Obama’s Dualistic Grand Strategy in Asia:

Cooperative Security and Primacy

by

James Edward Peterson

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2013

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

James Edward Peterson 2015

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Summer 2015

ii

Approval

Name: James Edward Peterson

Degree: Master of Arts (Political Science)

Title: Obama’s Dualistic Grand Strategy in Asia: Cooperative Security and Primacy

Examining Committee: Chair: Laurent Dobuzinskis, Associate Professor

Alexander Moens Senior Supervisor Professor

Douglas Ross Supervisor Professor

Paul Evans External Examiner Professor, Institute of Asian Research and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia

Date Defended/Approved: May 27, 2015

iii

Abstract

This thesis examines the grand strategy behind U.S. President Barack Obama’s

rebalance to Asia. Many scholars have argued that the rebalance does not constitute a

grand strategy. This thesis argues that the rebalance is motivated by a grand strategy,

one that combines cooperative security and primacy. The thesis explores what American

actions have entailed in numerous military and non-military dimensions between 2009

and 2014. The central focus of America’s military, economic, and diplomatic initiatives in

Asia is China and its potentially destabilizing role in the region. While there are a host of

cooperative features in the rebalance, primacy is the primary motivator, as most of the

military and non-military elements are aimed at the continuation of U.S. global leadership

and the existing international order. The analysis reveals that the Obama

administration’s policies in Asia have been relatively consistent throughout Obama’s

presidency.

Keywords: Rebalance; Grand Strategy; Obama; Asia; China

iv

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mom and dad, Yumi and Robin, and my brother, Billy, who

have always supported me.

v

Acknowledgements

I am proud to have had Dr. Moens as my supervisor. Dr. Moens has guided me not only

as an academic mentor, but as a role model and person. I am grateful to Dr. Logan

Masilamani, my dad, and friends (Jamie Horncastle, Khash Hemmati, Sukhjit Chohan,

and Jennifer Cooper) for their helpful suggestions and edits throughout various drafts, as

well as their encouragement, in the writing process.

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Table of Contents

Approval .............................................................................................................................ii Abstract ............................................................................................................................. iii Dedication .........................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... v Table of Contents ..............................................................................................................vi List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................... vii

Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 1

Chapter 2. Grand Strategy .......................................................................................... 7 2.1. The Concept of Grand Strategy ............................................................................... 7 2.2. Obama’s Rebalance and Grand Strategy .............................................................. 10

2.2.1. Selective Engagement .............................................................................. 13 2.2.2. Cooperative Security ................................................................................. 15 2.2.3. Primacy ..................................................................................................... 16

Chapter 3. The Rebalance ......................................................................................... 20 3.1. Objectives and Background ................................................................................... 20 3.2. Six Components ..................................................................................................... 28

3.2.1. Alliances .................................................................................................... 28 3.2.2. Partnerships .............................................................................................. 36 3.2.3. Multilateral Regional Institutions ............................................................... 47 3.2.4. Economic Engagement ............................................................................. 55 3.2.5. Force Projection ........................................................................................ 59 3.2.6. Democratic Values and Human Rights ..................................................... 67

Chapter 4. Analysis of Strategic Rationale ............................................................. 71

Chapter 5. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 87

References .................................................................................................................. 90

vii

List of Acronyms

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial

ADB Asian Development Bank

ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ARF DiREx ARF Disaster Relief Exercises

ASB Air-Sea Battle

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN+3 ASEAN members plus China, Japan, and South Korea

BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty

BRICS Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

E3 Expanded Economic Engagement

EAS East Asian Summit

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EU European Union

FTA Free Trade Agreement

G2 Group of 2

G8 Group of 8

G20 Group of 20

IMF International Monetary Fund

LMI Lower Mekong Initiative

MRC Mekong River Commission

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

PLA People’s Liberation Army

RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

S&ED Strategic and Economic Dialogue

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEACAT Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training

TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia

viii

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defence

TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership

TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UN United Nations

UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

WTO World Trade Organization

1

Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis examines the grand strategy behind American President Barack

Obama administration’s foreign policy “rebalance” (or “pivot”) to Asia between when he

first entered office and the end of 2014.1 Upon his inauguration in 2009, Obama felt that

American resources were heavily overinvested in the Middle East, and that U.S. foreign

policy had to become more balanced across various regions.2 The drawdown from the

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan gave Obama the opportunity to shift newly available

military, economic, diplomatic, and political attention and resources to Asia.3 In 2013,

Tom Donilon, then National Security Adviser, declared the overarching objective of the

rebalance was “to sustain a stable security environment and a regional order rooted in

economic openness, peaceful resolution of disputes, and respect for universal rights and

freedoms.”4 This ambition necessitates American leadership in the region to encourage

and uphold the principles of the current international system. The “rebalance” was

articulated most clearly by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a 2011 Foreign

1 Within the American rebalance, geographically, Asia generally includes Northeast and

Southeast Asia whereas Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East have separate American policies geared towards them. However, India, part of South Asia, is also factored into America’s rebalance.

2 Michael McDevitt, “America’s New Security Strategy and its Military Dimension,” Global Asia 7, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 15.

3 Ashton B. Carter, “The U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia,” U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., April 8, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1765 (accessed September 11, 2014).

4 Thomas E. Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, New York, Asia Society, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisory-president-united-states-a (accessed July 15, 2014). Obama’s former National Security Adviser, Tom Donilon, has been recognized widely for his experience and activism on the American rebalance to Asia during his time in office. This contrasts with Obama’s first National Security Adviser, General James Jones, who directed most of his attention to the Middle East. Jones’s wisdom and military experience was meant to reflect a contrast with Obama’s youth and idealism.

2

Policy article titled “America’s Pacific Century.”5 Clinton stated that America’s

commitment to the Asia-Pacific region was essential to sustaining long-term prosperity

and security at home and abroad.6 She outlined six key areas for increased American

engagement in Asia: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening working

relationships with emerging powers; engaging with regional multilateral institutions;

expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and

advancing democracy and human rights.7 This would include signalling to Southeast

Asia its importance to America’s interests, an area that had been traditionally

downplayed in U.S. foreign policy. The rebalance also emphasizes the economic and

strategic connections between the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean, another

undervalued link in historic American engagement in Asia.8

Initially the thesis outlines the concept of grand strategy and characterizes the

grand strategic approaches that scholars have adopted to describe Obama’s approach

to Asia.9 Grand strategies are frameworks that seek to align a country’s foreign policy

resources and goals. They provide leaders with coherent ideas and purposeful

objectives. Decision-makers conducting grand strategy are not simply reacting to crises.

Their long-term vision does not radically alter when problems arise. Yet, grand strategy

is a continuous process whereby the means can change given changes in

circumstances. While there are many interpretations of the concept, grand strategy

5 The term “pivot” can be used interchangeably with “rebalance.” Hillary Clinton popularized the

use of the term “pivot” and continues to utilize it, along with President Obama, but most of the State Department has distanced itself from the term. Donilon has stated that the term “pivot” is too sharp and inaccurately signals an abandonment of European allies and the Middle East. The January 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance was the first statement to utilize the term “rebalance.” See Michael J. Green and Zack Cooper, “Revitalizing the Rebalance: How to Keep U.S. Focus on Asia,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 28.

6 Hillary R. Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy 189 (2011): 57. 7 The term “engagement” is commonly employed in different ways. In this case and throughout

this paper, it is being utilized by the author to show the disposition of the United States. American officials use it to describe a “process as well as a goal.” See David H. Capie, Paul M. Evans, and Akiko Fukushima, Speaking Asia Pacific Security: A Lexicon of English Terms with Chinese and Japanese Translations and a Note on the Japanese Translation, Working Paper (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University, 1998), 43.

8 Phillip C. Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.-China Relations and Regional Security,” Strategic Forum 281 (August 2013): 2.

9 Grand strategy work is done primarily by American authors.

3

increasingly encompasses a wide range of non-military and peacetime aims. Grand

strategies such as selective engagement, cooperative security, offshore balancing, and

primacy have been outlined as representative of Obama’s grand strategy. While there

are challenges defining each of these grand strategies, American grand strategy

theorists have a tendency to conflate distinct approaches such as cooperative security,

collective security, and collective defence into one grand strategy of cooperative

security. Nevertheless, most scholars in the field of grand strategy have argued that the

rebalance does not amount to a grand strategy. They see the Obama administration as

reactive to events in Asia, and around the world, employing sparse high-level strategic

thinking on foreign policy.

However, this thesis argues that the rebalance does constitute a grand strategy.

The scope of the rebalance suggests an overall strategic rationale that is most

accurately called “cooperative primacy,” a term that Professor Michael Evans from the

Australian Defence College coined, combining elements of cooperative security and

primacy.10 The thesis describes the strategic goals and underpinning of the rebalance. It

demonstrates how the principles within the rebalance were conceived even prior to

Obama taking office. The rebalance entails a farsighted view of how the United States

should refocus on and engage in the Asia-Pacific region. It involves a far more

comprehensive strategy than just a military shift. Economic, diplomatic, and institutional

mechanisms play a major role in the rebalance. The Obama administration recognizes

the increasing fundamental importance of Asia, especially China, to America’s economic

well-being and to regional and global stability. Part of this attention to Asia was also

motivated by Obama’s own upbringing in Jakarta, Indonesia, where he lived from the

ages of six to ten years old. Another aspect was the perceived vitriol with which much of

the rest of the world held towards the United States following the Bush presidency;

Obama’s administration undoubtedly wanted to revamp America’s image abroad.

At the same time, China made a series of highly assertive moves in 2009 and

2010 that led to greater demands from Southeast and Northeast Asia for a firmer

10 Michael Evans, “American Defence Policy and the Challenge of Austerity: Some Implications

for Southeast Asia,” Journal of Southeast Asian Economies 30, no. 2 (August 2013): 175.

4

American commitment to maintaining peace in the region.11 These included Chinese

Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s outburst against its “small” neighbours and the United

States at the 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF)

claiming China’s sovereignty over most of the South China Sea (known as the West

Philippine Sea in the Philippines and the East Sea in Vietnam), China’s implicit support

for North Korea following its multiple provocations that killed many South Korean

civilians, and China’s harsh banning of rare earth exports following a minor incident with

Japan in the East China Sea.12 Diplomatic moves by China’s government also upset

many members of the European Union (EU), and while China toned down its diplomacy

in 2011, this period from 2009-2010 has become known as China’s “year of

assertiveness.”13 China’s concept of its “peaceful rise” was tarnished, as much of the

world became more uncertain about China’s intentions. The rebalance is thus also

driven by an American desire to reassure its allies and partners in Asia in the face of a

rising China.

Examining the six areas that Hillary Clinton outlined in the rebalance, the thesis

next focuses on what level of follow-through has been achieved in each area by the

Obama administration. The United States has made efforts to improve its relationships

with its allies in Asia, although largely in the realm of greater military cooperation,

especially with Australia and the Philippines (and South Korea in order to deter North

Korean provocations). Thailand has generally rebuffed closer military ties to the United

States. In terms of creating new relationships with emerging powers, the Obama

administration has focused on Southeast Asian countries and India to help check

China’s growing influence in the region. At the same time, the United States has been

welcomed by some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries such as

Vietnam to play a stabilizing role with respect to the intensifying disputes over the

contested islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, while the Obama administration

has encouraged the strengthening of regional multilateral institutions, its key initiatives in

11 Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia,” 4. 12 David M. Lampton, “China and the United States: Beyond Balance,” Asia Policy 14 (July 2012):

41. 13 David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press,

2013), 4.

5

this area have been strategically motivated to maintain its position of global leader.

Obama’s economic engagement in Asia revolves around the negotiations for the Trans-

Pacific Partnership (TPP), which attempts to create a high-standards regional free trade

regime, pushing countries such as China to eventually conform. Militarily, the United

States has shifted naval and air power resources towards Asia and it has increased

direct military-to-military contact with China in order to reduce the chances for

miscalculations by either military. Little effort has been made by the Obama

administration to stimulate more respect for democracy and human rights among Asian

governments. These concerns have been overshadowed by the pursuit of economic,

military, and political interests.

Overall, the analysis shows that there is a grand strategy that involves a

combination of components. The approach and the strategic goals have remained

relatively consistent throughout the entire Obama presidency. Continuation of American

primacy is the primary motivator. Most of the military and non-military elements are

aimed at constraining China’s rise in order to maintain U.S. global leadership and the

existing international order. The rules-based international order, according to the Obama

administration, establishes a set of common rules, supports a system of rules and

responsibilities, comprises freedom of navigation and open commerce, rewards

constructive behaviour via respect and legitimacy, holds accountable those who

undermine peace and prosperity, ensures stability, and promotes the peaceful rise of

emerging powers.14 The United States touts this system as beneficial to all countries,

especially China. The President’s 2010 National Security Strategy, which was Obama’s

national security team’s first major document outlining the administration’s strategic

vision, emphasized the fundamental importance of preserving the international order and

America’s principal role in that effort.15

Yet, the rebalance has multiple dimensions, some of which are less glamorous.

The Obama administration has signalled its long-term commitment to regional

14 Jonathan G. Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like? Elements of the U.S.

Strategic Turn Towards Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Waters?” Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 14, no. 1 (2012): 25.

15 Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like?” 2-3.

6

multilateral institutions in Asia. It has followed through on its anti-proliferation agenda

including collecting and destroying part of Japan’s nuclear stockpile. Obama has been

relatively quiet on matters of human rights and democracy, recognizing that democracy

cannot be imposed on other states. The United States has encouraged and facilitated

greater dialogue between adversaries Japan and South Korea (and between Japan and

China). Obama’s government has prioritized the Group of 20 (G20) over the Group of 8

(G8) since the global financial crisis in 2008, which is far more inclusive of the emerging

powers in Asia. Finally, the United States has emphasized more cooperative relations

with China to be able to more effectively address global challenges.

7

Chapter 2. Grand Strategy

2.1. The Concept of Grand Strategy

After the Second World War, the idea of grand strategy became popularized.16

Liddell Hart, a military historian and the first to advance the idea of grand strategy,

posited that the concept is “higher strategy” that allocates and coordinates military and

non-military resources towards a wartime or subsequent peacetime goal.17 Military

means represent only one tool of grand strategy and are combined with economic,

political, and psychological instruments. Hart contended that “strategy is only concerned

with the problem of winning military victory” whereas “grand strategy must take the

longer view-for its problem is the winning of the peace.”18 Hart claimed that leaders must

be shrewd, perceptive, and moral to carry out a successful grand strategy that is lasting

and compatible with the peace that follows war.19 While strategy for Hart is largely

concerned with deceiving an adversary, grand strategy generally coincides with morality.

Yet, Hart’s sense of grand strategy was restrictive in that it is appropriated only during

conflict – even if the goal is beyond war.20 Hart argued that the purpose of grand

strategy was not only to achieve victory, but also to ensure that it was worth the cost.

One of Hart’s critical insights then was that states have finite resources to pursue their

goals.21

16 Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from

Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (New York, Cornell University Press, 2014), 2. 17 Liddell Hart, Strategy, Second Revised Edition, (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 336. 18 Hart, Strategy, 362. 19 Hart, Strategy, 236. 20 Terry L. Deibel, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft (New York, Cambridge

University Press, 2007), 6. 21 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 3.

8

With increasing global interdependence in the subsequent decades since the end

of the World Wars and Cold War, most modern writers have broadened grand strategy

to include both peacetime and wartime planning as well as political, diplomatic,

technological, cultural, moral, economic, and military factors.22 Military strategy is now

seen as only a component of grand strategy.23 While military strategy is directed by

generals, grand strategy is conducted by statesmen. Grand strategy is broader than

strategy, but has little theoretical consistency among scholars. The concept is

ambiguous and contested, and is often criticized as impractical. President Bill Clinton

dismissed it as a “pipe dream.”24 Many theorists find too many contradictions to allow

any government to practically integrate long-term policies.25 Ad-hoc responses to crises

are unavoidable. Critics claim that no leader can reasonably manage a country’s

strategic direction or have the time to think thoroughly through each of their decisions.26

Columbia University Professor of Political Science Richard Betts argues that sensible

strategy is an “illusion” that rarely works.27 Complex strategies are problematic because

many variables impacted by the strategy cannot be controlled or even contained.

Nonetheless, grand strategy theory assumes that leaders can impose a degree

of control over events.28 Former U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger has regularly declared that a state’s destiny is not determined by

external circumstances such as geography, but by the choices statesmen make.29

Leaders’ decisions, while affected by several external and internal factors, are crucial to

the direction that a state takes.

22 Deibel, American Statecraft, 8. 23 John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute

Press, 1973), 15. 24 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 14. 25 Thomas M. Kane and David J. Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy (New York:

Routledge, 2012), 103. 26 Kane and Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy, 106. 27 Richard Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 46. 28 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 190. 29 Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins Publishers,

2007), 46.

9

This thesis takes an expansive interpretation of grand strategy, considering both

peace-time and war-time strategy. The thesis assumes that statesmen consider the

feasibility of reaching strategic objectives in the context of the state’s available

resources.30 While tempting for the United States to engage in all of the world’s

problems, prioritization of specific challenges and opportunities is necessary. National

leaders must assess what commitments are mandatory. They conduct this strategic

planning typically at the outset of a presidency, hoping to distinguish themselves from

their predecessors and before the momentum of foreign policy sets in.31

Fundamentally, Duke Public Policy Professor Hal Brands states that “grand

strategy is the intellectual architecture that lends structure to foreign policy.”32 Leaders

conducting grand strategy are not simply reacting to crises. They have coherent ideas

and purposeful objectives, and this logic steers their choices. They hope to shape the

circumstances of potential future events that have not yet reached prominence.33 Grand

strategy can provide governments with analytical strength and a conceptual frame to be

able to respond more quickly to these sorts of events.34 Their long-term vision does not

radically alter with new problems.35 Grand strategy shapes foreign policy, but is more

concerned with long-term ambitions. Foreign policy incorporates everything a state is

affected by, whether short-, medium-, or long-term. Grand strategy need not be

formalized or announced, but requires a continuation or consistency of actions and aims.

It comprises forecasting as well as reassessment and sensitivity to history to make

reasoned decisions about policy.36

Nevertheless, grand strategy is a process whereby the means can change given

circumstances that arise from domestic and international politics.37 The targets remain,

but the methods by which to accomplish them may change. Recognizing the dynamic

30 Deibel, American Statecraft, 18. 31 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 197. 32 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 1. 33 Kane and Lonsdale, Understanding Contemporary Strategy, 104. 34 Deibel, American Statecraft, 32. 35 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 4. 36 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 204. 37 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 5.

10

nature of international relations, grand strategy is obliged to be influenced by the

behaviour of other states. Grand strategy should not be understood as fixed; it is a

continuous process.38 Grand strategy may require the United States and its allies to

show restraint, waiting for an adversary to defeat itself.39 It thus serves as a framework

for leaders on how to respond to problems domestically and internationally.

2.2. Obama’s Rebalance and Grand Strategy

There is ample debate about whether the rebalance constitutes a grand strategy

or if it is part of a broader grand strategic framework. Some scholars argue that the

rebalance is the absolute key to Obama’s grand strategy. For example, Simi Mehta, a

researcher at Jawaharlal Nehru University, asserts that the rebalance is driven by the

Obama administration’s desire to create a stable balance of power in response to

aggressive Chinese behaviour in the East and South China Seas.40 Mehta maintains

that the Obama administration is seriously committed to the rebalance in the long-term

given official statements and the closing down of two American military bases in Europe.

She argues that Obama’s engagement and reassurance of its allies is primarily

motivated by an increasingly assertive Chinese leadership, which upsets its allies and

partners in the region. Mehta views the rebalance as the fundamental element of

Obama’s grand strategic vision. Likewise, Professor of International Affairs at George

Washington University, Robert Sutter, contends that “the rebalance is the Obama

administration’s grand strategy.”41

38 Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy?, 199. 39 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National

Security Policy during the Cold War, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 386.

40 Simi Mehta, “Rebalancing: Part of its Grand Strategy,” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), China Articles, May 16, 2014, http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/us-in-asia-pacific-rebalancing-part-of-its-grand-strategy-4443.html (accessed February 9, 2015).

41 Robert G. Sutter et. al, “Balancing Acts: The U.S. Rebalance and Asia Pacific Stability,” The George Washington University, Elliott School of International Affairs and Sigure Center for Asian Studies (April 2013): 1.

11

However, many scholars of grand strategy have argued that Obama has no

grand strategy.42 Obama officials have long been aware that there is great skepticism

that the rebalance is sustainable in light of sequestration and an American economy that

has struggled to rebound after 2008.43 In March of 2014 at a defence industry

conference, Katrina McFarland, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, said

that “right now, the [rebalance] is being looked at again because, candidly, it can’t

happen” due to budgetary constraints.44 Early on in the rebalance, it was announced that

America’s defence budget was being cut by $487USD billion over the next decade.45

Sequestration led to a further $470USD billion reduction over the same time frame.46

Defence spending reductions pose major challenges to readiness and force structure.

