Obama Called a Moron

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012

lled a Moron at Phone Security

M-220 mail list: http://groups.google.com/group/tscm-l2006?hl=en_US

6 Jan 2012 15:40:24 -0500

006[at]googlegroups.com

SCM-L] {5984} POTUS telephones

ry nice collection of dozens of photos of current POTUS telephones in use on John Young's Cryptome site. The trained

interesting TSCM-related items.

ome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/0015.htm

6 Jan 2012 17:00:07 -0500

es M. Atkinson" <jmatk[at]tscm.com>


: [TSCM-L] {5986} POTUS telephones

se are CISCO IP phones, or Avaya telephone sets.

mplex instrument with some simply lovely security holes that an eavesdropper can exploit.

cisco.com/en/US/products/ps9748/index.html

cisco.com/en/US/products/ps8538/index.html

cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/ps5440/index.html

cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/index.html

se phones are also Lucent MLS of Definite phones (all an eavesdroppers paradise).

to have to mention this, but in the following image. You will notice the moron who is using a cell phone right next to a

http://cryptome.org/donations.htm


http://groups.google.com/group/tscm-l2006?hl=en_US



http://cryptome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/0015.htm


http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps9748/index.html




http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/ps5440/index.html


http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/phones/ps379/index.html











ome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/pict52.jpg

Moron using cell phone in close proximity to a secure telephone:


http://cryptome.org/2012-info/obama-phones/pict52.jpg








place a concentrated RF signal transmitter in close proximity to a piece of cryptographic gear (like a STU or STE) the R

enough to intermix with the RF or magnetic signals and create a third signal. This is most valuable with cryptographic

hat used cables that was not in conduit as the cable (seem in these pictures) provides a high threat access point where all

n be caused if a cell phone is brought within 8-12 feet of a STU, or 16+ feet of a STE. You will notice that the moron ho

well within those distances.

ng image just proved what a utter moron this guy is, and remember who is is:







he is in a STE, in secure mode, and the STE (unencrypted voice path) is draped over a live RF transmitter.

Mr. President, but you sir are a fscking moron, just an utter moron.

with sharp eyes will also notice the profoundly sloppy jobs of TSCM that is being done on these phones as well, and how

uirements for cables are not beign observered, but then that is the least of their probelms... their boss obviously does not

they.



... no seriously, WTF?

tkinson

nd Sr. Engineerda Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"

linkedin.com/profile/view?id=15178662

nd Group

m.com

tscm.com/

803

6 Jan 2012 17:53:00 -0500006[at]googlegroups.com


ves at the highest levels expected to be TSCM, COMSEC, and TEMPEST experts who possess detailed technical knowl

ve related experience?

why would any top executive have any need to hire experts in those fields? Does JMA call his executive clients (who ar in those fields as he obviously is) "fucking morons?" That doesn't seem like an effective business practice to me.

executive in the photo wasn't briefed by his experts on the finer points of proper COMSEC--such as not to use a cell phe wasn't, then perhaps those experts are to blame, not the executive. Or maybe there's other protections in place which p

eing a COMSEC problem. There is equipment in those photos that probably none of us know the workings of...

6 Jan 2012 18:19:17 -0500




s.

hat he can not use a cellphone within X feet of a STU, STE, or security communications media because he can read the

he matter, and has been briefed by the technical advisors until they were blue in the face, but he does not care, he likes hi

ause it makes him a more effective leader)

er hires me to tell them about the problem, and I tell them about it, write numerous white papers on the subject for them,

e the risk for them by recovering classified information, and even the CIK form a STU using only a nearby cell phone, a

o use proper communications security, and abide by stand-off distances (the space between the secure phone and the cell

n I will have no problems explain that they are a moron to their face (usually in private, but still).

nly to watch the video of my testimony before Congress on related matters to see that I tend not to couch my words whe

http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=15178662


http://www.tscm.com/






tional security matters like this.

nt of the United States is a fucking moron, but given the last pool of candidates he is less of a moron, then the other mor

at the time. But still, he is a moron, and an arrogant one at that.

6 Jan 2012 18:42:24 -0500



w this for a fact? I would think POTUS has more important things to do than "read the white papers" about

rogant? Relative to whom?

