Ogni cosa è una, ma non unimodamente'- Unity and Multiplicity in Giordano Bruno's

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Ogni cosa e una, ma non unim odam ente :

Unity and mnltiplicity in Giordano Brnno s

De la causa principio e uno

and

De Vinfinito universo e mondi

Max Henninger

When Sydney Greenberg published his English translation of Giordano Bruno's

De la causa principio e uno in 1950,^ he saw fit to remind his readers of the

overwhelming hostility with which the ideas presented in that dialogue continued

to be received long after its autho r had died at the stake. It was only with Jacobi,

Goethe, and other e xponents of German romanticism that almost two centuries of

'slanderous attacks' (Greenberg,

p

4) on Bruno came to an end. Yet the 'restoration

of Bruno's philosophy ' soon met with an imp sse in the form of protra cted debates

on what Greenberg (pp. 4-5) calls 'the problem of consistency and inner

contradiction' in Bruno's metaphysical dialogues. Polemicizing against Felice

Tocco, Giovanni Gentile argued famously that Bruno's philosophy was

fundamentally eclectic, without deeper unity; Leonardo Olschki and James

Mclntyre placed similar emphasis on what they identified as the insuperable

contradictions of Bruno's thought.^ S o persistent was this view that G reenberg still

felt the need to insist, in a work published 350 years after B runo's death , that the

latter's philosophical method 'presupposes a unity in principle, regardless of

app aren t inconsistencies in detail' (p. 8).

In the decades following the publication of Yates'

Giordano Bruno an d the

Herm etic Tradition ^

much attention was devoted to the influence of Herm etic or

magical thought on Bruno. In its own way, this 'rovesciamento interpretativo'

prevented the philosophical analysis of Bruno's work from advancing.'' The

scholarship inspired by Yates may even have m arked a return to the first stage in

the reception of Bruno, when the philosophical character of his work was flatly

denied. T his, in any case, is the position of Ciliberto (p. 7): 'Al vecchio mito se ne

e sostituito un altro. Rovesciando antichi e consolidati punti di vista, le

interpretaz ioni piu diffuse negli ultimi anni han no battuto, anzi tutto , suU'immagine

di Bruno m ag o , offuscandone il nesso complesso - ma decisivo - con linee



18 the italianist 26 • 2 6

carattere intrinseco di una filosofia capace di espandersi, attraverso una sorta di

movimen to a spirale, su una p luralita staord inaria di piani e di livelli, senza venire

meno alia sua ispirazione originaria'.

It is one of the premises of this paper tha t C iliberto's claim on the originality

of Bruno's writings, and on their ph ilosophical character, is essentially correct. In

the pages that follow, it will be argued tha t the cosm ological dialogues De

l

causa,

principio e uno an d De I infinito, universo e mondi are devoted to the elaboration

of two properly philosophical concepts, those of unity and multiplicity, and that

Bruno's propositions on the interrelatedness of unity and multiplicity cannot be

dismissed as an eclectic assemblage of previous philosoph ical o r non-ph ilosophical

(magical) themes.

It is worth noting that, even where the philosophical importance of Bruno's

elaboration of these concepts has been recognized, this has not always led to

adequate interpretations. Huber's

Einheit und Vielheit in Denken und Sprache

Giordano Brunos,^

which rightly identifies the problem of unity and multiplicity

as the single m ost im portant element in Bruno's philosophy, ends up telling us more

abo ut Huber's philosophical preferences, and abo ut the general climate of German

academia in the 19 60s, than a bout B runo. Even if Huber did not refer explicitly to

Heidegger, one could ha rdly overlook the latter's influence in those passages th at

speak of Bruno's 'philosoph ical speech as poetic speech' and of his 'protest against

terminology' (p. 4). While such remarks do address important issues, namely

Bruno's use of poetic forms and his polemic against scholastic jargon, other

passages such as those that attribute to Bruno a view of multiplicity as 'painful

decay ' or characterize his fascination with unity as 'Plotinia n' are simply misleading

(p.

5). Huber's characterization of Bruno's philosophy as a 'dialectic of statement

and response' (p. 7), or his invocation of the concept of contradiction, are even

more problematic. Nor is he the only one to analyse Bruno's philosophy in such

terms;

Vedrine has also seen in Bruno 'a dialectical philosopher in the modern sense

oftheword ' ip . 131) .^

Arguably, Bruno's philosophy of unity and multiplicity cannot be

characterized as dialectical any more than that of Spinoza, with whom he has so

frequently been compared.^ While Spinoza's philosophy could still be described as

dialectical as late as the 196 0s, several decades of scholarsh ip have since cleared up

that misunderstanding.^ The same task has still to be accomplished for Bruno.

Reconstructing Bruno's philosophy of unity and multiplicity without recourse to

conceptual schemes inherited from later philosophers such as Hegel, on the basis

of solid recognition that it is indeed an original philosophy and not an eclectic and

contradictory assemblage of pre-existing ideas, is not a feat that can be

accomplished with any claim to comprehensiveness in the pages that follow.



Henninger • Unity and mu ltiplicity in Bruno 9

Four elements of Bruno's philosophy of unity and multiplicity will be

examined here. For the sake of exposition, these elements will be discussed

separately; as will become clear, they are in fact intimately related. It is mainly out

of deference to the exigencies of terminological clarity that these four elements are

identified here as the question of imm anence, the question of

unity,

the question of

composition, and the question of constancy and mutability. Despite its formulaic

character, the distinction between these questions will be helpful insofar as it

provides a general theoretical framework. Like the ladder invoked in the

penultimate aphorism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus., this framew ork should be

thoug ht of s prov isional, to be discarded once its distinctions are seen to mask the

deeper unity of the underlying argument.

