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OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 1
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
No More Lockpicking –Making The Open Source Lock.
Why closed is often open, and open locks are more secure...
mh & Ray,
SSDeV, muCCC, TOSL.org - The Open Source Lock Project
2013-08-03, OHM2013, Noord-Scharwoude, NL
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 2
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Content
1. Why Electronic Locks
2. Existing High Security Electronic Locks
▪ Design
▪ Exploits
3. The Open Source Lock
▪ Motivation
▪ Design
▪ How you can contribute
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 3
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Mechanical locks aren't that bad...
▪ Can be picked, but not a common risk
▪ ...at least for a few better models
▪ Are well analyzed so you can judge their security
▪ ...and thus we know there are some more issues than picking
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 4
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Copying Keys
▪ Any mechanical key can be copied
▪ Revocation of keys therefore not possible
▪ Security cards and patents offer very limited protection
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 5
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Classic Methods
▪ Using a machine
▪ Protected blanks using EasyEntrie
▪ Casting
▪ Re-building one
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 6
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
3D Printing
▪ First printed key presented at HAR2009
▪ Mass production using laser cutters shown at HOPE2012
▪ Today there are parametric models for door locks on Thingiverse
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 7
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
So why electronics?
▪ Pick resistance
▪ Prevent key copying
▪ Easy key revocation
▪ Protect against privacy escalation
▪ Flexible rights management
▪ Logging
▪ Multi-factor authorization
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 8
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Electronic LocksDesign
▪ Components:
▪ Key
▪ Often: Passive RFID transponder, active RF transceiverRare: Infrared, galvanic connection, knocking, …
▪ Lock
▪ Electronics: Interface to key, authentication, logging
▪ Electro-Mechanical Actuator: Typically couples a knob to the deadbolt; also: unblocks rotation of a key, motorized turning of a knob.
Authenticate (Log)
Authenticate Log
Unlock
Key Lock
Electronics Electro-mechanical actuator
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 9
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Electro-Mechanical Actuator
▪ Typical design criteria:
▪ Small
▪ Wear resistant
▪ Long battery life (small battery)
▪ Implementations:
▪ Solenoid pulls a blocking pin out of the way
▪ Electric motor moves a clutch element or turns a blocking element
▪ (exotic: centrifugal clutch element)
▪ Small... → can often be influenced from outside
using relatively small forces (mechanical, magnetic fields, ...)
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 10
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Example: Axial Solenoid
Video:
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 11
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Solenoid Actuator Activates Clutch
▪ Can potentially be influenced by
▪ Momentum transfer (bumping, vibration)
▪ Magnet, if close to outside
Knob with batteries, antenna, ...
Solenoid
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 12
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Authentication by Bumping
Video:
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 13
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Authentication by Bumping
Solenoid blocks the “bolt work”:
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 14
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Authentication by Strong Magnet
Early version of an RFID-based cylinder lock
(Source: Presentation by Barry Wels at 21C3, 2005)
„Magnet of Death“
Invalid Key
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 15
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Turning Magnet Actuator
▪ Can potentially be influenced by
▪ Vibration
▪ Possibly: Magnet, if located on the outside
Magnet turns
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 16
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Authentication by Vibration
Early version of an electronic cylinder lock
(Source: Presentation by Barry Wels at HAR2009)
High speed rotary toolwith vibrating plastic piece
Invalid Key
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 17
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Countermeasure: Use a Geared Motor
▪ Engaging a clutch or unblocking rotation requires several turns of an electric motor
▪ Use gears to transmit rotation
▪ Influencing by vibration seems to be futile
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 18
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploit: Turn a Sensor
Early version of an RFID-based electronic cylinder lock
(Source: Youtube.com, “civil1230”)
Ring with magnets turns a magnetic sensor element that's connected to the gears.
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 19
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Example: Electronic Padlock
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 20
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploit: Turn the Motor from the OutsideVideo:
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 21
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
How to find such exploits?
Reverse Engineering of the mechanical part:
▪ Take apart, analyze, observe
▪ Ideally make a working cutaway lock
▪ Attacker's focus is different from the focus of the lock development team: Cost, Time-to-market, Quality, Patents, … → completely irrelevantOne single weakness is sufficient.
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 22
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Electronic Part of Electronic Locks
▪ Mainly a micro controller
▪ Designed for low energy consumption, budget, time to market, user convenience
▪ ...but probably not mainly security
▪ Manufacturers don't tell many details
▪ Analysis requires complex reverse engineering
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 23
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Opened Mechanical Lock
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 24
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Opened Electronic Lock
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 25
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Difficulties while analyzing
▪ Unknown controllers, sometimes even covered in glue
▪ Software sometimes not easy to extract
▪ Different controllers, so many different tools and know-how needed
▪ Altogether: quite a challenge
▪ ... but not impossible
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 26
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploits: Call-A-Bike
▪ Anonymously sent to the CCC in 2004
▪ Common Atmel micro controller
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 27
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 28
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploits: Call-A-Bike
▪ Anonymously sent to the CCC in 2004
▪ Common Atmel micro controller
▪ Possible to read out firmware
▪ Development of an own, ”improved” firmware
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 29
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 30
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 31
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploits: Call-A-Bike
▪ „Proof-of-Concept“ mass-flashing of over 100 bikes in Berlin
▪ They were not happy but honored the efforts – lock bits are now set
▪ More Details: http://www.ccc.de/hackabike/
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 32
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Hotel Locks
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 33
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Hotel Locks
▪ Power/Programming Interface open at the bottom
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 34
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploits: Hotel Locks
▪ Interface accessible at the bottom
▪ Enables you to read memory and send commands
▪ Opening: read out hotel code from any lock, and open all locks using open command which only needs the hotel code
▪ Exploit using simple Arduino hardware (“$50”)
▪ Fixing only by exchange of hardware
▪ "Irresponsible" Disclosure (BlackHat 2012)
▪ More details: http://daeken.com/blackhat-paper
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 35
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Exploits: Electronic Padlock
▪ Texas Instruments standard controller (MSP430)
▪ Read protection not enabled
▪ Flash contacts accessible from battery slot
▪ Motor contacts also...
