence advises the government against a military

response

27 March Argentine missile boats Drummond and Granville sail south to join Bahia

Paraiso

28 March Argentina restates its claim to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, tells

Britain there will be no negotiations on South Georgia, cancels leave for

military and diplomatic personnel, sends stores and equipment to the naval

bases of Puerto Belgrano and Comodoro Rivadavia, and begins over

flights of Stanley; 5 Argentine warships are sighted near South Georgia;

Britain begins contingency planning for the sending of a task force to the

Islands;

Lord Carrington asks U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig to intercede

with the junta in an attempt to avoid military action

29 March UK Joint Intelligence Committee reports an invasion seems imminent and

Thatcher orders 3 nuclear submarines south to the Islands; British

submarine HMS Spartan sails south to the Islands from Gibraltar; Royal

Fleet Auxiliary Fort Austin sails south to provide support for Endurance;

New Royal Marine detachment arrives in Stanley aboard research ship

John Biscoe

30 March Daily Telegraph reports that a nuclear submarine is sailing south; Former

Prime Minister James Callaghan informs Parliament that in 1977 in

response to Argentine pressure Britain secretly sent a nuclear submarine

and two warships to the South Atlantic; Lord Carrington states that a

diplomatic solution is being pursued

31 March Argentine Military Junta takes final decision to invade the Islands on 2

April; Violent anti-government riots occur across Argentina; British

intelligence warns that the Argentine fleet is at sea heading toward

Falklands; Chief of Navy Staff Admiral Sir Henry Leach advises a crisis

meeting headed by Thatcher that Britain could and should send a task force

if the islands are invaded; Governor Rex Hunt is informed Britain believes

Argentina is planning a submarine landing on the Islands as a means of

increasing pressure over South Georgia; Royal Marines commander

Brigadier Julian Thompson is alerted to the crisis

1 April British submarine Splendid sails from Faslane; UN Security Council meets

at Britain‘s request and calls for restraint and avoidance of force; U.S.

President Reagan warns Argentine military junta leader General Galtieri

not to take military action; Governor Hunt is informed at 3:30 pm FI time

that Britain now believes a full invasion is planned and summons an

immediate meeting of government heads of department; at 7:15 pm FI time

Governor Hunt in a radio broadcast warns Islanders of impending invasion

and mobilizes the Royal Marines and Falkland Islands Defence Force;

59

Admiral Leach orders ships on exercise in the Mediterranean to prepare to

sail south

2 April Argentina launches Operation ROSARIO, bringing ships into position off

the Islands; Governor Hunt advises Islanders that Galtieri has rejected

Reagan‘s intervention, and declares a State of Emergency at 3:25 am;

Argentine special forces land at Mullet Creek ~ 4:30am, more troops land

at York Bay at 5:30 am, and Governor Hunt orders the surrender at 9:15

am—by now the whole town other than Government House is under

Argentine control; Galtieri hails the ―recovery‖ of the Malvinas, saying

Argentina had been left no option other than military action; Governor

Hunt and other Foreign Office officials and the captured Royal Marines

are forcibly evacuated by the Argentines to Montevideo; Brigadier General

Mario Menéndez is appointed governor of ―Islas Malvinas and

Dependencies‖; Stanley renamed ―Puerto Argentino‖; Royal Marines on

South Georgia attack the Argentine forces at 12:30 pm, but after inflicting

heavy damage surrender to a far-superior force at 2:30 pm; Britain orders

Argentine diplomats out of the country; Bank of England freezes

Argentine assets in Britain; Emergency cabinet meeting approves the

sending of the task force to liberate the Islands; 9 Royal Navy ships on

exercise in the Mediterranean sail south;

3 April UN Security Council passes Resolution 502 by 10 votes to 1 (with 4

abstentions) demanding immediate Argentine withdrawal from the Islands;

Argentina refuses to comply; Emergency session of House of Commons

endorses the decision to send the task force but attacks the British

Government for not foreseeing the Argentine attack; first RAF elements of

the task force deploy to Ascension Island; Argentina reinforces its troops

on South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands;

