on the Korean Peninsula: What Next - IFPA · Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis In Association with the Fletcher School, ... on the Korean Peninsula: What Next. ... The workshop

on the Korean Peninsula:

A Project Interim Report by:Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

May 2009

ByJames L. Schoff

Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies &

Yaron EisenbergResearch Associate

What Next

May 2009

A Project Interim Report by:Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

In Association with the Fletcher School, Tufts University

By: James L. Schoff

Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies

andYaron Eisenberg

Research Associate

For further information, please contact: Cambridge, Mass., IFPA Office

James L. [email protected]

on the Korean Peninsula:What Next

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula iii

Introduction v

Milestones and Meanings 1

How to Characterize a Peace Regime 5

Developing a Peace Regime 8

First, Do No Harm: Armistice and OPCON 8

Basic Agreement as a Foundation 10

Parties to a Peace Regime 11

Five Tracks 13

The Six-Party/KPPR Linkage 14

Timing and Triggers 15

The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor and Regional Considerations 18

Appendix A App:1 References

Appendix B App:3 Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

Appendix C App:4 Trail of Documents Related to Korean Peace Regime Development

Appendix D App:5 North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Cooperation and Exchange (Basic Agreement), 1991

Contents

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsulaiv

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula v

The term “peace regime” officially made its Six-Party Talks debut in the September 2005 Joint Statement from the fourth round of those negotiations, as the participating nations emphasized their commitment to build a lasting peace in Northeast Asia by pledging to initiate a separate negotiation for a “permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” at an appropriate time.1 Although the Six-Party Talks are primarily focused on denuclearizing North Ko-rea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK), the mention of a separate peace regime dialogue by “the di-rectly related parties” acknowledged the many unresolved political, diplomatic, and national security issues in Korea that contribute to North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. After all, North and South Korea (Republic of Korea, or ROK) are still technically at war with one another, and the armistice agreement that has governed the cease-fire for over fifty-five years was never intended as a long-term solution to the Korean War.

Despite this acknowledgement of the ultimate impor-tance of establishing a Korean Peninsula peace regime (KPPR), no KPPR talks have occurred and no one can iden-tify a probable start date or even a likely agenda for those negotiations. At this writing, the Six-Party Talks them-selves are in danger of collapsing (again), and the pros-pects for true peace in Korea seem dimmer than they have been in more than a decade. North Korea has stepped up

1 The Six-Party Talks consist of delegations sent by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. For a de-tailed discussion about the Six-Party Talks, see Schoff et. al. 2008.

its threats against the South, the United States, and Japan with bellicose statements, missile tests, and border clos-ings. Pyongyang also stated in April 2009 that nuclear war with South Korea and the United States was just “a mat-ter of time,” given what it called the “war chariot” of the U.S.-ROK alliance (Yonhap News Agency 2009a). North Korea followed this up with its second nuclear weapon test in May 2009, and it called for “shaping a new diplo-matic framework” through bilateral talks with the United States (Yonhap News Agency 2009b).

These developments require careful consideration by U.S. and ROK policy makers, as political transition in the North (and earlier in the South), economic stress, and re-gional military modernization seem to be prompting ma-jor strategic adjustments on the peninsula. As a result, stronger linkages are developing between the denuclear-ization talks, armistice management, and KPPR develop-ment, and they are also becoming less predictable. On the one hand, efforts to better manage the armistice and to think concretely about peace regime options could have a positive influence on the atmosphere for Six-Party Talks and lead to useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) for the future. On the other hand, rushing into peace talks when mutual confidence is particularly low could strain an outdated armistice and allow conflict to erupt in the West Sea or along the demilitarized zone (DMZ), endan-gering the fragile peace that has endured for half a centu-ry. The way that the U.S.-ROK alliance responds on these

Introduction

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula

t h e I n s t i t u t e f o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y A n a ly s i s

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interconnected fronts will influence North Korea’s reac-tion and determine how much support the allies receive for their initiatives from other key players in the region. These are the critical variables for shaping a more positive security environment on the peninsula in the near term and for the future.

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA), work-ing with partners in South Korea, the United States, and China is in the middle of a three-year project exploring peace regime building on the Korean Peninsula in ways that support and facilitate the denuclearization objec-tives of the Six-Party Talks. Our aim is to combine re-search and dialogue in a mixed academic/policy (Track 1.5) environment among the “directly related parties” to explore the linkages mentioned above, and to develop a broader consensus regarding the potential synergies be-tween armistice management, peace regime building, and denuclearization.

As part of this project, IFPA and some of its partners held a one-day U.S.-ROK workshop in Washington, D.C., on November 22, 2008, to discuss peace regime development

from a bilateral perspective, which will lead to future meetings involving Chinese specialists and (we hope) eventually DPRK representatives. The November 2008 workshop explored critical alliance issues such as consid-ering how the two governments approach the design and development of a peace regime, prioritizing concerns that a peace regime must eventually address, and finding the most productive way to build bilateral, and later multilat-eral, consensus on key issues and processes. This interim report in part describes the results of that bilateral meet-ing, combined with subsequent interviews and research in the lead-up to North Korea’s May 2009 nuclear test.

The IFPA workshop was organized in cooperation with the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS) at Yonsei University and the East Asia Foundation (EAF), and in collaboration with the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP). IFPA is grateful to its partners and collabo-rators in this endeavor, and to the Carnegie Corporation of New York for its generous financial support that makes this project possible. IFPA is also grateful to the workshop

Six-Party TalksSince 2003, China has hosted an irregular series of multilateral meetings known as the Six-Party Talks, with the goal of achieving “verifiable denucle-arization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.” Delegates representing China, the United States, DPRK, ROK, Japan, and Russia convene sporadically at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing and engage in negotiations at a very senior level. The meetings are marked by rounds and phases, each lasting anywhere from a couple of days to two weeks. Participants meet in plenary and bilateral sessions, in addition to informal con-versations and ceremonial events. The purpose of the talks is generally to formalize agreements worked out in rough form through bilateral and minilateral shuttle diplomacy that takes place among key players in the intervening months.

As host, China serves as the Six-Party chair and secretariat. Each country delegation can number up to twenty officials drawn from various gov-ernment ministries and departments, though the heads of delegations have been largely consistent:

China: Vice minister of foreign affairs (chair),United States: Assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs,DPRK: Vice minister of foreign affairs,

ROK: Deputy minister of foreign affairs and trade,Japan: Director-general for Asian and Oceanian affairs (foreign ministry),Russia: Deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Six-Party Talks: Summary of RoundsRound Phase Dates Outcomes / Remarks1 8/27-29/20032 2/25-28/20043 6/23-25/20044 1 7/26-8/7/20054 2 9/13-19/2005 Agreement on a joint statement restating the goal of peacefully completing verifiable denuclearization; the six

parties will implement agreed-upon steps based on “commitment for commitment and action for action” 5 1 11/9-11/20055 2 12/18-22/20065 3 2/8-13/2007 Initial-actions agreement for implementation of the September 2005 joint statement; establishment of five

working groups6 1a 3/19-22/2007 6th round starts slowly as BDA funds held up and Yongbyon shutdown delayed6 1b 7/18-20/2007 Resumption of first phase talks6 2 9/27-30/2007 Second-phase actions agreement for implementation of the September 2005 joint statement6 3a 7/10-12/2008 Agreement in principle on verification procedures

7/23/2008 Foreign ministers meet informally on sidelines of ASEAN Regional Forum6 3b 12/8-11/2008 Failed to agree on detailed verification protocol, but door still open for future talks



vii

participants, who lent their valuable time and consider-able expertise to the project.

The workshop occurred in the wake of a flurry of ac-tivity related to the Six-Party Talks and North Korean de-nuclearization. In May 2008, North Korea delivered to U.S. officials thousands of documents detailing its nuclear programs, plans were drawn up to raze the cooling tower attached to the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and there was even talk of the United States establishing a liaison office in Pyongyang to oversee nuclear disablement (Yonhap News Agency 2008). On June 26, 2008, President Bush an-nounced that the United States intended to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, an ac-tion long sought by the North Koreans, and the cooling tower came down. Although a process of verification for North Korea’s nuclear declarations had been agreed to in broad principle during this period, disputes quickly erupt-ed about what kinds of procedures would be allowed (and when), and the Six-Party Talks began to break down. By September North Korea was threatening to restart its nu-clear reactor, it expelled UN inspectors from the site, and in December a final Six-Party push for an agreed verifi-cation protocol failed to bridge the differences. Compli-cating the situation, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il re-portedly suffered a stroke in August, and outsiders were unsure of the state of his health until he reappeared in public in early 2009.

At the time of the workshop, inter-Korean relations were also showing clear signs of deterioration, after years of incremental progress. The new ROK president, Lee Myung-bak, took a different approach to North-South relations than had his two predecessors, emphasizing greater reciprocity in diplomatic relations, and he advo-cated a stronger ROK relationship with the United States. North Korea’s response became increasingly negative as 2008 wore on, refusing to engage the South, for example, even after a fatal shooting of a South Korean tourist by a North Korean soldier in the Mt. Kumgang area in July. The situation further deteriorated after the IFPA workshop, as ROK tour operations in North Korea were suspended, and Pyongyang threatened clashes with the South in late January 2009 and announced that the country was scrap-ping all inter-Korean political and military agreements. According to a statement made by the DPRK Commit-tee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea and carried

by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency, “All the agreed points concerning the issue of putting an end to the political and military confrontation between the north and the south will be nullified” (Yonhap News Agen-cy 2009c). North Korea’s rocket/missile launch in April and its nuclear test in May exacerbated tensions, and now the last operating North-South venture (the joint industrial complex at Gaesong) is in danger of being shut down.

The results of the workshop in Washington, D.C., were both encouraging and sobering. The majority of the par-ticipants agreed that beginning to discuss and conceptu-alize a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula would ben-efit the allies in the short term and ultimately all members of the Six-Party Talks. Despite such general agreement, however, there were clear differences of opinion regarding the preferred timing and KPPR negotiating priorities. This report highlights several themes that participants raised during the workshop, such as 1) defining the peace regime concept; 2) explaining the linkage between peace regime building and denuclearization; 3) organizing the timing and sequencing of events; and 4) understanding the po-tential roles that different countries and international or-ganizations can play in the process, as well as considering how KPPR developments might affect other U.S. alliances in the region.

