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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
RAYMOND JAMES FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
Case No. SCI 1-2513
Lower Case No. 2D10-2144,
07-0080-CA
BARBARA J. PHILLIPS, etc., et al,
Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
On appeal from the District Court of Appeal, Second District of Florida
George L. Guerra, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 005762
Dominique E. Heller, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 044135
WIAND GUERRA KING P.L.
3000 Bayport Drive, Suite 600
Tampa, FL 33607
Telephone: (813)347-5100
Facsimile: (813) 347-5152
Hala Sandridge, Esquire
Florida Bar No. 0454362
FOWLER WHITE BOGGS P.A.
P.O. Box 1438
Tampa, FL 33601
Telephone: (813)222-1127
Facsimile: (813) 384-2843
Attorneysfor Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1
INTRODUCTION 1
I. Respondents Ignore That The Objectives Underlying
Section 95.011 Specifically Apply To Claims Made In
Arbitration Proceedings 4
II. Respondents Engage In A Flawed Analysis OfThe Term
"Or Proceeding" In Section 95.011 6
III. Respondents Ignore Critical Distinctions Between
Substantive And Procedural Law 7
IV. Respondents Reliance On Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.040 Is
Misplaced 8
V. The Practitioner Articles Offered By Respondents Do
Not Provide Reliable Authority 8
VI. Respondents' Interpretation OfThe FINRA Eligibility
Rule Not Only Ignores The Scope OfThe District
Court's Holding, It Is Unsupported By The FINRA Rule
And Guidance 9
VII. The Constitutional Issues Raised By The District Court's
Ruling Are Properly Raised On Appeal For This Court's
Consideration 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
AT&TMobility LLC v. Conception,
131 S.Ct 1740 (2011) 13
Barco v. Sch. Bd. ofPinellas County,
975 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 2008) 4
Bd. ofPub. Instruction ofSarasota v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,
184 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) 15
Bradberry v. Atlantic Bank ofSt. Augustine,
336 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) 8
Emery v. International Glass & MFG, Inc.,
249 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971) 8
Lockhart-Mummery v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.,
103 Cal. App. 3d 891 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980) 9
Miele v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.,
656 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1995) 13
North Shore Bank v. Surfside,
72 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1954) 14, 15
Rubin v. Sanford,
218 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) 13
Sanford v. Rubin,
237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970) 13, 14
O'Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED Constr. Partners, Ltd.,
994 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 2006) 2
Town ofMonticello v. Finlayson,
23 So. 2d 843 (1945) 14
Trushin v. State,
425 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1982) 14
Wychie v. State,
178 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) 15
ii
Statutes
9U.S.C. §l,etseq 3,12
Fla. Stat. § 95, et seq passim
Rules
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.040 8
Other Authorities
Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration (The law and practice of
commercial arbitration), 186-187 (Callaghan 1984) 9
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure Rule 12206 10
The Arbitrator's Manual (August 2007) 11
in
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Raymond James Financial Services, Inc., will be referred to herein as
"Petitioner" or "RJFS." Barbara J. Phillips, Jennifer L. Phillips, and Margaret K.
Camp will be referred to collectively as "Respondents." Citations to Petitioner's
Appendix will be "(V_T_)," referring to the volume number ("V_") followed by
the tab number ("T_") and, as necessary, specific exhibits or page numbers.
INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is merely an alternative forum for the resolution of civil
disputes.1 Respondents, however, pose a much different proposition. Arbitration,
they contend, is neither a civil action nor proceeding of any kind. Floridians who
agree to it, have neither the same substantive rights nor protections afforded those
who litigate in state courts, and the public policies underlying substantive law
created by the Legislature simply evaporate once individuals agree to resolve their
disputes in an arbitral forum.
It is impossible to rationalize these contradictions and Respondents have
made no appreciable effort to do so. The Answer brief is instead replete with
secondary authorities and inapposite case law, none of which respond to the
Although generally a faster and less expensive alternative to litigation in
court, arbitration proceeds in largely the same fashion. Besides procedural
differences, substantively arbitration is identical to court litigation.
substantive arguments raised by RJFS.2 The propositions they offer, the premises
their arguments stand on, and the conclusion they assert do not withstand legal
scrutiny. For example, the contention that RJFS could have unilaterally
incorporated Florida's statute of limitations ("Chapter 95") into its contract ignores
the fact that this Court and district courts throughout Florida have held a broad
arbitration agreement such as the one at issue includes the determination of statute
of limitations defenses.3 See O'Keefe Architects, Inc. v. CED Constr. Partners,
Ltd., 994 So. 2d 181, 188 (Fla. 2006). Unable to justify the District Court's
departure from that precedent and creation of the "express inclusion" rule,
Respondents virtually ignored it in their brief.4 Their scant treatment ofthe various
Respondents spend pages discussing allegations in the underlying arbitration
that are totally irrelevant to the declaratory judgment action that gave rise to this
appeal and whether Chapter 95 applies in arbitration. (Answer pp. 1-3.)
