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• Objec&ve:Cra-adefenseU.S.strategyforEurasiawhoseprimarypurposeistopreventtheemergenceofahegemonicpower
• Constraints:Thestrategymustbelimitedbyprojectedresourceconstraints
• Focus:Notana&onalsecuritystrategy;rather,adefensestrategy
• TimeFrame:10-20yearplanninghorizon
• Detail:Fargreaterthanthe“classic”ColdWarstrategies,butnotadetailedposturestatement
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Theregionalapproachremains,however,thebestwaytodealwithpoli7calproblems.ThequestforuniversalitythatcharacterizedtheLeagueofNa7onsonlyledtoweakness.TheScandinavianstateswerenotinterestedintheboundaryandpowerproblemsoftheLaPlataregion,andtheLa7nAmericanstateswerenotinterestedintheques7onsthatconfrontedeasternEurope.
NicholasSpykman
• Returnofprotractedgreatpowercompe&&onandbalanceofpowerpoli&cs• RevisionistpowersinthreekeyregionsalongtheEurasianlandmass—a
“strategicchoice”fortheUS
• Chinaposesbyfarthegreatestchallenge,inboththenear(andlikely)longterm• WorrisomeU.S.andallyfiscalposi&on• AbsenceofconsensusonsecuritymaVerscreatestoughchoices• U.S.shouldshi-toaforwarddefensepostureintheWesternPacificTheaterof
Opera&ons,evenattheexpenseoftheEuropeanandMiddleEastTheaters
• A“One-and-half”warposturethatalsoaddressestheradicalIslamistthreat• Long-termcompe&&onandrapidadvancesinmilitary-relatedtechnologies
suggestprioritymustbeaccordedto– Socialdimensionofstrategy– Crea&ngcapabilityop&ons– Developingnewopera&onalconcepts– Time-basedcompe&&on– Recalibra&nghorizontalandver&calescala&on“ladders”
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• Anenduringna&onalinterestforacentury
• TwomajorwarsinEurope—andoneColdWar
• OnemajorwarinthePacific—andaColdWar
• FillingthefinalgapintheMiddleEast
• Underlyingreasonss&llobtain
• Issue:IssuchastrategywithinU.S.means?
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TheUnitedStatesmustrecognizeonceagain,andpermanently,thatthepowerconstella7oninEuropeandAsiaisofeverlas7ngconcerntoher,bothin7meofwarandin7meofpeace.
NicholasSpykman
AnyworldbalanceofpowermeansfirstandforemostabalanceontheEurasianlandmass.
GeorgeKennan
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Sovietdomina7onofthepoten7alpowerofEurasia,whetherachievedbyarmedaggressionorby...subversivemeans,wouldbestrategicallyandpoli7callyunacceptabletotheUnitedStates.
NSC20/4
ThelossofWesternEuropeorofimportantpartsofAsiaortheMiddleEastwouldresultinatransferofpoten7alfromWesttoEastwhich...mighthavethegravestconsequencesinthelongrun.
DeanAcheson
IfWesternEuropeweretofalltoSovietRussiaitwoulddoubletheSovietsupplyofcoalandtripletheSovietsupplyofsteel.Ifthefreena7onsofAsiaandAfricashouldfalltoSovietRussia,wewouldlosethesourcesofmanyofourmostvitalrawmaterials....AndSovietcommandofthemanpowerofthefreena7onsofEuropeandAsiawouldconfrontuswithmilitaryforceswhichwecouldneverhopetoequal.
PresidentHarryTruman
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Legi&macy China Russia Iran
TheVote - - -
The“Vision” - - ?
Prosperity X - -
Na&onalism X X ?
PrincipalObjec&vesPreservingtheregime
Displacingthecurrentinterna&onalorder
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RivalPower Year PctofUSGDP
ImperialGermany 1917 35.6percent
NaziGermany 1943 26.2percent
ImperialJapan 1943 13.5percent
SovietRussia 1980 40.4percent
CommunistChina 2014 59.4percent
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Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)
China $10,866,444
Russia $1,326,015
Iran $425,326
$12,617,785
UnitedStates $17,946,996
Japan $4,123,258
Germany $3,355,772
UnitedKingdom $2,848,755
France $2,421,682
$30,696,463
ItemofInterest:WhoisbeVerabletotranslatelatentmilitarypoten&alintomilitarycapability?
