Operational and Administrative Analysis Dover Fire

Operational and Administrative Analysis Dover Fire Department

Dover, Del. Final Report – March 2016

EMS FIRE

474 K Street, NW, Suite 702

475 K Street, NW, Suite 702 Washington, DC 20001

www.cpsm.us – 716‐969‐1360

Exclusive Provider of Public Safety Technical Assistance for the

International City/County Management Association

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page ii

International City/County Management Association (ICMA) The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is a 100-year-old, nonprofit professional association of local government administrators and managers, with approximately 9,000 members spanning thirty-two countries.

Since its inception in 1914, ICMA has been dedicated to assisting local governments in providing services to their citizens in an efficient and effective manner. Our work spans all of the activities of local government — parks, libraries, recreation, public works, economic development, code enforcement, Brownfields, public safety, etc.

ICMA advances the knowledge of local government best practices across a wide range of platforms including publications, research, training, and technical assistance. Its work includes both domestic and international activities in partnership with local, state, and federal governments as well as private foundations. For example, it is involved in a major library research project funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and is providing community policing training in Panama working with the U.S. State Department. It has personnel in Afghanistan assisting with building wastewater treatment plants and has had teams in Central America providing training in disaster relief working with SOUTHCOM.

The ICMA Center for Public Safety Management (ICMA/CPSM) was one of four Centers within the Information and Assistance Division of ICMA providing support to local governments in the areas of police, fire, EMS, emergency management, and homeland security. In addition to providing technical assistance in these areas we also represent local governments at the federal level and are involved in numerous projects with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. In each of these Centers, ICMA has selected to partner with nationally recognized individuals or companies to provide services that ICMA has previously provided directly. Doing so will provide a higher level of services, greater flexibility, and reduced costs in meeting members’ needs as ICMA will be expanding the services that it can offer to local governments. For example, The Center for Productivity Management (CPM) is now working exclusively with SAS, one of the world’s leaders in data management and analysis. And the Center for Strategic Management (CSM) is now partnering with nationally recognized experts and academics in local government management and finance.

Center for Public Safety Management, LLC (CPSM) is now the exclusive provider of public safety technical assistance for ICMA. CPSM provides training and research for the Association’s members and represents ICMA in its dealings with the federal government and other public safety professional associations such as CALEA. The Center for Public Safety Management, LLC maintains the same team of individuals performing the same level of service that it has for the past seven years for ICMA.

CPSM’s local government technical assistance experience includes workload and deployment analysis using our unique methodology and subject matter experts to examine department organizational structure and culture, identify workload and staffing needs, and identify and disseminate industry best practices. We have conducted more than 200 such studies in 36 states and 155 communities ranging in size from 8,000 population (Boone, Iowa) to 800,000 population (Indianapolis, Ind.).

Thomas Wieczorek is the Director of the Center for Public Safety Management. Leonard Matarese serves as the Director of Research & Program Development. Dr. Dov Chelst is the Director of Quantitative Analysis.

The Association & The Company

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page iii

CPSM Project Contributors Thomas J. Wieczorek, Director Leonard A. Matarese, Director of Research and Program Development Michael Iacona, Senior Manager for Fire and EMS John Brown, CPSM Associate Peter Finley, CPSM Associate Dennis Kouba, Editor

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page iv

Contents

Tables .............................................................................................................................................. vi

Figures ............................................................................................................................................ vii

Section 1. Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 1

Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................ 2

Section 2. Scope of Project ............................................................................................................. 7

Section 3. Organization and Management ..................................................................................... 8

Governance and Administration ................................................................................................................... 8

Dover Fire Department ............................................................................................................................... 14

Robbins Hose Company No. 1 ........................................................................................................ 16

Organizational Structure ................................................................................................................ 16

Personnel Management/Rank Structure ....................................................................................... 19

Section 4. Analysis and Planning Approaches .............................................................................. 22

Community Risk Analysis ............................................................................................................................ 22

Strategic Planning/Long‐Range Planning .................................................................................................... 22

Standards of Cover ...................................................................................................................................... 23

Fire Risk Analysis/Target Hazards ............................................................................................................... 24

Section 5. Operational Response Approaches .............................................................................. 27

Dover Response Matrix/Response Protocols ............................................................................................. 30

Staffing and Volunteer Deployment ........................................................................................................... 33

Apparatus and Fleet Maintenance ............................................................................................................. 33

Fleet Maintenance ......................................................................................................................... 38

Fire Response .............................................................................................................................................. 39

EMS Response and Transport ..................................................................................................................... 45

Workload Analysis/Fire Loss ....................................................................................................................... 50

Fire Loss ......................................................................................................................................... 52

Service Relationship with Kent County ....................................................................................................... 53

Mutual Aid .................................................................................................................................................. 54

Emergency/Nonemergency Response ........................................................................................................ 54

Section 6. Response Time Analysis ............................................................................................... 58

Measuring Response Times ........................................................................................................................ 59

Dover Fire Department Response Times .................................................................................................... 60

Station Locations ......................................................................................................................................... 63

Assessment of Fire Station Locations ............................................................................................ 63

Section 7. Measurement and Self‐Assessment ............................................................................ 69

Performance Measurement ........................................................................................................................ 69

Hazard Analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 72

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page v

Fire Preplanning/Company Inspections ...................................................................................................... 73

Accreditation ............................................................................................................................................... 75

ISO ............................................................................................................................................................... 75

Section 8. Essential Resources ...................................................................................................... 78

Fire Prevention, Code Enforcement, Public Education, and Investigations ............................................... 78

Education and Training Programs ............................................................................................................... 80

Internal Communications ........................................................................................................................... 83

Emergency Management/COOP/Hazard Mitigation .................................................................................. 83

Emergency Communications Center (ECC) ................................................................................................. 85

Section 9. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 87

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 87

Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 87

Aggregate Call Totals and Dispatches ......................................................................................................... 88

Calls by Type .................................................................................................................................. 88

Calls by Type and Duration ............................................................................................................ 90

Average Calls per Day and per Hour .............................................................................................. 91

Units Dispatched to Calls ............................................................................................................... 93

Workload by Individual Unit—Calls and Total Time Spent ......................................................................... 95

Runs and Deployed Time – All Units .............................................................................................. 95

Workload by Unit ........................................................................................................................... 96

Analysis of Busiest Hours ............................................................................................................................ 99

Overlapping Calls ......................................................................................................................... 100

Response Time .......................................................................................................................................... 101

Response Times by Type of Call ................................................................................................... 101

Response Times by Hour .............................................................................................................. 104

Response Time Distribution ......................................................................................................... 106

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page vi

Tables

TABLE 3‐1: Comparison of Personnel Costs ................................................................................................ 19

TABLE 5‐1: Staffing and Response Time Guidance from NFPA 1720 .......................................................... 29

TABLE 5‐2: Fire Pumper Life Expectancy by Type of Jurisdiction ................................................................ 34

TABLE 5‐3: Dover Fire Department Apparatus Inventory ........................................................................... 35

TABLE 5‐4: Call Workload by Unit ............................................................................................................... 36

TABLE 5‐5: Proposed Fire Apparatus Replacement Schedule .................................................................... 37

TABLE 5‐6: Call Types .................................................................................................................................. 42

TABLE 5‐7: Calls by Type and Duration ....................................................................................................... 43

TABLE 5‐8: Actions Taken Analysis for Structure and Outside Fire Calls .................................................... 44

TABLE 5‐9: PrimeCare Statistics, June 2015‐September 2015 .................................................................... 47

TABLE 5‐10: 2015 Mutual Aid EMS Units Dispatched into Dover ............................................................... 47

TABLE 5‐11: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Call Type ....................................................................... 51

TABLE 5‐12: Call Workload by Unit ............................................................................................................. 52

TABLE 5‐13: Fire Loss .................................................................................................................................. 53

TABLE 5‐14: Number of Units Dispatched to Calls ...................................................................................... 56

TABLE 6‐1: Average Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type (Minutes) ................................... 61

TABLE 6‐2: 90th Percentile Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type (Minutes) ....................... 62

TABLE 7‐1: The Five GASB Performance Indicators .................................................................................... 70

TABLE 9‐1: Call Types .................................................................................................................................. 88

TABLE 9‐2: Calls by Type and Duration ....................................................................................................... 90

TABLE 9‐3: Number of Units Dispatched to Calls ........................................................................................ 93

TABLE 9‐4: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Call Type.......................................................................... 95

TABLE 9‐5: Call Workload by Unit ............................................................................................................... 96

TABLE 9‐6: Total Annual Runs by Call Type and Unit .................................................................................. 97

TABLE 9‐7: Daily Average Deployed Minutes by Call Type and Unit .......................................................... 98

TABLE 9‐8: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Calls ........................................................................ 99

TABLE 9‐9: Top 10 Hours with the Most Calls Received ............................................................................. 99

TABLE 9‐10: Average Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type (Minutes) ............................... 102

TABLE 9‐11: 90th Percentile Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type (Minutes) ................... 102

TABLE 9‐12: Average and 90th Percentile Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day .......... 105

TABLE 9‐13: Number of Total Calls by First Arriving Units ........................................................................ 106

TABLE 9‐14: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Response Time of First Arriving Unit ................ 107

TABLE 9‐15: Actions Taken Analysis for Structure and Outside Fire Calls ................................................ 109

TABLE 9‐16: Fire Loss ................................................................................................................................ 110

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page vii

Figures

FIGURE 3‐1: City of Dover FY 2016 Organizational Chart ............................................................................. 9

FIGURE 3‐2: Proposed Fire Department Organizational Structure ............................................................. 13

FIGURE 3‐3: City of Dover Map with Fire Station Locations ....................................................................... 15

FIGURE 3‐4: Dover Fire Department FY 2015 Organizational Chart ........................................................... 17

FIGURE 5‐1: Low‐Risk Response–Exterior Fire Attack ................................................................................ 28

FIGURE 5‐2: Moderate‐Risk Response–Interior Fire Attack ....................................................................... 29

FIGURE 5‐3: Calls by Type ........................................................................................................................... 42

FIGURE 5‐4: Dover EMS Incidents 2001‐2014............................................................................................. 46

FIGURE 5‐5: Number of Dover Fire Department Units Dispatched to Calls ............................................... 56

FIGURE 6‐1: Fire Propagation Curve ........................................................................................................... 59

FIGURE 6‐2: DFD Station Locations and Travel Times (red = 240 seconds) ................................................ 65

FIGURE 6‐3: DFD Station Locations and Travel Times (green = 360 seconds) ............................................ 66

FIGURE 6‐4: DFD Station Locations and Travel Times (blue = 480 seconds) .............................................. 67

FIGURE 6‐5: DFD Fire Runs .......................................................................................................................... 68

FIGURE 9‐1: Calls by Type ........................................................................................................................... 89

FIGURE 9‐2: Average Calls per Day, by Month ............................................................................................ 91

FIGURE 9‐3: Calls by Hour of Day ................................................................................................................ 91

FIGURE 9‐4: Number of Dover Fire Department Units Dispatched to Calls ............................................... 93

FIGURE 9‐5: Average Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type ............................................... 101

FIGURE 9‐6: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day ............................................ 104

FIGURE 9‐7: Number of Total Calls by First Arriving Units ........................................................................ 106

FIGURE 9‐8: Response Time Distribution — First Arriving Unit ................................................................ 108

Operational and Administrative Analysis, Dover Fire Department page 1

Section 1. Executive Summary

TheCenterforPublicSafetyManagement,LLC(CPSM)wasretainedbytheCityofDovertoconductacomprehensiveanalysisofitsfiredepartmentoperations,includingthedepartment’sdeploymentpractices,workload,organizationstructure,training,performancemeasures,preventionactivities,andinteractionswithmutualaidpartners.Specifically,CPSMwastaskedwithprovidingrecommendationsandalternativesregardingfiredepartmentoperations,staffinglevels,financialefficiencies,andalternativemodesofoperation.

Duringthestudy,CPSManalyzedperformancedataprovidedbytheDoverFireDepartment(DFD)andalsoexaminedfirsthandthedepartment’soperations,includingitsworkingrelationshipwiththeVolunteerAssociation(formallytheRobbinsHoseCompanyNo.1),whichprovidesfireprotectioninthecommunity.Firedepartmentstendtodeployresourcesutilizingtraditionalapproaches,whicharerarelyreviewed.Tobeginthereview,projectstaffaskedthecityforcertaindocuments,data,andinformation.Theprojectstaffusedthisinformation/datatofamiliarizethemselveswiththedepartment’sstructure,assets,andoperations.Theprovidedinformationwasalsousedinconjunctionwithinformationcollectedduringanon‐sitevisittodeterminetheexistingperformanceofthedepartment,andtocomparethatperformancetonationalbenchmarks.ThesebenchmarkshavebeendevelopedbyorganizationssuchastheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA),CenterforPublicSafetyExcellence,Inc.,(CPSE),andtheICMACenterforPerformanceMeasurement.

ProjectstaffconductedasitevisitonNovember3‐5,2015forthepurposeofobservingfiredepartmentandagency‐connectedsupportoperations,interviewingkeydepartmentstaff,andreviewingpreliminarydataandoperations.Telephoneconferencecallsaswellase‐mailexchangeswereconductedbetweenCPSMprojectmanagementstaff,thecity,andtheDFDsothatCPSMstaffcouldaffirmtheprojectscope,andelicitfurtherdiscussionregardingthisoperationalanalysis.

DFDisahighlyskilledandprogressiveorganizationthatiscomposedalmostentirelyofvolunteerpersonnel.ThecityandthevolunteerpersonnelwithwhomCPSMinteractedaretrulyinterestedinservingthecitytothebestoftheirabilities.OneoutstandingissuefacingDFDistheinteractionbetweentheVolunteerAssociationandcitygovernment.IntertwinedinthisassociationistheworkingrelationshipwithPrimeCare,theprivateambulancetransportprovidercontractedbythecitytoprovideEMStransport.Inaddition,thecollaborationbetweenthefireandpolicedispatchcentersisanintegralcomponentofensuringthehighestlevelsofprotection.AsservicedemandsincreaseandDFDisrequiredtoprovideincreasedresponseactivities,thenecessityforstrongcollaborationsandseamlessservicedeliverywillalsocontinuetoexpand.Thisworkloadandthepotentialforexpandingcallvolumeisnot,however,insurmountableandCPSMwillprovideaseriesofobservationsandrecommendationsthatwebelievecanallowDFDtobecomemoreefficientandsmarterinthemanagementofitsemergencyandnonemergencyresponsibilities.


Recommendations

TheDFDprovidesanexcellentandextremelycost‐effectiveservicetoitscitizens,visitorstothearea,andlocalbusinesses.Thedepartmentiswellrespectedinthecommunityandbycityleadership.TheCityofDover,thestatecapital,hasmaintaineditsrelationshipwiththeVolunteerAssociation(formallytheRobbinsHoseCompanyNo.1)since1882.TheworkingrelationshipobservedbetweenthecityandtheVolunteerAssociationisimpressiveandtrulycommendable.

Forty‐ninerecommendationsarelistedbelowandintheapplicablesectionswithinthisreport.TherecommendationsarebasedonbestpracticesderivedfromtheNFPA,CPSM,ICMA,theU.S.FireAdministration,theInternationalAssociationofEmergencyManagers(IAEM),andtheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA).

