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Open Media and Transitioning Societiesin the Arab Middle East:

Implications for US Security Policy

The Stanley Foundationin association with

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis

2005-2006

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Media Landscape: Trends and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The Media Landscape: Trends and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Participant List: Dubai Dialogue 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Participant List: Dubai Dialogue 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

The Stanley Foundation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

The CNA Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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Table of Contents

The increased presence and growth of MiddleEastern media, particularly satellite television,raises pertinent questions about the nature andinfluence of this information explosion. ForUS decision makers, the most pressing ques-tion is how the realities of expanding openmedia sources and transitioning societies affectissues such as the US presence in the region,regional stability and growth, democratization,and transnational terrorism. The complexity ofthe Middle East media landscape needs to bebetter understood by US policymakers if moreproductive security policies and solutions areto be developed. This encompasses the grow-ing sophistication of the media outlets andaudiences; how new Middle East media com-pares and contrasts with US media norms andtrends; and what, if any, impact the media rev-olution has on the region’s social, economic,and political realms.

In an effort to assist US policymakers andinform US expert and academic communitiesabout the realities of expanding open media inthe Middle East, the Stanley Foundation, inassociation with the Institute for Near East &Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) and theCNA Corporation (CNAC), brought togetherkey media and policy elites from the MiddleEast, the United States, and the UnitedKingdom to discuss the implications of this

Middle East media transformation. The dis-cussions took place at an initial roundtable inDubai in December 2005 and at a subsequentworkshop in Washington, DC, in February2006. This report summarizes the main trends,challenges, and recommendations for US poli-cy derived from these discussions.

The Media Landscape: Trends and Challenges

External and Internal Forces Drive theMiddle East Media TransformationMuch of the impetus for this new media eraderives from the coverage of regional wars andcivil conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s. Directcredit for the new media era belongs to strategicregional elites. Due to the small amount of for-eign direct investment (FDI) and advertisingdollars available, the development of mediainfrastructure and talent continues to rely heavi-ly upon their support. Yet foreign pressure andinfluence also drive dynamic and fresh media inthe region. Small states with strong ties to theUnited States and Europe such as the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Lebanonlead the media revolution. These states’ moreoutwardly focused orientation enables each toincrease its influence by using rather than sup-pressing change and globalization. The UnitedStates impacts regional media directly via the

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The rapporteurs, Michael Kraig and Kathy Gockel, prepared this report following the conferences. It contains their interpretation of theproceedings and is not merely a descriptive, chronological account. Participants neither reviewed nor approved the report. Therefore, itshould not be assumed that every participant subscribes to all recommendations, observations, and conclusions.

Executive SummaryOpen Arab Media and US Foreign Policy

availability of its programming on satellite tele-vision and its foreign policy efforts, particularlyin the area of public diplomacy. Paradoxically, itis the nonstrategic and unconstrained compo-nents of US media that have the strongest affecton Middle East culture and society.

Openness Does Not Pertain Equally to All Media Outlets or All States The effects of foreign pressure and influenceare not felt equally in all states or in all typesof media. The “openness” of the regionalmedia varies across the region due to the abil-ity of regimes to censor content. Most localbroadcast stations and print media are stillunder the control of state regimes and can bestifled and shut down more easily than satel-lite and Internet sources. And while it is fareasier to censor local outlets—especially printsources—the transnational outlets also operateunder significant constraints. Self-criticism ofregimes is rare and editorializing on these sta-tions tends to focus on transnational religious,social, and moral questions, including Islamand Arabism, or on foreign policies of outsidepowers such as the United States.

Outside influences and trends are most preva-lent on the Pan-Arab satellite television chan-nels such as the LBC in Lebanon, MBC andAl Arabiya in the UAE, and Al Jazeera fromQatar. These stations try to assess the entirespectrum of views and offer different voices.

Satellite Television Dominates, but CannotRely on Private Funding SourcesIt is estimated that there are more than 200Arab satellite channels not counting Internet

broadcasts. Of these 200, only ten to fifteen areon the ratings radar and seven to nine are newschannels. Western international news channels,including the BBC and CNN International, areavailable as is Western entertainment program-ming. There is relatively little data on the view-ing audience and this deficiency, along with thelack of an advertising culture, contributes toregional difficulties in attracting advertising dol-lars. However, one regional study shows AlJazeera as the most popular channel.

In spite of the West’s emphasis on the potentialeffects of news channels, the majority of satellitechannels offers thematic entertainment program-ming covering topics such as religion, music, andcooking. LBC, a channel that is profitable (unlikemany others), presents entertainment program-ming. As in the United States, mass audiencesgravitate toward entertainment.

Satellite Television as the Most Influential Medium The mediums used to gather information vary,with traditional sources being used alongside“new” media. Two influential “traditional”sources are the mosque and the tribe/family.Seventy percent of Arabs receive their newsfrom television, while only 1 percent uses printmedia. Access to the Internet is transitioning,and although its use is still most prevalentamong the elites, the growth of Internet cafés ismaking the medium more available to themasses. Radio, in contrast to the others, is amedium mainly taken advantage of in the car.

Information is also being packaged and repack-aged—content from different mediums (such as

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Open Media and Transitioning Societies in the Arab Middle East

the photos from Abu Ghraib) can be picked upand magnified via other communications mecha-nisms. Thus there is an inability to shut anythingdown—the shutdown itself sends a message.

The Dichotomy—Uniformity and SchismsThe new media era is viewed as building aregional consumer culture and a new Pan-Arabidentity. This contrasts starkly with the “total-izing discourse” of former Arab pan-nationalistregimes such as those in Egypt and Syria. Theintersection of the new media era with theregion’s increasing youth population generatesa great deal of discussion. There is the poten-tial for conflict between traditional and newinformation sources. Yet the ability to reconcileoverlapping identities, especially by youngergenerations, may alleviate this tension. Themedia, in particular, is cited as helping peoplereconcile these potentially dissonant ideas.One critique is that stations do not truly knowtheir audiences due to inadequate research, andthere is no clear consensus on whether themedia is driving audience views or vice versa.

A competing trend emerging is the breakdownof media channels and audiences along socialcleavages. In states where media has a chance tothrive locally, such as in Iraq, there is a tendencyto have specific stations for specific sects, faiths,and other groupings. There is intense debateregarding whether the transnational satellite sta-tions represent the entire Arab spectrum cultur-ally, politically, and intellectually. Dubaiparticipants disagreed with US critics who feltstations such as Al Jazeera cause extremism andanti-Americanism among the larger populace.However, there was no consensus regarding

whether the media should be open to all groups,especially those viewed as radical.

Thus cleavages still matter, even as most Arabsare getting their information from transnationaltelevision stations. These trends raise concernsthat despite the explosion of satellite TV viewer-ship, Arabs in different parts of the Middle Eastdo not truly know or understand one another.The consensus is that conflict will increase associeties “connect up” to globalization.

Continued Dominance of English-LanguageOutlets and MarketsThe English-language market is the largest lin-guistic market in the world even though it onlyaccounts for around 12 percent of the world’spopulation. English-language speakers controlapproximately 66 percent of the world econo-my, which explains why the English languagedominates the mass media. According to oneUS participant, FDI will be critical to continuethe Middle East’s move toward globalization.Therefore, the region’s governments, media,and publics need a better understanding of howto communicate effectively with English-speaking markets.

