Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011 Final

8/12/2019 Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011 Final

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operational progress and strategicobstacles in Afghanistan, 20092011

RUDRA CHAUDHURI AND THEO FARRELL*

International Affairs: () The Author(s). International Affairs The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by Blackwell PublishingLtd, Garsington Road, Oxford , UK and Main Street, Malden, MA , USA.

The United States and its allies have been at war in Afghanistan for almost tenyears. The campaign has been led formally by NATO since , when it took

command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan.It seems fair to ask now whether ISAF has made any progress at all. Indeed, someanalysts might be excused for arguing that it is time for the United States to cutits losses and give up on this war.

Critics of the war see little real progress. They point to rising civilian casual-ties, intensification of the war in the south since , and a growing insurgentpresence in previously quiet areas of the country (especially in the north) as signsthat things are getting worse, not better. Our research, drawing on extensivefieldwork, shows the opposite. We find that ISAF has made significant progress atthe operational level. As we show in the first section of this article below, this isevident in the adoption of a more effective approach to counterinsurgency (COIN),

in the development of Afghan national security forces (ANSF) and subnationalgovernance, and in the military campaign against the Taleban, especially in thekey southern provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

So much progress having been made, one might expect NATO to be well onthe road to victory. A handful of optimists do indeed think there are reasonableprospects for campaign successwhich is to say, the development of a democraticgovernment able to survive and provide for the countrys own internal securitywhen NATO withdraws its combat forces in . We argue otherwise. In the

* Drafts of this article were presented to the Department of War Studies at Kings College London and theCentre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen in November , and to the Carr Center at

the University of Harvard in February . We are grateful to the seminar participants for their feedback. Wealso thank the following for their written comments on earlier drafts: Stephen Biddle, Robert Cassidy, Jamesde Waal, Antonio Giustozzi, Anatol Lieven, Mike Martin, Jeff Michaels, Mikkel Rasmussen, Michael Semple,

Joshua White, the anonymous reviewer, and especially Lawrence Lewis. Theo Farrell wishes gratefully toacknowledge the financial support provided by an ESRC/AHRC Research Fellowship (RES-)funded under the Research Councils UK Global uncertainties programme.

Robert D. Blackwill, Plan B in Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs: , , pp. . Ahmed Rashid, Before the endgame: Americas fatal flaws in Afghanistan, Der Spiegel, May ; Gilles

Dorronso, Afghanistan at the breaking point, Carnegie Report, Nov. , pp. . Paul D. Miller, Finish the job, Foreign Affairs : , , pp. ; Max Boot, Afghanistan: the case for

optimism (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Sept. ), http://www.cfr.org/publication//afghanistan.html, accessed Feb. ; Michael OHanlon and Hassina Sherjan, Toughing it out in Afghanistan(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, ); Michael E. OHanlon, New reasons for hope in Afghanistan(Washington DC: Brookings Institution, Sept. ), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions//_


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International Affairs: , Copyright The Author(s). International Affairs The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

campaign. McChrystal redefined the campaign using classic COIN principles.Recognizing that the conflict was essentially a political struggle rather than amilitary one, his campaign planthe first for Afghanistan despite eight years of

operationsaddressed the reality that the greatest threat to stability in Afghani-stan was not from insurgent violence but from insurgent shadow government, aswell as local power struggles. Thus the key to eventual success in the campaignwas to demonstrate to the Afghan people that their government could protect andprovide for them. McChrystal declared that ISAFs centre of gravity is the willand ability to provide for the needs of the population by, with and through theAfghan government.

McChrystals new approach to operations in Afghanistan was dubbedpopulation-centric COIN. It aimed to address the campaign centre of gravitythrough two operational priorities. First and foremost was to protect the popula-tion from violence, intimidation and corruption. This required ISAF to connect

with the people, in order to build relationships with Afghan partners and the localpopulation.The second imperative was to accelerate the development and owner-ship of Afghan security by Afghan national security forces through embeddedpartnership of ISAF with ANSF. Tactically this required ISAF forces to assumemore risk by getting out of forward operating bases and armoured vehicles.

Protecting civilians from violence included a focus on reducing civilian casual-ties in operations involving ISAF forces. Karzai had been complaining in private toUS commanders about civilian casualties since , and had received reassurancesthat this issue would be dealt with.By he was fed up and became openlycritical of ISAFs failure to reduce the number of civilians killed and injured in

military operations.

Even so, the numbers increased further in , with theUnited Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) estimating that civilian casualties were caused by ISAF and ANSF forces. This was an increase over, when ISAF and ANSF together caused an estimated civilian casualties.

In this context, McChrystal recognized that it was imperative to reduce civiliancasualties. In his nomination hearing before the US Senate, McChrystal noted thathow ISAF conducts its operations may be the critical point in winning the supportof the Afghan people and thereby campaign success. McChrystal told senatorsthat ISAF would have to operate in ways that minimize [civilian] casualties or

McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. .

McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. . The McChrystal approach was in fact based on that developed under General Petraeus in Iraq, which emphasizedsecuring the population and close partnership with Iraqi security forces. See Lt-Gen. Raymond Odierno,Commander Multinational Forces Iraq, Counterinsurgency guidance, June . Ironically, towardsthe end of his command McKiernan did produce a COIN guidance paper that recognized the imperative ofprotecting the population and supporting the ANSF. But this came too late to effect the necessary change incampaign approach. See Walter Pincus, Generals paper sheds light on counterinsurgency, Washington Post, April .

Sarah Sewall, The civilian in American warfare: normative pathways and institutional imperatives, D.Phil.thesis, St Antonys College, Oxford, , p. .

Barry Bearak, Karzai calls coalition careless, New York Times, June . Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, Afghanistan index: tracking variables of reconstruction and security

in post-/ Afghanistan (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, June ), p. , http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx, accessed Feb.


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damageeven when doing so makes our task more difficult. Hence, uponassuming command, McChrystal issued a tactical directive that set restraints onthe use by ISAF of lethal force, especially air power and artillery.

McChrystal also saw that it was imperative to accelerate the development of theAfghan National Army (ANA), both in size and in capability. In May ANAstrength stood at around ,, with planned expansion to , by the endof . McChrystal brought forward this target to October . It was alreadyclear that there were serious shortcomings both in ISAF training facilities and inANA leadership and equipment.Accelerating ANA growth risked sacrificingANA quality, as it would invariably lead to a lower standard of recruits and thecondensing of ANA training. Moreover, ANA quality was far worse than wasofficially acknowledged at the time.In , NATO had assessed per cent ofANA units to be incapable of conducting battalion-level operations with someISAF support.In reality, ANA units were plagued by corruption, drug abuse,

ethnic rivalry and poor leadership at all levels. Not surprisingly, ANA units sufferedhigh rates of desertion, especially in the south and east. Given all these problems,few ANA kandaks(battalions) had the men, let alone the command and equipmentcapabilities, to conduct battalion-level operations in .Thus McChrystal hadnot only to make the ANA bigger, he also had to make it far better. Compoundingthis challenge was a roughly per cent shortfall in military trainers.

McChrystal decided to adopt a fundamentally new approach that extendsbeyond just working together outside a [forward operating base]. Embeddedpartnering involved ISAF troops merging with ANSF to form a single combinedforce. McChrystal directed that ISAF will partner with ANSF at all levels

from Government ministries down to platoon level, in order to live, train, plan,control and execute operations together. It was hoped that embedded partneringwould enable the Afghan army to move more quickly towards eventual transitionto lead responsibility for security.

McChrystal also had to sort out ISAF unity of effort and command. Hefound ISAF waging not one war but several. In broad terms, ISAF was engagedin two different campaigns: a peace operations campaign in the west and northof the country, and a COIN campaign involving much combat in the east and

Tim Reid, NATO commander Stanley McChrystal: we must gain support of Afghans, The Times, June.

General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, Tactical directive, July (unclassifiedversion).

Inspector General of the US Department of Defense, Report on the assessment of US and coalition plans to train,equip and field the Afghan national security forces, SPO- (Washington DC: Department of Defense, Sept. ), pp. iiiii.

Thom Shaker and John H. Cushman, Jr, Reviews raise doubts on training of Afghan forces, New York Times, Nov. .

ISAF HQ, Metrics brief , p. . Antonio Giustozzi, The Afghan national army: unwarranted hope?, RUSI Journal: , , pp. . Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera and Michael OHanlon, Afghanistan index: tracking variables of

reconstruction and security in post-/ Afghanistan, Dec. , p. . General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, Partnering directive, Aug. (unclassified).

