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7/28/2019 Operation Jackpot
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Operation Jackpot was the codename assigned to several different operations during the
Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The original "Operation Jackpot" was the logistical
and training operation set up under the Indian Army Eastern Command to aid the MuktiBahini-led insurgency. [4] The commando operation that sabotaged Pakistan Navy and
other ships in Chittagong, Chandpur, Mongla and Naryanganj on the 15th of August is
known in Bangladesh as "Operation Jackpot". [5] [6] Finally, the operational plan of LtGen Sagat Singh, commanding the Indian Army IV corps and Mukti Bahini personnel
against Pakistani forces defending the eastern sector (Syhlet, Comilla, Noakhali and
Chittagong districts) during December 3-16 may also have been named "OperationJackpot". [7]
Contents:
1. Indian Army and Mukti Bahini joint operation (May to December 1971)2. Bangladesh naval commando operation (August 16, 1971)
3. Indian Army IV corps operation (November 21, 1971)
4. See also
5. References6. Sources & Further Reading
7. External linksOperation JackpotPart of Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and Bangladesh Liberation War
Partial representation of Operation Jackpot setup in November 1971. Some of thelocation are indicative because of lack of primary data.
Date November 21, 1971 - December 16, 1971, [1] .
Location Bangladesh, then East Pakistan
Result Defeat of Pakistan Forces
Liberation of large areas in the Eastern SectorTerritorialchanges Bangladesh
Belligerents
India
Mukti BahiniPakistan
Commanders
Lt. General Sagat SinghM.A.G. Osmani Maj. General A. Majid Kazi
Maj. General Rahim
Brig. General AtaullahStrength
Bangladesh Army: Z Force Brigade, K Force Brigade, S Force Brigade
Sector Troops: 6,400
Guerrillas: from Mukti bahini Sectors 1-5 [2]
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Indian Army : IV Corps. 8th Mountain Division
23rd Mountain Division57th Mountain Division
Kilo Force
4 Independent Armored Squadrons Pakistan Army: 14th Infantry Division39th Ad hoc Infantry Division
97th Independent Infantry Brigade
Paramilitary Forces: EPCAF 2 Sector HQ wings, 6 operational Wings [3]
[[|d]]
Bangladesh Liberation War
Operation Searchlight - Jinjira genocide - Battle of Daruin - Battle of Rangamati-
Mahalchari waterway - Gopalpur massacre - Chuknagar massacre - Operation Jackpot -Battle of Goahati - Battle of Dhalai Outpost - Battle of Dhalai
Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
Mukti Bahini - Operation Searchlight - Operation Cactus-Lilly - Operation Chengiz Khan
- Operation Jackpot - Sinking of PNS Ghazi - Operation Trident - Operation Python -
Battle of Atgram - Battle of Basantar - Battle of Boyra - Battle of Chamb - Battle of
Dhalai - Battle of Garibpur - Battle of Gazipur - Battle of Hilli - Battle of Longewala -Battle of Sylhet - Meghna Heli Bridge - Tangail Airdrop - Air War - Instrument of
Surrender - Simla Agreement
Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts
Kashmir conflict 1947 War 1965 War 1971 War Siachen Operation Brasstacks Operation Rakshak Kargil War Atlantique Incident Operation Parakram
1. Indian Army and Mukti Bahini joint operation (May to December 1971)
After the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight in March 1971 in a bid to curb
all resistance (political and otherwise), the Indian government decided to open the
borders to admit Bengali refugees and the Bengali resistance fighters. [8] By mid May,
Pakistan Army had occupied all major towns in Bangladesh and had driven the battered
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remnants of the Mukti Bahini across the border into India, forcing the Mukti Bahihi to
switch to guerrilla warfare. The Indian BSF (Border Security Force) had given supplies
locally to the Mukti Bahini since April, and had even made some incursions across theborder in to East Pakistan, [9] but these efforts had been disorganized, uncoordinated and
inadequate to meet the needs of the Mukti Bahini. Once the Indian army took over aiding
the Mukti Bahini, they decided to launch a fully fledged integrated operation, codenamedOperation Jackpot.
1. 1. The Operational Setup
On May 15, [10] the Indian Army took over the task of aiding the Mukti Bahini, setting
up a coordinated enterprise under the Eastern Command for meeting the logistical and
training needs and, to some extent, lend operational support and planning advice. [4] The
operation was codenamed "Operation Jackpot". The operation was initially commandedby Maj. Gen. Onkar Singh Kalkat and after 2 months operational command was assumed
by Maj. Gen. B.N. 'Jimmy' Sarcar. The border areas around Bangladesh was divided into
6 logistical sectors, each to be commanded by a Brigadier from the Indian army. [11]
The Indian logistical sectors for this operation were:
Alpha (HQ: Murti Camp, West Bengal, C.O Brig. B.C. Joshi - serving Mukti Bahinisector no. 6).