4 April British submarine HMS Conqueror sails from Faslane; Argentines occupy

Goose Green and Darwin;

5 April Aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and Invincible sail from Portsmouth with

other ships; Lord Carrington resigns and is replaced as Foreign Secretary

by Francis Pym;

7 April British Government announces it will impose a 200-mile exclusion zone

around the Islands on 26 April; Liner SS Canberra is requisitioned at

Southampton upon her return from a world cruise; Britain freezes $1.4

billion in Argentine assets held in British banks

9 April 3 Commando Brigade sails from Southampton aboard SS Canberra;

European Economic Community approves economic sanctions against

Argentina (Ireland and Italy veto)

10 April EEC sanctions against Argentina come into effect (against wishes of Italy

and Ireland)

12 April 200 mile maritime exclusion zone around the Islands declared by Britain to

prevent Argentine reinforcements/supplies reaching the Islands from the

60

mainland; British submarine HMS Spartan arrives on station off Stanley;

14 April Argentine fleet leaves Puerto Belgrano; Squadron of ships carrying Royal

Marines and special forces sent to retake South Georgia rendezvous with

HMS Endurance;

15 April British destroyer group takes up holding position in mid-Atlantic;

17 April Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse chairs conference at Ascension Island with

Admiral Sandy Woodward and 3 Commando Brigade, which sets out

detailed plans for the retaking of the Islands by force; main task force sails

south from Ascension Island;

18 April Argentine aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo returns to port with engine

trouble

20 April British War Cabinet orders repossession of Islands; SS Canberra arrives at

Ascension Island

21 April South Georgia operation begins with failed landing by SAS on Fortuna

Glacier

22 April Britain warns all British nationals to leave Argentina; British task force

arrives in Falklands waters; Galtieri visits Islands; Argentine navy

commandeers trawler Narwhal for intelligence purposes

23 April Britain warns Argentina that any military or civilian ship or aircraft

representing a threat to the task force will be destroyed

24 April RADM Woodward‘s task group rendezvous with mid-Atlantic destroyers

25 April South Georgia recaptured by Royal Marines; Thatcher tells Britain to

―rejoice‖; Argentine submarine Santa Fe is beached on South Georgia

after British attack

26 April ―Defence area‖ declared around British fleet; Thatcher declares time for

diplomacy is running out; Argentines occupy Port Howard

27 April UK Chiefs of staff present San Carlos landing proposals (Operation

SUTTON) to War cabinet

28 April Organization of American States supports Argentina‘s sovereignty claim

but calls for peaceful negotiations

29 April Task force arrives at exclusion zone; Vulcan bombers arrive at Ascension

Island;

30 April Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) is declared a Total Exclusion Zone

(TEZ), applicable to all ships and aircraft supporting the Argentine

occupation of the Islands; MG Sir Jeremy Moore flies to Ascension for

conference with Brigadier Thompson; Reagan terminates Haig‘s peace

mission, declares U.S. support for Britain, imposes economic sanctions on

Argentina, and offers Britain materiel and other aid

1 May Initial SAS and SBS landings on the Islands; first Vulcan bomber raid on

Stanley airport; Sea harrier aircraft attack Stanley airport and Goose

61

Green;

3 Argentine aircraft are shot down;

naval bombardment of Stanley begins; 114 inhabitants of Goose Green are

imprisoned in the settlement‘s Recreation Club for the next 4 weeks;

14 Stanley residents previously sent to Fox Bay East are placed under

house arrest;

2 May General Belgrano sunk 30 miles outside exclusion zone by submarine

HMS Conqueror on orders of War Cabinet who claim self-defence—368

Argentines die

3 May British forces sink one Argentine patrol boat and seriously damage

another;