Again, while this approach was fundamentally new to Afghanistan, it had been adopted two years before inIraq under General Petraeus.


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the south. ISAF was also divided into five regional commandsWest, North,Capital, East and Southwith little coordination between them. Each regionalcommand contained a number of military task forces, often from different troop-

contributing countries. Here too unity of effort and command was weak, withthe national task forces taking little direction from their supposedly superiorregional commands. Further complicating matters was a lack of unity betweenISAF efforts and those of partners outside the ISAF chain of commandboththe civilian development programmes of partner nations and also the counterter-rorism mission of US forces still waging Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

McChrystal declared that ISAFs subordinate headquarters must stop fightingseparate campaigns. To this end, he established an intermediate operationalheadquartersISAF Joint Commandto synchronize operational activities andlocal civilmilitary coordination and ensure a shared understanding of the missionthroughout the force. With ISAF Joint Command taking care of the down and

in aspect of command, ISAF Headquarters would be able to focus on the upand out aspect: that is, overall campaign strategy, coordination with the Afghangovernment and international partners, and liaison with NATO capitals and othercountries in the region.McChrystal also took command of all American forcesin theatre, and thus was able to improve unity of effort between the ISAF andOEF missions. Improving unity of effort on the civilian side has proved morechallenging. Even the appointment in January of a high-profile and highlycapable NATO Senior Civilian Representative, Mark Sedwill (former UK ambas-sador to Afghanistan), to grapple with this problem appears to have made littledifference on the ground.However, on protecting the population and partnership

with ANSF, the picture looks more encouraging.

Protecting the population

Since population-centric COIN is focused on protecting the population, civiliancasualties (CIVCAS) provide a useful metric for assessing its effectiveness.Producing reliable and independent data on CIVCAS is problematic, however,given the limited UN and humanitarian presence on the ground. ISAF has civiliancasualty tracking cells in each regional command, which has improved the qualityof the data, but there are still inherent limitations in relying on self-reporting byunits on the ground.

UNAMA reported in August that there had been an per cent decrease inCIVCAS caused by ISAF and ANSF over the first nine months of in compar-ison with the same period in .This picture is consistent with a CIVCASstudy commissioned by Petraeus and undertaken by an independent team fromNovember to November . Drawing on quantitative and qualitative data,the study found that some progress had been made in reducing CIVCAS. It assessed

McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. . United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Civilian casualties rise per cent in first six months of

, Aug. .


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that CIVCAS numbers had reduced by about per cent over the period frommid through to October . Moreover, this period saw a huge increase inthe scale and number of operations undertaken by ISAF, as a consequence of the

surge of American forces into Afghanistan. When the number of civilian casual-ties is adjusted against this baseline, the study identifies an overall per centdecrease both in civilian casualties and the number of CIVCAS incidents overthe -month period.

As noted already, a major priority for McChrystal was to reduce civilian casual-ties caused by ISAF air attacks, and this was reflected in his tactical directive toISAF units. The ISAF CIVCAS study found that civilian casualties from air-to-ground engagements had decreased since . However, the number of civil-ians shot by ISAF forces, especially in situations involving escalation of force (forexample, at checkpoints), had increased over the same period.

Clearly, there is more work to be done, both in improving the accuracy with

which civilian casualties are tracked and, more importantly, in reducing civiliancasualties caused by ISAF troops escalating to lethal force. But overall the trendis going in the right direction. The ISAF CIVCAS study found that McChrystalsconsistent emphasis on reducing civilian harm did have a positive effect. Indeed,the study concluded that this command philosophy was more important than theformal restrictions in the tactical directive on containing civilian casualties duringa period when ISAF went on the offensive in the south.

Developing Afghan security forces

There has been a huge numerical expansion in the ANSF. Indeed, growth hasexceeded targets. The ANA target was , by October ; actual numbershad reached , by September . Likewise, the Afghan National Police(ANP) target was , by October, and numbers had already reached ,by September .

So the ANA has got far bigger. But has it got better? In truth, we dont entirelyknow. There is no accurate overall picture of ANA operational proficiency. Themain assessment process, called the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, wasmanaged by the same institutions responsible for training the ANA, namely theCombined Security Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and NATOTraining Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A). This created a motivated bias in theassessment process, as CSTC-A and NTM-A had an obvious institutional incen-tive to demonstrate the effectiveness of their training programmes. In late ,ISAF Joint Command assumed responsibility for managing the CM rating system,and in early it abandoned the system following a damning report by the US

ISAF CIVCAS study briefing (classified), Nov. , slide . ISAF CIVCAS study, August , p. . The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) also reported a sharp

rise in civilians killed in escalations of force incidents in the first quarter of : ANSO quarterly data report(Q ), Jan. Mar., , p. .

This is evidenced in part by the fact that General McChrystals tactical directive was similar to directives putin place by the two previous ISAF commanders: ISAF CIVCAS study, August , p. .

COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A General David Petraeus, unclassified briefing, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Oct. .


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Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).The systemadopted in its place, called the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT), reliesmore on qualitative assessment and tracks a broader range of metrics. According

to ISAF Joint Command, SIGAR had given CUAT a clean bill of health by theend of .

What is clear is that the rapid growth of the ANA has put a very great strainon the limited abilities of the Afghan Ministry of Defence to manage such a largearmy. Moreover, ANA infrastructure and logistics are struggling to support theexpanding force. Predictably, ANA training was also shortened; the Basic WarriorTraining course was reduced from ten to eight weeks.These structural and sustain-ability challenges are compounded by ethnic and political rivalries within theANA, especially between Tajik and Pashtun factions.Moreover, the army stillsuffers from high levels of illiteracy ( per cent) and drug addiction (per cent).Absence without leave and desertion rates remain a serious problem,

at per cent nationally and as high as per cent in some units in the south.

Anecdotal evidence from Helmand suggests that ANA troops generally fightwell, and that they are better at spotting IEDs than ISAF personnel.To be sure,Afghan troops exercise poor fire discipline, creating hazards for friendly forcesand civilians.But they also are better able to ascertain hostile intent than ISAFtroops, and thereby to avoid unwarranted escalation of force incidents involvingcivilians. The CIVCAS study for ISAF concluded that the general consensusby forces in the field was that partnering probably provides some reduction inCIVCAS.By one key measure, Afghan public opinion, the ANA is doing well.Accordingly to one major survey, most Afghans recognize that the ANA is poorly

trained ( per cent) and cannot operate without ISAF support ( per cent). Yetwhen asked if the ANA helps improve security, there is a very positive response( per cent).

Partnering with the ANA became a priority for ISAF forces across theatre inlate following McChrystals directive. All regional commands recognize theessential importance of partnering to the ISAF strategy of eventual transition to

United States Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Actions needed to improvethe reliability of Afghan security force assessments, SIGAR Audit-- Security/ANSF Capability Ratings, June .

Farrell email correspondence with Colonel Robert Cassidy, ISAF Joint Command, Dec. . International Crisis Group, A force in fragments: reconstituting the Afghan National Army, Asia Report ,

(Brussels: ICG, May ), pp. , , ; US SIGAR, uarterly report to the United States Congress(Arlington, VA, April ), p. ; Obaid Younossi et al., The long march: building an Afghan national army(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, ), pp. .

ICG,A force in fragments, p. . US SIGAR, uarterly report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA, Oct. ), p. , fig. .; Farrell

interview with ISAF mentor, TFH HQ, Lashkar Gah, May . Farrell interview with ISAF mentors, Corps HQ, Camp Hero, Kandahar, May ; Major Ed Hill,

All together now: observations on embedded partnering with ANA on Op Moshtarak, Bravo Company, Royal Welsh BG (CF), n.d.; Afghan National Army Training Center (ANATC)/Doctrine Directorate,Observations from Marjeh, pp. , .

Wesley Morgan, Afghanistan: the problems with partnering, New York Times, Nov. . ISAF CIVCAS study, p. . Random survey of , adults across all provinces of Afghanistan: Asia Foundation,Afghanistan in : a

survey of the Afghan people(), p. , http://asiafoundation.org/publications/pdf/, accessed Feb. .


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ANSF security lead.The main obstacle to partnering is not the commitment ofISAF units, but ANA willingness to deploy in the field. Often ANA units willnot deploy without clear instruction to do so. This situation is worsened by

the highly centralized Afghan Ministry of Defence, which retards initiative bysubordinate commanders.ISAF is trying to get around this, with some success,by issuing combined force orders down the ISAF and ANSF chains of command,and enabling ISAF field commanders to walk these orders across to their Afghanpartners.