Bravo (HQ: Rajgaunj, West Bengal, C.O Brig. Prem Singh - handling logistics for Mukti
Bahini sector no. 7).Charlie (HQ: Chakulia, Bihar, C.O. Brig. N.A. Salik, giving logistical support to sectors
no. 8 and 9).
Delta (HQ: Devta Mura, Tripura, C.O Brig. Sabeg Singh, supporting sectors no. 1,2 and
3).Echo (HQ: Masimpur, Assam, C.O Brig. M.B. Wadh, coordinating logistics for Mukti
bahini sectors 4 and 5).
Foxtrot, (HQ: Tura, Meghalaya, C.O Brig. Sant Singh, supplying sector 11).
Through this network, Mukti Bahini sector commanders communicated with the
Bangladesh Forces Headquarters in Kolkata and coordinated all supply, training andoperational efforts for the war. Lt Gen J.S. Aurora, commander of Eastern Command,
was closely involved in the operation.
1. 2. Effectiveness and Importance
Despite the limitations and challenges rising from the state of the Indian transport system
(training camps were located inside India), remoteness of the guerrilla bases,
unavailability and inadequacy of proper supplies, [12] and the decision of BangladeshHigh Command to put the maximum number of guerrillas into battle in the minimum
time possible (often after 4 to 6 weeks of training, sometimes resulting in only 50% of the
personnel receiving firearms initially), [13] the operation was effective enough to supportthe 30,000 regular soldiers (8 infantry battalions, and sector troops) and 100,000
guerrillas that Bangladesh eventually fielded in 1971, and help run a Mukti Bahini
campaign that destroyed or damaged at least 231 bridges, 122 railway lines and 90 power
stations, [14] while killing 237 officers, 136 JCOs/NCOs and 3,559 soldiers, [15] of the
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Pakistan army and an unspecified number of EPCAF and police and an estimated 5,000
Razakar personnel [16] during the period of April-November 1971. The Mukti Bahini
efforts also demoralized the Pakistani Army to the extent that, by November, they lefttheir bases only if the need arose. [14] The contribution of the Mukti Bahini to the
eventual defeat of Pakistan was enormous, [17] which would not have been as effective
without the aid of Operation Jackpot.
Once Indian army reorganized and deployed 3 Infantry coprs to commence operations
inside Bangladesh, some of the operation Jackpot formations were built up as combatformations. Foxtrot was designated FJ sector force, with Mukti Bahini sector 11 troops
and a BSF battalion and the 6 Bihar regiment, and was placed under 101 communication
zone. Echo sector became Echo force, with Mukti Bahini Z force Brigade, Sector #5
troops, Indian 5/5 Gurkha and 86th BSF battalion, and it operated under the 8 mountaindivision.
2. Bangladesh naval commando operation (August 16, 1971)
The Bangladesh naval commando operation that was called "Operation Jackpot" wasprecipitated by events in Toulon, a coastal city of southern France. In 1971, there were 11
East Pakistan naval submarine crewmen receiving training there aboard a Pakistanisubmarine. One commissioned officer (Mosharraf Hassain) and 8 crewmen decided to
take control of the submarine and to fight against Pakistan. Their plan was disclosed,
however, causing them to flee from death threats made by Pakistani intelligence. Out ofthe 9 crewmen, one was killed by Pakistani Intelligence, but the others managed to travel
to the Indian Embassy in Geneva, Switzerland. From Geneva, embassy officials took
them to New Delhi on the 9th of April where they began a program of top secret naval
training. [18]
At the conclusion of Operation Searchlight, the Pakistani Army had driven the Mukti
Bahini into India, where they entered a period of reorganization during June and July1971 to train guerrillas, set up networks and safe houses in the occupied territories to run
the insurgency and rebuild the conventional forces. As the pace of military operations in
East Pakistan slacked off, the civilian morale was adversely affected, [19] whichprompted Pakistani authorities to claim that the situation had returned to "normal". In
response to this declaration, the Mukti Bahini launched 2 operations: 1) Guerrilla attacks
in targets in Dhaka by a crack commando group trained by Major ATM Haider (ex-SSG
commando), and 2) the simultaneous mining and damaging of ships in Chittagong,Chandpur, Mongla and Narayanganj on the 15th of August, which became known in
Bangladesh and international media as "Operation Jackpot".
2. 1. Setup and Training
After initial training in Delhi under commander Sharma and DFI chief Brd. Gupta, from
April 25 to May 15, the Indian trainers planned for bigger actions. The river transportsystem was vital for economic activity given the primitive state of the road and railways
system of East Pakistan. Indian Commander Bhattachariya, Major Jalil and Colonel
M.A.G. Osmani in collaboration with top regional commanders established the secret
camp, codenamed C2P, in Plassey, West Bengal on May 23 [6] [20] to train volunteers
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selected from various Mukti Bahini sectors (Bangladesh was divided in 10 operational
sectors for Mukti Bahini operations) for this purpose. Initially 300 volunteers were
chosen, [21] ultimately 499 commandos were trained in the camp. The course includedswimming, survival training, using limpet mines, hand to hand combat and navigation.