Growing Gulf Between US and MiddleEastern AudiencesFraming issues for audiences in the UnitedStates versus in the Middle East are a signifi-cant challenge. There are distinct differences inthe messages being presented. The potentialcauses include audience affinity, access to infor-mation sources, and who controls the program-ming. Media influence predominantly flowsfrom the United States and Britain toward the

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Middle East. According to one US media par-ticipant, most Americans are not very interestedin news, let alone news from a Middle Easternoutlet. Limited access to sources is another keyfactor. American journalists find these limita-tions frustrating and Arab reporters are rarelyallowed access at all. Further exacerbating thesituation is government control of stations andmessages by regional governments and theUnited States. US efforts are perceived byArabs as unidirectional. There is a need fortwo-way discussions that incorporate Americanofficials learning about Arab culture, answeringquestions, and increasing the regional media’saccess to sources.

Another significant trend impacting the gapbetween US and Middle East perceptions ofevents is the decline of traditional Westernbroadcast and print media. Western consumerstend to turn to specific sources that support theirviews, such as online information aggregators’sites where one can select several news sourcesand stories that fit one’s preferences. Helpingdrive this fragmentation is the corporate owner-ship of media sources. The focus on profits leadsto a lack of news for knowledge’s sake and to lessthan satisfactory coverage of Middle East issues.

RecommendationsMedia is impacting political and economicnorms in varying degrees in the region, but theconsensus is that the largest impact is in thesocial realm. Economic and political implica-tions are more highly debated. To date, openmedia has not led to political action on localissues that challenge the power of sovereignregimes. Satellite stations concentrate on

transnational issues, while the majority of polit-ical and economic issues remain at the nationaland local levels. Thus the growing transnationalcivic culture being created by Pan-Arab stationsis not leading to a growth in national politicalempowerment.

Arab media today stands at a crossroads. Asboth it and its audiences become increasinglysophisticated, each is impacting the other andboth are hitting traditional local, state, andinternational policy barriers that constrain theirability to become truly open purveyors and con-sumers of knowledge and entertainment.

The United States has the opportunity to use itsforeign policy to augment the region’s own preva-lent modernization and globalization trends.These policies should support better understand-ing between US and Middle Eastern audiences,encourage FDI and advertising in stable MiddleEastern states, and work within the existingregional media establishment to change Arabmisperceptions about US objectives. US policiesneed to align not only with positive regionaltrends but also with each other.

To that end, specific policy recommendationsderived from the discussions include:

1. Decentralize US Public Diplomacy• Use existing regional and international

satellite stations as much as possible topromote US viewpoints. Reconsider thecommunications approach of Al Hurra.The perception of the station and its pro-gramming as tools for US propagandaprecludes it from being effective. Use the

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station to showcase truly open media—varied programming and views, includingUS “self-criticism”—and model the mediaphilosophy that both the United Statesand much of the Arab media want topromote in the region.

• Offer and provide a variety of US pro-gramming from public and cable televi-sion as well as from the “big three”networks that show the diversity of USviews on international topics. Thisaddresses the issues of “differences inframing” for US and Middle East audi-ences, provides a view of the breadth ofUS discussion of its own foreign policy,gives greater validity to the messages, andmodels the democratic behaviors theUnited States cites as critical for theregion’s development.

• Develop US communication policies andprograms that represent the variety ofMiddle Eastern identities and states ratherthan emphasizing the Middle East as sim-ply the key battleground for the “war onterror.” This includes dropping messagingthat emphasizes “we’re fighting them overthere so we don’t have to fight them here,”which merely reinforces perceptions of“us” against “them” and characterizes theregion as a generic land of terrorism.

• Place trusted public affairs officers in thefield who have the ability to listen andlearn as well as communicate critical for-eign policy ideas. Enable these officers tocommunicate more freely, be more acces-

sible, and respond more quickly via blogs,bulletin boards, and interviews.

• Provide Arab journalists with better andeasier access to US sources.

2. Emphasize Understanding ThroughCultural Exchange Policies• Establish government-sponsored student

exchange programs, speaking tours, andguest lecturer programs between the USand Middle Eastern countries.

• Offer more visas to populations from theregion and add staff to the embassies andconsulates in order to decrease the time ittakes to get a visa.

• Consider the impact on regional percep-tions caused by Homeland Security poli-cies, such as lengthy delays of MiddleEastern citizens by customs officials.

3. Encourage Private Development• Focus on developing the region’s civil and

business capabilities.

• Sponsor business conferences that bringtogether Western and Middle Easternmedia and business leaders to addressdevelopment issues.

• Recognize that advertising revenue helpsfree the media from its reliance on gov-ernment-only sponsorship and also acts asa force for “objectivity” in reporting.Encourage advertising by multinationalcompanies via emphasis on the size and

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modern tastes of the region’s Pan-Arabpopulation, especially the burgeoningyouth population.

• Establish US-based public diplomacyand media efforts to facilitate US-Arabbusiness partnerships.

4. Change Isolation Policies Toward KeyRegional Players• Recognize that the direction of change in

the region is more important than thedegree of change. These countries do nothave to be democracies for the UnitedStates to value their movement towardgreater openness. For example, the factthat the current leaders of Palestine andIran were elected by the nation’s citizensin democratic elections may be reasonenough to shift toward policies of engage-ment with them.

• Recognize that multilateral solutionsemphasizing the role of cooperationbetween Middle Eastern governmentsand de-emphasizing US intervention aremore likely to provide lasting solutions.

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The increased presence and growth of MiddleEastern media, particularly satellite television,raises pertinent questions regarding the natureand influence of this information explosion.Who is driving this media revolution and set-ting the agenda—the governments, the media,the audience, international forces, or a combina-tion of all four? How open is this new media?Does it reflect the paradigms associated withWestern media—that openness exists at thelocal, national, and transnational levels and cov-ers all forms of media from print to the Internetto broadcast outlets? What challenges and bar-riers do media outlets confront in their effortsto bring modern technology and programmingto a region where this type of access is consid-ered new and even threatening to some audi-ences, including many regional governments?

The focus from outside the region tends to con-centrate on broadcast news channels, and in par-ticular Al Jazeera. Yet within the region, a varietyof entertainment and religious programming isavailable across a variety of mediums. What arethe implications of expanding information accessboth from within and outside the region at thesame time that a “youth bulge” is occurring?

For US decision makers, the most pressingquestion is how the onset of expanding openmedia sources and the reality of transitioningsocieties affect issues such as the US presencein the region, regional stability and growth,democratization, and transnational terrorism.

The complexity of the Middle East medialandscape needs to be better understood byUS policymakers if more productive securitypolicies and solutions are to be developed.This encompasses the growing sophisticationof the media’s purveyors and consumers; hownew Middle East media compares and con-trasts with US media norms and trends; andwhat, if any, impact the media transformationis having on the region’s social, economic, andpolitical realms.

In an effort to assist US policymakers andinform US expert and academic communitiesabout the objective realities of expandingopen media in the Middle East, the StanleyFoundation, in association with the Institute forNear East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEG-MA) and the CNA Corporation (CNAC),brought together key media and policy elitesfrom the Middle East, the United States, andthe United Kingdom to discuss the implicationsof this Middle East media transformation. Thisinitiative grew out of the Stanley Foundation’sprogramming on Middle East security and theUS-Muslim relationship. The discussions tookplace at an initial roundtable in Dubai, UnitedArab Emirates (UAE), in December 2005, anda subsequent workshop in Washington, DC, inFebruary 2006. The objectives of these meetingswere to define the issues, discuss their ramifica-tions, outline policy implications for the UnitedStates, and make a first contribution toward alarger national dialogue on these and related

Conference Report

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issues. This report summarizes the main trends,challenges, implications, and recommendationsfor US policy derived from these discussions.