Theserecommendationshavebeengroupedonthebasisofourperceivedprioritizationforimplementation.Wehaveidentifiedthreegroupings:InitialPhaseImplementation,SecondPhaseImplementationandThirdPhaseImplementation.CPSMrecommendsthattheFirstPhaserecommendationsbeimplementedwithinthefirstsix(6)monthsafterformalacceptanceofthereport.TheSecondPhasewouldbeimplementednextandwerecommendthistakeplacewithinsix‐(6)monthstoeighteen(18)monthsafteracceptance.TheThirdPhasewouldthenfollowandweanticipateanimplementationschedulethatwouldoccurfromtwo(2)tofive(5)yearsafterformalacceptance.

InitialPhaseRecommendations

TheCityofDovershouldcreateafull‐timepositionofEmergencyServicesManagerandtransfertheday‐to‐dayoversightofthefiredepartmentandtheothercloselyrelatedemergencyservicesandsupportfunctionsunderthisposition.WerecommendthatthisnewpositionbeadirectreporttotheCityManager.

TheCityofDoverandtheVolunteerAssociationshouldenterintoacontractualagreementthatspecifiesthetermsandconditionsinvolvedinthedeliveryoffireservices.

TheEmergencyServicesManagershouldbeassignedtheadministrationofthecontractwithPrimeCareandshouldcoordinatetheemergencymanagementactivitiesfortheCityofDover.

TheCityofDoverandtheVolunteerAssociationshouldspecifythosecitypersonnelpoliciesthatapplytomembersoftheVolunteerAssociationandplacetheseprovisionsintheserviceagreement.

TheCityofDovershouldfacilitatethedevelopmentofastrategicplanfortheDoverFireDepartmentwhichfocusesonthedepartment’slong‐termneedsandanticipatedservicedemands.


TheFireChiefand/orthedutyofficer,whendispatchedtoanincident,shouldrespondwiththeirassignedcommandvehicletotheincidentsceneandassumetheroleofincidentcommander.

TheDFDshouldstandardizeitsresponsetoasingleunittoautomaticfirealarmsoundingsandothernonemergencysituations(whentheseareunconfirmedasatrueemergency).

TheDFDshouldlimititsfleetofprimaryresponseapparatustothreeengines,oneladdertruck,andtwocommandvehicles.

TheDFDshouldbuildatleastaportionofitstrainingregimensandtacticalstrategiesaroundtheexteriorortransitionalattackwhenthefirescenarioandthenumberofrespondingpersonnelwarrantthisapproach.

TheDFDshouldworkwiththeDover911PoliceCommunicationsCenterinanefforttoclassifyanddispatchfirecallsintoemergencyandnonemergencyresponsecategories.

TheDFDshouldmodifyitsresponseprotocolsinanefforttoreducethenumberofunitsrespondingtothosecallsthatarescreenedsufficientlytodeterminethattheyarenonemergencyinnature.

TheDFDshouldinstituteaunifiedincidentandactivityreportingsystemforemergencyresponseandothersupportactivitiescarriedoutbyallpersonnel.

DovershouldrequestfromISOareevaluationofitsAugust2015reviewaftermakingadjustmentsinitsfirehydranttestingproceduresandthetransferoffiredispatchingtoKentCounty.

TheCityofDovershouldincludearequirementforresidentialfiresprinklerswhenitadoptsthe2015InternationalCodeCouncilInternationalFireCode.

TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldrequireallnewfirefighterstomeetthetrainingqualificationsoftheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)Standard1001,StandardforFirefighterProfessionalQualificationsforFirefighterIandII.

TheDFDtrainingprogramshouldberevisedinordertoscheduleweeklytrainingmeetingsanddrillsthroughouttheyear.

TheDFDshouldrevisetheongoingtrainingrequirementsforallactivemembers(includinglife‐members)toensurethatskillsandproficiencytrainingiscarriedouttosufficientlyensurefirefighterreadinessandsafety.


SecondPhaseImplementation

TheCityofDovershouldreorganizethestructureoffiredepartmentoperationssothatthesupervisionandmanagementoftheDoverFireDepartmentisunifiedandunderthedirectionoftheCityManager.

ThecityFireMarshalandFireInspectors(DeputyFireMarshals),alongwithfirecodeenforcement,plansreview,andfireinspectionduties,shouldbeassignedunderthesupervisionoftheEmergencyServicesManager.

Allofficerpositions,includingCaptain,AssistantFireChief,DeputyFireChief,andFireChief,shouldbefilledonthebasisoffirefighting/emergencyservicestraining,certifications,andexperience,alongwithsuccessfulcompletionofaformal,openlycompetitiveassessmentprocess,includingapracticalskillsevaluation.

TheCityofDovershouldreassignthedispatchingfunctionattheDoverFireDepartmentandmoveallfiredispatchingtotheKentCounty911DispatchCenter.

TheCityofDovershouldreducethenumberoffull‐timedispatchersfromfivetotwo,reclassifythispositiontoaFireTechniciandesignation,andeliminatetheFireChief’sAssistantposition.

TheCityofDover,throughtheEmergencyServicesManager,shouldreviewallselection,promotional,andpersonnelissuescarriedoutbytheVolunteerAssociationinordertoensurecompliancewithcityregulations,andstateandfederalguidelines.

TheCityofDovershouldrevisititscurrentprohibitionofallowingemployeestorespondasvolunteerfirefighterswithoutdockingtheirpayorrequiringutilizationofleavetime.

TheDFDshouldconductaformalfireriskanalysisthatconcentratesonitsdowntownareas,high‐risestructures,andmanufacturingandinstitutionaloccupancies.

TheCityofDovershouldadoptanapparatusreplacementscheduletoserveasaguideforthefinancialplanningandreplacementoffireapparatus.

TheCityofDovershouldadoptanapparatusreplacementprogramthatallocatesannualfundingthatisearmarkedforfutureapparatuspurchases.

Thecity,underthedirectionofthenewEmergencyServiceManager,shouldberesponsibleforfleetmaintenanceandvehicleacquisitionfortheDoverFireDepartment.

TheDFDshouldundertakeaconcertedefforttodevelopacomprehensivesetofperformancemeasuresthatmonitorsitssystemperformanceandsystemoutcomes.TheprocessofdevelopingthesemeasuresshouldutilizeinputfromDFDmembers,thecommunity,electedofficials,andcityadministrators.


DFDshouldexpandtheresponsibilitiesoftheFireTechnicianpositiontoincludeinspectionandcodeenforcement,includingtheprefireplanningofkeyoccupancies.

TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldmandatethatallofficersparticipateinadditionalofficer‐relatedtrainingeachyearinordertobeeligibletoretaintheirpositions.

Dovershouldconsiderthere‐assignmentoftheFireMarshal’sOfficeanditsfirecodeenforcementdutiesundertheFireDepartment’sEmergencyServicesManager.

TheDFDshoulddevelopanannualtrainingbudgetthatidentifiestheneededtrainingforitsmembershipandtheassociatedcostsforeachelementofthetrainingprogram.

UnderthedirectionoftheEmergencyServicesManager,theDFDshouldformacommitteecomprisedofacross‐sectionofthedepartment’smembershiptodevelopstandardoperatingguidelines(SOGs).

TheCityofDovershouldensurethatallFireDepartmentpersonnelarefamiliarwithapplicablecitypoliciesandthattheseareincludedintheannualtrainingcurriculum.

TheCityofDovershouldensurethatthehazardmitigationeffortsofKentCountyarealignedwiththeneedsofthecityandshouldidentifythosekeyinfrastructureandpublicoutreacheffortsnecessarytoprotectallcityresidents.

TheCityofDovershouldtransferitsfiredispatchingdutiestotheKentCounty911CommunicationsCenter.

ThirdPhaseImplementation

ThecityshouldconsidertherelocationofallFireDepartmentoperations,includingFireCodeInspections/Enforcement,EMStransport,andtheemergencymanagementfunctions,tothemainfirestationat103S.GovernorsAve.

TheCityofDovershouldintegrateitscommunityriskanalysisandhazardmitigationeffortswithKentCounty.

TheDFDshouldconductaformalStandardsofResponseCoverageanalysisundertheguidelinesoftheCommissiononFireAccreditationInternational(CFAI)

TheDFDshoulddevelopacomprehensive,department‐wideriskmanagementplanasrecommendedinNFPA1500.


TheDFDshouldmakeitaprioritytoestablishaformalpre‐incidentplanningprogramwiththegoalofhavinganup‐to‐datepreplanforeverybusinessandcommercialoccupancy(includingschools,churches,etc.)withinitsresponsearea.

TheCityofDovershouldreviseitsperformancecriteriainfuturecontractswiththeambulanceprovider,withspecificguidelinesrelatingtounitavailability,turnouttime,andoverallresponsetime,measuredatthe90percentfractilerates.

TheCityofDovershouldamenditsfutureambulancecontracttorequirethatallambulancesoperatingwithinthecitybestaffedwithaminimumoftwo(2)EMTs.

AtthecloseofthecurrentcontractwithPrimeCare,theCityofDovershouldconsiderissuinganationalRFPforanambulanceproviderforthecityservicearea.

ThecityshouldconsiderthehousinganddeploymentofambulanceunitsfromtheDoverfirestations.

TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldconsiderCPSEaccreditationinthefuture.

Personnelseekingtobecomeanofficershouldberequiredtostartattherankofcaptainandserveineachsuccessiverankforaminimumperiodoftimebeforeseekingahigheroffice.

TheCityofDovershoulddevelopContinuityofOperationsPlans(COOP)foreachdepartmentandaligntheseplanswithanoverallContinuityofGovernmentPlan.


Section 2. Scope of Project

ThescopeofthisprojectwastoprovideanindependentreviewoftheDoverFireDepartment(DFD)sothatcityofficials,includingofficialsoftheVolunteerAssociation,couldobtainanexternalperspectiveofthecity’sfireandEMSdeliverysystem.Thisstudyprovidesacomprehensive

analysisoftheDoverFireDepartment,includingitsorganizationalstructure,workload,staffing,deployment,training,fireprevention,emergencycommunications(911),andplanningandpubliceducationefforts.Cityofficialsoftenattempttounderstandiftheirfiredepartmentismeetingtheservicedemandsofthecommunity,andcommissionthesetypesofstudiestomeasuretheirdepartmentsagainst

industrybestpractices.InthisanalysisCPSMprovidesrecommendationswhereappropriate,andoffersinputonastrategicdirectionforthefuture.

Keyareasevaluatedduringthisstudyinclude:

Firedepartmentresponsetimes(usingdatafromthecity’scomputer‐aideddispatchsystemandthecity’srecordsmanagementsystem).

Deploymentandstaffing.

Organizationalstructureandmanagerialoversight.

FireandEMSunitworkloads.

DFDsupportfunctions(training,fireprevention/codeenforcement/911dispatch).

EssentialDFDfacilities,equipment,andresources.

Budgetandfinancialaccountability.


Section 3. Organization and Management

Governance and Administration

TheCityofDoverislocatedinKentCountyincentralDelaware.ItisthecapitalCityofDelaware,adistinctionithasheldcontinuouslysince1781.ItisalsothecountyseatofKentCounty.ThecityisthehosttoDoverAirForcebaseandishometoDelawareStateUniversity,WesleyCollege,WilmingtonUniversity,DelawareTechnicalandCommunityCollege,andDoverDownsInternationalSpeedway.Doverisapproximatelyninety(90)milessouthofPhiladelphia,Penn.;fifty‐three(53)milessouthofWilmington,Del.;andninety(90)mileseastofWashington,D.C.Thecityisoneofonlyfour(4)statecapitalsnotservedbyanInterstatehighway.ItsprimaryhighwayconnectionisDelawareRoute1,alimitedaccesstollroadthatconnectsthecitytopointsnorthandsouth.

AccordingtotheU.S.CensusBureau,Doverhadanofficial2010populationof36,047andanestimatedJuly2014populationof37,355,1makingitthesecond‐mostpopulouscityinthestate.Thecityencompassesanareaof23.15squaremiles,andhasapopulationdensityof1,557personspersquaremile.2WhileitspopulationissignificantlylessthanthatofWilmington,DoverencompassesalargerareathananyothercityontheDelmarvaPeninsula.3IncontrasttomostmajorcitiesintheNortheastUnitedStates,Doveriscontinuingtogroweconomically,inpopulation,andinlandarea.4Thecity’smajoremployersaretheStateofDelaware,DoverAirForceBase,BayHealth/KentGeneralHospital,DoverDowns,andtheinstitutionsofhigherlearning.5Therearealsoseveralmanufacturingfacilities,eachwithmorethan390employees.6Retailsalesarealsocumulativelyamajorsourceofemployment.

Doveroperatesunderahybridformofmunicipalgovernmentutilizingamodifiedcouncil‐citymanagersystem.Thegoverningbodyiscomposedofafull‐timeMayorandnine(9)part‐timecouncilmembers.Two(2)membersofthecouncilarechosenfromeachofthecity’sfour(4)councildistricts;theninthmemberofcounciliselectedatlarge,asistheMayor.Allelectionsarenonpartisan.TheMayorandmembersofCouncilservestaggeredtermsoffour(4)years.TheCityCouncilannuallyelectsone(1)ofitsmemberstoserveastheCouncilPresident.Together,theMayorandCityCouncilarethecollectivelegislativeandpolicy‐makingbranchofthegovernment.

TheCityCouncilappointstheCityManager,TaxAssessor,CityClerk,CityController,CitySolicitor,andCityPlanner,allofwhomreportdirectlytotheCouncil.TheVolunteerAssociation(RobbinsHoseCompany),whichbycitycharterprovidesfireprotectiontothecity,electsitsFireChiefandotherofficerssubjecttoapprovalbytheCouncil.TheFireChiefalsoreportstotheCityCouncil.The 1http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml,December14,20152http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/10/1021200.html,December14,20153CityofDover,Delawarewebsite,December14,20154CityofDover,Delawarewebsite,December14,20155https://imageserv11.team‐logic.com/mediaLibrary/134/Kent_County_Major_Employers_2010_1.pdf,December14,20156https://imageserv11.team‐logic.com/mediaLibrary/134/Kent_County_Major_Employers_2010_1.pdf,December14,2015


Mayor,whomthecitycharteridentifiesasthecity’sCEO,appointsthePoliceChief,whoreportsdirectlytohim/her.Perthecharter,theCityManageristhechiefadministrativeofficerandprovidesfinancialoversight;however,aswasnoted,thefinanceofficerisappointedby,andreportsdirectlyto,thecouncil.Themanageroverseespublicworks,humanresources,electric,informationtechnology,customerservices,andthelibrary.

FIGURE 3‐1: City of Dover FY 2016 Organizational Chart

Inmostcommunitieswithacouncil/managerformofgovernmenttheCityManagerisresponsiblefortheday‐to‐dayadministrationandoperationsofthecitywhiletheelectedofficialsareresponsibleforpolicydirectionandfiscaloversight.InDover’shybridsystemthemanagerhaslimitedcontrolofcityoperations.TheMayorandCityCouncilbothhaveappointmentpowersanddirectsupervisionoverasignificantportionofthecity’sday‐to‐dayoperations.InthecaseoftheFireDepartment,CPSMhasobservedthatthecurrentoversightofoperationsappearsdisjointed.TheFireChiefandlineofficersareelectedbytheVolunteerAssociationmembershipandtheelectionresultsareconfirmedbyCityCouncil.BudgetaryoversightandpersonnelmattersareunderthesupervisionoftheCityManager;however,theLeadershipoftheVolunteerAssociationmaintainssignificantoversightofFireDepartmentoperations.