For example, it puts greater pressure on the number of force-deployed carrier strike

groups that the United States can operate. The lack of fiscal discipline within the

Pentagon makes sound strategic thinking improbable. Little integration takes place

within the organization and instead of prioritizing missions the Pentagon tends to layer

on additional missions.47 Moreover, scholars and commentators have argued that the

rebalance is dead or being abandoned by Obama to focus on other international and

domestic problems, especially following the cancellation of Obama’s attendance at the

42 Jackson Diehl, “Obama’s Foreign Policy Needs an Update,” The Washington Post, November

22, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/21/AR2010112102263.html (accessed February 6, 2015); Niall Ferguson, “Obama's Egypt and Foreign-Policy Failures,” Newsweek, February 13, 2011, http://www.newsweek.com/obamas-egypt-and-foreign-policy-failures-68731 (accessed February 6, 2015); Michael Hirsh, “Obama has no Doctrine,” The Atlantic, March 29, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/03/obama-has-no-doctrine/73171/ (accessed February 6, 2015).

43 Bob Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Work Delivers Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations,” U.S. Department of Defense, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., September 30, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5509 (accessed October 24, 2014).

44 Scott W. Harold, “Is the Pivot Doomed? The Resilience of America’s Strategic ‘Rebalance’,” The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015): 85.

45 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” U.S. Department of Defense, Chuck Hagel and Martin E. Dempsey (2014): 12.

46 Michael J. Green, Zack Cooper and Mira Rapp Hooper, “Defense: Explaining and Resourcing the Rebalance.” In “Pivot 2.0: How the Administration and Congress can Work Together to Sustain American Engagement in Asia to 2016,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Report, Eds. Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi (January 2015): 7.

47 Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman, “A Leaner and Meaner Defense: How to Cut the Pentagon's Budget While Improving Its Performance,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1 (January 2011).

12

November 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum and the East Asia

Summit (EAS) due to the government shutdown.48 It is posited that even though the

rebalance may be identified as Obama’s top foreign policy priority, that would change

immediately with a Russian attack on a Baltic state, another major terrorist incident in

the United States, or war in the Gulf.49

In his 2012 book Limited Achievements: Obama’s Foreign Policy, a Professor of

International Relations at the Paris Institute of Political Studies, Zaki Laidi, argued that

the Obama administration may be relatively coherent in its policies, but is not

fundamentally driven by any grand strategy.50 Laidi states that Obama is committed to

maintaining America’s military superiority, particularly over China, and that the United

States refuses to be excluded from having a mediating role in the potential conflicts in

Asia, especially over the South and East China Seas.51 Yet, the Obama administration

has not done so through its own proactive role, but by taking advantage of increasing

tensions between China and its neighbours. By and large, Laidi points to an Obama

government that is reactive to Chinese actions. Similarly, throughout his 2012 book The

Rise of China, Edward Luttwak argues that the rebalance does not represent a grand

strategy; instead, it is just a way to reassure American allies concerned about Chinese

assertiveness.52 Luttwak portrays the rebalance as having little real substance beyond

mere rhetoric and symbolic actions.

Professor Victor Cha, director of the Asian Studies at Georgetown University and

former Director for Asian Affairs in President George W. Bush’s National Security

Council, makes the case that rebalance has been determined more by regional

48 Dustin Walker, “Is America’s “Rebalance” to Asia Dead?,” The National Interest, April 24, 2014,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-rebalance-asia-dead-10304 (accessed January 29, 2015).

49 R.D. Hooker Jr., “The Grand Strategy of the United States,” INSS Strategic Monograph (Washington D.C., Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University, October 2014): 25.

50 Zaki Laidi, Limited Achievements: Obama’s Foreign Policy, Translated by Carolyn Avery (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), xiv.

51 Laidi, Limited Achievements, 155. 52 Edward Luttwak, The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Belknap Press, 2012).

13

dynamics than by a grand strategy.53 Cha argues that domestic politics in China, Japan,

and throughout Asia has undercut any strategic plans that the White House may have

had. Cha states that the Asia Obama expected coming into office was not the Asia he

encountered and that policy, in general, is about adjusting to events. Vali Nasr, author of

the 2013 book Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat and Dean of the

Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, goes even further and asserts

that “President Obama has eschewed grand strategy and a global outlook.”54 While Nasr

focuses on U.S. policy towards the Middle East, he argues that Obama’s foreign policy

has essentially been to withdraw the United States from world problems.

This section outlines the grand strategies that scholars have used to describe

Obama’s grand strategy and his approach to Asia, namely selective engagement,

cooperative security, and primacy. While there are a number of grand strategies that

scholars encourage the United States to adopt, such as neo-isolationism, cooperative

defence, collective defence, restrainment, and liberal internationalism, these have not

been used to describe Obama’s grand strategy. For this reason, they are not outlined in

this thesis.

2.2.1. Selective Engagement

John Barry, a Newsweek magazine National Security Correspondent, argues that

the Obama administration’s grand strategy is one of selective engagement, which stems

from America’s domestic economic challenges and involves necessarily pulling back

troops and bases from Europe and reducing national defence spending. Barry posits that

the United States follows a maritime strategy, maintaining an offshore presence and

intervening only when necessary to support its allies.55 While the shift to Asia is real,

particularly on the military side according to Barry, the grand strategy calls on other

53 Victor D. Cha, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia with a Focus on Korea,” USC KSI, December

3, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBtSkN9PO0I (accessed April 1, 2015). 54 Vali R. Nasr, “The Grand Strategy Obama Needs,” The New York Times, September 11, 2014. 55 John Barry, “Historic Shift in US Strategy Will Have Major Impact on Europe,” The European

Institute, April 2012, http://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/147-european-affairs/ea-april-2012/1560-historic-shift-in-us-defense-strategy-will-have-major-impact-on-europe (accessed February 9, 2015).

14

regional powers to take the lead on major regional problems, especially in Europe and

the Middle East. The Asia-Pacific region is the leading priority for the United States in its

foreign policy.

Daniel Drezner, a Professor of International Politics at Tufts University, contends

that Obama’s strategic thinking was first driven by a “multilateral retrenchment” whereby

the United States could pullback its resources from the rest of the world in order to gain

back a better world standing.56 Drezner states that the Obama administration felt that it

was overextended internationally and had to focus on pressing domestic concerns. In

doing so, it wanted to transfer more responsibility for reviving the global economy and for

addressing global challenges on to the emerging powers, particularly China through the

Obama administration’s embrace of the G20 over the G8. Drezner’s retrenchment

characterization is similar to Barry’s selective engagement, although it does not prioritize

American involvement and leadership in the Asia-Pacific region to the same extent. Yet,

Drezner argues that Obama abandoned this grand strategy of multilateral retrenchment

when he realized he could only achieve limited cooperation with the rising powers,

especially China.57 Consequently, Obama switched to a more assertive grand strategy of

“counterpunching” according to Drezner.58 The rebalance involved developing better

relations with China’s neighbours to check China’s assertiveness.59 Hillary Clinton

became especially vocal about and critical of China’s human rights record following the

shift in grand strategy. The United States began to declare its national and global

leadership.

Richard Betts labels the rebalance as “soft primacy,” which is more open to

minimizing security commitments in less important regions to be able to retain them in

others with the goal of preventing the rise of a peer competitor (China).60 Obama’s

56 Daniel Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain

Times,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011): 64. 57 Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?,” 65. 58 Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?,” 58. 59 Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?,” 66. 60 David S. McDonough, “America’s Pivot to the Pacific: Selective Primacy, Operational Access,

and China’s A2/AD Challenge,” Calgary Paper in Military and Strategic Studies 7, Occasional Paper (November 2013): 8.

15

administration has signalled its willingness to downsize its presence in Europe and the

Middle East. Pushing the Chinese to engage its neighbours in multilateral mechanisms

is a means to restrain China. During the Cold War, American officials in the senior Bush

government complained that the Soviet Union was doing just this to the United States by

trying to lock the United States into multilateral discussions.61 Also taking the position of

selective engagement is Douglas Stuart, a Professor of Political Science and

International Studies at Dickinson College, who states that Obama’s grand strategy is

not fundamentally different from that of his predecessors with respect to the Asia-Pacific

region. Stuart argues that the rebalance is a reassertion of America’s national interests

in the region with an overriding concern to preserve a stable regional balance of power.62

Amongst scholars and theorists within grand strategy literature, Brandeis

University Professor of International Relations, Robert Art, is the leading advocate for

selective engagement. He sees Obama’s adoption of selective engagement as basically

inevitable. Art argues that sequestration and ongoing defence spending cuts force the

Obama administration to prioritize certain regions such as the Asia-Pacific.63 Art posits

that the American economy is losing importance in the world economy as China’s growth

continues, and this gives the United States less leverage in global affairs.

2.2.2. Cooperative Security

President of the public policy think-tank, the New America Foundation, Anne-

Marie Slaughter argues that the Obama administration’s grand strategy is informed by

the principles of cooperative security. Slaughter references numerous Obama

statements that speak of “respect” for universal values as a core American interest.64

61 Capie, Evans, and Fukushima, Speaking Asia Pacific Security, 45. 62 Douglas Stuart, “Chapter 2: Obama’s ‘Rebalance’ in Historical Context,” in The New US

Strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot, Ed. William T. Tow (New York: Routledge, 2014), 24.

63 Robert J. Art, “Chapter 1: Selective Engagement in the Age of Austerity,” In America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, Eds. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (Center for a New American Security, May 2012), 16.

64 Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Chapter 3: A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality,” In America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration, Eds. Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (Center for a New American Security, May 2012): 47.

16

Slaughter argues that the Obama administration respects the rules-based international

order to which it encourages all other countries to adhere. She believes that Obama’s

government emphasizes common institutions to address global collective action

problems. These challenges force governments to cooperate: Slaughter cites

pandemics, terrorism, resource scarcity, food insecurity, climate change, and non-

proliferation as examples.65 Slaughter contends that the cooperative security grand

strategy stems to a great extent from the Obama administration’s recognition of its

immense domestic challenges and constrained level of resources for defence abroad.66

She refers to various American defence officials’ statements that emphasize non-military

responses to international crises and the importance of America’s security partners for

any military missions.

2.2.3. Primacy

Free University of Amsterdam researchers Bastiaan Apeldoorn and Nana Graaff

argue that Obama’s grand strategy generally and in Asia “remains informed by a

commitment to maintaining a global Open Door and to preserving…global hegemony as

the basis of a liberal world order.”67 They see American financial elites as benefiting

greatly from increased engagement with Asia and view Obama’s government as serving

the interests of corporate elites. Apeldoorn and Graaff see the Obama administration as

seeking a global free trade regime to advance American business interests. They point

to the 2010 Obama National Security Strategy document that states unequivocally “there

should be no doubt: the United States of America will continue to underwrite global

stability.”68 Yale Professor of Public Policy, Hal Brands, also argues that at the core of

65 Slaughter, “A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality,” 55. 66 Slaughter, “A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality,” 48. 67 Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graaff, “Chapter 12: Corporate Elite Networks and US

Foreign Policy: The Revolving Door and the Open Door under Obama,” Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy, Second Edition, Eds. Inderjeet Parmar, Lina B. Miller and Mark Ledwidge (New York: Routledge, 2014), 159.

68 Apeldoorn and Graaff, “Corporate Elite Networks,” 158.

17

the Obama administration’s grand strategy is the pursuit of continued primacy.69 Brands

asserts that Obama is looking for more prudent and cheaper ways to exert U.S.

leadership abroad. Similarly, John Mearsheimer, a Professor of Political Science at the

University of Chicago, contends that Obama’s grand strategy of primacy has been

announced in various speeches by his first Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.70

Mearsheimer sees Obama’s administration as clinging to President Bill Clinton’s grand

strategy driven by the pursuit and maintenance of hegemony. While there is a lesser

focus on the military than the George W. Bush government by Obama, the emphasis on

international institutions and allies are used to continue American global dominance.71

Jorn Dosch, a Professor of International Politics at the University of Rostock in Germany,

argues that this attachment to primacy in Asia stems from historical, structural legacies

that lead the United States to view the Pacific Ocean as its own lake and as a natural

zone of American control.72 Dosch contends that the Obama administration’s emphasis

on multilateralism is not a substitute for its core approach, which is primarily bilateral to

advance U.S. national interests.73 He elaborates that rapidly expanded military ties with

Southeast Asian countries are aimed at balancing China’s increasing influence;

maintaining a strong naval presence to protect commercial sea routes, such as the

Malacca Strait; and for a quid-pro-quo in that Southeast Asian governments have more

opportunities to join free trade agreements with the United States if they augment their

military cooperation with the Obama administration. In the end, Obama’s rebalance has

the same goals as American presidents over the past few decades according to Dosch:

preventing the rise of a regional hegemon; keeping commercial sea and air routes of

transportation open; maintaining America’s preferential access to Asian markets through

69 Hal Brands, “Breaking down Obama’s Grand Strategy,” The National Interest, June 23, 2014,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/breaking-down-obamas-grand-strategy-10719 (accessed January 29, 2015).

70 John J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” The National Interest 111 (January 1, 2011): 31. 71 Mearsheimer, “Imperial by Design,” 30. 72 Jorn Dosch, “Chapter 2: The United States in the Asia Pacific: Still the Hegemon?,” in The New

Global Politics of the Asia Pacific, Second Edition, Eds. Michael K. Connors, Remy Davison and Jorn Dosch (New York: Routledge, 2012), 22.

73 Dosch, “The United States in the Asia Pacific,” 28.

18

a large naval presence; and strengthening security cooperation with regional partners

and allies.74

According to then Research Fellow at the Dalhousie University Centre for

Foreign Policy Studies, David McDonough, the rebalance is directed at China and

preserving operational access to the Western Pacific.75 McDonough asserts that the

rebalance is chiefly about reassuring allies and bolstering access to defence bases for

American naval and air forces. McDonough argues that Obama is seeking “selective

primacy… a grand strategy that combines elements of primacy and selective

engagement, [which] emerges from the country’s current economic and fiscal malaise.”76

Selective engagement involves emphasizing resources in certain regions at the expense

of others less important or vital to U.S. interests. In the case of Asia, McDonough argues

that Obama hopes that “primacy is retained in the one region that matters the most.”77

McDonough notes that American forces in Europe have been reduced by 15 percent.

Despite the Obama administration’s emphasis on the increased non-military ties to

Northeast and Southeast Asia, McDonough contends that even these components are

intended to lessen Chinese influence in the region.78 The easing of American economic

sanctions on Burma has a primary strategic dimension targeted at mitigating China’s

dominance in the country. Likewise, America’s military and diplomatic engagement with

India serves the purpose of attempting to check China. Primacy for the Obama

administration, according to McDonough, has too many benefits to be discarded.79 It is

too effective at containing near-peer competitors that threaten the traditional

international order and at fighting terrorist groups around the world.

74 Dosch, “The United States in the Asia Pacific,” 33. 75 McDonough, “America’s Pivot,” 10. 76 David S. McDonough, “America’s Rebalance to the Pacific: Selective Deep Engagement,

Operational Access, and China’s A2/AD Challenge,” In Calgary Papers in Military and Strategic Studies, Edited by John Ferris (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2013): 1.

77 David S. McDonough, “Obama's Pacific Pivot in US Grand Strategy: A Canadian Perspective,” Asian Security 9, no. 3 (November 2013): 169.

78 McDonough, “Obama's Pacific Pivot,” 166. 79 McDonough, “America’s Pivot,” 8.

19

Robert Ross, a Professor of Political Science at Boston College, asserts that the

Obama administration’s grand strategy in Asia consists of a containment of China.80

Previous presidencies, Ross claims aimed for a regional balance of power in Asia that

prevented any hegemon from arising. A forward-deployed presence and bases in Asia

served to divide the region. Ross sees the rebalance as unsustainable because it

focuses on expanding relations with mainland states on China’s periphery whereas

presidents before Obama emphasized offshore states in Asia to balance China’s rise.81

Ross argues that America’s attempts to advance relations with Indochina (particularly

Cambodia and Vietnam) and South Korea are futile because its naval capacity cannot

match China’s coercive capability.

Dartmouth College Professors Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, along with

Princeton University Professor John Ikenberry, argue that the Obama administration has

pursued a grand strategy of deep engagement. They contend that Obama has promoted

a global liberal economic order and forged closer military relationships to America’s

partners and allies in Asia.82 Brooks, Wohlforth, and Ikenberry conducted interviews with

Obama officials who said that their Asian alliances give the United States greater

leverage in free trade negotiations in the region and more authority in multilateral

regional institutions.83 The authors believe that the Obama administration is motivated by

a desire to reduce regional competition and check potential rivals to maintain its position

of global leadership. Even with large defence spending cuts, they argue that Obama has

maintained extensive engagement and U.S leadership abroad.84 Although it has a

different name, deep engagement endorses the same principles as primacy.

80 Robert S. Ross, “US Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US National Security Strategy for

East Asia,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 28. 81 Ross, “US Grand Strategy,” 31. 82 Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth, “Lean Forward: In Defense of

American Engagement,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2013): 130. 83 Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America:

The Case against Retrenchment,” International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 44. 84 Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home,” 18.

20

Chapter 3. The Rebalance

3.1. Objectives and Background

Conducting a review of America’s place in the world in 2008, Obama and his

closest advisers were disappointed by the contempt much of the world felt towards the

United States.1 Upon taking office, Obama blamed President George W. Bush for the

alienation of the United States from its friends and the international community.2

Obama’s White House was especially critical of what it saw as Bush’s unilateralism,

arrogance, tendency to resort to force when other tools were available, and disdain for

international institutions and rules. Obama hoped to restore and renew America’s image

and legitimacy. In his 2006 best-seller The Audacity of Hope, Obama criticized U.S.

foreign policy as “a series of ad hoc decisions, with dubious results.”3 He described

America’s national security policy as needing consistency and guiding principles. A well-

articulated “grand strategy” supported by the public and understood by the world would

foster legitimacy for American engagement internationally.4 As exhibited by his lofty

rhetoric, Obama wanted to have a transformative impact in foreign policy. He sought out

to create a more just, inclusive, peaceful, and stable global order.5 At his 2009 Nobel

1 Hillary R. Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 15. 2 Steven W. Hook and James M. Scott, “Chapter 1: Seeking Renewal: American Foreign Policy in

the Obama Era,” in U.S. Foreign Policy Today: American Renewal? Eds. Steven W. Hook and James M. Scott (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 5; Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

3 Barack H. Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), 302.

4 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 303. 5 Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Bending History: Barack

Obama’s Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 2.

21

Prize acceptance speech, Obama stated that “no nation can insist that others follow the

rules of the road if [they] refuse to follow them [themselves].”6

Prior to becoming President, an anonymous former advisor to Obama stated that

Europe was much lower on Obama’s agenda than the Asia-Pacific region.7 As chairman

of the Senate Foreign Relations European sub-committee, Obama failed to convene a

single policy meeting.8 Conversely, Obama has a deeper personal connection to Asia,

spending four of his childhood years in Indonesia with his mother. In 2010, speaking in

Indonesian at the University of Indonesia, Obama proclaimed “Indonesia bagian dari diri

saya,” which means “Indonesia is a part of me.”9 He was socialized into a secular Islamic

community in Jakarta wherein Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and

Confucianism are recognized as official faiths; and people are free to follow any other

religion.10 This was Obama’s first experience with Islamic culture. With the world’s

largest Muslim population and third largest democracy, Obama continues to laud

Indonesia’s pluralistic society.11 Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s informal leader, especially

within ASEAN, the most powerful organization in the region. Obama’s upbringing in

Hawaii, which is known for its tolerance towards European-American, Pacific Islands,

and Asian cultures, also made him more sensitive to the issues faced by those in Asia.

While he was first exposed to extreme poverty and desolation in Jakarta, Obama grew

up comfortably in Hawaii wherein he began trying to find and create his own identity.12

6 Lawrence C. Reardon, “Chapter 5: Shifting Global Paradigms and Obama’s Adaptive Foreign

Policy,” in The Obama Presidency: Promise and Performance Ed. William Crotty (Plymouth, United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2012), 118.

7 Joerg Wolf, “Barack Obama’s Lack of Real Interest in Transatlantic Cooperation,” Atlantic Review, January 4, 2008, http://www.atlanticreview.org/archives/959-Barack-Obamas-Lack-of-Real-Interest-in-Transatlantic-Cooperation.html (accessed January 5, 2015).

8 Steve Clemson, “Obama’s Hearing Problem,” Washington Note, Blog, February 28, 2008, http://washingtonnote.com/obamas_hearing/ (accessed January 21, 2015).

9 Carol E. Lee, “President Obama in Jakarta: ‘Indonesia is a Part of me’,” Politico, November 9, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44926.html (accessed February 5, 2015).

10 Dinesh Sharma, Barack Obama in Hawai'i and Indonesia: The Making of a Global President (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2011), 108.

11 Robert M. Gates, “America’s Security Role in the Asia-Pacific,” U.S. Department of Defence, Secretary of Defense, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2009, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1357 (accessed October 22, 2014).