In sum, the ANA is quickly getting bigger and slowly getting better. The nextbig challenge is the ANP. In fact, the police are in many respects more importantthan the army, since it is the police who must provide long-term security withinan area cleared of insurgents. The ANA dislikes hanging around for the holdphase because they consider this to be a police role. The problem is that the ANPis far more corrupt, poorly trained, drug-ridden and ill-disciplined than the ANA.

Often, the police are little more than a militia of the local powerholder; theycommonly prey on the population, and through their extortion and violent abuseof civilians can turn local people towards insurgency.

A number of institutional reforms within the Ministry of Interior and theAfghan police since have begun to address the problems. A very top-heavypolice force has been flattened: the number of commissioned officers (,) washalved, and the number of police generals and colonels (,) was reduced by per cent. Police pay for all ranks has been greatly increased (to reduce the needand inclination to extort from the local population).CTSC-A also operates theFocused District Delivery (FDD) Program, designed to improve the ANP rapidly

in key districts. FDD takes whole police units away from their localities for eightweeks, weeds out the drug addicts and retrains the unit as a whole. CTSC-Asown assessment indicates that FDD has produced promising results. In it

judged that per cent of retrained ANP were able to operate independently,and per cent could operate to various degrees with ISAF support. However,the impact of FDD is hindered by a shortage of training teams.Moreover, thesituation in Helmand suggests that FDD has had more mixed results. When theANP from Gereshk were taken to the regional training centre in Kandahar in May, of the policemen tested positive for drugs. The entire eight-weektraining course was spent detoxifying the police. The ANP did show improve-ment on return to Gereshk, but one year on few FDD-retrained police were still

Farrell interviews with command staff at RC-North (Mazar-e-Sharif ), RC-East (BAF), RC-South (KAF),RC-Southwest (Camp Bastion) and RC-West (Herat), Afghanistan, Oct. .

Farrell interview with ISAF mentor team, Camp Hero, Kandahar, May . ICG,A force in fragments, p. . Royal United Services Institute and Foreign Policy Research Institute, Reforming the Afghan national

police, Joint Report, Nov. , pp. ; Brian Brady, Drugs and defection: how the UK really rates theAfghan police, Independent, March ; Thomas Hardy, Afghan police corruption is fuelling insurgency,Daily Telegraph, June .

US General Accounting Office,Afghan security: US programs to further reform Ministry of Interior and national policechallenged by lack of military personnel and Afghan cooperation, GAO- (Washington DC: USGAO, March).

USGAO,Afghan security.


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dramatic success in Marjah, and so did not produce a campaign-wide boost.However, the Taleban did suffer defeat in Nad-e-Ali. Indeed, by mid- it wasclear that the tide had turned in Helmand. In most districts the trends looked

encouraging in terms of improved governance, services and security.

This concentration of effort continues under the revised ISAFANSF opera-tional plan, promulgated in October . The number of key terrain districtshas increased to just over , and there is increased emphasis on freedom ofmovement on the major transport routes. Crucially, the revised plan focuseson combating corruption and developing subnational governance.This effortis aided by the international communitys support of a number of Afghanprogrammes to promote subnational governance. A key example is the DistrictDelivery Programme (DDP) run by the Independent Directorate of Local Gover-nance (IDLG). Launched in January the plan was for DDP to rapidly improvegovernance and services in key terrain districts by the end of , primarily byproviding funds and personnel for the district governors and improving links withnational government line ministries.DDP was trialled, with some success, inNad-e-Ali during Moshtarak. But the programme is lagging considerably behindschedule. By September it had been rolled out only to six pilot districts, withpackages being worked up for a further districts.

More successful has been the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), launchedby the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD) in topromote democracy at village level in areas under government control. By mid-NSP had supported the creation of , community development councils in districts across Afghanistan, and had financed some , development projects.

Field research shows the crucial importance of driving development assistancethrough local governance structures, in order to increase the local legitimacy andhence effectiveness of aid projects. Assessment of NSP, based on an iterativelarge-scale survey, indicates that the programme has improved local democracy(especially in empowering women) and transparency, and has significantly raisedlocal perceptions of access to governance and services.

Noah Shachtman, Marjahs government in a box flops as McChrystal fumes, Wired, May , http://www.wired.com/dangerroom///marjahs-government-in-a-box-flops-as-mcchryst, accessed Feb..

Farrell interviews with stabilization officers and government officials in Lashkar Gah and Nad-e-Ali, Helmand,May .

ISAFANSF operational plan, Oct. (classified). Farrell attendance at final coordination meeting for roll-out of DDP trial, IDLG, Kabul, Jan. . Farrell telephone interview with DDP mentor, Sept. . Stuart Gordon, Helmand and stabilisation, (Boston, MA: Feinstein Center, Tufts University,

forthcoming ). Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Rubin Enikolopov and Shahim Ahmad Kabuli, Randomized impact evaluation of

Phase II of Afghanistans National Solidarity Programme: estimates of interim project impact from first follow-up survey, July , http://www.nsp-ie.org/reportsimpacts.html, accessed Feb. .


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Regaining military momentum

The modest progress achieved on protecting the population, developing ANSFand improving subnational governance belies a more dramatic development onthe ground. In short, ISAF regained military momentum in . The surge of, additional US troops into Afghanistan authorized by President Obamashifted the campaign on the ground in favour of the ISAFANSF combined force.These additional resources had been concentrated in the south (see table ), whichwas designated campaign main effort. Under the new combined force opera-tional plan, forces in the south would first secure central Helmand (OperationMoshtarak) and then go on to create the security conditions to expand governancein Kandahar (Operation Hamkari).

Moshtarak was the first major test of McChrystals population-centric COIN.This massive operation involved simultaneously clearing insurgent strongholds inMarjah (by the US Marines) and north-east Nad-e-Ali (by British forces). Partner-ship with ANSF was far better than in previous offensives, and further improvedas the operation progressed.ISAF went to extraordinary lengths to gain localsupport for the clearing of central Helmand and to minimize civilian casualties.There were no civilian casualties in the British sector; the Taleban put up more ofa fight in Marjah, and between and civilians were killed here.

The American press took a dim view of Moshtarak. ISAF set expectationsunrealistically high for the pace of progress in Marjah. When the Marines pushed

into Taleban territory, they found the area far more run-down and people morecowed than they had anticipated. This has made it difficult for ISAF to build

ISAF operational plan, Oct. (classified). Major B. Parker, OP MOSHTARAK Phase observations and lessons identified, ATAL Corps, ANA,

Camp hero, KAF, April ; ANATC/Doctrine Directorate, ANA Lessons Learned Center, Helmandprovince: observations from Marjeh, April .

Theo Farrell,Appraising Moshtarak: the campaign in Nad-e-Ali District, Helmand, Royal United Services Institutereport (London: RUSI, June ); Jeffrey Dressler, Operation Moshtarak: taking and holding Marjah, Institute forthe Study of War report (Washington DC, March ), pp. .

Michael M. Philips, Progress in Marjeh, but civilian trust remains elusive, Wall Street Journal, Feb. ;Richard A. Oppel, Violence helps Taleban undo Afghan gains, New York Times, April .

Table : ISAF force levels by regional command

Regional command March February

RC-North , ,

RC-West , ,

RC-Capital , ,

RC-East , ,

RC-South , ,

Source: Data from ISAF webpage, http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/isaf-placemat-archives.html.


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government and services, and easy for the Taleban to re-infiltrate and intimidatethe local populace.American reporters failed to spot the far more encouragingprogress in north-east Nad-e-Ali. Following Moshtarak, district governance was

strengthened, freedom of movement for locals greatly improved, and a morerepresentative district community council elected. The atmospherics on theground and key indicatorssuch as the number of shops in the bazaar and thenumber of children attending schoolall pointed to improvements in security.In a survey of public opinion in Nad-e-Ali, per cent of respondents felt that lifewas better or very much better in the district since Moshtarak.

Following Moshtarak, ISAF turned its attention under Petraeus to Hamkari,a massive operation to improve security and governance in and around Kandaharcity. This operation is now ISAFs main effort, with some , ISAF troopsmassed for it. The summer of was spent in a tough fight to clear the districtsof Dand, Arghandab, Zharay and Panjwai and, with the ANP, establish a security

force encircling Kandahar city. Dand was quickly cleared. Arghandab was eventu-ally cleared of insurgents with the help of the Afghan border police in October.By early November , Taleban were leaving Zharay and Panjwai, albeit towardsthe end of the fighting season when fighters typically decamp to Pakistan for thewinter months. The view within ISAF, and reported by the American press, wasthat the Taleban had been routed in southern Afghanistan.

