The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 13 | Issue 28 | Number 2 | Article ID 4341 | Jul 13, 2015

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Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in UnitedStates–Japan–China Relations

Kimie Hara

The dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islandserupted in the 1970s, but the territorial disputebetween Japan and China itself had startedearlier, over Okinawa, immediately after theSecond World War. The major point of disputein the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue is whether theseislands are part of Okinawa or part of Taiwan.The former is the position of the Japanesegovernment, while the latter is

J a p a n ’ s M O F A c l a i m s t o t h eSenkakus/Diaoyu Islands

the position of both Chinese governments, thatis, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) inBeijing and the Republic of China (ROC) inTaiwan. There was no such dispute over theseislands before the end of the Second WorldWar, that is, when both Okinawa and Taiwanwere territories of the Japanese Empire.

Many studies have been written on the cross-Taiwan Strait and Okinawa problems. Thereare also many Senkaku/Diaoyu studies, but aswith the Takeshima/Dokdo dispute betweenJapan and Korea, little attention has been paidto the Cold War context. The reason for this is,in addition to the fact that Taiwan (ROC)remained in the “West,” that the disputesurfaced during the period of détente whenmajor states in the West, including the UnitedStates and Japan, were improving relationswith China (PRC). Also, newly discoveredmaritime resources, particularly potential oiland gas reserves, in the neighboring areasbegan to attract attention. However, theSenkaku/Diaoyu issue is also a dispute between“China,” which (except for Taiwan) becamecommunist after the Second World War, andJapan, which became a “cl ient state”(McCormack, 2007) of the United States in theSan Francisco System against the backgroundof the Cold War.

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Chinese Defense Ministry Map showingSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Air DefenceIdentification Zones. 2015

This article looks at how the territorialdisposition of Okinawa, Taiwan, and theSenkaku/Diaoyu Islands were dealt with in theprocess of constructing the post-warinternational order in East Asia and how theterritorial disputes between Japan and Chinaemerged, developed, and remained in theregional Cold War system, with particularattention paid to the relations between Japan,China, and the United States. In doing so, itattempts to provide a broader internationalcontext beyond the China-Japan bilateralframework to consider possible solutions.

Okinawa and Taiwan in the Allies’Blueprint for Post-war Regional Order

Okinawa was once an independent kingdom(Ryukyu) and became a tributary state to Japanin 1609. It also retained tributary relations withChina until 1872, when it was incorporated intoJapan as Ryukyu-han. In 1879, 16 years beforeJapan’s acquisition of Taiwan, it was designatedas Okinawa Prefecture. The Senkaku/DiaoyuIslands were incorporated into OkinawaPrefecture by a cabinet decision in January1895. Three months later, in April 1895,Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Treaty ofShimonoseki, as a result of the First Sino-

Japanese War.

Half a century later, at the end of the SecondWorld War, between April and June 1945,Okinawa and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands wereoccupied by the US military. Taiwan wasincorporated into China (ROC) as a provinceafter the Japanese surrender in August 1945.Six years later in September 1951, Japanformally renounced Taiwan in the peace treatysigned in San Francisco. Okinawa was placedunder US administration together with theother US-occupied islands, including theSenkaku/Diaoyu. However, as with so manyother contested islands of the postwar era, thetreaty specified neither precise limits nor thefinal designation of the disposed territories(Hara, 2007, 2015). The problems surroundingOkinawa, Taiwan, and Senkaku/Diaoyu areclosely related to the post-war territorialdispositions of Japan, particularly in the SanFrancisco Peace Treaty.

Cairo Declaration and the Principle of “NoTerritorial Expansion”

Several wartime international agreementscovered the post-war disposition of theterritories formerly under Japanese control. Akey agreement made by the Allied leaders wasthe Cairo Declaration of 1943. This was acommun iqué agreed on dur ing theUS–UK–China summit meeting held in Cairofrom November 22 to November 26, andre l eased on December 1 , a f t e r theUS–UK–USSR summit held in Tehran betweenNovember 28 and December 1, 1943. Itstipulated that Japan would be expelled from allthe territories it had taken “by violence andgreed” adopting the principle of “no territorialexpansion,” which was originally laid down inthe Atlantic Charter, a blueprint for the post-war world signed in August 1941 by Anglo-American leaders on a battleship off the shoresof Newfoundland. The Cairo Declarationspecifically referred to Taiwan as territory tobe “restored to the Republic of China.”

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Cairo Declaration, 1943 (Excerpt):The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain forthemselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all theislands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that allthe territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restoredto the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence andgreed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that indue course Korea shall become free and independent.

The Cairo Declaration made no specificmention of Okinawa or Senkaku/Diaoyu.However, the future of Okinawa was discussedby President Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek inCairo. According to the record of their meeting,the “President referred to the question of theRyukyu Islands and enquired more than oncewhether China would want the Ryukyus.” Tothis, “the Generalissimo replied that Chinawould be agreeable to joint occupation of theRyukyus by China and the United States, and,eventually, joint administration by the twocountries under the trusteeship of aninternational organization” (US StateDepartment 1943, p. 324).

China had by then publicly shown stronginterest in the future possession of Okinawa;the Nationalist (ROC) government on severaloccasions indicated its wish to secure theislands’ transfer to China. In a press statementon November 5, 1942, for example, ForeignMinister T.V. Soong included the islands amongthe territories that China expected to “recover”(Hara 2007, p. 161). It appears that, havingbeen briefed about the Chinese interest inobtaining Okinawa, Roosevelt asked Chiangabout the Chinese preference for treatment ofthe islands. However, Chiang instead proposedjo int occupat ion and eventua l jo intadministration with the United States underinternational trusteeship. Chiang noted in hisdiary that he had responded this way 1) to “putthe US at ease” by not pursuing China’sterritorial ambitions, 2) because the Ryukyushad belonged to Japan prior to the Sino-Japanese War, and 3) as joint control with theUS is more valid than our exclusive control(Chiang 1977, p.122; Zhang 2007, pp. 683–4).

