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U.S.-Soviet Relations and Nuclear-Risk ReductionAuthor(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr.Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Autumn, 1984), pp. 401-414Published by: The Academy of Political Science

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U.S.-Soviet Relationsand

Nuclear-RiskReduction

JOSEPH S.

NYE,

JR.

Since the decline of detente

in

the 1970s, there has

been

an in-

crease

in

public concern about the U.S.-Soviet relations and the risk of nuclear

war. This is not the first time that public concern has been aroused, nor is

it

likely to be the last time. Managing relations with the USSR has never been easy

for

the United States.

One reason is the Soviet Union itself. The marriage of the old Russian empire

and

a universalistic ideology has produced

a

state

that sometimes looks

like a

traditional great power and sometimes like an expansionist revolutionary power.

A

repressive and secretive political system frustrates efforts to fathom Soviet in-

tentions. It is small wonder then that Americans often have divided views about

the

nature of their principal opponent. Even lifelong experts do not agree

about

the nature of the Soviet state and its goals. Although-the Soviet Union

will

re-

main an enigma, its nuclear capability remains an inescapable fact, and there is

broad public concern over whether we can manage the relationship

in

a manner

that reduces the

risk

of

nuclear war.

BASES OF SOVIET-AMERICAN TENSIONS

There are several deep-seated reasons

to

believe that tension

is

likely

to be

a

con-

tinual feature

in

the U.S.-Soviet relations. First, as Alexis

de

Tocqueville already

saw

in

the nineteenth

century,

the enormous size and resources

of the Russian

and

American nations foreshadowed

a

future

bipolar rivalry.

Then

in

1917,

the

Bolshevik Revolution added

a

layer

of

deep ideological incompatibility.

When

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR. is professor of government at Harvard University. From 1977-79 he served

as a

deputy under-secretary

n

the

Department

of

State.

He

recently

edited The

Making of

America's

Soviet

Policy

for the Council on

Foreign

Relations.

Political Science Quarterly Volume 99

Number

3 Fall 1984

401







402

|

POLITICAL SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

WorldWar IIdestroyed he multinationbalance

of power existingbefore 1939,

it left a bipolar tructure

f worldpowercentered n the U.S.-Soviet

rivalry.The

accumulation f vast nucleararsenalsovershadowing

hose of all

other nations

has consolidated hat special elationship.

roma powerpoliticspoint of view,

the probabilityof tension is

built into the

very

structure

of the

relationship.

-Nonetheless,at different

times there have been different degrees

of tension

and hostility.American ttitudes, esponding

n

part

o

Soviet

acticalmovesand

in

part to the requirements

f democraticpolitics, have tended

to alternatebe-

tweenoveremphasis

nd underemphasis

n thethreateningnature

of Soviet ob-

jectives.The resulthas been missedopportunities

nd an inconsistency

n

policy.

During he cold war,our exaggeration f Soviet

capabilitiespreventedus from

negotiatingat a timewhen our position was strong. Subsequently,he ideolog-

ical interpretation f policy and domesticpolitical

constraintspreventedAmer-

ican policy from exploiting

he diplomaticopportunities

n

the Sino-Soviet

plit

for more than a decade after it occurred

n

the late-1950s.

Conversely,

he

en-

thusiasm or detente

n

the 1960sand early

1970s ed Americanofficials to

un-

derestimate

he Soviet militarybuild-up,

to

delay

an

appropriate

esponse,

and

to

encourage

alse domestic

expectations

of future restraint

n

Soviet interna-

tional behavior.

At the same time,it is worthremembering

hat the worstoutcomehas not oc-

curred.Despitehostility, herehas also been

prudence

n

managing

he world's

first nuclear balanceof power.The destructiveness f nuclearweapons intro-

duced a disproportionbetween

most

ends

that the superpowers eek and the

major militarymeans

at their disposal.

The situationhas led to the evolutionby

a processof trial and errorof some

primitive ules for avoidingand managingcrises.

The rules are so primitive

hat

they might

morecorrectlybe called prudent

ractices. ndeed, hey beganwell

before the onset of detente.As describedby StanleyHoffmann,

one such

in-

formal

rule was the non-resort to atomic weapons....

A

second

rule was the

avoidance

of direct

militaryclashes

between he armedforces.This meant

that

theirgamesof chickenhad to end withthe retreatof one of the playersrather

than with a fight....

A

third

element was

the slow (and for America) painful

learning of limited

wars

. . .

calculated so as to limit the risks of escalation,

even

if

those constraints

made a clearcutvictory

or a rapid settlement mpossible.

Later came the beginningsof nuclear arms

control between Washington

and

Moscow.

Rudimentary

s these rules or

prudent

practicesare,they

are

signifi-

cant

if

one believes

hat a

stable

balanceof powerrequires degree

of modera-

tion

in

the actors'behavior,

as well as

military

balance.