Respondents include an equally irrelevant lengthy commentary on Saldukas, an
opinion that dealt with waiver of the right to arbitrate, which is not at issue. RJFS
cannot identify any legitimate reason to include these discussions in the Answer.
3
The District Court's ruling cannot be harmonized with O'Keefe. Its holding
that Chapter 95 does not apply unless the arbitration agreement expressly includes
the statute is directly contrary to O'Keefe's holding that "<ar broad agreement to
arbitrate ... includes the determination of statute of limitations defenses." 994 So.
2d at 188. (emphasis added) The numerous opinions in line with O'Keefe are
consistent with the fundamental legal tenet that substantive law existing at the time
of contracting becomes a part of the contract as though expressly incorporated
therein. The District Court's "express inclusion" rule runs contrary to that tenet.
Although Respondents argue the agreement is a contract of adhesion, they
contemporaneously take positions on what the drafters intended and argue RJFS
"misconstrues" and "misinterprets" its own contract. (Answer p.32) No evidence
constitutional issues created by the District Court's ruling, including the
preemption of Chapter 95 by the Federal Arbtiration Act ("FAA"), remain
unresolved.5 Various other issues raised by the District Court's ruling and
addressed in RJFS' brief have also gone unanswered by Respondents, to wit:
• The District Court's ruling renders portions of Chapter 95 meaningless, and
leads to a plethora of incongruous results and absurd consequences;
• The legislative intent and public policy underlying Chapter 95 cannot rationally
be abandoned simply because of the forum in which parties choose to resolve
their disputes;
• No legitimate governmental interest exists in depriving parties in arbitration of
the rights afforded other Floridians who choose to use the court system;
• The contract at issue includes language heretofore considered by this Court to
effectively incorporate the substantive law of the State of Florida;
• The District Court's "express inclusion" rule departs from Florida precedent
establishing that substantive law (such as Chapter 95), existing at the time the
contract is formed, is incorporated as a matter of law;
has been taken on what the drafters intended by the various contractual provisions.
Further, Respondents inaccurately represent the agreement relegates the decision
of whether claims were timely brought to a court. (Answer pp.29-30) The
contract, in fact, provided the parties with the option of petitioning a court to
determine whether the claims were time-barred, which Respondents invoked.
(RJFS moved the panel to decide that issue.) Rather than determining whether the
claims were timely brought, however, the Circuit Court held Chapter 95 did not
apply in the first instance. In doing so, RJFS was divested of a protected property
right because, once accrued, the statute of limitations defense is a protected interest
that may only be knowingly and voluntarily waived, (see Initial Br. pp.29-30).
Contrary to Respondents' assertion, all constitutional arguments raised by
RJFS are properly considered by this Court on appeal, (see infra pp. 12-14).
• The District Court construed the parties' contract against RJFS when any doubt
or ambiguity in the agreement must be resolved in favor of arbitration;
• The issue of who decides whether claims are time-barred, judges or arbitrators,
would be irrelevant if Chapter 95 did not apply as a matter of law, and the vast
body of law addressing that issue is nullified by the ruling below.
I. Respondents Ignore That The Objectives Underlying Section 95.011
Specifically Apply To Claims Made In Arbitration Proceedings.
Respondents' conclusion regarding the absence of the term "arbitration"
from the Florida Law Review Counsel Report might be viable but for the fact that
the same report omits the word "proceeding."6 (See Answer pp.9-10) The latter,
of course, appears in the statute, undercutting Respondents' position. The true
value of that report is not its inclusion or omission of any one word but rather that
it elucidates the objectives intended by the "applicability" section of Chapter 95.