According to Wada’s study of the Cairocommuniqué and its preparation, the UnitedStates and United Kingdom did not originally

plan to include the sentence reflecting theprinciple of no territorial expansion: “Theycovet no gain for themselves and have nothought of territorial expansion.” It did notappear in the first and second drafts, and waslikely a last-minute addition at Chiang’ssuggestion (Wada 2013).

Three weeks prior to the Cairo Conference, onNovember 5-6, 1943, Japan had hosted theGreater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. Thisepoch-maing event was the very f irstinternational conference held among non-Caucasian states on the basis of Japan's"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"initiative. The major participants were TojoHideki (prime minister of Japan), Zhang Jinghui(prime minister of Manchukuo), Wang Jingwei(president of the Reorganized NationalGovernment of China in Nanjing), Ba Maw(head of state, Burma), José P. Laurel(president of the Second Philippine Republic),Subhas Chandra Bose (head of state of theprovisional Government of Free India), andWan Waithayakon (envoy of the Kingdom ofThailand). They were the representative ofJapan's allies, friends, and puppet regimes.1

However, no representative was invited fromIndonesia, which Japan had decided toincorporate into its own territory.

Greater East Asia Conference, Tokyo

The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia

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adopted at this conference presented acompeting strain of rhetoric to that of theAnglo-American Atlantic Charter. It stated thatthe “countries of Greater East Asia, with a viewto contributing to the cause of world peace,undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting theWar of Greater East Asia to a successfulconclusion, liberating their region from theyoke of British-American domination, andensuring their self-existence and self-defense,”and listed dignifying principles, including“abolition of racial discrimination,” inconstructing a Greater East Asia. However, nophrase such as “no territorial expansion” wasincluded here, as Japan planned to expand itsterritories to Southeast Asia, building on theterritorial expansion in the wake of the attackon Pearl Harbor in December 1941.

The Joint Declaration of the Greater East Asia Conference, 1943It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place,and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance.The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nationsand peoples. Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation, and sought to satisfytheir inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability ofEast Asia. Herein lies the cause of the recent war. The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing tothe cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successfulconclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-American domination, and ensuring their self-existenceand self-defense, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and constructan order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another'ssovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties ofeach race will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperationupon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general prosperity of their region.The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world, and work for theabolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse and the opening of resources throughout theworld, and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.

For Chiang, the Cairo Conference was tocounter the Greater East Asia Conference, inwhich Wang J ingwei o f the Nan j ingGovernment had participated. Therefore, it isunderstandable that he brought up the “noterritorial expansion” principle of the AtlanticCharter here as a rhetorical device thatcontested and defied that of the JointDeclaration of the Greater East Asia (Wada,2013). But this principle had already becomemerely nominal among the Allied Powers. Atthe Tehran Conference, which followed theCairo Conference, the US and Soviet leadersdiscussed Sakhalin and the Kuriles in terms ofSoviet conditions for joining the war againstJapan. Roosevelt, on returning to Washington,informed the Pacific War Council that “theKuriles would be conceded to Stalin as a pricefor Soviet participation” (Allison, Kimura, andSarkisov 1992, p. 86).

Whereas the USSR had ambitions to acquireJapan’s northern territories, China restated itsintention to acquire the southern territories ofJapan, referring to Okinawa. The ROC foreignminister T.V. Soong stated on October 29,1944, that Japan would have to evacuate theRyukyu Islands; at a press conference a fewdays later, he added that China would“recover” the is lands af ter the war.Furthermore, although the first edition ofChiang Kai-shek’s China’s Destiny did notmention the Ryukyus, its revised edition ofJanuary 1, 1944, described them as integralparts of China, particularly necessary for itsnational defense (Hara 2007, p. 161).

Yalta Blueprint

"The Allies’ principle of no territorial expansionhad clearly become a dead letter at theUS–UK–USSR Yalta Conference of February1945, where Roosevelt and Churchil lrecognized Soviet territorial expansion inEastern Europe as well as in its Far East. The“Agreement Regarding Entry of the SovietUnion Into the War Against Japan” signed byStalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill in February1945—the so-called Yalta Protocol—is animportant agreement providing a coreblueprint for the post-war international order inthe Asia-Pacific. It outlined the conditionsunder which the Soviet Union would enter thewar against Japan. In addition to the cession ofterritories (Southern Sakhalin and the KurileIslands) from Japan to the USSR, it includedagreements concerning China, such as thepreservation of the status quo in OuterMongolia"2 (1), the lease of Port Arthur as anaval base, the internationalization of Dairenwith Soviet preeminent status (2-b), and jointSoviet–Chinese operation of the ChineseEastern and South Manchurian railways (2-c)(US State Department 1945, p. 984).

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Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta,Feb. 1945

These arrangements, the protocol stated, would“require concurrence of Generalissimo ChiangKai-shek,” and “the President will takemeasures in order to obtain this concurrenceon advice from Marshal Stalin.” The protocolconcluded:

For its part the Soviet Unionexpresses its readiness to concludewith the National Government ofChina a pact of friendship andalliance between the USSR andChina in order to render assistanceto China with its armed forces forthe purpose of liberating Chinafrom the Japanese yoke. (US StateDepartment 1945, p. 984)

The above conditions were concessions by theUnited States and United Kingdom to have theUSSR break its neutrality pact with, anddeclare war on, Japan. They were rewards forthe USSR’s cooperation in ending the warquickly. It should be noted that “China” herewas the Republic of China (ROC), led by ChiangKai-shek, which the USSR, as well as the

United States and the United Kingdom, thensupported as the legitimate government ofChina. According to the record of a meetingwith Roosevelt at Yalta, Stalin thought that“Chiang Kai-Shek should assume leadership”for the purpose of having “a united frontagainst the Japanese” (US State Department1945, p. 771).