12 Sharma, Barack Obama in Hawai'i and Indonesia, xxiii.

22

Obama speaks admiringly about the Hawaiian “aloha” spirit of tolerance towards

different religions and ethnicities.13

Although widely reported to have commenced as a priority in late-2011 when

there was a flurry of announcements signaling America’ shift, the Obama administration

considers 2009 to be the beginning of the rebalance. The ideas behind the rebalance

were largely held by Obama’s team prior to his inauguration. Even though candidate

Obama did not pronounce a clear China or Asia policy,14 Obama envisioned himself as

becoming America’s “first Pacific president.”15 Before his first presidential election

campaign, Obama sought out Geoffrey Bader, an expert on Asia, to co-chair his Asia

advisory team.16 Bader would serve in Obama’s administration as the National Security

Council’s senior director for East Asian affairs and special assistant to the President for

national security affairs from 2009 until 2011. The foreign policy group agreed that

alliances should be the heart of American engagement in Asia, America’s forward

deployment must be sustained, differences with China could be managed and

cooperative areas expanded, free trade ought to be broadened across the region, and

Asia given a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy. They felt that Asia lacked an effective

architecture for dealing with internal and external security problems.17 According to the

Obama administration, a more robust “architecture” implies a collection of countries that

is able to meet together in various mechanisms and institutions to cooperate more

13 David G. Winter, “Philosopher-King or Polarizing Politician? A Personality Profile of Barack

Obama,” Political Psychology 32, no. 6 (2011): 1062. 14 S. Mahmud Ali, Asia-Pacific Security Dynamics in the Obama Era: A New World Emerging

(New York: Routledge, 2012), 19. 15 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific: Third and Revised Edition (New

York: Routledge, 2011), 259. 16 Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy

(Washington, Brookings Institution Press, 2012), xv. 17 Kurt M. Campbell “Public Lecture on “U.S. Engagement in Asia”,” Assistant Secretary, Bureau

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, October 10, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/10/175241.htm (accessed October 2, 2014).

23

deeply on major challenges.18 Human rights and democracy promotion were not

prominent in the early discussions of Obama’s foreign policy team.

While details of the rebalance were not worked out immediately upon Obama’s

taking office (for example: there was a lengthy internal debate within Washington about

whether or not to join the EAS), the fundamental goals of regional economic

development, stability, and adherence to international rules were in place.19 The United

States sought a “whole-of-government” approach, integrating military, economic,

political, diplomatic, cultural, and humanitarian components.20 Some American foreign

policy experts have stated that this “integrated strategy is unprecedented in modern

American history.”21 Multilateral mechanisms had to be emphasized to gain back greater

credibility and trust in the world. The Obama administration understood that it could not

effectively tackle international problems alone.22

Asian leaders made it clear to U.S. officials that they had felt neglected during

the George W. Bush years.23 In particular, Southeast Asian governments believed that

Bush was indifferent to their interests. Bush’s focus on the Middle East produced a

perception among Asian leaders that the United States was disengaging from Asia.24

When Bush officials attended regional meetings in Asia, they pushed terrorism to the

fore of the agenda, frustrating Asian leaders who came prepared to discuss other

18 Kurt M. Campbell, “Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell on Next Steps in Engaging the

Asia-Pacific Region,” United States Institute of Peace, September 16, 2010, http://www.usip.org/events/assistant-secretary-state-kurt-campbell-next-steps-in-engaging-the-asia-pacific-region (accessed April 16, 2015).

19 Scot Marciel, “U.S. Policy toward ASEAN,” U.S. Department of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and U.S. Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs, Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, February 26, 2009, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2009/02/119967.htm (accessed October 2, 2014).

20 Gates, “America’s Security Role in the Asia-Pacific.” 21 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 58. 22 Robert M. Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific,” U.S. Department of

Defence, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 5, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1483 (accessed October 22, 2014).

23 Gates, Duty, 322. 24 Clinton, Hard Choices, 43.

24

regional problems.25 As a group, ASEAN disapproves of external powers that attempt to

push its agenda.26 This has been a core principle of ASEAN since its founding in 1967,

as Indonesia strongly drove this principle of non-interference by outside powers in

Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Charter states that one of ASEAN’s goals is “to maintain

the centrality and proactive role of ASEAN as the primary driving force in its relations…

with its external partners.”27 Following Bush’s presidency, Southeast Asian leaders

sought tangible U.S. leadership, characterizing the United States as “diplomatically

absentee.”28 On the contrary, China was pleased by Bush’s ignorance of regional issues

because that provided Chinese leaders with more strategic space to maneuver quietly

without American resistance.29 As a result, Obama hoped to signal the importance of

American alliances in Asia. The initial step in revamping this image with its Asian allies

was the hosting of Japan’s prime minister as the first state leader to visit Obama’s White

House.30 In addition, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s first overseas trip was to Asia,

instead of Europe as is tradition for new Secretaries of State. On that trip, Clinton visited

the ASEAN headquarters in Indonesia, where she declared America’s intention to

accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the

foundational treaty for ASEAN.31

At the heart of the rebalance, the United States sought the continuation of

regional economic and social development, stability, and peace, given that there

remains a demand for U.S. leadership in Asia.32 As China rises rapidly, the United

States hopes to influence the region’s development of norms and rules to be consistent

25 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 2. 26 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 168. 27 ASEAN, “The ASEAN Charter,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (January

2008): 5. http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf. 28 Clinton, Hard Choices, 52. 29 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 26. 30 Daniel R. Russel, “Transatlantic Interests in Asia,” U.S. Department of State, Interview with

Xenia Dormandy, Project Director, Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, January 13, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/01/219881.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

31 Amy Searight, “Chapter 5: The United States and Asian Regionalism: The Politics of Reactive Leadership,” in Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions, Eds. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Seungjoo Lee (New York: Springer, 2011), 117.

32 Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific.”

25

with those of regional and international standards. The Obama administration also fears

that China may be trying to carve out the region into spheres of influence that exclude

the United States from exerting its leadership.33 China’s declaration of the East China

Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in November 2013 and a potentially

forthcoming one over the South China Sea may illustrate these aspirations. China’s

burgeoning military and assertiveness has led to greater sensitivity towards China’s

interests in many cases,34 but also a greater demand for a larger, stabilizing American

presence among most Asian countries.35 The desire for stronger military-to-military

relationships with the United States among many Asian governments is as strong as it

has been in recent memory.36 Over the past decade, Asia is experiencing the world’s

fastest arms race, as military spending in East Asia has almost tripled and it has nearly

doubled in Southeast Asia.37 Flashpoints in the South and East China Seas have the

potential for large-scale escalation. Yet, the Obama administration recognizes that Asian

governments expect the United States to pursue and have a productive relationship with

China.

A robust American economic recovery is also linked to Asia’s continued

development. By 2025, the region will account for over half of the world’s economic

33 Vali R. Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (Doubleday, New

York: Random House, Inc., 2013), 217. 34 Yuen Foong Khong, “Primacy or World Order: The United States and China’s Rise-A Review

Essay,” International Security 38, no. 3 (Winter 2013/2014): 162. 35 Mark Manyin et. al, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s Rebalancing toward

Asia,” Congressional Research Service: CRS Report for Congress, Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress (March 2012): 2.

36 Robert M. Gates, “Remarks by Secretary Gates at the Shangri-La Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Defense, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 3, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4831 (accessed October 7, 2014).

37 Tim Ferguson, “Asia's Week: It Transpires That an Arms Race Is Under Way,” Forbes, April 4, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timferguson/2014/04/04/asias-week-it-transpires-that-an-arms-race-is-under-way/ (accessed February 20, 2015).

26

output and projections show Asia’s economic ascent will last for decades.38 The 2012

National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2030 report, which is published every four

years following the presidential election, states that by 2030, “Asia will have surpassed

North America and Europe combined in terms of global power, based upon [Gross

Domestic Product], population size, military spending, and technological investment.39

The report suggests that China’s economy will surpass America’s before 2030.

Throughout the Global Trends 2030 report, there is talk of a gradual transition from a

unipolar world toward a different international system with more superpowers alongside

the United States, mainly China. Currently, almost fifty percent of global goods are

transported through the South China Sea and a majority of the world’s population

resides in Asia.40 While American engagement in Asia has traditionally prioritized

Northeast Asia, the rebalance has expanded efforts in Southeast Asia and beyond.

China’s increasing economic and political leverage over ASEAN members and

Southeast Asia’s geographic position as a maritime transit hub between the Pacific and

Indian Oceans have fuelled the American government’s desire to have closer ties to

Southeast Asia.41 China has become increasingly confident since the 2008 financial

crisis exposed America’s economic weaknesses (and those of the Washington

Consensus).42 Many Chinese felt that America’s economic, political, and military decline

38 Geoff Dyer, The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China-And How

America Can Win (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 21; Majority Staff Report, “Re-Balancing the Rebalance: Resourcing U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” A Majority Staff Report prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 113th Congress: 2nd Session, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/872692.pdf (April 17, 2014): 7.

39 National Intelligence Council, “Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,” National Intelligence Council (December 12, 2012): iv.

40 Peter Lavoy, “US Strategy, Asia, and NATO,” NATO Defense College, Keynote Address, “Euro-Atlantic meets Asia-Pacific” Conference, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, May 15, 2014.

41 Robert Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York, Random House, 2014), 9.

42 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 237. The “Washington Consensus” is based on ten principles: 1) fiscal discipline, 2) reorientation of public expenditure, 3) tax reform, 4) financial liberalization, 5) unified and competitive exchange rates, 6) trade liberalization, 7) openness to foreign direct investment, 8) privatization, 9) deregulation, and 10) property rights. See Imad Moosa, The US-China Trade Dispute: Facts, Figures and Myths (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2012), 68.

27

was coming after 2008.43 Furthermore, the Indian Ocean’s importance will only grow in

the 21st century as a “center of world trade…connecting the Arab and Asian worlds.”44

Already, seventy percent of global petroleum products traverse the Indian Ocean, two-

fifths of world trade pass through the Strait of Malacca, and forty percent of crude oil

travels through the Strait of Hormuz.45

The Obama administration argues that the rebalance should be viewed in the

long-term, whereby the United States incrementally fulfills its strategic objectives. This

leaves future presidencies with the ability to build off of the existing platform as they

increase America’s engagement in Asia. In 2011, then Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell, said that the rebalance “will best be

understood only in retrospect because [it is] difficult to understand the full scope without

looking at it on a global basis.”46 Hillary Clinton asserts that much of the Obama

administration’s efforts have been discreet because of dramatic headlines elsewhere

and the nature of long-term investments in Asia.47 Clinton said that “there is less need

for dramatic breakthroughs that marked earlier phases in [the United States-Asia]

relationship…collaboration may not always be glamorous, but it is strategically

significant.”48 While military forces can be re-deployed in a relatively short time, it takes

more time for civilian hardware to restructure.49 Bringing about major improvements in

relationships with allies, creating new partnerships, and negotiating free trade

agreements are onerous tasks. As U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice

articulates, Obama hopes to lay the foundations for the “sustained work of successive

43 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 4. 44 Bartholomew Thanhauser, “Ceaseless Currents of Change: A Journey around the Indian

Ocean Littorals,” review of Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power, by Robert Kaplan, SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013): 149.

45 Nasr, The Dispensable Nation, 241. 46 Campbell, “U.S. Engagement in Asia.” 47 Clinton, Hard Choices, 58. 48 Satu P. Limaye, “Southeast Asia in America’s Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific,” Institute of

Southeast Asian Studies 1 (2013): 48. 49 Majority Staff Report, “Re-Balancing the Rebalance,” 25.

28

administrations.”50 Key parts of the rebalance will not be realized during this presidency.

America’s support for the development of Asia’s regional institutional architecture is

intended as an enduring principle.

3.2. Six Components

The thesis now describes changes within each of the six major components of

the rebalance as declared by Hillary Clinton in 2011: shoring up alliances; forging new

partnerships; investing in multilateral institutions; expanding the regional economic

architecture; shifting military assets to the Asia-Pacific region; and the projection of

democratic values and human rights within Asia. There is overlap in many of the areas.

3.2.1. Alliances

The first element of the rebalance is the bolstering of treaty alliances with

Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. As the White House’s

2010 National Security Strategy expressed, regional allies are the foundation of the

rebalance.51 In the document, equal partnerships were specified as imperative to a

durable American presence in the region. The United States hopes to reassure its

partners that it remains committed to Asia amidst fears among Asian governments that

the rebalance is unsustainable given American budget cuts and attention to crises

elsewhere.52

50 Susan E. Rice, “America’s Future in Asia,” The White House: Office of the Press Secretary,

Remarks Prepared for Delivery by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice. Georgetown University, Washington, November 20, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/21/remarks-prepared-delivery-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice (accessed July 20, 2014).

51 The White House, “National Security Strategy,” The President of the United States, May 2010, 42. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf

52 Joseph Y. Yun, “The Rebalance to Asia: Why South Asia Matters (Part 1),” U.S. Department of State, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Washington, DC, February 26, 2013, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2013/02/205208.htm (accessed September 11, 2014).

29

The United States emphasized closer military relations with Australia, notably the

deployment of 2,500 American troops to Darwin and northern Australia by 2020.53 In

2012 and 2013, nearly 200 American soldiers went to Darwin, and in 2014 there were

1,050 U.S. Marines deployed there.54 Australia has highlighted the need to augment

collective security in the Asia-Pacific, improving defence ties with the United States,

Japan, India, and Vietnam as a measure to check China.55 Prime Minister Tony Abbott

proclaimed that “the coming century will be an Asian one…but only if America is present

to keep the peace and enforce the rules.”56 Yet, American engagement with Australia

has been limited outside of the Darwin troop announcement. The American troops there

would not be very effective in the event of a military confrontation with China, although

they would be helpful to the region in a response to a natural disaster.57 Australia’s

outback has large open spaces with extensive training taking place between the

American and Australian militaries, especially at the Bradshaw training area, which is

southwest of Darwin. In August 2012, Australia rejected a report released by an

American think-tank commissioned by the Pentagon, the Centre for Strategic and

International Studies, which recommended an American naval base and nuclear aircraft

carrier group in Perth.58 Being in Western Australia, Perth would have been beyond the

range of the Chinese military.

53 Peter Jennings, “The U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific: An Australian Perspective,” Asia

Policy 15 (January 2013): 38. 54 Xavier La Canna, “Marines Arriving in Darwin,” ABC, Darwin, March 26, 2014,

http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2014/03/26/3971865.htm (accessed January 29, 2015). 55 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 120. 56 Patrick M. Cronin and Richard Fontaine, “Send the U.S. Navy to Australia: The Coming

Century will be an Asian one, but only if America is Present to Keep Peace and Enforce Rules,” The Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/send-the-u-s-navy-to-australia-1409760664 (accessed January 29, 2015).

57 Sarah Serizawa, “An Interview with Rory Medcalf: An Australian Perspective on U.S. Rebalancing toward Asia,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, Q&A, April 30, 2012, http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/PSA/SA_Medcalf_interview_04302012.pdf (accessed January 29, 2015): 1.

58 Kathy Marks, “Australia Rejects Proposal to Base a US Nuclear Aircraft Carrier Group near Perth,” The Independent, Australasia, August 3, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/australia-rejects-proposal-to-base-a-us-nuclear-aircraft-carrier-group-near-perth-8002078.html (accessed January 29, 2015).

30

Obama’s government has repeatedly stressed the importance of its alliance with

Japan, yet it has conveyed its apprehensions about deteriorating Japanese relations

with South Korea and China.59 Declining relations between the countries stem chiefly

from the Japanese government’s mishandling of sensitive historical issues related to its

colonial past. In February 2014, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe ordered a review

of the 1993 Kono Statement, which apologized for the use of comfort women (mostly

Korean) by the Japanese military before and during the Second World War. In 2013,

Abe also upset China and South Korea by questioning the 1995 Murayama Statement,

which apologized for Japan’s destructive and aggressive behaviour throughout the war

and early 1900s. Rather than “releasing” Japan to counterbalance against China, the

United States has encouraged Japan to act as a responsible regional leader. In

December 2013, Vice President Joe Biden advised Abe against visiting the Yasukuni

Shrine, where fourteen war criminals are honoured.60 The United States was

unsuccessful in that case, as relations soured between Japan and China as well as

Japan and South Korea. However, the United States achieved a breakthrough in its non-

proliferation agenda in March 2014 when Japan gave up control over its nuclear

stockpile to the United States.61 Hundreds of kilograms of plutonium and uranium were

removed from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency and transferred to the United States

(although some plutonium and uranium remains in Japan, where it first arrived in the

1960s from the United Kingdom for research purposes).62 This occurred in the wake of

public Chinese outcries about its fear of Japanese right-wing political leaders driving

Japan towards nuclear armament.

59 Jeffrey A. Bader, “U.S. Policy: Balancing in Asia and Rebalancing to Asia,” Brookings, India-

U.S. Policy Memo (September 2014): 14. 60 Mark Landler, “Obama Juggles Itinerary in Bid to Ease Tensions between Two Asian Allies,”

The New York Times A10, March 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/world/asia/obama-juggles-itinerary-in-bid-to-ease-tensions-between-two-asian-allies.html?_r=0

61 Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, “Japan to Let U.S. Assume Control of Nuclear Cache,” The New York Times A1, March 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/asia/japan-to-let-us-assume-control-of-nuclear-cache.html?_r=0

62 Richard McGregor, James Fontanella-Khan and Jonathan Soble, “Japan, Italy and Belgium Hand Nuclear Material to US,” The Financial Times, March 24, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a81601e-b347-11e3-b09d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3SJuK8YSs (accessed February 20, 2015).

31

The United States has also encouraged Japan to “normalize” its military by

revising its pacifist constitution, which renounces offensive war and prohibits the

maintenance of armed forces, so that it can better defend itself and its allies. Japan’s

gradual shift towards the “normalization” of its military is influenced significantly by its

assessment of the sustainability (or lack thereof) of the American rebalance.63 Ironically,

this has led to the United States being more satisfied with Japan’s increased military

investment. The Obama government supports a larger contribution from Japan in all

levels of regional security.64 While China and South Korea protested Japanese Prime

Minister Shinzō Abe’s decision to drop its ban on collective self-defence in July 2014,

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel affirmed that Japan had enhanced avenues for

bilateral cooperation.65 Japan’s reinterpretation of the constitution is qualified in that

Japan can only “[aid] an ally with which it has a very close relationship.”66 Yet, the United

States is Japan’s only official ally, which gives Japan the ability to assist the United

States in humanitarian operations and to be a more active American security partner.67

Despite disagreements between Obama and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama

of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) between September 2009 and June 2010, the

United States and Japan abandoned plans to relocate the Okinawa base amidst

increasing fears about China’s growing assertiveness.68 Before resigning, Hatoyama had

sought a more independent Japanese foreign policy and an equal partnership with the

United States, but quickly realized the extent of his country’s reliance on the American

military.

The American alliance with South Korea has not been as deep as with Japan

and Australia during the Obama presidency. South Korea has not made any big

63 Henry Kissinger, World Order, (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), 191. 64 Brad Glosserman, “The US ‘Rebalance’ and the US-Japan Alliance*,” Asian Issue Brief,

Analysis, No. 189 (July 2013): 6. 65 Hayley Channer, “Steadying the US Rebalance to Asia: The Role of Australia, Japan and

South Korea,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Strategic Insights (November 10, 2014): 2. 66 Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview: The Rebalance Remains a

Reality,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 2 (September 2014): 8. 67 Japan has close strategic partnerships with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines for example,

but its only official ally is the United States. 68 Nigel Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America's Cold War Alliances (Palgrave

Macmillan: 2012), 89.

32

gestures towards the United States in the way that Australia did with the Darwin

deployment or Japan with its expanded defence capabilities.69 Most South Koreans have

a deep cultural respect for China and recognize the Chinese market’s increasing

importance to their own well-being.70 Many Korean elites resent the United States,

perceiving the Korean War as the result of a Sino-American strategic game. While the

United States is responsible for deterring any full-scale attack on South Korea, China is

relied on to prevent any smaller attacks.71 The United States, Japan, and South Korea

conducted numerous joint naval and air drills following North Korea’s sinking of the

Cheonan ship in March of 2010, which killed 46 South Korean crew members.72 South

Korean President Lee Myung-bak was furious and discontinued virtually all of South

Korea’s economic and political ties to the North after the incident.73 However, the United

States and South Korea reversed their decision to conduct joint exercises in the Yellow

Sea after Chinese officials strongly protested.74 China is sensitive to external military

activity in the Yellow Sea given that other countries historically used the Yellow Sea as a

gateway to Tianjin and Beijing. The naval drills were thus confined to the East Sea (or

Sea of Japan). Trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea, and

Japan has been limited on North Korea primarily due to tensions between Japan and

South Korea.

Nonetheless, consultation levels with South Korea have been upgraded during

the Obama administration to a “2+2” format, which means that both foreign and defence

ministers are present.75 Within America’s alliances worldwide, this is only the case for

South Korea, Japan, and Australia. 800 U.S. Marines have also been added to the

69 Channer, “Steadying the US Rebalance,” 3. 70 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 169. 71 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 175. 72 Ali, Asia-Pacific Security, 157. 73 Christopher Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2011),

201. 74 Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 174. 75 Thalakada, Unipolarity, 95.

33

contingent of 28,500 American soldiers in South Korea since 2008.76 After numerous

North Korean provocations and subsequent South Korean requests, in 2010 the Obama

government agreed to continue its wartime control over South Korea’s armed forces

from 2012 until 2015.77 In April 2013, the United States deployed the Terminal High

Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), a missile defence system, to Guam as a precaution

against North Korea’s ballistic missile threat.78 In October 2014, following a further

pattern of North Korean aggression the United States again agreed to retain its wartime

command of Seoul’s military until the mid-2020s.79 At the G20 Summit in June 2010,

Obama made a commitment to complete the free trade agreement (FTA) with South

Korea.80 Negotiations over free trade with South Korea in November 2011 led to an

agreement that demonstrated the power of the American bargaining position, signified

by concessions made by South Korea on various labour and environmental clauses.81

Obama was also worried that if the United States did not complete the FTA with South

Korea quickly (it entered into force in March of 2012), the EU would have the advantage

in Korea’s market over the United States by completing its FTA with South Korea’s

government first.82

The Philippines has sought expanded military cooperation with the United States

considering its perception of China’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. To

supplement their existing security treaty, under Obama the United States and the

76 Anthony Capaccio and Nicole Gaouette, “U.S. Adding 800 Troops for South Korea Citing

Rebalance,” Bloomberg, Business, January 7, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-07/u-s-adding-800-troops-for-south-korea-citing-rebalance (accessed January 30, 2015).