Where

here s a

degree

of common interest

n

stability,

he balance

of

power

can

become

a

positive

game

in

which both

sides

win.

Indeed,

an international

regime a set of tacit or explicitrules and procedures maybe developed o

I

Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy

or

World

Order

(New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1978),

11.

See also

Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981),

ch.

3.







U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR-RISK

REDUCTION |

403

encourage

a

stabilizingperspective

f

long-rangerather han short-range elf-

interest.The nineteenth enturybalanceof powerand the contrast

betweenOtto

von Bismarck's estraintand the failureof his successors s often cited as an

example.

To say that the postwarU.S.-Sovietbalanceof powerhas been embedded

n

such

a regimewouldbe to stretch he point.2The ruleshavebeen

ambiguousand

not openly acceptedby both sides. In 1972and 1973,RichardNixon

and Leonid

Brezhnev ignedagreementshat seemed o codify the rules,but the ambiguities

(such

as

exceptions

for

war

of

national liberation ) ater led to

a

sense

of

cheatingand deceptionafter the MiddleEast war

of

1973and the Soviet trans-

port

of

Cubantroops to Angola

in

1975and 1976. Moreover, n agreedregime

impliesreciprocity nd flexibility n bargainingbehavioras the opponentsseek

to avoid

jeopardizing he regime.

In

U.S.-Sovietrelations,however, eciprocity

has proven o be limited n time and on issues. It is difficult to bank

good

will

from one time or issue to another n the relationship.While both

sides have a

degree

of

interest

in

preservingstability

in

the form

of

preservingnuclear

bipolarity

and

the

avoidanceof nuclear

war,

their

competition

makes

t

impos-

sible

to

agree

on the status

quo.

While

a

common

interestexists,

it

is

severely

limitedand strainedby the competitivedimension.

Anotherreasonwhythe effects of this common nterestare imited s the diffi-

culty

of

communication

etween he two societies.The

secretivenature

of Soviet

societymakesit somethingof a blackbox to us. Wesee whatcomesout of

the

box,

but cannotunderstandwhat

goes

on inside t.

It

is

difficultto

bring

evi-

denceto bearon our differences f opinion overSoviet ntentionsand the

nature

of

their nternal

processes.Obviously,

his situation

can

result

n

misperceptions,

but it

is hard to

prove

what is or is not

a misperception.

There

s

none

of

the

relative ransparencyhat characterizes elationswith most countries.This

in-

determinacy

xacerbates he

struggle

for definition and control

of appropriate

policy responses

in

the United States. American

foreign policy

making

is a

notablyuntidyprocess.

In

the wordsof EdwinS. Corwin,a greatconstitutional

scholar,the constitutionestablishesan invitation o struggle or the controlof

foreign policy.3 Thus,

it is not

surprising

that we find

it

even harder to

figure

out

what is happening

n

a blackbox.

At the same

time, ncoherence

nd

inconsistency

n U.S.

policycan

lead to So-

viet

misperceptions

nd

miscalculations f American ntentionsand concerns.

Josef Stalin must

certainly

have

been

surprisedby Harry

Truman's eaction

n

Korea o soon after the

U.S.

had declared t outside ts defenseperimeter.Nikita

Khrushchev

may also

havebeen

surprisedby

the

strength

of

John

F.

Kennedy's

reaction o the emplacement f missiles

n

Cuba after the acceptanceof defeat

at

the

Bay

of

Pigs.

Soviet

intentions

are opaque

to us

because

of

Soviet

secrecy.

2

See

Robert

Jervis, Security Regimes,

International

Organization (Cambridge,

Mass.: MIT

Press, 1982).

3

Edwin S.

Corwin, The President: Office and

Powers (New

York: New York

University Press,

1940), 200.







404

|

POLITICAL

SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

Our intentions may be opaque to them because of incoherence

and multiple

-

and

often contradictory-signals. They may be a black box to us, but we may

confuse them with white noise.

In

dealing with a stronger Soviet Union in an age of-nuclear

parity, we

will

not have as much leeway for incoherence, inconsistency, and inefficiency as in

earlier

periods. Thus, the fact that past crises have not led to nuclear

war in

nearly four decades cannot justify complacency about the future.

Nuclear-risk

reduction deserves a high policy priority.

TYPES

OF

RISK-REDUCTION

MEASURES

Efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war must start with an understanding of

the likely paths by which a nuclear war might begin. As Table 1 illustrates, there

are at least five significantly different paths by which a nuclear

war might arise.

First, conventional wars could escalate to nuclear ones. Second,

pre-emptive at-

tacks might be launched

in

desperation in times of crises

because one side be-

lieves (rightly or wrongly) that the other intends soon to strike first. Third, nu-

clear weapons might accidentally be used through malfunctions of people or

machines. Fourth, nuclear wars could be initiated by

nuclear-armed nations

other than

the superpowersor by terrorist organizations. Finally,

surprise attacks

by one superpower might be made on all or part of the nuclear

forces of the

other. For each of these generic paths, a number of possible scenarios can be

constructed.4

There are also a variety of actions that can be taken to reduce the likelihood

of

each

path leading

to

nuclear

war.