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• Demographictrendshaveimportantsecond-orderimplica&onsformilitarycompe&&onsandthemilitarybalance
• AllthemajorpowerssavetheU.S.andIndiaarein“demographicdecline”
• U.S.compe&&veposi&onisstrong;strongers&llifIndiaemergesasareliablepartner
• U.S.hasanadvantageinquan&tyandquality(educa&on;techliteracy)overRussiaandIran;lackssamev.China
• DespiteadvantageousU.S.profile,demographicweaknessofotherscouldbeasourceofsecurityproblems(China’ssexra&oimbalance;“RichMillions”and“PoorBillions”)
Itemsofinterest
• Subs&tu&onof“capital”for“labor”(suchasrobo&csandAI)
• Geographyandlogis&cswilllimitabilitytoprojectlargegroundforces
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TheU.S.militaryremainstheworld’sfinest—butitsadvantagesarediminishing
• An&-Access/Area-DenialForces
• AdvancedIrregular(akaGrayArea”)Warfare
• BlurringofConven&onal,CyberandNuclearopera&ons
• “New”WarfareDomains(space,cyberspace,theunderseainfrastructure)
• Thepoten&alofemergingtechnologies(AI,BigData,Bio,DE,etc.)toalterthecompe&&on
ItemsofInterest
Whatisthe“newnormal?”
Any“newnormal”maynotlastlong...hencethesearchforthe“nextbigthing(s)”
Needtobalancemaintainingcapabilityintheneartermwithcrea&ngop&onsforthelongterm
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• U.S.financialposi&onhasdeclineddrama&callyoverthepast15years
• U.S.fiscalwoesprimarilytheresult,notofimperialoverstretch,buten&tlementanddebtoverstretch
• Projectedrapidandsustainedgrowthinen&tlementspendingandindebt
• StateandLocalpensionsunfundedliabili&es:$5,000,000,000,000
• SocialSecuritytrustfundprojectedexhaustedin2034;Medicarein2030
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2015 2026(CBOest.) Change
MandatorySpending
$2,299B $4,412B +92%
NetInterestPayments
$223B $830B +272%
• Sequestra&ondoesn’taddresstheproblem,nordoesithelpU.S.defense
• DoDfacespoten&al~$275billionprogram-fundingmismatchinFY2018-22
• Defensespendingprojectedtodeclineto2.6percentofGDPbymid-2020s
ItemsofInterest
• LiVlelikelihoodof“20-yearboost”—evenwithrisingthreats
• Absentclearandpresentdanger,steadydownwardpressureonbudgets
• Inmajorwar,U.S.maybefacedwithdefeatorundesirableescala&on
• U.S.poten&allyonapathtowardsocialinstabilityaswell
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• Demographyonlytellspartofthestory—mustconsidertheavailablemanpowerpool
• AnyoneintheU.S.(andmostmajorally)manpowerpoolscanavoidservice
• Manyinthemanpowerpoolareunfitforservice
• Thusdespitelarge“raw”numbers,manpowerisdifficult/expensivetoaccess/retain
• Small,eliteforcemaybesufficientfortheTalibans,al-QaedasandISISsoftheworld,butnotlikelyagainstChina,RussiaandIran
• Longstandingmajoralliesareevenlesscapable
ItemsofInterest
• Capablemanpowerrichalliesofincreasingvalue;Indiaapoten&allyaVrac&vepartner
• TechnologiesthatreducerelianceonmanpowerincreasinglyaVrac&ve
• Findawayoutofcost-imposingmanpowerintensiveconflicts—useofproxies?21
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GoodNews.TheU.S.is:• Richinrawmaterials• Possessesahighlyskilledlaborforce• Producesmorerawmaterials/industrialproductsthanthe“ArsenalofDemocracy”
GoodNews.TheU.S.DefenseIndustrialBaseis:• Abletoproducehighlysophis&catedsystemsinlargenumbers—givensufficient
lead&me• Abletoproduceawidearrayofproducts—givensufficientlead&me• Movingtosubs&tutecapitalforlabor(“smart”robots)fordecliningmanpower• Exploringaddi&vemanufacturing
BadNews.Ontheotherhand,thereareareasofpoten&alweakness:• Greatuncertaintyoverabilitytosurgeandsustainproduc&on• Baseishighlyconcentrated• Nostrategicmaterialsstockpile• Declininglaborforce• FARandenvironmentalregula&onscouldcompromiseindustrialbasemobiliza&on
ItemsofInterest:• Areaofconsiderableimportanceyetnotwellunderstood• Lackofsurgeabilitymayseverelylimitstrategicop&ons
