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Operation Unthinkable 1
Operation Unthinkable
Allied army positions in central Europe on 10 May 1945. The
Soviet numericalsuperiority in relation to the Western Allies was
roughly 4:1 in men and 2:1 in tanks at the
end of hostilities in Europe.
Operation Unthinkable was acode-name of two related plans of
aconflict between the Western Alliesand the Soviet Union. Both
wereordered by British Prime MinisterWinston Churchill in 1945
anddeveloped by the British ArmedForces' Joint Planning Staff at
the endof World War II in Europe.
The first of the two assumed a surpriseattack on the Soviet
forces stationed inGermany in order to "impose the willof the
Western Allies" on the Sovietsand force Joseph Stalin to honour
theagreements in regards to the future ofCentral
Europe.Wikipedia:Citationneeded When the odds were judged
"fanciful", the original plan was abandoned. The code-name was used
instead fora defensive scenario, in which the British were to
defend against a Soviet drive towards the North Sea and theAtlantic
following the withdrawal of the American forces from the
continent.
The study became the first of Cold War-era contingency plans for
war with the Soviet Union. Both plans were highlysecret at the time
of their creation and it was not until 1998 that they were made
public.
Offensive operationsThe initial primary goal of the operation
was declared as follows: "to impose upon Russia the will of the
UnitedStates and the British Empire. Even though 'the will' of
these two countries may be defined as no more than a squaredeal for
Poland, that does not necessarily limit the military commitment".
The word "Russia" is used heavilythroughout the document, as during
the Imperial period the term was used as pars pro toto for the
Czarist Empire,with which the USSR was almost coterminous.The
Chiefs of Staff were concerned that given the enormous size of
Soviet forces deployed in Europe at the end ofthe war, and the
perception that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was unreliable,
there existed a Soviet threat toWestern Europe. The Soviet
numerical superiority was roughly 4:1 in men and 2:1 in tanks at
the end of hostilities inEurope. The Soviet Union had yet to launch
its attack on Japan, and so one assumption in the report was that
theSoviet Union would instead ally with Japan if the Western Allies
commenced hostilities.The hypothetical date for the start of the
Allied invasion of Soviet-held Europe was scheduled for 1 July
1945. Theplan assumed a surprise attack by up to 47 British and
American divisions in the area of Dresden, in the middle ofSoviet
lines. This represented almost a half of roughly 100 divisions (ca.
2.5 million men) available to the British,American and Canadian
headquarters at that time.The plan was taken by the British Chiefs
of Staff Committee as militarily unfeasible due to a three-to-one
superiority of Soviet land forces in Europe and the Middle East,
where the conflict was projected to take place. The majority of any
offensive operation would have been undertaken by American and
British forces, as well as Polish forces and up to 100,000 German
Wehrmacht soldiers. Any quick success would be due to surprise
alone. If a quick success could not be obtained before the onset of
winter, the assessment was that the Allies would be committed to a
total war
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Operation Unthinkable 2
which would be protracted. In the report of 22 May 1945, an
offensive operation was deemed "hazardous".
Defensive operationsIn response to an instruction by Churchill
of 10 June 1945 a follow up report was written concerning "what
measureswould be required to ensure the security of the British
Isles in the event of war with Russia in the near future".United
States forces were relocating to the Pacific Theatre to prepare for
the invasion of Japan, and Churchill wasconcerned that this
reduction in supporting forces would leave the Soviets in a strong
position to take offensiveaction in Western Europe. The report
concluded that if the United States focused on the Pacific theatre,
GreatBritain's odds "would become fanciful."The Joint Planning
Staff rejected Churchill's notion of retaining bridgeheads on the
continent as having nooperational advantage. It was envisaged that
Britain would use its air force and navy to resist, although a
threat frommass rocket attack was anticipated, with no means of
resistance except for strategic bombing.