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 36
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Flash Access
▪ So we needed a matching adapter
▪ ...and had a laser cutter
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 37
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Flash Analysis
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 38
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Flash Analysis
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 39
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Flash Analysis
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 40
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Analyzing Software
▪ Reading out the flash and disassembly
▪ Reverse engineering of used algorithms
▪ Typical Problems:
▪ Bad crypto (Home grown algorithms, side channel attacks)
▪ Bad protocols (Master keys distributed everywhere, replay attacks, ... )
▪ Backdoors (intentional or unintentional)
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 41
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
In a nutshell
▪ Too Many Secrets
▪ Lock companies didn't understand Kerkhoff's principle
("A crypto system should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.“ - La cryptographie militaire, 1883)
▪ Therefore very limited public reviews
▪ Basically no publication/discussion of good implementations
▪ Neutral judgment of different systems basically impossible
▪ (except for the broken ones...)
▪ So we need Open Source
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 42
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
The solution: Open Source.
We observed, we hacked, … Now it's time to MAKE!
Let's make a highly secure electronic lock!
▪ Publish sources for the electronic components (software, schematics, layouts) and of the mechanical components (drawings, test results)
▪ Open Source allows for Peer Review with early intensive and targeted tests by experienced experts – the international hacker and lock sport communities
→ TOSL: The Open Source Lock
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 43
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
TOSL: Mechanics
Goals:
▪ Secure against all known manipulation attacks (bumping, vibration, magnets, shimming, glue injection, heating / cooling, fast turning, ...)
▪ High resistance against brute force (drilling, milling, pulling, …), have a defined resistance level,ideally exceed standards like VdS, SKG, etc
→ Design a simple, secure mechanics part, not miniaturized
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 44
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Standard Locks in Europe
Standardized, so it fits into many European doors: DIN 18252 / DIN EN 1303 / “Euro Cylinder”
→ Start with Euro Cylinder. If it fits into this format, making a U.S. Style deadbolt will be possible as well.
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 45
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Euro Cylinder
Design constraints:
17mm30mm
M5 hole / weak point (if forced, cylinder typically breaks here)
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 46
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Prototype
Knob cylinder, coupling element placed in the inside knob.
Authentication electronics will also be placed in the inside knob.
Outside Inside
Here be drill protection Coupling
element
Servo motor
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 47
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Video
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 48
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
TOSL: Electronics
Goals:
▪ Of course: Authentication which is secured against sniffing and man in the middle
▪ One time access keys
▪ Temporary access keys
▪ 2-Factor authorization like key+PIN
▪ Offline creation of new keys
▪ Logging
▪ No Logging
▪ Backdoor-free
▪ ...except if you want one...
▪ Basically: Whatever you can think of...
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 49
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Challenges
▪ Extraction of key from micro controller not under our control
▪ Jamming might be quite easy
▪ Permanent DoS should not be too easy
▪ Power consumption (if the lock has no permanent supply)
▪ Hardware shouldn't be too special to enable peer review
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 50
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Open Source Electronics
▪ Modular design:
▪ Different authentication schemes
▪ Maybe even different transmission channels (RF, IR, ...)
▪ Probably multiple micro controllers
▪ Useable with our hardware, or mechanics of existing locks
▪ Goal: have a power saving electronic for the lock and a small token for your keychain
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 51
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Prototype
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 52
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Prototype
▪ Using the r0ket (http://r0ket.de/) as sender and receiver
▪ Has 60MHz ARM Cortex M3, 2.4GHz RF, rechargeable battery, 5-way input button
▪ Not really end-user compatible, but might well be an option for hacker spaces
▪ It will be easy to build a reduced r0ket with just micro controller and RF part
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 53
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Other options
▪ Power saving MCU like TI MSP430 including RF
▪ Special Crypto MCUs (like Maxim) which incorporate counter measures against side channel attacks etc.
▪ Smart card MCUs?
▪ Arduino/ATMega for the ”entry level“
▪ Or go James-Bond-style and use a watch?
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 54
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Crypto
▪ Use well known algorithms (AES, SHA256, etc.)
▪ We know enough about crypto so we know that nobody alone ever knows enough about crypto
▪ Currently collecting ideas in our Wiki / Mailing list to build first implementation on r0ket
▪ Contact us if you're interested in working on and/or using this!
OHM2013
No More Lockpicking.Making The Open Source Lock.
mh & Ray
Page 55
The Open Source Lock.http://tosl.org/
Thank you for your attention!
▪ Questions?
▪ Contact: [email protected] / [email protected]
▪ TOSL: http://tosl.org
▪ Subscribe to our mailing list! Tell us why you find TOSL interesting, and how you would like to contribute to the project!
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