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Thelevelofhuman,materialandtechnicalresourcesdevotedtotheU.S.militaryul&matelydependsupontheAmericanpeopleandtheirwillingnesstosacrifice,bothinpeaceandwar
• Intheabstract,mostAmericanswanttomaintainorincreasethecountry’smilitarystrength—butarefarlesswillingtopaytaxesorforegogovernmentbenefitstoachievethis
• YetiftheU.S.istoaddressthegrowingchallengestothebalanceofpoweralongtheEurasianperiphery,itwillalmostcertainlyneedtoaugmentthesizeandcapabili&esofitsmilitary
ItemsofInterest
• Absentstrongleadership,thepeopleoftheUnitedStatesandmost(andperhapsall)ofitsmajoralliesarenotinclinedtosupportasubstan&allygreaterdefenseeffort
• NoristhereanyenthusiasmamongtheU.S.publicorthoseofitsalliesinsupportofcompulsorymilitaryservice
• Acompellingstrategicnarra&veisneededtosupportthestrategy
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IfthemenandwomenofAmericafacethisissue[communism]assquarelyandbravelyastheirsoldiersfacedtheterrorsofbaLleinWorldWarII,wewouldhavenofearoftheoutcome....Iftheycanretainthemoralintegrity,theclarityofcomprehension,andthereadinesstosacrificethatfinallycrushedtheAxis,thenthefreeworldwillliveandprosper,andallpeoples,eventually,willreachalevelofculture,contentment,andsecuritythathasneverbeforebeenachieved.
DwightD.Eisenhower
HavinggoLentheissuewelldefinedinmymind,Itryinthenextsteptodeterminewhat...solu7onwecangetthatwillbestconformtothelongterminterestsofthecountryandatthesame7mecancommandasufficientapprovalinthiscountrysoastosecurethenecessaryCongressionalac7on.
DwightD.Eisenhower
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Defenseprograminthisstrategyisbasedontwoop&ons
• President’sbudgetforFY2018-FY2022,projectedalongasecondFYDP(FY2023-2027)
• “MiddleWay”budget;halfwaybetweentheFY2012defenseprojec&onandthePresident’sbudget
• Bothseeadeclineindefensefundingto3percentofGDP—orless
FailuretoenactthePresident’s(PB17)budgetcreatessignificantnear/long-termrisk
Failuretotransi&ontothe“MiddleWay”budgetlikelyposesseverelong-termrisk
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BudgetOp&on FY2018-2022Pct.GDP
FY2023-2027Pct.GDP
FY2018-2027Pct.GDPAverage
PB17 2.75 2.44 2.57
“MiddleWay” 3.10 2.85 2.88
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Thegoalisnottoholdequallyeverywhere[butto]holdinenoughplaces,andinsufficientstrategicplaces,toaccomplishourgeneralpurpose.
GeorgeKennan
Wemustavoiddispersalofourforceswhenconcentra7onappearstobethewisestcause,especiallyinviewofourpresentlimita7ons.
GeorgeC.Marshall
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US
Leve
l of E
ffort
2017 2027 2037
Iran
China
Radical Islamism and Proxies
Russia
Post-Pu&nEra NuclearCapability
Threetheatersofopera&on:WesternPacific(WPTO);European(ETO);andMiddleEast(METO)
1. Whatrevisionistpowerhasthegreatestmilitarypoten&alinthenearterm?Longterm?
2. Inwhichtheaterofopera&onsdowelackstrategicdepth?Whereisitmostsevere?
3. Inwhattheater(s)ofopera&onsaremajorpowerfrontlinealliesatrisk?
4. Inwhattheater(s)ofopera&onsareU.S.alliesleastcapableofmoun&nganeffec&veindependentdefense?
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TheaterofRevisionistPowerGreatestMilitaryPoten&al
TheaterLackingStrategicDepth
GreatPowerFrontlineAllyatRisk
LocalAlliesLeastCapableofMoun&nganIndependentDefense
WesternPacific WesternPacific WesternPacific WesternPacific
European MiddleEast
MiddleEastEuropean
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Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)
China $10,866,444
Japan $4,123,258
SouthKorea $1,377,873
Taiwan $529,600
Subtotal $6,030,731
India $2,073,542
Total $8,104,273
ItemofInterest:Thegapiswidening.CouldIndiaproveavaluablepartner?IsIndiaadefactopartner?HowtoexploitIndia’spoten&al?