Argentine navy vessels are recalled to shallow waters off Argentine

coastline out of reach of submarines; Galtieri rejects Peruvian peace plan,

citing General Belgrano

4 May British destroyer HMS Sheffield hit by an Exocet missile, and

subsequently sinks—20 die; British forces begin bombarding Argentine

positions around Stanley

6 May Two British sea harriers crash in fog; convoy including SS Canberra heads

south from Ascension Island

7 May Britain extends TEZ to 12 miles off Argentine coast; UN Sec Gen de

Cuellar discusses peace proposals in NYC with British and Argentine

delegations

8 May War cabinet dispatches landing force south from Ascension Island;

9 May Final plans drawn up for San Carlos landing site; Argentine trawler

Narwhal bombed by sea harriers, and subsequently sinks; Argentine

positions face heavy bombardment from sea and air, especially around

Stanley

10 May Task Force briefed about San Carlos landing plans; Argentine supply ship

Islas de los Estados sunk by HMS Alacrity in Falkland Sound;

Argentina declares the entire South Atlantic a war zone

12 May QEII leaves Southampton with 5 Infantry Brigade comprising Scots

Guards, Welsh Guards and Gurkhas; Argentine military junta concedes

sovereignty of the Islands isn‘t a precondition to the UN peace plan

14 May Britain‘s ambassadors to U.S. and UN summoned back to London;

Thatcher warns Britain that a peaceful settlement may not be possible;

SAS attack the Argentine base on Pebble Island and destroy supplies and

11 Pucará aircraft; 3 Argentine Skyhawk are shot down by Sea Harriers

17 May Helicopter from HMS Invincible lands SAS team in Argentina, but they

fail to destroy Argentine military aircraft at the Rio Grande base

18 May Landing force rendezvous with RADM Woodward‘s task group; San

Carlos landing plan put to full cabinet; Argentine junta rejects British

62

peace proposals

19 May War cabinet gives RADM Woodward the go ahead for landing plan;

British sea king helicopter crashes with the loss of its crew and 19 Special

Forces personnel

20 May Thatcher accuses Argentina of ―obduracy and delay, deception and bad

faith,‖ tells Commons of collapse of peace process, and orders task force

into battle; RMS St. Helena requisitioned by the Task Force

21 May San Carlos landings begin, codenamed Operation SUTTON; British frigate

Ardent sunk in San Carlos Water by air attack—22 die; HMS Argonaut

and Antrim hit by Argentine bombs, which fail to explode—2 die; 2 British

helicopters and 15 Argentine aircraft are shot down;

23 May British frigate HMS Antelope hit by Argentine bomb which fails to

explode —1 crewman dies; 10 Argentine aircraft are shot down

24 May HMS Antelope explodes and sinks when a bomb disposal officer attempts

to defuse the bomb; landing craft Sir Galahad and Sir Lancelot hit by

Argentine bombs, which fail to explode while Sir Bedivere is damaged by

a bomb exploding in water nearby; 7 Argentine aircraft are shot down

25 May British destroyer HMS Coventry sunk by air attack—20 die; British

container ship Atlantic Conveyor is abandoned with 3 vital Chinook

helicopters aboard after an Exocet missile hit sets the ship ablaze—12 die;

8 Argentine aircraft are shot down; SAS unit reconnoiters Mount Kent

26 May War cabinet questions lack of movement out of bridgehead at San Carlos;

London makes the retaking of Goose Green a priority; 2 Para sets out for

Goose Green; UN Security Council Resolution 505 instructs de Cuellar to

seek negotiated settlement

27 May 45 Commando and 3 Para set out for Douglas and Teal Inlet; SAS land in

strength on Mount Kent; Sea Harriers attack Goose Green—one plane is

shot down; British forces furious when BBC World Service report 2 Para

are advancing on Darwin; however, Argentine commander believes this is

deliberate misinformation

28 May 2 Para launch attack early in the morning, and by evening surround Goose

Green—17 British and 250 Argentines die; 5 Infantry Brigade transship

from QEII to Norland and Canberra at South Georgia; British shelling by

air and sea of Stanley recommences and continues for the next 16 days

29 May Argentines surrender Goose Green, British take 1,400 prisoners, and the

Islanders imprisoned at Goose Green by the Argentines are released;