TheVolunteerAssociation,asaseparateentity,functionsindependentofmunicipaloperationsandtheAssociation’sstructureoforganization,training,selectionprocesses,anddisciplinarypractices


arenotunderthepurviewofeitherthecity’selectedofficialsortheCityManager.Thereare,however,severalcityemployeeswhoareemployedbythefiredepartment(DispatchersandtheAssistanttotheFireChief)whooperateundercitypersonnelpoliciesandfallunderthesupervisionoftheCityManager.FireInspectorswhoareresponsibleforenforcingfirecodeandlifesafetypermittingprocessesarealsocityemployees,buttheyworkunderthesupervisionoftheDirectorofPlanningandCommunityServices.Webelievethatthisoverlycomplexarrangementcreatestheveryrealpotentialforambiguousorconflictingdirection.Revisionsshouldbeconsidered.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldreorganizethestructureoffiredepartmentoperationssothatthesupervisionandmanagementoftheDoverFireDepartmentisunifiedandunderthedirectionoftheCityManager.

CompoundingthismanagementissueisthefactthattheFireChiefiselectedonanannualbasisbytheVolunteerAssociationandthenapprovedbytheCityCouncil.He/shehasdirectcontrolandoversightofthedepartment’sfieldoperations.SincetheFireChiefiselectedonanannualbasisthereisthepossibilityforalackofcontinuityinmanagementandadministrativeoversightofthedepartment.Inaddition,therearenospecificqualifications,training,orsupervisoryexperiencerequiredtobeselectedFireChief.

TheCityofDoverprovidessignificantannualfundingfortheoperationoftheFireDepartmentandprovidesannualpaymentstotheVolunteerAssociation.ThedutiesforoperatingandmanagingthevariousfunctionsoftheFireDepartmentareextensiveandtheimpactsofthesedecisionscreatesignificantliabilitiesforthecity.Theseliabilitiesareintheareasinvolvingworkplaceissues,discrimination,anddisparatetreatmentwithregardtoage,gender,nepotism,race,orethnicity.Inaddition,therearebroadfinancialcomponentsofthisoversightthatrequiretransparency,equalaccess,andproperaccountingpractices.Ouranalysisdidnotrevealanyillegalorunethicalpractices;however,thereisconcernthatimprovedoversightiswarranted.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldcreateafull‐timepositionofEmergencyServicesManagerandtransfertheday‐to‐dayoversightofthefiredepartmentandtheothercloselyrelatedemergencyservicesandsupportfunctionsunderthisposition.WerecommendthatthisnewpositionbeadirectreporttotheCityManager.

ThedutiesandresponsibilitiesoftheEmergencyServicesManagerwillbesignificant,withtheoversightofthefiredepartment,emergencymanagement,EMS,fireprevention,publiceducation,fleetmaintenance,andcapitalplanning.However,theprimaryobjectivewouldbetomanageandadministertherelationshipbetweentheVolunteerAssociationanditsinteractionwiththeCityofDover.

In2009,areportbythepublicaccountingandmanagementfirmofHaggertyandHaggertywascommissionedbyCityCouncil.InthereportanumberoffindingsandrecommendationsweremaderegardingimprovedoversightoftheFireDepartment.Ultimately,ajointcommitteecomposedofCityofDoverandrepresentativesoftheVolunteerAssociationnegotiatedanine‐pointagreement


thataddressedfinancialissuesandtheoverallworkingrelationshipbetweenthetwoparties.Inourinterviewswithvariousstakeholderstherewasawidedivergenceofopiniononwhetherthisagreementresolvedthevariousconcerns,andiftheagreementisstillbeingadheredto.Itisapparent,however,fromCPSM’sperspectivethataformal,writtenagreementiswarranted.ThisagreementshouldspecifythetermsandconditionsaroundwhichthecityandtheVolunteerAssociationshouldoperatejointlyinprovidingfireservices.

Recommendation:TheCityofDoverandtheVolunteerAssociationshouldenterintoacontractualagreementthatspecifiesthetermsandconditionsinvolvedinthedeliveryoffireservices.

CPSMbelievesthatthisagreementshouldbefullyencompassingandshouldprovidedetailedguidanceintheworkingrelationshipbetweenthecityandtheVolunteerAssociation.WefurtherrecommendthatthenewlyappointedEmergencyServicesManagerberesponsiblefortheadministrationofthisagreementandbethedirectpointofcontactbetweenthecityandVolunteerAssociation.Wewouldrecommendthefollowingcomponentsbedefinedinthisagreement:

RelationshipbetweenthecityandtheVolunteerAssociation.

Annualbudgetallocationsandreportingrequirements.

ReportingrelationshipbetweentheFireChiefandtheEmergencyServicesManager.

Minimumtrainingandselectioncriteriafornewvolunteerpersonnel.

Professionalqualifications,promotionalprocesses,andon‐goingtrainingrequirementsforexistingvolunteers.

Safetypractices,safetyequipment,andPPE.

Deployment,emergencyresponse,andon‐sceneoperationalpractices.

Incidentreportingandotherreportrequirements.

Themanagementofthefiredepartmentapparatus,includingpurchasing,maintenance,andownership.

Useoffirefacilitiesandassociatedrentalcharges.

WorkingrelationshipwithPrimeCare.

WorkingrelationshipwithKentCounty.

Serviceresponsedesignationandrelationshipwithmutualaidresponders.

IncludedinthisagreementshouldbethedelineationoftheresponsibilitiesoftheEmergencyServicesManagerandhis/herrelationshipwiththeVolunteerAssociationinthedeliveryofservices.Thiswouldinclude:

Managingtheday‐to‐dayadministrativeoperationsofthefiredepartmentandprovidingtheFireChiefwithadditionaloperationalsupportwhenneeded


○ TheFireChief,aschosenbythemembershipoftheVolunteerAssociation,wouldretaintheresponsibilityforemergencyscenemanagementandincidentcontrol;however,he/shewouldreportdirectlytotheEmergencyServicesManager.

OverseeingEMSoperationsandmanagingtheEMScontract.

OverseeingtheoperationsoftheFireMarshal’soffice.

ServingastheOEMcoordinator,or,ataminimum,overseeingtheOEMfunctionanditsoperations.

ManagingtheFireDepartmentfleet.

Ensuringadherencetotrainingrequirementsandrecordkeeping.

Reviewingincidentreportsandfollowinguponincompleteorinaccuratereporting.

Maintainingproperworkplacebehaviorandthesupervisionoffiredepartmentemployees.

Maintainingfinancialrecords.

Long‐andshort‐termplanningforFireDepartmentoperations,facilities,andequipment.

Emergencymedicaltransportinthecityisprovided,undercontract,byaprivatethird‐partyentity.ThecurrentproviderisPrimeCareMedicalTransport.ThePrimeCarecontractisadministeredbythecity’sCoordinatorofPublicAffairs.Thisindividualalsohasoversightofthecity’sOfficeofEmergencyManagementfunctions.CPSMbelievesthatboththeadministrationoftheEMScontractwithPrimeCareandtheoversightofthecity’semergencymanagementactivitiesshouldfallunderthedutiesassignedtotheEmergencyServicesManager.

Recommendation:TheEmergencyServicesManagershouldbeassignedtheadministrationofthecontractwithPrimeCareandshouldcoordinatetheemergencymanagementactivitiesfortheCityofDover.

TheCoordinatorforPublicAffairshasmanagedthecity’sresponsibilitiesinvolvingPrimeCareandemergencymanagementinaveryprofessionalandproficientmanner.ItisstronglyrecommendedthatthisindividualworkcloselywiththeEmergencyServicesManagerintransitioningtheseduties.CPSMalsorecommendsthatthisindividualcontinuetoplayanactiveroleinbothactivitiesandpossiblyassumeanalternateordeputymanagerstatusinthesekeyduties.

TheFireMarshal’sofficeiscurrentlylocatedinthePlanningandCommunityDevelopmentDepartment.CPSMbelievesthatthisisaFireDepartmentfunctionandshouldfallunderthepurviewofthenewEmergencyServicesManager.Itisimportant,however,thattheFireMarshal’sdutiescontinuetohaveclosetiesandcoordinationwiththePlanningandCommunityDevelopmentDepartment.

Recommendation:ThecityFireMarshalandFireInspectors(DeputyFireMarshals),alongwithfirecodeenforcement,plansreview,andfireinspectionduties,shouldbeassignedunderthesupervisionoftheEmergencyServicesManager.


Asnotedabove,thecurrentappointmentofkeyfireofficials(FireChiefandFireMarshal)requiresapprovalbytheDoverCityCouncil.UndertheproposedrestructuringwearenotrecommendingthatthesechangesmodifythecurrentCityCharterprovisionsthatguidethisoversight.InsteadCPSMrecommendsthattheCityManagerbeinvolvedanddevelophis/herrecommendationsinthesekeyareasofoversight,whichthenarepresentedtoCityCouncilforapproval.ThiswouldincludetherecommendedappointmentofFireChiefandFireMarshal.Inaddition,theCityManagerwouldnegotiatetheagreementsandtheirrespectivestipulationswithboththeVolunteerAssociationandPrimeCareandpresenttheserecommendationstoCityCouncilforapproval.However,onceapprovalisachieved,itthenbecomestheresponsibilityoftheCityManagerandtheEmergencyServicesManagertoadministertheseagreementsinaccordancewiththedirectionofthecitycouncil.

FIGURE 3‐2: Proposed Fire Department Organizational Structure

InadditiontotherevisionsintheorganizationalstructureoftheFireDepartmentandassociatedsupportactivities,CPSMbelievesthatitisalsobeneficialtohouseallfiredepartmentoperationsatacentrallocationinthemainfirestation.Weproposethatthosepersonneloperatingfromthislocationinclude:theEmergencyServicesManager,theFireMarshal,FireInspectors,FireTechnicians,andothersupportpersonnel.ThiswillrequireVolunteerAssociationapprovalandagreementregardingthestipulationsinvolvingspaceallocation,buildingmaintenance,utilities,andrentalcharges.WebelievethattheproposedserviceagreementbetweenthecityandtheVolunteer


Associationisthebestmechanismtonegotiatethesetermsandshouldbebuiltintothewrittenagreement.CPSMalsorecommendsthatPrimeCareoperationsbemovedtothemainfirestation.ThiswillfacilitateacloseralignmentbetweentheFireDepartmentandPrimeCareandwillprovidetheabilityfordirectoversightofPrimeCareactivitiesbytheEmergencyServicesManager.

Recommendation:Thecityshouldconsidertherelocationofallfiredepartmentoperations,includingFireCodeInspections/Enforcement,EMStransport,andtheemergencymanagementfunctionstothemainfirestationat103S.GovernorsAve.

AsthecityandtheVolunteerAssociationmovetowardacloseralignmentoftheirworkingrelationship,itiscriticalthatallfiredepartmentactivitiesarehousedatacommonlocation.Theregularmovementofpersonnelinanoutofthisstructurewillidentifythestructureasafullyoperationalgovernmentfacilityandthiswillassistinmaintainingthesecurityatthislocation.Inaddition,thisverylargestructureprovidesamplespacetohostFireDepartmentadministrativeservices,VolunteerAssociationactivities,anEMSdormitory,andapparatusspace.Thisfacilityalsoprovidesopportunitiestohouseandoperatethecity’sEmergencyOperationsCenterwhenneeded.

Dover Fire Department

TheDoverFireDepartmentisoperatedandstaffedbytheVolunteerAssociation(formallytheRobbinsHoseCompanyNo.1).ThedesignationofRobbinsHoseCompanyasthecity’sofficialfirecompanyisspecifiedinthecitycharterandthecitycode.TheVolunteerAssociationisanautonomousorganization,andprovidesfireprotectionandemergencyresponsewithinthecorporatelimitsoftheCityofDoveralongwithsomecontiguousareasofKentCounty.

DFDStation1islocatedat103S.GovernorsAve.indowntownDover.Engines4,6,and7,Ladder2,Rescue1,Brush9,andMarine1aredeployedfromthisstation.ThisfacilityalsohousestheVolunteerAssociation’sadministrativeoffices,afiredispatchcenter,meetingareas,andafiremuseum.Station2islocatedat911KentonRd.,andhousesEngines2and3,Ladder1,Utility1,andafoamtrailer.MembersoftheVolunteerAssociationgenerallyrespondtothestationnearesttheirresidence.Thelocationofthecity’sfirestationsandthemunicipalboundariesareillustratedinFigure3‐3.


FIGURE 3‐3: City of Dover Map with Fire Station Locations

AllmembersoftheDFDarevolunteer.Thedepartment’smembershiprollshowsanactiverosterofapproximatelyeighty(80)personnel.Aswithmostvolunteerorganizations,thenumberofactivevolunteerscontinuallyfluctuatesasnewmembersjoinwhileotherleaveormoveon.TheVolunteerAssociationhasbeenshowinganetgaininitsactivemembersofapproximatelyfive(5)tosix(6)newmembersannually.Basedonourexperiencestudyingdepartmentsacrossthecountry,wecansaythatthecityisfortunatetohaveaveryhealthyvolunteerorganizationthatappearstobeeffectiveinitsrecruitmentandretentionefforts.

TheCityemploysfive(5)full‐timeFireDispatchers,andseveralpart‐timedispatchers(alternates),whoprovidedispatchandcommunicationsservicesforthedepartment.Thereisone(1)dispatcherondutyatStation1atalltimes.DispatchersatStation1workarotatingschedulethatconsistsoffour(4)daysonfollowedbythree(3)daysoff.One(1)full‐timedispatcherisalsoassignedatStation2andworksfour(4)ten(10)‐hourdays.ThisindividualmaymovetoStation‐1asafill‐inifoneoftheotherdispatchersisonleave.Thepart‐timedispatchersareutilizedtofillinasnecessary.ThecityalsoemploysaFireChief’sAssistantwhoprovidesadministrativeandnoncombatoperationalsupporttotheFireChief.Thispersoninessencehandlestheday‐to‐dayadministrativeneedsofthedepartment.Whilethepositionhastraditionallybeenfulltime,atthetimeofourassessmentitwasonlybeingfilledonapart‐timebasisoftwenty‐nine(29)hoursperweek.The


FireChief’sAssistantisdesignatedasthesupervisorfortheFireDispatchers,thoughthesepersonneloftenreceiveworkassignmentsanddirectionfromvolunteerpersonnel.

Robbins Hose Company No. 1 TheRobbinsHoseCompanywasorganizedasavolunteerfirecompanyinNovember1882byseventeencitizensofDover.ThecompanywasgrantedanactofincorporationbytheDelawareLegislatureonJanuary25,1883.Thecompanyhasremainedthesolefirefightingforceforthecityeversinceandthisrelationshiphasbeendesignatedinboththecitycharterandcitycodes.Despitetrendsnationwidethathavestrainedtheabilityofthevolunteerfireservicetoprotectlargercommunities,theDoverFireDepartmenthasremainedfullyvolunteerfor132years.Infact,thecityandcompanypridethemselvesonbeingtheonlystatecapitalthatisprotectedbyafullyvolunteerfiredepartment.AlthoughtodaythecompanyismoreoftenreferredtosimplyastheDoverFireDepartment,thetraditionalfirecompanystructurewhichispartofitsheritageisstillveryactiveinallfacetsofitsoperations.