The present investigation's point of departure is, then, the question of

immanence, which is inseparable from Bruno's rejection of the hierarchically

structured cosmology of the Ptolemaic system, 'quella vii fantasia della figura, de

le sfere e diversita di cieli'.^ The to tality presented in that cosm ology is founded on

the concept of

transcendence:

with the exception of the earth, which constitutes the

foundation of the entire system, each of the various regions of the universe is

thought of as lying beyond the preceding one. Each line of demarcation between

one region of the universe and the next confirms the ontologica l insufficiency of the

regions in question; only God , who lies outside the en tire system, is sufficient unto

himself.

The resulting vision of order is a hierarchical vision. What is mo re, it does

not allow for a conception of the world as imm anen t, complete in itself and fully

explicable witho ut reference to a beyond.^

In the philosophical dialogues of

De I infinito,

the cha racter Burchio realizes

at one point that Bruno's vision of the universe, as presented by Filoteo and

gradually endorsed by the rema ining cha racters, is a vision of imm anence. In one

of the dialogue's most celebrated pa ssages, Burchio's suspicion th at the hierarchies

of the Ptolemaic universe are being systematically dismantled is brutally confirmed:

Burchio. Ove e dunque quel bell'ord ine, quella bella scala della natura , per

cui si ascende dal corpo piii denso e crasso, quale e la terra, al men crasso,

quale e I'acqua, al suttile, quale e il vapo re, al piu suttile, quale e

l aria

puro,

al suttilissimo , quale e il fuoco, al divino , quale e il corpo celeste? [...]

Fracastorio. Volete saper ove sia questo ordine? Ove sono gli sogni, le

fantasie, le chimere, le pazzie. (De I infinito, p. 450)

It would be overhasty to assert that Bruno 's rejection of cosmological hierarchies

is a rejection of hierarchy

tout

court ^^

In the metaphysical dialogues, the concept

of hierarchy is no t so much eliminated altogether as displaced from the dom ains of

ontology and cosmology to that of epistemology. There may not be a 'scala della




as a process of gradua l ascension from appearance to reality in much the same way

as in the philosophy of Plotinus (whose influence on Ptolemaic cosm ology was of

course considerab le; see, for exam ple, Bruno, p. 333) . Indeed, it would seem th at

the explicit references to P lotinus found occasionally in Bruno s dialogues (see, for

example, pp. 299-301) m otivated Hu ber s characterization of Bruno s philosophy

as Plotinian.

And yet, as Greenberg recognized before H uber, Bruno does not simply echo

the philosophy of Plotinus; rather, he polemicizes against it (Greenberg, pp. 21-2 3).

In Plotinus, there is an ontological hierarchy in addition to an epistemological one;

Plotinian aphairesis or ascension to the One is both an ontological and an

epistemological ascension. The vision of

unity,

or of the O ne, th at Plotinus describes

in the

nneads is

supposed to liberate us from the vagaries of our m aterial existence

by leading us into a region of pure unity thought to lie beyond Being.^^ The

ascension conceptualized by Bruno is a movem ent tha t remains imm anent to Being.

The vision of unity described in Bruno s dialogues is not to be found outside the

universe (as mystical contem plation of the transcendent On e); rather, it is a vision

of the unity of the universe itself

For Brun o, there is no outside w ith regard to the universe - the universe is

infinite. As a result, Bruno rejects not just the Plotinian One, but also another

im por tant element of Ptolemaic cosmology, namely the Aristotelian concept of the

primum mobile., o r of the First Mover, conceived of, like the O ne , as existing outside

the un iverse proper. If

th

universe know s no outside , then the origin of movemen t

must be found within the universe, not outside it.^- Consequently, Bruno argues,

in

De I infinito.,

not just tha t the sources of movemen t are mu ltiple - Sono du nque,

infiniti motori, cossi comme anime infinite di queste infinite sfere - but also that

they are all immanent to the universe (p. 519). Bruno later goes on to reduce the

multiplicity of movers to the unity of a single generative principle, nature. This

reduction of multiplicity t o unity w ill be explored shortly; for now, it is enough to

note Bruno s rejection of the concept of transcendence, and of

th

ordered hierarchy

of

th

Ptolemaic universe: perche dove

num ero infinito, ivi non

grado ne ordine

num erate (p. 519).

A third aspect of Bruno s philosophy of immanence needs here to be noted.

Bruno s concep tion of the universe as imman ent is at odd s not only with the

Plotinian One and the Aristotelian primum mobile., but also with the Aristotelian

distinction between potentia and actus. H ere, the materialist thru st of B runo s

conception of the universe, which becomes explicit in the third dialogue of De la

causa.,

is

particularly evident. Aristotle s distinction is founded on the no tion of the

insufficiency of matter: the transition from potential to actual existence is

understood by him as the grafting of an immaterial form onto a matter conceived



Hen ninger Unity and multiplicity in Bruno 21

productive. In

De l causa,

he recasts the distinction between

potentia

and

actus

as

one internal to a single substance (which the character Dicson calls

materia,

whereas the character Filoteo prefers the term

natura :

coincidenza della materia

e forma, della potenza e atto : di sorte che lo ente, logicamente diviso in quel che e

e puo essere, fisicamente e indiviso, indistinto ed uno; e questo insieme infinito,

imm obile, impartibile, senza differenza di tutto e parte, principio e princ ipiato

(p.

185). Everything that exists actually or materially is form and substratum at

once; material objects ha nn o in se la ma teria e la forma (p. 242). The universe

realizes only tbose possibilites that are already contained in it; potentiality is

imm anent to the universe like unity and mo tion: questo principio [...] puo essere

considerato in doi modi: prima, come una potenza; secondo, come un soggetto

(pp. 279-80).