Organization of American States condemns Britain‘s military action and

calls on U.S. to stop helping Britain—only the U.S., Chile, Columbia and

Trinidad & Tobago abstain

30 May 45 Commando takes Douglas and 3 Para takes Teal Inlet; 42 Commando

advances on Mount Kent and Mount Challenger; General Moore arrives at

San Carlos;

63

31 May 42 Commando takes Mount Kent and Mount Challenger; 19 men from the

Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre capture Top Malo

House after a firefight; Reagan asks Thatcher not to inflict too serious a

defeat on the Argentines

1 June 5 Infantry Brigade begins disembarkation at San Carlos; War Cabinet

debates further peace proposals; Britain repeats its ceasefire terms;

2 June 2 Para reaches Bluff Cove; Argentine military envoys arrive in New York

offering to surrender to the UN

3 June Versailles summit opens; Reagan‘s 5-point plan given to Britain

4 June Britain and U.S. veto Panamanian-Spanish immediate ceasefire resolution

in UN Security Council; Spain criticizes Britain‘s military action,

becoming the only NATO country not to support Britain; 2 Para occupies

the undefended Bluff Cove and Fitzroy

5 June Scots Guards depart San Carlos at night on board HMS Intrepid heading

for Fitzroy

6 June Scots Guards land at Fitzroy in early morning; Versailles summit supports

British position on the conflict; Welsh Guards depart San Carlos at night

on board HMS Fearless heading for Fitzroy

7 June A shortage of landing craft means half the Welsh Guards land at Fitzroy in

early morning but the rest return to San Carlos, which they leave again at

night on board landing craft Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram;

8 June Plymouth in Falkland Sound is hit by 4 Argentine bombs but none

explode;

Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram are bombed at Fitzroy while the Welsh

Guards are waiting to disembark—51 die including 38 Welsh Guards and

55 are seriously wounded; War cabinet asked not to reveal Fitzroy

casualties; Landing craft Foxtrot-4 sunk with British vehicles aboard;

3 Argentine Skyhawks are shot down by Sea Harriers; MG Moore finalizes

battle plan for Stanley

10 June Falklands Appeal launched under patronage of Lord Shackleton; Peru

sends 10 mirage jets to Argentina to replenish losses

11 June Battle for Stanley begins on Mount Longdon, Mount Harriet and Two

Sisters—23 paras and 50 Argentines die;

12 June 3 Para takes Mount Longdon—another 6 paras and 50 Argentines die;

42 Commando takes Mount Harriet and 45 Commando takes Two Sisters;

British destroyer HMS Glamorgan badly damaged by land-launched

Exocet missile—13 die; 5 Infantry Brigade moves into position

13 June Battle for Tumbledown, Wireless Ridge and Mount William—15 Britons

and 40 Argentines die

14 June By daylight Argentine troops are fleeing in disarray, by mid-morning

white flags flying in Stanley, and by noon British have marched to the

64

outskirts of Stanley; Thatcher informs the House of Commons at 10:15 pm

UK time that the Argentines have surrendered; BG Mario Menéndez

surrenders to MG Jeremy Moore at 9 pm FI time; 9,800 Argentines

surrender

15 June British officers are flown by helicopter to the outlying settlements to

accept the surrender of local Argentine commanders; Stanley‘s historic

Globe Store is destroyed by an Argentine arsonist; SS Canberra embarks

1,200 Argentine POWs at San Carlos

16 June SS Canberra embarks a further 1,850 Argentine POWs in Port William

outside Stanley; UK Defence Minister of State announces that the official

count of British military and civilian war dead is 255, with approximately

300 wounded

17 June Galtieri resigns

18 June SS Canberra sails from Port William with 3,046 Argentine POWs aboard

once Argentina guarantees her safe passage

19 June SS Canberra offloads the POWs at Puerto Madryn, Argentina; Britain

announces that 11,845 Argentines were captured

20 June British forces land on Southern Thule (South Sandwich Islands) —

Argentines surrender without a fight; Britain formally declares an end to

hostilities; 200 mile exclusion zone established around the Islands during

the war is replaced by a Falkland Islands Protection Zone of 150 miles;