According to a briefing paper prepared by theState Department before the Yalta Conference,the goal of US China policy was:

By every proper means to promoteestabl ishment of a broadlyrepresentative government whichwill bring about internal unity,including reconci lement ofK u o m i n t a n g - C o m m u n i s tdifferences, and which wil leffectively discharge its internaland international responsibilities.(US State Department 1945, p.356)

The United States expected an independentChina to act as a stabilizing factor in the FarEast, without falling into any power bloc (Soeya1997, p. 35). In addition, cooperation betweenChina and the United Kingdom was consideredan essential part of UN solidarity andnecessary for the development of independentChina. For that purpose, the briefing papereven mentioned that:

We [US] should welcome therestoration by Great Britain ofHong Kong to China and we areprepared in that event to urgeupon China the desirability ofpreserving its status as a free port.(US State Department 1945, pp.352–7)

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At the time of the Yalta Conference, whereasthe United States wished China to become astable power in the Far East, the UnitedKingdom appeared to have a differentpreference; that is, it desired “a weak andpossibly disunited China in the post-warperiod” (US State Department 1945, pp.352–3). For the United Kingdom—a prewarcolonial power in major parts of South andSoutheast Asia, including India, Burma, andMalaya—recovery of its colonial interests wasan important objective, and applied also toChina. In contrast with the United States,which preferred building cooperative relationswith China by welcoming the reversion of HongKong, the United Kingdom was interested inregaining its prewar semi-colonial status inChina and its direct control over Hong Kong. Inshort, the Big Three had already shown somesigns of difference over their China policy.Nevertheless, at Yalta in February 1945 theywere groping for ways to construct the post-war international order by maintaining theircooperative relations (Hara 2004).

The Yalta Protocol makes no specific mentionof Okinawa or Taiwan. There was generalagreement at Yalta that territorial trusteeshipwould apply to “territory to be detached fromthe enemy” as a result of the Second WorldWar, but no specific territories were discussed.

Potsdam

The emergence of the Cold War has often beendescribed as a process in which the characterof Soviet–US relations was transformed fromcooperation to confrontation (Hara 2012).When the war ended and the common enemywas eliminated, cooperation soon collapsed.However, US–USSR confrontation had alreadybegun before the Japanese surrender. After theGerman surrender, the third and lastUS–USSR–UK summit was held in Potsdamfrom July 17 through August 2. In Potsdam,US–USSR confrontation surfaced over the post-war treatment of Europe, especially of

Germany and Poland. On July 16, just beforethe conference opened, the United Statessuccessfully tested the first atomic bomb. Theattitude of Truman, who succeeded Rooseveltafter his death in April, at the conferencebecame firm and rigid, leading to a grimconfrontation with Stalin. The US–UK–Chinaultimatum to Japan was issued on July 26 fromPotsdam, with Chiang Kai-shek (who was notpresent) concurring by wire. The Soviets, hostsof the conference, were not consulted. AsAverell Harriman noted in his memoirs, the USleaders preferred to end the war without theSoviets, if possible (Harriman 1975, p. 492).

Potsdam Declaration, 1945 (Excerpt)The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands ofHonshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

In the Potsdam Declaration, Japaneseterritories were to be limited to the four mainislands and “minor islands” determined by theAllies, but their limits were not defined. OnAugust 8, two days after the atomic bomb wasdropped on Hiroshima, the USSR declared waragainst Japan, joining in on the Potsdam andCairo declarations. Japan accepted the PotsdamDeclaration one week later, signing theInstrument of Surrender on September 2.

Taiwan, Okinawa, and Senkaku/Diaoyu inthe San Francisco System

In September 1951, six years after signing theInstrument of Surrender, 48 countriesincluding Japan signed a peace treaty. Vastterritories, extending from the Kurile Islands toAntarctica and from Micronesia to the Spratlys,were disposed of in the treaty. The treaty,however, specified neither their finaldevolution nor their precise limits, therebysowing the seeds of various “unresolvedproblems” in the region. In Article 2(b), Japanrenounced Taiwan, called “Formosa” in thetreaty. The treaty, however, did not specify towhich country or government Japan renouncedit. In the case of Okinawa, or “the RyukyuIslands,” Article 3 specified that the islandswere to be under US administration until a

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trusteeship proposal was submitted by theUnited States and passed by the UnitedNations. In other words, the United Statescould exclusively control Okinawa, until suchtime that it made a trusteeship proposal.Trusteeship is a transitional arrangement, not afinal disposition, of territorial sovereignty.Thus, the treaty also left the final devolution ofthese territories unresolved. Furthermore,neither government of China was invited to thepeace conference in San Francisco, where thist r e a t y w a s s i g n e d . T h e U S S R s e n trepresentatives to the conference, but refusedto sign the treaty.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty (Excerpts)Article 2(b)Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.Article 3Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system,with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including theRyukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Islandand the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmativeaction thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation andjurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Senkaku/Diaoyu was not discussed in theprocess of preparing the peace treaty. It wasthe disposition of Taiwan and Okinawa that hadbecome contentious and accordingly required anumber of discussions and deliberations. In thesix years between the Japanese surrender andthe signing of the peace treaty in SanFrancisco, the international politicalenvironment surrounding Japan had changedsignificantly. The Cold War had intensified,becoming hot in places, and developed incomplex ways. After the Japanese withdrawal,post-war liberation and independencemovements in some parts of the region hadturned to civil war over governing principlesfor the new states, where competition betweenthe superpowers over spheres of influencesupervened. The disposition of Taiwan andOkinawa in the San Francisco Peace Treaty wasclosely related to such changes, especially withregard to the situation in China.