What is clear is that Petraeus has ratcheted up the ISAF military campaign inorder to relentlessly pursue the insurgents. As one official put it: Weve takenthe gloves off. Under McChrystal, ISAF operated under the most restrictive rulesof engagement in order to minimize civilian casualties. Petraeus has sought to

rebalance things in order to give commanders increased latitude to use force, andthis has resulted in greater use of air strikes and artillery.Even more signifi-cant is the increased tempo of special operations forces (SOF) raids, especiallytargeted against Taleban leaders. From July to September some insur-gent leaders were killed or captured in SOF operations; a further lower-levelinsurgents were killed and , captured.The more robust military campaigncarries greater risk of civilian casualties, and potentially is in tension with theprotect the population mission. Certainly, the clearance of districts aroundKandahar has necessitated extensive destruction of civilian buildings (rigged with

Farrell interview with ISAF intelligence officers, RC-South HQ, Kandahar, May . Farrell interviews with civilian adviser and battlegroup commander, FOB Shawqat, Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, May .

Farrell visits to Nad-e-Ali district centre in late Sept. and late May . This survey was conducted between and May. Of callers to Radio Nad-e-Ali, per cent freely

agreed to participate in the survey. Capt. Nick Carter, Influence Officer, CF Nad-e-Ali, Public perceptionsof security in Nad-e-Ali, Helmand, powerpoint slides, June .

Carlotta Gall, Coalition routs Taleban in southern Afghanistan, New York Times, Oct. . This view wasconfirmed in Farrell interviews with ISAF officers, RC-South HQ, Kandahar, May .

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, US deploying heavily armoured battle tanks for first time in Afghanistan, WashingtonPost, Nov. .

Unclassified briefing by COMISAF, General David Petraeus, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Oct. . The International Committee of the Red Cross reported steep rises in CIVCAS in Kandahar in late :

Alissa J. Rubin, Conditions hit new low for Red Cross, New York Times, Dec. .


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IEDs), albeit with the promise of reconstruction funded by ISAF. The SOFraids, in particular, have attracted criticism from Karzai.ISAFs own assessmentis that those forces pursuing the kill-and-capture mission have developed ways

of operating that respond to the emphasis of senior leaders on reducing civiliancasualties.Press reporting of Taleban sources indicates that the SOF campaignhas thrown the insurgents into disarray in the south, in particular, and that relent-less targeting of enemy leadership has reduced insurgents ability to conductdeliberate operations.

It was with good reason, therefore, that the new British Chief of the DefenceStaff, General Sir David Richards, told the Commons Defence Committee inNovember that we are hammering [the Taleban] at the moment. Less clear,however, is the strategic effect of these military gains; hence, at another point inhis evidence to the committee, General Richards adopted a more guarded tone,telling MPs that we can be cautiously optimistic, that theres been a bit of an

upturn.Perhaps learning the lessons of Marjah, ISAF leaders are being carefulnot to oversell success. To be sure, it is too early to tell whether the gains in thesouth are sustainable. The Taleban may yet regenerate and return in force to centralHelmand and the area around Kandahar. One very senior ISAF commander, whileacknowledging the military gains ISAF has made, suggested that we must judgeprogress on a seasonal basis.

One problem is that ISAFs success in the south may displace insurgents toelsewhere in Afghanistan. In other words, the Taleban may simply change focusto where ISAF is weaker. Press reporting suggests that this has been happeningsince summer . In fact, Taleban infiltration of the north has been under way

since , with major Taleban gains in in Kunduz, Faryab and Baghlanprovinces with large Pashtun pockets. That said, Taleban efforts in the north doappear to have increased in , with the support of Taleban cadres sent from thesouth. It is not all plain sailing for the Taleban, however. While local resistance tothe Taleban in the north was not as fierce or widespread as commonly believed, theTaleban must still compete in a region with numerous other insurgent groups.

For an eyewitness account, see http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts////travels_with_paula_i_a_time_to_build, accessed Feb. .

Thom Shanker, Elizabeth Bumiller and Rob Noland, Despite gains, Afghan night raids split US and Karzai,New York Times, Dec. .

Farrell email correspondence with Dr Lawrence Lewis, US Joint Forces Command, Jan. . Alissa J. Rubin, Taleban extend reach to North, where armed groups reign, New York Times, Dec. ;

Jon Boone, Afghan Taleban leadership splintered by intense US military campaign, Guardian, Dec. . House of Commons Defence Committee hearing on The appointment of the new Chief of the Defence Staff,

uncorrected transcript of oral evidence, General Sir David Richards, Nov. , response to Q , Q,http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmselect/cmdfence/uc-i/uc.htm, accessed Feb. .

Comments at RUSILand Warfare Centre conference, Frontline COIN: linking strategy to tactics, London, Dec. .

Rubin, Taleban extend reach to North; Antonio Giustozzi and Christopher Reuter, The northern front:the Afghan insurgency spreading beyond the Pashtuns, briefing paper (Berlin: Afghan Analysts Network,).


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Strategic obstacles to success

So far, ISAF has been unable to convert operational progress into strategicmomentum. This failure is attributable to three strategic problems besetting thecampaign: first, the lack of transparency and rampant corruption within Afghangovernment; second, the decline in political and public support for the war inNATO capitals; and third, the existence of insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.We explore each issue in turn below.

The Karzai administration: an unreliable partner

A key objective in McChrystals efforts to redefine the fight was to increasetransparency within the Afghan government. Widespread corruption and rapidlydeclining government legitimacy were identified as strategic issues that createdfertile ground for the insurgency.The idea was to connect with the people,shielding them not only from insurgent violence but also, and just as importantly,from corruption and coercion.

Working with Sedwill, McChrystal focused on addressing endemic corruptionand the culture of impunity.A key initiative in this respect was the formation ofthe Major Crimes Task Force Afghanistan (MCTF-A) to coordinate internationalmentoring of Afghan efforts to combat corruption and organized crime. WhileMCTF-A is led by the Afghan government, it was created by international lawenforcement agencies, which maintains a close watch on the task force. This hasserved to irritate the already tense relationship between the international commu-nity and Karzai.

One prominent incident illustrates the problem. In July Mohammad ZiaSaleh, a top official in the office of the Afghan National Security Adviser, wasarrested on bribery charges. The investigation was prompted by the MCTF-A.Salehs internment exposed the deeply entrenched strains between Karzai and theISAF anti-corruption drive.Almost immediately, Karzai launched a campaignto rein in the MCTF-A and subordinate it to Afghan government structures,effectively robbing it of its independent status. Significantly, Saleh was laterreleased on the orders of the Afghan attorney generals office.

Hence, notwithstanding Karzais pledge to clean the government of corrup-tion,he has come to be viewed on the contrary as the chief stumbling block

The problems of Afghan corruption and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan have been noted in successive WhiteHouse reviews of the campaign. See General James Jones, President Obamas AfghanistanPakistan (AfPak)strategy, Foreign Press Center briefing, Washington DC, March ; Overview of the Afghanistan andPakistan strategy review, Dec. .

McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. . McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. . ISAF document (classified), July , p. . Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Karzai rift prompts US to re-evaluate anti-corruption strategy in Afghanistan,

Washington Post, Sept. . Joshua Partlow and Greg Miller, Karzai calls for probe of US-backed anti-corruption task force, Washington

Post, Aug. . Rod Nordland and Dexter Felkins, Anti-graft units, backed by US, draw Karzais ire, New York Times, Aug.

. uoted in Alissa J. Rubin, Karzai vows corruption fight, but avoids details, New York Times, Nov. .


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to meaningful reform. Indeed, as western law enforcement agencies workedto investigate corruption, they were rebuked by Karzais officials for misunder-standing the nature of patronage networks that served to support the government.

That such networks have a role to play is an established mantra in the RegionalCommands. Senior officers accept that functional corruption is a norm inAfghanistan.The question is, how much corruption is acceptable and necessaryto lubricate government? The fact remains that an uncontrollable level of corrup-tion undermines strategic progress.