22 June Retired Army General Reynaldo Bignone replaces Galtieri as President of

Argentina; Argentine army assumes full power, the Navy and Air Force

withdrawing from the Junta

25 June Governor Rex Hunt returns to Stanley as Civil Commissioner; SS

Canberra departs Falklands waters with 40, 42 and 45 Commando on

board

2 July Argentine war toll set at 645 dead and missing; RADM Woodward

replaced by RADM Derek Roy Reffell as Commander of the British naval

task force, and MG Jeremy Moore replaced by MG David Thorne as

Commander of the British ground forces

6 July Thatcher appoints an official commission headed by Lord Franks to

examine the causes of Britain‘s failure to prevent Argentine capture of the

Islands

8 July Argentina releases its only acknowledged British prisoner of war, an

airman shot down near Stanley in May; Thatcher announces British

government will repatriate bodies of dead British servicemen buried in the

Falklands for reburial in Britain if requested by next-of-kin

11 July SS Canberra arrives home at Southampton with 40, 42 and 45 Commando;

Britain drops its condition that Argentina formally acknowledge the end of

hostilities before repatriating the remaining prisoners of war

65

12 July USA ends trade sanctions against Argentina

14 July Final 593 Argentine prisoners of war (mostly officers and technicians)

repatriated

17 July Britain admits to falsifying press releases during the war to mislead

Argentina

22 July Britain lifts the Exclusion Zone around the Islands

26 July BG Menéndez dismissed from Argentine army

12 October Victory Parade in London

4 November UN General Assembly passes a resolution calling for a peaceful solution to

the sovereignty dispute1

1 Hastings and Jenkins, 341-43 and Conflicto Malvinas, Tomo II, Anexo 66.

66

Order of Battle: British Units in the Falklands War

Naval and Maritime Forces

Royal Navy Ships

Type Ship

Carriers

Hermes

Invincible

Guided Missile Destroyers

(County Class)

Antrim

Glamorgan

(Type 82)

Bristol

(Type 42)

Cardiff

Coventry

Exeter

Glasgow

Sheffield

Frigates

(Type 12)

Plymouth

Yarmouth

(Batch II)

Argonaut

(Leander)

Minerva

Penelope

(Batch III)

Active

Alacrity

Ambuscade

Antelope

Ardent

Arrow

Avenger

(Type 22)

Brilliant

Broadsword

Patrol Submarine

Onyx

Fleet Submarines

67

(Valiant)

Conqueror

Courageous

Valiant

(Swiftsure)

Spartan

Splendid

Amphibious Assault Ships

Fearless

Intrepid

Offshore Patrol Vessels

Dumbarton

Castle

Leeds Castle

Survey (Ambulance) Vessels

Heccla

Herald

Hydra

Antarctic Patrol Vessel

Endurance

Deep Armed Team Sweep Trawlers

Cordella

Farnella

Junella

Northella

Pict

Fleet Air Arm Squadrons Deployed

Squadron Aircraft Deployed

737 2 Wessex III helos Antrim/Glamorgan

800 12 Sea Harriers Hermes

801 8 Sea Harriers Invincible

809 8 Sea Harriers Hermes/Invincible

815 24 Lynx Helicopters various

820 9 Sea King Mk II ASW Invincible

824 7 Sea King Mk II ASW ‗O‘ class tankers

825 10 Sea King Mk II ASW San Carlos

826 9 Sea King Mk V ASW Hermes

829 12 Wasp Helicopters various

845 21 Wessex V Helos various

846 13 Sea King Mk IV CDO various

847 24 Wessex V Helos various

848 12 Wessex V Helos various

899 5 Sea Harriers Yeovilton

68

Fleet Clearance Diving Teams 1 and 3

Royal Fleet Auxiliaries

Type Name

Fleet Oilers

‗O‘ Olmeda

Olna

Tide

Tidepool

Tidespring

Rover

Blue Rover

Support Oilers (Chartered)