Formosa (Taiwan) in the San Francisco PeaceTreaty

After the war, Formosa was returned to Chinaas the province of Taiwan, while the civil warbetween the Nationalists and Communists re-

erupted. Over the next few years, China’spolitical conditions changed drastically fromthose envisaged at Yalta. In 1947, PresidentTruman officially proclaimed the US Cold Warpolicy to be the containment of Communism.This policy, however, initially focused solely onEurope—US policy toward China was officiallyone of non-intervention, even after theCommunist government was established inOctober 1949. The United States then foresawthe possibility that in the long run China wouldsplit from the USSR, as Tito’s Yugoslaviaalready had. This possibility was mentioned inthe US National Security Council policydocument NSC 48/1, approved by the presidenton December 23, 1949 (Etzold and Gaddis1978). The US defense line in the WesternPacific, stretching from the Aleutians throughJapan to the Philippines, came to be known asthe “Acheson Line,” after being mentioned in aspeech by Dean Acheson, the secretary of statein January 1950. Acheson did not mentionTaiwan, which the United States then saw ascapable of being “lost” to Communism, ascontinental China already had been.

From late 1946 onward, the State Departmentprepared several drafts of a peace treaty withJapan. Until December 1949, all those draftshad specified “China” as the country to whichJapan would cede Formosa. For example,Article 2 of the August 1949 draft read:

Japan hereby cedes to China in fullsovereignty the island of Taiwan(Formosa) and adjacent minorislands, including Agincourt (HokaSho), Crag (Menka Sho), Pinnacle(Kahei Sho), ... (cited in Hara 2007,p. 60)

“Pinnacle” might be interpreted as the Englishname of Senkaku/Diaoyu. However, theparenthesis with the Japanese name “KaheiSho” makes it clear that it is not the “Pinnacle”currently disputed by China and Japan.

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With the outbreak of the Korean War in June1950, US China policy changed drastically toone of active containment. The dispatch of theUS Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait toprotect Taiwan from invasion addedintervention in the Chinese civil war to thatalready under way in Korea (Soeya 1997, p.47). Since then, the Taiwan Strait has been aCold War frontier in the region.

In 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed tooversee the drafting of the Japanese peacetreaty; the first draft prepared under hissupervision was completed on August 7. Fromthis point on, “China” as the country to receiveFormosa disappeared from US drafts. Forexample, the August draft stated (in ChapterIV, Territory, Article 5):

Japan accepts whatever decisionmay hereafter be agreed upon bythe United States, the UnitedKingdom, the USSR and Chinawith reference to the future statusof Formosa, the Pescadores,Sakhalin south of 50 degrees northlatitude and the Kurile Islands. Inthe event of failure in any case toagree within one year, the partiesof the treaty will accept thedecision of the United NationsGeneral Assembly. (cited in Hara2007, pp. 61–2)

The same formula appeared in the Septemberdraft and also in the “seven-point statement ofprinciples,” which was prepared for theforthcoming peace negotiations. In thesedrafts, the “UN resolution formula” wasadopted for the disposition of Korea (Hara2007, pp. 35–6). This was presumably becausethe Korean War was being fought in the nameof the United Nations, that is, it reflectedDulles’s desire to justify US intervention in theTaiwan Strait as well as that in Korea in thepeace treaty. On October 23, 1950, Dulles met

Wellington Koo, the ambassador from China(ROC), and other Chinese diplomats who hadmisgivings about this Formosa disposition.Dulles told them that “Formosa represents aproblem which should be set t led byinternational agreement that we [US] were ableto protect Formosa with the Seventh Fleet” (USState Department 1951, p. 1,325). SouthernSakhalin and the Kurile Islands, promised tothe USSR in the Yalta blueprint, were also dealtwith in the same article.

In the meantime, the war in Korea reached amajor turning point. In late November 1950, aChinese “volunteer” army crossed the borderand began large-scale military intervention inthe Korean War. Anti-Chinese emotion erupteddomestically in the United States, affecting theissue of Chinese participation in the peaceconference. US policy toward Chineserepresentation thereafter hardened in favor ofthe ROC (Hosoya 1984, p. 116).

The next year, after a series of negotiations, anew draft was completed on March 1, 1951.“The Four Powers or UN resolution” formula ofthe previous year was dropped. Formosa wasmentioned along with Korea in Chapter III,“Territory,” as follows: “Japan renounces allrights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa andthe Pescadores” (cited in Hara 2007, p. 38).

The alteration in this draft was due to thechange in the Korean situation, as Chinese(PRC) intervention prompted Washington toconsider the “loss of Korea” as a possibility(Hosoya 1984, p. 150). As for Formosa, therewas a danger within the UN framework that itmight be ceded to the PRC, which the Britishhad already recognized in January 1950. TheBritish participated in the Korean Waralongside the Americans, but did not changetheir policy of recognizing the PRC. The UnitedKingdom had its own national interests toprotect, particularly its remaining colonialinterest in Hong Kong and economic interestsin the Chinese market. Through the fiction that

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the Chinese troops were “volunteers,” Chinaavoided declaring itself at war.

The Japanese peace treaty was drafted jointlyby the United States and the United Kingdom.However, in the process, difficulties arose overpolicies toward China. While the United Statessupported Chiang Kai-shek’s ROC, the UnitedKingdom insisted that the PRC governmentshould represent China. This caused a serioussplit between the two countries over issuessuch as the disposition of Formosa and Chineseparticipation in the peace treaty. In the end,they finalized the peace treaty on the followingbases: that Japan should choose its own futurerelationship with China, that Taiwan’s futurewould not be determined by the peace treatyitself, and that neither China would berepresented at the peace conference (Hosoya1984, p. 281). The US–UK joint draft was thusprepared on June 14, 1951 (US StateDepartment 1951, p. 1,120).

For Formosa, this June draft became the finalone signed at the peace conference. In thewartime Allies’ agreements and in earliertreaty drafts, Formosa had been to be returnedto “China” but it became an “unresolvedproblem” in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.Certainly, the peace treaty by itself did notdivide China. However, by leaving the status ofthe island undecided, various options remainedopen for its future, including possession by thePRC or the ROC, or even independence.