Many

of these measures

of nuclear-risk

reduction involve unilateral political and military measures to enhance deter-

rence, reduce the vulnerability of forces, reassure other nations, and

improve

procedures

and

devices

to

prevent accidents

or unauthorized use.

In

other

words,

many significant measures of nuclear-risk reduction do not require

cooperative

action with the Soviet Union. At the same

time,

as Table

1

indicates, cooperative

measures of crisis prevention and management can also help to reduce the risk

of war associated with nearly all of the paths.

Most

nuclear-risk reduction measures

share

a

common

approach.

In

contrast

to those

aspects

of arms control and disarmament that focus on reductions

of

the number of

nuclear weapons,

risk-reduction measures are more concerned

with

the prospects of

use

of such weapons regardless

of numbers.

On

the other

hand, the terminology surrounding nuclear-risk reduction measures

is

some-

times confusing,

with terms like

crisis management,

crisis

prevention,

stabilization,

and confidence

building

often used

in

overlapping ways.

Measures may vary along dimensions

of technical versus

political,

unilateral

4

This table was developed jointly

with

Graham

Allison

and

Albert Carnesale for the Avoiding

Nuclear War Project

at the John

E

Kennedy School of Government

at Harvard University.

For

elaboration of scenarios,

see Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel

Huntington,

Joseph Nye, Scott

Sagan, Living

With

Nuclear Weapons (New

York: Bantam Books, 1983), ch. 3.







U.S.-SOVIET

NUCLEAR-RISK

REDUCTION | 405

TABLE

1

Nuclear-Risk Reduction

Factors Affecting Actions to reduce

Paths to Nuclear War

Likelihood of Path Likelihood of Path

(ranked by probability)

1. Escalation of Conventional

U.S.-Soviet conventional war Crisis prevention

and

War Balance of general purpose forces management

Vulnerability of theater nuclear Maintain balance of

forces

general purpose forces

Misperception/miscalculation Reduce

vulnerability of

theater nuclear forces

Improve command/control

2.

Pre-Emption

in crisis War

appears

imminent and un- Crisis

prevention

and

avoidable management

Balance

of nuclear forces Maintain balance

of

Vulnerability of nuclear forces nu,clear forces

Misperception/miscalculation Reduce vulnerability

of

nuclear forces

3.

Accidental

or

Unauthorized Procedures and devices

designed Improve procedures

and

Use to

prevent

accidents

and un- devices

authorized use (that is, Permis- Improve communication

sive

Action Links) systems

Communication

systems

Crisis

prevention

and

management

4.

Initiation

by

a

Third

Party

Third

party

access

to

nuclear Inhibit

nuclear

prolifera-

weapons

and

delivery systems

tion

U.S.

and Soviet

presence

in

con- Crisis

prevention

and

flict areas

management

5.

Surprise

Attack Extreme

U.S.-Soviet

hostility Strengthen

incentives

Balance of nuclear forces for peace

Vulnerability

of nuclear forces Maintain balance

of

Misperception/miscalculation

nuclear forces

Irrationality

Reduce

vulnerability

of

nuclear forces

versuscooperative, lobal versus

regional;general

versus

specific,

and

so forth.

Sometimes

confidence-building

measuresare

narrowly

used to describe

pecific

technicalor-militarynitiatives.But the term can also be used morebroadly o

referto

any efforts

to

increaseconfidence

and

predictability.

Another

way

to

distinguish

ariousnuclearrisk reductionmeasures s

by

their

proximity

n

time to the causes of a

possible

nuclearwar.

(See

Table

2).

With

any complex event,

we often

distinguishprecipitating, ontributory,

nd

deep







406

| POLITICAL

SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

causes.

For

example, he

assassinationof

AustrianArchdukeFranzFerdinand

and the rigidity

of mobilizationscheduleswere precipitating

auses

of World

WarI; the competition

between

Austria-Hungarynd Russia

n the Balkansand

Serbianadventurismwerecontributory

r intermediate auses;

and the increased

rigidity n European

alliances

was a deep cause.Alternatively,

he simple meta-

phor of starting

a fire can be applied

a

match

s a precipitating ause, kindling

is an intermediate ause, and

the piling up of logs is a deep

cause.

Table2 differentiates isk-reduction

measures

n these terms.Crisis manage-

ment refers

o measures o deal with a crisis

once it has begun,

and to prevent

the precipitating

actors hat

couldleadto war.Crisisprevention

efers o efforts

to deal with intermediate r

contributory auses

hat give rise to crises

n

the first

place. Long-rangetabilization elates o effortsto deal with the basic causesof

conflict

inherent

n

the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

All three levels are

part

of

nuclear-risk eduction.At each

level, confidence-building

measuresand stabili-

zation devicescan be designed

o increase

openness

and

predictability,

o

provide

warningand

reassurance, nd

to demonstrate common interest.