Ernst Blocb is one of the commentators most alert to this aspect of Bruno s

pbilosopby. Bloch distinguished between two Aristotelian traditions: that of the

M otakh alim , w ho insisted on ma tter s dependence on a driving force thoug ht to

exist outside it, and another derived from Avicenna; the members of this second

tradition identified the creative will of God witb matter. Bloch sees Bruno as

following tbe second tradition, according to wbicb God does not create tbe world

from a transcendent and imm aterial vantage point, ma tter being not so mucb tbe

subs tratum of God s creative act as sometbing divine in

itself.

As Blocb says: In

Bruno, tbe world fully becomes tbe realization of tbose possibilities tbat are

con tained in unified ma tter and identified witb it .^ Tbe scbolastic distinction

between

natura naturans

and

natura naturata

collapses as tbe natural world

becomes not just tbe containe r or substratum , but also tbe source of forms.^^ Tbis,

tbe no tion of nature s unqualified self-sufficiency, is perbaps tbe apex of Bruno s

pbilosopby of immanence.

On tbe basis of tbese remarks on imm anence, an explora tion of tbe question

of tbe unity of tbe universe can n ow be unde rtake n. In Bruno s on tology, tbe

universe or natural world is unitary, even if it manifests itself in multiple ways.

W bat cbanges, Bruno insists, is not n ature

per

se,

but only its appearance, wbicb

is subject to tbe transience of

t e

forms. In De

l

causa, tbe cbarac ter Dicson - wb o

prefers tbe term

ma teria

to tb at of

natura,

as noted - expresses tbis as follows:

Oltre cbe le forme non ban no l essere senza la ma teria, in quella si generano

e si corrompono, dal seno di quella escono ed in quello si accogliono; pero

la materia la qual sempre rim ane medesima e feconda, deve aver la principal

prorogativa d esser conosciuta sol principio substanziale,

e

quello cbe

e e

cbe

sempre rim ane;

e le

forme tutte insieme non intenderle, se non come cbe sono

dispozioni varie della materia, cbe sen vanno e vegnono, altre cessano e se




As Greenberg (p. 66) says: The substance of all is eternal, and only the outward

form of it chan ges . In othe r wo rds, the distinctions tha t can be draw n between the

various phenom ena we encounter in our experience merely disguise a deeper unity.

Greenberg has elegantly paraphrase d this view in his statement that all distinctions

in Bruno remain distinctions and no t separa tions (p. 75). In Spinozian term s, one

might say that every distinction is ultimately like the one between Israel and Jacob ,

or between two proper names belonging to the same individual.^^ In fact, Bruno

resorts once to a similar linguistic metaphor, arguing tha t the differences between

individuals reveal that these individuals are tutti differenti in specie but

concordanti in genere et numero et casu (Bruno, De la causa, p. 219). His

well-known comparison between the lion and the man is made in support of the

same fundamental argument; the lion and the man appertain to different species,

but share a com mo n identity as living

organisms.^ In

the larger context of Bruno s

conception of nature, this means that non e mutazione che cerca altro essere, ma

altro m odo di essere De la

causa.,

p . 32 2). Or, as Bruno writes in the same contex t:

ogni cosa e una, ma non u nimodam ente (p. 323).

Multiplicity is merely the product of an original unity - a unity that is not

negated or overcome in multiplicity, but persists within it. Natu re rem ains unitary

even as it manifests itself in infinitely various ways. This is the import of Bruno s

metaphor of the child already contained in the sperm:

Dite che quel tutto che si vede di differenza negli corpi, quanto alle

formazioni, complessioni, figure, colori

e

altre proprietad i

e

comun itadi, non

e altro che un diverso volto di medesima sustanza; volto labile, mobile,

corrottibile di un o inm obile, perseverante ed eterno essere; in cui sono tu tte

forme, figure e membri, ma indistinti e come agglomerati, non altrimente

che nel seme, nel quale non e diviso il braccio da la ma no , il busto dal c apo ,

il nervo da l osso. La qual distinzione

e

sglomeramento non viene a produre

altra e nuova sustanza, ma viene a ponere in atto e compimento certe

qua litadi, differenze, accidenti e ordini circa quella su stanza. [De la causa,

p.

327)

s

Bruno argues elsewhere, natu re exp licates itself

in

the variety of

its

appearances

or accidentals; the peak of philosophical contemplation is arrived at by a

countervailing com plication of the multiple, an intellectual return to the unity

that underlies multiplicity: Cossi dunque, montando noi alia perfetta cognizione,

and iamo com plicando la moltitudine; come, descendosi alia produzion e delle cose,

si va esplicando la un ita {De la

causa,

p. 333).^^

It is here that the scholastic theme of the coincidentia oppositorum enters

Bruno s argum ent. Bruno follows Cusanus in asserting that l altezza

e

profondita,



Henninger • Unity and mu ltiplicity in Bruno 3

contrario (De

l

causa, p. 186). Yet in the larger context of Bruno s ontology, the

claim th at the universe [com prende] tutte co ntrarie tadi nell esser suo in unita e

convenienza (p. 318) also signals a radical dep arture from Cu sanus. Here as in his

references to Plotinus and Aristode, Bruno evokes a pre-existing terminology or

style of argument only to put it to original use.^^ For in Cusanus, perceiving the

unity of opposites leads us closer to a transcendent God (while simultaneously

alerting us to his ultima te ineffability and even incom prehensibility). In Bruno s

philosophy of immanence, the unity of opposites does not lead us outside the

universe. Rather than alerting us to the existence of a transcendent being, it

constitutes the pinnacle of a successful philosophical contemplation that occurs

within the universe itself

In turning from the question of unity to that of comp osition, it is imp ortan t

to avoid the misconception th at there is a contradiction between w hat B runo has

to say about the two. The relationship of the question of unity to that of

composition would seem to constitute the easiest point of attack for those

com me ntators w ho insist on the contradictory character of Bruno s thoug ht. An

unsym pathetic reader of Bruno s metaphysical dialogues could easily compile a list

of apparently contradictory statemen ts. At the beginning ofthe fifth dialogue of De

la causa, for exa mp le, one finds tbe claim tha t the universe no n ha parte

prop orzio nab ili (p. 318 ), whereas at the beginning of the tbird dialogue of De