Incidentally, as late as the May 1951 draft, “theUSSR” had been specified as the country towhich Japan would renounce the SouthernSakhalin and the Kurile Islands. However,Dulles proposed that the territorial clauses beconsistent: consequently, “the USSR”disappeared from the June draft (Hara 2007,pp. 93–5). In its negotiations with theUSSR/Russia over the Northern Territories,Japan has taken the position that the finaldesignation and attribution of these territorieswas not specified in the peace treaty and

therefore is still pending. However, this logicdoes not seem to have been applied to China:that is, Japan never proposed that Chinanegotiate the final designation of Taiwan basedon the fact that its final disposition was notspecified in the peace treaty.

Senkaku/Diaoyu was not considered in thecontext of the disposition of Taiwan. Theseislands were placed under US control, togetherwith Okinawa, which will be discussed in thenext section. While those islands were underU S o c c u p a t i o n , t h e o w n e r s h i p o fSenkaku/Diaoyu was hardly questioned.Nevertheless, the seeds of a future disputewere sown, because no c lear borderdemarcation was made in the 1951 SanFrancisco Treaty.

On April 28, 1952, the same day that the SanFrancisco Peace Treaty went into effect, Japansigned a peace treaty with the ChineseNationalist government (ROC), effectivelyrecognizing that regime as the legitimategovernment of China. The United Statespressured Japan to do so, warning thatCongress would not otherwise ratify the SanFrancisco treaty and the security alliance withJapan, also signed on the same day. The 1952Japan–ROC peace treaty contained provisionsin its own Article 2 that were similar to those inthe San Francisco treaty:

It is recognized that under Article2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japansigned at the city of San Franciscoin the United States of America onSeptember 8, 1951, Japan hasrenounced all right, title and claimto Taiwan (Formosa) and P’eng-hu(Pescadores) as well as the Spratlyand the Paracel Islands. (UnitedNations 1952, p. 38)

This s imply recognized the Japaneserenunciation of Formosa, as well as of the

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Spratlys and the Paracels, but withoutspecifying their geographical limits or futureownership.

Okinawa and Senkaku/Diaoyu in the SanFrancisco Peace Treaty

The prob lems o f bo th Ok inawa andSenkaku/Diaoyu are in their origin deeplyrelated to US policy toward Asia, especiallyChina. Both the Chinese Nationalist (ROC)government and US military had had aninterest in possessing or controlling Okinawafrom the wartime period. US wartime studiessuggested that Japanese sovereignty was mostvalid, but left other options open, respectingChina’s interest . Japan was then anenemy—defense there meant “defense againstJapanese aggression”—while China was an ally,thus plans for the post-war period took accountof its cooperation and interests.

After the Second World War, with thedevelopment of the Cold War in Asia, the USinterest in Okinawa shifted to the defense of itssphere of influence, especially to “defense ofJapan”. Whereas US military leaders, includingMacArthur, insisted on exclusive andpermanent control, or annexation, of theislands, the State Department explored ways tosecure US bases through the UN trusteeshipsystem instead of outright annexation, whichwould be criticized as “imperialism” or“expansionism.” In 1947, tactically linking andnegotiating its position of the Kuriles with theUSSR during the UN Security Councilmeetings, the United States secured itsexclusive strategic trusteeship of Micronesia,where it had already begun to carry out nucleartesting (Hara 2007, ch. 4). In 1951, withoutactual ly p lacing the is lands under atrusteeship, the United States securedexclusive control of Okinawa in the carefullyelaborated provisions of the San FranciscoPeace Treaty. The United States also placedSenkaku/Diaoyu, together with Okinawa, underits control as part of “Nansei Shoto south of 29°

north latitude” although there is no specificmention of those islands in the treaty.

Both the retention and renunciation of Okinawaby Japan were considered in the course of thepeace treaty preparation; after all, the status ofthe territories mentioned in Article 3 was notclearly defined in the treaty. Article 3 of thetreaty does not specify renunciation ofterritorial sovereignty by Japan. But neitherdoes it confirm Japanese sovereignty.Examination of the other territorial dispositionssuggests that Dulles considered it convenientto leave the devolution of the territories vague.The same thinking was probably applied toOkinawa. The absence of any phrase specifying“renunciation by Japan” means that Japan wasnot excluded from future possession. But it didnot necessarily close off ways for alternativesettlement, such as possession by the UnitedStates or China, or even independence. Thus,the treaty did not completely guaranteeJapanese sovereignty over Okinawa andSenkaku/Diaoyu. Their future status was leftundecided. Here, with the reality of danger ofTaiwan’s “liberation” by the PRC, a “wedge” ofterritorial dispute was inserted between Chinaand Japan through the ROC’s demand forOkinawa. The Senkaku/Diaoyu problem thaterupted in the 1970s thus actually started whenthe San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed,designating the islands not as part of Taiwan,but as part of Okinawa.3 Lying on the AchesonLine, Okinawa too was a “wedge” to secureJapan under the US sphere of influence, as wellas an important base for the defense of Taiwanin US China policy.

Interestingly, at the time of the San Franciscoconference, China (PRC) openly supported thereturn of Okinawa to Japan. Prior to theconference, Chinese media had stated thePRC’s position that Okinawa was part ofJapanese territory, supporting demands madein Okinawa for the return of administrativerights to Japan. In a statement on August 15,1951, Zhou Enlai flatly opposed the idea of

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putting Okinawa under US trusteeship,declaring “these islands have never by anyinternational agreement been separated fromJapan.” However, the PRC’s support forOkinawa’s reversion to Japan was really ademand for the removal of US military basesfrom Okinawa and a peace treaty with Japanthat would expand PRC influence (Hara 2007,ch. 7).

Okinawa Reversion, Resources, and theSenkaku/Diaoyu Dispute

For almost two decades after the signing of thetreaty, no party questioned Japan’s sovereigntyover Senkaku/Diaoyu, and none claimed thatthese islands should have been allocated aspart of Taiwan, which Japan had renounced inthe peace treaty. It was not until around 1970that both the PRC and the ROC began to claimthat the islands were part of Taiwan.