The Media Landscape:Trends and Challenges

External and Internal Forces Drive theMiddle East Media TransformationThe rise of the Arab media is a relatively newphenomenon, although much of the impetuscame from the coverage of regional wars and civilconflicts in the 1980s and 1990s. Lebanon’s civilwar led to the development of an entrenchedmedia infrastructure in order to promote theideas of competing militias. Post-war, this infra-structure and media knowledge helped foster thetransition to a competitive, diverse media indus-try. The dominance of the coverage of the 1991Gulf War by a Western media channel, CNN,led to two key effects: it opened Arab eyes to theway in which real life crises and conflicts can becovered and it also created consternation andfrustration at the predominance of Western per-spectives in the coverage of a regional event. Inresponse, Saudi elites started BBC-Arabic.Although this station eventually shut down, itwas the precursor to current regional satellitestations Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya. The contri-bution of regional talent from the BBC alsohelped make this transition possible, and theBritish broadcaster’s imprint on regional talent isstill evident.

Foreign pressure and influence continue to drivedynamic and innovative media in the region.But it is the small states with strong ties to theUnited States and Europe, such as the UAE,

Qatar, and Lebanon that are truly leading themedia transformation. Their smaller geographicsize and the fact that they are surrounded on allsides by stronger cultural, economic, and mili-tary powers have led to stronger ties with theWest and a greater acceptance of globalization.This more outwardly focused orientationenabled each state to increase its influencewithin the region and internationally by usingrather than suppressing modernity and global-ization. This ultimately led to the creation ofthe strongest Pan-Arab media outlets: AlJazeera, Al Arabiya, and LBC. Faster globalintegration by some states reflects a DC partici-pant’s prediction that integration into the glob-alized world will occur on a state versus regionalbasis and will be a significant motivator forother states and governments to also integrateinto the global environment.

The United States continues to have a stronginfluence on international and regional media inthe Middle East through both its business andgovernment sectors. US television programmingis popular and widely available on MiddleEastern satellite television channels and the USgovernment has established its own satellitetelevision channel, Al Hurra. However, the top-down attempt by the US government to influ-ence the region through Al Hurra only attracts1 percent of the regional audience and, in gen-eral, is viewed by Arab citizens as a tool of theUS government. The State Department is alsoundertaking public diplomacy efforts underKaren Hughes and the US military embedsreporters with its forces and uses public relationsfirms to project positive stories to media outletsin Iraq.

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Even though foreign influence continues to bea significant driver of the regional media trans-formation, direct credit belongs to strategicelites from states such as Lebanon, SaudiArabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Due to the smallamount of foreign direct investment (FDI) andadvertising dollars available in the region, thedevelopment of media infrastructure and talentcontinues to rely heavily upon the support ofthese regional elites. The most popular regionalnews channel, Al Jazeera, is not profitable. OneMiddle Eastern media participant shared thatthe station would have starved in its infancywithout state funding due to the lack of outsidefunding and the ban on advertising by somecountries in the region.

Openness Does Not Pertain Equally to All Media Outlets or All StatesThe effects of foreign pressure and influence onthis new media era are not felt equally in allstates or in all types of media across the region.Most local broadcast stations and print mediaare still under the control of state regimes andcan be stifled and shut down more easily, andwith less effect, than broadcast media andInternet sources. As mentioned previously, out-side influences and trends are most prevalenton the Pan-Arab satellite television channelslocated in smaller states such as the LBC inLebanon, MBC and Al Arabiya in the UAE,and Al Jazeera from Qatar. These stations canbe characterized as libertarian more thanIslamist or Arabist in that they try to assess theentire spectrum of different views and offer dif-ferent voices. For example, on these channels,Egyptian and Saudi clerics are joined by liber-als of a more secular orientation or who have a

more progressive view of Islam and modernity.Criticism of the domestic practices of pastleaders of the Arab world, including Egypt andSyria, are accepted as normal. Coverage of Iraqshows violence against both Americans andIraqis. As regional media participants shared inboth sessions, the media is breaking previouslyestablished information taboos. Now, there is adrive to present the news “as it actually is,”even if this means sharing stark, highly ideo-logical views that might be regarded inWestern countries as politically incorrect.

However, transnational stations are not abovestate censorship as demonstrated by the mannerin which the Egyptian and Syrian authoritiesare reacting to coverage of their internal affairs.While Hezbollah in Lebanon has its ownmedia outlets and the leaders of Hamas areinterviewed on various channels, Egypt did notallow coverage of the Muslim Brotherhood dur-ing its recent elections. Egyptian authoritiesalso harassed, constrained, and temporarilyjailed Al Jazeera reporters who attempted toshow the clashes between police, regime sup-porters, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Syriaclosed down the Al Arabiya office in Damascusand routinely attempts to jam signals. A partici-pant in the Dubai dialogue also noted that thestate apparatus in Syria sends out false “quotes”from individuals in the free media in an attemptto discredit these individuals. It also sendshecklers to participate as audience members.

Ironically, Saudi Arabia, one of the first govern-ments to sponsor a satellite channel, alsoemploys censorship when its strategic interestsare at stake. In 1998, around the time of Desert

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Fox, Saudi authorities disallowed coverage byhundreds of MBC reporters because the Saudiregime did not like or trust Saddam Husseinand felt that coverage of the US bombingsmight be viewed negatively by Arab audiences.In response, most of the MBC reporters quitand moved to Al Jazeera.

This government regulation also helps explainwhy the Internet is the medium of choice for themost radical regional groups such as Al Qaeda—because it is easier to establish and shut down aWeb site, the medium is much more difficult totrack, monitor, and regulate than traditionalbroadcast and print mediums. Indeed, one ofthe findings of the Dubai discussions was thatthe Western perception of lack of control onbroadcast stations is incorrect. Currently,many US citizens and political elites alikeseem to believe that mainline broadcast chan-nels such as Al Jazeera help Al Qaeda andother militants by airing highly objectionablematerial, including beheadings of kidnappedprisoners. However, this is false. The Internetis more widely used by these transnationalcells to advocate their message, not the largercross-national satellite stations funded byregional governments.

Overall, the “openness” of the regional mediavaries due to state ownership of media outletsand the ability of regimes to censor content. It isfar easier to censor local outlets, especially printsources, but the transnational outlets also oper-ate under significant constraints. Also, as oneparticipant noted, self-criticism of Arab actionsat both the personal and regime level are stillrare, due to both cultural and political factors.

Policy and social critique are strong on these sta-tions, but the nature of the critique tends to beon transnational religious, social, and moralquestions such as Islam and Arabism, or on for-eign policies of outside powers such as theUnited States, rather than on cutting localissues. For instance, the government of Qatardoes not allow coverage of pressing and con-tentious social and political issues such as laborpolicies for immigrant workers.

Satellite Television Dominates, but CannotRely on Private Funding SourcesMiddle Eastern broadcast participants at theDC workshop estimated that there are morethan 200 Arab satellite channels, not countingInternet broadcasts. Of these 200, only ten tofifteen are on the ratings radar (these aremonthly ratings versus the day-to-day ratingscommon to the United States) and only sevento nine are news channels. Western interna-tional news channels, including the BBC andCNN International, are also available as isWestern entertainment programming. AMiddle Eastern media participant noted thatthis broad array of channels is due to the factthat many wealthy elites are establishing theirown channels because having one connotesprestige. The participant also predicted futureindustry consolidation since not all of thesechannels can survive.

There is relatively little data on the viewingaudience and this deficiency, along with the lackof an advertising culture, makes it difficult toattract advertising dollars within the region. Oneparticipant in the UAE dialogue shared that theestimate of advertising dollars per capita in the

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Middle East is $160 versus $370 in the UnitedStates. Participants at the DC workshop esti-mated available commercial funding at $1.2 bil-lion to $1.8 billion for the 22 countries in theregion, and most of that money goes to the newschannels. The breakdown of funding betweenMiddle Eastern and Western news channels wasnot provided.