I infinito one finds what would seem to be the opposing claim, namely that

[l] universo imm enso ed infinito e il com posto (p. 433).

The contradiction is only apparent. Everytbing turns, of course, on the

adjective prop orzio nab ili . The claim in De la causa is made in the contex t of an

argum ent tha t tbe universe, being infinite, can neither contrac t nor expand : N on

puo sm inuire o crescere (p. 318 ). To say tbat tbe universe bas no par te

proporzionabili is therefore to say tbat tbe universe is not composed of pre-defined

elements whose addition or removal would alter its magnitud e. Tbe universe is not

a measu rable assemblage; it is infinite: N on e misurabile ne m isura (p. 319). This

does not mean tbat one cannot distinguish various elements witbin the universe,

and tbink of

t e

universe as being composed of tbose elements; tbe point

is

tbat one

must no t conclude from tbe measu rable charac ter of tbe elements tba t tbe universe

itself is also m easurable.

In tbe first dialogue of De I infinito, Bruno draws a distinction tbat is

fundamental for understanding tbe problem. Tbis is tbe distinction between

complete and total infinity:

Io dico l universo tutto infinito, percbe non ba margine, termine, ne

superficie; dico l unive rso non essere

totalmente infinito,

percbe ciascuna




To say that the universe is not totally infinite is to say that not everything in it is

infinite; the universe is not totally infinite because it consists of finite parts. Yet

hecause these part s are infinite in numher, the universe

itself

as the totality of these

parts, is infinite - completely infinite or 'tutto infinito', in Bruno's terminology.^ ^

Bruno's insistence on the infinity of the universe is directed at the Ptolemaic

system and its cosmological foundations in Aristo tle. Bruno accuses Aristotle of the

very logical fallacy th at has just heen warned against: namely, concluding from the

finitude of the pa rts con stituting the universe tha t the universe must itself

he

finite.

In De I infinito, Filoteo points out a terminological discrepancy between his own

philosophy and that of Aristotle: Filoteo reserves the term mondo for the

com ponen ts of the universe, whereas for A ristotle the universe itself is a mondo:

Circa cotal questione sapete, che differentemente prende egli il nome del

mondo e noi; perche noi giongemo m ondo a mo ndo , come astro ad astro in

questo spaciosissimo etereo seno, come e condecente anco ch'ab biano inteso

tutti quelli sapienti ch'hanno stimati mondi innumerabili ed infiniti. Lui

prende il nome del mondo per un aggregato di sino al convesso del primo

mobile, che, di perfetta rotond a figura formato, con rapidissimo tratto tutto

rivolge, rivolgendosi egli, circa

il

cen tro, verso il qual noi siam o.

(pp.

472-73)

This terminological discrepancy indicates a philosophical disagreement between

Aristotle and Bruno. In Bruno, every world (mondo) is finite, unlike the universe

universo

itself.

Th at the Aristotelians should apply the term mondo to what Bruno

calls the universe is indicative, therefore, of the manner in which Aristotle concludes

from the finitude of the parts tha t their aggregate must also be finite.

Another aspect of Aristotle's cosmology as evoked by Bruno is worth

stressing, namely its anth ropo cen trism, or the claim th at the earth is located at the

centre of 'questi disposti elementi e fantastici orb i' (De I infinito, p . 473). Unlike

Aristotle's, Bruno's universe knows no single centre; it

is

polycentric.

s

Alexandre

Koyre has pointed ou t, there is nothin g despairing in this polycentrism; there is no

sense of loss or confusion.^^ The polycentric universe is no t the site of a frightening

disorder, but rather one of infinite harmony. To be sure, this is not the artificial

harm ony of the Ptolemaic system, but one m ore closely based on the reality of the

natural world. Bruno compares the polycentric universe to the body, which

becomes a polycentric microcosm by virtue of the d istinct yet unified ope ration of

its organs :

Al

fine

u tto va ad u no: perche nell'animale non si richiede che tutte le parti

vadan o al mezzo e cen tro; perche questo e impossibile ed inconveniente; ma

che si referiscano a quello per la unione de le parti e constituzion del tutto .



Hen ninge r Unity and multiplicity in Bruno 25

intiero, le parti si referiscono ad un sol mezzo; per la costituzion di ciascun

membro, le particole di ciascuno si referiscono al mezzo particular di

ciascuno, a fin che l epate consista per l union de le sue parti: cossi il pulmone,

il cap o, l orecchio, l occhio ed altri. (p. 489)

The analogy is resorted to repeatedly by Bruno.^^ It accords well with the

organic imagery found elsewhere in

De I infinito.

In the

proem iale epistola,

for

example, Bruno describes intellectual achievement in organic terms: Altri molti

sono i degni ed ono rati frutti che da questi arbori si raccog lieno (p. 362 ).