The United States had by the early 1970sreturned to Japan its administrative rights overall the territories mentioned in Article 3 of thepeace treaty, without placing them under UNtrusteeship. As it did so, both the PRC and theR O C b e g a n t o c l a i m o w n e r s h i p o fSenkaku/Diaoyu, at least in part motivated bythe value of natural resources in the watersnear the islands that began to receiveattention. Because the Senkakus had neverbeen disputed before, it was for Japan a“problem that emerged suddenly,” as describedin a government pamphlet published in 1972(Gaimusho joho-bunka-kyoku 1972). Thegovernment in Taiwan retained the positionthat Okinawa was not Japanese territory, andopposed its “reversion” to Japan.4 The PRC alsocriticized this “reversion,” but for a differentreason, calling it “a fraud” because the USmilitary bases were retained (Hara 2007, ch.7).

US policy over Senkaku/Diaoyu at the time ofthe Okinawa reversion deserves specialattent ion, as i t is perhaps the key tounderstanding the problem. Before thereversion of Okinawa, there was certainly an

understanding in the US government thatSenkaku was part of Okinawa. However, theNixon administration adopted a policy of taking“no position on sovereignty” when returning“administrative rights” over these islands toJapan along with Okinawa, thus leaving thedispute to the Japanese and the Chinese. Thispolicy was in fact questioned at the time. InMarch 1971, the US Department of Defensesent a memorandum to the State Department,recalling that the United States had recognizedand treated Senkaku/Diaoyu as part of Okinawain the past.5 However, this point was notreflected in US policy. There are reasons forthis.

The first is obviously the PRC. The time wasone of US-PRC détente, the centerpiece of adramatic transformation in the structure ofAsia-Pacific and global international relations.The primary diplomatic agenda of the Nixonadministration, inaugurated in 1969, wasnormalizing relations with the PRC. It hadinherited the Okinawa reversion agreementfrom the Johnson period, but had no intentionof allowing the tiny islands of Senkaku/Diaoyuto impede the development of its policy towardChina.

The next is Okinawa. The US aim was to ensureretention of the bases on the islands. In the late1960s, President Johnson had promised toreturn Okinawa to Japan. However, the UnitedStates had no incentive for reversion; on thecontrary, during the Johnson administration,Okinawa’s strategic importance increased inconnection with the war in Vietnam. Johnson’spromise was a political one, renderednecessary by the growth of movementsdemanding reversion, not only in Okinawa, butall over Japan. Many Japanese opposed USintervention in the Vietnam War and theincreased use of the Okinawa bases for thatwar further provoked anti-US demonstrations,with signs that the Japanese Socialists andCommunists were gaining in popularity. Hencethe Johnson administration’s compromise was

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undertaken to appease anti-US feeling amongthe Japanese and to prevent the Communistsfrom exploiting the situation.

Thus, though the United States would “return”Okinawa to Japan, it would retain its basesthere. Nor was the Vietnam War its only reasonfor so desiring to retain the bases on Okinawa.The 1969 Nixon–Sato Communiqué contained aspecific promise of Okinawa’s return, but alsoincluded the so-called “Taiwan and SouthKorean provisions” (Soeya 1997, pp. 113–14).The implication of these, which directly linkedJapan’s security to that of Taiwan and SouthKorea, was that the PRC continued to beperceived as a threat in the region.

In his annual presidential address in February1971, President Nixon stated:

We are prepared to establish adialogue with Peking. We cannotaccept its ideological precepts, orthe notion that Communist Chinamust exercise hegemony over Asia.But neither do we wish to imposeon China an international positionthat denies its legitimate nationalinterests. (Kissinger 1994, p. 724)

A territorial dispute between Japan and China,especially over islands near Okinawa, has infact rendered the US military presence inOkinawa more acceptable to Japan. Whileemphasizing the “China threat” and the“defense of Japan” to the Japanese, Nixonmanaged to secure tacit Chinese approval ofthe US presence in Okinawa as “defenseagainst Japan,” thus exploiting China’s fear of arevival of Japanese militarism. The UnitedStates achieved a series of difficult diplomaticobjectives, such as withdrawal from Vietnam,reconciliation with Communist China, andretention of bases in Okinawa, one afteranother, by recognizing their relationship andtactically linking them to its advantage. The

Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute was merely anotherelement of that emergent reality that could beused, according to the logic of Henry Kissinger,the architect of Nixon’s diplomacy, “to create anetwork of incentives and penalties to producethe most favorable outcome” (Kissinger 1994,p. 717) for the United States.6 It is not clearwhether the ROC ever officially abandoned itsclaim to Okinawa. As noted earlier, the PRC’ssupport for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan was apolitical move, directed against the US basesthere. As with Vietnam’s claim in the SouthChina Sea, the PRC’s position on Okinawacould be reversed, and China’s “traditional”claim espoused after reunification. Until boththe PRC and the ROC recognize Japan’ssovereignty over Okinawa, the possibilityremains for China to revive its claim.

Conclusion

The ally-foe relations between the UnitedStates, Japan, and China were reversed inwartime and the post-war period. WhereasJapan changed from a former enemy to animportant ally as a cornerstone of the USstrategy in Asia, China, that is the PRC, turnedinto a threat. The disposition of Taiwan andOkinawa, including Senkaku/Diaoyu, in theJapanese peace treaty reflected thesedevelopments and, accordingly, changes in theUS strategy in East Asia.