Subsequent discussionsBy 1946 tensions and conflicts were
developing between democratic and communist areas of Europe. These
wereseen as being potential triggers for a wider conflict. One such
area was the Julian March (which was applied to anarea of
southeastern Europe, today split among Croatia, Slovenia, and
Italy), and on 30 August 1946 informaldiscussions took place
between the British and US Chiefs of Staff concerning how such a
conflict could develop andthe best strategy for conducting a
European war. Again the issue of retaining a bridgehead on the
continent wasdiscussed, with Dwight D. Eisenhower preferring a
withdrawal to the Low Countries, rather than Italy, for
theirproximity to the United Kingdom.
Citations
ReferencesBooks (English) Jonathan Walker (2013). Operation
Unthinkable: The Third World War. The History Press. p.192.
ISBN9780752487182. (English) David Reynolds (2006). From World
War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International
History of the 1940s. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.376.
ISBN978-0-19-928411-5. (English) Joel Clarke Gibbons (2009). The
Empire Strikes a Match in a World Full of Oil. Bloomington, IN:
Xlibris Corporation. p.352. ISBN9781450008693. (English) Frank
Costigliola (2011). Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal
Politics Helped Start the Cold War.
Princeton University Press. p.544. ISBN9780691121291.Documents
(English) British War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, Public Record
Office, CAB 120/691/109040 / 002 (11
August 1945). "Operation Unthinkable: 'Russia: Threat to Western
Civilization'" (https:/ / web. archive. org/ web/20101116160624/
http:/ / www. history. neu. edu/ PRO2/ ) (online photocopy).
Department of History,Northeastern University. Archived from the
original (http:/ / www. history. neu. edu/ PRO2/ ) on 16
November2010. Retrieved 9 May 2006.
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Operation Unthinkable 3
External links Richard Northon-Taylor: Churchill plotted
invasion of Russia; Richard Norton-Taylor on allied blueprint to
crush
Soviet system after the end of the war in Europe, The Guardian,
2 October 1998 Julian Lewis: 978-0-415-49171-6 Changing Direction:
British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence
(http:/ / www. routledge. com/ books/ Changing-Direction-ISBN),
2nd edn., Routledge, 2008, pp.xxx-xl (ISBN0-415-49171-1)
Operation Unthinkable: Churchills plan to start World War III
(http:/ / indrus. in/ blogs/ 2013/ 06/
13/operation_unthinkable_churchills_plan_to_start_world_war_iii_26091.
html)
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Article Sources and Contributors 4
Article Sources and ContributorsOperation Unthinkable Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=611235346 Contributors:
Ahmad510, Ahpook, Alan Liefting, Alysg, Amcalabrese,
Artem-S-Tashkinov, Atrix20,Bchan, Bender235, Britannicus, Brovary,
Buckshot06, Builtiger, Cffrost, ChainSuck-Jimmy, Clarityfiend,
Cyclopia, Emurphy42, ErikWarmelink, Fastboy, GMRE, Gaius Cornelius,
Ghirlandajo,Glossologist, Gob Lofa, Ground Zero, Guinness man,
Halibutt, Hibernian, HisSpaceResearch, Hmains, Hunter2005,
JCDenton2052, Jacurek, JanSuchy, Jaraalbe, Laurinavicius,
Ligulem,Manormadman, MarkThomas, Mogism, Neddyseagoon, Nick-D,
Ohconfucius, Paul Barlow, Petri Krohn, Phd8511, Rewster,
Royalcourtier, SaltIrritates, Silverhorse, Stevebritgimp,
Supertask,Surv1v4l1st, Swliv, Tec15, Tempshill, Waggers, Xihr,
Xtremeways, 50 anonymous edits
Image Sources, Licenses and ContributorsFile:Allied army
positions on 10 May 1945.png Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:Allied_army_positions_on_10_May_1945.png
License: Creative CommonsAttribution-Sharealike 3.0 Contributors:
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