Philosophical innovation is described in similar language in the fifth dialogue,

where A lbertino announces his interest in the theories of Filoteo: Ce rto, entrato che

mi sara nel capo q uesto p ensiero, facilmente succederanno gli altri tutti che voi mi

prop one te: arrete insieme tolte le radici

d una

e pian tate quelle

d una

altra filosofia

(p.

516).-^^ The m etaphor s aggressive u nde rtone becomes explicit on the final pages

of

D e I infinito,

whe re verbs such as stracc ia , strugg iasi , togli via , and cassa

proliferate as Albertino urges Filoteo to exercise no restraint in his polemic against

the Ptolemaic system: Rom pi e gitta per terra gli orbi deferenti e stelle

fisse

(p. 536).

Yet Bruno s organic m etaph ors are seldom ch aracterized by such an

aggressive tone. For the refutation of the Ptolemaic system is merely the

pars

destruens

of a larger ph ilosophical project. Its

pars construens,

the exploration of

the infinite universe, is described by metaphors that are also organic, but not

violent. Perhaps the most striking is the image of the liberated bird. It appears first

in the opening poem of D e I infinito, M io passar solitario , and is later taken up

by Elpino: La o nde e stimato evidentissimo, come al senso de gli occhi, che a que

luminosi corpi non si conviene m oto p rop rio, come essi discorrer pos sano, qual

ucelli per

l aria

(pp. 364 and 434). The image of the bird evokes that sense of

freedom that

comes,

for Bruno , when the Ptolemaic system

is

left behind. The latter

is described in terms th at suggest enclosure and inhibition; in Bruno s co nception

of the infinite universe, however, [n]on sono

fini,

ermini, m argini, muraglia che ne

defrodino e suttragano la infinita copia de le cose (p. 361). Koyre has aptly

compared the burning enthusiasm with which Bruno announces his conception

of the infinite universe to that of prisoner wh o sees the walls of his jails crum ble

(p.

43). And this is indeed the image chosen by Bruno

himself:

Uscito da priggione angusta e nera,

Ove tant ann i error stretto m avinse.

Qu a lascia la catena , che mi cinse

La man di mia nemica invid e fera. (De I infinito, p. 364)

N o analysis of Bruno s m etaphysical d ialogues can fail to note the close




a case in point. Yet it is in his exploration of the question of constancy and

mutability that Bruno resorts most frequently to poetic language. This exploration

is inseparable from the problem of matter as it is treated in De la causa. In th at

dialogue, Bruno takes up the Plotinian association of matter with mutability, and

develops this association in poetic images that frequently involve the motif of

femininity. The character Poliinnio repeatedly links matter, mutability, and

femininity in order to dismiss all three as imperfect: vo lendo elucidare cosa fosse

la prima materia, prendo per specchio il sesso femminile; sesso, dico , ritroso , fragile,

inconstante, molle, pusillo, infame (p. 29 2). This dismissal recalls the Plotinian

equa tion of mutability with imperfection, and of constancy with the perfection of

the transcendent One. In the course of lengthy discussions that see another

character, Teofilo, making a num ber of jabs at the misogynist rem arks of Poliinnio,

this dismissal of both matter and mu tability is gradually subverted.

In other wo rds, when Bruno adopts the common association of matter w ith

the feminine principle, he does so in order t o polemicize against the hostile view of

matter, mutability, and femininity that has traditionally accompanied the

association; the femininity of matter is understood by Bruno as an index no t of its

insufficiency and imperfection, but rather of its perfection, its boundless fecundity.

Feminine m atter is characterized y mutability, but this mutability is seen in positive

terms.

Wha t is m ore, there is constancy w ithin mu tability: what remains co nstant

in the course of matte r s transfo rmations is its mutability

itself

M atter s ceaseless

transformations, the constancy of its mutability, are not conceived of in terms of

corruption (which suggests imperfection, as in Plotinus) but rather in terms of

generation. Matter, m adre di cose natura li , is that which sempre rim ane

medesima e feconda

{ e la

causa, pp . 312 and 273).

Behind the debates on woman and matter there lies, then, the problem of

constancy and m utability. By insisting on treating m atter s m utability as an index

of its imperfection, Poliinnio declares his unequivocal endorsement ofthe medieval

association of perfection with an eternity conceived of in purely static terms: Non

credete che, se la m ateria si contentasse de la forma presente, nuUa alterazione o

passione arrebe dom inio sopra di noi, non mo riremm o, sarrebon incorrottibili ed

eterni? De la causa, p. 296). On this view, which equates mutability with

corruption, the concepts of mutability and constancy are poles apart, radically

irreconcilable. It is precisely this dicho tomy tha t is rejected in Bruno s philosophy,

which advances a conception of matter as characterized by both constancy and

mutability, and asserts that the eternity of matter is a dynamic, no t a static one.

To understan d this, it is worth considering the charac ter Gervasio s critique

of Poliinnio. This critique turns on the notion that Poliinnio s claims are made in

bad faith, as the man w ho condem ns m atter s mutability is himself no thing but the



He nn inge r Uni ty and m ul t ip l i c i ty in Bruno 2 7

E se

la si fosse contentata di quella forma, che avea cinquanta anni addietro,

che direste? sareste tu, Poliinio? Se si fusse fermata sotto quella di quaranta

anni pas s ati, sare ste [...] si adulto, s i perfetto, si detto? Come dunque ti piace,

che le altre forme abbiano ce duto a ques ta, cossi e in volonta de la natura,

che ordina l unive rso, che tutte le forme cedano a tutte . Lascio che e maggior

dignita di questa nostra sustanza di farsi ogni cosa, ricevendo tutte le forme,

che,

r i te ne ndone una sola, e s se re parziale . Cossi , al suo poss ibile , ha la

sim ilitudine di chi e tutto in tutto .