6 Jan 2012 19:17:28 -0500




white paper, and the paper has been repeatedly briefed to him by the DCI in his Daily Presidential Briefing. He has also

, but it has not dissuaded his cell phone mis-use. Several DCI staffers who prepare the PDB have assured me that the DC

ncluded issue several times in the PDB, and POTUS just does not care.

s known, the threat has been demonstrated, the threat has been replicated by others, it is a known and confirmed weakne

care, not even slightly.

dents like to ride around Dallas in open top limos, other are addicted to their cell phones... neither tend to remain in offic

smarten up, as he is risking national security and sabotaging international diplomacy (easily screwed up when secure

tions are intercepted).

7 Jan 2012 11:44:11 -0500


: Your Comments on Prez Phones

me

my permission to publish anything that you see on the TSCM-L list so long as I am the originator of the post.

my permission to publish the information that I published about the Presidents phone, and the comments I made in regard



ed not to do it.

ething about STU/STE and cell phones

tscm.com/stu.html

HIJACK, NONSTOP, and TEAPOT Vulnerabilities A STU-III is a highly sophisticated digital device; however, they s

cular nasty vulnerability to strong RF signals that if not properly addressed can cause the accidental disclosure of classif

, and recovery of the keys by an eavesdropper. While the unit itself is well shielded, the power line feeding the unit may

n ground (thus negating the shielding).

ption equipment is located within six to ten wavelengths of a radio transmitter (such as a cellular telephone, beeper, or t

F signal can mix with the signals inside the STU and carry information to an eavesdropper. This six to ten wavelengths i

as the "near field" or the wave front where the magnetic field of the signal is stronger then the electrical field.

l COMSEC equipment should be kept out the "near field" by a factor of at least 2.5 to 3 times to get it outside of the fiel

oint. Simply put, there needs to be a "danger zone" or exclusion zone around any and all COMSEC gear 2.5 to 3 times th

ce, or 16 to 30 times the longest signal wavelength (the lower the frequency the longer the wavelength).

gth" is inversely proportional to frequency being used which means that an 800 MHz cellular phone (near a STU) prese

ct threat that a higher frequency PCS phone operating in the 1.7 GHz region. On the other hand a PCS or CDMA telepho

eater spectral density and far more transitions which allows an eavesdropper to corelate on the signal with more precisio

ve to consider the amplitude of the signals as well as the "danger zone" created by the transition point or radius of the ne

o 3). When any RF signals inside the "danger zone" exceed -50 dBm (or -77 dBm in some cases) there is still a problem

cryptographic equipment is some distance from the actual transmitter, cellular phone, pager, etc. These relatively high si

ve -50 dBm or -77 dBm) are actually strong enough that they create secondary fields or signals when they encounter thement case or any other conductive or non-linear element. This is called the "saturation effect", and if it is not properly a

n the cryptographic equipment put at risk of disclosing secrets. Typically the ambient RF environment near any cryptogr

hould be well below -80 dBm and in some cases well below -110 dBm. Fields of this strength are common near broadca

ch as FM or television transmission towers or cellular/PCS towers. If you have a concern of this nature then you should

essional and schedule an evaluation of the RF in the vicinity of where you will be using your encryption equipment.

thing to remember in all of this is that the ciphering key is where all the magic is at, and that the eavesdropper will typic

phering circuit (or "Scrambler") to obtain the secret key. Sure they are interested in the material being scrambled by the

ic system, and they will also be interested in the inner workings of the phone, but it is obtaining the secret ciphering key

tant to the spy. An encryption box or cryptographic device may only be classified secret, and yet the keying material is t

he keying material is far more sensitive then the box itself, and must be protected with much greater care.

d note, it should be mentioned that the ciphering key is actually of a fairly small length, and that is even if a very small se

promised the eavesdropper's may be able to reconstruct it in whole (depending on what segment they get). In some cases

ering key can be broken by obtaining a small fragment the cipher which can be "snatched from the airwaves in less a ten

f a second" (if the cryptographic ignition key is loaded when in the presence of a cellular phone or strong RF field). Once

to the cryptographic device the amount of time required to reconstruct the key is significantly larger, but not at all prohib

the eavesdropper is only looking for a few bits of data (the payload of the key), and that this small number of bits can be

by an external RF source like a cellular phone as a highjack requires an absolute minimum of bandwidth.

gnal of interest is of extremely narrow bandwidth, and the "illuminating" signal can be easily correlated to the "signal of

eavesdropper can be a considerable distance away from the encryption device and still perform the highjack (called "co

http://www.tscm.com/stu.html





h can be well over 40 dB). This assumes that someone using the encryption device has a cell phone or other RF device o

while not on an active call is still checking in with the base station for status updates on a regular basis. Without this

gain" the intercept may only be feasible within a few feet, but with it; the eavesdropper can be 500 and even 1500 feet a

that the most valuable "item of interest" is not directly the clear text communication itself, but the key used to protect the

tion. Once the eavesdropper has the key, then the communication itself would be targeted and exploited. You must protemes.