This Court should look to the purpose behind the enactment of the statute to
ascertain legislative intent. Barco v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas County, 975 So. 2d
1116, 1123 (Fla. 2008)("Consideration must be accorded not only to the literal and
usual meaning of the words, but also to their meaning and effect on the objectives
and purposes of the statute's enactment."). According to Respondents, the purpose
of adopting Section 95.011 was to:
Respondents assert that Chapter 95 "is unambiguous so as to exclude
arbitrations" because the word "arbitration" is not in the statute. (Answer pp.11,
15). However, nowhere in Chapter 95 does it expressly state it is inapplicable to
arbitration proceedings and Chapter 95, in fact, refers to an "arbitralproceeding."
(See infra, p. 6.)
(1) create more uniformity; (2) increase the ability of attorneys to
predict results in different factual situations; (3) adjust prescribed
periods to reflect present realities rather than historical ones; and (4)
simplify this area of the law by stating the underlying principles
applicable to all statutes of limitations. (Answer p. 10)
Those purposes are clearly undermined by limiting the application of the statute to
certain forums - breeding inconsistency; decreasing predictability; ignoring the
present reality in which arbitrators regularly apply statutes of limitations to stale
claims;7 and complicating this area of the law.
Arbitration is merely an alternative forum in which to obtain the exact same
relief. Respondents have asserted causes of action sounding in tort, as well as
statutory claims. But for the virtual absence of pleading standards in the FINRA
arbitration forum and the obligation to arbitrate, these common law and statutory
claims are presented the same way they would be presented in court.8
Notwithstanding the fact that arbitral parties prosecute and defend the same claims
and are required to offer proof leading ultimately to the same relief, neither
Respondents, PIABA, nor the District Court have identified any reason why the
Legislative purposes underlying Chapter 95 ought to be discarded in arbitration.
7 {See V1T9, fii.4; V2T16 fii.7, collecting cases).
Q
Generally, the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in arbitration but,
like the court, arbitrators have discretion to control the presentation of evidence.
II. Respondents Engage In A Flawed Analysis Of The Term "Or
Proceeding" In Section 95.011.
The District Court construed the phrase "or proceeding" in Section 95.011 to
mean solely a "court proceeding." (V2T18 pp.9-10) Yet, as Respondents discuss,
the statute explicitly contemplates certain administrative proceedings, which
undermines the conclusion that "or proceeding" is limited to judicial proceedings.
(Answer p.20) Recognizing this flaw in the District Court's conclusion,
Respondents note the administrative proceedings explicitly contemplated by
Chapter 95 do not include arbitration proceedings. Respondents argue that, in fact,
the word "arbitration" is not included anywhere in the statute. (Answer pp.11, 15)
They ignore that Chapter 95 does, in fact, refer to an "arbitral proceeding and
treats the pendency of such proceedings the same as the pendency of a "civil
action" for purposes of tolling the expiration of the statute of limitations. Fla. Stat.
§ 95.051(1 )(g) ("The running of the time under any statute of limitations [ ] is
tolled by...(g) the pendency of any arbitral proceeding pertaining to a dispute
that is the subject of the action.")(emphasis added). The Legislature's treatment of
"arbitral proceedings" consistent with the pendency of a court action for tolling
purposes underscores Petitioner's position that arbitration proceedings are merely
an alternative forum for the resolution of civil claims.
In further support for their position that "or proceeding" does not encompass
arbitration proceedings, Respondents list a variety of proceedings to which Chapter
95 would never apply. (Answer p.21) Essentially, they argue the term "or
proceeding" cannot mean all proceedings because there are a number of
proceedings in which statutes of limitations would never apply. However,
Respondents' reference to "school disciplinary proceedings,'" for example, is
fatally flawed. Unlike arbitration proceedings in which identical civil claims
contemplated by Chapter 95 are raised and adjudicated, those various proceedings
listed by Respondents do not involve the bringing of civil claims at all. Again,
Respondents ignore that arbitration proceedings, unlike other proceedings, are
merely a forum for resolving the same claims made in court.
III. Respondents Ignore Critical Distinctions Between Substantive And
Procedural Law.
Further, Respondents ignore the distinction between procedural rules and
substantive law. Respondents and PIABA argue that adopting RJFS' position
would open the floodgates to an application of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Florida Evidence Code in arbitration. Those procedural rules are no more
applicable in arbitration proceedings than the AAA Rules of Arbitration Procedure
or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in state court. While arbitration has its
own set of procedural rules that are determined pursuant to agreement, the
substantive law of Florida, including Chapter 95, is inherent in the parties'
contract.