In this broad

sense,

such measures

an touch the core as well

as the

marginaldimensions

of

conflict.5

We can look at the

costs,

benefitsand limits

of such measures

at each

level.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT MEASURES

The U.S. and

the Soviet Union have been

involved in the practice of crisis

managementor a long

time, at least since

the Berlin

Crisis

of

1948.

In

Berlin

(in 1948and later), Korea,

Cuba,

Vietnamand the

MiddleEast, the two super-

powers stablished

imitson theirobjectives

and means

hat

successfully

voided

the escalation

of such crises to U.S.-Soviet

war

(not

to mention nuclear

war).

As mentionedabove,however,

uch crisismanagement

endedto be

ad hoc pru-

dent

practices

rather

han

codified

rules of

procedures.

Alexander

George has listed seven

operational requirements

for

crisis

management:

*

Each side

must maintain op level

civilian control over militaryoptions.

*

The tempo

of

military

movementsmay

have

to

be slowed

to

provide

ime

for

diplomatic

exchanges.

*

Military

movements

must

be coordinated

nto

diplomatic

trategy,

ncluding

a

strategy

or termination.

*

Military ignals

of resolve

must be

consistent

with one's limited

diplomatic

objectives.

I

See J. J. Holst, Confidence Building Measures:A Conceptual Framework, Survival 25 (1983):

2. Holst defines CBMs

as arrangements

designed to

enhance ... assurance

of mind

and belief in

the trustworthiness

of states and

the

facts

they create.

He

argues

that

they

affect the

margins

of

international conflict,

they do not address

the core.

See also F. Stephen

Larrabee and Dietrich

Stobbe, eds., Confidence

Building Measures

in Europe. (New

York:

Institute

for East-West

Security

Studies,

1983).







U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR-RISK

REDUCTION 407

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408

|

POLITICAL SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

*

Moves that give the impression

of resort to

large-scale warfare, and give an

incentive for

pre-emption, should be avoided.

*

Options should be chosen

that signal a way

out of the crisis other than a

military

solution.

*

Proposals should be

formulated that are compatible with the

opponents'

fundamental

interests.6

Some of

the

requirements

are

basically prudent

practice

that can

be applied

unilaterally

for

example, standard

operating procedures (SOPs) that

ensure ci-

vilian control and integration of

military and diplomatic moves

in a single

strategy. Crisis control exercises

and

political-military games can help to develop

such SOPs.

Another useful device are SOPs that

buy time. One

suggestion is a

declaratory policy of no second

strike in response

to small scale nuclear attacks

until there has

been communication with the

enemy. 7

In

principle,

both sides

could agree to make such a

statement.

Rapid

and

reliable communication is an essential

component of crisis manage-

ment.

Recognition

of the

importance of communication

gave

rise to one of the

first formal

cooperative crisis management

procedures, the Hot Line, established

in

the aftermath of the Cuban

Missile Crisis. While

its existence is a useful safety

device, the Hot

Line has

in

practice rarely

been

used,

and

has not

really

been

a

substitute for more

formal diplomatic

communications.

Various

proposals

have been made to upgrade the Hot Line to a visual and voice link or to supple-

ment it

by

establishing

a

permanently

manned

crisis control center.

The visual

and

voice link, however, does not

guarantee better

communication

and

control

in

a crisis. On the

contrary, it may communicate

(rightly or wrongly) too much

information (such as strain or

fatigue), while making careful

formulation

of a

response more

difficult.

In

1983, the United States

proposed

a modest

upgrading

of

the Hot Line

by adding the

capability

to

transmit facsimiles.8

Another idea that has

recently

received a good deal of attention

is

the

pro-

posal by

Senator Sam Nunn

that the U.S. and the USSR establish

a

joint

crisis-

control center.9 The

value of the

jointly operated

center would

vary

with

the

crisis path or scenario that is assumed. It might be particularlyvaluable in case

of

accidental or

catalytic

use of a nuclear device

(paths

3 and

4

in

Table

1)

when

not only rapid communication

would be important, but rapid

agreement among

experts

on the nature

of

technical evidence

might

be

necessary

to avoid

misper-

ception

or

overreaction. It

might

be less valuable

in

cases

of

pre-emption

or

deliberate escalation or bluff

in

a conventional war situation

(paths

1

and

2 in

Table 1). While the permanent staff

might

have

developed ways

to

calibrate

each

6

Alexander George, Third Areas

Competition: Problems of Crisis-Management and Crisis

Prevention, in J.S. Nye, ed., The Making of America's Soviet Policy (New

Haven: Yale

University

Press, 1984).

7

This

ideas

was suggested by Robert MacNamara

in

Newsweek,

5

December 1983, 50.