According to surveys collated in by Transparency International, in termsof local Afghan perception, Afghanistan is the third most corrupt state in theworld.Importantly, per cent of those polled in stated that corruption hadincreased in the previous three years.Data collected for a United NationsOffice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report are even more staggering. Nearlytwo-thirds per centof those polled affirm that public dishonesty is a greater

concern than insecurity ( per cent) and unemployment ( per cent). Amongthose surveyed, the average amount of baksheeshpaid in cash between January and January was $in a country where, on average, GDP per capita is$ per annum. UNODC estimates the total sum of bribes paid over the sameperiod amounted to $. billion, or nearly a quarter of Afghanistans GDP.

Given this state of affairs, Petraeus has identified combating corruption as akey objective. Shortly after assuming command, he appointed Brigadier-GeneralH. R. McMaster (much lauded for conducting a brilliant counterinsurgencycampaign in Tal Afar in Iraq) to head a newly created anti-corruption unit. The mission of the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF) Shafafiyat

(Transparency) is to understand the nature of patronage networks and implementachievable anti-graft strategies.Rather than seek to eliminate corruption per se,the transparency task force is seeking to restore legitimacy by focusing on localnetworks in the provinces and districts, as well as on high-level corruption inKabul.Importantly, the CJIATF incorporates the work on combating corrup-tion already under way in ISAF contracting practices.

This has become evident in recently leaked diplomatic documents: see Polly Curtis, Wikileaks cables on UKsAfghan role embarrassing, says Cameron, Guardian, Dec. .

ISAF document (classified), Nov. . Transparency International, Corruption perception index , http://www.transparency.org/policy_

research/surveys_indices/cpi//results, accessed Feb. . Transparency International, Global corruption barometer report, http://www.transparency.org/

policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb//results, accessed Feb. . United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Corruption in Afghanistan: bribery as reported bythe victims (New York: UNODC, Jan. ), p. . Similar results were yielded by a poll conducted jointly bythe BBC, ABC News and Germanys ARD News Show: per cent of those surveyed said that corruptionwas a problem, per cent said it was a big problem. See BBC News, Afghans more optimistic for future, Jan. , http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/.stm, accessed Feb. .

UNODC, Corruption, p. . Dexter Filkins, Petraeus opposes rapid pull-out in Afghanistan, New York Times, Aug. . US Department of Defense, Progress towards security and stability in Afghanistan: Report to Congress (Washington

DC: Department of Defense, Nov. ), p. . Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman, US shifts Afghan graft plan, Wall Street Journal, Sept.

. COMISAF/CDR USFOR-A, General David Petraeus, COMISAFs counterinsurgency (COIN) contracting

guidance, Sept. .


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These contentious issuesKarzai, ISAF contracting and corruptionall cametogether in Kandahar which, as noted, was the focus of ISAFs main effort fromsummer . The key power broker in the area is the Presidents half-brother and

Chief of the Kandahar Provincial Council, Ahmed Wali Karzai (AWK). Westernofficials and journalists alike have long maintained that AWK is heavily involvedin the illicit drugs trade.Exerting a dominant influence over regional politicsthrough patronage networks, AWK was identified by ISAF as a major obstacle toprogress in the southbut one that it was unable to remove. AWK is untouchable,given his close links to the President, who depends on his half-brother to maintainhis support base in the south.Accordingly, ISAF has sought to win over andwork with AWK. International contracts worth millions of dollars were dispensedto various companies and agencies run by his network. This engagement strategyhas produced a short-term pay-off: AWK assisted in stabilizing parts of Kandaharprovince, and has stayed clear of ISAFs execution of operations inside the city.

But this has been achieved at a longer-term cost to ISAFs campaign to combatcorruption and improve Afghan government legitimacy.

The extent of corruption was most dramatically revealed in the fiasco of the presidential elections, which were marred by massive electoral fraud.Overa million votes cast were found to be suspicious, of which , in favour ofKarzai were fraudulent.In the wake of this unedifying spectacle, internationalobservers argued that ISAF could not defeat the Taleban because it did not have acredible local partner.Yet polls indicate that the elections themselves have noteroded Karzais popularity among Afghans. One major survey put the Presidentsapproval rating at per cent.Another surmised that per cent of Afghans

believe that elections have improved the country.

Clearly, vote-rigging has notput people off the electoral process.

However, this is not to say that ordinary Afghans have been fooled. Most people,especially in the east and south of the country, do not think that the presidential andparliamentary elections were free and fair.In sum, the persistence of supportfor Karzai exists alongside waning public faith in the state and its organs. Indeed,

James Risen, Reports link Karzais brother to Afghanistan heroin trade, New York Times, Oct. . AWKsmalign activities have been confirmed in recently leaked diplomatic cables: see Embassy in Kabul to StateDepartment, Ahmed Wali Karzai: seeking to define himself as US partner, Feb. , http://.../cable///KABUL.html, accessed Feb. .

Abdul Waheed Wafa, Brother of Karzai denies links to heroin, New York Times, Oct. .

Chaudhuri interviews with British, Canadian and American officials, Kandahar RC-South, Aug. ;Chaudhuri interview with former senior adviser to the Afghan government, London, Oct. ; Chaudhuriinterview with senior official, Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Aug. ; Farrell interviews withcommand staff, RC-South, Oct. .

Haseeb Humayoon, The re-election of Hamid Karzai, report (Washington DC: Institute for the Study ofWar, Jan. ); Peter. W. Galbraith, How the Afghan election was rigged, Time Magazine, Oct. .

Humayoon, The re-election of Hamid Karzai, pp. . Galbraith, How the Afghan election was rigged; Chaudhuri interviews with British, Canadian and American

officials, Kandahar, Aug. ; Chaudhuri observations in three round tables with senior ISAF officials, ISAFHQ, Kabul, Aug. .

BBC News, Afghans more optimistic for future. Asia Foundation, Key findings Afghanistan in : a survey of the Afghan people, pp. , http://

asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/KeyFindingsAGSurvey.pdf, accessed Feb. .Asia Foundation, Key findings, pp. .


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the high approval rating for the President may reflect an inclination to supportpolitical authority and thus not provide an accurate picture of Karzais personalpopularity.Independent studies suggest that the lack of legitimacy has pushed

the population to look elsewhere for a more moral form of governance.

Somehave taken to Taleban courts, often reputed to deliver harsh but swift justice.Others have chosen to support insurgent groups, not necessarily out of positivechoice, but because of the lack of political alternatives.

Petraeus has thrown his best and brightest at this problem. But progress oncorruption is hindered by multiple tensions. Afghan politicians depend on thewell-entrenched patronage system for survival and capacity to govern. Hence,tackling corruption targets the bedrock of the Afghan government. Moreover, asthe case of AWK illustrates, ISAF often finds it expedient to work with corruptpower brokers.

NATO politics and withdrawal

The question of when international forces would withdraw from the countrydominated policy debate on Afghanistan in , both in Washington DC andin other key NATO capitals. It generated considerable strategic uncertainty,clouding progress on the ground. The debate kicked off with President Obamasspeech at West Point on December . Speaking to international and domesticaudiences alike, the President argued that the American military surge was tocreate the conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to theAfghans, following which US forces would begin to withdraw in July .In

other words, transition to ANSF lead would open the door for NATO to leave.As Obama put it in private, this [the surge] needs to be a plan about how weregoing to hand it off [sic] and get out of Afghanistan. In public, the Obamaadministration has emphasized that the July deadline is not set in stone, and isdependent upon conditions on the ground.Nonetheless, it has buttressed thedownturn in strategic momentum.

The international conferences in London ( January ) and Kabul ( July )emphasized transition as a strategic goal. The communiqu following the Kabulconference stressed that transition should be completed by .This positionwas endorsed by NATO members at the Lisbon summit in November . Indeed,

Chaudhuri telephone interview with senior Afghan specialist involved in polling, Jan. .Sarah Ladbury, Testing hypotheses on radicalisation in Afghanistan, independent Report for the Departmentof International Development (London: DfID, Aug. ), p. ; Stephen Carter and Kate Clark, Noshortcut to stability: justice, politics, and insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Chatham House, Dec. ),pp. .

For details, see Frank Ledwidge, Justice and counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: a missing link, RUSI Journal: , , p. .

For surveys that validate this point, see Ladbury, Testing hypotheses, pp. .Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in address to the nation, speech at United States Military Academy

at West Point, Dec. , http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan, accessed Feb. .

uoted in Bob Woodward, Obamas war(London: Simon & Schuster, ), p. .Jon Boone, General Petraeus insists he will not be bound by Obamas Afghan exit date,Guardian, Aug. .Communiqu, Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, July , p. .