Data from a study regarding the popularity ofMiddle Eastern news channels was providedat the Dubai roundtable. The results of thestudy—which was conducted in Jordan,Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and theUAE—demonstrated the reach of Al Jazeera.Forty-five percent of respondents watched thechannel, with 12 percent watching MBC andLBC respectively. Al Arabiya captured 9 percent,Abu Dhabi 6 percent, and Hezbollah 4 percent.The US government-sponsored network, AlHurra, captured 1 percent. In some countries AlJazeera is even preferred over state television.Fifty-six percent of respondents in Egypt pre-ferred Al Jazeera, compared to 10 percent forthe country’s national television stations. Thenumbers were similar in the UAE, with 57percent watching Al Jazeera and 10 percentwatching Abu Dhabi television. Overall, AlJazeera and Al Arabiya were the stations mostlikely to be turned to as a second choice bymost survey respondents.

It was noted that a key difference between Pan-Arab stations such as Al Jazeera and local sta-tions was the presentation of confrontationaldebates on sensitive issues that affect the entireregion on a transnational or international as wellas a national basis, including outside interven-

tion by Western states. In turn, many US andregional participants at both events argued thatthis is directly contributing to the formation of anew sense of cross-national Arab and Islamicidentity. Social and cultural connections betweendisparate populations are being established viathis internationalist programming on the mostpopular satellite broadcast stations and a sharedsense of community is slowly but surely growing.

Yet, as stated earlier, there are still constraintson what can be shown and the topics that canbe covered. As one participant from the regionnoted, perhaps there is so much focus on USforeign policy because the stations cannot lookat the region’s own social issues very closely.

In spite of the emphasis in the West on thepotential effects of news channels, the majorityof satellite channels offer thematic entertain-ment programming, covering topics such asreligion, music, and cooking. The moneymakingLBC is an entertainment channel. As in theUnited States, mass audiences gravitate towardentertainment. Some of the most successfulprogramming also follows Western themes suchas reality television and contests similar toAmerican Idol.

Media and Audience Sophistication PertainsMainly to Satellite Television The mediums used by the Middle Eastern pub-lic to gather information vary, with traditionalsources being used alongside “new” media. Thetwo traditional sources emphasized as influen-tial were the mosque and the tribe/family. Thecentral role of the mosque in shaping opinion,via both messages delivered by religious leaders

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and information distributed outside, is particu-larly important to Islamic male audiences.(Satellite television was also cited as a means forproviding religious information and opinion,with women comprising the largest audience forreligious programming.) The importance of thehuman voice in tribal and family discussionswas highlighted by one regional academic, aswas the significant impact that these socialstructures have on what information sources areused, and how the information is interpreted.

There is an imbalance in the use of more for-malized media sources. Seventy percent ofArabs throughout the Middle East get theirnews from television. The dominance of satel-lite TV has significant social implications. Oneparticipant shared that “those who lack dishesare often viewed by neighbors as ignorant.”Only 1 percent of Arabs use print media. Evenin Lebanon, which has one of the most edu-cated populaces and dynamic civil societies inthe region, there are millions of TV viewersbut only 30,000-40,000 newspaper subscribers.Access to the Internet is also expanding.Although its use is still most prevalent amongthe elites, the growth of Internet cafés is mak-ing the medium more available to the masses.Participants at the Washington conferenceemphasized that there is a real interest in hav-ing completely uncensored and uncontrolledaccess to this information, especially on thepart of the younger generations. With such alarge section of the population below 30 yearsold, Internet usage will become even moreprevalent. Radio, in contrast to other popularmediums, is something mainly taken advan-tage of in the car.

The current imbalance in the use of variousmedia outlets in the Middle East can be tracedto factors such as:

• The importance of the human voice to theculture.

• The variance in literacy rates across theArab world—70 percent cannot read orwrite and only 1 percent regularly readnewspapers.

• Print sources are more easily shut downsince they are inherently local and most arestate-owned.

• Internet access is still relatively expensiveand not as uniformly available as television.The fact that it is the preferred informationsource for radical political movements mayalso have some effect on states’ willingnessto make it more widely available.

However, as pointed out by one US media ana-lyst, information is now getting packaged andrepackaged in many ways. Content from differentmediums, such as the photos from Abu Ghraib,the Danish cartoons, and videos from extremistgroups, can be picked up and magnified via othercommunications mechanisms. This inherentlymeans that there is significance in shutting downsources of information—the shutdown itselfsends a message, and those who have alreadyaccessed the information can distribute it throughother communication mechanisms.

A critique heard at the Dubai roundtable wasthat stations do not truly know their audiences

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due to inadequate research. Many asked whichwas pushing and which was pulling, which wasshaping and which was being shaped—theaudience or the networks? There was no clearconsensus on this issue. Some felt strongly thatthe “new Arab” was young, global, consumer-oriented, and savvy to the biases of particularnews sources. Others felt that the audiencetended to be a captive of the three or four majortransnational satellite stations and that these sta-tions significantly shaped public attitudes onmajor issues. Clearly, this is a question thatrequires more focused and methodologicallysophisticated research. A Dubai participantargued that UNDP should augment its currentArab Human Development Report process byadding in an entirely new project on assessingthe impacts of regional media, including theobjective realities of audiences across countries.

The Dichotomy—Uniformity and Schisms Some participants saw media as building aregional consumer culture, but most saw it inthe broader context of identity. The intersectionof this new media programming and access (viathe Internet as well as television) with theregion’s “youth bulge” generated a great deal ofdiscussion. The “circles of affinity,” as describedby an American academic in the DC workshop,are changing. The professionalism of the com-mentators, the topics and forums used, and theability to reach an entire generation across theregion are making the media circle of belonging“warmer”—there is a greater sense of trust,familiarity, loyalty, and reciprocity. These attrib-utes were traditionally allocated to more localaffiliations such as the tribe and family.

Another American analyst stated that “it is theyouth and those who are parents of teenagerswho will define the future. How do you recon-cile a traditional patriarchal system with thenew media norms? What kinds of grownups arethese people going to be?” Another participantfelt that social institutions, such as the family,can morph to mean other things and that “oneshould not underestimate these things or seethem as constraints—they are quite adaptable.”At the same time, there was concern about“contrived authenticity” and the prospect offorcing identity systems onto a person.

Although some participants saw a potential forconflict between traditional and new informa-tion sources and trends, US analysts emphasizedthe notion of overlapping identities—the abilityof the people, especially younger generations, toreconcile the notions of what it means to bemodern, Arab, Islamic, a member of a state, anda member of a tribe/family at the same time.One analyst even spoke of entertainment pro-gramming as “aspirational” and emphasized howit actually helps people reconcile these variousidentities so that they are not dissonant by giv-ing Arabs from different states a common per-ception of what it means to be Arab. For thefirst time, there is a source offering a “uniform”Arab language, presenting facts that the “aver-age” Arab should know, and enabling a glimpseof what life is like throughout the region.

There was support from both discussions thatthe media was helping create a new Pan-Arabidentity. This was contrasted with the “totalizingdiscourse” of old Arab pan-nationalist regimes,such as Egypt and Syria, in which citizens were

17


treated as objects rather than subjects and thestate apparatus “told people what they needed toknow” during the Cold War years rather thansharing all information on a given subject.

However, another competing media trend isalso emerging—the breakdown of mediachannels and audiences along social cleavages.There was fairly intense debate regardingwhether the transnational satellite stationsrepresent the entire Arab spectrum culturally,politically, or intellectually. Many Gulf partic-ipants at the Dubai roundtable stressed thatalthough money tends to come from the GulfArab monarchies, the talent—specifically pro-ducers, editors, writers, anchors, interviewers,and interviewees—tend to come from Levantcountries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt.In the view of Gulf participants, the expertsbrought on to talk shows from the Gulf aremerely a cosmetic attempt to show balanceand even then comprise small rotations of aselect few individuals. The one exception hasbeen the large number of Saudis interviewedon Al Arabiya, which is ultimately funded bythe Saudi government.