By August 1971, the first batch of commandos were ready for operation.
2. 2. The Operation
The operation was planned in the last week of September, under tight security.
Information on river tides, weather and Pakistani infrastructure and deployment wascollected through the Mukti Bahini. Selected commandos were sent from C2P to forward
bases in Tripura and West Bengal, where a final briefing was given to them. Mukti
Bahini in Sector 1 assisted the group going to Chittagong, Sector 2 aided the groups
going to Chandpur and Naryanganj and Sector 9 assisted the group targeting Mongla.Each commando carried a pair of fins, a knife, a limpet mine, and swimming trunks.
Some had compasses, 1 in 3 commandos had sten guns and hand grenades, the group
leaders carried a transistor radio. All the groups carried their own equipment to their
targets and after entering Bangladesh between August 3 and 9, reached their destinationsby August 12, using the local Mukti Bahini network of safehouses. A pair of songs was
played in India Radio (Akashbani) at specific times to convey the intended signal forcommencing the operations. [22] The first song (Amar putul ajke prothom jabe shoshur
bari) [23] was played on the 13th of August, the second song (Ami tomay joto
shuniyechilem gan tar bodole chaini kono dan) [24] on the 14th. The result of thisoperation was:
Chittagong: 60 commandos were sent, out of which 31 finally took part in the sabotage
operation on the 16th. Between 1:45 to 2:15AM explosions sank the MV Al-Abbas, the
MV Hormuz and the Orient barge no.6, sinking 19,000 tons of arms and ammunition.Chandpur: 18 out of 40 commandos finally took part in the operation. 3 steamers/barges
were damaged or sunk.
Narayanganj: 20 commandos conducted the sabotage operation. 4 ships were sunk ordamaged.
Mongla: 20 commandos managed to damage 6 foreign owned ships.
The simultaneous attacks on Pakistani shipping assets on August 16 destroyed the myth
of normalcy in East Pakistan when the news was flashed in the international media.
2. 3. Naval Commandos killed in Operation Jackpot
[25]
Commando Abdur Raquib, who was killed during the Foolchhori Ghat Operation
Commando Hossain Farid, who was executed during the second Chittagong operation.He was captured by Pakistani army, who tortured him to death by placing him inside a
manhole and bending his body until his vertebral column was shattered.
Commando Khabiruzzaman, who was killed in second operation in FaridpurCommando Sirajul Islam, M. Aziz, Aftab Uddin, and Rafiqul Islam, nothing further is
known about them.
2. 4. Naval Commandos Who Received Bangladesh 'National Hero' Recognition
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[26]
Mr. A.W. Chowdhury- Bir Uttam
Mr. Badiul Alam- Bir UttamDr. Shah Alam- Bir Uttam
Mr. Mazhar Ullah- Bir Uttam
Mr. Sheikh Md. Amin Ullah- Bir UttamMr. Abedur Rahman- Bir Uttam
Mr. Mosharraf Hossain- Bir Uttam (His honor was revoked by the ruling Government of
Bangladesh)Mohammad Khabiruzzan- Bir Bikrom
Mr. Momin Ullah Patwari- Bir Protik
Mr. Shahjahan Kabir- Bir Protik
Mr. Faruq-e-Azam- Bir ProtikMohammad Rahmatullah-Bir Protik
Mohammad Mojjamel Hossain- Bir Protik
Amir Hossain- Bir Protik
3. Indian Army IV corps operation (November 21, 1971)
The plan of operation for the Indian Army IV corps (8 Mountain Div., 23 Mountain Div.,57 Mountain Div. and "Kilo Force") and the Bangladesh forces (8 infantry battalions, and
guerrillas and sector troops of Sector 1-5 of Mukti Bahini) may have been codenamed
"Operation Jackpot". The opposition forces included the Pakistani 14th Infantry divisiondefending Sylhet, Maulaviabazar and Akhaura, the 39th ad hoc division in Comilla,
Laksham and Feni and the 97th independent infantry brigade stationed in Chittagong.
Indian army had supported Mukti Bahini efforts to seize salients in the Eastern border
from November 21, 1971. After Pakistan launched air attacks on India on December 3,the Indian army crossed the border into Bangladesh. By the end of the war on 16
December 1971, the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini had isolated and surrounded the
remnants of the 14th division in Syhlet and Bhairabbazar, the 39th division was corneredin Comilla and Chittagong, with all other areas of Syhlet, Comilla, Noakhali and
Chittagong clear of enemy forces. Part of the corps and Mukti Bahini forces had crossed
the Meghna river using the "Meghna Heli Bridge" and using local boats collected byMukti Bahini to drive towards Dhaka when the Pakistani army surrendered.