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the summit discussions made clear that the vast majority of the , inter-national troops deployed in Afghanistan would leave by .NotwithstandingNATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussens assurance that NATO is in

this for the long term,

political elites affirmed the deadline was real. BritainsPrime Minister David Cameron argued forcefully that transitioning by willpave the way for British combat troops to be out of Afghanistan by , a firmdeadline that the UK is set to meet.The withdrawal of Dutch troops in August, the planned withdrawal of Canadian forces in the middle of and thatof Polish soldiers in further suggest that NATO has begun the process ofleaving Afghanistan.

The situation in Germany, the third largest troop-contributing nation, is hardlymore encouraging. The current government is divided on the issue, with DefenceMinister Guttenberg seeking an extended role for the Bundeswehr, and ForeignMinister Westerwelle pushing for withdrawal sooner rather than later.While theBundestag is expected to extend the force mandate in March , further exten-sions are likely to invite strong political opposition, making it all the more difficultto secure broad social consensus for what is effectively a parliamentary army. Indeed, Westerwelle has confirmed that German troops will begin withdrawing asearly as , suggesting the direction policy is likely to take on this question.

Even in Australia and France, where the governments have actually advocatedextending the mission beyond , public pressure has reined in executive branchenthusiasm. In October, the federal parliament in Canberra debated the Afghanwar for the first time since Australian Defence Forces deployed to Afghanistanin .While both Prime Minister Julia Gillard and opposition leader Tony

Abbott supported the war,

polls indicate dipping public confidence.

Similarly,in France, President Sarkozys backing of the Afghan war has done nothing torally popular support. Indeed, as table shows, public support for the war amongall four top troop-contributing states declined in .

There are three reasons for this decline in public support: NATOs inabilityto craft a convincing strategic narrative that has a degree of salience with home

Ian Traynor, NATO maps out Afghanistan withdrawal by at Lisbon Summit,Guardian, Nov. .uoted in NATO and Afghanistan launch transition and embark on a long term partnership, NATO News,

Nov. , http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D-FC/natolive/news_.htm, accessed Feb. .

BBC News, David Cameron defends Afghan withdrawal deadline, Nov. , http://www.bbc.co.uk/

news/uk-politics-, accessed Feb. .Ralf Beste, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit, Ralf Neukirch and Gregor-Peter Schmitz, Germanydebates Afghanistan, Der Spiegel, Dec. .

Ulrike Demmer, Christoph Hickmann, Dirk Kurbjuweit and Ralf Neukirch, Fear of rising death toll, DerSpiegel, Dec. .

Judy Dempsey and Mathew Saltmarsh, German troops to begin Afghan exit next year, New York Times, Dec. .

Gerard Henderson, Party leaders closer on Afghanistan war than you may think, Sydney Morning Herald, Oct. .

Editorial, Speeches mask the reality of Afghanistans war, Sydney Morning Herald, Oct. ; HamishMcDonald, A shaky premise for our Afghan exit, Sydney Morning Herald, Jan. .

Mathew Franklin and Mark Todd, Afghan flak hits Tony Abbott in the polls, Australian, Oct. ; MoreAustralians call for Afghanistan withdrawal,Angus Reid Public Opinion, June , http://www.angus-reid.com/polls//more_australians_call_for_afghanistan_withdrawal/, accessed Feb. .


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Campaign disconnect


Table . Comparative public support for Afghanistan campaign, and

Country Public support in (%) Public support in (%)

United States a bUnited Kingdom c d

Germany e f

France g h

a Mean percentage figure for the period between and , based on multiple polls computed by SarahKreps, Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion, Foreign Policy Analysis: , July , p. .

b Figure computed by the authors based on the mean average of polls conducted between Aug. and Dec. .See JeffreyM. Jones, Americans less pessimistic about US progress in Afghanistan, Gallup, Nov. ,http://www.gallup.com/poll//Americans-Less-Pessimistic-Progress-Afghanistan.aspx; Jeffrey M.

Jones, Obama finds majority approval elusive,Gallup, Aug. , http://www.gallup.com/poll//Issues-Obama-Finds-Majority-Approval-Elusive.aspx; Jeffrey M. Jones, In the US, new high of % callAfghanistan war a mistake, Gallup, Aug. , http://www.gallup.com/poll//New-High-Call-

Afghanistan-War-Mistake.aspx; Julie Phelon and Gary Langer, Poll: assessment of Afghanistan war sours,ABC/Washington Postpoll, Dec. ; What the numbers say about Afghanistan progress in Afghanistan,CNN, Oct. , http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com////what-the-numbers-say-about-progress-in-afghanistan/.

c Based on the average of polls conducted in : see Richard Norton Taylor, Julian Glover and NicholasWatt, Public support of war in Afghanistan is firm, Guardian, July ; Majority of Britons opposeAfghan war, Reuters, Oct. , http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-.

d This percentage argued that British troops should begin to be removed from Afghanistan in : News-night poll: most think Afghan war unwinnable, BBCNewsnight, Feb. , http://news.bbc.co.uk//hi/programmes/newsnight/.stm; Nigel Morris, Afghan war is unwinnable and we should not be there,says voters, Independent, April .

e Based on the average of polls conducted in : see Transatlantic trends, German Marshall Fund, ,pp. , http://www.gmfus.org/trends/doc/_English_Top.pdf; Germans would remove troopsfrom Afghanistan, Angus Reid Public Opinion, March , http://www.angus-reid.com/polls//germans_would_remove_troops_from_afghanistan/. These figures are consistent with alternative research:

Kreps, Elite consensus, p. .f Germans consider ending Afghan mission now, Angus Reid Public Opinion, April , http://www.angus-reid.com/polls//germans_consider_ending_afghan_mission_now/. The authors calculated theaverage of those advocating immediate withdrawal (%), withdrawal by (%) and withdrawal by (%).

g Based on the average percentage of polling data from questions concerning attitudes towards the war andrespondents support for withdrawal: see Transatlantic trends, pp. .

h Gene Zbikowski, War in Afghanistan unpopular in France, LHumanit, July , http://www.humaniteinenglish.com/spip.php?article.

populations; a sharp rise in western casualties;and the questionable objectiveof supporting a government marred by charges of corruption and electoral fraud.The fact that both NATO and western political leaders have failed to commu-

nicate the purpose of the mission to home audiences is an accepted fact amongmilitary commanders at ISAF HQ.In Britain, for instance, the war has been

justified as necessary in order to prevent Afghanistan once again becoming a basefor terrorism. However, the government has failed to convince the parliament,let alone the public, of this case for war. As one senior British commander

Coalition fatalities were the highest in and : Military casualty data, Afghanistan Conflict Monitor,, http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/military.html, accessed Feb. .

Chaudhuri interviews and observations during four round tables with senior British, American, French andCanadian officers and civilians at ISAF HQ and RC-South, Aug. .

House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Global security: Afghanistan and Pakistan, eighth report of


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recounts, the /-Al aeda story lacks credibility when the scope of our missionis as expansive as it is, and complicated by an elusive end state.

With support for the war declining in NATO capitals, the political mood has

turned against it. This is the all-important context of the deadline. No matterwhat officials say about transition being based on conditions on the ground, thepolitical reality is that, come , NATO combat troops will almost certainlywithdraw.

Pakistan: an unwilling ally

Pakistans unwillingness to target insurgent groups hostile to coalition forces andhoused in sanctuaries on the Pakistani side of the porous Durand Line serves asyet another strategic impediment to progress in Afghanistan. These groupsinclude the ST and the HN, which operate out of uetta (the capital city

of Baluchistan), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and, increasingly, thedensely populated city of Karachi.

Under the Bush administration, little attention was given to the dynamic ofa shared insurgency spanning the AfghanistanPakistan border. Conversely,Obamas advisers were quick to recognize that both the ISAF mission and thefuture of Afghanistan were directly dependent upon Pakistani cooperation.InMarch the much publicized Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) strategy documentmade a case for a regional approach, treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as twocountries with one challenge in one region.At ISAF HQ, McChrystal reacheda similar conclusion: stability in Pakistan was essential to enable progress in

Afghanistan.

Insurgent groups were reportedly aided by some elements ofPakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).While the veracity ofthe latter claim is questionable,that the Pakistani military are living a lie is amatter of both conventional wisdom and dilemma.

session , HC (London: TSO, Aug. ), pp. ; David J. Betz, Communication breakdown:strategic communication and defeat in Afghanistan, internal paper for PRISM, RC-South, Sept. .