Thebusinessaspectsofthefirecompanyareoverseenbyanine(9)‐memberboardofdirectorswhosemembersareelectedbythecompanymembership.Ontheadministrativesideofthecompanythemembershipalsoelectsafirecompanypresident(whoalsoservesasanex‐officiomemberoftheboard),vicepresident,secretary,treasurer,andthree(3)trustees.Thetrusteesservetwo‐year(2)termswhiletheremainderoftheofficersserveone‐year(1)terms.Thecompanymembershipalsodirectlyvotesforthemembersoftheapparatusandmaintenancecommittee,therulescommittee,funddrivecommittee,andthefirerecorder.Therearealsotwenty‐four(24)variouscommitteeswhosemembersareappointedbythefirecompanypresident.

OntheoperationssidethefirecompanymembershipelectstheFireChief,DeputyFireChief,four(4)AssistantFireChiefs,andtwo(2)firelineCaptains.Allofthesepersonnelalsoserveone‐year(1)terms.Aswithmanyvolunteerfirecompaniestheadministrative/socialofficersandboardofdirectorsandtrustees,whilenotdirectlyinvolvedinemergencyoperations,wieldsignificantinfluenceandcontroloverallaspectsofthecompany’soperations.Ultimately,iftherewasamajordisagreementbetweentheFireChiefandthecompanyPresident,thecompanyPresident’sdecisionwouldprevail.

Organizational Structure TheDoverFireDepartmentutilizesatraditional,althoughratherlinear,organizationalstructure.ThedepartmentisledbyaFireChiefwhoisanactiveresponder.HeisassistedbyaDeputyFireChiefwhoservesasthesecondincommandandinchargeoffiresuppressionoperations.Therearefour(4)AssistantChiefs,firstassistantthroughfourthassistant,andtwo(2)firelineCaptains.PersonnelwhoarecertifiedasFirefighterIIIaredeemedtobequalifiedtoserveasanofficeronapparatus.Thehierarchicalrelationshipsandthejobfunctionsencompassedinthisstructuredoesnotappeartobewelldefinedanditwasdifficulttodetermineanydifferencesinassignmentsorresponsibilitiesamongchiefofficersandcompanyofficers.


FIGURE 3‐4: Dover Fire Department FY 2015 Organizational Chart

Allofficersareelectedannuallybythemembershipofthedepartment.Thereisnotapromotionalprocesstodetermineifthepersonnelbeingnominatedthroughthecompany’selectionprocessarequalifiedtoholdtheirrespectivepositions.OfficersareonlyrequiredtohavecompletedthefourmandatorytrainingclassesthatarerequiredtoreceivetheClassIIIFireFightergrade.Officersarenotrequiredtopossessordemonstrateanyskillsinadvancedfirefightingtactics,knowledgeofbuildingconstruction,firecodes,codeenforcement,firepumppractices,operationalscenemanagement,incidentcommand,orfirefightersafety.Thereisnorequirementthatpersonnelhaveaprogressionintheirassignments,norhavepreviousexperienceasanadvancedfirefighter,companyofficer,orchiefofficer.Mostofthosepersonnelwhoserveasofficersweresimplyrecruitedbyotherstorunforapositiontowhichtheywereultimatelyelected.

Recommendation:Allofficerpositions,includingCaptain,AssistantFireChief,DeputyFireChief,andFireChief,shouldbefilledonthebasisoffirefighting/emergencyservicestraining,certifications,andexperience,alongwithsuccessfulcompletionofaformal,openlycompetitiveassessmentprocess,includingapracticalskillsevaluation.

CPSMbelievesthatthetestingandselectionprocessforthevariousrankedpositionswithintheFireDepartment’sorganizationalstructureistheresponsibilityoftheVolunteerAssociationtomanage.Itisnecessary,however,toincludeinthecontractualagreementbetweenthecityandtheVolunteerAssociationspecificlanguagethatrequirestheAssociationtomaketheseselectionsthroughanopenlycompetitivetestingprocessesthatutilizesnationallyrecognizedskillsrequirementsandexperiencefortheaffectedpositions.Thecontractshouldalsoprovidethecitywiththeabilitytoreviewtheseprocessesandthatdetailedrecordkeepingbekeptregardingtheseselections.


Aswaspreviouslynoted,theCityofDoveremploysfive(5)full‐timeandseveralpart‐timefiredispatcherswhoareassignedtoworkatthefiredepartment.Thisdispatchersworkintandemwiththecity’s911PoliceDispatchCenter;whenafirecallisreceivedbythe911centeritispassedtothefiredispatchcenter,whichsendsoutapagetothevolunteersandmonitorstheresponseandon‐scenecommunicationsinvolvingfiredepartmentpersonnel.However,theprimaryworkloadforthefiredispatchersisthemaintenanceofvehiclesandstationequipmentalongwiththecustodialdutiesforthetwofirestations.CPSMbelievesthattheassignmentofdutiesforFireDispatchersisjustifiedandappearseffective.TheFireDispatchersarechargedwithkeepingtheequipmentandvehiclesinafullstateofreadiness.Theycleanthefacilitiesandprovidegeneralmaintenanceonthevehiclesandequipment.Thisallowsthevolunteerstorespondtoincidentsandfocusontrainingandskillsdevelopment.Duringfirecallsthedispatchersupportssceneactivitiesviaradiocommunicationsandcoordinatespersonneldeployment.Thecurrentarrangementisnot,however,themostefficientutilizationofthesepersonnelandCPSMrecommendsthatthisarrangementbemodified.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldreassignthedispatchingfunctionattheDoverFireDepartmentandmovethisdispatchingfunctiontotheKentCounty911DispatchCenter.

ThecurrentdispatchoperationsprovidedbytheDoverFireDepartmentappearredundantandinefficient.ThesameservicecanbeprovidedbyKentCountyfromamuchmoretechnologicallyadvancedcenter,withprofessionallytrainedpersonnel.Byusingasinglecentertoprocesscalls,CPSMbelievesthatthiswillreducethenumberoftimescallsaretransferredbetweenagenciesandwillexpeditetheemergencyresponseprocess.TheKentCenterismodernandwell‐staffedandmoretechnologicallyadvancedthaneitherthecity’spoliceorfirecommunicationscenters.TheKentCenterislocatedintheCityofDover,whichwouldenabledirectinteractionwithmanagerialandlineofficerswhenneeded.Thiscentercurrentlydispatchesallothervolunteercompaniesinthecounty,alongwithPrimeCare.Thecenterhastheabilitytoscreencallsandprioritizetheassignmentofunitstobestmatchthenatureofthecall.ThecenteralsomonitorsallradiotrafficforPrimeCareandotherMutualAidCompaniesinthearea.Countyofficialswithwhomwespokeindicatedthatthe911serviceisavailabletothecityatnocharge.ThecurrentworkloadanticipatedwithamoveoffiredispatchingservicesintotheKentCentercouldbehandledwithouttheneedforadditionalpersonnelorequipment.

Thecityiscurrentlyexpendinginexcessof$400,000annuallyinpersonnelcostsfortheFireDispatchersandthepart‐timeFireChief’sAssistant.CPSMbelievesthatbyrestructuringtheorganizationoftheFireDepartment,movingdispatchoperationstoKentCounty,reducingthenumberofFireDispatcherstotwo(2)full‐timepositions,andeliminatingtheFireChief’sAssistant,therewouldbesufficientsavingstofundthefull‐timeEmergencyServicesManagerandafull‐timeadministrativesupportposition.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldreducethenumberoffull‐timedispatchersfromfive(5)totwo(2),reclassifythispositiontoaFireTechniciandesignation,andeliminatetheFireChief’sAssistantposition.


TABLE 3‐1: Comparison of Personnel Costs

Current DFD Personnel Costs* Proposed DFD Personnel Costs

Five (5) Dispatchers & Alternates,

Fire Chief’s Asst.‐Salary & Benefits

$409,800

$80,000 1‐Emergency Services Manager

$33,000 1‐Administrative Assistant

$90,000 2‐Fire Technicians

$20,000 Fire Technicians/Alternates/OT

$99,904 Employee Benefits (@44.8%)

TOTALS $409,800 $322,904

*Note: Does not include any payments to the Volunteer Association or for Fire Prevention staff.

WhenreclassifyingthepositionofFireDispatchertoFireTechnician,CPSMproposestoeliminatethedispatchingdutiesforthesepersonnelandtoexpandtheirroleinsupportofvolunteeroperations.Theirprimaryjobswillcontinuetobethemaintenanceoffireapparatus,equipment,andfirestationfacilitiesandgrounds.Itisproposedthatthetwo(2)full‐timeFireTechsworkfour10‐hourdayssothatone(1)firetechnicianisondutyeverydayoftheseven(7)‐dayweekandonone(1)dayeachweek,two(2)wouldbescheduledtowork.Inaddition,CPSMproposesthat$20,000inadditionalfundingbeavailabletomaintainalternateswhowouldcoverfortheFireTechniciansduringscheduledabsencesortosupplementstaffingduringhigherworkloadperiods,specialevents,training,etc.However,withtheeliminationofthedispatchingduties,theFireTechscansupporttheFireMarshal’sofficeindevelopingdetailedpreplansontargethazardsandothercommercial,industrial,andmultifamilyresidentialoccupanciesthroughoutthecity.Theywillberesponsibleforproducingthesedocumentsintoviableprefireplanningdocumentsthatwouldbeavailabletorespondingpersonnelandkeptontheapparatus.Inaddition,theycouldbeinvolvedinthetrainingofthesematerialstothevolunteerpersonnelduringweeklytrainingsession.CPSMdoesnotbelievethenewroleofFireTechnicianisa24/7operation,butinsteadcanbeaccomplishedonamodified40‐hourschedulewithtwo(2)full‐timepositionsandalternativesupport.WeproposethattheFireTechpositionbeplacedunderthesupervisionoftheEmergencyServicesManagertoassisttheEmergencyServicesManagerinvariousdutiesinvolvedintheoversightoffiredepartmentoperations.

TheFireChief’sAssistantisresponsibleformanyoftheadministrativedutieswithinthefiredepartment.BycreatingtheEmergencyServicesManagerandtheAdministrativeAssistantpositions,thedutiesoftheChief’sAssistantdutieswillbeassumedbythesenewpositionsandthiswilleliminatetheneedfortheFireChief’sAssistantposition.

Personnel Management/Rank Structure FireDepartmentrules,regulations,andproceduresshouldworkintandemwithandbeconsistentwiththeoverarchingordinances,rules,regulations,andpoliciesthathavebeenadoptedbytheCityofDover.Thoughvolunteerpersonnelarenotemployeesofthecity,theyoperateundertheauthorityandsupervisionofcitygovernment.Assuch,employeeworkplacepoliciesinvolving


discrimination,sexualharassment,utilizationofgovernmentfundsforpurchasing,freedomofinformation,Internetandcomputerusage(includingsocialmedia),andsmoking(oncitypremisesorinvehicles)aretypicallyguidedbythegoverningbodyandappliedacross‐the‐boardtoallemployees,includingvolunteermembers.Thecityshouldprovidetrainingandfamiliarizationconcerningthesepoliciesandthesupervisoryoversighttoensurethatthesepoliciesarebeingfollowed.

Recommendation:TheCityofDoverandtheVolunteerAssociationshouldspecifythosecitypersonnelpoliciesthatapplytomembersoftheVolunteerAssociationandincludetheseprovisionsintheserviceagreement.

CPSMrecommendsthatacleardelineationofthosecitypersonnelpoliciesthatapplytothemembersoftheVolunteerAssociationbecommunicatedinwriting.ItshouldbetheresponsibilityoftheEmergencyServicesManagerincollaborationwiththeFireChieftosupervisethiseffort.

TheVolunteerAssociationalsohasapersonnelcommittee.Thecommitteeisprimarilyresponsibleforprocessingapplicationsfornewvolunteermembersoftheassociation.Onceanapplicationisreceivedthechairpersonofthecommitteeperformsabackgroundcheckontheapplicant;however,theyarenotfingerprintedtodetermineifthereisacriminalhistory,whichisastaterequirement.Theapplicantisthensentforamedicalevaluationanddrugtesting.TheVolunteerAssociationhasrecentlyaddedasocialmediareviewcomponenttothescreeningprocess.Ifthepotentialmembersuccessfullypassesallscreening,thechairpersonandthreeadditionalmembersinterviewthecandidate.Thisisacommendableeffortforavolunteerorganization,andwhichCPSMconsidersabestpractice.OncethecandidateisacceptedintomembershipintheVolunteerAssociationtheyareassignedtotheorientationofficertoinitiateandoverseetheirtraining.

TheVolunteerAssociationhasaninternalaffairscommitteecomprisedofthePresident,VicePresident,andFireChief.Othermemberscanbeappointedasnecessary.Thecommitteeistaskedwithinvestigatingcomplaintsorallegationsofwrongdoingagainstmembersandrecommendingappropriatedisciplinaryaction.Thoughtheseprocessesarevalidandintendedtoprovidethenecessaryoversightoftheselectionprocessandperformanceissues,CPSMbelievesthatagovernmentalreviewoftheseactivitiesiswarranted.

Recommendation:TheCityofDover,throughtheEmergencyServicesManager,shouldreviewallselection,promotional,andpersonnelissuescarriedoutbytheVolunteerAssociationtoensurecompliancewithcityregulations,andstateandfederalguidelines.

CPSMrealizesthatthereisseparationbetweencitygovernmentandtheinnerworkingsoftheVolunteerAssociation.However,itisincumbentuponthecitytoensurethattheactionsoftheVolunteerAssociationareincompliancewithlocal,state,andfederalguidelines.ItshouldbetheprimaryresponsibilityoftheEmergencyServicesManagerinconjunctionwiththeFireChieftomakesurethatthisoversighttakesplaceandthatproperrecordkeepingismaintained.


Undercurrentcitypolicy,employeesarenotpermittedtorespondaspartoftheVolunteerAssociationwithouttakingpersonalleaveforanyworkinghoursmissed.EmployeesarepermittedtobemembersoftheAssociation,butarerestrictedintheirabilitytorespondtoemergencies.CPSMbelievesthatthereareanumberofemployeeswhohaveadesiretoparticipatefullyandshouldbepermittedtodoso.Thereisalwaysaneededbalancethatmustbemaintainedwhenemployeesassumesecondaryrolesapartfromtheirprimaryemploymentduties.Clearguidelinesmustbeprovidedastowhenitisappropriatetorespondtoemergenciesandwhenitisnot.Inaddition,worker’scompensationissuesmayariseifanemployeeisinjuredorlosestimefromtheirprimaryworkresponsibilitiesbecauseofinjuriessustainedinavolunteerfirefightingstatus.Inaddition,thecityandtheemployeemustestablishanovertimeexclusionforthosevolunteeractivitiesthatmaytakeplaceaftertheemployee’snormalworkinghours.Notwithstandingtheseconsiderations,CPSMbelievesthatthecityshoulddiscontinuethelimitationonreleasingemployeeswhoareactivefirefightervolunteersforrespondingtoemergenciesduringbusinesshours.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldrevisititscurrentprohibitiononallowingemployeestorespondasvolunteerfirefighterswithoutdockingtheirpayorrequiringutilizationofleavetimeinprovidingthisservice.