At the time of this report’s release the region is in the grip of a tense geopolitical standoff, suggesting that achieving a workable peace regime (or even starting that process) could prove elusive for several years. Despite these challenges, preparing to build and institutionalize a KPPR is an important U.S.-ROK alliance exercise. It will also be important to include China, and eventually North Korea too, to begin developing a common understanding of KPPR principles. Although there will be much for the parties to argue and disagree about, focusing on the com-mon ground that does exist is the first step, along with understanding each country’s interests and political im-peratives. This will help the allies contribute to building a better armistice in the near term, and it should also im-prove the chances that the parties can take advantage of brief windows of negotiating opportunity when they do occur in the future.

Problems on the Korean Peninsula are certainly in-tractable, but they are not static. The prospects for last-ing peace in Korea will rise and fall, and we must be ready



viii

to take at least one step forward each time they rise. Just as in building a house, even in winter one can begin to design, seek approvals, and prepare for logistical chal-lenges long before hitting the first nail with a hammer in the spring. Like any negotiation filled with complex-ity and historical significance, solving the security dilem-mas swirling around the Korean Peninsula requires time and patience.

We begin this report with a short look at the history of KPPR concepts and achievements to date. Even though North Korea has recently disavowed past agreements, these are still the foundation upon which any future KPPR effort will build. They also illustrate why a “new diplomat-ic framework,” as Pyongyang sees it (i.e., a U.S.-DPRK bilat-eral negotiation) will not solve , and could exacerbate, the security situation on the peninsula.

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula 1

By invading South Korea in June 1950, North Korea intend-ed to unify the peninsula under Pyongyang’s communist control, and it received strong support from China and the Soviet Union in this endeavor. Despite North Korea’s ob-jectives, by the time the armistice was signed at Panmu-njom three years later, the Korean War only managed to cement the peninsular divide created by U.S. and Soviet forces following Japan’s surrender to end the Second World War. Moreover, the Korean War exacted a horrible toll of human suffering and economic damage in Korea.

Korea’s fate has often been affected by decisions made in foreign capitals. In 1943, the United States, Britain, and China stated in the Cairo Declaration that “in due course, Korea shall become free and independent,” but that had not come to pass by the time North Korean soldiers crossed the 38th parallel in 1950 (Oberdorfer 2001). On July 7, 1950, shortly after the war began, the newly estab-lished United Nations passed Security Council resolution UNSC 84, which called for the establishment of the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) to help South Korea defend itself.

One year into the conflict, in July 1951, the Soviet del-egation to the UN approached the UNC to initiate nego-tiations for ending the war. Although the parties agreed in principle that the 38th parallel should serve as a guide for a demarcation line, talks continued for two years as disagreements over prisoner exchanges and the final de-marcation line intensified. Finally, the UNC commander,

the commander of Chinese “volunteer” forces (Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, or CPV), and North Korea’s su-preme commander signed the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953. Although the agreement was relatively effec-tive at institutionalizing a cease-fire, the signatories never meant for it to serve as a political settlement. It is instead a military document signed by military leaders, contain-ing mechanisms to help the parties keep the cease-fire. For example, the armistice established the Military De-marcation Line (MDL) along the 38th parallel, a line sepa-rating North and South. The armistice also created a two-kilometer buffer on either side of the MDL known as the DMZ. In addition, it established committees and commis-sions to provide multilateral oversight of the terms of the cease-fire.

The armistice contains many limitations despite its continued utility. First, the armistice failed to construct an effective means by which to adjudicate armistice vi-olations. For instance, the UNC claims that North Korea has violated the terms of the armistice 430,000 times while North Korea recognizes approximately 3. Con-versely, North Korea accuses the South of 830,000 viola-tions when the number of violations is probably closer to 16 (Lee Sanghee 2007). Second, North Korea rejects the West Sea demarcation line. Soon after the armistice was signed, the UNC determined that the islands of Pak Yong Do, Dae Cheong Do, So Cheong Do, Yun Pyung Do, and Woo Do would fall under UNC control and established

Milestones and Meanings



2

the Northern Limit Line (NLL) three nautical miles to the north of those islands. Pyongyang often expressed its de-sire to see the NLL pushed farther south, and at a Military Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting in 1973 the North declared that it would not recognize the NLL.

As one IFPA workshop participant noted, “The armi-stice’s objective of a complete cessation of hostilities was temporary in nature, until a final peaceful settlement would be achieved.” The parties designed the armistice to segue from a military settlement to a political one, and they scheduled a meeting for within three months of sign-ing the armistice to plan for that transition. In what would emerge as a pattern with inter-Korean negotiations, how-ever, those talks were delayed by nearly a year and even-tually abandoned.

Allusions to a final Korean political settlement did not resurface until 1972 with the release of the North-South Joint Communiqué. In that document, the two Koreas agreed in principle to threat reduction and confidence-building measures and recognized their mutual desire for reunification and a peaceful conclusion to the Kore-an War. It reads, “Firstly, reunification should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference; secondly, reunification should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side” (see Appendix C for a list of KP-PR-related documents). What prompted Pyongyang to seek talks with Seoul in 1972 on these issues? The answer is not clear (and probably multifaceted), but one impor-tant factor might have been Washington’s new China poli-cy and President Nixon’s visit to Beijing earlier that year. It is hard to know, however, if North Korea sensed potential U.S. weakness (its former enemy embracing its ally), or if it was more concerned with possible Chinese abandonment (its former ally embracing its enemy).

Although the 1972 Joint Communiqué offered a de-gree of optimism, North Korea circumvented the South Koreans just two years later by appealing directly to the Americans for peace talks. The DPRK government sent a letter to the U.S. Congress in which it proposed direct bi-lateral negotiations in order to create “the prerequisites to the removal of tension on Korea and the acceleration of the country’s independent and peaceful reunification.” The letter continued, “It is becoming increasingly evident that as long as the U.S. troops remain in south [sic] Korea

it is impossible to remove tension and consolidate peace in Korea” (DPRK government 1974). North Korea did not recognize South Korea as a sovereign and legitimate state, and for Pyongyang, the presence of U.S. troops on the pen-insula constituted the main issue that required resolution.2

The DPRK peace proposal sought the dissolution of the UNC and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. Needless to say, the United States and South Korea were opposed to such terms.

Hope for introducing a KPPR was renewed in 1991 when top officials from Seoul and Pyongyang signed the North-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggres-sion, and Cooperation and Exchange (the so-called Basic Agreement, see Appendix D). This was a comprehensive document in which the two parties pledged to “exert joint efforts to achieve peaceful unification,” including various CBMs such as the establishment of a South-North liaison office at Panmunjom and plan to reconnect certain rail-ways, roads, and many Korean families separated for de-cades since the war. Important points to note about this document include that the two parties described their re-lationship not as one between states, but instead as a “spe-cial interim relationship stemming from the process to-ward unification.”

In addition, the agreement pledged recognition and re-spect for each other’s system of government, non-interfer-ence in each other’s internal affairs, no slander or vilifica-tion, and no actions of sabotage or attempts to overthrow the opposing regime. A former ROK official emphasized at the workshop, “The North Koreans are really obsessed with these principles… and they will insist they be includ-ed in any agreement you try to negotiate with them.”

The Basic Agreement was followed by the 1992 North-South declaration of the denuclearization of the peninsula, which, interestingly, directly connected the denucleariza-tion of the Korean Peninsula to helping “to create condi-tions and an environment favorable for peace and peaceful unification.” This agreement also suggested establishing a South-North joint nuclear control commission (JNCC) to aid in verification, but the two sides could never agree on how to launch that organization.

Pyongyang’s apparent lack of interest in actually im-plementing these two agreements with any vigor again

2 For its part, the ROK constitution enacted in 1987 states in Ar-ticle 3 that “the territory of the Republic of Korea shall con-

sist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands.”



3

raises the question of why the North agreed to their terms in the first place. As during 1972, external factors might have been critical, as Pyongyang watched Germany reuni-fy in late 1990 and the Soviet Union collapse at the end of 1991. Kim Il-sung might have viewed reaching out to South Korea as a useful strategy to provide his country some diplomatic space and political breathing room as it contemplated the possible ramifications of these tumul-tuous geopolitical events.

In 1993, amidst DPRK-IAEA wrangling over nuclear-re-lated inspections, the United States and North Korea met for “policy-level” talks in New York and later issued a brief joint statement that, among other items, agreed to the fa-miliar principles of assurances against the threat and use of force (including nuclear weapons), mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and support for peaceful reunification of Korea. A series of inter-Korean talks began around this time as well (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004). But as one veteran Korean negotiator reminded workshop par-ticipants, “Any optimism with the North turned out to be a frustration and a disappointment, and any good agree-ment rarely lasted more than two years.” In this case, the momentum for peace that began building in 1991 lasted only slightly more than two years, as the first North Kore-an nuclear crisis broke out in earnest in early 1994.

What little progress had been made during those years regarding possible U.S.-DPRK normalization, limiting U.S.-ROK military exercises, and exchanging North-South special envoys was gone, and the spotlight was back on denuclearization. Still, the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Frame-work that came out of this crisis offered a new (albeit frag-ile) diplomatic path to support reconciliation efforts. The framework did focus more on the nuclear issue than on peace regime building, but it also led to an unprecedented level of economic and diplomatic engagement, including planning for the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea by a multinational consortium, KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Economic Development Organization).

Moreover, the Agreed Framework paved the way for other initiatives, such as a four-party meeting proposed by presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton in 1996, in-volving North and South Korea, the United States, and China to discuss replacing the armistice with a political

settlement. Even though the Four-Party Talks failed to achieve their objectives, one Korean workshop partici-pant involved in those talks noted that “It provided an im-portant venue for bilateral discussions to happen simul-taneously in the four-party context. These meetings were an important ice-breaking moment, in terms of our abil-ity to talk very frankly with each other about our concerns, and to begin an initial exploration of some basic concepts regarding what we are now calling a peace regime.” The United States also opened bilateral talks with the North on missiles, the recovery of U.S. soldiers missing in action from the Korean War, and future denuclearization logis-tics (such as fuel rod removal).

