Of the Neutrality Question in Science and Technology

8/14/2019 Of the Neutrality Question in Science and Technology

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Of The Neutrality Question in Science and Technology

Alloy S Ihuah PhD

Deptof Rel. and Philosophy,Benue State University,

Makurdi.

Abstract

This paper argues that, science and technology are not and cannot be value-free, and that,the burden of proof (of evidence of marked injury to man) should lie on the man who wants to

introduce any change (or scientific or technological breakthrough) before the change or thebreakthrough will proceed for public use. The paper argues the conclusion that, the

complicated planet, inhabited by more than a million and half species living together in a

more or less balanced equilibrium, in which they use and re-use the same facilities cannot,and should not be improved by aimless and uninformed tinkering.

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The concept of neutrality associated to any human activity suggests an inherent

quality of perfection. In relation to science and technology, the neutrality theory argues for

itself the omniscience, which suggests and elevates the scientist (and to some extent the

technologist) to the role of a high priest expounding its truths. The theory grants to itself the

self-contained completeness of knowledge truths especially when science is considered in

the context of what is normally defined as pure and applied science.

Sir Ernest Chain more clearly states the thesis of scientific neutrality thus: science as

long as it limits itself to the descriptive study of the laws of nature, has no moral or ethical quality,and this applies to the physical as well as the biological sciences (1970).

This position is traditionally inherent in scientific thinking more so that science seeks

to ascertain the truth about nature, which hypotheses which aim to move nearer and nearer to

an accurate description of natural laws, which are seen as universal truths. Such thinking is

also anchored on the fact that objective reasoning cannot deny scientific facts and all

scientists must inevitably reach the same conclusion.

It means, then, as Joan Lipscombe and Bill Williams (1979:6) posited, that value

judgements, cultural biases or political standpoints do not in any way influence or determine

scientific knowledge. There is nothing good or bad about scientific knowledge. Such

understanding of science has been carried forward and is strongly supported today which

perhaps may have informed the thought of Bronowski who attributes to science anunrelenting independence in the search for truth that pays no attention to received opinion or

expediency or political advantage (Bronowski, 1971:25).

The neutrality of technology unlike science does not very well find convenient

application. Indeed, there is no way in which we can talk about the pursuit of knowledge for

its own sake or the objectivity of observations, experiments and theory as applied to

technology, for it necessarily implies the application of science, invention and industry and or

commerce to matters which are of importance to our life style and must, therefore, have a

social effect. Notwithstanding such position, technology is, undoubtedly, commonly

regarded as being neutral in some senses of the word. Considered as a collection of

machines, techniques and tools, technology is here said to be neutral in the sense that in itself

it does not incorporate or imply any political or social values, and that it is neither good nor

evil.


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Taken, therefore, as a blameless tool, any beneficial or harmful effect is said to arise

out of the motives of the people applying a particular piece of technology and the end to

which it is used. It means, then, that where a particular application, chosen for its beneficial

results, produces harmful side-effects, these are blamed either on inadequate social policies or

on lack of sophistication in the control of the effects of technology. Whichever is chosen as a

whipping boy, concludes Joan Lipscombe and Bill Williams (1979:19), technology itself isneutral.

But the most challenging question is, to what extent is science and technology

neutral? The question of the neutrality of science and technology is essentially the question

of the rationality of science and technology. This is perhaps where the essential link between

science and technology very clearly bears on man in his integral whole, in both his material

and spiritual life, but more so in the spiritual towards which the material must serve. Suffice

to say here that the argument in support of an unrelenting independence [of science and

technology] in the search for truth that pays no attention to received opinion or expediency or

political advantage is an exercise in the promotion of ignorance and scepticism. To quote

Andrew Efemini:

Anyone with scientific consciousness, understands the place of sciencein mans struggle to improve his living (science is not) something that

should be pursued for its own sake but something that should bepursued for mans benefit (Efemini, 1982:18).

It thus means that, traditionally, practical knowledge i.e. techne which is concernedwith making (recta ratio factibilium) directed to the perfection of the object of knowledge,

combines with theoretical knowledge i.e. scientia or episteme comprising also contemplation

of nature, which goal is the perfection of the subject (the knower) to bring about the ultimate

end in the perfection of the whole man. Such an endeavour is a conscious and goal oriented

one, which not only reflects the value systems of the society at that time, but are value laden

in themselves.Granted that science is a move towards the unknown according to which it is

impossible to foresee the practical results of any research in pure science, it is neither a blind

move nor a goalless move. Matthew Nwoko aptly suggests here that:At least a scientific research worthy of the name must be a planned venture. Even if the scientist does not foresee the remote consequences of hisventure, but the planned structure of his work carries or must carry anultimate intention of discovery for the good of man (Nwoko, 1992:143).