Thekeytoavibrantandcompetentvolunteerfireserviceisdirectlyrelatedtoitsabilitytorecruitandmaintainaviablecomplementofpersonnel.Doverhasbeenfortunateinitsrecruitingeffortbutasnationaltrendingindicates,thiscapacitywillbetestedintheyearsahead.Theremustalwaysbeabalanceinregulatingtheabilitiesofemployeestomaintaindualrolesandthisisparticularlydifficultwhentheadditionaldutiesinvolveemergencyresponse.Goodcommunicationsbetweentheemployeeandtheirsupervisorregardingwhenitisappropriatetorespondandwhenitisnotisessential.Theremustbeanabilitytotrainandtoparticipateinfiredepartmentactivitieswithoutafinancialhardshiporreductioninleavetime.Similarly,theemployeemustunderstandthelimitationsinvolvedinthiseffortandthattheultimatepriorityistheirprimarywork.Theprocessmustbeguidedbywrittenpolicyandgoodcommonsense.Ultimatelythenumberofparticipantswillnotbesignificant;however,CPSMbelievesthattheexpansionofthetalentpoolwillhavefarmorebeneficialimpactsthancomplications.


Section 4. Analysis and Planning Approaches

Community Risk Analysis

Inanefforttoreducethenation'smountingnaturaldisasterlosses,theU.S.CongresspassedtheDisasterMitigationActof2000(DMA2000)toprovidenewandrevitalizedapproachestomitigationplanning.Section322ofDMA2000emphasizestheneedforstateandlocalentitiestocloselycoordinatemitigationplanningandmakesthedevelopmentofahazardmitigationplanaspecificeligibilityrequirementforanylocalgovernmentapplyingforfederalmitigationgrantfunds.ThesefundsincludetheHazardMitigationGrantProgram(HMGP)andthePre‐DisasterMitigation(PDM)program,bothofwhichareadministeredbytheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA).Communitieswithanadoptedandfederallyapprovedhazardmitigationplantherebybecomeprepositionedandmoreapttoreceiveavailablemitigationfundsbeforeandafterthenextdisasterstrikes.

In2015,theKentCountyDepartmentofPublicSafety,EmergencyManagementDivision,facilitatedanupdatetotheKentCountyMulti‐JurisdictionalHazardMitigationPlan,whichincludestheCityofDover.KentCountyisvulnerabletoawiderangeofnaturalhazards,includingflooding,drought,tropicalstormsandhurricanes,andwinterstorms.Itisalsovulnerabletoavarietyofhuman‐causedhazards,includingchemicalreleases,spills,orexplosionsassociatedwiththefixedstorageormobiletransportofhazardousmaterials.Thesehazardsthreatenthelifeandsafetyofcountyresidents,andhavethepotentialtodamageordestroybothpublicandprivatepropertyanddisruptthelocaleconomyandoverallqualityoflife.7

The2015PlanUpdatewasconductedincoordinationwiththeFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)andtheDelawareEmergencyManagementAgency(DEMA)toensurethatitmeetsallapplicableDMA2000planningrequirements.ALocalMitigationPlanReviewTool,includedinthePlanUpdate,providesasummaryofFEMA’scurrentminimumstandardsofacceptabilityandnotesthelocationwithintheplanwhereeachplanningrequirementismet.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldintegrateitscommunityriskanalysisandhazardmitigationeffortswithKentCounty.

Strategic Planning/Long‐Range Planning

Thedevelopmentofacomprehensivefireprotectionandpreventionstrategicplaninvolvesthreekeysteps:

First:Togenerateanassumptionofwhatthecommunitywilllooklikeattheendoftheplanningprocess.

7KentCountyMulti‐JurisdictionalHazardMitigationPlan,2015Update(Draft)


Second:Thedepartmentneedstoassessrealisticallythestrengthsandweaknessesoftheexistingfireprotectionsystemtoincludecodes,standards,andordinancesrelatingtofirepreventionefforts,publicsafetyeducationprograms,andemergencyresponsecapability.

Third:Toprojecttheneededcapabilitiesandcapacityofthefireprotectionsystemanditsfiredepartmentcomponentasthecommunitychanges.

Thisprocesshelpstoensurethatanadequatelevelofresources,includingstaffingandequipment,areallocatedtomeetthecommunity’sneedsfortheservicesdeliveredbytheFireDepartmentasefficientlyaspossible.Astrategicplanalsoassiststhedepartmentinmatchingresourceswithavailablerevenues.

Definingcleargoalsandobjectivesforanyorganizationthroughaformalstrategicplanningdocumentestablishesaresourcethatanymemberoftheorganization,orthoseexternaltotheorganization,canviewanddetermineinwhatdirectiontheorganizationisheading,andaswellashowtheorganizationisplanningtogetthere.

Inastrategicplan,itisessentialthatclearandachievablegoalsandobjectivesforeachprogramareaaredeveloped.Eachprogramareamustthen(1)defineitsgoals;(2)translatethegoalsintomeasurableindicatorsofgoalachievement;(3)collectdataontheindicatorsforthosewhohaveutilizedtheprogram;and(4)comparethedataonprogramparticipantsandcontrolsintermsofgoalcriteria.ObjectivesshouldbeSMART,anacronymthatstandsforspecific,measurable,ambitious/attainable,realistic,andtime‐bound.Additionally,thesegoalsshouldlinkbacktofiscalplanninggoals.

TheDoverFireDepartmentdoesnothaveacomprehensivestrategicplanthatfocusesonthefuture,providescleardepartmentaldirection,anddefinesresourcesthatsupportthestrategyforfireprotection.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldfacilitatethedevelopmentofastrategicplanfortheDoverFireDepartmentthatfocusesonthedepartment’slong‐termneedsandanticipatedservicedemands.

Standards of Cover

AStandardsofCoverisadocumentthatisfullycompliantwithindustrybestpracticesinthefieldofdeploymentanalysis.Theevaluationandanalysisofdataisbasedonnationallyrecognizedguidelinesandcriteria,includingrecognizedNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)standards,ISOschedules,anyfederalandstatemandatesrelativetoemergencyservices,andgenerallyacceptedpracticeswithinemergencyservices.AllmethodologyusedinaStandardsofCoveranalysisofadepartmentshouldfollowthemethodologydescribedinthe“StandardsofResponseCoverage,5thEdition,”publishedbytheCommissiononFireAccreditationInternational(CFAI).


CFAIdefinestheprocess,knownas“deploymentanalysis,”aswrittenprocedureswhichdeterminethedistributionandconcentrationoffixedandmobileresourcesofanorganization.Thepurposeforcompletingsuchadocumentistoassisttheagencyinensuringasafeandeffectiveresponseforceforfiresuppression,emergencymedicalservices,andspecialtyresponsesituationsinadditiontohomelandsecurityissues.CFAIfurtherdefines“StandardsofResponseCoverageasbeingthoseadopted,writtenpoliciesandproceduresthatdeterminethedistribution,concentration,andreliabilityoffixedandmobileresponseforcesforfire,emergencymedicalservices,hazardousmaterials,andotherforcesoftechnicalresponse.”

TheCityofDoverhasnotdevelopedaStandardsofCoverdocumentinaccordancewithCFAIguidelines.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldconductaformalStandardsofResponseCoverageanalysisundertheguidelinesoftheCommissiononFireAccreditationInternational(CFAI).

Fire Risk Analysis/Target Hazards TheCityofDoverisfortunatetohaveadedicatedforceofvolunteerswhoprovide100%ofthecity’sfirefightingneeds.Ifafull‐timeforceofpaidpersonnelwereutilized,CPSMestimatesthatthesecostscouldexceed$3millionto$4millionannually.The“professionalvolunteerfiredepartment”intheCityofDoverworkswellandhasbeeneffectiveinservingthiscommunityformanyyears.ThisarrangementisextremelycosteffectiveandisconsideredbyCPSMtobeabestpractice,anditshouldbefullysupportedandmaintained.

Regardlessofthetypeoforganizationthatservesagivencommunity,itisinherentuponacommunity’sleadershiptoaskthefundamentalquestionofwhetherthelevelofriskintheirjurisdictioniscommensuratewiththetypeofprotectiveforcethatiscurrentlybeingdeployed.Tothisend,afireriskassessmentandhazardanalysisprocessshouldbeutilizedinanefforttoprovideamoreobjectiveassessmentofthecommunity’slevelofrisk.

Afireriskanalysisutilizesa“fireriskscore,”whichisaratingofanindividualpropertyonthebasisofseveralfactors,including;

Theneededfireflow.

Theprobabilityofanoccurrencebasedonhistoricalevents.

Theconsequenceofanincidentinthatoccupancy(tobothoccupantsandresponders).

Thecumulativeeffectofsuchoccupanciesandtheirconcentrationinthecommunity.

Plottingtheratedpropertiesonamapwillprovideabetterunderstandingofhowtheresponsematrixandstaffingpatternscanbeusedtoprovideahigherconcentrationofresourcesforworse‐


casescenariosor,conversely,fewerresourcesforlowerlevelsofrisk.8Thecommunityfireriskassessmentmayalsoincludedetermininganddefiningthedifferencesinfireriskbetweenadetachedsingle‐familydwelling,amultifamilydwelling,anindustrialbuilding,andahigh‐risebuildingbyplacingeachinseparatecategory.Further,anoverallcommunityriskprofilecanbelinkedtohistoricalresponsetimedata.Thatanalysiscanthenbeusedtoestablishresponsetimebaselinesandbenchmarks.

Communityriskandvulnerabilityassessmentareessentialelementsinafiredepartment’splanningprocess.TheCityofDoverhasnotcompletedacomprehensivecommunityriskandvulnerabilityassessment.AccordingtoaNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)paperonassessingcommunityvulnerability,firedepartmentoperationalperformanceisafunctionofthreeconsiderations:resourceavailability/reliability,departmentcapability,andoperationaleffectiveness.9Theseelementscanbefurtherdefinedas:

Resourceavailability/reliability:Thedegreetowhichtheresourcesarereadyandavailabletorespond.

Departmentcapability:Theabilityoftheresourcesdeployedtomanageanincident.

Operationaleffectiveness:Theproductofavailabilityandcapability.Itistheoutcomeachievedbythedeployedresourcesorameasureoftheabilitytomatchresourcesdeployedtotheriskleveltowhichtheyareresponding.10

Theprocessofidentifyingtargethazardsandpreplanningsuppressionandrescueeffortsarebasicpreparednesseffortsthathavebeenkeyfunctionsinthefireserviceformanyyears.Inthisprocess,criticalstructuresareidentifiedonthebasisoftherisktheypose.Then,tacticalconsiderationsareestablishedforfiresinthesestructures.Considerationisgiventotheactivitiesthattakeplace(manufacturing,processing,etc.),thenumberandtypesofoccupants(elderly,youth,handicapped,imprisoned,etc.),andotherspecificaspectsrelatingtotheconstructionofthefacilityoranyhazardousorflammablematerialsthatareregularlyfoundinthebuilding.Targethazardsarethoseoccupanciesorstructuresthatareunusuallydangerouswhenconsideringthepotentialforlossoflifeorthepotentialforpropertydamage.Typically,theseoccupanciesincludehospitals,nursinghomes,high‐rise,andotherlargestructures.Alsoincludedarearenasandstadiums,industrialandmanufacturingplants,andotherbuildingsorlargecomplexes.

TheCityofDoverhasanumberoftargethazardswithinitsservicearea.Targethazardsautomaticallyreceiveanupgraded“boxalarm”responseassignment,eachspecificallytailoredtotheuniquerisksandhazards.TheDoverFireDepartmentclearlydesignatesthetypesandnumberofapparatustobedeployedtoeachtargethazard.

8FireandEmergencyServiceSelf‐AssessmentManual,EighthEdition,(CenterforPublicSafetyExcellence,2009),49.9FireServiceDeployment,AssessingCommunityVulnerability:Fromhttp://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/pdf/urbanfirevulnerability.pdf.10NationalFireServiceDataSummitProceedings,U.S.DepartmentofCommerce,NISTTechNote1698,May2011.


Thecity’stargethazardsinclude:

LutherTowers,locatedat430KingsHighwayhas258onebedroomand33efficiency(studio)apartmentsinfourbuildings.LutherTowersandLutherVillageofDoverareoperatedundertheguidelinesestablishedbytheU.S.DepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopmentSection202/8programs.LutherTowersandLutherVillageareapartmentcampusesforseniors62andolder.

NRGEnergysellselectricitytothemid‐Atlanticregion,whichfeedsintotheCityofDovertransmission/distributionsystem.ThecombinedheatandpowerplantwasconstructedbyGeneralFoodsin1984,lateracquiredbyKraftFoodsandthensoldtoStatOilin1996andfinallypurchasedbyNRGin2000.NRGaddedtwounitstothefacilitytobettersupportthelocalKraftFoodsplant,theProcter&Gambleplant,andtheCityofDover.

TheGarrisonOakTechnologyParkishometoTheGarrisonEnergyCenter,a309‐megawattcombined‐cycleelectricgeneratingfacilitybuilttoenhancereliabilityforDelawareandtheregionalpowermarket.Theenergycenterwillaccommodatetheadditionofanother309megawattsofgenerationcapacityshouldmarketconditionswarrant.

KraftFoodshasoperatedamajorplantinDoversinceatleast1969,originallyaGeneralFoodsplant.TheplantisownedbyKraftFoodsGroup,oneofthedaughtercompaniesoftheKraftFoodsbreakup.ItmakesJell‐O,StoveTopdressingmix,Baker'sChocolate,CountryTimepowderedmix,CrystalLight,andKool‐Aid.

ProctorandGambleisanAmericanmultinationalconsumergoodscompanyheadquarteredinCincinnati,Ohio,foundedbyWilliamProcterandJamesGamble.Itsproductsincludecleaningagents,andpersonalcareproducts.TheDoverfacilityknownasProctorandGambleDoverWipesisclassifiedasanindustrialplant;itmanufactures40percentofthebabywipesproductssoldintheUnitedStates,Canada,andPuertoRico.

DoverMallisaclimate‐controlledindoormallwithmorethaneighty‐five(85)storesrangingfromjewelrytoapparel,appliancestocellular,andfootweartosportinggoods.LargestoresincludeMacy’s,JCPenney,Boscov’s,Sears,OldNavy,andHollisterCo.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldconductaformalfireriskanalysisthatconcentratesonthedowntownareas,high‐risestructures,andmanufacturingandinstitutionaloccupancies.


Section 5. Operational Response Approaches

Manyagenciesincorporatetheuseofpre‐fireplanstoprovidearesponseandtacticalstrategyforthosemorecriticalorcomplexoccupanciesinthecommunity.Thecommunityriskandvulnerabilityassessmentevaluatesthecommunityasawhole,andwithregardtoproperty,measuresallpropertyandtherisksassociatedwiththatpropertyandthensegregatesthepropertyaseitherahigh,medium,orlow‐hazard,whicharefurtherbrokendownintovaryingdegreesofrisk.AccordingtotheNFPAFireProtectionHandbook,thesehazardsaredefinedas:

High‐hazardoccupancies:Schools,hospitals,nursinghomes,explosivesplants,refineries,high‐risebuildings,andotherhighlife‐hazardorlargefire‐potentialoccupancies.

Medium‐hazardoccupancies:Apartments,offices,andmercantileandindustrialoccupanciesnotnormallyrequiringextensiverescuebyfirefightingforces.