The next key milestone came amid ROK president Kim Dae-jung’s so-called sunshine policy toward the North, specifically the first-ever inter-Korean leadership summit in June 2000. Although the resulting joint declaration was short on specifics, the endorsement by top leaders for pro-moting exchanges and economic development led to sev-eral inter-Korean projects including the joint industrial zone at Gaesong and a tourism zone at Mt. Kumgang, as well as a series of family and cultural exchanges. At the summit, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il also “agreed that there is a common element in the South’s concept of a confederation and the North’s formula for a loose form of federation.” For a brief time after the summit meeting, it seemed as if the spirit of the Basic Agreement of 1991 (which had hardly been implemented throughout the 1990s), had been revived, and that the political environ-ment was finally favorable for carrying out the ambitious agenda described in that document.

In the “two-steps-forward, two-steps-back” dance of negotiating with North Korea, however, many of these achievements were rolled back over the next nine years. A change in administration in the United States and new evidence regarding a possible North Korean uranium en-richment program (UEP) contributed to the collapse of the Agreed Framework and the second North Korean nu-clear crisis, in 2002. North Korea then withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003, a move that later prompted a multilateral approach to pur-suing denuclearization in the form of the Six-Party Talks. The Six-Party Talks have a mixed track record in terms of stopping North Korea’s nuclear program, and they have contributed only slightly to the future development of a



4

KPPR. Still, the talks on denuclearization are now close-ly intertwined with formally ending the Korean War and normalizing U.S.-DPRK relations, even if the parties can-not agree about which step comes first.

The United States clearly sees substantial (if not near-ly complete) DPRK denuclearization as a prerequisite for diplomatic normalization and signing some sort of decla-ration ending the war, even if planning for a peace regime and implementing CBMs might begin beforehand. After North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, for example, White House spokesperson Tony Snow stated, “If the North Koreans dismantle their nuclear programs and renounced further nuclear ambitions, we are willing to do a whole series of things, including declaration of the end of the Korean War.” Conversely, North Korea prefers to hold onto its nuclear devices until after normalization and related KPPR steps, as a way to maintain deterrence until it is convinced that America has ended its “hostile policy” toward the North. A North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement, for example, released on July 22, 2007, explained, “The estab-lishment of the peace regime on the Korean peninsula is one of processes to the goal of denuclearization.” This is a fundamental challenge going forward, though it is per-haps an area where discussing a KPPR can be useful, since depending on how it is structured, it could include incre-mental steps that might provide political cover for both sides so that it does not appear that one has capitulated to the other.

The final historical milestone worth mentioning is the second inter-Korean leadership summit in October 2007. The resulting Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity further em-phasized the “need to end the current armistice regime and build a permanent peace regime…[and] of having the leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.” This question about the number of directly concerned par-ties (three or four) is discussed in more detail below, but the statement is noteworthy in that Pyongyang seemed to acknowledge the multilateral nature of the problem. In the past, even though North Korea participated in the Four-Party Talks, it never truly accepted the legitimacy of South Korea’s right to participate, as Pyongyang only wanted to negotiate directly with the United States. Now, in late 2007, after a decade of negotiating with liberal governments in

Seoul, Pyongyang seemed to recognize that South Korea deserves an official seat at the peace table. Whether or not this would ever mean that the North would sign a peace treaty directly with the South, however, is still an open question.

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula 5

The 2005 Joint Statement may have officially linked a peace regime to the Six-Party Talks, but few experts can adequate-ly define the KPPR concept, let alone specify its compo-nents. One workshop participant confessed, “I’m not sure what the organizers mean when they say ‘peace regime.’ In fact, I’m not sure what I mean when I say ‘peace regime.’ And I’m pretty convinced that the people in 2005 who wrote ‘peace regime’ into the joint declaration didn’t have a clue what they meant when they said ‘peace regime.’” This point was echoed by others at the workshop, and from an alli-ance perspective, this lack of clarity can lead to misunder-standings and a misalignment of expectations. Defining the concept of a KPPR and its implementation is critical-ly important to the alliance and the success of future ne-gotiations. As one participant offered, “If at the end of the day we can come up with a common definition of what we all mean by ‘peace regime,’ we will have probably already made a major contribution to this effort.”

Academics and policy makers often think of regimes as sets of norms, rules, patterns, and principles of behav-ior guiding the pursuit of interests, around which actors converge (Krasner 1983). Regimes usually are not as for-mal as institutions (with a specific address, staff, or letter-head), and they can often be quite expansive (such as the nuclear non-proliferation regime based on bilateral and multilateral treaties and involving international organi-zations and supplemental supplier initiatives). Although many scholars have been studying and writing about vari-ous KPPR schemes for years, there is still no clear consen-sus about what approach is best.

There are two principal debates regarding the nature of a KPPR, and they are interconnected. The first revolves

around what a peace regime is supposed to produce (that is, how we describe its purpose and the desired end state). At its most basic level, the KPPR could be an updated ver-sion of the armistice, with an added political agreement to end the war and endorse a framework for reconcilia-tion along the lines of the Basic Agreement; this would be only a slight change from the status quo based on hope for improved North-South relations over time. A more ambi-tious view links a KPPR directly to the process of recon-ciliation and confederation, to settling tough issues like the West Sea NLL, to facilitating cross-border traffic, trade, and communication, and to meaningful military CBMs that reduce military forces along the DMZ. Related to this, the second debate focuses on whether a peace regime is primarily a process (or even just the trigger for a process) that eventually leads to a desired end state, or instead more of a destination that will codify or institutionalize a particular outcome.

A peace regime has alternatively been described as “a mechanism to create peace;” “a framework for amelio-rating the mutual distrust and the hostile relationships… [and] a foundation for peaceful coexistence and mutu-al prosperity between the two Koreas;” “an institutional device for legal termination and prevention of wars and maintenance of peace;” and “a process of building peace, not the ultimate state of peace” (O 2007; Lee Sanghee 2007; Lee In Ho 2008; Cho 2007). Alexander Vershbow, then-U.S. ambassador to South Korea, described the U.S. attitude in late 2007: “We agree that, in addition to the core commitments [of formally ending the war and es-tablishing a normal boundary between the two Koreas], a permanent peace agreement would also include military

How to Characterize a Peace Regime



6

confidence-building measures that would defuse some of the military tensions that today cut across the DMZ” (Ver-shbow 2007).

Workshop participants shared varying interpretations of peace regime and peace regime building as well. Many of the participants agreed with some of their academic counterparts that a peace regime refers to a process and not just an outcome. One Korean participant argued that a “peace regime is something bigger than peace agree-ment. It should involve reconciliation among the parties and confidence-building measures among the parties.” An American participant concurred that a peace regime is a

“process, not just an end state, and that the process codi-fies mutual actions and it provides for the requisite confi-dence-building measures.”

Several participants focused on replacing the armi-stice with a permanent political settlement. An American government official commented that “The peace regime is a grouping of international agreements that specifical-ly constitute a framework for ending the Korean War and establishing an enduring peace on the peninsula.” Another participant agreed: “The Korean War Armistice Agreement should be replaced by a peace treaty with a final peaceful settlement as it is stipulated in the preamble of this agree-ment.” According to one Korean participant, the current South Korean administration views peace regime build-ing as a mechanism to replace the armistice. The partici-pant said, “The KPPR as we know it and we view it means a political and legal state where the Korean War has been officially terminated and where a permanent peace has replaced the current regime on the peninsula.”

Yet for one Korean participant, the armistice though outdated has provided a relative peace quite successfully. He explained, “I am living in Korea with the peace regime of the armistice agreement. Actually we maintain peace relatively well since 1953.” He sug-gested that a peace regime should build upon the armi-stice and focus on other issues that the armistice fails to deal with, such as the process of unification or con-federation. This might seem a bit like splitting hairs—whether or not the armistice is “replaced” or “built upon”—but it should at least prompt us to consider the specific day-to-day (and extraordinary) responsi-bilities of the current armistice infrastructure so that key duties are addressed and capabilities maintained

or enhanced. For the sake of security and peace, it is important to strike the right balance between build-ing confidence and maintaining deterrence.

There is also an overarching question of whether the KPPR ends up facilitating Korean reconciliation and unification, or in fact serves to solidify the divi-sion of Korea by allowing North Korea to strengthen its economy through more normalized external rela-tions while its leadership remains focused on main-taining internal control and trying to improve its abil-ity to dictate terms for future reunification. In other words, is a prerequisite for a KPPR essentially a North Korean political decision to seek unification on terms acceptable to the South, or can a KPPR be realized even if North Korea just wants to be left alone? As one participant put it, “The peace regime process should be seen as changing the game in North Korea, not locking it in place. That means it should lead to chang-es in Pyongyang…maybe not a change in regime, but changes in behavior, and changes in the way the re-gime operates.”

When one considers the various benchmarks or preconditions that would most likely comprise any peace regime process for the Korean Peninsula, ma-jor roadblocks will no doubt emerge during negotia-tions. For instance, the United States has made it clear that peace cannot occur without denuclearization, ef-fectively making denuclearization a precondition for normalization, peace with South Korea, or even legal-ly concluding the Korean War. For the North Koreans the sequence is reversed. One participant said it best:

“I can’t imagine a peace regime or any type of peace agreement being actualized before denuclearization. I also have never met a North Korean who could imag-ine denuclearization before there was a peace agree-ment or a peace treaty or some similar arrangement. Therein I think lies the rub and one of the reasons why we find this so difficult.” But there is much more to it than just the nuclear issue.