IV. Respondents Reliance On Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.040 Is Misplaced.
Respondents misinterpret Rule 1.040. It was adopted to eliminate the
historical distinction between law and equity and to clarify that the Florida Rules
of Civil Procedure apply to both. See Bradberry v. Atlantic Bank ofSt. Augustine,
336 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Emery v. International Glass & MFG,
Inc., 249 So. 2d 496, 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). More importantly, it is procedural,
not substantive like Chapter 95. It is for that same reason that Chapter 95 is made
a part of all contracts (including arbitration agreements) as a matter of law, and
Rule 1.040 is not.
V. The Practitioner Articles Offered By Respondents Do Not Provide
Reliable Authority.
Secondary authority and analysis by practitioners can provide insight in
some instances. That insight is, however, diminished if motivated by bias or based
on analysis limited in scope to avoid the difficult, albeit, central issues. The
advocacy pieces cited by Respondents are plagued by both.9 They fail to address
virtually all the problems created by the District Court's opinion that are
enumerated in Petitioner's brief. Some of those issues have been identified
previously. Martin Domke, lauded as "a leading writer in the field of arbitration
For example, the article "When Do Statutes Of Limitations Apply," upon
which Respondents rely heavily, was authored by counsel for PIABA.
,10law," states as follows:
The application of the statute of limitations by the arbitrators is
necessary because of the practical consequences which would arise if
they were not required to abide by the statute. It is conceivable that
by agreeing to submit all controversies to arbitration a defendant
might be held answerable for a claim accruing twenty years prior to
the commencement of the arbitration proceedings. This would
encourage the institution of fraudulent and stale claims, when all
witnesses were dead, all proper documents lost, and most facts
obscured by lapse of time and memory. Furthermore, if the arbitrators
are not bound by the statute of limitations, the contracting parties in
effect would be agreeing to waive their rights to the statute at the
inception of the contract. This is contrary to public policy and would
probably be considered invalid in the majority ofjurisdictions.
Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration (The law and practice of
commercial arbitration), 186-187 (Callaghan 1984). Domke's reasoning is sound.
The policy underlying statutes of limitations applies equally to claims made in
court and in arbitration forums.
VI. Respondents' Interpretation Of The FINRA Eligibility Rule Not Only
Ignores The Scope Of The District Court's Holding, It Is Unsupported
By The FINRA Rule And Guidance.
Respondents ignore that the eligibility rule is unique to FINRA arbitrations
and the District Court's opinion applies to all Florida arbitrations regardless of the
procedural venue {e.g., JAMS, AAA, FINRA, etc.). Clearly no other arbitration
forum has such a rule, a fact Respondents do not address. Further, FINRA has
explicitly stated that its eligibility rule is not a statute of limitation.
Lockhart-Mummery v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 103 Cal. App. 3d 891, 895
(Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1980).
A. Rule 12206 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Customer Disputes
Rule 12206 indicates that the FESfRA Rules contemplate the applicability of
statutes of limitations in arbitrations:
(a) Time Limitation on Submission of Claims
No claim shall be eligible for submission to arbitration under
the Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or
event giving rise to the claim. The panel will resolve any
questions regarding the eligibility of a claim under this rule.
* * *
(b) Effect of Rule on Time Limits for Filing Claim in Court
The rule does not extend applicable statutes of limitations ...
Eligibility and statutes of limitations are distinct under the Rule. Indeed,
Respondents agree that "ineligible claims" and "time-barred claims" differ,
contending that a claim ineligible for FINRA arbitration may be raised in court
whereas a time-barred claim must be dismissed. (Answer p.28)
B. The Arbitrator's Manual
The language in the FINRA Arbitrator's Manual supports a finding that
statutes of limitation may be applied to FINRA arbitration proceedings to preclude
an award of damages:
The Uniform Code contains an eligibility provision, which states that
no dispute, claim or controversy can be submitted to arbitration if six
(6) years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the
claim. This time period may be extended by court proceedings. The
arbitrators should also be aware that a statute of limitations may
10
preclude the awarding of damages even though the claim is eligible
for submission to arbitration.
The Arbitrator's Manual (August 2007) p. 8. The language in the Arbitrator's
Manual confirms that although a claim may be eligible for arbitration, an award of
damages may be precluded by the applicable statute of limitations. If statutes of
limitations were not applicable in FINRA arbitrations, the caveat in the Manual
would be superfluous.