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Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)
Russia $1,326,015
FrontlineStates
Bal&cStates $90,969
Poland $474,783
Subtotal $565,752
Germany $3,355,772
UnitedKingdom $2,848,755
France $2,421,682
GrandTotal $9,191,961
ItemofInterest:“OldNATO”canprotectitself,butdoesn’tneedto;“NewNATO”needstoprotectitself,butcannot.
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Country GDP(MillionsofU.S.$)
Iran $425,326
FrontlineStates
Egypt $330,778
Israel $296,075
SaudiArabia $646,001
UAE $370,292
GrandTotal $1,643,146
ItemofInterest:SeeETO.DoestheU.S.providethemortar—andthebricksaswell?
Oneforward-deployedforcecapableofwagingamajorregionalwaragainstagreatpower(WPTO)
Onetheater-size“Expedi&onaryForce”capableofdeployingtoETOortheMETOintheeventofwar;alterna&velycanreinforcetheWPTO
“Counter-OffensiveForce”capableofretakinglostgroundintheWPTOorexecu&ngforcibleentryop&onsintheMETO
“StrategicReserveForce”capableofopera&ngpromptlyatextendedrangesinanyofthethreetheaters;includesnuclear;globalprecisionstrike;cyberstrikeandair/missiledefenses
N.B.:Shi[willnotoccurovernight.
WPTOForwardDefense
ETODefenseinDepth
METOAdviseandAssist
MajorWarForce FirstPriorityForwardDeployed
PrincipalAir/NavalForce FirstPriorityForwardDeployed
TheaterExpedi&onaryForce FirstPriority SecondPriority
Counter-Offensive/ForcibleEntry FirstPriority ThirdPriority SecondPriority
StrategicReserve FirstPriority SecondPriority ThirdPriority
PrimaryMission:DefenseoftheFirstIslandChainemploying“AirSeaBa_le”and“ArchipelagicDefense”opera&onalconcepts
GeographicPriori&es• Transi&ontoforwarddefenseoftheFirstIslandChain• Japanprimaryresponsibilityinnorthernsector• U.S.primaryresponsibilityinsouthernsector
Forces• Cross-domaingroundforcesforwarddeployed• AdvancedirregularforcesinPhilippinesandTaiwan(“ArcDef”and“HardROC2.0”)• U.S.forcibleentryforces(USMC;Airborne;Ranger;SOF;AirAssault)• Distantblockadeforce(primarilylandforces)• Airandmari&meforcesserveasmobileopera&onalreserve(“counter-concentra&on”)• Globalstrikeandcyberforcesactasstrategicreserve(“counter-concentra&on”)
InfrastructurePriori&es:basehardening;basedispersal
“Billpayers:”BCTs(KoreaWarPlan);largesurfacecombatants;non-stealthytac&calreconandstrikeaircra-
KeyProspec&vePartners:Australia;India;Indonesia;RepublicofKorea;Singapore;Vietnam
PrimaryMission:DefendNATO’sfrontlinestates
Posture(“DefenseinDepth”)(“Tripwire”)
GeographicPriori&es• Bal&cStatesandPoland• U.S./majorNATOalliestrain,adviseandassistfrontlinestatesindeterring/counteringRussian
grayareaaggression;developinginfrastructureforrapidreinforcement
Forces:U.S./majorNATOallies• Advise/assistfrontlinestatestoestablishA2/AD“high-low”mix• Advise/assistincrea&ngUW“G-RAMM”resistanceforces• Supportfrontlinestateswithextended-rangeC4ISR/strikes• Provideexpedi&onaryforcestoexecutecounter-offensiveopera&ons• Provideglobalstrikeandcyberforcesasstrategicreserve
InfrastructurePriori&es:FrontlinestatePOMCUSfacili&es
“Billpayers:”BCTs(adaptto“NewModel”BCTs);non-stealthytac&calrecon/strikeaircra-
KeyAlliesandProspec&vePartners:FrontlineStates;France/Germany/UK;Finland/Sweden
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PrimaryMissions• AssistlocalstatesresistIranianproxyforceaggression/subversion• Supportlocalstatesindefea&ngovertIranianaggression• AssistlocalstatesagainstvariousformsofradicalSunniIslamistwarfare• Defendenergyinfrastructureandtransitroutes
Posture(“LightFootprint”)
GeographicPriori&es:PersianGulfand“IranianCrescent”