During the early post-war period, the UnitedStates prepared for the disposition of Japanbased on the principle of “no territorialexpansion,” proclaimed in both the AtlanticCharter and Cairo Declaration. For example, apeace treaty draft prepared by the StateDepartment in March 1947 stated: “Theterritorial limits of Japan shall be those existingon January 1, 1894, subject to the modificationsset forth in Articles 2, 3 … [sic]” (cited in Hara2007, p.26). In principle, Japan was envisagedto become what it had been prior to itsterritorial expansion in the Sino-Japanese War.The same draft, however, specified that Japan

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was to renounce “the Ryukyu Islands formingpart of Okinawa Prefecture” as well (cited inHara 2007, p. 166). According to theseprinciples, Senkaku/Diaoyu, incorporated intoOkinawa Prefecture in January 1895, wouldhave been removed from Japan.

The United States initially prepared peacetreaty drafts according to the CairoDeclaration, the Yalta Agreement, the PotsdamDeclaration, and the Basic Post-SurrenderPolicy for Japan adopted by the Far EasternCommission on June 19, 1947. Peace treatydrafts prepared in July and August 1947provided detailed specification of territorialdispositions, in order to avoid future conflict,specifying names of minor islands such as“Takeshima” and “Kunashiri” or providing cleardemarcations using latitude and longitude(Hara 2007, ch. 2 and ch. 3).

If a peace treaty had been signed according tothe premises of the US State Departmentaround this time, the situation in East Asiawould have developed quite differently. Some,at least, of the existing disputes would not haveemerged. However, the actual outcome wasdifferent. Against the background of theescalating Cold War, which turned into “hot”wars in Asia, peace treaty drafts went throughvarious changes and eventually becamesimplified. Countries that were intended toreceive such islands as Formosa (Taiwan), theKuriles, and other territories disappeared fromthe text, leaving various “unresolved problems”among the regional neighbors. Including theOkinawa provisions, the equivocal wording ofthe peace treaty was the result neither ofinadvertence nor error—issues weredel iberately left unresolved. It is nocoincidence that the regional conflicts derivedfrom the San Francisco Peace Treaty—theNorthern Territories/Southern Kuriles,Takeshima/Dokdo, Senkaku/Diaoyu (Okinawa),Sprat ly /Nansha, and Parace l /X ishaproblems—all line up along the Acheson Line.In all of these instances the US would play a

decisive role, whether denying territorial gainsto rivals or forcing allies such as Japan toaccept terms favourable to US interests such asthe reversion of Okinawa with US bases intact.

In the ear ly 1970s , the s tructure o finternational political relations in the Asia-Pacific changed drastically, especially thosecentering on China. The split in the EasternCamp contributed to the emergence of aChina–US–USSR tripolar system in the politicalmap of this region. However, the shift to policyby the US and its allies to one of “engagement”with China did not necessarily mean thecollapse of the Cold War structure. The basicstructure of the regional Cold War, in which thetwo Chinas confront each other across theTaiwan Strait and Taiwan is protected by theUS umbrella, has not changed to this date.

The territorial problem between Japan andChina originally centered on Okinawa. In the1970s, as the “administrative rights” ofOkinawa were returned to Japan, the focus ofthe Sino-Japanese territorial dispute shifted tothe Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, where resourcenationalism was accented by the new energypotential discovered in the vicinity of thoseislands. The emergence of new factors,including valuable resources around the islandsand the adoption of the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)granting even small islands large territorialrights, complicated the problem further. In themeantime, the origin of the problem as a by-product of the Cold War has been forgotten.

The issue of US bases after the Okinawareversion experienced a major turning point inthe 1990s and in late 2000s. With the collapseof the Yalta System and the demise of theUSSR and the advent of the so-cal led“post–Cold War” era, the necessity of keepingUS bases in Okinawa began to be questionedby many in the US media and politics (Johnsonand Keen 1995, pp. 103–14). The “Okinawaproblem” developed into a hot issue in Japan in

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1995, after a schoolgirl was raped by three USmil i tary personnel . However, due tocooperative efforts between the US andJapanese governments , the i ssue of“withdrawal” (tettai) was somehow replaced by“transfer” (iten).

Although waves of the global “post–Cold War”transformations in international relations suchas globalization and regionalism have reachedEast Asia, they have not necessarily denied theremaining structure of confrontation founded inthe early post-war years. The relaxation oftensions seen in the Cold War thaw in the1950s and US-China détente in the 1970s inboth instances gave way to a deterioration ofEast–West relations. Similar phenomena havebeen observed in East Asia, including tensionsacross the Taiwan Strait and over theSenkakus, thereby contributing to thecontinued importance of US bases in Okinawaand throughout the Asia-Pacific.

Although economic interdependence hasdeepened and efforts to enhance confidence-building measures have been repeated over thepast decades, as far as these conflicts remainunresolved, there is always danger for theirescalation. Unless the sources of the conflictsare removed, not only Japan–China relationsbut the entire region of East Asia will never bereleased from the vicious circle of instabilityand uncertainty.

Resolution of the problems originating in thepost-war territorial disposition of Japan maybetter be sought in a broader multilateralcontext, just those problems were created insuch a context, rather than in limiting theframework to parties with territorial claims—anapproach that has not seen success for manyyears. Although there is no space here tointroduce concrete details, there have indeedbeen several projects by international group ofscholars to consider these regional conflictsand their resolution in a multi lateralframework. 7

In the 1990s, against the backdrop of the “endof the Cold War” and the relaxation of tensionsin East Asia, a window of opportunity appearedto open, and expectation for settling theNorthern Territories dispute between Japanand Russia also heightened. Yet none of theproposals presented then was acceptable toboth Japan and Russia. Including Japan, thepresent political environment may notnecessarily be ideal for settling these problemsin East Asia. As with the Northern Territoriesand many other international disputes, timemay again present opportunities for solutions.It seems worthwhile that scholars, researchers,and intellectuals bring together their wisdomand prepare ideas and recommendations inadvance of the time when an opportunity doespresent itself again. The complex threads ofinternational relations cannot be easilydisentangled. Yet, while there are clues, bymobilizing wisdom and conscience, solutions toproblems should never be impossible.