77 Harold, “Is the Pivot Doomed,” 94. 78 David Lerman and Gopal Ratnam, “U.S. to Deploy Anti-Missile System to Guam, Pentagon

Says,” Bloomberg, April 3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-03/u-s-to-deploy-thaad-anti-missile-system-to-guam-pentagon-says (accessed April 1, 2015).

79 Choe Sang-Hun, “U.S. and South Korea Agree to Delay Shift in Wartime Command,” The New York Times, October 24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/international-home/us-and-south-korea-agree-to-delay-shift-in-wartime-command.html?_r=0 (accessed March 20, 2015).

80 Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 105. 81 Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth, “Lean Forward,” 5. 82 Sang-young Rhyu, “Chapter 4: South Korea’s Political Dynamics of Regionalism: A

comparative Study of Korea-Japan FTA and Korea-U.S. FTA,” in Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific: The Role of Ideas, Interests, and Domestic Institutions, Eds. Vinod K. Aggarwal and Seungjoo Lee (New York: Springer, 2011), 86.

34

Philippines negotiated a framework agreement for American surveillance aircraft and

forces to be based at Philippine facilities. The signing of the April 2014 United States-

Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, an executive agreement and

not a formal treaty, was touted as a major milestone for the Obama administration.83 The

10-year security pact allows for American troops to be stationed on a rotating basis,

when the Philippines had banned U.S. military bases in the country in 1992.84 It aims to

build the Philippines’ capacity in dealing with maritime security and natural disasters.

Central though is that it “provides a legal framework for the increased rotational

presence of U.S. armed forces in the Philippines,” although the details of how many

troops and where they will be are still to be worked out.85 The Visiting Forces

Agreements also provides the United States the ability to conduct drills in the

Philippines. Joint military exercises between the Philippines and the United States have

quadrupled between 2011 and 2014, the Subic Bay alone having more than 100

American naval visits in 2014 compared to 54 in 2011.86 The generous assistance

provided by the United States after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in November 2013

garnered goodwill from the Philippines.

Thailand became a major non-NATO ally in 2003, designated as such by

President George Bush. Obama’s high-profile visit to Thailand in November 2012

immediately following his re-election was intended to revive cooperation with Thailand.87

As a result of the trip, Thailand joined the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was

welcomed by the Obama administration in its efforts to build wider support for its non-

83 Cossa and Glosserman, “The Rebalance Remains a Reality,” 3. 84 The Philippines had requested the withdrawal of American marines from the Subic Bay and

Clark Field bases in 1992. See Michael Holtz, “US Marine Accused of Murder in Philippines. A Blow to Obama’s Pivot?,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 2014.

85 Carl Thayer, “Analyzing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement: What Precisely does the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines do?,” The Diplomat, Flashpoints, May 2, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/analyzing-the-us-philippines-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/ (accessed January 29, 2015).

86 CNBC, “In Asia, Old US Alliances Face New Strains amid China’s Influence,” CNBC, Politics, November 8, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/id/102167038#. (accessed January 29, 2015).

87 Euan Graham, “Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 35, no. 3 (December 2013): 312.

35

proliferation initiative.88 Thailand and the United States also announced a Joint Vision

Statement for the first time in more than five decades of bilateral relations.89 The

statement focused on America’s training of Thailand’s military forces so that they could

increase their contributions towards regional collective security, according to then

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta.90 It included new ground in interoperability and

readiness for bilateral and multilateral missions.91

However, the joint statement involved few, if any, substantive measures.

Generally, Thai officials have responded negatively to the rebalance. Thai ministries,

academics, and private firms “concluded that Thailand must look beyond the US

alliance, which was more advantageous during the Cold War, and strengthen

engagement with China.”92 Thailand rejected America’s request to access its U-Tapao

air base. Thailand displays little interest in Cobra Gold, “the most elaborate annual U.S.

military exercise in Southeast Asia,” which is held in Thailand.93 Beginning as a bilateral

United States-Thailand operation in 1982, Cobra Gold is now the largest multinational

exercise in Asia.94 In 2012, China’s military accepted an American invitation to the event

for the first time as an observer. Two years later, China was invited to participate in the

humanitarian operations though not in the war-fighting exercises.95 The exercises were

intended as a strong demonstration of force to Chinese spectators. Thai participants

tend to be lower-level military officers, as the higher-ranking officials regard the 10-day

88 Office of the Spokesperson, “Thailand Endorses the Proliferation Security Initiative,” U.S.

Department of State, Washington, DC, Media Note, November 19, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200849.htm (accessed February 2, 2015).

89 Chuck Hagel, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel,” U.S. Department of Defense, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 1, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5251 (accessed October 22, 2014).

90 Cheryl Pellerin, “U.S., Thai Leaders Move Defense Alliance Into 21st Century,” U.S. Department of Defense, American Forces Press Service, November 15, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118550 (accessed February 2, 2015).

91 Graham, “Southeast Asia,” 320. 92 Graham, “Southeast Asia,” 319. 93 Sheldon Simon, “US-Southeast Asia Relations: High-Level Attention,” Comparative

Connections 14.3 (January 2013): 57. 94 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (London: Yale University

Press, 2014), 226. 95 Hayton, The South China Sea, 229.

36

event as disruptive to their ongoing duties. United States-Thailand relations have been

further hampered by the May 2014 coup d’état (against the caretaker government in

place which had been the subject of major political protests since November 2013) led

by General Prayuth Chan-ocha of the Royal Thai Army. Prayuth has consolidated his

power ever since, cracking down on any opposition and banning discussions about

democracy.96 The Thai government protested the U.S. State Department’s July 2014

report characterizing it as having failed to address human trafficking.97 Thailand has

resisted the American rebalance, as few inroads have been made in the alliance.

3.2.2. Partnerships

Secondly, the Obama administration seeks new partnerships with China, India,

New Zealand, and Southeast Asian countries. The pursuit of more harmonious relations

with China is sometimes elevated to a core principle of the rebalance.98 China is

America’s second-largest trading partner and third-largest export market.99 Essential for

the United States is the management of inevitable competition, and cooperation on

issues where there are common interests. Complementary interests include fighting

terrorism, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, global economic stability, environmental

protection, and stopping the spread of epidemics.100 Obama was able to convince former

Chinese President Hu Jintao that coordinated sanctions against Iran (to deter it from

pursuing its nuclear ambitions) was a “core interest” of the United States and that China

should cooperate if it wanted its core interests to be acknowledged.101 However, Chinese

industries benefited economically from sanctions against Iran by filling the void of the

96 Cossa and Glosserman, “The Rebalance Remains a Reality,” 9. 97 Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, “Tier Placements,” U.S. Department of

State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2014, Report, June 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/226649.htm (accessed February 2, 2015).

98 Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific.” 99 Michael D. Swaine, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century

(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), 4. 100 Amitai Etzioni, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘Concept’: A Critique,” International Politics 51, no. 5

(2014): 590. 101 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 196.

37

Western businesses that had been driven away by the sanctions.102 Many Chinese

companies have failed to comply with the sanctions regime. In March 2009, Obama and

Hu Jintao defused tensions following the harassment of the USNS Impeccable naval

surveillance ship by numerous Chinese vessels near China’s Hainan Island (China

claimed the American ship was within its exclusive economic zone [EEZ]).103 This was

one of the tensest moments between the United States and Chinese militaries in the

past decade. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates affirmed that competition can

likewise benefit both countries, as long as it remains “peaceful competition.”104 The

Obama administration aims for the optimum balance of managing competition and

expanding cooperation in its China policy.

It also expects China to concede that the United States is an Asia-Pacific power

with a legitimate role on the continent.105 The Obama administration contends that it is

not containing China, but attempting to shape the environment for its choices.106

Enhanced dialogue mechanisms serve to mitigate the notion that zero-sum competition

between the United States and China exists. The United States agrees with China’s

catchphrase of nurturing a “new model of relations between major powers,” which is

based on building cooperation, managing competition, and avoiding rivalry.107 However,

Obama only accepts this if China acts as a constructive, responsible leader in the

international community.108 At the 2011 APEC meeting in Hawaii, Obama proclaimed

102 Nasr, The Dispensable Nation, 243. 103 Ali, Asia-Pacific Security, xii. 104 Robert M. Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific QA,” U.S.

Department of Defense, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 4, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4634 (accessed October 22, 2014).

105 Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 106 Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the

Obama Administration,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 3 (July 2009): 91. 107 Chuck Hagel, “Secretary of Defense Speech,” U.S. Department of Defense, International

Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1857 (accessed October 7, 2014).

108 John F. Kerry and Jack Lew, “Interview with Wang Guan of CCTV,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, June 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/06/228904.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

38

that China “must play by the rules in international relations.”109 Chinese officials have

resisted this notion because they do not believe that China is ready yet to take on these

responsibilities of upholding the international system while still developing, and because

of what it sees as America’s inconsistent adherence to its own international duties.110

Some Chinese officials claim that America’s encouragement of China as a “responsible

power” is a trap to force China to take on more international burdens than China can

manage.111 China’s government is divided and unsure about what global governance

should constitute for its own role.112 Thus, Obama’s attitude towards China became

tougher after a softer, more conciliatory tone in his first year.113

The Obama administration reiterates that improving United States-Chinese

military-to-military relations through open communication channels is essential to

confidence building and upgraded cooperation.114 The Obama government has tried to

focus on less controversial aspects of its military relationship with China. Obama’s 2010

Nuclear Posture Review report removed provocative language regarding Taiwan that

had been there since Bush’s first report in 2002, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR) spoke mainly about China’s potential for cooperation on major global

challenges.115 The establishment of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which

merged the Senior Dialogue and the former economic dialogue, aims to build confidence

amongst high-level senior officials. Both the Treasury and State departments run the

S&ED and Hillary Clinton’s early chairing of the discussions signalled its prioritization by

109 Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like?” 27. 110 Etzioni, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘Concept’,” 587. 111 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 40. 112 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 128. 113 De-Yuan Kao, “Chapter 17: China Policy,” in The Obama Presidency: A Preliminary

Assessment, Eds. Robert P. Watson, Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford and Douglas M. Brattebo (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2012), 268.

114 Robert M. Gates, “America’s Security Role in the Asia–Pacific: QA,” IISS, Secretary of Defense, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 30, 2009, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2009-99ea/first-plenary-session-5080/americas-security-role-in-the-asia-pacific-qa-f30f (accessed October 22, 2014).

115 The QDR is a wartime report released by the Defense Department on its strategy and what reforms are necessary. See David M. Lampton, “Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Suspicion in U.S.-China Relations,” The National Bureau of Asian Research 93 (June 2010): 20.

39

the Obama administration.116 It continues to convene annual meetings between high-

level civilian and military officials. Practical cooperative areas discussed have included

counter-drug efforts, anti-proliferation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster

relief, and counter-piracy.117 Unfortunately, the implementation has lacked follow-through

and the meetings are held only annually as opposed to biannually under the old format

when the Strategic and Economic dialogues were separate.118 American Congressional

legislation also places limits on the amount and level of military-to-military exchanges

possible with China.119

Obama realizes that the biggest challenge to the United States-Chinese

relationship may be economic, rather than military.120 Controversial in the relationship

was Obama’s September 2009 decision to place tariffs on Chinese-made tires to prevent

further jobs from being lost to China.121 Hu Jintao was resentful but did not retaliate

seriously. Chinese officials also rejected any notion of a Group of Two (G2) with the

United States, arguing that it had to focus on its internal development and

modernization.122 The idea of a G2 was not officially endorsed by the Obama

administration, but was floated by many foreign policy pundits during 2009.123 The

number of trade disputes between the United States and China is increasing, although

Obama expects this to be the case as the economic ties between the countries

expand.124 Obama points out that the United States continues to have major

116 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 133; Sally Burt, “Chapter 1: At the President’s Pleasure:

Constraints on Presidential Development of Foreign Policy in Sino-US Relations,” in Global Perspectives on US Foreign Policy: From the Outside In, Eds. Sally Burt and Daniel Anorve Anorve (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 23.

117 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” 17. 118 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 65. 119 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 77. 120 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 307. 121 Ali, Asia-Pacific Security, 42. 122 Ali, Asia-Pacific Security, 48. 123 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in

Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), 113. 124 Kurt M. Campbell, “Asia Overview: Protecting American Interests in China and Asia,” Assistant

Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, D.C., March 31, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/03/159450.htm (accessed March 27, 2015).

40

disagreements with the EU on subsidies for agriculture, steel, and aircraft as well as the

harmfulness of genetically modified foods; yet, the EU and the United States have a

highly cooperative relationship. Obama’s government relies on businesses to help

nurture the relationship with China, viewing it as a public-private partnership.125

American-Chinese cooperation on climate change has been difficult to achieve.

At the 2009 United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, the

Obama administration knew that it had to negotiate with China given that the two

countries are the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases.126 China’s leaders

viewed the proposed EU agreement as unrealistic and instead called a secret meeting

with India, Brazil, and South Africa. Obama heard about the meeting and pushed his

way past Chinese officials to join in. He pressured Premier Wen Jiabao into approving a

compromise by putting the onus of responsibility on China if the conference collapsed.127

While the Europeans were unhappy, they understood the lack of viable alternatives and

reluctantly accepted the non-binding deal Obama negotiated.128 Yet, following the

conference Obama was blocked by Congress in his attempt to push legislation for cap-

and-trade to fulfill the pledge to cut American carbon emissions to 17% below 2005

levels by 2020.129 This undermined the legitimacy of America’s agreement towards the

non-binding compromise from Copenhagen. That being said, in June 2013, Obama and

Jinping signed an agreement to eliminate hydrofluorocarbons, which was the first

specific arrangement between the United States and China on climate change.130 They

also agreed to upgrade discussions on energy policy to ministerial levels. The November

2014 United States-China joint announcement on climate change stated that the United

States intends to reduce its emissions by more than one-quarter of its 2005 output level

125 Campbell, “U.S. Engagement in Asia.” 126 Clinton, Hard Choices, 491. 127 Bader, Obama and China’s Rise, 67. 128 Clinton, Hard Choices, 500. 129 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 260. 130 Hydrofluorocarbons come from air conditioning units. See Clinton, Hard Choices, 505.

41

by 2025 and that China’s carbon emissions aim to peak by 2030.131 While there are no

binding targets, it is the first time that China has ever committed to peak its emissions.

The Obama administration has also sought improved intercultural exchange

through the U.S.-China Consultation on People-to-People Exchange, which is the formal

bilateral mechanism to discuss how to deepen intercultural understanding. The 100,000

Strong China is an educational exchange initiative that was officially launched by Hillary

Clinton and Chinese Vice Premier Liu Yandong in May 2010 in Beijing to increase the

number of Americans studying in China to 100,000 by the end of 2014. China’s

government has strongly supported the initiative and by 2012 had committed 20,000

scholarships for American students to study in China. The Obama administration relies

primarily on private businesses to fund the 100,000 Strong Foundation. Demonstrating

the stark differences in human capital with direct knowledge of the other country, in

2011-2012, only 14,000 American university students were studying in China whereas

China had 236,000 university students being educated in the United States.132 By July

2014, the target of 100,000 American students abroad in China had been surpassed.133

Secretary of State John Kerry has argued that this is critical for the long term as the

younger generation of Americans begin to increasingly take up more positions of

power.134

131 Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change,” The

White House, November 12, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change (accessed January 27, 2015).

132 Stephen A. Schwarzman, “Connecting Future Leaders: The Benefits of Student Exchange in a Multi-Polar World,” in “Strengthening US-China Relations, One Student at a Time – Perspectives from Leaders in the Field,” 100,000 Strong Foundation, Report, Washington, D.C. (September 2014): 17.

133 Carola McGiffert, “U.S. Reaches Major Milestone: 100,000 American Students Study in China,” Huffington Post, July 9, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carola-mcgiffert/us-reaches-major-mileston_b_5571793.html (accessed April 1, 2015).

134 John F. Kerry, “Remarks at the Consultation on People-to-People Exchange Plenary Session,” U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, July 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229076.htm (accessed April 1, 2015).

42

Although China is central to the Obama administration’s thinking with respect to

the rebalance, India is described as a “linchpin” within the strategy.135 India is the world’s

largest democracy, has potential for tremendous economic growth, and has raised its

profile in East Asia since establishing its “Look East” policy in 1991. India is on pace to

add 320 million more people to its population by 2030, making it the world’s most

populated country within the next 15 years.136 Trade between ASEAN and India is

booming and will quickly surpass US$80 billion annually.137 Importantly, the United

States and India initiated a strategic dialogue in 2010. India, the United States, and

Japan have also launched a trilateral dialogue to discuss and develop more coordinated

responses to problems along the Indo-Pacific corridor.

Yet, India is cautious not to agree to any formal alliance with the United States

because that would hasten Chinese assistance to India’s neighbours, especially

Pakistan, and India’s government fears that the United States may not be a reliable long-

term partner because of its domestic challenges and the potential for alteration of U.S.

policy towards China.138 In 2012 and 2013, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton

Carter worked with the Indian government on increasing America’s technology transfer

and the production of military assets inside India, but progress was constrained by

bureaucratic barriers in both the U.S. and India as well as concerns in India about

provoking China.139 India allocates more military resources to the potential threat of

Pakistan than to China.140 There are noteworthy disagreements between the United

States and India over Afghanistan, Pakistan, non-proliferation, trade, climate change,

and Indian participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Brazil-

Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) mechanism. India strives to retain an

135 Kurt M. Campbell and Brian Andrews, “Explaining the US ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” Chatham House,

The Asia Group, Americas 2013/01, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf (August 2013): 4.

136 Wallace Chip Gregson, “Rebalancing U.S. Security Posture in Asia,” Asia Policy 14 (July 2012): 46.

137 Yun, “The Rebalance to Asia.” 138 Mohan Malik, “India Balances China,” Asian Politics and Policy 4, no. 3 (2012): 363. 139 Stephen Burgess, “A Pivot to India? The US-India Strategic Partnership and Multipolarity in

Asia,” United States Air Force Academy, INSS Strategic Papers (April 2014): 9-10. 140 Kissinger, World Order, 210.

43

independent foreign policy and it also envies China’s rapid economic progress. Indian

leaders recognize their country’s value in geo-politics, and want to preserve their

maneuverability in relations in Asia and within the Middle East.141 Appropriately, India’s

response to the rebalance has been fairly measured.

After 25 years of little security interaction, New Zealand’s security relationship

with the United States has been re-established as a result of the rebalance.142 Security

ties had been cut by the United States in the 1980s after a major dispute over visits by

American nuclear ships.143 Yet, in Obama’s first year, intelligence sharing between the

countries was restored and New Zealand strongly supported U.S. membership in the

EAS. The 2010 Wellington Declaration and the 2012 Washington Declaration are not

binding, but have produced bilateral cooperation on maritime security, disaster relief,

and humanitarian assistance.144 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visited New Zealand

in November 2012, the first U.S. Secretary of Defense to do so in three decades.

Panetta even suggested that the United States would be happy to station troops in New

Zealand if New Zealand was open to hosting them.145 In 2014, a New Zealand naval ship

docked at Pearl Harbour for the first time in 30 years and participated in the American-

led Rim of the Pacific maritime warfighting training exercises.146

The Obama administration pursues greater ties to ASEAN countries, especially

Indonesia. The 2010 United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership Agreement

emphasized improving government-to-government and people-to-people relations, and

141 Kissinger, World Order, 208. 142 Kurt M. Campbell, “U.S. Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives,” Assistant Secretary, Bureau of

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2011, http://fpc.state.gov/155878.htm (accessed March 27, 2015).

143 Robert Ayson, “Choosing Ahead of Time?: Australia, New Zealand and the US-China Contest in Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 34, no. 3 (December 2012): 344.

144 Hagel, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel.” 145 Ayson, “Choosing Ahead of Time,” 347. 146 Gregory B. Poling and James Hurndell, “Pacific Partners Outlook: Why the Pacific Matters to

the Rebalance,” CSIS, Centre for International and Strategic Studies 4, no. 11 (December 4, 2014): 2

44

expanded cooperation in science, health, entrepreneurship, and technology.147 The

United States re-established cooperation with Kopassus, the Indonesian army’s principal

counter-terrorist arm, which has rebuilt itself after being found guilty of human rights

violations in the past. Military ties between the United States and Indonesia were fully

restored in 2010. There have been joint counterterrorism exercises; eight American AH-

64E Apache helicopters were sold to Indonesia; and a multiyear deal involving the sale

of 24 used F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia is being finalized.148 Indonesia supported

America’s entry into the EAS, especially given Obama’s high popularity among

Indonesian people.149 The United States and Indonesia participate in wider air combat

drills as part of Pitch Black, held in northern Australia, as well as in the maritime

Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercises.150

American relations with Singapore have strengthened as a result of the

rebalance. The QDR, in fact, identified Singapore as a strategic partner of the United

States.151 Singapore agreed to host up to four American Littoral combat ships.152 The

rotating combat ships were intended to allow the United States to be able to rapidly

conduct joint exercises with ASEAN navies. The first of the four ships deployed to

Changi Naval Base for eight months in 2013 was used to conduct joint bilateral

exercises with Singapore and multilateral ones with ASEAN.153 However, while the

Littoral combat ships are small and fast, naval experts contend that they are limited in

147 Office of the Spokesperson, “United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,” U.S.

Department of State, Washington, DC, October 8, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215196.htm (accessed September 25, 2012).