Pearleaf

Plumleaf

Appleleaf

Bayleaf

Brambleleaf

Fleet Replenishment Ships

Regent

Resource

Stromness

‗Fort‘

Fort Austin

Fort Grange

Helicopter Support Ship

Engadine

Landing Ships (Logistic)

Sir Bedivere

Sir Galahad

Sir Geraint

Sir Lancelot

Sir Percivale

Sir Tristram

Royal Maritime Auxillary Service

Tug

Typhoon

Mooring Vessel

Goosander

69

Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT)

Auxiliary Fleet Support

Hospital Ship

Uganda

Minesweeper

Support

St Helena

Mooring Vessel

Wimpey

Seahorse

Repair Ship

Stena Inspector

Stena

Seaspread

Salvage Tug

Irishman

Yorkshireman

Salvageman

Logistic Support

Support Oiler

Anco Charger

Balder London

British Avon

British Dart

British Esk

British Tamar

British Tay

British Test

British Wye

Eburna

GA Walker

Base Storage Tanker

(Ascension) Alvega

Base Storage Tanker

(S Georgia) Scottish Eagle

Fresh Water Tanker

Fort Toronto

Stores Ships

Refrigerated Stores

Avelona Star

Geestport

Military Supplies

Laertes

Ammunition

70

Lycaon

Naval Stores

Saxonia

Transports

A/C Transports

Astronomer

RO/RO

Atlantic Causeway

Atlantic Conveyor

Contendor Bezant

Dispatch Vessels

British Enterprise III

CS Iris

Personnel and Vehicle Transports

RO/RO

Baltic Ferry

Europic Ferry

Nordic Ferry

Norland

St Edmund

Tor Caledonia

Liner

Canberra

Queen Elizabeth II

Falklands Islands Merchant Vessels

Forrest

Monsunen

British Land Combat Forces (Major Units)

HQ 3 Commando Brigade

29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery

40 Commando, RM

42 Commando, RM

45 Commando, RM

2nd

Battalion Parachute Regiment+

3rd

Battalion Parachute Regiment+

HQ 5 Infantry Brigade

2nd

Battalion Scots Guards

1st Battalion Welsh Guards

1/7th

Duke of Edinburgh Own Gurka Rifles

Royal Air Force Aircraft Units

Squadron Aircraft Deployed

44/50/101 6 Vulcan Ascension

71

1 (F) 10 GR3 Harriers Hermes

18 7 Chinook San Carlos

(3 sunk before arrival)

55/57 23 Victor tankers Ascension

42 (TB) 5 Nimrod MR1 Mainly Ascension

120/201/206 7 Nimrod MR2 Mainly Ascension

47 Hercules C-130 Ascension

24/30/70 Hercules C-130 RAF Lyneham

10 13 VC-10 RAF Lyneham/

Ascension

202 1 Sea King Ascension2

Order of Battle: Argentine Units

Argentine Navy (Armada Argentina)

Patrol Vessel

Alférez Sobral

Comodoro Somellara

Francisco de Gurruchaga

Polar Vessel

Almirante Irizar

Bahía Paraíso

Fleet Transport

Bahía Buen Suceso

Amphibious Landing Ship

Cabo San Antonio

Destroyers

Comodoro Py

Segui

(Type 42)

Hércules

Santísima Trinidad

(Exocet-equipped)

Hipólito Bouchard

Piedra Buena

Frigates

Drummond

Gránville

Guerrico (corvette)

Cruiser

General Belgrano

Naval Transport

2 Freedman, 771-80.

72

Isla de los Estados

Fleet Tanker

Punta Medanos

Submarine

San Luis

Santa Fé

Aircraft Carrier

Veinticinco de Mayo

Coast Guard (Prefectura Naval Argentina)

Patrol Vessels

Islas Malvinas

Río Iguazú

Merchant and Other Civil Ships

ELMA Cargo Ships

Formosa

Lago Argentino

Río Cincel

Río Carcaraña

Río de la Plata

Stern Fishing Trawler

Narwal

Commercial Tanker

Puerto Rosales

Oil-rig Tender

Yehuin

Small Coasters (Owned by Falklands Island Company; taken over by Argentines for

inter-island work)