In discussions of perceived imbalances in cover-age, none of the Dubai participants agreed withthe views of US critics who feel that, by givingairtime to conservative Islamists, stations suchas Al Jazeera actually cause extremism and anti-Americanism among the larger populace. Theyalso did not feel that this type of programmingwas a major driver of negative attitudes towardthe United States. Participants at the DC work-shop were not all in agreement with this view.

As one DC participant shared, Al Hurra wasestablished “in an effort to expand the land-scape of debate” since many of the stations arestate-owned or set up by the sons and daughtersof rulers who are in charge of privatization.This participant felt that until there is a trulyindependent Arab media, the subjectivity inreporting will not change, and an indicator oftrue independence would be the attendance ofmultinational companies at Middle Easternmedia conferences.

US groups are not alone in their critiques ofcoverage. Regional groups also feel that theirconcerns are not covered objectively and thatsome treatment of sensitive topics is even hos-tile. Women’s views are perceived as given shortshrift on various stations. The Shia in Iraq feelthat Al Jazeera’s coverage is anti-Sistani. TheSaudis are annoyed that their attempts to liber-alize are sometimes portrayed on Al Jazeera as“giving in to US demands.” In states wheremedia has a chance to thrive locally, such as Iraq(which was cited by one participant as being themost free, dynamic, and growth-oriented marketin the Middle East), there is a tendency to havespecific stations for specific sects, faiths, andother groupings.

There was no consensus even from regionalmedia participants regarding whether the mediashould be open to all groups. Some felt that onecannot have open media and exclude Islamistgroups. Others felt it was dangerous to give vio-lent groups access to major media coverage. Oneregional media participant in the DC conferenceshared, “The greatest danger is the prospectthat, through clever manipulation and public

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relations, programs or even whole channels canbe hijacked by extremists or fundamentalistsacross the social and political spectrum. If thiswere to happen, it would be bad for all aspectsof society as well as the media.”

Thus cleavages still matter, even as most Arabsare getting their information from transnation-al television stations. These trends raised con-cerns that despite the explosion of satellite TVviewership, Arabs in different parts of theMiddle East still do not truly know or under-stand one another beyond their shared atti-tudes toward issues such as Israel, Palestine,and US intervention. For instance, does theaverage Lebanese citizen really “know” orunderstand the average Qatari or other GulfArab citizen, or vice versa? Several participantswere skeptical of this claim.

Overall, as noted by one participant in the DCworkshop, there will be increasing conflict associeties “connect up” to globalization. This par-ticipant, a leading analyst on globalization andsecurity, suggested that there will be an attendantrise in nationalism, with uncertain or unpre-dictable consequences. Despite this uncertainty,however, he felt it was possible to integrateMiddle Eastern countries into the global systemand cited Asia as an example of how this canoccur over the long term.

Continued Dominance of English-LanguageOutlets and MarketsA Western media participant shared that theEnglish language is the largest linguistic marketin the world, even though it only accounts foraround 12 percent of the world’s population.

This is due to the fact that English-languagespeakers control approximately 66 percent of theworld economy, and this economic dominanceexplains why the English language also domi-nates the mass media. He also felt that this waswhy Al Jazeera is starting an English-languagechannel. Also, as one participant suggested, FDIwill be key in helping the Middle East continueits move toward globalization. Therefore, theMiddle East will need to better understand howto communicate with these English-speakingmarkets if it is to attract more foreign invest-ment. This is a large challenge, as demonstratedby the US media coverage surrounding the pro-posed management of American ports by aDubai-based company.

Difficult to Reach a Broad Audience WithNews That Reflects a Variety of Perspectives Another significant challenge impacting theunderstanding of and dialogue around MiddleEast issues is the decline in traditional broad-cast news viewership and print readership in theWest. Americans “do not want much news oranalysis.” One US media representative at theDC workshop stated that Americans are “totallyfocused on ourselves—we’re egocentric” andthat that the Middle East should not look toAmerican media for much understanding of theregion’s issues. The appearance of broadcastchannels and programs dedicated to a singlepoint of view such as FOX News and Hardball,enable audiences to pay attention only to storiesand viewpoints that interest them.

Relating to and helping drive this fragmenta-tion is the corporate ownership of mediasources. According to one member of the US

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media, these corporations focus on profits andthis focus on the bottom line leads to a lack ofnews for knowledge’s sake. It also contributes toa lack of expertise within the broadcast journal-ism field. US news outlets used to have foreigncorrespondents that focused on specific areas ofthe world. Today the goal is to become ananchor. To that end, news correspondents spenda short amount of time in any one region anddo not know or learn the language. This leadsto less than satisfactory coverage of the issuesfrom the Middle East point of view.

Another media participant stated that hewould not put any more money into increasingnewspaper subscriptions and would insteadfocus on the electronic market. Newspaper cir-culation is declining and, due to the variety ofonline information aggregators, American andinternational audiences can select several newssources and types of stories to view at oneWeb site. This participant stated that the newgoal is to ensure that your outlets and storiesare one of the two to three chosen by audiencemembers through these sites. This trend isshifting power from those reporting on andproviding the news content to the aggregatorswho “own the eyeballs.”

The corporate focus of news outlets combinedwith this fragmentation of the audience is lead-ing to a press that reflects more of what its cor-porate owners and audiences want instead ofjournalistic principles. As one internationalmedia participant stated, “We reflect. We don’tcreate. We’re not good at educating our ownpublics in the US and England.”

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Increasing Polarity Due to Different Framing The difference in framing issues for audiencesin the United States versus those in the MiddleEast is another challenge for both US andMiddle Eastern media. The potential causes forthese differences are many, including audienceaffinity, access to information sources, and whocontrols the programming.

Media influence today predominately flowsfrom the United States and Britain toward theMiddle East. Even though some Arabic chan-nels and shows can be seen in the UnitedStates, and although Western news outlets pickup stories from Middle Eastern stations, mostAmericans are not that interested in watchingnews, let alone news from a Middle Easternoutlet. The launch of Al Jazeera’s English lan-guage station will be a good test to see whetheran Arab station can generate American interest.However, Al Jazeera faces a huge challenge inovercoming the negative brand associationsderived from its showing of videos from radicalIslamist groups as well as the US government’sless-than-positive responses to its program-ming. At the DC event, one participant attrib-uted a story to Al Jazeera that the station’srepresentative did not remember being part ofthe station’s formal coverage. The comment wasalso made that stories are often attributed tothe station even when it was not the source ofthe story.

Access to sources was a key factor cited by onejournalist, who used the US military action inIraq as an example of how difficult it is for allreporters to get the information necessary toaccurately frame a story. The only safe way for

an American journalist to get access is to beembedded with the US military. Even then it isdifficult to gain access to, and the consent of,people who can explain the complexities of thesituation on the ground. These explanationsalso tend to contain a lot of “spin,” which leadsAmerican journalists to question the accuracyof the information. Compare this to the factthat Arab journalists are not invited to partici-pate in these types of activities. As the partici-pant stated, if American journalists with directaccess do not trust the information, then whatis an Arab reporter to think of informationpassed along secondhand?