148 Sheldon Simon and Carl Baker, “US-Southeast Asia Relations: Obama Passes,” Comparative Connections 15, no. 3 (January 2014): 52.

149 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective on the U.S. Rebalancing Effort toward Asia,” NBR, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Commentary (February 26, 2013): 3.

150 Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview: US Rebalances as Others Squabble,” Comparative Connections 14, no. 2 (September 2012): 15.

151 Ralf Emmers, “Security and Power Balancing: Singapore’s Response to the U.S. Rebalance,” The New U.S. Strategy towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot, Eds. William T. Tow and Douglas Stuart (New York: Routledge, 2015), 148.

152 Sheldon Simon, “Philippines – An Exemplar of the US Rebalance,” Comparative Connections 15, no. 2, (September 2013): 51-60.

153 Emmers, “Security and Power Balancing,” 148.

45

their usefulness because of their vulnerability to aircraft and missiles in the region.154

Then Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was also quite skeptical of their effectiveness,

cancelling nearly half of the Navy’s program to produce more of the combat ships.155 The

2012 Third Country Training Program between the United States and Singapore has led

to the countries combining their resources to offer technical assistance to other ASEAN

governments, especially in capacity-building areas.156 They have conducted training

workshops on integrated water resource management for the Lower Mekong River.

Southeast Asian officials have been trained on disaster relief, humanitarian assistance,

road management, and energy efficiency among other topics.

Vietnam was mentioned as a potential “strategic partner” of the United States in

the 2010 QDR.157 Hillary Clinton also made reference to Vietnam as a strategic partner

on a visit to Hanoi later that year. In 2011, Vietnam and the United States signed a

comprehensive memorandum of understanding.158 This was largely motivated by

Vietnamese concerns about Chinese assertiveness over disputed islands in the South

China Sea. Two years later, another step was taken with the signing of a comprehensive

partnership.159 Vietnam’s foreign ministry conveyed to Washington that a comprehensive

partnership was more in line with the bilateral relationship than a strategic partnership.160

Vietnam is a negotiating party to the TPP and some of Obama’s smaller economic

initiatives in Southeast Asia. In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry announced

a partial lifting of the American ban of military sales to Vietnam, allowing for the “transfer

154 David Lerman and Nick Taborek, “Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships Expensive,” The Herald,

February 22, 2013, http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20130222/NEWS02/702229905 (accessed February 12, 2015).

155 Anthony Capaccio, “Hagel Expands on Reservations’ about Littoral Combat Ship,” Bloomberg, Business, February 25, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-02-25/hagel-expands-on-reservations-about-littoral-combat-ship (accessed February 12, 2015).

156 Prashanth Parameswaran, “Explaining US Strategic Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific Region,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 36, no. 2 (August 2014): 267.

157 Parameswaran, “US Strategic Partnerships,” 267. 158 Leon E. Panetta, “The US Rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific,” U.S. Department of Defense,

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681 (accessed October 22, 2014).

159 Parameswaran, “Explaining US Strategic Partnerships,” 275. 160 Parameswaran, “Explaining US Strategic Partnerships,” 280.

46

of defence equipment…for maritime security purposes only.”161 Vietnam is still banned

from buying most American weapons because of its poor human rights record.162 In fact,

the 2013 comprehensive partnership document was fairly limited in its ambitions given

the obvious differences in political systems between the countries.163 Regular high-level

dialogue between the foreign ministries has not taken place either. Therefore, while

bilateral relations have improved and been spurred on by Chinese behaviour in the

South China Sea, there are limitations given Vietnam’s non-democratic regime.

Myanmar sits at Southeast Asia’s heart, strongly influenced by China and India.

The Bush administration isolated Myanmar, refusing to meet its leaders because of the

country’s deplorable human rights record.164 This approach forced ASEAN to choose

between the United States and Myanmar.165 After the Obama administration’s review of

U.S. foreign policy upon taking office, Obama tried an “overall engagement policy” with

Myanmar.166 Obama’s government suspended or lifted many sanctions against Burma

(in return for moderate reforms) and met Burmese leaders in an attempt to stimulate

further democratic changes. After the first two years of the Obama presidency, the

Obama administration was disappointed with the lack of political progress in Myanmar,

but stuck with its engagement hoping that a change could be sparked. The Obama

administration realizes that Myanmar is at the very early stages of a potentially lengthy

democratic development.167 In late 2011, Clinton became the first Secretary of State to

visit Myanmar in more than 50 years.168 Clinton sought to convey a message to the

Burmese people that the United States would engage the country in the future. Obama

became the first sitting U.S. president to visit Myanmar in 2012. In 2013, U.S. Defense

161 Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview: (Almost) Everyone Pivots to the

Asia-Pacific,” Comparative Connections 16, no. 3, (January 2015): 13. 162 Simon and Baker, “Obama Passes,” 53. 163 Parameswaran, “Explaining US Strategic Partnerships,” 281. 164 Clinton, Hard Choices, 105. 165 Bader, China’s Rise, 95. 166 Campbell, “U.S. Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives.” 167 Derek J. Mitchell, “Press Roundtable at U.S. Embassy Beijing, China,” U.S. Department of

State, Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, U.S. Embassy, Beijing, China, December 13, 2011, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/12/178909.htm (accessed October 2, 2014).

168 Clinton, Hard Choices, 126.

47

Secretary Chuck Hagel asserted that the United States had begun engaging in limited

military-to-military relations with Myanmar.169 Some Obama officials defend closer

military relations because they argue that there is a “morality by osmosis” whereby direct

contact with American military officials will rub off on Burmese generals and improve

their ethics and respect for human rights.170 They also argue that Burmese leaders can

be incentivized by offers of assistance or cooperation with the United States.

Since Obama’s first visit to Myanmar, political progress in the country has

regressed by many accounts, especially with the growing persecution of the minority

Rohingya Muslim community, continued ties between the Burmese and North Korean

government, and an increasing number of land grabs against poorer rural citizens by the

repressive Burmese government.171 Nonetheless, Obama took a second visit to

Myanmar in November 2014 at the ASEAN summit and the United States has invited

Burmese military officials to the Cobra Gold multilateral military exercises in Thailand

since 2013.172

3.2.3. Multilateral Regional Institutions

Thirdly, the Obama administration has made a concerted effort to participate in

ventures with Asian institutions. Acknowledging that Asia’s organizations are “vastly less

mature [and] less developed than elsewhere,” Obama felt that a serious commitment to

entrenching a rules-based order required assisting in their development.173 The

American government seeks a more effective ASEAN while recognizing that ASEAN is

169 Hagel, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel.” 170 Walter Lohman, “Examining U.S.-Burma Military-to-Military Relations,” The Heritage

Foundation, Lehrman Auditorium, Washington, D.C., October 29, 2013, http://www.heritage.org/events/2013/10/burma (accessed February 4, 2015).

171 Bruce Einhorn, “Obama Visits Myanmar: A Success Story that has Soured,” Bloomberg, Business, November 13, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-13/obama-visits-myanmar-a-success-story-that-has-soured (accessed February 4, 2015).

172 Josh Kurlantzick, “Why Obama’s Courtship of Myanmar Backfired,” Bloomberg, Business, November 6, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-11-06/why-obamas-courtship-of-myanmar-backfired#p2 (accessed February 4, 2015).

173 Russel, “Transatlantic Interests in Asia.”

48

mainly a discussion forum.174 It hopes that its support will produce incremental changes

to ASEAN over the long run. That being said, the United States has attempted to bolster

the EAS as the region’s premier security discussion mechanism; in contrast, ASEAN

prioritizes the ARF. Hillary Clinton and other members of the Obama administration have

also articulated that certain transnational threats such as piracy, human trafficking, and

weapons proliferation require collective action and multilateral cooperation to properly

address.175

The United States has practiced what it describes as pro-active “forward-

deployed diplomacy” in the Asia-Pacific.176 Asia has been the site of numerous high-

profile visits by the president and Secretaries of States Clinton and Kerry and by lower-

ranking diplomats and experts on a wide range of issues.177 Obama visited Asia five

times during his first term; Clinton went 14 times throughout her time as Secretary of

State; and Defense Secretaries Panetta and Gates travelled there a combined 13 times

in Obama’s first four years.178 Even while many of these visits were more symbolically

important, high-level attention is a scarce commodity at such high levels of government.

During these visits, U.S. officials highlighted their respect for ASEAN centrality and “the

ASEAN Way.”179

Bob Gates argued that military strength is a vital deterrent for conflict, but

requires sustained non-military ties to maintain stability in the first place.180 At the

Shangri-La Dialogue in 2013, Hagel stated that the rebalance “is primarily a diplomatic, 174 Xenia Dormandy and Rory Kinane, “Asia-Pacific Security: A Changing Role for the United

States,” Chatham House Report (April 2014): 44. 175 Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like?” 11. 176 Hillary R. Clinton, “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” U.S. Department of State,

Secretary of State, Kahala Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii, October 28, 2010, http://m.state.gov/md150141.htm (accessed October 2, 2014).

177 Rahul Mishra, “Chapter 10: The US Rebalancing Strategy: Responses from Southeast Asia,” Asian Strategic Review, US Pivot and Asian Security, Eds. S. Muni and V. Chadha (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2014), 150.

178 Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia,” 5. 179 The ASEAN Way emphasizes patience, informality, pragmatism, evolution, and consensus,

rejecting Western styles of diplomacy. It is low-key, inclusive, non-discriminatory, and strongly protective of the principle of non-interference in other states’ affairs. See Campbell, “U.S. Engagement in Asia.”

180 Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.”

49

economic and cultural strategy.”181 Former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel

proclaimed that a cooperative security architecture boosts confidence and trust among

its members.182 At the 2010 Shangri-La Dialogue then Defense Secretary Gates stated

that multilateral dialogue reduces tensions to help a situation from escalating into a

violent conflict.183 Kerry consistently asserts that the overwhelming majority of American

actions in Asia are defensive.184 The Obama administration understands that China is

bound to produce further backlash from its neighbours if it continues to pursue such

expansive levels of military growth.185 The United States does not need to take

controversial steps in Asia, which will inflame tensions in the region; aggressive Chinese

behaviour has done much of the work of pushing Asian countries closer to the United

States.

Clinton signed the TAC, an American ambassador post to ASEAN was created in

2011, the United States sought and gained membership in the EAS, and Obama hosted

meetings with ASEAN leaders in each of his first two years.186 The United States has

cooperative initiatives with APEC on public health and trade facilitation; ASEAN on

education and economic support funding; the ARF on disaster preparedness; and the

EAS on clean energy and transnational crime.187 It leverages its expertise in areas such

as relief and reconstruction to build up goodwill.188 Seventy percent of global natural

disasters occur in Asia, which costs the region nearly $7USD billion annually.189

Cooperation on these types of non-traditional security threats is more easily welcomed

by Asian regional organizations, which are cautious not to antagonize China via greater

181 Hagel, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel.” 182 Hagel, “Secretary of Defense Speech.” 183 Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.” 184 John F. Kerry, “Opening Remarks at ASEAN Regional Forum,” U.S. Department of State,

Secretary of State, Naypyitaw, Burma, August 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230518.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

185 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 4. 186 Bader, China’s Rise, 144. 187 Manyin et. al, “Pivot to the Pacific?,” 18. 188 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 323. 189 Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S. Engagement in the 2014 ASEAN Regional Forum,” U.S.

Department of State, Washington, DC, August 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230479.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

50

traditional military cooperation. The ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF DiREx), formed

in 2009, has played a substantial role in preparing Asian governments for calamities and

is the most notable regional multilateral undertaking.190 The United States has been a

strong supporter of ARF DiREx although then-ASEAN chair Vietnam chose not to carry

out the exercises in 2010.

The United States created the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2009 to assist

less-developed ASEAN members (Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam)

in supporting education, healthcare, infrastructure, and the environment. It aims to close

the development gap within ASEAN.191 The main issues on this agenda are water,

energy, food security, and female empowerment.192 Creation of an integrated water

management arrangement for the Mekong River is a priority given the detrimental

economic, environmental, and social consequences that Chinese dams in the upper

portion of the river have on the parts downstream.193 Many downstream rivers have been

devastated and all freshwater systems are under pressure.194 The Mekong River

Commission (MRC), the intergovernmental body that mediates disputes related to the

river, faces multiple challenges. The MRC is a consensus-driven grouping wherein

members have historically had difficulties coordinating, especially given China’s

reluctance to deliberate on sustainable development.195 Sustainability has been

underlined in the LMI given the rapid deforestation taking place in the area due to the

palm oil industry.196 The LMI aims to integrate its activities with those of the MRC.197 The

190 Catharin Dalpino, “Special Assessment: Asian Regionalism Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific,”

Comparative Connections 15, no. 1 (January 2013): 154. 191 Myanmar was added to the LMI in 2012 after demonstrating greater respect for human rights

and democratic principles. See Campbell and Andrews, “Explaining the US ‘Pivot’,” 6. 192 Office of the Spokesperson, “The Lower Mekong Initiative Sets Course for 2015-2020,” U.S.

Department of State, Washington, DC, August 9, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230466.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

193 Felix K. Chang, “The Lower Mekong Initiative & U.S. Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Energy, Environment & Power,” Orbis 57, no. 2 (April 2013): 284.

194 Gregson, “Rebalancing U.S. Security Posture,” 46. 195 Chang, “The Lower Mekong Initiative,” 299. 196 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at Young Southeast Asian Leaders

Initiative Town Hall,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, April 27, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/14/remarks-president-obama-young-southeast-asian-leaders-initiative-town-ha (accessed September 8, 2014).

51

LMI is the only forum in the region for tackling cross-border development and political

hurdles faced by these lesser developed states.198 These countries have seen major

funding increases for infrastructure development projects. LMI members have “advanced

the vision of narrowing the development gap in ASEAN and accelerating economic

integration in the lead-up to establishing the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015.”199

The Obama administration views the EAS as the premier regional security

platform. Obama was the first U.S. head of state to attend the EAS.200 The EAS is

preferred because it often defines the agenda for ASEAN-related institutions including

the ARF and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus, and it includes India,

Australia, New Zealand, and ASEAN+3.201 ASEAN+3 is made up of the ASEAN

members plus China, Japan, and South Korea. Despite not taking a position on the

territorial disputes themselves, the United States advocates for the negotiation of a

China-ASEAN Code of Conduct and a freeze on any controversial activity in the South

China Sea.202 This framework would establish hotlines between ASEAN countries and

China to mitigate the potential for escalation. While the Chinese government prefers

bilateral mechanisms to settle the maritime disputes since these provide the most

leverage to them, Southeast Asian governments prefer multilateral channels to negotiate

more equally.203 ASEAN states created the ARF partly to ensure continued American

involvement in Asia and to hold China accountable within a rules-based, multilateral

arrangement.204 Yet, the ARF operates by consensus and rarely discusses specific

197 Jean-Pierre A. Verbiest, “Regional Cooperation and Integration in the Mekong Region,” Asian

Economic Policy Review 8, no. 1 (June 2013): 185. 198 Glosserman, “The Rebalance Remains a Reality,” 5. 199 Office of the Spokesperson, “Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Lower Mekong Initiative Joint

Statement,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., August 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230474.htm (accessed September 29, 2014).

200 Sutter et. al, “Balancing Acts,” 34. 201 Sutter et. al, “Balancing Acts,” 15; Bader, China’s Rise, 14. 202 Daniel R. Russel, “Maritime Disputes in East Asia,” U.S. Department of State, Testimony

before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Washington, D.C., February 5, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

203 Dyer, Contest of the Century, 94. 204 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF

(London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 8.

52

problems, making it appealing to China at the same time.205 The Chinese repudiate

America’s involvement; China favours bilateral settings and ASEAN+3. China’s historic

tributary system has instilled in its leaders the sense that bilateral diplomacy is the only

effective way of resolving their problems.206 Nevertheless, Congress’s refusal to ratify

the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) inhibits the United States from

having a more authoritative voice at international forums on maritime issues. China has

used divide-and-rule tactics with ASEAN, targeting Cambodia because of its heavy

reliance on the Chinese economy.207 Relations between Cambodian Prime Minister Hun

Sen and Obama have been shaky because of Obama’s frank private objections

regarding Sen’s crackdown on political opposition.208

On North Korea, Obama’s administration has practiced what it describes as

“strategic patience” whereby its first principle is alliance coordination with South

Korea.209 Any serious effort to change North Korean behaviour would have to account

for the North-South Korean relationship. This differs from the previous Bush

administration’s approach, which took a harder-line against North Korea without

accounting for South Korea’s concerns about the potential consequences of a collapse

of the North Korean regime.210 Strategic patience implies that the United States would

wait for the North Korean regime to eventually drop its nuclear ambitions before

engaging it. Obama suspended American participation in the Six-Party Talks until North

Korea makes credible steps towards denuclearization.211 The Obama administration

designated four of its 16 special envoys worldwide to North Korea (one for North Korea,

one for the Six Party Talks, one to monitor the human rights situation in the country, and

205 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 58. 206 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 34. 207 Dyer, Contest of the Century, 124. 208 Simon, “High-Level Attention,” 62. 209 Scott Snyder, “US Policy toward North Korea,” SERI Quarterly 6, no. 1 (January 2013): 99. 210 Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2012), 135. 211 Glyn Davies, “U.S. Policy towards North Korea,” U.S. Department of State, Special

Representative for North Korea Policy, Statement before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Washington, DC, July 30, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229936.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

53

one for the implementation of UN sanctions against North Korea).212 The United States

has utilized trilateral mechanisms with Japan and South Korea as well as UN sanctions

against North Korea in an attempt to force it to the negotiating table. Following military

threats by North Korean officials against South Korea in March of 2013, the United

States and South Korea released a Counter-Provocation Strategy to deter North Korea

and reassure South Korea’s population.213 The publication of the document was

surprising, as military plans against North Korea are typically secretive. If South Korea

was attacked by the North, American and South Korean officials would resort to

proportional counter-strikes directed at the source of the attack with similar weaponry. In

addition, the United States has demonstrated strong displays of force to North Korea,

including the use of B-2 bombers, which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Problematic has been China’s unwillingness to pressure North Korea’s regime,

hampering major changes to North Korean behaviour or steps toward denuclearization.

China values North Korea as a buffer state in Northeast Asia and has concerns about

the ramifications of the regime collapsing. Korean unification could favour South Korea’s

(and America’s) interests over China’s, military escalation and intervention may result,

and the Yanbian Prefecture (an ethnically Korean part of Northeast China) would face

enormous numbers of refugees from Korea.214 Throughout the Obama presidency, the

United States has held to its policy of strategic patience towards North Korea.

Obama supported the transition from the European-dominated G8 to the G20,

which is more representative of rising powers’ increasing global economic power.215 At

the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, the G20 was designated by the leaders as the

“premier forum for international economic cooperation.”216 This change impacts Asia

greatly because within the G20 it has representation by China, Japan, India, Indonesia,

212 Cha, “The U.S. Alliance System in Asia.” 213 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Designs a Korea Response Proportional to the

Provocation,” The New York Times, April 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/asia/us-and-south-korea-devise-plan-to-counter-north.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed February 5, 2015).

214 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 214. 215 Campbell, “U.S. Engagement in Asia.” 216 I.M. (Mac) Destler, “Chapter 11: First, do no Harm: Foreign Economic Policy Making under

Barack Obama,” in U.S. Foreign Policy Today: American Renewal? Eds. Steven W. Hook and James M. Scott (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012), 205.

54

and South Korea while in the G8 it is only represented by Japan. The G20 was founded

in 1999 partly in response to the Asian economic crash, yet it held its first summit in

Washington in 2008.217 The replacement of the G8 by the G20 as the world’s premier

economic body was accelerated by the 2008 financial crisis. The United States realized

that the recovery of the global economy could not be managed without the leadership

and participation of emerging powers such as China, Brazil, and India.218 China’s

stimulus package was the world’s largest in 2009.219 China criticized the United States

for its part in triggering the financial crisis, but fulfilled its 2009 London and Pittsburgh

summit commitments.

Even though Asia’s numeric representation has increased in the G20, there has

been little concerted coordination by Asian governments.220 The G8 is underpinned by

respect for the values of democracy and freedom among its members, whereas the G20

has many different value systems and a larger membership makes it more challenging to

coordinate.221 The G20 further lacks a centralized bureaucracy.222 Japan prefers the G8

given its role as Asia’s lone representative. On the other hand, China is central to the

G20 whilst antagonistic towards the G8.223 China stresses its “developing” status lacking

the capabilities and willingness to take on the responsibilities of a global leader, and thus

views the G20 as more of an opportunity to gain greater recognition. Western countries

have found it difficult to pursue their interests within the G20.224 The United States was

disappointed by its inability to persuade other G20 members to pressure China to

217 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 31. 218 Dhaka Courier, “G-20 Summit in Seoul: An Effort to Rebalance Global Economy,” Dhaka

Courier, November 28, 2010. 219 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 31; Destler, “First, do no Harm,” 212. 220 Hugo Dobson, “Chapter 7: Asia Shaping the Group of 20 or the Group of 20 Shaping Asia,” in

The Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and the Global System, Eds. Christopher M. Dent and Jorn Dosch (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, 2012), 108.