Forrest

Monsumen

Marines

2nd Marine Infantry Battalion (Batallón de Infantería de Marina 2)

Amphibious Commando Company (Compañia de Comandos Anfibios)

Tactical Divers (Buzos Tácticos)

Marine Field Artillery

Amphibious Vehicles Battalion (Batallón de Vehículos Anfibios)

5th

Marine Infantry Battalion (Batallón de Infantería de Marina 5)

Marine Machine0Gun Company (Compañia de Ametralladoras)

Marine Anti-Aircraft Unit

Marine Amphibious Engineer Company (Compañia de Ingenieros Anfibios de Marina)

73

Argentine Army (Ejército Argentino)

III Brigade

X Brigade

3rd

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería Mecanizado 3)

4th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería 4)

5th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería 5)

6th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería Compañía de Ingenieros 6)

7th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería Mecanizado 7)

8th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería 8)

12th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería 12)

25th

Regiment (Regimiento de Infantería 25)

3rd

Artillery Regiment (Grupo de Artillería 3)

4th

Air Mobile Artillery Regiment (Grupo de Artillería Aerotransportado)

601st Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Grupo de Artillería Defensa Aerea 601)

B Battery, 101st Anti-Aircraft Regiment

601st Combat Aviation Battalion (Batallón de Aviación de Combate 601)

9th

Engineer Company (Compañía de Ingenieros de Combate 9)

10th

Engineer Company Compañía de Ingenieros Mecanizado 10)

601st Engineer Company (Compañía de Ingenieros de Combate 601)

601st Commando Company (Compañia de Comandos 601)

602nd

Commando Company (Compañia de Comandos 602)

601st National Guard Special Forces Company (Compañia de Fuerzas Especiales 601 de

Gendarmería Nacional)

10th

Armored Car Squadron (Escuadrón de Exploración de Caballería Blindada 10)

181st Military Police Company (Compañía de Policía Militar 181)

Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Argentina)

1st Air Transport Group (Grupo 1 Transporte Aéro) (7 C-130, 2 KC-130, 3 707)

1st Aerial Photographic Group (Grupo 1 de Aerofotográfico) (4 Learjets)

2nd

Bomber Group (Grupo 2 de Bombardeo) (7 Canberra B-6 [Ex-RAF])

3rd

Attack Group (Grupo 3 de Ataque) (24 Pucará)

4th

Fighter Group (Grupo 4 de Caza) (12-15 Skyhawk A-4C [Ex-USN])

5th

Fighter Group (Grupo 5 de Caza) (12 Skyhawk A-4B)

6th

Fighter Group (Grupo 6 de Caza) (12 Daggers [Ex-Israeli-built Mirage V])

8th

Fighter Group (Grupo 8 de Caza) (11 Mirage IIIEA)

Helicopters (2 Chinook, 2 Bell 212)

Air Transport (civil aircraft of Aerolíneas Argentinas, Austral Airlines, and LADE semi-

military air service)

Phoenix Squadron (Escuadrón Fénix) (35 civil aircraft)

Naval Air Units

1st Attack Squadron (1 Escuadrilla de Ataque) (6 Aeromachi 339A)

2nd

Fighter and Attack Squadron (2 Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque) (4 Super Étendard)

74

3rd

Fighter and Attack Squadron (3 Escuadrilla de Caza y Ataque) (10 Skyhawk A-4B)

4th

Attack Squadron (4 Escuadrilla de Ataque) (4 Turbo-Mentor T-34C)

Anti-Submarine Squadron ( Escuadrilla Antisubmarina) (unknown number of S-2Es)

Reconnaissance Squadron (Escuadrilla de Exploración) (4 Neptune SP-2H)

1st and 2

nd Transport Squadrons (1 and 2 Escuadrillas de Sostén Logístico Móvil) (3 F-28

Fellowships and 3 Electras)

1st and 2

nd Helicopter Squadrons (1 and 2 Escuadrillas de Helicópteros) (Lynx, Alouette,

and Sea King helicopters)3

3 Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, 292-309.

75

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