r Motorola iDen phones based on a TDMA or "Time Domain" signal presents a really nasty threat as the cell phone is co

pecific predictable time slice, and basically illuminates the STU and turns it into a strobing lighthouse that will seriously

e classified information. If a NEXTEL is present within 12-15 feet of a STU-III (when it goes secure or a CIK is loaded)

nformation passed though it should be considered compromised. The STU should always be located in an area called an

one, and cellular phones, pagers, beepers, and other RF devices should be kept outside of a stand-off zone of at least 15-

good practice).

wasn't confusing enough; portable Inmarsat stations also present a similar problem, but only if the STU is located in fro

antenna or within the side lobes of the signal (about 45 degrees off the center axis of the antenna).

ay to deal with this is to never have a cellular telephone or pager on your person when using a STU, or within a radius of

n any direction) from an operational STU (even with a good ground). If the STU is being used in a SCIF or secure facili

pposed to be an excluded item, but it is simply amazing how many government people (who know better) forget to turn

e entering controlled areas and thus cause classified materials to be compromised.

If you have a powered up NEXTEL on your belt and you walk within 12 feet of a STU-III in secure mode you have jus

ed the classified key.

where the STU is being used on a cell phone or satellite phone your best option is to keep the phone in analog mode (a Slocate the STU a good 6-12 feet away from the antenna. In the case of an Inmarsat terminal simply keep the STU BEHI

at least 10-15 feet (this is why Inmarsat terminals have long cables for the antenna). If you can obtain a digital Inmarsat

you can get a very high quality connection, but the equipment is fairly costly, the terminal is quite large, and the digital s

sive.

should a STU-III be operated in the presence of an RF field that exceeds -105 dBm for any signal with less then 30 kHz

ndwidth. In the case of a signal which the occupied bandwidth exceeds 30 kHz the RF levels should not exceed -138 dB

e and Security are Always Inversely Proportional.

Atkinson, 1982

e further unclassified background on the matter (the data on the matter was in my written testimony).

tscm.com/DeepWaterDooDoo/

tscm.com/DeepWaterDooDoo/JamesAtkinsonwrittenTestimony.pdf

in a TEAPOT and HIJACK Exploits

e TEMPEST and TSCM fields of study there is also an area of our field that deals with unmodified or quasi-modified eq

which interact with each other. This is the case where in effect a classified signal or classified information is accidentall

http://www.tscm.com/DeepWaterDooDoo/


http://www.tscm.com/DeepWaterDooDoo/JamesAtkinsonwrittenTestimony.pdf






nto an unclassified signal. Thus, the unclassified signal carrying the classified data with it is accidentally transmitted a

e distance allowing for eavesdropping by those who should not possess the information. This is usually the result of TE

ot being rigorously followed during equipment design, installation, and maintenance.

gation, study, and control of intentional compromising emanations from telecommunications and automated information

hat was created, provoked, or induced by a spy is known by the code name of “TEAPOT”. An example of this would beof a rack of two way radios need a secure telephone, or by installing RED cable near to a BLACK cable. This can also i

ns to software, to slight breaches to the configuration of equipment.

e of this would be a case where a cable, which contains only unclassified radar, navigation, or communications signals, is

, which carries highly classified information. On a maritime vessel an example of an unclassified signal would be the V

os, the unencrypted HF (shortwave) radio communication systems, and sections of the radar and IFF systems. Should an

or equipment be placed near the classified systems an eavesdropper could intercept the classified information that was r

-of the unclassified signals.

ample of this would be a warship that downloads classified spy satellite imagery through the onboard satellite communic

m is that the installer of the classified system has not properly installed the system that creates considerable TEMPEST p

se signals to leak off the ship a short distance. This is further complicated by several cables which do not carry classified

but which pass in close proximity to the classified cables.

unclassified cable, perhaps being a high power antenna link the classified information can now leak out of the ship and b

by spies from dozens, if not hundreds of miles distant.

of James M. Atkinson, President and Sr. Engineer, Granite Island Group 9 of 168

House Committee on Transportation and InfrastructureGuard Budget and Oversight Hearing, April 18, 2007

er related information in the above PDF file, all of which you have permission to publish on Cryptome as you see fit.

egards,

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Obama Called a Moron