221 Dobson, “Asia Shaping the Group of 20,” 114. 222 Reardon, “Shifting Global Paradigms,” 112. 223 Dobson, “Asia Shaping the Group of 20,” 113. 224 Hong Yousheng and Fang Qing, “Chapter 8: From G8 to G20: A Shift of the Dynamics of

Global Economic Governance,” in The Asia-Pacific, Regionalism and the Global System, Eds. Christopher M. Dent and Jorn Dosch (Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, 2012), 124.

55

change its ‘managed’ exchange rate system. Obama also failed in his effort to establish

a code of behaviour within the G20 to limit trade surpluses and foreign reserves.225

The United States has shown apathy in providing leadership for the Doha

Development Agenda and for other multilateral trade talks given the increasing geo-

political shift of economic power towards emerging markets.226 The American position

has been that the Doha Round does not sufficiently serve its interests and it was not

supported by its own agricultural or organized business constituencies.227 Also unable to

prevent China, India, and Brazil from creating deadlock at the World Trade Organization

(WTO) on lowering the safeguards necessary for agricultural imports, the Obama

administration was more motivated to centre its economic policy towards Asia on the

TPP.228 Obama was disappointed that he could not get the WTO to investigate China’s

trade practices more seriously. Between 2009 and 2012, the United States won some

cases against China in the WTO in the areas of solar energy, automobile exports, rare

earths, and intellectual property rights, but these cases took a long time to settle and

China did not fully comply with all of the rulings.229 Frameworks such as the TPP may

eventually serve as an alternative to the WTO.230

3.2.4. Economic Engagement

The fourth dimension of the rebalance is the fortification of the regional economic

architecture primarily through the high standards the TPP would set.231 The TPP was

first conceived of in 2005, when Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore planned an

FTA. The TPP was intended to liberalize members’ trade policies and boost economic

225 Reardon, “Chapter 5: Shifting Global Paradigms,” 114. 226 Amitendu Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, China, and India: Economic and Political

Implications (New York: Routledge, 2014), 2. 227 Destler, “First, do no Harm,” 210. 228 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 143. 229 Carter Dougherty, “Obama Opens Broad Challenge to China Export Aid in WTO Case,”

Bloomberg, Business, February 11, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-11/u-s-tells-wto-china-unfairly-aids-its-industries-with-subsidies (accessed April 16, 2015).

230 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 156. 231 Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific.”

56

growth and investment flows between the countries, as more countries expressed their

interest in joining over time.232 TPP negotiating parties now also include Australia,

Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam; Thailand and

Taiwan have expressed interest in joining. Negotiations were scheduled to commence in

March of 2009, but Obama delayed the start date to undertake a 6-month review of

America’s trade policy.233 In November of 2009, Obama announced America’s readiness

to negotiate over the TPP while being pressured by Asian leaders during a trip to

Singapore for the APEC meetings.234 The Obama administration hoped that if the TPP

could be negotiated quickly, it would help contribute to the doubling of American exports

in five years and an increase of two million American jobs.

By taking on a binding approach and many “next-generation issues,” TPP

negotiations have advanced using the model of the U.S. FTA with South Korea.235 The

TPP aims to eliminate and streamline tariffs on almost 11,000 tariff lines to increase

market access.236 Respect for fair competition in investment, labour, the environment,

automobiles, state-owned enterprises, and agriculture is central.237 Obama reiterates

that the TPP predates American involvement and some negotiating countries are also

part of the Chinese-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

negotiations.238 The TPP is open to all Asian countries, including China, if they adopt

TPP standards. Even though China dismissed the TPP early on, China has recently

indicated its interest in participating in the negotiations.239 Because only Brunei,

Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia are official parties to the negotiations from Southeast

232 BBC News, “TPP: What is it and Why Does it Matter?” BBC, Business, March 14, 2013,

http://www.bbc.com/news/business-21782080 (accessed February 6, 2015). 233 Searight, “The United States and Asian Regionalism,” 115. 234 Destler, “First, do no Harm,” 214; Searight, “The United States and Asian Regionalism,” 119. 235 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 22-23. 236 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 24. 237 Joseph R. Biden, “Remarks by Vice President Joe Biden on Asia-Pacific Policy,” The White

House, Office of the Vice President, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., July 19, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-asia-pacific-policy (accessed September 11, 2014).

238 Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview: US Rebalance Continues Despite Distractions,” Comparative Connections 15, no. 2 (May 2013): 5.

239 Russel, “Transatlantic Interests in Asia.”

57

Asia, Obama established the Expanded Economic Engagement (E3) Initiative to help

ASEAN members meet TPP standards through a non-binding arrangement.240

Particularly, the E3 seeks to boost opportunities for small- and medium-sized businesses

in the poorer ASEAN countries. The United States supports efforts by ASEAN to enact a

single-market economic community.241

Yet, within the TPP negotiations the United States has not pushed for a unified

market access deal.242 Instead, it has used tariff commitments within its existing bilateral

FTAs as a benchmark to appease its protectionist interests (and those sensitive ones

within its allies). The United States has FTAs with Australia, Chile, Peru, and Singapore

already.243 Negotiations have thus involved bilateral compromises inside the broader

multilateral agreement. For example, the TPP legitimates exceptions such as sugar

standards in the United States-Australian FTA.244 Achieving regulatory convergence

between members will be arduous. Domestic politics serve as the toughest challenge to

China’s entry into the TPP with its state-owned enterprises being the biggest hurdle.245

Asian economic regional arrangements, such as RCEP, differ fundamentally from the

TPP based on their ASEAN centrality, non-binding and voluntary nature, and less

extensive coverage of issues.246 The United States has free trade deals with countries in

Asia such as South Korea and Singapore, which are regarded as economically more

open, but many TPP participants like Vietnam and Malaysia have larger state sectors

and are more inward-looking in their domestic policies.247 Overall, Obama has been

criticized for not investing the energy and time into pressing Congress, including

240 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),” Executive

Office of the President, Free Trade Agreements, 2014, http://www.ustr.gov/tpp (accessed September 1, 2014).

241 Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, August 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230480.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

242 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 27. 243 David A. Gantz, “World Trade Law after Doha: Multilateral, Regional, and National

Approaches,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 40, no. 1-3 (2011). 244 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 28. 245 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 7. 246 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 83. 247 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 35.

58

Democrats in the Senate, to provide him with trade promotion authority to be able to

negotiate the TPP more quickly and credibly.248 In almost all of America’s historic FTAs,

presidents have sought trade promotion authority prior to negotiations.249 Not attaining

trade promotion authority beforehand makes it more difficult for other negotiating parties

to take the U.S. position credibly because they expect a diluted deal when Obama finally

does have to bargain with Congress to obtain it.

Furthermore, the Obama administration opted out of the China-led Asian

Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), first proposed by China in 2009 and signed into

agreement by 21 Asian countries in October of 2014 (an agreement to establish the

bank, not its official launching).250 China’s government has stated that it would use its

enormous capital to help the AIIB focus on practical, infrastructure needs in Northeast

Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, especially roads and mobile phone towers. It

invited non-Asian members to join including the United States and the EU, stressing that

the bank would complement, rather than replace, institutions such as the World Bank.

Nonetheless, Obama’s government strongly pressured its allies, particularly Australia, to

reject membership in the AIIB.251 Japan, already concerned that the AIIB would

undermine the Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB), opposed its creation. Japan

has more than twice the voting share of China in the ADB and the president of the ADB

has always been Japanese.252 Australia, Japan, and the United States cited the low

governance standards of the AIIB as the main reason for opting out.253

248 Walker, “Is America’s “Rebalance” to Asia Dead?” 249 Scott Miller and Matthew P. Goodman, “Chapter 1: Conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” in

“Pivot 2.0: How the Administration and Congress can Work Together to Sustain American Engagement in Asia to 2016,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Report, Eds. Michael J. Green and Nicholas Szechenyi (January 2015): 2.

250 Indonesia also became a member of the bank in November of 2014. See Alice D. Ba, “Is China Leading? China, Southeast Asia and East Asian Integration,” Political Science 66.2 (December 2014): 163.

251 S.R., “Why China is Creating a New “World Bank” for Asia,” The Economist, November 11, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6 (accessed March 7, 2015).

252 S.R., “Why China is Creating a New “World Bank”.” 253 Although, Australia later decided to join the AIIB in March 2015.

59

At the end of the fifth U.S.-China S&ED in July 2013, it was announced that

negotiations between the United States and China over a Bilateral Investment Treaty

(BIT) had begun. This represented “the first time that China has agreed to negotiate a

BIT that includes all stages of investment and sectors.”254 Obama remarked that he

hoped the BIT would create a “more level playing field” by empowering American

businesses to better compete with Chinese companies and invest more in China.255

According to the BIT, investment from a foreign entity should be treated the same as one

from a domestic entity. In November 2014, Obama and Xi agreed that the countries

would exchange their “negative lists” in early 2015.256 Areas on these lists are ones that

are excluded from the BIT, as the governments have to opt out of these protections.

3.2.5. Force Projection

The fifth component of the rebalance is force projection. Obama officials stress

that a flexible and geographically distributed naval and air presence in the Asia-Pacific is

necessary to ensure peaceful resolution of disputes and support a foundation for long-

term prosperity in Asia.257 This involves a far greater military presence in Southeast Asia

and Oceania given the traditional American focus on its bases in Northeast Asia. As the

2012 U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region report released by the

prominent think-tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, America’s force

254 Betsy Bourassa, “U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on the Bilateral Investment

Treaty Negotiations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, July 15, 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-Breakthrough-Announcement-.aspx (accessed April 17, 2015).

255 Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama at APEC CEO Summit,” The White House, Beijing, China, November 10, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/10/remarks-president-obama-apec-ceo-summit (accessed April 17, 2015).

256 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Economic Relations,” The White House, November 12, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/fact-sheet-us-china-economic-relations (accessed April 17, 2015).

257 Ashton B. Carter, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech,” U.S. Department of Defense, National Press Club, Washington, D.C., May 7, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1775 (accessed September 11, 2014).

60

posture in Southeast Asia is based on not having a large permanent footprint.258 The

Obama administration feels that the United States must be more sensitive to local

resistance to American bases in Asia and instead pursue more rotational troop

deployments and access agreements.259 To have a more sustainable presence,

Obama’s government helps to and encourages the capacity-building of its allies and

partners through increased joint exercises and training.260

In June 2014, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel gave China an ultimatum

“to unite and recommit to a stable regional order, or to walk away from that commitment

and risk the peace and security that have benefited millions of people throughout the

Asia-Pacific.”261 China’s assertiveness over its borders and the South and East China

Seas in recent years is reviving territorial disputes with India, Japan, Vietnam, and the

Philippines.262 This has led to calls for closer defence ties with the United States among

these governments. By 2020, the United States plans to deploy 60 percent of its navy in

the Asia-Pacific region, as opposed to the traditional 50/50 split between the Pacific and

Atlantic Oceans. This includes a net increase of one aircraft carrier, three Zumwalt

destroyers, four destroyers, two submarines, and ten Littoral Combat Ships.263 The flurry

of bilateral defence announcements between the United States and its various partners

and allies in Asia in 2011 and 2012 led to concerns among most Asian leaders that the

rebalance was too fixated on the military.264 Consequently, beginning in late 2012

Donilon and the White House began to drop the prominence of force projection in

various speeches and statements.

258 Gregory T. Kiley and Nicholas F. Szechenyi, “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific

Region: An Independent Assessment,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (August 2012): 19.

259 Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia,” 9. 260 Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like?” 23. 261 Bill Van Auken, “Washington Boasts of Military Buildup against China,” World Socialist Web

Site, June 25, 2014, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/06/03/pers-j03.html (accessed February 11, 2015).

262 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 8. 263 Ashton B. Carter, “The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective,” U.S.

Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, New York, August 1, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1715 (accessed September 11, 2014).

264 Green and Cooper, “Revitalizing the Rebalance,” 29-30.

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America’s new defence strategy specifies its challenges as emanating

predominantly from Asia.265 The Department of Defense considers the military, cyber,

and space capabilities of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be threatening to

American interests in Southeast and Northeast Asia.266 While China may not challenge

America symmetrically for many years, it poses a greater threat in asymmetric areas

such as cyber-attacks. The 2010 QDR commented on the PLA’s unwillingness to share

information about its military modernization.267 Obama officials have frequently pressed

their counterparts in China to be more transparent about China’s defence spending.268

This has generated unease in the Pentagon about China’s long-term intentions. There

are concerns in the Pentagon about America’s ability to defend Taiwan given the PLA’s

aggressive military posture, geographic advantages, and accumulation of intermediate-

range missiles.269 China’s latest medium-range ballistic missiles are capable of striking

all of Japan and its land-attack cruise missiles have range as far as the Philippines and

Japan.270 The PLA has further expanded markedly its fire support, power projection,

cyber, and anti-satellite weapons capabilities.

Improved coordination between the Navy and Air Force has been emphasized by

the American military establishment to inhibit China’s ambitions more efficiently. The

United States aims for “elastic cohesion,” the idea that its military fleet can be widely

dispersed, yet swiftly concentrated if necessary.271 In order to protect the high level of

resources being allocated towards the Navy and Air Force, the Army is being reduced

significantly in all of its components (National Guard, Reserve, and Regular Army).272

The Pacific Command (PACOM), located in Hawaii and responsible for nearly half of the

Earth’s surface area, has been adamant about protecting American hegemony in

265 Leon E. Panetta, “America’s Pacific Rebalance,” Project Syndicate, World Affairs, December

2012. 266 Gates, Duty, 528. 267 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010,” 11. 268 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 43. 269 David W. Kearn, Jr, “Air-Sea Battle and China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge,”

Orbis 58, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 133. 270 McDonough, “America’s Pivot,” 19. 271 Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 272 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” 29.

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Asia.273 The 2010 Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept is the Pentagon’s response to China’s

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy.274 While it is more of an evolution of

American defence strategy than a fundamental overhaul, A2/AD is designed to stop an

adversary’s movement to and within a specific theatre of potential conflict.

Understanding that it could not match America’s military one-for-one, China has been

developing an asymmetric strategy with capabilities to exploit American vulnerabilities

including outdated American computer and satellite systems.275 Pentagon officials

contend that ASB is directed at neutralizing all A2/AD schemes, but the threat emanating

from Iran (the only other state with a developed A2/AD system) is limited and can likely

be subverted with conventional forces.276 ASB assumes that every domain (cyber, air,

space, land, and maritime) will be challenged in America’s attempts to access the

Western Pacific in the event of a major conflict.277

ASB concentrates on the PLA’s weakest links in the chain of command, namely

in control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and base launchers.278

It threatens a first-strike onto mainland China to disable Chinese long-range missile

launchers and surveillance systems and networks, thus crippling China’s capacity to

launch submarine attacks in its coastal waters and offensives into Taiwan.279 The

American military would seek to take the initiative if conflict was to arise. ASB has been

advertised as a means to make the American military so overwhelmingly superior that it

deters China from even considering resorting to military measures.280

In the case of aggressive Chinese behaviour over the contested Senkaku

Islands, the United States affirms its commitment to its security alliance with Japan

273 Ali, Asia-Pacific Security, 6. 274 Dyer, Contest of the Century, 115. 275 Etzioni, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘Concept’,” 579. 276 Kearn, “Air-Sea Battle,” 132. 277 Kearn, “Air-Sea Battle,” 136. 278 Sutter et. al, “Balancing Acts,” 13. 279 McDonough, “America’s Pivot,” 17. 280 Etzioni, “The Air-Sea Battle ‘Concept’,” 577.

63

because Japan has administrative authority over the islands.281 U.S. officials have said

that the United States would support Japan in “retaining administrative control of the

(islands).”282 When the Chinese declared an ADIZ over much of the East China Sea in

November 2013, the United States denounced the declaration and immediately flew two

B-52 bombers through that airspace.283

The United States also criticizes China’s “pattern of provocative and unilateral

behaviour” around the South China Sea.284 In response to assertive Chinese behaviour

in 2010, the United States indicated its commitments to its allies and to the peaceful

resolution of territorial disputes through Hillary Clinton’s speech at the July ARF

meeting.285 Clinton rejected China’s outright claim to the South China Sea in favour of an

approach of “principle” hinging on a negotiated code of conduct between China and

ASEAN.286 Clinton’s raising of the South China Sea disputes was the first time that they

had been raised at an ARF meeting and the first time that such a high-ranking American

official outlined America’s official policy on the South China Sea.287 This gave the

following ASEAN member states’ leaders the political cover and confidence necessary to

take up the issue within their speeches as well. China claims over 80 percent of the

South China Sea, although it has not referenced the specific land features that it

owns.288 U.S. officials consider China’s “nine-dashed line” as dubious. The nine-dashed

line is vague and without precise coordinates, but is based on China’s assertion of

281 The Senkaku Islands are known as the Diaoyu Islands in China and the Diaoyutai Islands in

Taiwan. See Kerry and Lew, “Interview with Wang Guan.” 282 Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 283 Clinton, Hard Choices, 74. 284 Michael Fuchs, “Fourth Annual South China Sea Conference,” U.S. Department of State,

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, July 11, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/07/229129.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

285 It should be noted that the rumours that China added the South China Sea to its “core interests” in 2010 remain unconfirmed. See Sebastian Heilmann and Dirk H. Schmidt, China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations: An Unconventional Global Power (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Maryland, 2014), 4.

286 Nasr, The Dispensable Nation, 249. 287 Hayton, The South China Sea, 191. 288 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 47-8.

64

“historic waters.”289 China’s claim to the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands hinges upon

references to the islands in ancient documents.290 Yet, the texts do not identify which

islands are specified. China’s claim infringes on the EEZ of other claimants, but is not

technically illegal under UNCLOS because it is not demarcated by longitude and

latitude.291 However, UNCLOS makes no mention of historic rights, which are the

grounds for China’s claim.292

With respect to the territorial disputes in the East or South China Seas, the

United States only takes a position on how the claims are resolved. It takes no side “on

any competing sovereignty claim.”293 The United States opposes actions that undermine

freedom of navigation and regular trade relations. Kerry asserts that the United States

“cannot impose solutions on the claimants in the region,” but that it favours good-faith

negotiations such as those between Indonesia and the Philippines, which resulted in a

settlement after twenty years of disputes.294 After leaving office, Kurt Campbell explained

that the Obama administration believes that there are no realistic short-term solutions for

the disputed islands (that would satisfy all parties), so the Obama government feels that

it is better to wait for a resolution in the future.295 Regarding intensifying disputes

between China and the Philippines over contested islands in the South China Sea,

Obama officials have emphasized that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty applies only to

attacks on the Philippines’ territory, not the South China Sea.296 In contrast to its

intransigence over the maritime disputes, China has demonstrated a willingness to

289 Michael McDevitt, “The South China Sea and U.S. Policy Options,” American Foreign Policy

Interests 35, no. 4 (July 2013): 176. 290 Hayton, The South China Sea, 97. 291 McDevitt, “The South China Sea,” 178. 292 Hayton, The South China Sea, 251. 293 Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific.” 294 John F. Kerry, “U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement,” U.S. Department of State, East-

West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 13, 2014, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230597.htm, (accessed September 2, 2014).

295 Amitai Etzioni, “U.S. Policy on Asia: Where do we go from Here?” YouTube, Interview with Kurt Campbell, Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 8, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2NwtHqZQ_Io (accessed April 16, 2015).

296 Sheldon Simon, “US-Southeast Asian Relations: ASEAN Stumbles,” Comparative Connections 14, no. 2 (September 2012): 52.

65

negotiate on land agreements, conceding a substantial majority of disputed lands to

Afghanistan, Nepal, Laos, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, North Korea, and Tajikistan.297

However, most of these territories were not highly valued economically or strategically

by Chinese leaders.

Consistent with the Obama administration’s enduring position on the disputes is

the 2014 suggestion by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel for a “voluntary

freeze” on all contentious activities in the South China Sea until an ASEAN-China code

of conduct is formalized.298 American statements at the annual Shangri-La Asian

Security Summits and on the South China Sea more generally have remained largely

unchanged throughout Obama’s presidency. Furthermore, the Obama administration

has continued to adhere to the Three Communiques and the one-China policy regarding

Taiwan.299 Like previous administrations, it opposes unilateral attempts to adjust the

status quo. Obama has also remained committed to America’s arms sales to Taiwan.

Until September 2010, China cut off military-to-military relations with the United States

following the January 2010 U.S. decision to supply weapons to Taiwan.300 Yet, while

upholding its obligations from the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to provide a minimum

standard of defence capacity to the Taiwanese, the United States opposes

independence for Taiwan.301 Obama has pressed Taiwan’s government to continue to

expand its integration with China.302

The Obama administration has made efforts to improve its traditionally very weak

military-to-military relations with China. Hillary Clinton sought to resume mid-level

military discussions with China only a few weeks after taking office; she cited wanting to

broaden engagement with civil society on major global challenges such as climate

297 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 15. 298 Sheldon Simon, “US-Southeast Asia Relations: Enhancing the Rebalance,” Comparative

Connections 16, no. 2 (September 2014): 50. 299 Panetta, “The US Rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific.” 300 Heilmann and Schmidt, China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations, 162. 301 Gates, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific QA.” 302 Yu-tai Ts’ai, “Chapter 2: A Rising China and Obama’s Foreign Policy: Taiwan’s New Security

Dilemma,” in Global Perspectives on US Foreign Policy: From the outside In, Eds. Sally Burt and Daniel Anorve Anorve (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 40.