8

Caspar Weinberger,Report to

the

Congress by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinbergeron

Di-

rect Communication Links and Other

Measures to Enhance Stability (Washington, D.C.: Depart-

ment of Defense, 11 April 1983).

9

Sam Nunn, Arms Control: What Should We

Do? Washington Post,

12

November 1981.







U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR-RISK REDUCTION |

409

others' reliability, it is not clear that such staff would be at high enough

a

level

to be fully informed of their governments' actions in such a situation.

In

that

case, the joint center might be ignored, or even worse,

the trust or

calibration

at the staff level might be turned to deceptive purposes by

the

higher

level

decision-makers.

-

In

short, crisis management measures for nuclear risk reduction

will

involve

a major component of unilateral domestic procedures. Some elements of such

procedures might be discussed with the Soviets. Both declaratory policy on stan-

dard procedures for response to small (possibly accidental) attacks and general

discussion of procedures for avoiding accidental and unauthorized use of nu-

clear

weapons might be discussed. Similarly, a jointly operated center might pro-

vide expertise that would reinforce rapid communication in cases of accidental

or third

party use. But

in

regard to other paths toward war

in

a crisis, most of

the requirements for crisis management listed by Alexander George would have

to be met by improved domestic procedure, good communication, and ad hoc

limits established in particular crisis bargaining situations. Or to put the point

in a slightly different way, there is a greater margin for nuclear-risk reduction in

preventing rather than managing such crises.

CRISIS PREVENTION

Crises can arise from a variety of sources. One way is through U.S. or Soviet mis-

perception

or

miscalculation of the other side's interests

and

likely responses.

Berlin, Korea, and Cuba are cases

in

point. Such crises may be averted by effec-

tive deterrence where relative stakes and

capabilities

are clear

to both sides. But

many ambiguous cases exist, the Persian Gulf for example, which is

in

the Soviet

Union's geographical back yard but

in

the Western world's economic

front

yard.

Another source

of

crisis lies

in

the

political instability

of Third World states.

With more than a

htindred

fragile polities suffering the pressures of turbulent

social change, there is almost always bound to be some government or its oppo-

nents who will search for borrowed power by involving the United States or-

the Soviet Union.10

Among

the

ways

to avert small states' conflicts

becoming

East-West crises are preventive diplomacy and cooperative diplomatic measures

with

the Soviet Union.

Yet a third source of serious crisis could arise

in

situations where

U.S. and So-

viet forces confront each other.

In

Europe, the

full

military panoply

of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

and Warsaw Pact alliances face

each

other.

In

such

circumstances,

there

is

always

some

danger

of

military accident,

mistake,

or miscalculation.

A

number of

military confidence-building

and disen-

gagement measures have been suggested to prevent such possible crises.

Military confidence-building

measures

(CBMs)

can

be a limited

but

useful

10

William Zartman, The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy

in

Third World Conflicts, in Alex-

ander George, ed., Managing US.-Soviet Rivalry (Boulder,

Colo.:

Westview Press,

1983), 362.







410

|

POLITICAL

SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

form of crisis

prevention. The 1972 Agreement on Incidents at Sea, with

its

procedures for early and regular consultation, has helped to defuse what was

once a series of minor but aggravating incidents. At the strategic level, the Stra-

tegic

Arms Limitation Talks

(SALT)

treaties

provide

for non-interference with

national technical means of verification, and the existence of the Standing Con-

sultative Committee (SCC), provides a channel to raise questions regarding pos-

sible violation

of

the SALT agreements. One could envisage further measures,

such as

prior notification of missile launches or agreements

to

establish subma-

rine stand-off zones, that might avert crises through military accidents or mis-

perceptions.

Similar

measures

at

the regional level

in

Europe, such

as mutual

notification of military maneuvers, drawbacks of armored divisions, removal of

bridging equipment, and rights to observe, are among the useful confidence-

building measures that are likely to be discussed

in

the context of the Conference

on

Disarmament

in

Europe which convened in Stockholm

in

January 1984.

If

one regards the prospects of crisis by accident or military mistake to be rela-

tively

low

in

the first

place, however,

these measures are of limited

importance.

And

skeptics warn that there are potential costs attached to some CBMs. False

confidence

may

be as

great

a

danger

as unwarranted

suspicion. Indeed,

the

popularity

of

CBMs

in

Europe may reflect a political tendency

to

substitute

them for the

detente

of

the 1970s. Richard Betts has

argued,

for

example,

that

there

have been

no

pure surprise attacks

in

this

century; rather,

the

primary

problem of surprise attack is not intelligence warning, but political disbelief. If

CBMs

contribute to

a

lulling effect, they may enhance

conditions

for

surprise.

Betts favors CBMs that force the exchange of information

with

closed societies

or

that

enhance military warning,

but is

skeptical

of those that

would curtail

NATO's preparedness.

I

The danger of building false confidence is not a trivial problem. One way to

protect against it is to divide CBMs into those with a primary military or a pri-

mary political function.