Washington and Seoul can begin by defining what they consider to be the conditions necessary for peace on the peninsula, each by itself, and as an alliance. As they do this, it is likely that they will end up describing a peace regime more as a destination than as a process. In oth-er words, the conditions acceptable to the allies are not



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something that North Korea is likely to agree to in advance, in such areas as verifiable denuclearization, reducing the forward-deployed nature of the DPRK forces along the DMZ, or scaling back the DPRK’s missile programs. Simi-larly, the allies are probably not yet ready to meet North Korea’s likely early conditions for shaping a peaceful envi-ronment, such as limiting US-ROK military exercises, cut-ting U.S. forces or military investment on the peninsula, avoiding any sanction or criticism of DPRK illicit activity or human rights violations, and many other possible con-ditions. A peace regime cannot be fully implemented until both sides are no longer suspicious or fearful. The regime itself does not alleviate suspicion or fear. A participant of-fered, “We’ll probably only be able to implement a peace regime when we don’t really need one anymore.”

If we choose to define a peace regime as a destination, then the final settlement should amount to a package deal addressing the outstanding issues plaguing negotiations and considering the demands and preferred timing for implementation by each party. A near simultaneous ex-change presents the best chance of success. One former U.S. official stated, “I look at a peace regime or peace ar-rangements as made up of different components. It’s not a single document. And I think it’s sort of a deal where noth-ing is agreed until everything is agreed on this. It’s got to be a package…if you don’t do that, you don’t have the pos-sibility of developing something that’ll hold.” By execut-ing such a complex diplomatic maneuver, one manages to satisfy the preferred timing of each party. The United States achieves denuclearization prior to normalization and the DPRK obtains normalization before denuclear-ization. This suggests a very long and drawn out negoti-ating process that focuses on building mutual confidence. To be successful, all sides must commit at some level to this process.

Viewing a KPPR as a far-off destination does not ab-solve the interested parties from their responsibility to work toward that goal, however indirectly or incremen-tally, even if they are convinced that no progress is pos-sible in the near term ( for example, because one consid-ers a counterpart’s ruling regime or administration to be completely hostile to its own core requirements). A poli-cy of throwing up one’s hands and claiming that nothing can be done is not an acceptable option for policy makers, even in the short term. Some productive work can always

be carried out, either in an alliance context, a trilateral ROK-U.S.-China context, or by engaging North Korea in the simplest of confidence-building measures related to armistice maintenance and armistice modernization. Of-ficial and unofficial dialogue on armistice and KPPR issues amongst the parties and the UN (and UN-related organiza-tions) will pay dividends in the future if we can begin to lay a baseline for common agreement on KPPR development. Some non-governmental interaction (e.g., medical assis-tance or education and cultural exchanges) might also be useful in the interim, to keep channels of communication open and to try to improve mutual understanding.

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula8

Participants echoed throughout the workshop the need for KPPR preparation, no matter how bleak the current chances are of reaching a final settlement with North Ko-rea. Negotiating with North Korea often resembles climbing a mountain, rather than a staircase. Climbing a staircase requires an incremental approach, maneuvering over pre-determined distances with each step building upon the pre-vious one. Climbing a mountain requires more creativity and entails added unpredictability, where a climber may take a shortcut one day but the long way around the next, make substantial progress one hour only to fall back the next, all the while experiencing moments of desperation and reaching many false peaks. Moreover, unlike climbing stairs, climbing a mountain requires preparation and logis-tical coordination. As one participant noted, “to support this long journey, we have to prepare, not only for the ini-tial stage, but also the desirable end state in the peace re-gime process.” By preparing, we better position ourselves to exploit any narrow window of opportunity that might open. Along these lines, several recurring themes surfaced over the course of the workshop.

First, Do No Harm: Armistice and OPCONMost participants credited the armistice arrangement with contributing to the relative peace that Korea has experi-enced over the last five decades. This has less to do with the piece of paper itself than with the spirit of the armistice and its infrastructure that helps to govern interaction between the two opposing forces and offers precedents for dispute resolution. The armistice has helped to control the number of violent clashes between the two sides over the years, but such incidents have occurred frequently nonetheless and

recently enough to warrant continued vigilance. These in-clude two DPRK assassination attempts of ROK president Park Chung-hee in 1968 and 1974, the Axe Murder Incident in the Joint Security Area (JSA) in 1976, and several clashes in the West Sea in the 1990s and in 2002, in which dozens were killed on both sides.3 In these and many other cases, components of the armistice infrastructure (or successor bodies) played important roles in preventing further es-calation and trying to devise new procedures to avoid fu-ture conflict.

The armistice created three commissions charged with implementing, monitoring, and maintaining the cease-fire. The first, the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), was made up of delegates from the UNC (UNCMAC) and the Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteers (KPA/CPV MAC). The UNCMAC delegation consisted of a U.S. two-star general leading the group of UN, South Ko-rean and British representatives. The KPA/CPV delegation consisted of one Chinese member and three North Kore-ans, also led by a two-star DPRK general. Between 1953 and 1991, the MAC held 459 meetings and thousands of engagements amongst lower-ranked delegations. In 1991, a South Korean general assumed the leadership role of the UNCMAC, which upset the North Koreans, who stopped attending certain MAC meetings. North Korea withdrew from the MAC in 1994, stating that it would not recognize the UNCMAC as a counterpart and prevented CPV staff

3 One North Korean infiltration of South Korean territory oc-curred in 1996, while the Four-Party Talks were taking place. Even though ROK officials were incensed and demanded a DPRK apolo-

gy, they also stressed the need to continue engagement in those talks. In fact, food aid, much of it from ROK charities and religious organi-zations, continued to flow to the North (Yonhap News Agency 1996).

Developing a Peace Regime



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officers from participating in certain MAC-related events (United Nations 1995). Eventually, in 1998, UNC-KPA gen-eral-officer (GO) talks replaced the MAC dialogue. The GO talks have a similar composition of delegates to that of the MAC, though the North Korean side lacks a Chinese member and the UNC side is not led by a ROK two-star general.

The second commission established by the armi-stice was the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC). The NNSC monitored both North and South Ko-rea for compliance with the terms of the armistice out-side of the DMZ. The NNSC also conducted investigations per the MAC’s request. However, the DPRK often proved uncooperative in such investigations, thus rendering the investigative arm of the NNSC largely irrelevant. The UNC and the KPA each nominated two of the members to this commission. The UNC nominated Sweden and Switzer-land while the KPA nominated Czechoslovakia and Po-land. In 1991 the KPA declared the NNSC irrelevant. Two years later the DPRK forced the Czech delegation to leave North Korea, and it then proceeded to evict the Polish del-egation in 1994. The NNSC continues to operate in sup-port of the terms of the armistice and enforcing the two main mechanisms responsible for maintaining the armi-stice, the MDL and the DMZ. The third commission estab-lished by the armistice was the Neutral Nations Repatria-tion Commission, which ceased functioning in 1954 after prisoners were exchanged.

As noted earlier, the UNC has faced some serious chal-lenges over the years, and the relationship among key ac-tors has evolved over time. The U.S. role was dominant early on. For example, U.S. forces took primary control af-ter the Axe Murder Incident in 1976, when two American officers were killed by North Koreans in the JSA as part of a small work detail to trim an obstructing tree. Eventually, the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) decided to return to the JSA to cut down the tree, and after much deliber-ation back in Washington, operation Paul Bunyan com-menced on August 21, 1976. This time the dispatched se-curity detail was backed by an infantry company in twenty helicopters and seven Cobra attack helicopters providing support overhead. B-52 bombers, fighter jets, and F-111s from the U.S. and ROK air forces were fueled and patrol-ling nearby. The aircraft carrier Midway also patrolled, ready to deploy assets if the need arose. Just before the

operation, the UNC used the MAC to notify the North Ko-reans of the impending mission, warning them not to in-terfere. After this show of force, the North Koreans stood down and agreed to a longstanding UNC proposal to di-vide the JSA at the MDL (Oberdorfer 2001).

Over the years, South Korea has taken increasing re-sponsibility for armistice maintenance and for crisis man-agement when conflict occurs. As noted above, a South Korean two-star general became the senior allied mem-ber of the MAC in 1991, and later direct North-South GO talks also occurred occasionally as a supplement to UNC-KPA GO talks. In 1994, South Korea assumed operational control (OPCON) of its armed forces in peacetime, and it took the lead in crisis management, for example, during the 1996 DPRK submarine infiltration incident, when ROK forces were in charge of the combined allied response. Af-ter a DPRK sub ran aground along the South Korean coast, ROK soldiers and police led the search for its crew, while twelve U.S. Kiowa helicopters equipped with infrared ra-dar joined the effort at the South’s request. U.S. forces also helped with communications and engaged in the search with the understanding that when the North Koreans were located, the South would greet them (Sullivan 1996).

Starting in 2004, as part of the USFK realignment pro-gram, South Korea began to take over a number of mis-sions directly associated with maintaining the armistice, and during the next five years ROK forces assumed the following missions historically performed by their U.S. partners: 1) security of the DMZ, 2) security and support at the JSA, 3) counter-fire task force headquarters com-mand and control, 4) air-to-ground range management, 5) rapid land mine emplacement, 6) maritime special op-erations forces interdiction, 6) close air support control-lers, 7) weather forecasting, 8) communication zone de-contamination, and 9) day and night search and rescue missions (Bell and Finley 2007).

In addition, the alliance is currently preparing to trans-fer wartime operational control of ROK forces from the CFC commander, a U.S. general, to the ROK military lead-ership, a change scheduled to take effect in 2012. OPCON transfer is an example of alliance modernization that will also affect peace regime building, so it must be taken into consideration by all concerned. In 2012, USFK will become U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), and together with ROK Joint Forces Command they will become “complementary,



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independent commands in a supporting-to-supported re-lationship” (Bell and Finley 2007). In other words, the ROK commander will indicate what U.S. support he needs, and KORCOM will be responsible for carrying out those activi-ties. KORCOM will be headquartered in Pyeongtaek, and the two commands will be linked through the Alliance Military Coordination Center (Zissis and Lee 2008). One workshop participant stressed that the “time to change” [the OPCON relationship] has arrived, but this process still leaves many questions as yet unanswered, not the least of which is what will be the practical role for the UNC and other armistice infrastructure going forward.