Chaudhuri interview with very senior British commander, ISAF HQ, Kabul, Aug. .This is not to suggest that NATO will abandon Afghanistan. There is evidence to suggest that a smaller

training/support mission and special forces will remain beyond the deadline.Overview of the Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy review; Elisabeth Bumiller, Intelligence reports offer

dim views of Afghan war, New York Times, Dec. .Ahmed Rashid, Descent into chaos (New York: Viking, ), pp.xxxviilviii; Gary C. Schroen, First in: an

insiders account of how the CIA spearheaded the war on terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine Books, ),

pp. .Chaudhuri interview with Bruce Riedel, Washington DC, Aug. ; Bruce Riedel, Al aeda strikesback, Foreign Affairs: , MayJune , pp. ; Richard C. Holbrooke, The next President: masteringa daunting agenda, Foreign Affairs: , Sept.Oct. , pp. .

Jones, President Obamas AfghanistanPakistan (AfPak) strategy.McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. .McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. .The ISIs linkage with the ST is a matter of much debate. While recent studies show that ISI officers are

represented on the STs leadership council, specialists claim that the ISI and the military merely provide shelter,not necessarily direct support, to the ST. See Matt Waldman, The sun in the sky: the relationship betweenPakistans ISI and Afghan insurgents, Crisis State Research Centre working paper (London: London School ofEconomics, June ), p. ; Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: a hard country(London: Penguin, forthcoming ), ch. .

uoted by Mike McConnell, the former US Director of National Intelligence, in Woodward, Obamas war, p.; Michael Semple, Afghanistan and Pakistan: interdependent, distrustful neighbours, Guardian, July .


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Campaign disconnect


Three interrelated reasons explain this state of affairs. First, Pakistani elites areconvinced that ISAF forces will soon withdraw from Afghanistan,leaving themto contend with a raging civil war. Western intelligence accepts that the July

deadline for the beginning of US force withdrawal reinforced Pakistani support forthe ST and the HN, viewed by Pakistan as its proxies in the Afghan endgame.Second, a core objective is to craft a hedging strategy against increasing Indianinfluence in Kabul.That is, as far as the military are concerned, it simply does notmake sense to target PashtunAfghan Taleban actors who may well return to powerin at least some part of Afghanistan, particularly when the contending partytheexisting Tajik-dominated government in Kabulis considered to comprise IndiasAfghan protgs.The insecurity complex is further compounded by the factthat Pakistan has historically shared an uneasy relationship with Afghan princi-ples.Third, recent research highlights a key domestic rationale for shelteringAfghan insurgent groups. Anatol Lieven argues that on the street there is an

overwhelming level of sympathy for the Afghan Taleban, making it all the harderfor state authorities to turn against them.In short, Pakistans frame of referenceis shaped by regional dynamics that have been accentuated by both the repeatedtalk of withdrawal and important domestic compulsions.

With a view to reversing Pakistans strategic calculation, the Obama administra-tion set about increasing US economic assistance. Accordingly, the US Congresspledged $. billion annually for five years.The idea, initially, was to strengthenthe government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari. However, US efforts tobuttress civilian authority irritated the military leadership.By the end of ,military elites felt sidelined. In an attempt to restore confidence, both countries

initiated a strategic dialogue at the ministerial level. Importantly, the US increasedassistance to the Pakistani military by $ billion.The extended fiscal supportwas once again intended to prompt the military to take action against insurgentgroups. Yet to date, for the reasons highlighted above, this approach has provedunsuccessful.

This is not to say that the Pakistani military has shied away from the war onterror. To the contrary: the military and intelligence agencies have taken decisiveaction against extremists who threaten stability within Pakistan. Indeed, the

Ahmed Rashid, Trotsky in Baluchistan, National Interest, Nov.Dec. . For alternative findings onPakistani military views on the US exit, see Christine C. Fair, The militant challenge in Pakistan, PolicyAnalysis, Jan. , p. .

Chaudhuri interview with a senior western intelligence officer, Kabul, Aug. . This is not to suggest thatthe military controls either the ST or the HN; rather, that these groups serve as favourites in Afghanistanspolitical landscape. See Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, eds, Abdul Salaam Zaeef: my life with theTaleban(London: Hurst, ) pp. .

Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the brink, New York Review of Books: , June .Rashid, Trotsky in Baluchistan.For an overview, see Farzana Shaikh, Making sense of Pakistan(London: Hurst, ) pp. .Lieven, Pakistan, chs , . The authors thank Anatol Lieven for sharing chapters of his manuscript and

research in advance of publication.Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act , http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s

&tab=summary, accessed Feb. .David Ignatius, How to aggravate Pakistan, Washington Post, Oct. ; KerryLugar aid bill sparks debate

in parliament, Dawn, Oct. .Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, US offers Pakistan army billion aid package, New York Times, Oct. .


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Pakistani security forces have lost more lives fighting the militancy than all NATOcountries in Afghanistan.Since at least the military has helped target keyAl-aeda leaders. In April it launched clearing operations in the Swat

Valley. Operation Rah-e-Raast (The Right Path) pushed extremists out, elimi-nating their ability to regain control of the area.In October the militarytook the fight (Operation Rah-e-Nijat or Path to Salvation) to the Tehrik-e-Taleban Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistan Taleban. In , while Pakistans COINstrategy and timetable were set back by the devastating floods that affected over million people,a number of operations were soon reinitiated in key Talebanstrongholds.Clearly, resolve is hardly an issue with the Pakistani military, aslong as the mission complements its strategic calculations.

Alongside the extended programme of assistance to Pakistan, the Obama admin-istration devoted attention to India. It was believed that meaningful dialogue andtraction on the Kashmir dispute would encourage Pakistani elites to focus their

attention on the ST and associated groups, rather than on India in the east.Holbrookes unofficial brief as US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistanwas to convince the Indians to engage in dialogue with Pakistan.However,the prospect of improving relations was sidelined by the growing opposition torapprochement in India following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November. Frustrated by Pakistans refusal to arrest those responsible, the IndianPrime Minister Manmohan Singh argued that talks could resume once Pakistanput a stop to the terror machine. In early Indian and Pakistani leadersstressed the need to engage in dialogue, but rapprochementwill require Pakistanto take meaningful action against those accused in the Mumbai attacks.This is

unlikely to happen any time soon.Neither economic nor regional incentives have altered Pakistans strategic

perceptions. In fact, Pakistani anxieties have deepened because of Indias expandingfootprint in Afghanistan. This point was emphasized by McChrystal, who arguedthat while Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, they exacerbateregional tensions and encourage[s] Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or

Hilary Synnott, Look both ways before attacking Pakistan, Financial Times, Aug. ; Pakistan Instituteof Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report (Islamabad,Jan. ), pp. .

Anatol Lieven, How the Afghan counterinsurgency threatens Pakistan, The Nation, Jan. .Hasan Abbas, Militancy in Pakistans borderlands (New York: Century Foundation, ), p. . This was

confirmed by independent observers having visited Swat: Chaudhuri interview with senior Pakistanijournalist embedded with the army, London, March ; discussions with Anatol Lieven following hisvisit to Swat in Sept. .

Hilary Synnott, After the flood, Survival: , Sept. , p. .S. Akbar Zaidi, Pakistan after the floods(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace),

Sept. ; Carlotta Gall, Floods stunt Pakistani fight against insurgents, New York Times, Sept. .Rashid, Trotsky in Baluchistan; C. Raja Mohan, Barack Obamas Kashmir thesis, Indian Express, Nov.

.Laura Roxen, Indias stealth lobbying against Holbrooke brief , The Cable, Foreign Policy, Jan. ;

Woodward, Obamas war, p. ; Chaudhuri interview with former senior US State Department official,London, Sept. .

See Rudra Chaudhuri, The proxy calculus, RUSI Journal: , Dec. , pp. .Obama says talk to Pakistan, Times of India, Nov. .Sandeep Dikshit, Krishna expects productive meeting with ureshi, The Hindu, Jan. .


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Campaign disconnect


India.McChrystal was referring to Indias $. billion aid package to Kabul,which angered the Pakistani military. This impending crisis in confidence is fuelledby claims made by Pakistani elites that India actively supports and arms Baluch

groups in their struggle against the government in Islamabad. Baluch leaders aresaid to be sheltered in Indian consulates in southern and eastern Afghanistan alongthe border with Pakistan.While the facts underlying these claims are hazy atbest, they serve to intensify further the prevailing culture of mistrust.