C. FINRA Literature
The applicability of statutes of limitations is also discussed in other FINRA
literature such as its publication "What Disputes are Eligible for Arbitration" found
on the FINRA website under the "Resources for Parties" section.11 In this
publication, FINRA explicitly informs parties that statutes of limitations will be
considered in arbitrations, and may be grounds for dismissing a claim:
Under the Uniform Code a controversy is not eligible for submission
to arbitration if six or more years have elapsed from the date of the
event giving rise to the dispute. The arbitrators also may dismiss a
claim barred by shorter applicable state or federal statutes of
limitations.
11
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009533
li
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has also addressed this issue and
has acknowledged that arbitrators may look at federal and state statutes of
limitations stating:
Arbitrators look to either a federal or state statute of limitations,
depending on whether your claim is a violation of federal or state law.
You generally cannot pursue an issue through arbitration if it is more
than six years old.12
Taken together, these FINRA Rules and materials clearly establish a practice
in which statutes of limitations are applied in FINRA arbitration proceedings,
regardless of the eligibility rule. Indeed, FINRA arbitration panels regularly
dismiss claims on the grounds that they are barred by the statute of limitations.
{supra m. 7).
VII. The Constitutional Issues Raised By The District Court's Ruling Are
Properly Raised On Appeal For This Court's Consideration.
If the District Court's interpretation is correct, Chapter 95 would be
preempted by the FAA and rendered unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.
Respondents' contention that RJFS has improperly raised the argument for the first
time on appeal is wrong because: (1) the Circuit Court's ruling was based on its
interpretation of this Court's opinion in Miele, not Chapter 95; (2) the District
Court's interpretation of Chapter 95 rendered it unconstitutional and RJFS raised
the argument at the first appellate opportunity; and (3) fundamental error involving
http://www.sec.gov/answers/arbproc.htm
12
constitutional issues is properly determined on appeal, regardless of whether the
issue was raised below.
The Circuit Court granted Respondents' Motion for Declaratory Judgment
below and held as follows:
[B]ased on this Court's interpretation of Miele v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., 656 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1995), in which the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that arbitrations are not "actions" or
"proceedings," [the Motion for Declaratory Judgment] is granted.
(V2T11). The Circuit Court's Order was based solely on the Miele decision, which
did not consider or rely on Chapter 95. The District Court, however, interpreted
Chapter 95 to prohibit arbitrators from considering a statutory defense unless the
parties' contract "expressly includes" Chapter 95. {Id.) That statutory
interpretation "creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA" and renders Chapter
95 unconstitutional. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Conception, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747
(2011). RJFS raised the argument at its first opportunity on appeal of that order to
this Court.13
In response to questioning by Judge Raiden at oral argument, the possibility
that the Circuit Court's ruling raised preemption and constitutional issues was, in
fact, discussed. See Oral Argument at 12:49-13:40; see Rubin v. Sanford, 218 So.
2d 177, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)(discussing circumstances when a court may hear
an issue that was not preserved because it was "not mentioned in either the briefs
or oral argument ")(emphasis added), rev 'd on other grounds, Sanford v. Rubin,
237 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1970). Therefore, although not briefed, the potential
preemption issue was raised for the District Court's consideration.
13
Further, this Court should consider on appeal whether Chapter 95 is
preempted under the doctrine of fundamental error. See Sanford, 237 So. 2d at
137. Fundamental error, "which can be considered on appeal without objection in
the lower court, is error which goes to the foundation of the case or goes to the
merits of the cause of action." Id. Respondents filed below a "Complaint for
Declaratory Relief seeking a declaratory judgment that Chapter 95 did not apply
to arbitration proceedings. (VlTl) Whether Chapter 95 is unconstitutional is an
issue that goes directly to the foundation of the case and merits of the cause of
action, and is one that should be considered by this Court. Trushin v. State, 425
So. 2d 1126, 1130 (Fla. 1982)("[T]he constitutionality of the statute under which
[defendant] was convicted was the kind of alleged error which must be conserved
for the first time on appeal because the arguments surrounding the statute's validity
raised a fundamental error.")(emphasis in original); Town of Monticello v.