Forces• U.S./allied/partnerforcestrain,equip,adviseandassistlocalforces• U.S./allied/partnerforcesprovidereconandstrike/directac&oncapabili&es• ReducedU.S.airandnavalforcesserveasopera&onalreserve• U.S.providesexpedi&onaryandforcibleentryforces• U.S.globalstrikeandcyberforcesactasstrategicreserve
InfrastructurePriori&es:Encouragelocaleffortstohardenenergyproduc&onandtransporta&oninfrastructure
“Billpayers:”Reducedairandmari&mepresence
KeyProspec&vePartners:Israel;“Conserva&ve”ArabStates;France/UK
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Geopoli&cal/Geostrategic• Engageexis&ngallies/partnerswith&me-phased,adap&veapproachto
establishingtheregionaldefensepostures(execu&ngstrategyconfersadvantage)
• Cul&vateAllies/Partners:India,Indonesia;Vietnam,alongwithFinlandandSweden(mi&gatemanpowerweakness;recoverscaleadvantage;gainposi&onaladvantage)
• DivestINFTreaty(Eliminatenega&veasymmetry;imposecosts)
• “Flip”Russia(Enabledincreasedfocus/op&miza&ononWPTO;gainposi&onaladvantage)
Opera&onal• PlanningagainstacontemporarysetofColor/RainbowPlans(orientandop&mize
around“newnormals”—thecorrect“diagnosis”)
• Intensivefieldexercises/experimenta&ontooperateinthe“newnormal”environmentandsearchforthe“nextbigthing”(enhanceeffec&veness;increaseprobabilityofiden&fyingthe“nextbigthing”)
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Ins&tu&onal
• Analysisonnewhorizontal/ver&calescala&onladders;compe&torviews/calcula&onsonwarfare;innova&veopera&onalconcepts;persistentwargaming
(IDsourcesofcompe&&veadvantage/weakness;strengthendeterrence)
• Protec&ngS&TandR&D“seedcorn”todevelopop&onsthatcanbeexercisedasthelongtermcomesintofocus(reducesuncertainty/enhance&me-based
competency;imposecostsoncompe&tors)• Developacorecompetencyin&me-basedcompe&&on(createop&onsforU.S.;
createuncertaintyamongrivals;imposecosts)
• Iden&fycurrentability(andwhatisneeded)towagesuccessfullyaprotractedwarwithChina(transformaweaknessintoastrength)
Social
• Mustdevelopacompellingstrategicnarra&veonmul&plelevels—fortheAmericanpeople;alliesand(prospec&ve)partners;andadversarypublics(stemerosionof
USeconomicfounda&on;generatesupportfornecessarydefenseexpenditures;
underminerevisionistpowerabilitytotranslatemilitarypoten&alintomilitary
capability)43
• Strategyisaboutmakingchoices,sezngpriori&es,decidingwhattodoandwhatnottodo
• Strategyisalsoaboutappor&oningrisk;mustunderstandwhenriskissuchthatthestrategyis“astrategyofbluff”
• If“diagnosis”iscorrect,thisstrategyrequiresincreasedresourcesover&me
• Failingthat,objec&ves/commitmentswilllikelyneedtobedivested,ininverseorderofpriority
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Thedefensestrategypresentedhere:
• AddressesanenduringstrategicinterestoftheUnitedStatesbyprovidingastrategydesignedtominimizetheoverallrisktothisinterestandtomaintainriskatanacceptablelevel
• Explicitlyaddressestherela&onshipbetweenendsandmeans;insodoingitallocatesriskamongthethreetheatersofopera&on
• Tailorsthedefensepostureandresourcesinlinewithstrategicpriori&es• Issupportedbyaforceposturethatissufficientlyflexibletoaddress
unan&cipatedthreatsto(oropportuni&estoadvance)U.S.interestsinanyofthethreetheaters
• CallsfortheUnitedStatestodevelopacorecompetencyin&me-basedcompe&&on,buyingcapabilityop&onsandiden&fyingpromisingnewopera&onalconcepts
• Placesheavyemphasisonthesocialdimensionofstrategy,accordinghighprioritytodevelopingstrategicnarra&ves
• Explicitlyiden&fiesthosetheaterswhereU.S.interestswillhavetobedivestediftheresourcesrequiredtoexecutethestrategyarenotmadeavailable 45
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