Some ROK politicians, former military officers, and defense analysts have been critical of the OPCON trans-fer initiative, concerned that it could weaken the ROK’s military ties with the United States and undermine de-terrence. A few are also wary of South Korea’s ability to adequately handle the job of command and control. U.S. confidence in the ROK’s capabilities, however, seems gen-uinely high, and the allies have been making investments and conducting a series of exercises to prepare for the 2012 milestone. An American workshop participant involved in the OPCON transfer process suggested that doubters visit Camp Humphreys, “and let’s show you all of the construc-tion that’s happening down there and all the improve-ments as we move south…If you see the investment being made by both sides of this military alliance, it’s clear that we’re there for the long haul.” Indeed, Camp Humphreys is expected to grow five-fold by 2012, eventually hosting over seventeen thousand troops and becoming one of America’s largest overseas bases (Baker 2007). Another U.S. workshop participant added, “The professionalism of the ROK military is on par with any force in the world. I fought side by side with them in Vietnam. And I have a great ap-preciation. And I am not the only general officer in the U.S. military that has that opinion, by far.”

This participant argued that the deterrence capability underwritten by the U.S. presence on the peninsula will not be lost as a result of this strategic change. Deterrence emanates from the strength of the alliance and not the ex-act number of U.S. warplanes that sit on a tarmac in South Korea. The overall opinion among American participants was that denuclearization constitutes a separate issue and need not affect the timing of OPCON transfer. “You can do the OPCON before you get the denuclearization,” said one

military officer, “because we have confidence that the de-terrence of the alliance will remain and the capability to respond is what makes that deterrence credible.”

Yet OPCON transfer has the potential to be an impor-tant factor in the KPPR debate. Discussions about armi-stice maintenance and improvement will increasingly be inter-Korean matters, and although this might not please Pyongyang, it is altogether appropriate and should facili-tate North-South coordination of expanding cross-border economic activity (such as rail and road links) and the maintenance of security. The evolution of the UNC will also be interesting to watch, as that body steps back into a sup-porting role, and under a KPPR it could eventually trans-form into a more neutral forum to assist with monitoring and dispute resolution (though it would probably have to undergo some change to accommodate likely DPRK res-ervations). If a KPPR dialogue is initiated in the near term, there must be effective communication and close coordi-nation between that process and the alliance effort to sup-port the armistice and execute OPCON transfer.

Basic Agreement as a FoundationMost workshop participants agreed that the 1991 Basic Agreement remains the most promising document in terms of establishing concrete measures and mechanisms to improve conditions for peace regime building, and this is probably still the case despite North Korea’s unilateral repudiation in January 2009 of all past inter-Korean po-litical and military accords. Many argued that the Basic Agreement could serve as the basis for a future political set-tlement. One Korean participant urged the new adminis-tration in Washington to “reconfirm the value of the Basic Agreement.” A second participant from the United States reiterated his Korean colleague’s point and said that even though the failure to implement the measures set forth by the Basic Agreement made it incapable of serving as the key political agreement to transition from the armi-stice, the agreement “does offer an internationally recog-nized, legally sufficient foundation upon which to build a peace regime.”

The Basic Agreement, as mentioned earlier, outlines several CBMs and other gestures to foster goodwill and build the trust necessary to make real progress on a KPPR. These go beyond mere pledges to refrain from aggression or interfering in each other’s internal affairs. The Basic Agreement authorized the establishment of a Korean



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joint military committee to oversee the implementation of CBMs including, among other measures, notification of troop movements, exchange of military personnel and information, phased and verifiable arms reductions, and direct telephone links. It also paved the way for various economic, social, and cultural exchanges, also managed by different joint committees.

The Basic Agreement is a template for improving in-ter-Korean relations and a way to help bring about the conditions necessary for peace. It is also something that Pyongyang consented to at one point in its history. “It is really necessary to think about the conditions that will enable a peace regime to establish real peace,” one par-ticipant said, “and it seems to me that as a starting point that begins with threat reduction. And that begins with the implementation of the basic agreements. I think this is absolutely fundamental as a starting point.” President Lee Myung-bak supports the idea of using the Basic Agree-ment as a foundation for peace regime building. In March 2008, Lee declared that previous agreements should act as a basis for making progress with North Korea and that the Basic Agreement outweighed any other in significance (Kang 2008).

Parties to a Peace RegimeAt first glance, identifying the so-called directly related par-ties to a KPPR seems quite obvious, namely the two Koreas, the United States, and China (given their central involve-ment in the Korean War and the precedent of the Four-Par-ty Talks). Scratch the surface, however, and some important differences of opinion, caveats, and qualifications begin to emerge. Fortunately for the U.S.-ROK alliance, there is unanimous agreement that a KPPR is first and foremost a Korean (that is, inter-Korean) initiative. Pyongyang pro-fesses to agree, judging from the language it has approved in North-South documents dating back to 1972. The first principle for reunification in the 1972 North-South Joint Communiqué, for example, is that it “should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference.” This point, conveyed with slightly different wording, has been reiterated in every important inter-Ko-rean agreement since.

DPRK leaders, however, seem to view ending the Ko-rean War and working toward unification as two separate activities, because in many ways they always saw them-selves as legitimately representing all of Korea and the war

as one of self-defense against the Americans (and their “traitorous puppet lackeys” in the South). Over the years, North Korea has persistently tried to isolate South Ko-rea at multilateral talks, and to seek direct bilateral ne-gotiations with the United States regarding a peace trea-ty. A Korean participant expressed his worry that at some point Washington might oblige Pyongyang, if only to try to move the diplomatic process along. “There is concern in Korea that in the end, it might just be the U.S. and the DPRK in the process,” he said, “and this would perhaps unintentionally accept the longstanding North Korean ar-gument that Washington and Pyongyang were the major players, or parties of the Korean War.” The participant con-tinued, “Doing so would also mistake Washington support for the North Korean logic that the U.S. initiated the Kore-an War, and recognize North Korea as the only legitimate political entity on the Korean Peninsula.”

Participants offered four major reasons behind North Korea’s strategy to engage directly with the Americans for ending the war. First, North Korea views the United States, not South Korea, as the central obstacle to peace, sym-bolized by the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. An American official pointed out that “the main reason the North Koreans participated in the Four-Party Talks was because the U.S. agreed that one agenda item could be the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula and establishment of a separate peace treaty between the U.S. and North Korea.” Second, Pyongyang sees peace with the United States as a more effective guarantor of regime survival. One participant observed, “The North wants to preserve its regime by changing the situation from an ar-mistice to a peace regime, not with South Korea, but with the United States. That’s the only way of regime survival in their mindset.” Third, North Korea suggests that tech-nically speaking, South Korea should not participate in peace regime building, since only the UNC commander, a Chinese representative, and a North Korean represen-tative signed the armistice. If a peace regime intends to replace the armistice, North Korea argues, only the signa-tories of the armistice should sit as parties to a peace re-gime. Fourth, North Korea seeks to buttress its belief that Pyongyang is the sole legitimate leadership in Korea.

U.S. officials, however, have consistently supported the idea that South Korea should be a party to any agree-ment involving resolution of the war. They often counter



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North Korea’s arguments by pointing out that the United States was not a signatory to the armistice either; rather, it was the UNC commander who signed on behalf of all UNC members (including the Republic of Korea). More-over, when the armistice was signed, the KPA and CPV commanders made a point of confirming this fact, be-cause they wanted to make sure that ROK forces would be required to abide by the terms of the agreement (Unit-ed Nations 1995, 6). So, if North Korea and China were sat-isfied in 1953 that the armistice was binding on ROK forc-es, they cannot now claim that Seoul was never a party to that agreement.

ROK leaders have made some progress over the years making their argument that Seoul will be a key player in KPPR dialogue and that it should be a party to ending the war. One participant answered fears concerning the ROK’s potential isolation by stating, “A peace regime must, at its core, have a Korean agreement and be seen by others as a Korean solution.” Since the introduction of the term

“peace regime” in the Six-Party Talks in 2005, Seoul and Pyongyang did manage to agree that the there were “three or four parties directly concerned,” when President Roh Moo-hyun met with Kim Jong-il in October 2007. The three they referred to were apparently the two Koreas plus the United States, and China might be the fourth. But given the vagueness of what KPPR actually means, this still does not clarify that the North would accept South Korea as a signatory to a formal peace treaty to end the war. Pyong-yang instead might view a KPPR as a collection of agree-ments and arrangements, including a U.S.-DPRK peace treaty.

Another reason why North Korea might be reluctant to include the South in formal peace treaty talks is because of all the potential claims this could open up from Seoul. For example, a Korean participant listed a few points ( from a ROK perspective) not often mentioned during dis-cussions of peace regime. He said, “First, we need to hold war criminals accountable in the historic context. Sec-ond, there has to be some discussion of reparations for the damages incurred during the Korean War.” There are also many in the South who believe that the North is still holding hundreds, if not thousands, of prisoners of war in their country. The North makes similar claims against the South. Getting into these disputes would open up a large number of intractable issues that could easily derail peace

talks before they ever got started. Koreans are going to have to think hard about whether or not they are willing (and able) to formally end the war without solving these problems. There might be a way to end the war and estab-lish a joint committee to explore and resolve these claims as part of peace regime building, but one must also be careful not to sweep too much under the rug in the early stages, lest the peace collapse and confidence be further undermined for the future.

Even though a key component of peace regime build-ing is a sincere inter-Korean dialogue, which appears quite elusive in the near term, tension between the two has sometimes facilitated an inter-Korean effort to insti-tute certain threat reduction measures without the assis-tance of the international community. The mechanisms may prove imperfect yet they demonstrate a capacity for the two states to work bilaterally.

For example, following a series of skirmishes over fish-ing areas in the West Sea that peaked in 1997 and 1999, North and South Korea initiated working-level engage-ments in 2001 to find a diplomatic solution to the fishing controversy and other maritime issues surrounding the disputed NLL. The effort accelerated after the 2002 naval clash that left dozens of sailors killed or injured. Finally, following a general-level military meeting in 2004, the two sides signed the Inter-Korean Maritime Agreement and Subsequent Exchange on June 14, 2004. The agreement encouraged the establishment of a military hotline, along with the use of the same radio frequencies so as to avoid future miscommunication, as well as to stop propagan-da along the DMZ (Sang-min 2004). The 2004 agreement served as a foundation from which the two sides contin-ued to issue further threat reduction measures in the mar-itime domain.