{D e l a c a u s a ,

296-97)

Poliinnio can see in the infinite mutability of the universe only the threat of

corrup tion, or of de ath. Yet in Bruno, mutability is ne ver ass ociated with de ath; on

the contrary: La quiete , la staticita, e morte (Ciliberto, p. 74).

The argument formulated here with regard to the individual is formulated

e lsewhe re in cosmological terms . In D e I infinito, Filoteo advance s a conce ption of

the world s eternity as resulting precisely from its mutability:

Onde questa te rra, se e e terna ed e pe rpetua, non e tale per la consis tenza di

sue me des ime parti e di mede simi s uoi individui, ma per la viciss itudine de

altri che diffonde , ed altri che gli succe dono in luogo di que lli; in m odo che ,

di medesima anima ed intelligenza, il corpo sempre si va a parte a parte

cangiando e rinnovand o. (p. 412)

Late r, the characte rization of

the

world as a living organism , ne l quale, come in un

animale, e lo efflusso de parti e certa vicissitudine e certa commutazione e

rinovazione (p. 448), lends furthe r s upport to the argume nt. It is precisely because

gli corpi mondani sono diss olubili that they pe rsist me des imi in nume ro, come

noi, che nella s us tanza corporale s imilme nte, giorno pe r giorno, ora per ora,

mom e nto per mom e nto, ne rinuoviamo pe r l attrazione e diges tione che facciamo

da tutte le parti del corpo (pp. 477-78).

The universe is not e ternal in the se nse of being static; it is e ternal or constant

by virtue of

its

mutability. This is the de e pe r significance of Bruno s naturalism ; the

universe is a living organism in the se nse of being characte rize d by a m e tabolic

relationship to its parts , their ongoing attrazione

e

dige stione (ibid.). Thes e parts

are indeed subject to processes of corruption, but to insist only on this is to tell

only half the story, for ceaseless corruption finds its counterweight in ceaseless

generation - the generation of matter which sempre rimane medesima because it

is not sterile but feconda (p. 273 ). To see only corruption and multiplicity is to not

see the universe properly, just as s tudying the organs of the body - multiple organs

subject to constant corruption and regeneration - is not the same as s ee ing the body

in its unity and identity over time. Where things appear as parts, or as evil, or as



28 the italianist 26 • 2006

It is in considering the concepts of constancy and mu tability in Bruno s

philosophy - and , more specifically, his emphasis on the dynam ic, rather than static ,

character of reality - that one can understand why scholars such as Vedrine have

seen affinities with Hegel s concept of

the

dialectic. It

is

imp ortant to no te, however,

that Bruno does not treat the concepts of constancy and mutability as mutually

exclusive or contrad ictory. Unlike Hegel, Bruno never begins with a co ntradiction

in order to arrive at its resolution via the mechanisms of negation and mediation;

there is no na rrative of

ufhebung

in his work. B runo s ontology does not pose the

task of overcoming any fundamental antagonism; the universe is already unified.

As Ciliberto says, Bruno never adopts una struttu ra di pensiero intim am ente

oppositiva, contrad ittoria . O n the contrary: Qu ella di Bruno e una filosofia tutta

impe rniata nella individuazione, o ltre la separazione, della connessione universale.

£ una filosofia della com unicazione, su tutti i piani della Vita (p. 115).

ibliogr phy

Bad aloni, N. 1 988. Gio rdano

B r u n o .

T ra cosm o log ia ed e t ica , Bari: Barese.

Bloch,

E . 1959 .

D a s

Pr inz ip Ho f fnung , vo l . I, Frankfurt : Suhrkam p.

Borkenau, F.

]973 .DerUbergangvomFeuda lenzumBiJ rge r l i chen

Wel tb i l d ,

D arm stadt:W issenschaftiiche

Buchgesellschaft.

Bruno, G. 1958. D ialoghi i ta l ian i , edited b y G. G entile and G. A qu ilecc hia. Florence: Sansoni.

Cil iberto, M. 1992. Gio rdano B runo , Bari: L aterza.

Deleuze, G. 1 962.

Nie tzsche

et ia ph i iosoph ie , Paris: Presses universitaires de France.

— ] S . Sp inoza e t i e p rob ieme de i 'exp ress ion , Paris: M inuit.

Deregibus, A . 1 9 8 1 Bruno e Sp inoza , 2 v ols, T urin: Giapp ichelli.

G entile, G. 1 94 0. ii pen s iero i ta iiano de i Rinasc im ento, Florence: Sansoni.

G reenberg, S. 1 95 0.

Tiie

in f in i te i n G io rdano Bruno . W i th a T rans ia t i on o f h i s D ia iogue , C once rn ing the Cau se ,

P r inc ip ie , and One , N ew

York:

King's Cr ow n Press.

H ardt, M. 1 993 .(j/7/e5D e/e(7ze;/4n/4pprenf/ces/)/p/A)P / /7osop/? y, M inneapolis, M N : University of M innesota

Press.

Hegel, G.W . F. 19 69.5c ;ence o f iog /c , translated b yA .V . Miller, A tlantic H ighlands, N J : Hum anities Press.

Huber, K. 19 65. Einhe i t und V ie ihe i t in

D e n i < e n

u n d

S p r a c h e

Gio rdano

Br u n o s ,

W interthur: Hans S chellenberg.

Koyre, A .

1 9 5 7 . From the dosed Wo r id t o the in f in i te Un ive rse , Baltimore, M D : Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lewis, C. S . 1995 . T h e Disca rded imag e , C amb ridge: Cam bridg e U niversity Press.

Macherey,

P.