It is, thus, the inherent vocation of the scientist to lay bare the richness of nature,

which practical use the technologist will bring to bear for the good of man. This is the

rationality of scientific inquiry, and such is the rationality of technological practice.

Understood as such, both the scientist and the technologist are said to be humanists who

must not only reach out to the worlds wealth of knowledge and practice, but must also

pursue the solution of our problems (of industrial, manufacture, environmental pollution,

economic progress etc) with dedication, conviction and patriotism (Newswatch Feb. 12,

1990:14).

Furthermore, to argue that science is unaffected by extraneous factors, which

pontification justifies scientific neutrality, is an overstatement to say the least. The dialectics

of science is intertwined with theological, ethical, ideological and other non-scientific

arguments, which at some points become impossible to separate them, and stand-points on

reality were determined by considering all these aspects. R. M. Young (1971:31) thus, argues

that, what people were prepared to accept as the truth was not determined by sciencealone but also by subtle and often un-acknowledged influence of social factors.


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The deliberate suppression of scientific knowledge or the active promotion of

particular theories, which conform to a specific political situation, similarly counts against the

neutrality theory of science. A ready example, here, is the Lysenko affair in Russia in which

a whole area of genetics was eliminated from Russian teaching and his theories imposed

because they were more supportive of the political system. Russian scientists worked within

the framework of these theories believing them to be true, at least as far as the existingevidence was concerned (D. W. Caspari and R. E. Marshak 1965:275-278). The case of

Jeremiah Abalaka, a Nigerian, is another example in which the scientists search for the truth

and or scientific knowledge is substantially tempered with to bolster up the Nigerian/foreign

interest. Pursued to a logical conclusion, and in the extreme case, scientific facts (if

Abalaka succumbs) may be the invention of a political regime instead of results from

disinterested pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.

Again, proponents of the neutrality theory say that science concerns itself purely with

a description of the world as it is, and so argue out the impossibility of scientific knowledge

giving rise to normative and evaluative statements. Arguably it cannot give rise to statement

about what should or should not be (normative), nor can it pass judgement on what is good or

bad (evaluative). Indeed orthodox philosophical argument has it that the only validconclusions of deductive arguments are the ones which contain only material which is

already in the premises, consequently scientific premises (factual) cannot lead to normative

or evaluative statements (Lipscombe and Williams 1979:8).

But, this argument collapses because of the difficulty in identifying which premises

are factual normative statements, it is argued could be expressed in the same way as factual

ones, and there are considerable difficulties in clearly distinguishing one from the other.

Black thus asserts that:Some normative evaluative propositions are objective (generallyaccepted and not subject to individual values) and this removes thedistinction which separates scientific propositions from others

(1975:40).

It is, thus, possible for science to provide factual statements that could lead to

normative or evaluative statements. An example of this could be:

Plant defoliants can cause food shortage (factual)

Food shortage lead to people starving (factual)

It is wrong that people should starve directly because of mans action (Normative)

Therefore, plant defoliants should not be used (Normative)

The base of our argument, here, is that the scientist has a social responsibility for the

application of his work. This is informed by the logic of distinction between the abstract

concept of science which argued position is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, from

the practical manifestation of that concept. This is science in the context of an overallactivity. Black mentions that:

Science as an overall activity can no longer be considered as thedisinterested pursuit of truth. Even where scientists are working on the

purest science, which has no apparent applications, scientists cannotescape the dilemma of responsibility because the speed of developmentis such that discoveries are often harnessed very quickly to industrial,military or other practical uses. (Black, 1975:40)

Besides, much of todays pure research is consciously directed at serving specific

objectives and or solving some problems. Black argues further that:It can no longer be considered neutral and is carried out with a definite

purpose in mind: to increase the profits of industry or strengthen thepower of government. Scientists involved in such projects know this


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and because the science is no longer neutral they have forfeited anyclaim to moral neutrality; they cannot subsequently plead not guilty

when this purpose is achieved and horror (or praise) is expressed at theresults (ibid).

We may, perhaps, argue further that such state in which science has found itself, of

developing and applying its results to specific objectives, thus, removes it out of this oldargument of scientific neutrality (as for example the work in plasma physics carried out

specifically with the aim of generating electricity from nuclear fusion). In such

circumstances, there is no realistic way of separating basic research from its application and,

hence this harnessing of science to specific ends implies the end of scientific neutrality and

with it the end of any legitimate claim to moral neutrality.

W. H. Ferry convincingly that technology has a career of its own, so far not subject

to the political guidance and restraints imposed on other enormously powerful institutions

(Ferry, 1971:120). Obviously, such conclusion sounds like the distant drums of science which

pays no regard as to whether people accept the truth it claims to have as part of its very

nature, or not. At best, such assumed neutrality of technology has arisen because certain

characteristics associated with science have, unjustifiably, been transferred to technology

hook, line and sinker. Richkover more correctly presents this scenario when he says:A certain ruthlessness has been encouraged by the mistaken belief that

to disregard human consideration is as necessary in technology as it isin science (Richcover, 1965:154 ).