Workshop participants also considered the inclusion of China as a party to KPPR negotiations. China, a region-al power and growing force on the international stage, chairs the Six-Party Talks and is North Korea’s largest trading partner and benefactor. Participants unanimous-ly agreed that China should be included in KPPR discus-sions and that in many ways the United States and China could act as endorsers or guarantors of what would pri-marily be an inter-Korean agreement. A few roles for the United States and China in the KPPR might mirror each other, perhaps including some involvement in dispute



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resolution, in which case Washington would need to coor-dinate its objectives and modalities with Beijing. One par-ticipant offered, “At the end of the day, the key track that emerges is between the U.S. and China. Because whatever we want to do on the Korean Peninsula, the management of the U.S.-China relationship will be the key pillar, and we have to plan in advance.”

The main area where Chinese and American involve-ment is qualitatively different, of course, is the fact that U.S. troops are forward deployed on ROK soil and oper-ate in a joint command (and there are no Chinese forces in North Korea), and it seems that this point was instru-mental behind the mention of “three or four parties” at the second inter-Korean summit. The suggestion is that there are some military CBM issues that only need to be discussed amongst the two Koreas and the United States, since only their troops would be involved. It remains to be seen whether or not Pyongyang’s distinction of “three or four” also applies to other potential components of a KPPR.

In addition to individual states, the United Nations is also a directly related party to some degree, and its in-volvement could prove useful when the other parties seek international legitimacy and external support in the form of monitoring and development assistance. The UN au-thorization for the UNC is still in force, and the UNC will still exist even after the transfer of operational control in 2012. UN members that still maintain a liaison (or stron-ger) presence in the UNC include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Columbia, Thailand, Philippines, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, and Norway. An American offi-cial commented, “I would argue that while a UN role spe-cifically is not required, either legally or practically, it is likely prudent nonetheless in order to ensure internation-al legitimacy of this process.” Yet despite the UN’s lack of direct involvement, a participant from the United Nations explained that although the UN would welcome an oppor-tunity to be part of a solution to the Korean dilemma, it does not necessarily see a need for it as an institution to take the lead or get directly involved at this time. The UN considers the North Korean nuclear issue and peace re-gime building as a contained issue already being handled by responsible parties in a multilateral fashion. Time will tell if this assessment continues.

Five TracksAs participants considered the potential contours of a peace regime, they identified five principal tracks as core el-ements of any process to develop a viable peace regime:

As discussed, the inter-Korean dialogue re-1. mains the central focus of any peace regime. The ROK-DPRK track addresses the need for a Korean solution to a Korean problem. An in-ter-Korean agreement to build a peace re-gime is a prerequisite for KPPR development.The United States will also play a key role in peace 2. regime building, in part because of its commit-ments to the U.S.-ROK alliance and in part be-cause of North Korea’s desire for normalized bi-lateral relations with Washington. The United States, through a U.S.-DPRK track within a wider framework, can offer North Korea several impor-tant diplomatic carrots that may help convince North Korea to pursue denuclearization and feel more comfortable compromising with the South.In addition to these two bilateral tracks, a quad-3. rilateral track reminiscent of the Four-Party Talks will be critical, since it is this group that will most likely be responsible for formally ending the armi-stice and endorsing the successor arrangement.Fourth, a wider and looser track consisting of 4. other parties such as Russia and Japan, and per-haps multilateral or intergovernmental institu-tions, in order to ensure that a peace regime ac-counts for their interests and to harness any support they can provide for the process. Those involved in building a KPPR should also exam-ine the possibility of using or creating intergov-ernmental institutions based upon the various European models, allowing for the creation, if needed, of additional mechanisms for regional support for a peace regime. The Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism envisioned in the Six-Party Talks is related to this broad track.Fifth, any peace regime arrangement must in-5. clude complete and verifiable denuclearization. This is, in essence, the main Six-Party track. In fact, some qualify denuclearization as an entirely sep-arate process, even if it remains in reality a com-ponent of a final peace regime. As one participant



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familiar with current South Korean thinking as it relates to the new U.S. administration’s diplomat-ic strategies towards the North said, “An impor-tant strategy of the [South] Korean government is to create a new peace structure, what we call structure, on the Korean Peninsula. This structure can be based on two pillars, first, the denuclear-ization of North Korea, and the second is the es-tablishment of a peace regime on the Peninsula.”

The Six-Party/KPPR LinkageEver since North Korea stepped up its nuclear program in the 1980s, U.S. policy has been to make denuclearization a sine qua non of any discussion about formally ending the Korean War. For U.S. policy makers, it is a fundamental component of the “conditions necessary for peace.” One participant with extensive government experience noted,

“It was also clear to us, at least on the U.S. side participating in the Four-Party Talks, that a resolution of the nuclear is-sue was absolutely fundamental if we were going to make any progress on the peace regime. That was clear going in. It was even clearer coming out of those talks.” Later, Pres-ident Bush stated in September 2007, “We look forward to the day when we can end the Korean War. That will hap-pen when Kim Jong-il verifiably gets rid of his weapons pro-grams and his weapons” (Chosun Ilbo 2007).

Much to the chagrin of allied negotiators, North Ko-rea continuously interweaves denuclearization with U.S. troop withdrawal from the peninsula. One participant shared his experiences discussing denuclearization with a North Korean counterpart:

And here, I want to come back to the point that was made earlier about U.S. troops on the Peninsula. Because in this discussion with the North Koreans, my interlocutor kept using the phrase “the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as the goal, the goal that North Korea has. And he repeated that phrase over and over again. And finally I interrupted him. And I asked him what he meant by that phrase. I said, “The ROK does not have nucle-ar weapons. The United States does not have nuclear weapons on the Peninsula. You are the only party,” I asserted, “…that has an evident nuclear capability on the Peninsula. What do you mean by the complete denuclearization of

the Korean Peninsula?” And then he respond-ed by saying, “We mean the elimination of the threat.” And I said, “Define that, if you would.” And his response was, “The threat posed by U.S. troops on the Peninsula and your alliance with the ROK.” And I said, “Is this what you mean by the end state that you seek in these current discussions with the United States and in the six-party talks?” And he looked at me and he said, “Yes.”

Such differing perspectives on denuclearization and the varying expectations of what denuclearization would entail cloud the peace regime building process by mak-ing denuclearization an endless cycle of trying to build a bridge that is too short to reach both sides.

Mention of peace regime building entered the Six-Party Talks slowly but surely. The Chinese delegation proposed a draft of a joint statement in 2005 that included language referring to a final peace settlement, and experts specu-lated that the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China would meet in follow-up engagements follow-ing the Six-Party Talks to discuss a final peace settlement ( Jin 2005). The result was the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement, which formally introduced the term ‘peace regime’ to the denuclearization negotiation, though the statement stipulated that reaching a peace regime would constitute a separate track from the Six-Party Talks. The South Korean offer, made in 2005, of an economic and se-curity package in return for nuclear dismantlement was a step toward recognizing that denuclearization required a comprehensive approach. And with the mention of peace regime in what was otherwise a denuclearization negotia-tion, the linkage between denuclearization and peace re-gime was established, creating a precedent that now ap-pears hard to break.

Several workshop participants reminded the group of the dangers of linking denuclearization and peace re-gime building, pointing out that the initial intention was to keep the two tracks separate. One participant warned that by including peace regime building, North Korea can continue to delay denuclearization in the name of peace regime building. The participant also cautioned the more enthusiastic participants against hastily pursuing a peace regime because doing so risks placing greater emphasis on peace rather than denuclearization, which remains the



15

core issue and the main obstacle to peace from a U.S. (and oftentimes a ROK) perspective.

The wariness associated with linking denuclearization to peace regime building stems from what several partici-pants viewed as a growing false sense of security in South Korea vis-à-vis the North. The participants who remained more skeptical of North Korea’s intentions and prospects for a peace regime wanted to make sure that a KPPR will protect South Korean security concerns and U.S. interests. One participant offered a historical analogy by claiming,

“We should not conduct a discussion about a peace agree-ment in public in a way that contributes to the psycho-logical disarmament of the Republic of Korea, which was already well advanced by the June 2000 summit. We must be very careful about avoiding a false peace, which would not serve the purposes of the alliance any better than the simulacrum of peace achieved in 421 B.C. served the inter-ests of Athens.” A Korean participant agreed: “So any uni-lateral moves toward North Korea or bilateral discussions should be very careful that these movements do not cre-ate a false sense of security in our society.” The participant advised not to underestimate the military threat posed by the North or to diminish the importance of the U.S. mili-tary presence in South Korea.

As mentioned earlier in this report, a comprehensive package deal where all of the pieces of the Korean puzzle fall together nearly simultaneously is the approach that seems the most likely to work, given the alternative, large-ly improbable scenarios. Denuclearization and the peace regime remain interwoven, and what emerges is an inter-play of agendas and national interests that coincide with a desired outcome. In such a scenario, the parties resemble a gang of prisoners chained at the ankle, only able to make progress toward their goals in small, coordinated steps. So if the two principal aims, as the South Korean govern-ment’s peace structure stipulates, are denuclearization and a peace regime, the negotiating parties should pur-sue parallel tracks of negotiation and try to make progress on each track. Progress on one track does not have to de-pend on the progress of the other, yet a conclusion to one track remains dependent on concluding the other. They must cross the finish line together.

Timing and TriggersMany participants recalled the rather fast-paced process of reunifying Germany in the years leading up to the end

of the Cold War as an example of a successful peaceful rec-onciliation of a divided people, separated by history, ide-ology, years of hostility, and a physical wall. Admirers of the German model also noted how success was predicat-ed on bilateral and multilateral cooperation prior to actu-al reunification. For instance, the “two-plus-four” treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by East and West Germany, the Soviet Union, France, the United States, and the Unit-ed Kingdom, outlined the necessary conditions for a peace-ful transition to a reunified, sovereign Germany. The treaty, which resulted from months of negotiation, addressed is-sues relating to security, border definition, sovereignty, nu-clear power status, withdrawal of Soviet military forces, other troop reductions and limits, and a vision of a future reunited Germany.