Further exacerbating this situation are USefforts at public diplomacy. These efforts areperceived by Arabs as unidirectional with thegoal of changing Arab perceptions, rather thanaccepting Arab culture as a given and creating atruly two-way discussion that incorporatesAmerican officials learning about Arab culture,answering questions, and increasing the regionalmedia’s access. One participant shared that dur-ing one of Karen Hughes’ first visits to theregion she stated that she was there to “doeverything but talk about problems with USpolicies.” In this participant’s view, her efforts atpublic diplomacy had already failed.

Finally, due to state ownership, there are limitsas to what can be shown on Arab stations, andin most cases, the state is the final arbiter as towhat can and cannot be shown. As one partici-pant noted, perhaps one of the reasons for thesubstantial focus on US involvement in theregion is the fact that self-criticism is still notprevalent in Middle East programming. A simi-

lar effect is happening in the United States eventhough the media outlets are not state-owned.According to one member of the US media, theWhite House realized during the Reaganadministration that by having a daily briefing itcould often set the daily political news agenda.In this participant’s view, the American medianeeds to find a way to get beyond the WhiteHouse public relations spin because it is crowd-ing out other stories that should be covered.

ImplicationsOpinions varied regarding the type and degreeof impact that the transformation of MiddleEast media is having inside and outside of theregion. However, there were several topics uponwhich most participants agreed and these werein the social realm. Economic and politicalimplications were more highly debated, withthe economic impacts receiving the least atten-tion. To date, media openness has not led toconcrete political action on local issues thatchallenge the power of sovereign regimes.Satellite stations concentrate on transnationalissues. The majority of political and economicissues remain at the national and local levels.Thus growing transnational civic culture is notleading to a growth in national politicalempowerment. This gap may cause mountingfrustration and even conflict in the future.

Dramatic Impact on Social Conventions and NormsThe discussion revealed that the greatest effectsof the new era of Middle Eastern media are beingfelt in the social realm. Pan-Arab satellite televi-sion stations broke Western media dominance,both in terms of outlets and coverage and, as one

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participant shared, “There must have been eupho-ria when the Arab public saw on TV what fewsaw on the Western media.”

Another consensus that surfaced among partici-pants was that these stations now talk to peopleacross the region as if they are all one commu-nity. In this regard, the trans-regional media isbuilding a new Pan-Arab identity. This is aninteresting phenomenon considering the Pan-Arabism of the 20th century is most oftenlinked to political leaders and elite-level issues.The nature of the current media discourse wasalso contrasted with the traditional “totalizingdiscourse” of Arab pan-nationalist regimes suchas Egypt and Syria, in which citizens weretreated as objects rather than subjects, and thestate apparatus “told people what they neededto know” during the Cold War years rather thansharing information on a given subject.

Caution was also recommended regarding howfast the Middle East media should “open.”Participants noted that the Middle East doesnot have the same media history as the UnitedStates. The established context of democraticknowledge that existed during the AmericanRevolution does not exist in the Middle East.Therefore, the same actions at the same paceare likely to foster different outcomes.

The rise of new identities, the previously men-tioned social and ethnic-sectarian schisms thatare appearing in television programming, andthe fact that democracy and openness are newto most members of the region are all sources ofconcern regarding future conflict. To summarizeone Middle Eastern media participant, televi-

sion is the number one interactive tool of themasses and it is unleashing the power of themasses as demonstrated by 9/11 and the Danishcartoon reactions. As such, it might createinstability in the short term. This is due to thefact that the media is part of a larger system—culture and society—and, thus, has limitationson it due to the context in which it exists.However, in the long term, he felt that themedia’s impact will lead to more securitybecause it is promoting norms across the region.

The participants also stressed that creatingviable civil societies in the Middle East cannotbe accomplished by the media alone. There arelimitations on its operations. The ability tosuccessfully navigate social transitions will relyon other players from the citizenry and gov-ernments. The United States needs toacknowledge that these social transitions placethe Middle East media and its governmentsupporters in a somewhat tenuous situationsince social transitions often cause conflict.The current perceptions of the United Statesin the region suggest that US policies need totake a supporting role in these transitions. IfUS policies drive the action, it will be per-ceived as meddling in internal affairs, whichcan, in turn, lead civil society and governmentsto turn against the region’s positive trendtoward openness and citizen involvement. As aMiddle East media participant shared, thesechanges need to come from within if they areto be lasting changes.

The regional media is also impacting Westernperceptions and policies. The coverage of eventsby Pan-Arab stations along with Internet con-

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tent offer access to perspectives not covered inthe West. Al Qaeda and other radical groupsare savvy to this and use the media to promotetheir efforts. Some of these groups are trying toestablish what it means to be Islamic and Arab.Meanwhile, the way in which this content iscovered by members of the media, government,and American public (through, for example,blogs or Internet sites) appears to be drivinggreater polarization in Americans’ perceptionsof the Middle East, Islam, and Arabs.

Divergent Views Regarding Media’s Impact on Politics and a Continuing Trend Toward OpennessThe reach of satellite television and increasingpenetration of the Internet make it much hard-er for governments at all levels to shut downmessages. It is also making it easier for groupsto move a message to the people—picking upinformation from one source and distributing itthrough another, such as the “repackaging” ofthe Danish cartoons. The power of the image isnot lost on governments, either. The coverage ofthe Danish cartoon protests from countries suchas Syria, which many think were encouraged bythe government, revealed how the media can beused as a pawn. The generation of compellingimages can be a call to action regardless of whoinitiates that call.

The actions toward the media taken by govern-ments—both those within the region andinternationally—are evidence that politicalregimes feel the media is having significantinfluence. Where this will lead is under debate.Some feel that there is forward momentumtoward a more open media. Others feel that the

future could lead to more censorship. Oneregional media participant mused that as politi-cal regimes come under pressure they will takesteps to protect themselves.

Middle Eastern media is also driving US policyinitiatives. One recent example is the US gov-ernment’s reaction to Lebanese satellite stationAl Manar, radio station Al Nour Radio, and theparent company Lebanese Media Group. TheUS government felt that these media playerswere assisting Hezbollah. Therefore, the USTreasury responded by designating each as aterrorist entity. This designation freezes theirassets in the United States and prohibits UScitizens from transacting with them. At thesame time, the US government set up its ownchannel in the region to ensure its views arebeing shared. Participants felt that these andother US efforts are largely perceived as restrict-ing truly open media at the same time that theUnited States is setting up its own propagandamechanisms.

The same can be said for the governmentswithin the region. Even though most openMiddle Eastern regimes may be fine with criti-cisms of the United States and showing videosfrom radical groups, many participants felt thatthe coverage of the domestic actions of media-sponsoring regimes (such as Qatar) by theregional media was too limited.

The actions of the media itself were also cited ascontributing to the demise of openness throughthe generation of its own propaganda (whichdrives out sponsors who object to subjective cov-erage) and the media’s emphasis on conflict and

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crises. One Middle Eastern participant sharedhow the media was used to call people to actionin Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution. It was felt thatthe media was a “purposeful mobilizer” and therewas “passive self-censorship,” which emphasizedcoverage of those who were anti-Syrian. Themedia chose to sacrifice its objectivity. Some feltthis was important in order for Lebanon to regaincontrol of its own affairs. Others felt that theoverall drive of Pan-Arab news media should beto tell the news as the news is. As a Dubai partic-ipant shared, the press in this case became the“revolutionary vanguard,” and when it does this itbecomes counter-propaganda. “Yesterday wedecried propaganda. Now we are saying there isgood propaganda and bad propaganda.” What arepeople to believe is real?

Thus the debate regarding how much themedia does and should impact politics is ongo-ing. A common theme was that this transition,along with social transitions, will probably leadto further conflict between the regimes and themedia. Whether public attitudes and engage-ment will be enough to override state censor-ship remains to be seen.