In

fact,

both

types have political effects, but

those with

a

military purpose

of

providing warning, information,

or constraint on offensive

preparations are less dangerous than those entered into solely to improve the po-

litical climate. At least

in

the former case, there is some built-in protection

against deception.

The

best

approach

to CBMs is to start with

the

militarily

useful and

hope

for a bonus effect on the

political climate,

rather than vice versa.

A

more likely source

of

crisis than attack

in

Europe

is a

conflict

in

the Third

World that the

superpowers

are

progressively

drawn into

by

local

actors.

This is

the area that the

general principles

of

1972 and 1973

were

supposed

to

affect,

but

as

argued above,

the

generality

and

ambiguity

of those

agreements

led

to

misunderstanding

rather

than

to cooperation

in

conflict

prevention.

Given the

difficulty

of

achieving

U.S.-Soviet

cooperation

in

this

area,

the first devices to

be tried should be unilateral or multilateral preventive diplomacy. This has

worked

in

situations like the Sinai, Zaire, and Zimbabwe, but not

in

other cases

such as the

West Bank,

the Horn of

Africa,

or

Namibia.

Richard

Betts, Surprise Despite

Warning:

Why Sudden Attacks Succeed,

Political Science

Quarterly

95

(Winter

1980-81):

551-72.







U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR-RISK REDUCTION |

411

Despite the difficulty of getting precision in U.S. and Soviet interpretations of

general principles, there have been

a number

of

instances when the two states

have used classic diplomatic devices of crisis prevention, such as spheres of in-

fluence, neutralization, buffer states; international forces, and so forth.

1

Ex-

amples are the treatment of Finland and

Austria

in

the

first

postwar decade; the

treatment

of

Laos

in

1961; and

of Cuba in

1962 and 1970. One could imagine

enhancing

such classic

practices

by regular

or

early

consultations

on

crisis

prevention regarding specific

situations. One could do likewise under the rubric

of

discussions

of

conventional arms

transfers

or on

the non-proliferation

of nu-

clear weapons.13

Looking at crisis prevention measures, we find as we did with crisis manage-

ment that there is a significant role

for unilateral measures. We also note that

political measures

that

deal

with

specific cases, often by classic diplomatic

means, are more valuable than

statements of general principles. Indeed, the

latter may be counterproductive unless efforts at implementation bring a more

detailed

level

of

agreement. Military

CBMs to reduce risks of accidents and mis-

takes can be useful within narrow

limits. More basic efforts to control the secu-

rity relationships have to go deeper into the nature of the overall conflict between

the

two

countries.

LONG-RUN

STABILIZATION

AND

POLITICAL

LINKAGE

Stability can have

several

meanings

in

U.S.-Soviet

relations. Political stability

is

difficult

to

agree upon

because the two

societies have

different

ideological per-

ceptions

of

what is the

legitimate

status

quo

over

the

long

run. On

the other

hand, both sides may find common prudential interests

in

interim or specific sit-

uations of

political stability

in

which

long-run questions

of

legitimacy

can be

begged. Moreover,

both

sides may

also

discover joint interests

in

crisis stability

(or

the absence of

incentive

to

pre-empt

in

a

crisis),

and

a

less

vigorous

arms

race

if

economic constraints continue to grow.

Given

the different

nature

of the

two

societies, explicit agreement

on

long-run

stabilization

will

not

be

easy.

But

given

also

that

there

is some finite

probability

of

nuclear deterrence

failing by accident

or

miscalculation,

a

strategy

for

nuclear-risk reduction cannot ignore

the possibility

of

trying

to

ameliorate the

basic

conditions of

conflict,

however

slow

that process may

be. As

argu-edabove,

the

secretive

nature of Soviet

society

and

the

disparate

nature

of

our two socie-

ties

enhances the

dangers

of

miscalculation

as

a

path

to war.

Thus,

one

of

the

goals

of

long-run

nuclear-risk reduction measures is

to

increase

the

transparency

and

predictability

in

the U.S.-Soviet

relationship

as

a means

of

reducing

the

chances of

miscalculation.

The aim is

to

poke

holes

in

the black

box.

A

second

goal of such measures is the canonical CBM goal of demonstrating the existence

12

See Paul Gordon

Lauren, Crisis Prevention

in

Nineteenth-Century

Diplomacy,

in

George,

ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet

Rivalry, 31-64.

13

See Barry

Blechman, Janne Nolan,

and Alan Platt, Negotiated Limits on

Arms Transfers:

First

Steps Towards Crisis Prevention?

in ibid., 255-284.







412

|

POLITICAL SCIENCE

QUARTERLY

of common interestsbetween

he two rivals.And as noted above in relation o

more restrictedCBMs, care must be taken to designthe measures o enhance

warningand minimizechances for deception.The pursuit

of such goals

would

involve trategies f increased ontactsand exchanges,particularly

hose that de-

velop in a climateof reciprocity.