Some participants looked beyond multilateral prepa-ration and the apparent success of German reunification, arguing that the real force behind the change lay with a se-quence of historical events that radically altered the geo-political reality in such a fundamental way that change was inevitable. Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and pere-stroika programs in the 1980s led to greater economic and political liberalization. Then, as the Soviet Union’s decay became apparent, East Germany and other Eastern Euro-pean countries under Moscow’s yoke began to seriously explore the prospects for independence. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and East Germany held its first free elections on March 18, 1990, fulfilling one of the preconditions for reunification talks. In the end, it was East Germany’s de-sire to reject communism and merge with the West that brought about reunification. Furthermore, the road to German reunification became clear once the breakdown of the East-West world order and the demise of the com-munist bloc had reached the point of no return. The mo-mentum building towards reunification, which included multilateral collaboration, occurred within a sequence of historical events that forced a set of circumstances on the actors, and not in a vacuum in which it was incumbent on the actors to change the fundamental environment. International and regional preparation, albeit important, only eased an otherwise foreseeable, if not unavoidable, outcome.

To some, the case of German reunification is not ap-plicable to peace regime building as long as the current North Korean regime remains in power. Assuming no



16

sequence of events that produces a tectonic shift on the peninsula, North Korea will not permit an environment that promotes true reconciliation, let alone a peace re-gime. A U.S. government official participating in the work-shop advised that North Korea, aware of what happened in Germany, would seek to avoid any negotiation that re-sembles the German example and integration of the East into the West. The participant stated that this is simply

“not where the North Korean regime wants to go.” One par-ticipant declared that throughout its history Pyongyang never truly revealed signs of interest in reconciliation with Seoul or Washington on anybody’s terms other than its own. North Korea seeks to maintain its nuclear capabil-ity and resists integrating with South Korea, not to men-tion continuing to threaten its southern neighbor and the United States. Therefore peace regime building without a change in regime, or a significant change in behavior, seems elusive.

Another participant warned that some policy makers in Seoul and Washington, eager to believe that North Ko-rea has changed its tune, have in the past misinterpreted North Korean signals, thus creating a dangerous environ-ment for a potentially ill-prepared and delusional alliance. For example, during an interview in October 1972 with several North Korean publications and some Japanese newspapers, Kim Il-sung discussed the 1972 North-South Joint Communiqué. According to the participant familiar with the articles, Kim Il-Sung “said that by independent unification he meant no more U.S. role on the peninsu-la. By peaceful, he meant stop military modernization in the south. And by Grand National Unity, he meant scope for pro-North Korean operatives to be active in the South.” The participant proceeded to offer a more recent example.

“Following the heralded visit by Jo Myong Rok on October 12, 2000, to Washington, D.C.,” he said, “Kim Jong-il ad-dressed a military cadre and explained that international agreements, such as the Berlin-Moscow Agreement of 1939 and the Moscow-Tokyo Agreement of 1940 only serve as temporary instruments designed to sustain a stalemate until one side attains the strength to overtake the other.”

Although some might believe that peace regime build-ing will require regime change in Pyongyang, Washing-ton’s policy is to refrain from trying to facilitate or pro-mote such a change. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice echoed previous White House statements to that effect

when responding to a direct question on regime change during a State Department briefing in 2006 (U.S. Depart-ment of State 2006). Workshop participants highlighted a perceived shift in U.S. policy that leans toward accom-modating the North Korean regime in power. One partici-pant noted, “I think that at least prior to the 2000 summit between the North and the South, ‘peace’ meant peace-ful reunification. I think after the summit, ‘peace’ became peaceful coexistence. And we’re probably defining peace more now I think in the coexistence frame than we are in the reunification frame.”

Still, as one participant noted, “Even if we believe that a peace regime is not possible without the collapse of the North Korean political system, this can’t be our only poli-cy approach, that is, to simply wait for North Korea to col-lapse or some kind of external change.” The United States should work proactively with its allies and regional part-ners in the region to envision a framework for building a KPPR, which in turn may help improve the conditions for peace regime building and denuclearization. Even negoti-ating with the North Korean regime in its current form can be beneficial in terms of keeping open lines of communi-cation and sustaining the dialogue, which might yield at least smoother implementation of the armistice arrange-ments. Perhaps if North Korea came to believe that the survivability of its regime would not be at stake in a peace regime, it might enter negotiations with some flexibility. One participant familiar with past negotiations stated, “It might be useful, at least if the North is willing to do this, to start negotiating [a KPPR]. My view is, we should have started negotiating it yesterday, for one particular reason…and that is, to give the North a sense that we are willing to live with them.”

North Korea has a terrible human rights record and has engaged in terrorism, kidnappings of foreign nation-als, counterfeiting, drug trafficking, and weapons prolif-eration. The United States has difficulty turning its back on such transgressions and working with a regime that commits acts of this kind, yet history has demonstrated that the United States is at times able to work with unpal-atable governments in order to achieve broader aims. The reversal of Libya’s nuclear program and the restoration of Libya-U.S. diplomatic relations is one example. It is im-portant to remember, however, that there was no “South Libya” in that case that was a steadfast and trusted ally



17

of the United States. Washington cannot simply hold its nose and reach out its hand to North Korea without care-fully considering the impact in Seoul. Thus, the inter-Ko-rean track is paramount.

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula18

As we move forward and begin to understand what char-acterizes a peace regime and how best to approach peace regime building, we must also examine the endeavor from the perspective of the U.S.-ROK alliance, along with look-ing closely at other regional considerations. History dem-onstrates that improperly coordinated diplomacy frustrates any hope of negotiating with North Korea effectively and satisfactorily from an alliance standpoint.

For years North Korea has pursued a negotiating strat-egy of trying to split and weaken the alliance by moving each bilateral dialogue forward at different speeds. The overarching feature of North Korean diplomacy remains its attempt to isolate South Korea by repeatedly probing the United States to test Washington’s receptiveness to bilateral negotiations. When the United States displays a willingness to explore the possibility of conducting bilat-eral talks with North Korea, South Korea begins to fear isolation or abandonment. Many South Korean experts worry that North Korea may in fact manage to manipu-late the United States into engaging in a bilateral track to the detriment of the alliance and South Korean national interests. A participant warned, “The end result would be a North Korean victory in political, ideological, psycho-logical warfare and political embarrassment for our gov-ernment and the South Korean people. It would also lead to the decline of the U.S.-ROK alliance and ultimately may lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the peninsula. Maybe that is the end result of such a U.S.-DPRK peace re-gime building process.”

The alliance must approach negotiations with a clear, mutual understanding of national and alliance interests,

short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, other regional influences such as China and the U.S.-Japan alliance, and diplomatic strategies. One participant remarked, “I be-lieve it is essential for our two countries to closely coop-erate as allies throughout the whole process of relevant negotiations.” Only a unified and coordinated diplomatic front can thwart and deter North Korean efforts to desta-bilize the alliance and derail multilateral negotiations.

The alliance can begin the process of coordinating its diplomatic strategies by first clarifying certain points that may help improve conditions on the ground and guide fu-ture negotiations, such as the outlook for continued U.S. military presence on the peninsula and the importance of achieving denuclearization. A participant stressed the importance of gaining a “common understanding on pro-spective agendas including measures to reduce military tensions and the relationship between the KPPR and the U.S.-ROK relationship.”

Participants offered their opinions about how the Unit-ed States and South Korea could improve the coordination of negotiating strategies and maintain lines of communi-cation. One participant highlighted the appeal of the good-cop-bad-cop scenario in which one country offers carrots while the other threatens to use sticks of some kind, thus

“maximizing incentives.” In reality, this scenario has not al-ways played out well. A Korean participant recalled his experience trying to execute the good-cop-bad-cop tactic with the Bush administration. At the time, U.S. officials urged their ROK counterparts to play the bad cop, in or-der to make U.S. “carrot” offers look more attractive. Seoul pondered this, only to find out in subsequent discussions

The U.S.-ROK Alliance Factor and Regional Considerations



19

with others in the administration that the U.S. commit-ment to providing carrots was tenuous at best. The par-ticipant lamented, “How could I guarantee that my side would be a bad and tough cop, when the other side can-not be counted on to be a reliably good cop?”

An American participant recalled that U.S. and ROK negotiators have often undermined each other by not properly coordinating their carrot-and-stick approach in their negotiations with North Korea. The participant recommended that the Obama administration create a role within the U.S. government similar to that of William Perry’s position as a policy coordinator and presidential envoy during the Clinton administration. President Clin-ton charged Perry with coordinating the U.S. incentives and disincentives with those that the ROK and Japan em-ployed during negotiations. In fact, Obama did eventually appoint former U.S. ambassador to South Korea Stephen Bosworth to be his special representative for North Korea policy, though the extent to which he is the overall coor-dinator is not yet clear, as some other key Obama officials are still awaiting confirmation.

A Korean participant echoed calls for coordination and remarked that the United States and South Korea, even trilaterally with China, should begin to prioritize ob-jectives, agree upon future steps, and identify the timing and sequencing of events. He suggested that a commit-ted Track 2 channel may best fulfill the need to initiate such coordination. The participant said, “And such com-mon ground should be further expanded through quiet, but substantive discussions like this very forum.”

Although the alliance needs to better coordinate its strategies vis-à-vis North Korea and appear united in its effort to denuclearize the peninsula and build a peace regime, South Korea must ultimately lead peace regime building. Despite the many layers of the Korean dilemma, the inter-Korean relationship remains the core issue, and ultimately a peace regime must emerge from an inter-Ko-rean dialogue. A participant said, “Regardless of how you define peace regime, the South Koreans have to take the lead.” Yet the possibility of North Korea accepting South Korea as a major, if not the main, player in this conversa-tion appears to have grown more distant in the past year. The participant added, “And the prospects of North Ko-rea cooperating with the South in that regard, at least to-day, seem fairly slim.” In order for peace regime building to

progress, North Korea must recognize that the road to rec-onciliation and normalization runs through Seoul and not exclusively through Washington. North Korea cannot con-tinue to insist on pursuing alternative negotiations bilat-erally with the United States at the expense of the multi-lateral process and bilaterally with South Korea

The alliance must also consider other regional influ-ences and partners as it develops a coordinated strategy to pursue peace regime building. The process of includ-ing multiple regional actors is further complicated by con-sidering the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and Ja-pan’s legitimate interests in the resolution of the Korean War and the outcome of peace regime building. Japan’s grievances against North Korea include the whereabouts of Japanese abductees and the threat of a nuclear North Korea armed with ballistic missiles capable of reaching Japanese shores. Aside from Japan’s disagreements and fears regarding North Korea, Japan could play an impor-tant role in the process. One participant recommended approaching Japan first and then China. He said, “The next step should be to involve Japan in the trilateral mech-anism. That way we can increase our package of incen-tives and disincentives. And then we have to go to China to explain our plan, so that they are also onboard. The se-quence of consultation is very important.”