Adapted by permission of the publisher fromChapter 2 ‘Okinawa, Taiwan, and theSenkaku /D iaoyu I s l ands i n Un i t edStates–Japan–China Relations’ in Tim F. Liao,Kimie Hara and Krista Wiegand eds. The China-Japan Border Dispute: Islands of Contention inM u l t i d i s c i p l i n a r y P e r s p e c t i v e(http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781472442994), (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015),pp. 37-55.

K i m i e H a r a ( e m a i l(https://apjjf.org/mailto:khara@uwaterloo.ca))is the Director of East Asian Studies at RenisonUniversity College, the Renison ResearchProfessor at the University of Waterloo(Canada), and an Asia-Pacific Journalcontributing editor. Her books includeNorthern Territories, Asia-Pacific RegionalConflicts and the Aland Experience: Untyingt h e K u r i l l i a n K n o t(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415666046/) (with Geoffrey Jukes), “Zaigai”nihonjin kenkyusha ga mita nihon gaiko(Japanese Diplomacy through the Eyes of

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J a p a n e s e S c h o l a r s O v e r s e a s(http://www.fujiwara-shoten.co.jp/shop/index.php?main_page=product_info&products_id=1078)), Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific:Divided Territories in the San Francisco System(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415646789/) and Japanese-Soviet/RussianRelations since 1945: A Difficult Peace(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415194990/).

Recommended citation: Kimie Hara, "Okinawa,Taiwan, and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands inUnited States–Japan–China Relations", TheAsia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 28, No. 2,July 13, 2015.

Related articles

• Reinhard Dr i f te , The Japan-ChinaConfrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands– Between “shelving” and “dispute escalation(https://apjjf.org/-Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.html)

• John W. Dower, The San Francisco System:Past, Present, Future in U.S.-Japan-ChinaR e l a t i o n s(https://apjjf.org/-John_W_-Dower/4079/article.html)

• Yabuki Susumi, Mark Selden, The Origins ofthe Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute between China,T a i w a n a n d J a p a n(https://apjjf.org/-Mark-Selden/4061/article.html)

• Kimie Hara, The San Francisco Peace Treatyand Frontier Problems in the Regional Order inEast As ia : A S ix ty Year Perspect ive(https://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/3739/article.html)

• Wada Haruki, Resolving the China-JapanConflict Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands(https://apjjf.org/-Wada-Haruki/3433/article.html)

• Kimie Hara, Untying the Kurillian Knot:Toward an Åland-Inspired Solution for theRusso- Japanese Terr i tor ia l Dispute(https://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/3170/article.html)

• Kimie Hara, Micronesia and the PostwarRemaking of the Asia Pacific: "An AmericanL a k e "(https://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/2493/article.html)

• Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: The Troubling Legacy of the SanF r a n c i s c o T r e a t y(https://apjjf.org/-Kimie-HARA/2211/article.html)

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Peace Treaties and China’s Ocean FrontierProblems.” The American Journal of ChineseStudies, 11(1), 1–24.

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———. 2009. “Envisioning Åland-inspiredsolutions for the Northern Territoriesproblem.” In: Kimie Hara and Geoffrey Jukes(eds). Northern Territories, Asia-PacificRegional Conflicts and the Åland Experience:Untying the Kurillian Knot. London and NewYork: Routledge.

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Harriman, William Averell, and Elie Abel. 1975.Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin,1941–1946. New York: Random House.

Hosoya, Chihiro. 1984. Sanfuranshisuko kowaeno michi [Path to the San Francisco PeaceTreaty]. Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha.

Johnson, Chalmers and E.B. Keen. 1995. “EastAsian Security: The Pentagon’s OssifiedStrategy.” Foreign Affairs, July/August, 103–14.

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Notes

1 Subhas Chandra Bose was present only as an“observer” since India was still under Britishrule.

2 Mongolian Peoples Republic (1924-1992), anindependent state within the Soviet sphere.

3 Dulles warned that the United States wouldnot return Okinawa to Japan if it madeconcessions to the Soviet Union and gave up itsclaim to all four island groups in its so-calledNorthern Territories (Hara 2007, ch. 3).

4 In his statement on August 15, 1951, ZhouEnlai flatly opposed the idea of puttingOkinawa under American trusteeship,declaring, “these islands have never by anyinternational agreement separated from Japan”(cited in Hara 2007, p. 176).

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5 It states: “Our [DOD’s] search has indicatedthat the coordinates proposed in the cable callfor identical points to those found in CivilAdministration Proclamation No. 27 ofDecember 25, 1953, and these in turn arefound in Army Map Service Gazetteer to Mapsof Ryukyu-Retto and Ogasawara-Gunto,published in October 1944. Moreover, theGazetteer, which is undoubtedly the source ofthe Proclamation coordinates refers at thispoint to the Senkakus [Diaoyu] as part of theOkinawa prefecture. It would therefore dignifythe Japanese claim to the Senkakus, contrary tothe neutral position assumed by the UnitedStates … Unquestionably the United States‘administered’ the Senkaku Islands as part ofthe Okinawa administration, and such anadministration took place (a) without questionor issue raised by the United States as to itspowers to administer, and (b) apparentlywithout Taiwan making a claim or attemptingto claim the Senkaku until oil becomes an

issue. Under these circumstances, the UnitedStates ‘position’ is not entirely free from anelement of recognition …” (March 19, 1971,Memorandum for Mr. Mark Greenwood,Department of State, from Harry H. Almond,Jr., Office of the Assistant General Counsel,International Affairs, Department of Defense,cited in Hara 2007, p. 180).

6 Deng Xiaoping, Deputy Prime Minister ofChina, commented on the Senkaku/Diaoyuissue as follows, responding to a question at apress conference at the Japan National PressClub in 1978. “It does not matter if thisquestion is shelved for some time, say, 10years. Our generation is not wise enough tofind common language on this question. Ournext generation will certainly be wiser. Theywill certainly find a solution acceptable to all."(Deng, 1978)

7 See for example, Hara and Jukes 2009; Hara2015.