But such conclusion is founded on illicit premise. Technology understood as an art or

skill, entails in its essence the employment of means to accomplish some end: opposed to

nature, which in itself is a product of the rational faculty. Essentially, technology thus means

a set of principles, or rational method, in the production of something or in the achievement

of an end. By its nature, technology is not and cannot be neutral, because human needs and

values remain its essential ingredients. It is, perhaps, this conclusion that the Germanlanguage (especially in the philosophical usage) explains the term Technikas the utilization

of the knowledge of method or mode of production of material goods to serve human needs.

That is, technology by its nature is determined by the society. In the words of Dickson:In general we can say that a societys technology, when viewed as asocial institution rather than a heterogeneous collection of machinesand tools, is structured in such a way that it coincides with its dominant

modes of action and interaction Technology does not just provide inits individual machines, the physical means by which a society supportsand promotes its power structure, it also reflects, as a social institutionthis social structure in its design. A societys technology can never be

isolated from its power structure, and technology can thus never beconsidered politically neutral (Dicson, 1974:25).

This explains the fact of our being dominated by technology and which our generation

has seen the emergence of the machine, and the disappearance of the person. The reason

for this, according to Dickson, is the political nature of technology. This dominating

technology, he says reflects the wishes of the ruling class to control their fellow men.

Looking back into history, we cannot but agree with this simple but thought provoking

truism. The very process of industrialization, for example, did not arise from an objective

assessment of production needs determined by economic factors. It arose from the desires of

the dominant social class, the providers of capital, to dominate and control both nature andwork force. Consequently, these set of values and desires were built into the design of the


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machines and factories which benefits are confined to the members of a particular social

class.

To understand properly this argument of the neutrality of technology, it suffices to

clarify the distinction between science and technology. While the work which the scientists

do varies considerably along the spectrum from pure research to applied technology, that of

the technologists is concerned almost exclusively with developing and implementing specificideas with a definite end in mind. In putting this issue into proper perspective therefore, two

questions come to mind, namely, the question of the intended product of the work of the

technologist: how far, if at all, should the technologist make judgement about the desirability

or otherwise of the end product in considering whether or not to apply his technical skill to a

particular project? And the question which arises from the unpredicted harmful or

undesirable consequences which often arise from the application of a particular technology:

how far is the technologist innocent or responsible for such consequences?

The answers to these questions are not far-fetched. It is argued here that, the

professional status of technologists makes them culpable for the work of their hands. If they

are truly professionals, they have a responsibility to relinquish their neutral role and to take

steps to limit the harmful consequences of their works. As professional automotive engineersworth their salt, for example, they have the capacity to construct cars that may reduce road

deaths and injuries, high noise levels, congestion, pollution and despoliation of the

countryside among other harmful consequences. To argue the opposite view that

technologists are not in any way responsible for the intended consequences of the use of their

product is to create an artificial distinction between responsibility for the development of a

product and responsibility for the use of that product. Such distinction is simply a question of

conscience which does not find relevance in this consideration. Einstein was here clear on

this issue when he forcefully writes: we scientists whose tragic destination has been to help

in making the methods of annihilation more gruesome and more effective, must consider it

our solemn and transcendent duty to do all in our power in preventing these weapons from

being used (Time, December 1999:59).

More unacceptable is even the question of unforeseen consequences of technological

invention and development. The question put in context is, is it still acceptable for the

technologist to plead innocence when his device intended for human benefit turns out to do

more harm than good? The answer in this regard is No! Hardin (1972 especially chapter 7) is

vehement on this score and, thus, introduces the concept of guilty until proven innocent,

suggesting further that this should be applied to all technical development. Professor C. S.

Momoh canvasses a similar idea in his Philosophy and Moral Scientism, according to

which all scientific and technical inventions are allowed to play out their effects in the

scientists laboratory, and those with harmful consequences disallowed to see the light of

application. He says:For any scientific invention to be worth its salt, its consequences andpurpose for mankind and humanity must be seen to be moral thesimple test is: will the application of scientific invention or discoveryadvance the moral worth of mankind? If Yes such a discovery shouldbe developed and embraced. If the answer is No, such an invention

should be left to cool away in the laboratory. (Momoh, 2000:82)

The concern in both thinking is that, the burden of proof of both the effectiveness and

harmlessness has been placed on the proponent. All this boils down to the fact that the

technologist (and technology in general) is clearly denied any shelter behind the neutrality

shield. Technology is not and should no longer be seen as, a neutral tool. It should be

assumed to be harmful until proven otherwise. While accepting that such action on the partof man is likely to delay benefits and so limit the maximization of human creativity, it serves


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Of the Neutrality Question in Science and Technology