Opennessand informationon the Soviet

side

is a key objective.There are a varietyof such exchangesand contacts;

he fol-

lowing discussiondeals with

those

in

the militarydomain.

Viewedfrom this perspective, ne of the potentiallymost

significantCBMs

and stabilizationmeasures s the processof arms control

negotiations.

All

too

often,

arms

control efforts

have been judged solely in terms of formal treaties

and reductions

n

numbersof existingweapons.But arms

controlcan also con-

tribute o the enhancement f transparency r clarityabout the adversaries' e-

havior n the relationship.

When one compares he discussions n the 1950swith

those

today

it is

evident

that

the

Soviet

Union

has

gradually

come

to

disclose

more information.Cases in point are: provisions uch as

non-interference ith

nationaltechnicalmeans;regular

meetingsof delegationsand of the SCC; ac-

ceptance

of

cooperativesurveillancemeasures such as

in

the unratified

1976

Treatyon PeacefulNuclear

Explosions);and provisions or

the exchangeof in-

formationand establishment f common data bases.

In

fact,

if

one wished o

enhance he role of armscontrolas a CBM or stabili-

zationmeasure, nemightsupplementheexistingnegotiationsby incorporating

them

in

a broader ramework f

nuclearstabilization

alks.

14

Such an approach

wouldhaveseveral racks.Talkswoulddeliberately e designed

o enhance rans-

parency

and communicationratherthan to reach reductions.

They might

in-

clude,

for

example,regularmeetings

between he chairman

of

the

Joint Chiefs

of

Staff and his Sovietcounterpart.

Theywould not necessarily eek a particular

agreement,

but would discuss specific problems relating to stability-

and

confidence-buildingmeasures,

such as occur

in

the context

of

currentagree-

ments for controlling

naval ncidentsat sea.

In

fact, this might be a significant,

if

less obvious, role for a joint crisis-notification enter.

Officially,the center

would coordinateU.S. and Soviet reactions f a nuclearweapon wereexploded

by

a

terroristgroup

or a ThirdWorldcountry.

But

it might

also involve he ex-

change

of information

more generally

n

relation o stabilization

measures.

Yet another track

in

the nuclear-stabilization

ramework

could

consist

of

seeking

limited

agreement

where

possible.

We have seen

examples

of

this

ap-

proachrelating o physicalareas: encingoff Antarctica

rom the armsrace,

for

example,

or

fencing

off the seabedsand outer

space

from

nuclear

weapons.

We

have also seen it

in

certain

technologies. Whatever he merits of particular

proposals the list

can be

readily multiplied

the

larger

point

is that formal

armsreduction alks areonly part of the repertoire f arms controlwhenap-

proached

as a

strategy

or nuclear-risk eduction.

14

See J. Nye,

The Future of

Arms

Control,

in

Barry Blechman, ed., Rethinking

the US. Stra-

tegic Posture (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger

Publishing Company, 1982), 223-46.







U.S.-SOVIET

NUCLEAR-RISK

REDUCTION |

413

Naturally, here

are certain- isks

to approaching

rms control as

a CBM

or

stabilizationmeasure.One danger s that public opinion in democracieswould

be lulled

nto complacency

y the

comforting xistence

of the

process,

andwould

underinvest

n defense.The effect

of SALT

n

the 1970s

s sometimes

cited as

an

example.

On the otherhand, this

lullingeffect can be exaggerated.

U.S.defense

budgets

declinedin the

1970s as a result

of changing domestic

priorities

and

reaction

o the Vietnam

War (well

beforeSALTI),

and the debate over

SALT

II

probably

accentuated

attention

to defenseissues.

In any case, overall

Soviet

political

behavior

was probably

more important

n

its effects

on U.S. opinion

than the existence

of arms

controltalks.

Recent events have

shown

that arms

control

may be a domestic

political necessity

n democracies.

f

so,

it

can be

better designedto fill its role as a nuclear-risk eductionmeasure.

There

will always be

two types of

linkage between nuclear-stabilization

measuresand

U.S.-Soviet

relationsgenerally.

One type is

inherent:

whetherwe

wantto or not,

our democracy ould

not ignore

a bloody invasion

of Poland or

Iran.

The othertype is tactical,

n which

we choose to

make an explicit

connec-

tion.

The latter

s a questionof

degreeand

of

choice.

Theremay be

a situation

in

which, if we

had a richer

menuof stabilization

measures,

we would

be more

flexible

n

some

linkagepossibilities

nsteadof beingcompelled

o put pressure

on

only

a

major

arms-control

negotiation.

It is interesting

o

note that

the

Reaganadministrationcame into office committedto the idea of tactical

linkage,but seems

argely

o haveeschewed

t in practice. n any

case, predicting

the effect

of a worsening

limateof relations

on various

risk-reduction

measures

will

dependon

how an administration

hooses

to respond

n

light of publicper-

ceptions

of

particular

Soviet

behavior,

he reaction

of

allies,

and of the existence

(or

absence)

of other

policy

instruments

or

response

o Soviet

behavior.