Low‐hazardoccupancies:One(1)‐,two(2)‐,orthree(3)‐familydwellingsandscatteredsmallbusinessandindustrialoccupancies.11

Theoperationsnecessarytosuccessfullyextinguishastructurefire,anddosoeffectively,efficiently,andsafely,requiresacarefullycoordinated,andcontrolled,planofaction.Certainoperationssuchasventingaheadoftheadvancinginteriorhoseline(s)shouldbecarriedoutwithahighdegreeofprecisionandtiming.Multipleoperations,frequentlywheresecondscount,suchassearchandrescueoperationsandtryingtocutoffarapidlyadvancingfire,mustalsobeconductedsimultaneously.Iftherearenotenoughpersonnelontheincidentinitiallytoperformallofthecriticaltasks,somewill,outofnecessity,bedelayed.Thiscanresultinanincreasedriskofinjury,ordeath,tobuildingoccupantsandfirefighters,and,increasedpropertydamage.Figures5‐1and5‐2illustratethecriticaltasksandresourcedeploymenttypicallyutilizedonlow‐riskincidentsandmoderate‐riskstructurefires.Understandingthecommunity’sriskgreatlyassistsfiredepartmentmanagementplanningforandjustificationofstaffingandapparatusresources.

11Cote,Grant,Hall&Solomon,eds.,FireProtectionHandbook(Quincy,MA:NationalFireProtectionAssociation,2008),12.


FIGURE 5‐1: Low‐Risk Response–Exterior Fire Attack

Figure5‐2representscriticaltaskelementsforamoderate‐riskstructurefire.Somejurisdictionsaddadditionalresponseresourcestomeetandinsomecasesexceedthespecificsofnationalbenchmarking,suchasNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)1720,StandardfortheOrganizationandDeploymentofFireSuppressionOperations,EmergencyMedicalOperations,andSpecialOperationstothePublicbyVolunteerDepartments,2014Edition.DFDoftenutilizesmutualaidtoassemblethenecessarystaffingtomanageitslargerincidents.


FIGURE 5‐2: Moderate‐Risk Response–Interior Fire Attack

NFPA1720(paragraph4.3.2)isaguidethatcanbeusedbytheauthorityhavingjurisdiction(AHJ)todeterminestaffingandresponsetimeobjectivesforstructuralfirefighting.Thisguidanceisbasedonalow‐hazardoccupancysuchasa2,000squarefoot,one(1)‐ortwo(2)‐story,andsinglefamilystructureswithoutbasementorexposures.

TABLE 5‐1: Staffing and Response Time Guidance from NFPA 1720

Demand Zone Demographics

Minimum

Staff to

Respond

Response

Time

(minutes)

Meets

Objective (%

of time)

Special risks AHJ AHJ AHJ 90

Urban >1000 people/mi. 15 9 90

Suburban 500 ‐ 1000 people/mi. 10 10 80

Rural < 500 people/mi. 6 14 80

Remote Travel distance > 8 mi. 4

Dependent

upon travel

distance

90

Note: Dover is an urban community with a population density of 1,557 people per square mile.


Inadditiontoexaminingrisksfacedinthecommunityatlarge,adepartmentshouldexaminethecumulativerisksitplacesonitsrespondingpersonnel.TheNationalFireProtectionAssociation’sStandardforaFireDepartmentOccupationalSafetyandHealthProgram(NFPA1500)recommendsthedevelopmentofaseparateriskmanagementplanforthedailyoperationsofthedepartment.12Thisstandardofsafetyestablishestheparametersbywhichthedepartmentshouldconductallactivitiesduringemergencyandnonemergencyoperations.Theintentisforallmembersofthedepartmenttooperatewithinthisstandardorplanofsafetyandnotdeviatefromthisprocess.

Recommendation:TheDFDshoulddevelopacomprehensive,departmentwideriskmanagementplanasrecommendedinNFPA1500.

AtthetimeofthisstudytheDFDhadalimitednumberofformalprefire/incidentplans.Aswithmanyotheraspectsofadepartmentthatisstaffedwithvolunteerpersonnel,itisdifficulttomanageaprocessofthistype.ItisenvisionedthatthisprocesscanbeaddressedwiththeadditionoftheFireTechnicianpositionandtheassignmentofthesepersonneltocarryoutthistask.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldmakeitaprioritytoestablishaformalpre‐incidentplanningprogramwiththegoalofhavinganup‐to‐datepreplanforeverybusinessandcommercialoccupancy(includingschools,churches,etc.)withinitsresponsearea.

Prefire/incidentplansshouldbereviewedregularlyandtestedbyperiodictable‐topexercisesandon‐sitedrills.Inaddition,thedepartmentshoulddevelopaplantomakeprefire/incidentplansaccessibleonmobiledataterminals(notebook/laptopcomputers)onallfireapparatusforuseenroutetoanincidentandwhileonscene.

Dover Response Matrix/Response Protocols

TheDoverFireDepartmentself‐dispatchesallincidentsafterbeingforwardedthe911callfromthe911PoliceDispatchCenter.Incidentsaregenerallyclassifiedascrewcalls,stationcalls,orgeneralalarms.Crewcallsareincidentsthataregenerallyhandledwithone(1),orperhapstwo(2),units.Thisincludesminorincidentssuchasfireinvestigations,vehiclefires,ortrashfires.Crewcallsaredispatchedfromtheneareststation,MondaythroughFridayfrom6:00p.m.to6:00a.m.and24hoursonSaturdaysandSundays.Ifthereisnoresponsetoacrewcallaftereight(8)minutes,theincidentisre‐dispatchedasageneralalarmforbothstationsandallpersonnel.

Stationcallsareincidentsthatarehandledbyacrewthatisinstationatthetimethecallisreceivedwithouttheincidentbeingtonedoutasacrewcallorgeneralalarm.Stationcallscancoverawiderangeofincidenttypesandareinitiatedatthediscretionofanofficerinthestationatthetimethecallisreceived.

12RobertC.BarrandJohnM.Eversole,eds.,TheFireChief’sHandbook,6thedition(Tulsa,OK:PennWellBooks),270.


Generalalarmsareincidentstowhichtheentiredepartmentisdispatched.Thesecanbeincidentsthatstartedasacrewcallthatdidnotgeneratearesponse.However,themajorityofgeneralalarmsinvolvestructuralfireincidentsincludingalertsfromautomaticfirealarmsystems.Astationcallcanbesubstitutedforageneralalarmatthediscretionofanofficerifwarranted.Ifthereisnoresponsetoageneralalarmdispatchaftereight(8)minutestheincidentisre‐dispatchedalongwiththenearestmutualaidcompanyunlessanofficerdirectsotherwise.

Thedepartmentutilizesaresponsematrixthatindicatesthenumbersandtypeofunitsthatrespondtoaspecifictypeofincident.Thedepartment’sresponseareas(whichincludesareasoutsideoftheCityofDover)arebrokendownintoquadrantsandunitassignmentsaredesignatedforeachquadrant.ThenormalDoverresponsetoasinglefamilydwellingfireis:

Station1–One(1)engine,One(1)ladder,One(1)rescue

Station2–Two(2)engines,One(1)ladder

IftheofficerrequeststohaveaboxalarmassignmentthenthedispatchercontactsKentCountyformutualaidresources.DFDhas“BoxAlarms”establishedforsix(6)ofitslargesttargetand/orlifehazardoccupancies.Theseboxalarmsareutilizedonlywhenanactualfireisconfirmedbyon‐scenepersonnel.

InanefforttoreducethehighnumberoffalsefirealarmsoriginatingfromDelawareStateUniversityandWesleyCollege,DFDhasestablishedaverificationprocessfromcollegesecuritybeforearesponseisinitiated.Ifsecuritydoesnotrespondwithinseven(7)minutesfromthereceiptofthealarm,anactivationofthevolunteersisgenerated.ThispracticehasbeenimplementedinthelastyearandCPSMrecognizesthisasabestpracticethatshouldbecontinued.

Thedepartmenthastwo(2)commandvehicles.One(1)isassignedtotheFireChiefandtheotherisutilizedbythedepartmentdutyofficer.Eachofficerinthedepartmentrotatesthroughthedutyofficerassignmentandinthiscapacityhe/shemustbeavailabletorespondtoincidentsasarankingofficerorforminorincidentstoconductaninvestigationbeforepagingoutthealarm.OnmostincidentstheFireChieforthedutyofficerrespondtoastationandridetheapparatusratherthanrespondingdirectlytothesceneintheircommandvehicle.Typically,commandisresponsiblefortheincidentsize‐up,scenesafety,determiningifadditionalresourcesareneeded,andmakingassignmentsfortheincomingunits.Whenoperatingasacompanyofficerandengagedinthetacticalcomponentsoftheincident,thecommandofficerisnotabletoperformthenecessaryoversightoftheincidentandprovidethenecessaryscenemanagement.Inmanycasesthisisnotaproblem,asthesituationisminorandthecoordinationofmultipleresourcesisnotrequired.However,onlargereventsitiscriticalthatthecommandofficerbeapartfromthetacticalunitsandareabletomanagetheentireincident.

Recommendation:TheFireChiefand/orthedutyofficer,whendispatchedtoanincident,shouldrespondtotheincidentscenewiththeirassignedcommandvehicleinordertoassumetheroleofincidentcommander.


Scenemanagementandtheincidentcommandprocessarecriticaltotheorderlyexecutionofanemergencyincident.Itisessentialthateveryincidenthaveadesignatedincidentcommanderandthatacommandpostbeformallyestablishedandclearlyidentifiableamongthevariousrespondingunits.Theincidentmanagementprocessisauniversallyadoptedmanagementtoolthatisutilizedinalleventsandisparticularlycriticalwhentherearemultipleagenciesresponding.Itiscriticalthatallcompanyofficers(captains)andchiefofficersarefullytrainedandutilizetheincidentcommandprocessinmanagingemergencyevents.

CPSMhasalsoobservedsomeinconsistenciesinthenumberofunitsrespondingtothevarioustypesofemergencyincidents.Weobservedtwo(2)automaticfirealarmsthatwerereceivedduringoursitevisit.Thefirstincidentwasforanalarmsoundinginalargemanufacturingfacility.Itwasbelievedthatthebuildingwasfullysprinklered,butitisafacilityofsignificantsizewhereapotentialfirewouldbechallenging.Therewasnocorrespondingcallconfirmingsmokeoractualfire.AtthetimeoftheincidenttherewasacrewinStation1andtheincidentwashandledasastationcall,withasingleengineandtheFireChiefresponding.Thejudgementutilizedinscreeningthiscallandreducingthelevelofresponseappearedsoundandwebelievegoodjudgementwasusedinmanagingandadjustingtheresponsetomeettheneed.Thefollowingdayanalarmwasreceivedforafirealarminasinglefamilydwelling.Again,therewasnocorroboratingcallconfirmingorobservingsmokeorfire.Sincetherewerenopersonnelinstationatthetimeageneralalarmwasdispatched.Theresponsetothismuchsmallerstructurewastwo(2)enginesandtwo(2)ladders.Thislevelofresponseappearedunnecessary,thuscreatinganinconsistencyinthemannerinwhichthecallswerehandled.

PartoftheFireDepartmentriskmanagementassessmentprocessisdecidingwhatresourcesarenecessary,andappropriate,forresponsetoeachtypeofincident.Thereshouldalsobeconsistencyindispatchandresponse.Anytimethatemergencyvehiclesactivatetheirwarninglightsandsirensitincreasestheirchancesofbeinginvolvedinavehicleaccident.Thisriskincreasesasmultiplevolunteerpersonnelrespondtotheirstationsintheirpersonalvehicles.Thisiscoupledwiththefactthatmanyfireresponsesarenotactualfiresortrueemergencies.Organizationstodayareattemptingtolimitthenumberofapparatusresponding,andlimitthoseresponsestoacoldresponse(nolightsandsirensandfollowingnormaltrafficpatterns)asmuchaspossible.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldstandardizeitsresponsetoasingleunittoautomaticfirealarmsoundingsandothernonemergencysituations(whentheseareunconfirmedasatrueemergency).

Iftherearenoindicationsthatthecallisatrueemergency,therespondingunitshouldproceedinacoldresponsetoinvestigate.


Staffing and Volunteer Deployment

TheCityofDoverandtheVolunteerAssociationhavefaredwellinmaintainingasuitableandreliableworkforce.However,withthechangingnatureofoursocietytheleadersofboththeCityofDoverandVolunteerAssociationwillneedtomonitorandbeawareofanysubtlechangesthatbegintooccurintheiroperations.

Withanactivemembershiprosterofapproximatelyeighty(80)personneltheDFDwouldseemtohaveenoughpersonneltoprovideadequateprotectiontothecity.Associationrecordsindicatethatonaverage,fourteen(14)personnelarerespondingongeneralalarms.ThislevelofresponseisexcellentandwellwithintherecommendationsofNFPA1720.Thislevelisalsowell‐suitedforthecallactivitiesandservicedemandscurrentlypresentedinthecommunity.

UnderAssociationguidelines,apparatusaresupposedtorespondwithaminimumoffour(4)personnelonboard.Ideallythisconsistsofadriver,officerandtwo(2)personnelcertifiedattheFFIIIlevel.However,whennecessaryFFIIsarepermittedtorespond.Theabsoluteminimumstaffingisidentifiedasthree(3)personnel.Apparatuswithfewerthanthree(3)personnelwouldnotnormallybeallowedtorespond.Thisisaveryhighstaffinglevelandinourobservationconsistentwithmanyofthemoreurbanized,careerorganizationsacrossthenation.

TheCityofDoverhasbeenextremelyfortunateinitsassociationwiththeVolunteerAssociationanditsabilitytomaintainandrecruitaviablevolunteerfirefightingforce.CPSMrecognizesthiseffortandcommendstheleadershipoftheVolunteerAssociationinitsservicetothecommunity.

Apparatus and Fleet Maintenance

Apparatuspurchaseandmaintenanceisanintegralpartofanyfiredepartmentandrequiressoundfinancialplanning.Asfleetsage,itislogicaltoconcludethatreliabilityislessenedandrepaircostsincrease. Therearetwo(2)provenwaystomitigatethelong‐andshort‐termcostsassociatedwithvehiclerepairsandreplacement.Theprimarywayistohavearegimentedpreventivemaintenance(PM)programthatplaceseachvehicleonaregularmaintenancecycle.Theothermethodistohavearealisticapparatusreplacementplansothatwhenavehiclehasoutliveditsusefulnessitisreplacedandremovedfromservice.

NFPA1901AppendixD,whichsets“GuidelinesforFirst‐LineandReserveFireApparatus,”haschangedandadaptedovertheyearstoreflectthechangesinindustrystandards.Itstates:

“Thelengthofthatlifedependsonmanyfactors,includingvehiclemaintenance,enginehours,qualityofthepreventivemaintenanceprogram,qualityofdrivertrainingprogram,whetherthefireapparatuswasusedwithinthedesignparameters…therearefireapparatuswith8to10yearsofservicethataresimplywornout.Therearealsofireapparatus…thathaveexcellentmaintenance,andthathaverespondedtoaminimumnumberofincidentsthatarestillinserviceableconditionafter20years.


…thecareoffireapparatuswhilebeingusedandthequalityandtimelinessofmaintenanceareperhapsthemostsignificantfactorsindetermininghowwellafireapparatusages.”13

Ina2004surveyofthree‐hundred‐sixty(360)firedepartmentsinurban,suburban,andruralsettingsacrossthenation,PierceManufacturingreportedontheaveragelifeexpectancyforfirepumpers.14TheresultsareshowninTable5‐2.