Economic Impact Is Still To Be Determined There was agreement that the Pan-Arab media ishelping to create a new consumer culture andcommon identities both within and across gener-ations. At the same time, career opportunities arelimited by the lack of regional development, par-ticularly from foreign investors and multinationalcorporations. So many young Arabs can now seea world that they may perceive is beyond theirreach. One US analyst felt that FDI was the crit-ical factor needed to shrink that gap.

At the same time, instability in the region,media images of radical groups, the hightrade barriers, and the lack of venture capitalwere all mentioned as factors keepinginvestors away. Another key factor for broad-casters is that advertisers do not want to beassociated with a cause or run afoul of theadministrations in their own countries.Multinational clients fled Lebanon when theCedar Revolution coverage became so promi-nent. One participant felt that objectivity wascritical to attracting investment. Conversely,subjectivity would keep it out and even driveit away.

US media coverage is also having a hugeimpact on the willingness of the Americanpeople to trust allies from the region. TheDubai Ports deal became a political football.Too few Americans could separate the UnitedStates’ relationship with the UAE from USrelations with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, let alonethe question of whether or not UAE elites aretacitly supporting terrorists such as Al Qaeda.Many of the recent US political campaignsfocused on generalized notions of terrorismand regional conflicts in such a way that aMiddle Eastern company having responsibilityfor managing a port was perceived as giving aMiddle Eastern company responsibility forsecuring a port, which was not acceptable. Thisone incident points to the fact that theAmerican public and Middle Eastern compa-nies have a lot to learn about one another andthat perceptions created by mass media areimportant. In this one example, a generalizedperception of an Arab, Islamic, and “rogueregime” threat in the United States led to a

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suboptimal foreign policy outcome for boththe Bush administration and the leaders of theUAE, who are friends and supporters of theUS security role in the region.

Conclusions and RecommendationsThere is no doubt that the transformation ofMiddle Eastern media is impacting social,political, and economic norms in varyingdegrees. It stands today at a crossroads. TheArab media and its audiences are becomingmore sophisticated. As this sophisticationbuilds, it is becoming more difficult to deter-mine which is driving the other—the media orthe audience. As a comparison point, the USmedia was in a similar place in the near past,but today’s perception is that its corporateowners and audiences are driving the program-ming. It remains to be seen whether Arabmedia will follow the same trend, maintain itsdrive toward openness and objectivity, or movein a different direction. What is readily appar-ent is that the region’s media and audiences arehitting traditional local, state, and internation-al policy barriers that are constraining theirability to become truly open purveyors andconsumers of knowledge and entertainment.

What this means for US policy is that policy-makers need to constantly assess the landscapeby region, by country, by audience, and bymedium. One of the key ideas taken from theWashington workshop is that globalization isproceeding person by person, community bycommunity, and cannot be mapped by largeareas of the globe. The acceptance of opennessand globalization is uneven within popula-tions, and as one American participant pointed

out, some Middle Eastern audiences are farmore “connected” than some US audiences. USpolicymakers need to emphasize that some ofthe conflict seen in the region is about global-ization and societal transitions and less about a“clash of civilizations.”

Trying to influence the Middle East by usingtypical American public relations spin,restricting access to sources and networks,establishing new US government-backedinformation sources, and forcing change fromthe outside will not bridge the gap betweenthe United States and the Middle East, ateither the government or civil society levels.The audiences are too savvy and have toomany other sources from which to gatherinformation. These tactics run counter to whatthe United States says are its policy goals. Theobvious conflict between US messages and USactions is driving the United States and theMiddle East further apart and making it evenharder for regional players trying to facilitatepeaceful change.

The United States has the opportunity to useits foreign policy to augment the region’s ownprevalent modernization and globalizationtrends. These policies should support betterunderstanding between US and Middle Easternaudiences, encourage FDI and advertising instable Middle Eastern states, and work withinthe existing regional media establishment tochange Arab misperceptions about US objec-tives and vice versa. US policies need to alignnot only with positive regional trends but alsowith each other.

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To that end, specific policy recommendationsderived from the discussions include:

1. Decentralize US Public Diplomacy• Use existing regional and international

satellite stations as much as possible topromote US viewpoints. Reconsider thecommunications approach of Al Hurra.The perception of the station and its pro-gramming as tools for US propagandaprecludes it from being effective. Use thestation to showcase truly open media—varied programming and views, includingUS “self-criticism”—and model the mediaphilosophy that both the United Statesand much of the Arab media want topromote in the region.

• Offer and provide a variety of US pro-gramming from public and cable televisionas well as from the “big three” networksthat show the diversity of US views oninternational topics. This addresses theissues of “differences in framing” for USand Middle East audiences, provides aview of the breadth of US discussion of itsown foreign policy, gives greater validity tothe messages, and models the democraticbehaviors the United States cites as criticalfor the region’s development.

• Develop US communication policies andprograms that represent the variety ofMiddle Eastern identities and statesrather than emphasizing the Middle Eastas simply the key battleground for the“war on terror.” This includes droppingmessaging that emphasizes “we’re fighting

them over there so we don’t have to fightthem here,” which merely reinforces per-ceptions of “us” against “them” and char-acterizes the region as a generic land ofterrorism.

• Place trusted public affairs officers in thefield who have the ability to listen andlearn as well as communicate critical for-eign policy ideas. Enable these officers tocommunicate more freely, be more acces-sible, and respond more quickly via blogs,bulletin boards, and interviews.

• Provide Arab journalists with better andeasier access to US sources.

2. Emphasize Understanding ThroughCultural Exchange Policies• Establish government-sponsored student

exchange programs, speaking tours, andguest lecturer programs between the USand Middle Eastern countries.

• Offer more visas to populations from theregion and add staff to the embassies andconsulates in order to decrease the time ittakes to get a visa.

• Consider the impact on regional percep-tions caused by Homeland Security poli-cies, such as lengthy delays of MiddleEastern citizens by customs officials.

3. Encourage Private Development• Focus on developing the region’s civil and

business capabilities.

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• Sponsor business conferences that bringtogether Western and Middle Easternmedia and business leaders to addressdevelopment issues.

• Recognize that advertising revenue helpsfree the media from its reliance on gov-ernment-only sponsorship and also actsas a force for “objectivity” in reporting.Encourage advertising by multinationalcompanies via emphasis on the size andmodern tastes of the region’s Pan-Arabpopulation, especially the burgeoningyouth population.

• Establish US-based public diplomacy andmedia efforts to facilitate US-Arab busi-ness partnerships.

4. Change Isolation Policies Toward KeyRegional Players• Recognize that the direction of change in

the region is more important than thedegree of change. These countries do nothave to be democracies for the UnitedStates to value their movement towardgreater openness. For example, the factthat the current leaders of Palestine andIran were elected by the nation’s citizensin democratic elections may be reasonenough to shift toward policies of engage-ment with them.

• Recognize that multilateral solutionsemphasizing the role of cooperationbetween Middle Eastern governmentsand de-emphasizing US intervention aremore likely to provide lasting solutions.