1990. Hege iou S p inoza , Paris: La Deco uv erte.

Mclntyre,

J

L. 1903. Gio rdano Bruno , Lo ndon and N ew

York:

M acm illan.



Henninger • Uni ty and mu l t ip l ic i ty in Bruno 2 9

Olschki, L. 1927. Giordano Bruno

Bari:

Laterza.

Papi, F.

1968. Antropoiogia e civiiita neipensiero di Giordano Bruno Mila n: La Nuova Ital ia.

Plotinus. 1991. The Enneads edited by J. Di l lon and translated by S. MacKenna, London : Penguin.

Vedrine, H. 1967. ia conception de ia nature chez Giordano Bruno Paris: Vrin.

Yates, F. A. 1964. Giordano Bruno and the i^ermetic Tradition London: Routledge.

o t s

S. Greenberg, Ttie infinite in Giordano Bruno. Witii a

Transiation of his Diaiogue Concerning ttie Cause

Principie and One (New York, King s Crown Press, 1950),

p. 4 .

^ See Greenberg, pp. 3-8, G. G entile, ii pensiero itaiiano dei

Rinascimento

(Florence, Sansoni, 1940), pp. 311 -30,

L. Olschki, Giordano Bruno (Bari, Laterza, 1927), p.

91,

and

J. L. Mclntyre , Giordano Bruno (London and New York,

Macmillan, 1903),

p.

viii.

F.

Borkenau, Der Ubergang vom

Feudaien zum Burgeriichen We/fWW (Darmstadt,

Wissenschaftiiche Buchgeselischaft, 1973), pp.

82-91,

has

similarly emphasized the eclectic character of Bruno s

philosophy. On the limits of this ch aracterization, see

M. Ciliberto, Giordano Bruno (Bari, Laterza, 1992). p. 8 8.

For a general discussion of the question of internal

contradiction, see

H

Vedrine, La conception de ia nature

chez Giordano Bruno (Paris,

Vrin,

1967), pp. 103-26.

^ F

A

Yates, Giordano Bruno an d the Hermetic Tradition

(London,

Routiedge).

N. Badaioni,

Giordano Bruno. Tra cosmoiogia ed etica

(Bari, Barese, 1988), p. 14.

^ K. Huber

Einheit

un d

Vieiheit in Deni en und Sprache

Giordano Brunos (Winterthur, Hans Scheilenberg, 1965).

^ To

be sure, Vedrine is constrained to qualify this

characterization somewhat wh en she enters into the

detaiis of Bruno s argument

(pp.

166-67). Yet she never

fuiiy revokes her use of the adjective dialectica l , and

continues to apply it to Bruno (pp. 3 24-32 ). Her insistence

on the importance of the theme of the coincidentia

oppositorum

(p.

186) wou ld also seem to derive from her

concept of dialectics. The question is a compiex one, as

there is a peculiar slippage in the use of the adjective

dialectical by commentators such as Huber

and

Vedrine.

Dialectical wou ld then be roughly synonymous w ith

dialogica l , and the question of the dialectical or

non-dialectical character of Bruno s work wou ld be a

question of ph ilosophical Darsteiiung.Jhls view seems to

be implicit in Huber s remark on Bruno s diaiectic of

statement and response

(p. 7),

which appears to allude to

Plato s dialogues. When Vedrine speaks of Bruno as a a

dialecticai philosopher in the modern sense of the wo rd

(p.

131), more is at stake. Vedrine is clearly thinking of

Hegel,

and hence of the dialectic not just as

a

particular

methodology, but as an ontological model. I hope to show

that Bruno s philosophy of unity and m ultiplicity can be

understood with out reference to Hegel s dialectical

ontology. Deleuze has famously argued tha t Hegel

conceives of the relationship between unity and mu ltiplicity

in terms tha t are essentially dualist (as an antagonism

between the general and the particular). Deleuze maintains

that this entails

a

failure to grasp multiplicity in all its

richness (as infin ite variety); multiplic ity is merely reduced

to one of two functions in a rigidly presupposed binary

scheme (the thesis-antithesis model). See G. Deleuze,

Nietzsche et ia phiiosophie

(Paris,

Presses universitaires de

France, 1962) and the iucid exposition of Deieuze s critique

in M. Hardt, Giiies Deieuze: An Apprenticeship in

PW/osop/)> (Minneapolis,

MN ,

University of Minnesota

Press, 1993). Conclusively demonstrating the heterogeneity

of the ph ilosophical projects of Bruno and Hegel would

require a comprehensive engagement with Hegel s

dialectical ontology (and with Deieuze s critique) that

cannot be undertaken within the bounds of this

paper.

However, it oug ht to become apparent in the course of my

reading of De ia causa and of De i infinito tha t the concepts

of neg ation and med iation, so central to Hegel s d ialectical

model,

play no comparable role in Bruno s philosophy.



30 the italianist 26 • 2006

that 'la continuita speculativa' between the two 'e di quelle

che non possono assolutamente revocarsi in dubb io' (II,

379).

The last sustained argument for the dialectical character

of Spinoza's philosophy was made, paradoxically, in the

very work that has done the most to expose the extremeiy

problematic character of its Hegelian inte rpretation,

P Macherey's Wege/

ou Spinoza

(Paris, La Decouverte,

1990). An entire generation of Spinoza scholars,

spearheaded by Deleuze and Negri, has since argued

against this interpretation. See

G.

Deieuze, Spinoza

etie

probieme de

i expression (Paris, Minuit 1968), A. Negri,

L anomaiia

seivaggia:

saggio su potere e potenza

in

Baruch

Spinoza (Milan, Feltrine lli, 1981), and the essays edited in

W. Montag and T

Stoize,

The New Spinoza (Minneapolis,

MN,

University of Minnesota Press, 1997).