TABLE 5‐2: Fire Pumper Life Expectancy by Type of Jurisdiction

Demographic First‐Line Service

Annual Miles Driven

Reserve Status Total Years of Service

Urban 15 Years 7,629 10 Years 25

Suburban 16 Years 4,992 11 Years 27

Rural 18 years 3,034 14 Years 32

Note: Survey information was developed by Added Value Inc. for Pierce Manufacturing in, “Fire Apparatus Duty Cycle White Paper,” Fire Apparatus Manufacturer’s Association, August 2004.

Thecity’sfireapparatusfleetisrepresentedinTable5‐3.Inmostorganizationswereviewthetypicalapparatusreplacementscheduleanticipatestheusefulworkinglifeoffireenginestobefifteen(15)yearsinfrontlineservicefollowedbyfive(5)toseven(7)yearsinareservestatus(ausefullifeexpectancyof20to22years).Laddertruckstypicallyhavealongerlifeexpectancy—twenty(20)yearsinfrontlineserviceandfiveyearsinreserve.Thisisbecauseinmostsystemsladdersareutilizedlessthanfirst‐linefirepumpersandtheirservicetimeisabitlonger.Today’sfireenginesareexpectedtotravelatotalof100,000to120,000miles,withpropermaintenance,beforeneedingreplacement.TheDoverFireDepartmentoperateswithseven(7)engines,two(2)aerialladdertrucks,one(1)heavyrescuevehicle,six(6)utilityvehicles(includingtwo(2)command,two(2)brush,andtwo(2)pickuptrucks),one(1)boat,andone(1)foamtrailer.

13NFPA‐1901StandardforAutomotiveFireApparatus‐2016Edition,Sect.D.214FireApparatusDutyCycleWhitePaper,FireApparatusManufacturer’sAssociation.August2004.


TABLE 5‐3: Dover Fire Department Apparatus Inventory

Unit ID Year Manufacturer Type Age

Ladder 1 2011 Pierce Rear mount aerial 5 years

Ladder 2 2005 Pierce Tower Ladder 11 years

Engine 2 2008 Pierce Pumper 8 years





Brush 1 2013 RTV Kubota Brush Vehicle 3 years

Brush 9 2001 Ford F‐350 4x4 Pick‐Up truck 15 years

Rescue 1 1997 Pierce Heavy Rescue Vehicle 18 years

Marine 1 1990 Polar Kraft Flat Bottom Boat 25 years

Foam 46‐13 2004 CNMI Foam Trailer 12 years

Car 1 2015 Chevrolet SUV Chief’s Vehicle 1 year

Car 2 2015 Chevrolet SUV Command Vehicle 1 year

Utility 1 2006 Ford Pickup 10 years

Utility 2 1997 GMC Pickup 18 years

ItisCPSM’sobservationthattheapparatusintheDoversystemdonotexperienceheavycallvolume.Inouranalysisofcallactivity,Ladder1hadthehighestnumberofruns,542inthe12‐monthperiodevaluated.Itisnotuncommoninmanysuburbanandurbancommunitiestoseefireapparatusrespondtobetween2,000and2,500alarmsandtravelfrom10,000to12,500milesannually.CPSMestimatesthattheaverage,round‐triptraveldistanceforcallsintheDoversystemisapproximatelyfour(4)miles.Withthistypeoftraveldistanceandtheassociatedcallvolume,weestimatethatLadder1wouldtravelapproximately2,200milesannually.Thethree(3)otherunitswiththehighestresponseactivityinthissametimeframewereEngines2,4,and6.Weestimatethattheseunitswilltravelanestimated1,200to1,800milesannually.GiventhisamountofresponseactivityweanticipatethatfireenginesintheDoversystemshouldhaveanexpectedfrontlineservicelifeoftwenty20‐plusyears.Weestimatethataladdertruck’slife‐cyclewouldbecomparable.Table5‐4showstheworkloadbyunitfortheDFDfleet.


TABLE 5‐4: Call Workload by Unit

Unit Type Unit ID

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Run

Total

Annual Hours

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Day

Total

Annual Runs

Avg. Runs

per Day

Brush B1 17.0 3.4 0.6 12 0.0*

B9 18.0 31.5 5.2 105 0.3

Engine E2 27.8 199.4 32.8 431 1.2

E3 29.0 63.8 10.5 132 0.4

E4 27.2 164.4 27.0 363 1.0

E6 25.7 120.7 19.8 282 0.8

E7 32.7 20.7 3.4 38 0.1

Ladder L1 26.1 235.8 38.8 542 1.5

L2 26.0 50.6 8.3 117 0.3

Rescue R1 33.7 58.3 9.6 104 0.3

Utility U1 24.2 14.9 2.5 37 0.1

Other Other 36.3 2.4 0.4 4 0.0*

* These units had so few runs that their average runs per day, rounded to the nearest one‐tenth, appears to be zero

ItisimportanttonotethatthecurrentworkloadobservedinDoverisconsiderablylowerthanmanyagenciesweobserveincomparablysizedcommunities.CPSMattributesthistotheinfrequencywithwhichDFDunitsrespondtoEMS‐relatedincidents.Inmostcommunities,EMScallsmakeupthepredominantshareofworkload,inmostcasesaccountingforasmuchasseventy‐five(75)toeighty(80)percentofresponseactivities.WeestimatethatifDFDunitswereprovidingfirstresponderserviceforEMScalls,totalresponseactivitieswoulddoubleandpossiblytriplefromwhatiscurrentlyoccurring.

Acriticaldeterminantindevelopingasuitableapparatusreplacementprogramisthedecisiononthesizeofthefleetthatisutilizedandultimatelymaintainedbytheorganization.Asindicatedabove,DFDoperatesfiveenginesandtwoladdertrucksasitsfirst‐lineresponseunits.Inaddition,thereareanumberofsupportandcommandvehiclesthatareavailable.Itisourobservation,however,thatonlyfour(4)DFDapparatusareutilizedregularlyinhandlingthecurrentworkload.Asindicatedinthetable,therearefour(4)primaryapparatusthatrespond:Ladder1,Engine2,Engine4,andEngine6.Thiswebelieveisaproductofthenumberofvehiclesneededtotransportthevolunteerswhoassembleandtheamountofequipmentrequiredtomanagemostincidents.Areviewofattendancerecordsforpersonnelrespondingtofiresduring2014indicatesthatonaverage,fourteen(14)personnelrespondedtomostincidents.Foravolunteerorganization,thisisanexcellentresponselevelandconsideredabestpracticebyCPSM.However,giventheworkloadinDoverandthelevelofriskindicatedbyhistoricaleventsandthestrengthofthecity’sfirepreventionefforts,werecommendthatthecityestablishasitsfirst‐linefleetaninitialresponseforceofsix(6)units,andatotalresponseforceoftwelve(12)tosixteen(16)personnel.


Recommendation:TheDFDshouldestablishasitsfirstresponseapparatusthree(3)engines,one(1)laddertruck,andtwo(2)commandvehicles.

Inadditiontotheprimaryresponsefleetofthree(3)engines,one(1)ladder,andtwo(2)commandvehicles,Dovershouldmaintainone(1)engineandone(1)ladderasreserveunits.Theassortedsupportvehiclesshouldalsobemaintainedandkeptaspartoftheapparatusfleet.Giventheproposedfirst‐linefleetofthree(3)engines,one(1)ladder,andthereserveunits(one(1)engineandone(1)ladder),wewouldrecommendareplacementscheduleforthissizefleetasshowninTable5‐5.

TABLE 5‐5: Proposed Fire Apparatus Replacement Schedule

VEHICLE TYPE FIRST LINE SERVICE RESERVE STATUS TOTAL SERVICE LIFE

Engines 18 yrs./or 100,000 mi. 5yrs./or 120,000 mi. 23 yrs./or 120,000 mi.

Aerial Ladders 20 yrs./or 100,000 mi. 7 yrs./or 120,000 mi. 25 yrs./or 120,000 mi.

Aswithanyscheduleorplan,theproposedapparatusscheduleshouldserveasaguideforfinancialplanningforapparatusreplacement.Ifanapparatusisinvolvedinawreckoriftherearefrequentandunexpectedrepairsthatarecostly,thereplacementplanmaybeacceleratedsothatareplacementismadebeforethescheduledtimeframe.Similarly,ifonthebasisofsometypeoffinancialconstraintorifanapparatusisstilloperatingwellattheendofthereplacementschedule,theproposedplanmaybeextendedsothataparticularapparatusisusedbeyondtheexpectedreplacementschedule.Itisalsowisetobuildintoanyreplacementscheduleotherfactorsinadditiontoageoftheapparatusandwhichwillassistinthisdecisionmaking.Vehiclemilesoroperatinghoursshouldbeconsidered.Inaddition,thecumulativerepaircostsforaparticularvehiclemaybeusedinguidingthepurchaseofnewapparatus.Forexample,ifthroughtheworkinglifeofanapparatus,thetotalrepaircostsexceedfifty(50)percenttoseventy‐five(75)percentofthevehiclecost,thismaybefactoredintothedecisiontoreplacethevehicle.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldadoptanapparatusreplacementscheduletoserveasaguideforthefinancialplanningandreplacementoffireapparatus.

IfDFDweretomaintainafleetoffour(4)first‐lineapparatusandtwo(2)reserveunits(four(4)enginesandtwo(2)aerialladders),thissizefleetwouldhaveareplacementvalueofmorethan$4.3millionin2016dollars($525,000perengineand$1.1millionperaerial).Thus,astraight‐linecalculationutilizingaTwenty‐three(23)yearreplacementscheduleindicatesaneedtoearmarkapproximately$187,000annuallyforapparatusreplacement.Thisnumberdoesnotaccountforspecialtyapparatus,boats,staff,andutilityvehicles.Doverdoesnothaveaformalreplacementprogramforfireapparatus,andmoreimportantlyitdoesnothaveinplaceanyongoingfundingordepreciationprogramforfutureexpenditures.Intheabsenceofthistypeofsinkingfund,acommunitycanbefacedwithmajorcapitalexpendituresthatareunexpectedandnotplannedfor.


Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldadoptanapparatusreplacementprogramthatearmarksannualfundingforfutureapparatuspurchases.

Fleet Maintenance Fleetmaintenanceisvitaltopreservingthequalityoffireapparatusandultimatelyaffectstheperformanceofapparatusatemergencyincidents.Unlikeothertasksthatcanbescheduledforonceaweek,month,oryear,apparatuschecksshouldbeperformeddaily.Takingthetimetoproperlyinspectandmaintainfireapparatuswillnotonlyextendvehiclelife,butit’salsoessentialtothesafetyofthecrew,department,andcommunity.

TheDoverFireDepartmenthasaprocessinplacetocheckvehiclesonaregularlyassignedbasisbytheFireDispatcher.Eachvehiclehasachecklistthatinvolvesthevehicle,handtools,pumps,andaerialdevices.Whenvehiclerepairsareneededorperiodicservicemaintenanceisrequired,thisfunctioniscarriedoutunderthesupervisionoftheVolunteerAssociation,specificallytheirapparatusandmaintenancecommittee,andwhichismanagedbythecommitteechairman.

Pumpsandaerialdevicesaretestedannually,inaccordancewithNFPAStandard1901,byAtlanticEmergencySolutionsatitsMiddletown,Del.,servicecenter.AtlanticEmergencySolutionsdeliversfireandemergencyequipmenttoVirginia,Maryland,Delaware,theDistrictofColumbia,NorthCarolina,andportionsofWestVirginia,servingastheprimaryPierceManufacturingdealer.PierceisapremiermanufactureroffireapparatusintheU.S.knownforthequalityofitsvehiclesandcustomerservice.AtlanticEmergencySolutionsisarespecteddealerandmaintenanceproviderinthemid‐Atlanticregion,withten(10)servicecentersstrategicallylocatedforcustomerconvenience.Currently,AtlanticEmergencyServicesprovidesbothdrivelineandtechnicalrepairservicestotheDoverFireDepartmentfleet.AtlanticEmergencyServicesmechanicsmaintainAutomotiveServiceExcellence(ASE)certificationsaswellasEmergencyVehicleTechnicianCertification.TheEmergencyVehicleTechnicianCertificationCommission,Inc.(EVT)isanonprofitcorporationdedicatedtoimprovingthequalityofemergencyvehicleserviceandrepairthroughouttheUnitedStatesandCanada.EVTisgovernedbyaboardofdirectorsthatrepresentsemergencyresponseagencies,emergencyvehiclemaintenanceserviceassociations,andtheeducationalcommunity.

TheapparatusspecificationandpurchasingprocessismanagedbytheVolunteerAssociationutilizingcityfunds.TheVolunteerAssociationappointsanapparatusreplacementcommitteetodevelopspecificationsandtodevelopthebidprocess.Inanypurchasingprocessthatutilizespublicfundsitisimperativetomaintainasystemofcompetitivenessandequalaccesswithoutanyindicationoffavoritismorpreferencetoanindividualdealerorvendor.Whilemanyvolunteerfiredepartmentsdevelopspecificationsforaparticularapparatusmanufacturerandpurchasefromtheirvendorofchoice,thispracticeisgenerallynotallowedinmostlocalandstategovernments.Itisessentialthatarequestforproposal(RFP)andaninvitationtobid(ITB)aredevelopedtoensuretheproductorserviceprovidestheintendedresults,andthattechnicalspecificationsarewritteninawaythatprovidesfairnessandcompetitiveness.


Duetothecostsandtheassociatedliabilitiesinvolvedinfleetpurchasesandmaintenance,CPSMrecommendsthatthecity,underthedirectionoftheproposedEmergencyServicesManager,beresponsibleforfleetmaintenanceandacquisitionfortheDoverFireDepartment.

Recommendation:Thecity,underthedirectionofthenewEmergencyServicesManager,shouldberesponsibleforfleetmaintenanceandvehicleacquisitionfortheDoverFireDepartment.

Thoughtheultimatedecisionmakingandauthorityshouldresidewiththecity,itisessentialthattheVolunteerAssociationbeintegrallyinvolvedinthefiredepartmentfleetfunctions.ForthisreasonitisrecommendedthatthecityutilizeacommitteegrouptoprovideguidanceandrecommendationstotheEmergencyServicesManagerincarryingoutthepurchase,maintenance,anddisposalofthefiredepartmentapparatusandequipment.

Fire Response

Doverisasmall‐tomedium‐sizedcitywithaservicepopulationofabout37,000people.Asastatecapital,andacommunitythathostsanumberofwell‐attendedspecialevents,itisnotuncommontoseepopulationspikesandacorrespondingincreaseinservicecalls.However,thefireservicedemandinthecityisstillrelativelylight.Intheone(1)‐yeartimeframeanalyzedbyCPSM,theDoverFireDepartmentrespondedtoatotalof991alarms,ofwhich106werestructurefiresand69wereoutsidefiresorgrassfires.AsmentionedearlierthecityutilizesKentCountyandaprivateambulanceproviderforitsEMStransports.TheDoverFireDepartmenttypicallydoesnotrespondtoEMSincidentsunlessthereareextenuatingconditionsthatwouldnecessitateitsresponse.Subsequently,onadailybasistheDFDrespondstofewerthanthree(3)callsperdayandinmostcasestheseareservicecallsorminorincidents.Onoccasiontherearethemoresignificantincidentsthatrequireasubstantialworkforcetomanage.Thisisthemostdifficultquestionthatmanycommunitiesface.Theymustaskthemselves:Whatistheappropriatelevelofprotectionwhenconsideringthetypicaldailydemandforserviceversustheinfrequentlargereventthatrequiresasubstantiallyhigherresponse?Regardlessofthesizeoftheresponseforce,itisstillextremelydifficulttodeterminetheeffectivenessoftheinitialresponseinlimitingfirespreadandfiredamage.Manyvariableswillimpacttheseoutcomes,including:

Theageandtypeofconstructionofthestructure.