In conclusion, U.S. policy makers should review care-fully the sorted history of Korean peace efforts before con-sidering substantive bilateral negotiations with the North, even if those talks occur ostensibly within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. Although our peace regime build-ing project is only at the midway point, it is already clear that Korean history, peace making, and denuclearization are all tightly intertwined, and Washington must under-stand how gestures in one area might impact inter-Kore-an relations and the U.S.-ROK alliance more generally. The best way to do this is to work closely with Seoul to com-bine historic review with forward looking policy making in a way that takes into consideration these interconnec-tions, and with other key regional players they can begin to chart a practical course for peace regime development. These are the next objectives for IFPA and its partners in this project. Ultimately, neither the alliance nor North Ko-rea can determine on its own what constitutes the condi-tions necessary for peace or how to achieve them. This can only be accomplished through dialogue involving all



20

three nations (and including China), and it will no doubt be a long journey. Before we take the next step, let us take stock together of where we’ve been, and where we think we ought to go.

Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula App:1

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Appendix AReferences



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———. 2009a. North Korea says nucle-ar war only matter of time. April 17.

———. 2009b. Pro-North Korea newspaper urg-es U.S. to open two-way talks. May 26.

———. 2009c. North Korea scraps agreement on sea border with South Korea. January 30.

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CBM confidence-building measure

CPV Chinese People’s Volunteer Army

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

EAF East Asia Foundation (ROK)

GO general officer

GSIS Graduate School of International Studies of Yonsei University (ROK)

IFANS Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security (ROK)

IFPA Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (U.S.)

JNCC joint nuclear control commission (DPRK-ROK)

JSA Joint Security Area

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

KORCOM U.S. Korea Command (to be established in 2012)

KPA Korean People’s Army

KPA/CPV MAC Korean People’s Army/Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Military Armistice Commission

KPPR Korean Peninsula peace regime

MAC Military Armistice Commission

MDL military demarcation line

NLL Northern Limit Line

NNSC Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee

NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

OPCON operational control

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

UEP uranium enrichment program

UN United Nations

UNC United Nations Command

UNCMAC United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission

USFK U.S. Forces Korea

USIP U.S. Institute for Peace

Appendix BAbbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms

Peace Regime Building on the Korean PeninsulaApp:4

Date Title Parties Highlights

7/27/1953 The Korean War Armistice Agreement

Chinese People’s VolunteersKorean People’s ArmyUnited Nations Command

Codified the ceasefireEstablished 38th parallel as Military Demarcation LineInstituted special commissions to oversee terms

7/4/1972 North-South Joint Communiqué

North KoreaSouth Korea

The first official joint statement agreeing to principles of independent and peaceful reconciliation

12/13/1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchang-es and Cooperation between the South and the North (Basic Agreement)


Created foundation for future discussions regarding peaceful reconciliationDetailed several CBMs

1/20/1992 Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula


Agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weaponsAgreed not to possess uranium enrichment facilities

6/11/1993 Joint Statement of the DPRK and the United States

North KoreaUnited States

Recognized each country’s sovereigntyPledged non-interference in domestic affairs

10/21/1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK

North KoreaUnited States

First official mention of moving toward “full normalization” of U.S.-DPRK relationsU.S. assurances against the threat or use of nukes against the North

6/15/2000 South-NorthJoint Statement


Sought common ground between the South’s concept of confederation and the North’s formula for loose federationPromoted balanced development of the national economy

9/19/2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks

ChinaJapanNorth KoreaRussiaSouth KoreaUnited States

DPRK committed to abandoning nuclear weapons and programs, and U.S. affirmed no-attack pledgeAgreed that the “directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.”

11/17/2005 Joint Declaration on the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula

South KoreaUnited States

The “two leaders shared a common understanding that the process of re-solving the North Korean nuclear issue will provide an important basis to build a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.”

2/13/2007 The Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement

ChinaJapanNorth KoreaRussiaSouth KoreaUnited States

Established five working groups to deal with core issues including U.S.-DPRK normalization and NE Asian regional securityReiterated plan for directly related parties to negotiate a KPPR

10/4/2007 Declaration on the Advance-ment of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity


Reaffirmed principles in the June 15 Joint DeclarationRecognized the need to end the armistice and build a permanent peace regimeAgreed to work together to have the “leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned” to declare an end to the war

Appendix CTr ail of Documents Related to Korean Peace Regime Development


Adopted at the third-day session of the fifth north-south high-level talks in Seoul on December 13, 1991

Pursuant to the will of all the fellow countrymen desirous of the peaceful reunification of the divided country, reaffirm-ing the three principles of national reunification laid down in the July 4th North-South Joint Statement;Pledging themselves to remove the political and military confrontation for the achievement of national reconcilia-tion, for the prevention of invasion and conflicts by the armed forces, for the realization of detente and for the guar-antee of peace;To realize many-sized cooperation and exchange for the promotion of the common interests and prosperity of the na-tion; andTo make concerted efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, admitting that the relationship between the sides is not the one between countries but a special one formed temporarily in the process of advancing towards reunification, the north and the south have agreed as follows:

1. North-South ReconciliationArticle 1. The north and the south shall recognize and respect the system that exists on the other side.Article 2. The north and the south shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side.Article 3. The north and the south shall cease to abuse and slander the other side.Article 4. The north and the south shall refrain from all acts aimed at destroying and overthrowing the other side.Article 5. The north and the south shall make concerted efforts to convert the present armistice into a durable peace between the north and the south and observe the present Military Armistice Agreement until such peace has been achieved.Article 6. The north and the south shall discontinue confrontation and competition, cooperate with each other and make concerted efforts for national dignity and interests in the international arena.Article 7. The north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south liaison office at Panmunjom within three months after the effectuation of this agreement in order to ensure close contacts and prompt consultation with each other.Article 8. The north and the south shall form a north-south political subcommittee within the framework of the full-dress talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement in order to discuss concrete measures for implement-ing and observing the agreement on north-south reconciliation.

2. North-South NonaggressionArticle 9. The north and the south shall not use arms against the other side, nor shall they invade the other by force of arms.Article 10. The north and the south shall settle differences and disputes between them peacefully through dialogue and negotiation.

Appendix DNorth-South Joint Agreement on Reconciliation,

Nonaggression, and Cooper ation and Exchange (Basic Agreement), 1991



App:6

Article 11. The north and the south shall designate as the demarcation line and zone of nonaggression the Military Demarcation Line which was laid down in the agreement on the military armistice dated July 27, 1953 and the area which has so far been within the jurisdiction of the sides.Article 12. In order to implement and guarantee nonag-gression the north and the south shall set up and operate a north-south joint military committee within three months after the effectuation of this agreement.The north-south joint military committee shall discuss and promote the realization of military confidence-building and disarmament, such as notification of and control over the transfer of large units and military exercises, use of the Demilitarized Zone for peaceful purposes, exchange of mil-itary personnel and information, the realization of phased arms cutdown including the removal of mass destruction weapons and offensive capability and their verification.Article 13. The north and the south shall install and oper-ate direct telephone links between the military authorities of the sides in order to prevent the outbreak and escala-tion of accidental armed conflicts.Article 14. The north and the south shall form a north-south military sub-committee within the framework of the full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of this agreement and discuss concrete measures for the imple-mentation and observance of the agreement on nonaggres-sion and the removal of military confrontation.

3. North-South Cooperation and ExchangeArticle 15. The north and the south shall effect economic cooperation and exchange, such as joint development of re-sources and the exchange of goods in the form of exchange within the nation and joint investment for the coordinated and balanced development of the national economy and for the promotion of the well-being of the whole nation.Article 16. The north and the south shall effect coopera-tion and exchange in various fields, such as science, tech-nology, education, literature and art, public health, sports, environment and mass media including newspapers, ra-dio, TV and publications.Article 17. The north and the south shall effect free trav-els and contacts between members of the nation.Article 18. The north and the south shall effect free cor-respondence, travels, meetings and visits between the sep-arated families and relatives and their reunion based on

their free will and take measures regarding other problems awaiting humanitarian solution.Article 19. The north and the south shall connect severed railways and roads and open sea and air routes.Article 20. The north and the south shall install and connect the facilities necessary for the exchange of post and telecommunication and ensure secrecy in this sphere of exchange.Article 21. The north and the south shall cooperate with each other in economic, cultural and many other fields in the international arena and jointly conduct external activities.Article 22. For the implementation of the agreement on effecting cooperation and exchange in various fields, such as economy and culture, the north and the south shall form a north-south joint economic cooperation and exchange committee and other departmental joint committees with-in three months after the effectuation of this agreement.Article 23. In order to discuss concrete measures for the implementation and observance of the agreement on co-operation and exchange between the north and the south, the two parts shall establish a north-south cooperation and exchange subcommittee within the framework of the full-dressed talks in one month after the effectuation of the agreement.

4. Amendments and EffectuationArticle 24. This agreement can be amended and supple-mented by mutual consent.Article 25. This agreement shall become effective as from the date when the north and the south exchange its text after they go through necessary formalities.

Inked December 13, 1991 by,Yon Hyong MukPremier, DPRK Administration Council, Head of the north side’s chief delegate of the delegation to the N-S high-level talks

Chong Won SikPrime Minister, ROK Chief delegate of the south side’s delegation to the S-N high-level talks