66

change.303 The Department of Defense has expressed its interest in improving the

military-to-military relationship through various speeches, especially while Leon Panetta

was Secretary of Defense.304 During Obama’s first term, the administration’s approach to

improving military-to-military relations was based on: creating consistent lines of

communications between senior leaders; increasing the safety of American and Chinese

forces that were operating in increasingly close proximity; providing more transparency

about each side’s intentions and capabilities; and enhancing Chinese engagement with

multilateral institutions.305 After the temporary cessation of military-to-military relations by

China following the American decision to approve a major arms sale to Taiwan in 2010,

military-to-military engagement has expanded substantially.306 Top military officials from

both countries have frequently visited the other with the hopes of improving

communication and cooperation. Bilateral exercises have increasingly occurred in the

areas of disaster relief, search and rescue, anti-piracy, and humanitarian assistance. In

2014, China participated in the Rim of the Pacific exercises for the first time.307 PLA

General Fang Fenghui toured the nuclear-powered aircraft, the USS Ronald Reagan in

May 2014; in April, the PLA invited then Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel to tour the

Liaoning, China’s first aircraft carrier.308 In 2014, Admiral Harry B. Harris replaced

Admiral Samuel Locklear as Chief of America’s Pacific Command, and said that like

Locklear he would continue to pursue closer military-to-military ties with China.309

303 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 113. 304 Scott W. Harold, “Expanding Contacts to Enhance Durability: A Strategy for Improving U.S.-

China Military-to-Military Relations,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2013): 106. 305 Harold, “Expanding Contacts,” 111. 306 Shannon Tiezzi, “Surprise: US-China Military Ties Are Actually Improving,” The Diplomat,

June 27, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/surprise-us-china-military-ties-are-actually-improving/ (accessed February 12, 2015).

307 Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 308 Shannon Tiezzi, “US-China Military Relations: The Great Debate,” The Diplomat, December

19, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/12/us-china-military-relations-the-great-debate/ (accessed February 12, 2015).

309 Tiezzi, “US-China Military Relations.”

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3.2.6. Democratic Values and Human Rights

The sixth pillar is the promotion of democratic values. Despite theories that Asia

is poorly suited for democracy, the United States highlights the triumphs of the world’s

largest democracy in India.310 While largely avoiding lecturing China over its human

rights problems, the United States encourages Asian countries to adopt India’s

democratic model over China’s state capitalism.311 The Obama administration argues

that the Indian system is more sustainable despite the inefficient economic policies of

recent Indian governments. Obama believes that democratic institutions have proven to

be the world’s most durable form of government.312 American officials contend that they

are also far less likely to come into conflict with one another.313 Experts predict that

India’s population will continue to grow until peaking in 2060, at which point, nearly one-

fifth of the world’s economy will be driven by India.314 Progressively aligning interests

between India and the United States will also lead to improved relations.315

Obama’s approach involves intensifying people-to-people ties with all Asian

countries, particularly through the funding and cultivating of civil society organizations.316

In 2013, Obama announced the creation of the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative

to increase American engagement with Southeast Asia’s next generation of leaders and

growing middle class population.317 Significant in this realm has been the increase in the

number of student exchanges, English-language teaching schools for government

officials and businesspeople in ASEAN countries, and increased access to American

310 William J. Burns, “Keynote Address at the Asia Society Policy Institute Launch,” U.S.

Department of State, Deputy Secretary of State, New York, April 8, 2014, http://www.state.gov/s/d/2014/224558.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

311 Clinton, Hard Choices, 60. 312 Obama, “Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall.” 313 Hagel, “Secretary of Defense Speech.” 314 Yun, “The Rebalance to Asia.” 315 Burns, “Asia Society Policy Institute.” 316 Daniel R. Russel, “U.S. Policy in the East Asia and Pacific Region for 2014,” U.S. Department

of State, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC, February 4, 2014, http://fpc.state.gov/220927.htm (accessed September 5, 2014).

317 Obama, “Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall.”

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higher education for Southeast Asians.318 Obama reaches out to young adults in

Southeast Asia for ideas about solutions to challenges such as unemployment, climate

change, and political reform.

Moreover, Obama officials believe that broad trends in China since the 1970s

have been towards a more pluralistic and open society.319 The Obama administration

regards the Chinese state capitalist model as self-defeating. Obama claims that China

realizes it must “change its whole strategy,” broadening its domestic consumer market

and expanding social insurance programs and retirement services.320 China may not

face a sudden collapse like the Soviet Union did, but its leadership will need to yield

more power to its citizens over time and move towards a more democratic system. The

administration expects Chinese leaders to be preoccupied with corruption, pollution,

income inequality, and unemployment for the next few decades. Protests against district

governments are becoming more common, typically sparked by public officials’

misconduct and land expropriations.321 Ethnic tensions in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang

Uyghur, Tibet, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan have incendiary potential. President Xi

Jinping’s corruption campaign reforms have shown the extent of China’s numerous long-

term challenges.322 Abuse of public funds has been so pervasive that the Finance

Ministry estimated it costs China more than $2USD billion per year.323 Many Chinese

leaders recognize that a modification to its development model is necessary given rising

social tensions and economic deceleration.

The insecurity of Chinese Communist Party leaders has led to a growing number

of arrests of Chinese dissidents, activists, artists, and lawyers who are seen as critical of

the party’s authority.324 The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs often uses sharp

318 Russel, “U.S. Policy in the East Asia and Pacific Region.” 319 Bader, Obama’s Rise, 147. 320 Obama, “Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall.” 321 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 253. 322 Kerry and Lew, “Interview with Wang Guan.” 323 Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China (New York:

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014), 256. 324 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 21.

69

nationalistic rhetoric and foreign journalists are monitored by Chinese authorities.325 Xi’s

crackdown is based on the supposition that democracy breeds instability.326 Xi has

hailed the “Chinese Dream” to garner greater support for the authoritarian capitalist

model. China’s education system emphasizes its humiliation suffered from foreign

imperialism in China beginning with the Opium Wars in 1842.327 The Communist Party

has encouraged nationalism at times and been powerless to restrain it at others. Given

the gender imbalance, there are an increasing number of unmarried and unemployed

men whom the state must adequately address. Some estimates predict that China will

have 25 million more young males than young females in 2020.328 Not disenfranchising

millions of young, unemployed, and angry males in society may be unachievable without

employing a number of them in the military.

Obama officials have been publicly and privately critical of what they regard as

China’s worsening human rights record. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel

stated that Obama officials raise their concerns with Chinese officials regularly.329

However, Russel also notes that the United States “approach to China can only be

understood in the context of the rebalance.”330 By this he means that the Obama

administration is cautious not to aggravate tensions with Chinese leaders given the

scope and depth of the challenges that they face. The Obama government was reserved

in its support for the protesters in Hong Kong who began a civil disobedience campaign

in September 2014, which ended in December. Although a White House statement

325 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 226. 326 Osnos, Age of Ambition, 331. 327 Osnos, Age of Ambition, 140. 328 Hannah Beech, “China Loosens its One-Child Policy: The Shift may be too Late to Offset the

Damage Already Done to China’s Economy and Society,” Time, November 15, 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/11/15/china-loosens-its-one-child-policy/ (accessed February 12, 2015).

329 Daniel R. Russel, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations,” U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, June 25, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228415.htm (accessed February 12, 2015).

330 Daniel R. Russel, “Remarks at China-U.S. Symposium,” U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Tufts University, Boston, Massachusetts, April 18, 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/04/225223.htm (accessed February 12, 2015).

70

encouraged China to respect a genuine democratic process in Hong Kong, Obama was

more cautious in his remarks. In November 2014, Obama withheld from discussing the

specifics of the protestors’ demands and stated that “the situation between China and

Hong Kong is historically complicated and is in the process of transition.”331 Obama

explained that American people had to temper their expectations of America’s ability to

influence China’s governing institutions. In late April 2012, while Hillary Clinton was

readying to leave for Beijing for the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the

American Embassy in Beijing provided refuge to Chen Guangcheng, a well-known

Chinese blind activist and lawyer who had just escaped house arrest. After sensitive

negotiations over the following week, a deal was struck between Chinese and American

officials for Chen (and his wife and children) to move to the United States in May to

study law at New York University. Clinton portrays the case as a major diplomatic

achievement and a notable stand by the United States for the values of democracy and

human rights.332 In his memoirs, Chen alleges that there was discord between the State

Department and the White House.333 Chen recounts that at a meeting Obama pressured

the State Department to not have the case further damage U.S.-China relations and to

restrict Chen’s internet access. Obama was trying to allow the Chinese government to

“save face” in a contentious situation that had sprung up very suddenly.334 Consistent

with its overall approach to China, the Obama administration tries to balance its

cooperation with and pressuring of Chinese leaders on these human rights issues.

331 Josh Gerstein, “President Obama Speaks Out, Carefully, on Hong Kong,” Politico, November

10, 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/obama-china-hong-kong-112743.html (accessed April 16, 2015).

332 Clinton, Hard Choices, 100. 333 Nahal Toosi, “Hillary Clinton and the Case of Chen Guangcheng,” Politico, March 21, 2015,

http://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/hillary-clinton-and-the-case-of-chen-guangcheng-116244.html (accessed March 27, 2015).

334 Bonnie Glaser, “US-China Relations: Xi Visit Steadies Ties; Dissident Creates Tension,” Comparative Connections 14, no. 1 (May 2012): 30.

71

Chapter 4. Analysis of Strategic Rationale

Kurt Campbell admits that he and the rest of the Obama administration could

have done a better job at explaining the rebalance and what its primary goals were early

on.1 Campbell understood the widespread perception that the term “pivot” connoted too

sharp of a turn towards Asia (and against China in particular) and an abandonment of

U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East. To some observers, the “pivot” also implied

that the United States was not making a long-term commitment to Asia, as it could easily

pivot away from Asia again. Nevertheless, one of the most impressive feats of the

rebalance is the synergy that the Obama administration has infused into U.S. foreign

policy in Asia.2 The Obama administration has pulled together a number of disparate

policies and conceptually packaged them into an integrated rebalancing strategy. As

Campbell argues, the key aspiration of the rebalance is to “embed China within a larger

regional framework.”3

China is the central focus of major American initiatives within the rebalance

because China poses the greatest threat to the stability and continuance of the

American-led international order. While America’s approach to China itself is fairly

balanced in that it attempts to manage competition and promote cooperation, it must

also be viewed within the wider context of the rebalance. Militarily, the shift of American

naval and air force resources to the region is critical to the conservation of the current

international system with the United States preeminent. On the economic side, as former

1 UCTV, “The Pivot to Asia with Kurt Campbell and Susan Shirk,” University of California

Television, August 5, 2013, http://www.uctv.tv/shows/The-Pivot-to-Asia-with-Kurt-Campbell-and-Susan-Shirk-25372 (accessed April 3, 2015).

2 Ken Lieberthal, “Understanding the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” The Brookings Institution, Full Transcript, Washington, D.C., January 31, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2012/1/31-us-asia/20120131_pivot_asia.pdf (accessed April 3, 2015): 6.

3 UCTV, “The Pivot to Asia with Kurt Campbell and Susan Shirk.”

72

National Security Adviser Tom Donilon argues, the TPP’s “most important aims…are

strategic” in that it would push China into conforming to the rules of a global free trade

regime.4 The TPP serves as the central economic component of the rebalance. Smaller

American initiatives attached to the TPP, such as the E3 and the LMI, are also motivated

by a desire to harmonize Southeast Asian countries’ positions vis-à-vis China.

Diplomatically, Obama officials call attention to the importance of concepts such as

ASEAN centrality. However, America’s major initiatives such as the TPP are driven

primarily by American priorities (in contrast to RCEP, which has affirmed ASEAN

centrality as a key driver of its negotiations).

The Obama administration urges its Asian allies and partners to contribute more

towards the evolving regional order, especially as they develop greater military

capabilities.5 One of the Obama administration’s long-term goals is that all allies share in

the burden of upholding regional security. Obama views the American military presence

as a security guarantor in Asia, but has tried to alter America’s character in this role.6

Susan Rice stated that mobilizing coalitions is the “hardest and the most important

element of how America leads on the world stage.”7 The United States increasingly

provides advice, training, and joint exercises to upgrade the capacities of its partners to

make them more effective at defending their own territory. The upgraded defence

capacity of other countries also generates more potential for burden-sharing missions.8

4 Thomas E. Donilon, “Obama is on the Right Course with the Pivot to Asia,” The Washington

Post, April 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-is-on-the-right-course-with-the-pivot-to-asia/2014/04/20/ed719108-c73c-11e3-9f37-7ce307c56815_story.html (accessed February 12, 2015).

5 Leon E. Panetta, “Statement on Defense Strategic Guidance,” U.S. Department of Defense, Press Briefing Room, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., January 5, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1643 (accessed November 5, 2014).

6 Russel, “Transatlantic Interests in Asia.” 7 Susan E. Rice, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice Keynote Address at the

Center for a New American Security Annual Conference,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., June 11, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/11/remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice-keynote-address-center-ne (accessed September 11, 2014).

8 Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” U.S. Department of Defense, Leon E. Panetta, Barack H. Obama, and Martin E. Dempsey (January 5, 2012): 3.

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Senior Obama officials contend that the United States is not all-powerful; rather,

it is “indispensable” whereby the United States is a necessary, not a sufficient power for

fixing global problems.9 It lacks the political, economic, military, and moral capacity to

dictate the outcomes of international affairs. The administration understands that the

United States cannot exert the same level of global dominance as it has in the past.10

The 2010 QDR mentioned that in some areas the American military is unable to extend

security.11 The QDR points to other governments that are better-equipped to address

certain challenges such as building more inclusive societies and healthy democratic

institutions and combating environmental problems within their own countries.

Cooperative security is therefore an integral grounding for many of the Obama

administration’s statements and actions in the Asia-Pacific region.

Yet, the Obama administration recognizes that it has a vastly greater network of

alliances than China does and American values are far more appealing to the world than

those espoused by China. Obama believes that the United States has the greatest

capacity to shape the global system and “build consensus around a new set of

international rules that expand the zones of freedom, personal safety, and economic

well-being.”12 The United States has formidable experience in the Asia-Pacific and Asian

states generally invite deeper American involvement in the region.13 Additionally,

American advisory, training, and assistance capabilities have been refined with the

experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last decade.14 This situation allows the

United States to assume a central task of fortifying the economic, institutional, and

defence capacity of Asian states.

America’s alliances may be interpreted as altruistic on the part of the United

States. America’s cautious approach towards Japan has demonstrated the extent to

which the United States does not want to antagonize the rest of the region. Taking 9 Clinton, Hard Choices, xii. 10 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 65. 11 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2010,” United States

Department of Defense, Robert Gates, Mike Mullen (February 2010): 73. 12 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 304. 13 Campbell, “U.S. Engagement in Asia.” 14 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” (2014): 23.

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control over part of Japan’s nuclear stockpile is consistent with cooperative security’s

goal of denuclearization, as the United States takes steps towards excluding the

possibility that Japan would seek to build or attain nuclear weapons. Obama’s

government has also focused on repairing relations between the regional powers,

principally Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea. American military bases in

Asia are critical for increased bilateral and multilateral training missions, being able to

quickly dispatch American forces throughout the region, and to deter the potentially

combative behaviour of other states.15 The Obama administration wants to be able to

build up goodwill in the event of humanitarian disasters in Asia, whereby the U.S. military

can help alleviate some of the damage, or at least assist in a rebuilding process, more

quickly. Operation Tomodachi in March 2011 by the United States in response to

Japan’s Triple Disaster was a resounding success. Nearly 24,000 members of the U.S.

military, 24 naval ships, and 189 aircraft helped to rescue 20,000 Japanese civilians in

the first week following the earthquake and they rapidly restored key transportation

facilities including Sendai Airport.16 The American relief operation in the Philippines was

additional proof to Obama officials that the rebalance enabled the United States to

respond more swiftly to disasters in Asia. Focus on humanitarian assistance is an

essential feature of cooperative security.

Notwithstanding, America’s alliances help to serve American interests.17

Alliances give the United States leverage in the region and reinforce American

leadership.18 The intensification of ties with its allies is chiefly directed at moderating

erratic North Korean behaviour and at restraining China. Even while largely symbolic,

the Darwin deployment, increased naval cooperation in northern Australia, and rotating

American marines in the Philippines are meant to be checks on China in Southeast Asia

and in the South China Sea. America’ support for Japan serves as a deterrent to

Chinese aggression in the East China Sea and in Northeast Asia more broadly. The

15 Gregson, “Rebalancing U.S. Security Posture,” 47. 16 Eric Johnston, “Operation Tomodachi a Huge Success, but was it a One-off?,” The Japan

Times, March 3, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/03/03/national/operation-tomodachi-a-huge-success-but-was-it-a-one-off/#.VRw3E2NTdyI (accessed April 1, 2015).

17 Hooker Jr., “The Grand Strategy of the United States,” 16. 18 Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like?” 7.

75

Obama administration’s disappointment with Japan over Abe’s mishandling of historical

issues concerns the Obama administration the most in that it creates a poor environment

for discussing Japan’s normalization of its military and its future security role in the

region.19 American government statements warn the Chinese military of overreaching

beyond the current rules-based international order. Economically, an FTA with South

Korea has been used to advance American corporate interests but also to send a

message to China that it needs to reform its economic policies if it wants to be a part of

trade pacts in Asia containing the United States. Furthermore, in opposing the AIIB, the

United States, Australia, and Japan were concerned that China would use the AIIB as a

foreign policy tool to unduly influence its neighbours.20 The Obama administration is

skeptical of any major Chinese initiatives that either challenge or supplement the

American-led international system. It immediately and strongly discouraged its allies

from joining the AIIB in private conversations, arguing that the World Bank and ADB

could take steps to increase their lending capacity instead.21 The United States has also

consistently rebuffed China’s bids for a larger voting share in the ADB, International

Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank.22

Increased American cooperation with India is predominantly the result of shared

concern over China’s expanding influence throughout Asia. India is uneasy about

Chinese motives for multiple reasons.23 China has a significant relative power advantage

over India and remains strategically allied with Pakistan. Given their close proximity and

contested borders, bilateral economic, resource, and military competition including the

construction of Chinese ports along the Indian Ocean and growing Chinese enterprise in

19 Jeffrey A. Bader, “Video: CNAS 2013 Annual Conference – The Future Rebalance to Asia,”

Center for a New American Security, June 12, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/media-and-events/audio-and-video/video-cnas-2013-annual-conference-the-future-rebalance-to-asia#.VTB30lXBzRY (accessed April 16, 2015).

20 Kevin Rudd, “An Hour with Kevin Rudd, Former Prime Minister of Australia and President of the Asia Society Policy Institute,” Charlie Rose, Interview, March 3, 2015, http://www.charlierose.com/watch/60526012 (accessed March 7, 2015).

21 Jane Perez, “U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank,” The New York Times, Asia Pacific, October 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-opposition.html?_r=0 (accessed April 16, 2015).

22 Hugh White, “AIIB: America's Influence in the Balance,” The Straits Times, October 29, 2014. 23 Malik, “India Balances China,” 349.

76

Central and South Asia worries Indian decision-makers. Many Indians are also

suspicious that China is trying to contain India, and China opposes a permanent seat in

the UN Security Council for India. The Indian population also harbours unhappy

memories of the Sino-centric Middle Kingdom and the tributary system. Strong

nationalistic segments in China and India generate considerable mutual distrust. The

Obama administration understands that India’s neighbours recognize the opportunity to

diversify economically via India’s huge domestic market and that India has vital interests

and capabilities to support regional security. Neither the United States nor India wants to

see China become a regional hegemon.

In addition, the Obama government has paid more attention to potential partners

in Southeast Asia. Building stronger links with ASEAN countries is critical to countering

China’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia according to then U.S. Secretary of

Defense Leon Panetta.24 U.S. officials see the strengthening of relations with Indonesia

as imperative because that country has long been viewed as ASEAN’s informal leader.25

Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia and its population of 250 million is

more than double the next ASEAN member, the Philippines.26 Indonesia’s efforts were

critically important to establishing ASEAN in 1967 and its restraint in its neighbours’

affairs has garnered the respect of other ASEAN members.27 During the Obama

administration, American-Indonesian relations have developed mainly in the area of

military cooperation. The predominant focus for American engagement with Singapore

has also been on improving military ties in the face of a rising China. As a result,

Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has urged the United States to take a more

active role in Asia, particularly economically.28 Similarly, bolstered American

engagement with New Zealand has centred primarily on military links, especially

24 Panetta, “America’s Pacific Rebalance.” 25 Bader, China’s Rise, 97. 26 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 186. 27 Erlina Widyaningsih and Christian B. Roberts, “Indonesia in ASEAN: Mediation, Leadership,

and Extra-mural Diplomacy,” National Security College, Australian National Security, Issue Brief 13 (May 2014): 107.

28 Howard LaFranchi, “Singapore Urges Obama to Take Stronger Stand in Asia,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2013/0403/Singapore-urges-Obama-to-take-stronger-stand-in-Asia (accessed February 12, 2015).

77

maritime cooperation. Building up strong maritime forces throughout the Asia-Pacific

region helps the Obama administration to pressure China to behave within the rules of

the current international system.