' G. Bruno,

De

i infinito, in

Diaioghi

itaiiani, edited by

G. Gentile and G. Aquilecchia (Florence, Sansoni, 1958),

p. 353.

' For an elegant summary of Ptolemaic cosmology, based

mainly on iiterary sources, see

C.

S. Lewis, The Discarded

Image (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995). For

Bruno's rejection of Ptolemaic cosmology and the ways in

which it goes beyond Copernicus, see Ciliberto, pp. 58-62.

' ' F. Papi,

Antropoiogia

e

civiita

nei

pensiero

d i

Giordano

Bruno (Milan, La Nuova Italian 1968), p.

87,

writes th at'i l

concetto di Uno bruniano dissolve qualsiasi

gerarchizzazione o graduazione degli esseri che risponda

ad un ordine di valori nei quadro de ll'universo'. Ciiiberto

(p.

70) concurs, adding tha t trad itional e thical and political

hierarchies are also done away

with:

'la Vita universale

consuma opinioni e costumi cons olidati; spezza antiche

gerarchie sia sui piano cosmologico che su quelio

etico-politico'. While entirely accurate, such passages are

also potentiaiiy m isleading to the extent that they suggest

Bruno is hostile to the concept of hierarchy

perse.

Both

Papi and Ciliberto are alert to the issue;

see

for example

their remarks on the an ti-egalitarian character of Bruno's

philosophy:

Papi,

pp. 179-92, and Ciliberto, pp. 135-40 .

'^ See Plotinus, The

Enneads,

edited by J. Dillon and

translated by S. MacKenna (London: Penguin, 1991),

pp.

535-49.

E.

Bloch,

Das Prinzip Hoffnung (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp,

1959),

1 272.

'^ On this and o n B runo's concept of immanence in

general, see Ciliberto,

pp.

95-100.

'^ For a lucid analysis of th is metaphor, see Deleuze (1968),

p.

52 .

See Bruno De ia

causa ,

p.

302.

As Bruno says

eisewhere: 'Ogni produzione, di qualsivoglia sorte che la

sia, e una alterazione, rimanendo la sustanza sempre

medesima; perche non e che una, uno ente divino,

immortaie'(p. 324).

'^ See also Bruno De ia

causa ,

pp. 34 1-42: 'Noi ne

delettamo (...) in uno cognoscibiie che comprende ogni

cognoscibile; in uno apprensibile che abbraccia tutt o che si

pub comprendere; in uno ente che complette t utto ,

massime in quello uno che e il tu tto istesso.'

I n other words, this is an example of wha t Ciliberto

(p.

88) has called Bruno's 'tecnica della contaminazione '.

On Bruno's relationship to Cusanus, see Vedrine, p.

330:

'An

unfaithfu i reader, Bruno adapts the thou ght of Cusanus to

his own perspective and completely disregards the

Cardinal's ulterior efforts to render more precise the

sometimes ambiguous formu lae of the Docta

Ignorantia,

particularly his effort to situate God beyond the unity of

opposites'.

^°On the distinction between total and complete infinity,

see C iliberto, p. 110.

2' 'It has often been pointed out [...

j

that the destruction

of the cosmos, the loss, by the e arth, of its central and thus

unique (though by no means privileged) situa tion, led

inevitably to the loss, by man, of his unique and privileged

position in the theo-cosmic drama of the creation | .. .

].

At

the end of the development we find the mute and terrifying

worid of Pascal's 'libe rtin,' the senseless world of m odern

scientific phiiosophy. At the end we find nihilism and

despair. Yet this was not so in the

beginning.

The

displacement of the earth from the centrum of the w orld

was not felt to be a demo tion' (A. Koyre, From

ti ie dosed

Worid

to the infinite

Universe (Baltimore,

MD,

Johns

Hopkins University

Press,

1957 ), p. 48). It may be worth

adding tha t between Bruno and the 'despair' of Pascal

there lies Descartes. The Cartesian conception of matter as



He nning er- Unity and mu ltiplicity in Bruno 31

contributed significantly to the gloomy worldview that

Koyre traces - perhaps somewhat hastily - to the

displacement of Ptolemaic cosmology. The analogy

between the universe and a living organism is one of the

main arguments in De l

causa,

where Bruno insists che e

cosa indegna di razional suggetto posser credere che

l universo e altri suoi corpi principali sieno inanima ti

(p.

179),

22 See Bruno De

rinfinito , pp.

451-5 2: In questi, dunque,

astri 0 mondi, come le vogliam dire, non altrimente si

intendeno o rdinate queste pa rti dissimilari secondo varie e

diverse complessicni di pietre, stagni, fiumi,

fonti,

mari,

arene, metalli, caverne, mon ti, piani ed altre sim ili specie di

corpi compcsti, de siti e figure, che ne gli a nimali son le

parti dette eterogenee, secondo diverse e varie

complessioni d i ossa, di intes tini, di vene, dl arterie, di

carne, di nervi, di pulmone, di membri di una e dl un altra

figura

[...|/

2

It is of course significant that that these nnetaphors

should be invoked

by

Albertino, the character that replaces

Burchio follow ing the latter s expulsion from the debate. In

De

llnfinito,

Burchio is the representative of precisely those

obsolete philosophical views that need to be uproote d .

His replacement

by

Albertino signals tha t the process of

intellectual innovation has been successful.

Please address correspondence to: Max Henninger Neue Bahnhofstr. 33

10245 Berlin Germany

© Department of Italian Studies, University of Reading and Department o f

Italian,

University of Cambridge



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Ogni cosa è una, ma non unimodamente'- Unity and Multiplicity in Giordano Bruno's