Generally,

n

improving

limate

will

help

new initiatives,

and a

worseningpo-

litical

climate will make

new measures

difficult to

initiate. Nonetheless,

f the

U.S. is publicly

perceivedo be more

at fault, the

worsening limate

may ncrease

popular

demands o enhance

certain

existing

tabilization

measures.Thus,

in the

areaof crisismanagement,deterioratingelationsmight ncreasepressureo up-

grade

he hot

line

or to

establish

a

crisis

control

center.

But

the same

conditions

may

make it difficult to

negotiate he details

of a

new initiative. n the

domain

of

crisisprevention,

deteriorating

limateneed

not interfere

with

ad

hoc

classic

measures f averting

rises.

Afterall, these

earlyformsof crisis

prevention rigi-

nated

at the heightof the

cold waras a result

of the prudential

oncerns

outlined

at

the

beginning

of

this

article.On the other hand,

new initiatives

n

consulta-

tions

or militaryCBMs

for

crisis

prevention

would be

difficult to

develop

n a

climate

of deteriorating

elations.Roughly

he

same pattern

could

be

expected

to be true for long-range tabilizationmeasures.Domestic concern mightlead

to

pressures

o initiate

arms

control

talks,

but mistrust

wouldprobably

make

their

completion

moredifficult.

At the

same

time,

the

willingness

o

initiatenew

exchanges,

tabilization

alks,

or

cooperative

measures,

s

likely

to

be morediffi-

cult

under deteriorating

elations.







414

1

POLITICAL

SCIENCE QUARTERLY

CONCLUSION

Thebasicconflictbetween he UnitedStatesandthe SovietUnion has deep roots

and will persistfor a long time. Duringthat time,

therewill be some dangerof

a breakdown f

deterrence.The paths areoutlined in Table1. The most

likely

path

is

thrbughmiscalculation f intentionsand

escalation n an areaof ambig-

uous interests n

the ThirdWorld.A somewhat ess probable,but still significant,

path

to

breakdown

would be throughaccident, mistake,or chaos surrounding

unforeseenevents

in situations where the two

military forces confront each

other.Furthern

the future,and somewhat ower n

probability, s the prospect

of

catalytic

nuclearwar startedby a third party. Least likely of the paths is a

pure 'boltout of

the blue surpriseattack.

A

varietyof

measurescan be taken to reduce

the risk of nuclearwar along

each of these

paths. Manyof the confidencebuildingmeasures hat stressearly

warning (such as notification of multiple

missile launches) are aimed at the

lowestprobability

paths.

Nonetheless,

f well designed, hey can havesome mili-

tary value and a

largerpolitical symbolic value. Other measures,such as im-

provingphysicalcommunications like upgrading

he Hot Line) or sharingand-

evaluating nformationabout thirdparty

explosions(such

as

joint crisis center)

are

useful in

dealing'

with

managinga crisis hat hasalreadybegun,butmaynot

be

very significant

n

preventing rises

from

arising n

the first

place. Moreover,

they must be carefullydesignedto minimize heir use for deception.

Because hey

often deal with less probable

paths to nuclearwar,or only with

precipitating

ather han deepercauses, CBMs

are often treatedas marginal

n

value and priority.

t would be a mistake o ignore even such modest improve-

nients

in

lowering

nuclearrisks. But it would

be

equally mistaken

o

constrain

a

strategy

or

nuclear-risk eduction

o

measures

hat

deal

with

the

least likely

paths (in Table1),

or

only the precipitating ather han the

deeper

causes

(in

the

terms of Table

2). A serious strategyfor nuclear-risk eductionshould work

across

the whole

range

of

paths

and

proximity

of

causes. Those measures

hat

deal with

dangers

of miscalculation etween

a

closed and

on

open society

should

not

be

neglected

simply

because

they

are

more

political

and less technical.On

the

otherhand, particularly

f

there s a

climate

of

deteriorating elations,

t

may

be easierto

start with more limited

and technical

measures.But measures uch

as

the joint

crisis

controlcenter

should

be designed

with

an

eye

to their

potential

and

perhaps ubsequent

ffect on broaderand

longer-term

onfidence

building

measures.Similarly, rms

control and

other negotiations

should be

designed

o

give long-term

ransparency nd communication onsiderations s prominent

a

priorityas the signingof formal arms-reduction

reaties.

In

this

broad sense

of

the

term,

CBMs and

stabilization

measurescan

play

a

significant

role

in

a

strategyof nuclearrisk reduction.*

*

This article was

originally prepared

for a

project

at

the Georgetown University

Center

for

Stra-

tegic and International Studies.

Documents

Nye, J. S. (1984) - US-Soviet Relations and Nuclear-Risk Reductionpdf