Finlayson, 23 So. 2d 843 (1945)("[T]his court has held that a fundamental error,
based on the unconstitutionality of a statute, can be raised for the first time in the
Supreme Court."); see also, North Shore Bank v. Surfside, 72 So. 2d 659, 662 (Fla.
1954)(considering issue not raised on appeal because "[t]his question is so
fundamental and its determination so vital to the very foundation on which any
decision must rest, we take upon ourselves the responsibility for delving into the
14
matter of our own volition.").14 Consideration of the preemption issue is
paramount in this instance because the District Court's ruling will have such a
drastic affect on the rights of parties to arbitration agreements, and the way parties
negotiate, approach, and view such contracts across the state, and on all industries
utilizing such contracts. Thus, a clear public interest is involved. See North Shore
Bank, 72 So. 2d at 663 (consideration of fundamental error is "especially justified
where the public interest is involved...").
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling and
remand for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
g. Gi&erra,
FBN 0005762
Dominique E. Heller, Esq.
FBN 0044135
WIAND GUERRA KING P.L.
3000 Bayport Drive, Suite 600
Tampa, Florida 33607
Telephone: (813)347-5100
Facsimile: (813)347-5152
Bd. ofPub. Instruction ofSarasota v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 184 So. 2d
491, 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)("Although the parties did not argue this point, an
appellate court will always consider fundamental error that is apparent on the face
of the record."); Wychie v. State, 178 So. 2d 875, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965) (same).
15
Hala Sandridge, Esquire
FBN 0454362
FOWLER WHITE BOGGS P.A.
P.O. Box 1438
Tampa, FL 33601
Telephone: (813) 222-1127
Facsimile: (813)384-2843
Attorneysfor Petitioner RaymondJames
Financial Services, Inc.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on June 29, 2012, a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing, Petitioner's Reply Brief, has been furnished by U.S. Mail to the
following individuals:
Robert J. Pearl, Esquire
The Pearl Law Firm, P.A.
7400 Tamiami Trail N., Suite 101
Naples, FL 34108
Attorneyfor Respondents
(U.S. Mail and Email)
Jon Polenberg, Esquire
Polenberg Cooper, P.A.
1351 Sawgrass Corp. Pkwy.
Suite 101
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33323
Veronica Tejada Lacayo, Esquire
Veronica Tejada Lacayo, P .A.
2525 Ponce De Leon Blvd.
Suite 300
Coral Gables, FL 33134
16
Anna V. Tumpovskiy, Esquire
Tumpovskiy Law Group
450 North Park Road
Penthouse Suite 800
Hollywood, FL 33021
Raquel A. Rodriguez, Esquire
Jeremy Colvin, Esquire
McDonald Hopkins LLC
200 S. Biscayne Blvd., Suite 3130
Miami, FL 33131
Edward M. Mullins, Esquire
Astigarraga Davis
701 Brickell Avenue, 16th Floor
Miami, FL 33131
Alex J. Sabo, Esquire
Bressler, Amery & Ross, P.C.
Huntington Centre II
2701 SW 149th Avenue, Suite 300
Miramar, FL 33027
Ronald D. Shindler
Fowler White Burnett
1395 Brickell Avenue
14th Floor
Miami, FL 33131
Bradford D. Kaufman, Esquire
James C. Coates, II, Esquire
Jason M. Fedo, Esquire
Greenberg Traurig, P.A.
777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 300 East
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Matthew J. Conigliaro
Carlton Fields, P.A.
200 Central Avenue, Suite 2300
St. Petersburg, FL 33701
17
Leah A. Sevi
Carlton Fields, P.A.
215 South Monroe Street, Suite 500
Tallahassee, FL 32301
Scott C. Ilgenfritz, Esq.
JOHNSON, POPE, BOKOR,
RUPPEL & BURNS, LLP
403 East Madison Street
Suite 400
Tampa, FL 33602
David A. Weintraub, Esq.
DAVID A. WEINTRAUB, P.A.
7805 S.W. 6th Court
Plantation, FL 33324
Lisa A. Catalano, Esq.
St. John's University School ofLaw
Securities Arbitration Clinic
8000 Utopia Parkway, 2nd Floor
Queens, NY 11439
Jeffrey R. Sonn, Esq.
SONNANDEREZ,PLC
Broward Financial Centre
500 E. Broward Blvd., Suite 1700
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33394-30
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the foregoing Initial Brief of Petitioner complies with the font
requirements of Rule 9.100(1), FRAP.
MUMLo,
18