Consistent with cooperative security, Obama has encouraged rising powers such

as China and India to take on greater responsibility globally. At the beginning of

Obama’s presidency, Hillary Clinton spoke of the Obama administration’s ambition for a

“multipartner world” giving special emphasis to India and Indonesia “to be full partners in

tackling the global agenda.”29 America’s push for India to gain a permanent seat on the

UN Security Council symbolized Obama’s emphasis on the recognition that rising

powers should have along with their greater obligations to the international system.30

While in India in November of 2010, Obama announced that reform of the Security

Council would be a protracted and laborious process, but that for India “increased power

comes increased responsibility [towards the UN goals of the preservation of peace and

security, the promotion of global cooperation, and the advancement of human rights].”31

Additionally, the Obama administration seeks to integrate China into the global system

more fully, understanding that most major global challenges require the cooperation of

the United States and China. The Obama administration has taken a more cooperative

strategic tack with China especially on the environment. It acknowledges that for

progress to be achieved on the environment globally, both the United States and China

must lead the way by setting an example to the rest of the world. Presidents Obama and

Jinping also often cite humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-terrorism, preventing

epidemics, and anti-proliferation as examples where the United States and China have

common interests.32

29 Parameswaran, “Explaining US Strategic Partnerships,” 267. 30 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 240. 31 Patricia Zengerle and Alistair Scrutton, “Obama Backs India’s Quest for U.N. Permanent Seat,”

Financial Express, November 8, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/08/us-india-obama-idUSTRE6A24UN20101108 (accessed March 23, 2015).

32 The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, November 12, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference (accessed March 26, 2015).

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Obama’s philosophy is that “beyond matters of [self-defence]… it will almost

always be… in [the U.S.] strategic interest to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally.”33

Multilateralism helps to legitimize the international rules of the road. Obama explains that

the United States cannot tackle global problems alone, thus it should try “to strengthen

the capacity of international institutions so that they can do some of this work.”34 In

addition, building general consensus allows the United States to hear other points of

view to better evaluate its own foreign policy choices.35 Cooperating in institutions and

coalitions also provides other states a greater stake in the maintenance of regional and

international order. Obama believes that the United States must set a good example to

the world by showing clear respect for international law in order to get more states on

board with the international system.36 During Obama’s first term, the administration

immediately reached out to China in multilateral mechanisms to address problems

including cyber espionage and cyber theft, climate change, and the global financial

system.37 Nevertheless, multilateral institutions supplement, rather than supplant,

bilateral relationships as the core of American engagement in the region.38 Bilateral

relations are the crux for enhanced security ties between the United States and its allies

and partners in Asia, whereas multilateral institutions are more crucial for identifying and

dealing with transnational threats.

Simultaneously, multilateral mechanisms have been utilized by the Obama

administration in an attempt to restrain China through a web of rules. The aims of the

LMI are sometimes questioned as a strategic ploy to gain support from Southeast Asian

nations with respect to China.39 Foreign ministers are key in this initiative, rather than the

heads of the departments directly responsible for fisheries, water, and other areas.

Likewise, the E3 has not enjoyed much success with ASEAN members feeling pressure

33 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 309. 34 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 320. 35 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 310. 36 Hagel, “Remarks by Secretary Hagel.” 37 Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 187. 38 Odom, “What Does a “Pivot” or “Rebalance” Look Like?” 12. 39 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 227; Chang, “The Lower Mekong Initiative,” 282; Richard P.

Cronin, “Hydropower Dams on the Mekong: Old Dreams, New Dangers,” Asia Policy 16, no. 1 (2013): 35.

79

from the United States to take a common position on regulatory cooperation and

investment.40 Negotiations over the TPP, in conjunction with the November 2011 South

Korean FTA and negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP) agreement between the United States and the EU, is a substantial leadership

move by the United States. As former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon told a large

audience at the Brookings Institution in March of 2014, success on all of these

agreements would signal an emerging global free trade regime, to which the Chinese

leadership would feel pressure to acquiesce.41 The Obama administration makes it clear

to China that if it would like to join the TPP, it must accept some of the standards it

refused to at the WTO.42 The United States has great leverage in the negotiations for the

TPP, accounting for nearly 60 percent of the economic size of the current TPP bloc.43

The United States hopes to eventually influence domestic regulations in both India and

China so that American businesses can be guaranteed preferential access to their

markets. American businesses seek greater access to services, especially

telecommunication and financial services.44 The Obama administration wants to change

China’s restrictive steel production policies, wherein foreign investors are expected to

possess proprietary knowledge and cannot control stakes.45 Labour is also high on the

American agenda, and ensuring an overhaul of China’s forced labour practices.46 The

BIT is significant in this respect as it attempts to reform and open up sectors of the

Chinese economy. Major anti-dumping duties within the TPP would affect China greatly.

40 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “ASEAN Fights Foreign Trade Pressure at Summits,” The Nation,

Opinion, Regional Perspective, October 7, 2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Asean-fights-foreign-trade-pressure-at-summits-30216448.html (accessed November 5, 2014); Miriam Sapiro, “Obama Heads to Asia for APEC, ASEAN, EAS and the G-20,” Brookings, November 7, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/07-strengthen-global-trade-g20-summit-sapiro (accessed November 8, 2014).

41 Thomas E. Donilon, “A Review of the ‘Asia Rebalance’ and A Preview of the President’s Trip to the Region: A Conversation with Thomas E. Donilon,” The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/03/06-asia-rebalance-donilon#/full-event/ (accessed March 25, 2015).

42 Laidi, Limited Achievements, 34. 43 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 3. 44 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 21. 45 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 126. 46 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 136.

80

Whereas Japan is expected to benefit from the TPP, India and China are projected to

take significant export and income losses, particularly as a result of greater trade

diversion.47 The successful completion of the TPP would reinforce and strengthen

America’s position within the existing international system.

Be that as it may, U.S. officials have generally been cautious about pressing

China to change its economic and monetary policies given America’s huge trade deficit.

The U.S. Treasury Department is committed to free trade and cooperation with China.48

Substantial inexpensive capital is available to American businesses largely because of

China’s industrial policy.49 American restrictions on high-technology exports to China (for

political reasons) also contribute to the rising deficit.50 Obama’s top economic advisers,

Larry Summers and Timothy Geithner, consistently concluded that the impact of China’s

unfair economic practices on the United States was quite small overall.51 They saw huge

risks in retaliatory escalation, at a cost to the United States more than China. They

understood the extent of their interdependence with China and the fundamental need for

China’s cooperation on the revitalization of the global economy following the 2008

financial crisis. Despite pressure to act more forcefully with the Chinese from the Senate

(as the United States has more trade disputes with China than all of its other trading

partners combined), Obama has refused to declare China as a currency manipulator.52

Instead, Obama has increased his efforts in commercial diplomacy with China with the

intent of gradually influencing Chinese policy.53 This cautiousness is reflective of the

balancing act the Obama administration is trying to manage with China. The United

States strives to preserve its position of regional and global leader, but recognizes it

must increasingly cooperate with an increasingly powerful China.

47 Palit, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 38-39. 48 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 45. 49 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 214. 50 Heilmann and Schmidt, China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations, 165. 51 Bader, China’s Rise, 114. 52 Greg Mastel, “America’s China Headache,” The International Economy 26, no. 4 (Fall 2012):

65. 53 Heilmann and Schmidt, China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations, 166.

81

Militarily, while direct military-to-military ties between the United States and China

have increased, especially in 2014, the Obama administration questions what China’s

goals are for its increasingly rapid military buildup. Kurt Campbell argued that “China’s

military investment is completely overblown” and that the United States had an obligation

to its concerned regional allies to respond and deter the Chinese military from taking any

provocative or destabilizing actions.54 The ASB doctrine is a reflection of what the

Department of Defense has to do, which is to prepare the joint forces for worst-case

scenarios, including wars.55 The Pentagon’s duty is to provide to the president as many

options as possible. ASB has been endorsed by all of Obama’s Secretaries of Defenses,

though it has not been formally approved by Obama himself.56 In spite of this fact,

because Obama has not separated himself from the ASB doctrine, it has been

recognized by many (particularly in China) as a major piece of the rebalance. ASB

prepares for a conflict against China in 2028 with the United States working closely with

Australia and Japan versus an isolated China.57 It keeps the navy at the centre of

America’s strategic priorities. Fundamentally, ASB reaffirms America’s commitment to

provide extended deterrence to its allies in Asia and it confirms America’s primacy in the

region.58

The new 60:40 balance of naval assets towards the Asia-Pacific by 2020 means

that numerically American forces in Asia will not increase substantially given overall

budget cuts.59 The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, released by the Pentagon and

formulated by the Defense Department in collaboration with Obama, the military chiefs,

Congress members, and outside experts, outlined that America’s defence posture must

become more politically sustainable and geographically dispersed as a result of budget

cuts and steps to curtail rising manpower costs.60 This report provided guidance about

54 Etzioni, “U.S. Policy on Asia.” 55 Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 56 Matteo Dian, “The Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and Contested Commons in the Asia Pacific

Region,” The Pacific Review 28, no. 2 (January 2015): 245. 57 Carl C. Hodge, “The Pivot in Perspective: American Naval Power, Then and Now,” Orbis 58,

no. 3 (July 2014): 405. 58 Dian, “The Pivot to Asia,” 238. 59 Dormandy and Kinane, “Asia-Pacific Security,” 31. 60 Panetta, “Statement on Defense Strategic Guidance.”

82

how the department would cope with financial austerity. In September 2014, U.S. Deputy

Secretary of Defense Bob Work reiterated that the United States has “to engage globally

differently… our forces are shrinking without question and our flexibility is under

pressure.”61 As the 2014 QDR warns, continuing sequestration will raise substantially

“the level of risk in conducting military operations.”62 The Defense Strategic Guidance

specifies that the United States “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific

region.”63 As selective engagers argue, the prioritization of specific regions including

Asia and the Middle East has become critical.

The Department of Defense is moving toward cheaper, lower footprint

procedures. While the American military presence will become more agile and flexible, it

will be smaller, relying more on technological advancements.64 Robert Gates argued that

non-permanent “lily-pads” are typically less controversial than traditionally large

permanent sites.65 These types of bases are more politically sustainable because they

provoke less domestic opposition. Moreover, the greater distance of bases from the

Chinese mainland reduces their vulnerability, but also provides further strategic space to

China. For example, Darwin is quite a long distance from China; Guam’s Andersen Air

Force Base is also being upgraded as a deployment site and logistical hub for American

forces.66 Guam gives the United States better reach into Southeast Asia and South Asia.

Western Pacific, PACOM’s Logistics Group, in Singapore is based at a civilian cargo

terminal in Sembawang, which has very few American military and civilian personnel and

is administered by New Zealand’s armed forces.67 Yet, in the event of a crisis, the United

States could project its resources directly into the region. Consequently, the United

States increasingly turns to its partners for assistance and maintaining these bases.

American Navy Admiral Mike Mullen acknowledged that the U.S. Navy cannot “by itself,

preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain” in the Asia-Pacific

61 Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense.” 62 Quadrennial Defense Review, “Quadrennial Defense Review 2014,” xiv. 63 Defense Strategic Guidance, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership,” 2. 64 Panetta, “The US Rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific.” 65 McDonough, “America’s Pivot,” 5. 66 Thomas Fargo, “The Military Side of Strategic Rebalancing,” Asia Policy 14, (July 2012): 28. 67 Hayton, The South China Sea, 231.

83

region over the long-run.68 Military cooperation in Asia is thus vital to the long-term

sustainment of the rebalance. By this logic, cooperative security helps the United States

to further project its power in the region and thus uphold its primacy.

Obama officials insist that all maritime disputes should be concluded without the

use of coercion or force, and conform to the UNCLOS.69 The United States has declared

that all claims should be based on land features, specifically the extension of continental

shelves.70 Obama officials contend that freedom of navigation is a right of international

law, not a privilege granted by more powerful states.71 While China ratified UNCLOS, it

does not actually follow it.72 Ironically, the United States failed to ratify the treaty, but

adheres to it. The United States has a far more expansive interpretation of the

permissibility of foreign military ships being in a state’s EEZ.73 Under UNCLOS, a state

does not have sovereignty beyond its 12-nautical-mile territorial limit.74 China argues that

all military activities within a 200-nautical-mile EEZ necessitate gaining consent from the

littoral state first. Any sort of surveillance or intelligence gathering within a country’s EEZ

signals hostile intent and thus violates the “peaceful purposes” sections of UNCLOS

(Article 88), according to the Chinese government.75 Obama officials argue that military

ships engaged in spying activities are allowed in another country’s EEZ, as long as they

do not have a scientific or commercial research purpose.76 The U.S. Freedom of

Navigation Program was established in 1979 to actively deter any state from trying to

close off their EEZ. It continues to do so by occasionally sending military vessels or

planes into other country’s EEZs to contest their country’s attempts to restrict sea lanes

or airspace. In 2014, the U.S. Navy challenged 19 countries for having excessive

68 McDonough, “America’s Pivot,” 15. 69 Clinton, Hard Choices, 79. 70 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 62. 71 Burns, “Asia Society Policy Institute Launch.” 72 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 173. 73 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 50. 74 Hayton, The South China Sea, 212. 75 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 160. 76 Hayton, The South China Sea, 212.

84

maritime claims as the Department of Defense interprets UNCLOS.77 That year

represented the most countries confronted by the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program

in over a decade.78 Countries included China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, although none of the challenges were

connected with the South China Sea disputes. If military ships did not have access to

EEZs, America would lose access to its bases around Asia and between the Middle East

and the Pacific, severely damaging America’s ability to defend Taiwan and its allies in

the Asia-Pacific.79 As a result, America’s leadership position in Asia would likely erode

very quickly.

Obama asserts that democracy is the best system of government, but that it

should not be imposed on other countries.80 The promotion of democracy and human

rights has served as more of a secondary concern for the Obama team in the rebalance

than the previous components outlined by Hillary Clinton. The Obama administration is

careful not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Asian states. Obama believes that a

healthy democracy is brought about by people in their respective countries through a

bottom-up process.81 Attempting to impose values weakens the “possibility that genuine,

home-grown democracy will ever emerge.”82 The Obama administration sees Chinese

civil society, including private actors and non-governmental organizations, as being far

more effective than the American government is at bringing about change on human

rights and democracy in China. Jeffrey Bader noted that, realistically, the Obama

77 Oceans Policy Advisor, “Freedom of Navigation Report for Fiscal Year 2014,” U.S. Department

of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), March 23, 2015. 78 David Alexander, “U.S. Military Challenged Maritime Claims of 19 Countries in 2014,” Reuters,

Washington, March 25, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/25/us-usa-defense-navigation-idUSKBN0ML1UQ20150325 (accessed March 26, 2015).

79 Hayton, The South China Sea, 213. 80 Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch, and Nicholas Bouchet, “Introduction: Presidents, American

Democracy Promotion and World Order,” in U.S. Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, Eds. Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch and Nicolas Bouchet (New York: Routledge, 2013), 10.

81 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 316. 82 Obama, The Audacity of Hope, 317.

85

government could not do much to improve the situation.83 Moreover, recognizing

Thailand’s challenges to constructing a democracy, the Obama administration has

stated that the people of Thailand are capable of resolving their issues and outsiders

cannot fix them.84 America’s engagement with Myanmar has involved the lifting of

numerous sanctions on Myanmar and the establishment of limited military-to-military

relations. Hillary Clinton noted that Myanmar’s political and economic reforms are an

arena for intensifying Sino-United States competition.85 Yet, as current Secretary of

State John Kerry stated, the United States encourages a responsible democratic

transformation in Myanmar, “but in the end the [Burmese] leadership will have to make

the critical choices.”86 Generally, Obama’s pragmatism has caused him to avoid

promoting democratic values abroad.87 Nevertheless, concern about human rights

violations has reduced the level of Obama administration’s cooperation with Vietnam

and Cambodia. The promotion of democracy and human rights are not exclusive to any

grand strategy, though they are most closely associated with cooperative security.

Obama is aware that many Chinese officials believe that one of America’s

aspirations is to bring about the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party.

Consequently, the Obama administration has not made human rights a main focus in its

China agenda in order to gain greater cooperation with China on other pressing

international issues.88 U.S. officials understand that Chinese officials loathe being

lectured to about their own domestic politics. Current and former American officials have

stated that Chinese leaders are especially concerned about their public reputation, at

home and abroad, so they want to be able to give China “face.”89 The United States has

utilized indirect and low-profile measures in its approach to human rights in China under

83 Jeffrey A. Bader, “Obama Policy toward China and Asia – Jeffrey Bader – Fairbank Center,”

YouTube, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, November 21, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbNyiYJDXuY (accessed April 16, 2015).

84 Marciel, “U.S. Policy toward ASEAN.” 85 Clinton, Hard Choices, 102. 86 Kerry, “U.S. Vision for Asia-Pacific Engagement.” 87 Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon, Bending History, 15. 88 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 287. 89 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 334.

86

Obama.90 Facilitating China’s movement towards being a more productive and

supportive member of the international system does not require the end of the

Communist Party, only a transformation.91 Obama’s refusal to meet the Dalai Lama prior

to his first China trip in November of 2009 was seen as an overture towards greater

cooperation with China.92 That being said, Obama’s reception of the Dalai Lama in

February of 2010 upset the Chinese government, which saw it as a form of “interference”

in their own domestic affairs.93 Yet, the Obama administration has been practical about

the limited extent of its potential influence to assist in the democratization of China. This

part of the rebalance has been more reflective of a grand strategy of selective

engagement, which focuses on economic and military engagement rather than

concerning itself with the promotion of values of human rights and democracy.

90 Thomas Carothers, “Chapter 11: Barack Obama,” in U.S. Foreign Policy and Democracy

Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, Eds. Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch and Nicolas Bouchet (New York: Routledge, 2013), 204.

91 Swaine, America’s Challenge, 378. 92 Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, 113. 93 Heilmann and Schmidt, China’s Foreign Political and Economic Relations, 162.

87

Chapter 5. Conclusion

In relation to American policy towards Asia, the Obama administration’s official

stance has changed only slightly since the beginning of 2009. The underlying

assumptions and rationale for the rebalance have persisted. As Jeffrey Bader mentioned

the Obama team all along felt that Asia should be a higher priority in U.S. foreign policy.

They thought that alliances should serve as the heart of American engagement in Asia,

America’s forward deployed troops and bases in the region must be sustained,

differences with China could be managed and cooperative areas expanded, stronger

regional and multilateral institutions could help to reduce or quell some of the key

regional problems, and free trade ought to be broadened. While Hillary Clinton listed the

promotion of human rights and democracy as a core element of the rebalance, this has

been more of a secondary concern relative to the strengthening of alliances and

partnerships, the augmentation of regional and multilateral institutions, the initiative of a

wider free trade agreement, and the shifting of naval and air force resources to Asia.

Adjustments have been made by the Obama government in responding to different

crises and events in Asia, but there have been no major overhauls of the framework.

At the core of the rebalance is the Obama administration’s hope to maintain and

strengthen the existing global order, constructed and built up by the United States after

the Second World War. The beefing up of America’s alliances, especially with Japan, the

Philippines and Australia, is largely focused on greater military cooperation and

concerns about potentially destabilizing Chinese behaviour in the East and South China

Seas. The military shift of personnel and forces to Asia seeks to maintain American

naval and air supremacy on the continent. Preservation of freedom of navigation is

essential to the Obama administration’s grand strategy. Myanmar’s reform process

represents a major area of competition between the United States and China. They seek

to have a larger economic (and eventually political) influence in the country, as Myanmar

88

represents a battleground in the region for a state that either democratizes or remains an

authoritarian capitalist system.

There are a plethora of cooperative initiatives within the rebalance. Key ones

include Obama’s commitment to multilateral and regional institutions such as the EAS,

ARF, and ASEAN; his understanding that the United States cannot fix the world’s major

hurdles without the support of other major powers including China; Obama’s support for

the prioritization of the G20 over the G8 following the global financial crisis; America’s

deepening of people-to-people ties with China through the 100,000 Strong China

initiative; the administration’s push for anti-proliferation of nuclear weapons including

taking and destroying large amounts of Japan’s nuclear stockpile; Obama’s personal

belief that democracy cannot be imposed upon states and instead the United States

must be patient to allow democracy to mature and flourish in other countries; and

Obama’s encouragement of dialogue and reconciliation between historical adversaries

China and Japan (and South Korea and Japan). Some of these are spurred on by the

Obama administration’s belief that America cannot sustain its traditional levels of high

engagement given America’s budgetary challenges and the amount of pressing

domestic problems that require more resources and attention. Obama’s government

regards the United States as the world’s leading power, but one that requires the support

and assistance of other powers to effectively tackle regional and international problems.

This thesis attempts to show that the existing explanations for the rebalance do

not quite meet the burden of evidence. Many scholars have made recommendations and

encouraged various grand strategies for the Obama administration to adopt without

closely tracing what the rebalance has entailed in actuality. For those that have

characterized the rebalance within grand strategy literature, most have concluded that

there is no grand strategy. Yet, American policies in Asia have been consistent and

wide-ranging, even if not always successful or effective. The effectiveness of the

rebalance will be difficult to measure for many years to come, as the grand strategy is

intended to have a lasting impact beyond the Obama presidency. Negotiations for the

TPP and the BIT may not be completed during Obama’s tenure, but future

administrations will likely continue these efforts. David Lampton, a Professor of China

89

Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, puts it succinctly:

“the long-term consequences of the [rebalance]...will take years to become apparent.”94

94 Lampton, “China and the United States,” 40.

90

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