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Abdellatif Al-Sayegh, CEO Arab Media Group

Assad Al-Shamlan, Professor of PoliticalScience, Institute of Diplomatic Studies

Abdullah Al-Shayji, Associate Professor ofPolitical Science, Kuwait University

Tarek Ayntrazi, Chief Executive Officer, FutureTelevision

Jamil Azar, Senior Anchor, Al JazeeraTelevision

Jassim Azzawi, News Anchor, Abu DhabiTelevision

Khaled Batarfi, Managing Editor of Al-MadinaPress Establishment

Marwan Chukri, Director, Foreign PressOffice, Lebanon Ministry of Information

Andreu Claret, Director-General, EuropeanInstitute of the Mediterranean

Michael Connell, Research Analyst, Center forStrategic Studies, The CNA Corporation

Nakhle El-Hage, Editor in Chief, Al ArabiyaTelevision, Lebanon

Sami Faraj, President of the Kuwait Center forStrategic Studies, State of Kuwait

Dubai Dialogue 1Middle East Security in an Era ofOpen Media and TransitioningSocieties

Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation in association with INEGMADecember 19-21, 2005

OrganizersRiad Kahwaji, Founder and Chief ExecutiveOfficer, Institute for Near East & Gulf MilitaryAnalysis (INEGMA)

Michael Kraig, Director, Policy Analysis andDialogue, The Stanley Foundation

ParticipantsAyman Abdel Noor, Political Analyst andIndependent Researcher

Ibrahim Al-Abed, Director, Emirates NewsAgency

Badr Al-Hinai, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Sultanate of Oman

Ibtisam Al-Kitbi, Assistant Professor ofPolitical Science, United Arab EmiratesUniversity

Rashed Al-Oraimi, Managing Editor, Al-Ittihad, UAE

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Participant List

Peter Grimsditch, The Daily Star, UnitedKingdom

Amjad Haddad, Executive Director, TheMiddle East Forum for Human Rights, Jordan

Christopher Isham, Chief of InvestigativeProjects, ABC News

Fadi Ismail, General Manager, O3 Production,MBC Group

Salah Khalil, Ibn Khaldun Center forDevelopment Studies

Jamal Khashoggi, Media Advisor to SaudiArabia’s Ambassador to the United States

Rami Khouri, Editor at Large, The Daily Star;Syndicated Columnist

Marwan Kraidy, Assistant Professor ofInternational Communication and InternationalRelations, School of International Service,American University

David L. Mack, Vice President, Middle EastInstitute

Taieb Mahjoub, Editor in Chief, AFP GulfRegional Office

Ramez Maluf, Director, Beirut Institute forMedia Arts, Lebanese American University

Marwan Matni, Senior Producer, LBC-HayatTelevision

Khawla Mattar, Professor of MassCommunications, Bahrain University

29


Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, Associate Professor,Political Science and International Studies,American University of Sharjah

Jamil Mroue, Editor in Chief/Publisher, TheDaily Star

Salah Nagm, Director, Middle East News,MBC Group

Julia Nanay, Senior Director, Country StrategyGroup, PFC Energy

Walid Noueihed, Editor in Chief, Al-Wasat,Bahrain

Shad Omar, News Anchor, LBC-HayatTelevision

Dina Osman, Reporter/Producer, Nile TV,Cairo

Walter Pincus, National Security Staff Writer,The Washington Post

John H. Sandrock, Director, Program onInternational Security, The Atlantic Council ofthe United States

Lee Smith, Independent Media Analyst andResearcher

Hesham Youssef, Office of the Secretary-General, League of Arab States

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.Participants attended as individuals rather than as repre-sentatives of their governments or organizations.

Dubai Dialogue 2Middle East Security in an Era ofOpen Media and TransitioningSocieties

The CNA Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia

Cosponsored by The Stanley Foundation and the Center forStrategic Studies, The CNA CorporationFebruary 9-10, 2006

OrganizersMary Ellen Connell, International AffairsGroup, Center for Strategic Studies, The CNACorporation

Michael Connell, Research Analyst, Center forStrategic Studies, The CNA Corporation

Michael Kraig, Director, Policy Analysis andDialogue, The Stanley Foundation

Michael McDevitt, Director, Center forStrategic Studies, The CNA Corporation

Eric Thompson, Director, Middle EastPrograms, International Affairs Group, Centerfor Strategic Studies, The CNA Corporation

RapporteurKathy Gockel, Associate Program Officer, TheStanley Foundation

ParticipantsJon Alterman, Director, Middle East Program,Center for Strategic and International Studies

Jane Arraf, Edward R. Murrow Fellow, Councilon Foreign Relations

Jamil Azar, Senior Anchor, Al JazeeraTelevision

Thomas P. M. Barnett, Senior StrategicResearcher, Decision Strategies Department,Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and Director,NewRuleSets.Project, US Naval War College

Dale F. Eickelman, Ralph and Richard LazarusProfessor of Anthropology and HumanRelations, Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,Dartmouth College

Emile El-Hokayem, Research Associate,Southwest Asia/Middle East Program, TheHenry L. Stimson Center

Mouafac Harb, Executive Vice President,Director of Network News, Alhurra

Fadi Ismail, General Manager, O3 Production,MBC Group

Riad Kahwaji, Founder and Chief ExecutiveOfficer, Institute for Near East & Gulf MilitaryAnalysis (INEGMA)

Anatol Lieven, Senior Research Fellow, NewAmerican Foundation

30


Participant List

David L. Mack, Vice President, Middle EastInstitute

Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, Associate Professor,Political Science and International Studies,American University of Sharjah

Julia Nanay, Senior Director, Country StrategyGroup, PFC Energy

Dina Osman, News Anchor and Producer, NileTelevision

Walter Pincus, National Security Staff Writer,The Washington Post

Martin Walker, Editor, English LanguageOperations, UPI

The Stanley Foundation StaffJeffrey G. Martin, Director of Programs andExecutive Vice PresidentKristin McHugh, Program OfficerKeith Porter, Director of Communications andOutreach

Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.Participants attended as individuals rather than as repre-sentatives of their governments or organizations.

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Institute for Near East & Gulf MilitaryAnalysis (INEGMA)INEGMA is a self-financed establishment thatoffers media, research, and consultation services inthe fields of defense, security, and geopolitics.INEGMA receives no financial backing from anygovernment or political party worldwide. It was setup to provide media organizations, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, militaries and govern-ments of the Middle East, and international privatecompanies with various services related to militaryand strategic affairs. Information on INEGMA canbe found at www.inegma.com.

The CNA Corporation (CNAC)CNAC is a nonprofit research and analysis organiza-tion that conducts independent, rigorous, empiricalresearch and analyses to inform the important workof public sector leaders. For more than 60 yearsCNAC has helped make a difference by putting ourminds to work on the critical issues that face ournation and the world.

We operate the Center for Naval Analyses, a feder-ally funded research and development center thatserves the Department of the Navy and otherdefense agencies, and the Institute for PublicResearch, that provides innovative research andanalyses on a wide range of domestic issues.

CNAC’s independent research and analysis helpdecision makers form sound policies, make better-informed decisions, and manage programs moreeffectively. CNAC takes a multidisciplinary, “field-based” approach to research and analysis—placingresearch scientists in the offices of public sectorleaders to identify and solve critical problems thatwould improve the policies and programs of publicorganizations. This innovative approach has definedCNAC research for more than 60 years.

The Stanley FoundationThe Stanley Foundation brings fresh voices and orig-inal ideas to debates on global and regional problems.It is a nonpartisan, private operating foundation thatfocuses primarily on peace and security issues andadvocates principled multilateralism. For us, principledmultilateralism means working respectfully acrossdifferences to create fair, just, and lasting solutions.

The Stanley Foundation’s work recognizes theessential roles of the policy community, mediaprofessionals, and the involved public in buildingsustainable peace. Our work aims to connect peo-ple from different backgrounds, often producingclarifying insights and innovative solutions.

The foundation frequently works collaborativelywith other organizations. It does not make grants.

Stanley Foundation reports, publications, programs,and a wealth of other information are available onthe Web at www.stanleyfoundation.org.

The Stanley Foundation209 Iowa AvenueMuscatine, IA 52761 USA563-264-1500563-264-0864 [email protected]

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Documents

Open Media and Transitioning Societies in the Arab … · US decision makers, ... Open Media and Transitioning Societies in the Arab Middle East. ... Open Media and Transitioning