Far from encouraging support for ISAF objectives, the layered and complexregional situation reinforces the belief among Pakistani elites that the centralnodes of the insurgency represent the most promising option in the quest tosecure Pakistani interests in the long term. This is the primary reason why, ratherthan turning on the Taleban, military leaders have positioned themselves as thekey brokers in any attempt at reconciliation between the ST and the Karzaiadministration.

The prospects for 2011

How, then, does the western campaign in Afghanistan look for ? It is prettypromising at the operational level. The trend on CIVCAS is positive. ANSF growthis healthy. There is more work yet to be done on ANA quality, but at least ISAF isnow also focused on ANP partnering. Militarily, the ISAF campaign has regainedmomentum, and the Taleban appear to have been worn down in Helmand andKandahar. ISAF is focused on the key challenge of supporting the development ofsubnational governance. The problem is that continued progress at the operational

level cannot address the three strategic obstacles to campaign success: a corruptand unreliable national government, declining domestic political support for thewar in NATO countries, and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.

For all the assistance that NATO provides to Afghanistan, there is only so muchthe US and its allies can do about Afghan government corruption. For a start,Afghanistan is a sovereign state and, ultimately, ISAF operates at the request ofthe Afghan government. Besides, Karzai probably realizes that the US needs him

McChrystal, Commanders initial assessment, pp. . For detailed analysis of Indias role in Afghanistan,see Shashank Joshi, Indias AfPak strategy, RUSI Journal : , Feb.March , pp. ; MatthieuAikins, India in Afghanistan, The Caravan Journal,Oct. .

For details on Pakistani views on the Indian hand, see Imtiaz Gul, The most dangerous place: Pakistans lawlessfrontier(London: Penguin, ), pp. .

To date, Indians argue that such evidence has not been made available, and western officials in Kandahar arenot clear about the validity of these claims. Importantly, and unsurprisingly, Afghan officials reject Pakistansclaims. See Pak claims India backing Baluch rebels, Indian Express, Apr. ; Chaudhuri interviews withBritish, American and Canadian officials, RC-South, Aug. .

Antonio Giustiozzi, Negotiating with the Taleban, (New York: Century Foundation, ), pp. .Space constraints have prevented our discussing every issue pertaining to campaign progress in this article.

Opium production declined between and , but from a very high baseline, while the licit economygrew spectacularly, albeit from a very low baseline: Afghan GDP grew on average by per cent per annumfrom to . See Ian S. Livingston, Heather L. Messera and Michael OHanlon, Afghanistan index:tracking variables of reconstruction and security in post-/ Afghanistan, Oct. , pp. , . Theimportant point is that economic growth is a crucial factor in enabling states to escape the conflict trap: seePaul Collier, The bottom billion(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ).


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almost as much as he needs the US.McMasters newly formed anti-corruptionunit, the CJIATF-Shafafiyat, promises to introduce better-informed anti-graftstrategies in consultation with Afghan principals, a key failing of the MCTF-A.

Yet rooting out high-level corruption, with the attendant costs for the existingpatronage system, is likely to attract strong opposition from within the Afghangovernment. Indeed, in most cases the patronage network in Kabul can be tracedback to key power brokers at the regional level. As we have noted, the paradox ofhaving to work with such ambiguous and problematic figures, while knowingthat they corrode the governments already waning legitimacy, is unfortunatelya reality.It is possible that, in time, the growth of subnational governance anda more professional ANSF will increase public confidence in the institutions ofgovernment. But such a legitimacy uplift is unlikely in the next four years.

Could progress in the military campaign not stem the decline in public supportfor the war? Well, possibly; but no amount of operational progress is likely to

significantly increasepublic support, because there is still the question of purpose:why is NATO fighting the war? Academic analysis of American public opinionand the use of force clearly show that public support for war is directly relatedto its purpose. As we have noted, NATO lacks a credible strategic narrativeto explain the purpose to home audiences. It may be argued that a NATO-widecoherent narrative is not possible or even desirable, given different national sensi-tivities and roles in Afghanistan. But in its absence, some NATO memberssuchas Britain, Canada and Germanyhave struggled to construct national narrativesthat resonate with their own publics. An endless stream of scandals, involvingpolitical and financial corruption at the highest levels of Afghan government, has

not helped on this score.Finally, there is the problem of Pakistan. Notwithstanding a slew of high-

ranking US visitors to Islamabad towards the end of and at the beginning of, there is nothing to suggest that the security forces will turn their guns on anti-coalition insurgents.Indeed, rather than adopting a conciliatory stance towardsAmerican pleas to dry the swamp in north Waziristan, suspected home to theHaqqanis, General Kayani has taken on an increasingly defiant attitude. Indeed,the media-shy general has made clear that the US and Pakistan have differentframes of reference with regard to regional security.A leaked US NationalIntelligence Estimate on Pakistan stressed that Kayani is unlikely to change hismind anytime soon.Convinced that western presence in Afghanistan will allbut disappear in the next four to five years, Pakistan depends for its leverageand reach within Afghanistan upon its ability to shape a reconciliation dialogue

Andrew Exum, Leverage: designing a political campaign for Afghanistan (Washington DC: Center for a NewAmerican Security, May ), p. .

Anthony King, The power of politics, RUSI Journal: , Dec. , p. .Richard C. Eichenberg, Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force,

, International Security: , , pp. .Karin Brulliard and Karen De Young, US courts Pakistans top general, with little result, Washington Post,

Jan. .Brulliard and Young, US courts Pakistans top general.Gen. Kayani resisting US pressures to launch ground attack, The Nation (Pakistan), Jan. .


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Campaign disconnect


between the ST and the Afghan government,or so senior Pakistani officialsbelieve. Additionally, the stalemate in IndiaPakistan relations followingthe Mumbai attacks persists, further aggravating Pakistani anxieties. In sum,

Pakistan is preparing for the endgame, in which there is little strategic space toconsider US appeals that are wholly inimical to Pakistani interests.

In turn, and with a view to ending the war, if ISAF were to change tackand support a high-level reconciliation dialogue with the ST and the HN,Pakistan would no doubt serve as a key interlocutor. Whether this is likely tohappen depends on how Washington reads the conflict nearer to the US presi-dential elections in . Either way, reconciliation can at best be interpreted asa central component of an exit strategy, itself shaped by the inability to convertoperational progress into strategic momentum.

Nobody can predict with any certainty how things will pan out in Afghan-istan in . Our reading of the situation leads us to conclude that the most

likely scenario is that operational progress will fail to produce the desired strategicoutcomes. Indeed, it is entirely possible that things will get worse on the strategicside of things. Growing war-weariness among NATO publics, a strong andlargely immovable patronage system led by corrupt power brokers in Afghanistan,and the strategic logic underlying Pakistani non-action may collectively tip thecampaign into a downward strategic spiral. In these circumstances, the best thatthe US and its allies can hope for is to exert influence on key terrain districts andgarrisoned cities like Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad. Withtransition as the central goal for and beyond, the focus is likely to remainon ANSF development. In many ways, the key will lie in converting the ANA

and ANP into corporate institutions capable of thinking and fighting for nationalstrategic interests.

As mentioned above, reconciliation is the wild card. There may yet be a negoti-ated end to the conflict that ensures a reasonably stable, legitimate and securenational government following NATO withdrawal. This coming year is likely tosee leniency on the part of Washington to widen the channel of dialogue with atleast the less ideologically driven parts of the insurgency. Negotiations in someform have been going on for some time.The process, if it succeeds at all, will bea slow one. Violent resistance to the Afghan government is driven by a combina-tion of local rivalries and grievances, and ideological and military direction fromthe ST, HN or HIG.Accordingly, reconciliation requires engaging witha myriad of insurgent groups and addressing the mix of motivations specific toeach group.There is a growing realization in Washington that a negotiated end

For details on Pakistan and reconciliation, see Matt Waldman, Tough talking, RUSI Journal: , Dec. ,pp. .

Chaudhuri observations in track-two meetings convened by the authors with senior Pakistani and Indianrepresentatives, London, March .

Chaudhuri, The proxy calculus, pp. .Ahmed Rashid, The way out of Afghanistan, New York Review of Books, Dec. ; Ewan MacAskill and

Simon Tisdall, White House shifts Afghanistan strategy towards talks with Taleban, Guardian, July .Antonio Giustozzi, ed., Decoding the new Taleban(London: Hurst, ).Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, ).


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International Affairs: , Copyright The Author(s) International Affairs The Royal Institute of International Affairs

to the conflict is a better scenario than a strategy of hope in which key strategicimpediments are implausibly expected to fall in line with ISAF campaign objec-tives.

Documents

Obstacles in Afghanistan 2009-2011 Final