Thecontentsstoredinthestructureandtheirflammability.

Thepresenceofanyflammableliquids,explosives,orcompressedgascanisters.

Thetimeofdetection,notification,andultimatelyresponseoffireunits.

Thepresenceofanybuilt‐inprotection(automaticfiresprinklers)orfiredetectionsystems.

Weatherconditionsandtheavailabilityofwaterforextinguishment


Subsequently,inthosesituationsinwhichthereareextendeddelaysintheextinguishmenteffortorthefirehasprogressedsufficientlyuponarrivaloffireunits,thereisactuallyverylittlethatcanbedonetolimittheextentofdamagetotheentirestructureanditscontents.Inthesesituationssuppressioneffortswillfocusontheprotectionofnearbyoradjacentstructureswiththegoalbeingtolimitthespreadofthefirebeyondthebuildingoforigin.Thisisoftentermedprotectingexposures.Whentheextentofdamageisextensiveandthebuildingbecomesunstable,firefightingtacticstypicallymovetowhatiscalledadefensiveattack,oroneinwhichhoselinesandmoreimportantlypersonnelareontheoutsideofthestructureandtheirfocusistomerelydischargelargevolumesofwateruntilthefiregoesout.Inthesesituationstheabilitytoenterthebuildingisverylimitedandifvictimsaretrappedinthestructure,thereareveryfewsafeoptionsformakingentry.

Today’sfireserviceisactivelydebatingtheoptionsofinteriorfirefightingvs.exteriorfirefighting.Thesetermsareself‐descriptiveinthataninteriorfireattackisoneinwhichfirefightersenteraburningbuildinginanattempttofindtheseatofthefireandfromthisinteriorpositionextinguishthefirewithlimitedamountsofwater.Anexteriorfireattackisatacticinwhichfirefightersinitiallydischargewaterfromtheexteriorofthebuilding,eitherthroughawindowordoorandknockdownthefirebeforeentryinthebuildingismade.Theconceptistointroducelargervolumesofwaterinitiallyfromtheoutsideofthebuilding,cooltheinteriortemperatures,andreducetheintensityofthefirebeforefirefightersenterthebuilding.Anexteriorattackismostapplicableinsmallerstructures,typically,one‐storydetachedunitswhicharesmallerthan2,000squarefeetintotalfloorarea.

Thereareanumberoffactorsthathavefueledthisdebate,thefirstandmostcriticalofwhicharestaffinglevels.Asfiredepartmentsoperatewithreducedlevelsofstaffing,andthisstaffarrivesatthescenefromgreaterdistances,itislikelythatasinglefireunitwiththreeorfourpersonnelwillonlyhavetheoptionofinitiatinganexteriorattack.TheU.S.OccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration(OSHA)hasissuedastandardthathasbeentermedthe“Two‐in‐Two‐Out”provision.ThisstandardaffectsmostpublicfiredepartmentsacrosstheU.S.,includingDFD.Underthisstandard, firefighterswhoareengagedininteriorstructuralfirefightingandenteranareathatisimmediatelydangeroustolifeorhealth(anIDLHatmosphere),mustremaininvisualorvoicecontactwitheachotherandhaveatleasttwootheremployeeslocatedoutsidetheIDLHatmosphere.Thisassuresthatthe"twoin"canmonitoreachotherandassistwithequipmentfailureorentrapmentorotherhazards,andthe"twoout"canmonitorthoseinthebuilding,initiatearescue,orcallforback‐upifaproblemarises.15ThereisaprovisionwithintheOSHAstandardthatallowstwo(2)personneltomakeentryintoanIDLHatmospherewithouttherequiredtwoback‐uppersonnel.Thisisallowedwhentheyareattemptingtorescueapersonorpersonsinthestructurebeforetheentireteamisassembled.16

Whenusinganexteriorattack,therequirementofhavingthefour(4)personsassembledon‐scenepriortomakingentrywouldnotapply.RecentstudiesbyULhaveevaluatedtheeffectivenessof

15OSHA‐RespiratoryProtectionStandard,29CFR‐1910.134(g)(4)16Ibid,Note2toparagraph(g).


interiorvs.exteriorattacksincertainsimulatedfireenvironments.Thesestudieshavefoundthattheexteriorattacktobeequallyeffectiveinthesesimulations.17Thisdebateisdeep‐seatedinthefireserviceandtraditionaltacticalmeasureshavealwaysproposedaninteriorfireattack,specificallywhenthereisapossibilitythatvictimsmaybepresentintheburningstructure.Thelong‐heldbeliefinoppositiontoanexteriorattackisthatthisapproachmayactuallypushthefireintoareasthatarenotburningorwherevictimsmaybelocated.Thecounterpointsupportingtheexteriorattackcentersonfirefightersafety.Theexteriorattacklimitsthefirefighterfrommakingentryintothosesuper‐heatedstructuresthatmaybesusceptibletoeitherafloororroofcollapse.FromCPSM’sperspective,andgiventheuncertaintiesregardingresponseofvolunteerpersonnelatanygiventime,thereisatleastsomelikelihoodthatasinglecrewofthreeorfourpersonnelwillencounterasignificantandrapidlydevelopingfiresituation.ItisprudentthattheDFDbuildatleastacomponentofitstrainingandoperatingproceduresaroundthetacticalconceptoftheexteriorfireattackwhenthesituationwarrantssuchanapproach.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldbuildatleastaportionofitstrainingregimensandtacticalstrategiesaroundtheexteriorortransitionalattackwhenthefirescenarioandthenumberofrespondingpersonnelwarrantthisapproach.

TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldbefullycapable(andwebelieveis)ofhandlingfiresthatarelimitedissizeandintensityinsingle‐familydwellings.Thisgoalbecomesmoreachievablewhensufficientstaffingisavailable,ANDthefiredepartmentcanarriveatthefireincidentandtakedefinitiveactionbeforethesizeofthefireintensifies.

CPSManalyzedtheDFD’sresponseactivityfromJuly1,2014throughJune30,2015.Duringthestudyperiod,thedepartmentrespondedto975calls.CPSManalyzedcallsandruns.Acallisanemergencyservicerequestorincident.Arunisadispatchofaunit.Asmultipleunitsareoftendispatchedtoacall,therearemorerunsthancalls.

Table5‐6andFigure5‐3showtheaggregatecalltotalsforthetwelve(12)monthperiodevaluated,brokendownbynumberofincidents,averagecallsperday,andthepercentageofcallsthatfallintoeachcalltypecategory.WhiletheDoverFireDepartmentdoesnotprovideambulanceservices,itdoesrespondtoselectemergencymedicalservice(EMS)callsandmotorvehicleaccidents(MVAs)involvingextricationsandrescues.WeincludeMVAsasaseparatecalltypewhileweidentifyallotherEMS‐typecallsgroupedassimply“EMS.”Actualfirecalls(structuralandoutside)represent17.6%percentoftheoverallcalls(approximately0.48callsperdayoroneactualfire‐typecalleveryotherday).Structurefiresaccountfor10.7%oftheincidents(approximately0.29perday,oronestructurefireevery3.4days).Hazard,falsealarms,goodintent,andpublicservicecallsrepresentthelargestpercentageoffirecallsforservice,whichisalsotypicalinCPSMdataandworkloadanalysesofotherfiredepartments.

17“InnovatingFireAttackTactics”,U.L.COM/NewsScience,Summer2013.


TABLE 5‐6: Call Types

Call Type Number of Calls Calls per Day Call Percentage

MVA 47 0.13 4.7

EMS 43 0.12 4.3

Structure fire 106 0.29 10.7

Outside fire 69 0.19 6.9

Hazard 115 0.32 11.6

False alarm 355 0.97 35.8

Good intent 127 0.35 12.8

Public service 113 0.31 11.4

Subtotal 975 2.67 98.2

Cancelled 16 0.04 1.6

Total 991 2.72 100.0

FIGURE 5‐3: Calls by Type

Observations:

Firecallsfortheyeartotaled975,averaging2.7perday.

Structureandoutsidefirescombinedtotaled175calls,averagingonecallevery2.1days.

Structurefires(106calls)accountedfor11percentoftotalcalls.

Outsidefires(69)accountedfor7percentoftotalcalls.

Falsealarms(355)accountedforthelargestpercentageofcallsat36percent.

Inlookingattheactualcallsitisimportanttonotethatofthe975incidentstabulated,atotalof885werefire‐related(thatis,excludesMVAandEMScalls).Ofthese885fire‐relatedincidents,only175(106structureand69outsidefires)wereactualfires(20percent).Falsealarms,publicservice,


goodintent,andhazardcallsmakeupthelargestpercentageofthefire‐relatedcalls,atmorethan80percent.Thisfactiscriticalwhenwelookattheresponsepatternsthatareutilizedfortheseminorornon‐emergentresponses.

Table5‐7indicatesthedurationofcallsbytypeanddurationusingfour(4)durationcategories:lessthanthirty(30)minutes,thirty(30)minutestoone(1)hour,one(1)totwo(2)hours,morethantwo(2)hours.

TABLE 5‐7: Calls by Type and Duration

Call Type

Less than

One‐half Hour

One‐half Hour

to One Hour

One to

Two Hours

More than

Two Hours Total

MVA 33 12 2 0 47

EMS 38 4 1 0 43

Structure fire 54 37 8 7 106

Outside fire 48 19 2 0 69

Hazard 64 42 8 1 115

False alarm 324 29 2 0 355

Good intent 100 23 4 0 127

Public service 67 33 11 2 113

Subtotal 728 199 38 10 975

Cancelled 15 1 0 0 16

Total 743 200 38 10 991

Observations:

Overall

95percentofcalls(943)lastedlessthanonehour.

Fourpercentofcalls(38)lastedbetweenoneandtwohoursand1percent(10)lastedmorethantwohours.

Onaverage,0.1callsperday,orapproximatelyonecalleveryeightdays,lastedmorethanonehour.

Structure Fires

86percentofstructurefires(91)lastedlessthanonehour;8percent(8)lastedbetweenoneandtwohours;and7percent(7)lastedmorethantwohours.

Outside Fires

97percentofoutsidefires(67)lastedlessthanonehour;3percent(2)lastedbetweenoneandtwohours;andnonelastedmorethantwohours.

False Alarms

99percentoffalsealarms(353)lastedlessthanonehour,and1percent(2)lastedmorethananhour.


Again,whenwelookatthenatureofthe86structurefirecalls,only15involvedcalldurationsthatexceededonehourormore.Thiscanbeattributedtothemagnitudeoftheseevents.Similarly,intheoutsidefirecategory,onlytwo(2)ofthesixty‐nine(69)eventshaddurationsinexcessofone(1)hour.

Table5‐8summarizestheactionstakenbytheFireDepartmentatstructureandoutsidefires.Inthistableitisimportanttonote,specificallyintherowreferencing“extinguishmentbyfireservicepersonnel,”thatonlyin26ofthe106structurefiresand45ofthe69outsidefires,wasextinguishmentdonebyfireservicepersonnel.Thisagainmayindicatethatononlyalimitednumberofinstanceswerefireextinguishmentactionsonthepartofthefiredepartmentactuallyneeded.

TABLE 5‐8: Actions Taken Analysis for Structure and Outside Fire Calls

Action Taken

Number of Calls

Structure Fire Outside Fire

Assistance, other 4 0

Extinguishment by fire service personnel 26 45

Fire control or extinguishment, other 11 10

Information, investigation & enforcement, other 3 3

Investigate 48 7

Investigate fire out on arrival 12 4

Notify other agencies. 2 0

Provide equipment 1 0

Remove hazard 2 0

Salvage & overhaul 6 2

Search & rescue, other 5 0

Ventilate 3 0

Total* 123 71

* Totals are higher than the total number of calls because some calls had more than one action taken.

Observations:

Atotalof26structurefirecallswereextinguishedbyfireservicepersonnel,whichaccountedfor25percentofstructurefirecallsinDFD’sjurisdiction.

Atotalof45outsidefirecallswereextinguishedbyfireservicepersonnel,whichaccountedfor65percentofoutsidefirecallsinDFD’sjurisdiction.


EMS Response and Transport

Emergencymedicalservices(EMS)operationsareanimportantcomponentofthecomprehensiveemergencyservicesdeliverysysteminanycommunity.Togetherwiththedeliveryofpolice,fire,andemergencymanagement,itformsthebackboneofthecommunity’soverallpublicsafetyservicenetwork.WhenEMSactivitiesarelookedatasapercentageofoverallservicerequests,itcouldbearguedthatEMSconstitutesthemostfrequentlyutilizedservicerequestamongacommunity’scitizenry.

EMSintheCityofDoverisprovidedunderatwo(2)‐tierservicedeliverysystemforbasiclifesupport(BLS)andadvancedlifesupport(ALS).ALSisprovidedcountywidebyKentCountyparamedicswhoutilizenontransportvehiclesforresponse.BLSisprovidedundercontracttothecitybyPrimeCare,aprivateandfor‐profitambulancecompany.PrimeCareMedicalTransport,LLC,hashadthecontractwiththecityforapproximatelyten(10)years.ThemostrecentRFPfortheambulancecontractwasissuedonJanuary8,2015.Thenewcontract,whichisforaperiodofthree(3)yearswithaprovisionfortwo(2)additionalone‐yearrenewaloptions,wasapprovedandsignedbythecityonOctober8,2015;itwasretroactivetoApril1,2015.ThecontractstipulatesthattheEMSserviceareaistheboundariesoftheVolunteerAssociationFireDistrict,whichincludesnotonlythecorporateboundariesofthecity(excludingDoverAirForceBase)butsomecontiguousareasofKentCountyaswell.ThePrimeCareservicecontractisadministeredbythecity’sOEMcoordinator.

PrimeCarestaffstwo(2)ambulancesinthecityfromaleasedfacilityat601FultonSt.Oneambulanceisstaffedona24‐basisthroughouttheyear.Thesecondunitisstaffedseven(7)daysaweekfrom7:00a.m.to11:00p.m.Eachambulanceisrequiredtobestaffedwithoneemergencymedicaltechnician(EMT‐B)andaqualifieddriver.TheambulancesarerequiredtobemaintainedandequippedasrequiredbytheStateofDelaware.

Whilenotspecifiedinthecontractthatwereviewed,CPSMwasinformedthatthecitypaysPrimeCareamonthlystipendforprovidingthisservice.Thisstipendisbasedonaflatrateformulathatpaysonthebasisofthenumberofcallsandnotonthebasisofcollections.In2014,thepaymentswereinexcessof$237,500andinthe10‐monthtimeframebetweenJanuary‐October2015,thepaymentswerejustunder$200,000.Infiscalyear2016(July2015–June2016),thebudgetallocationforthePrimeCarestipendisapproximately$238,000.Inadditiontothisstipend,PrimeCarealsobillstheindividualpatientfortransportservices;however,collectionratesandrevenuefigureswerenotavailableforourreview.

In2014,therewere6,865EMSincidentsintheCityofDover.Thisequatestoanaverageofapproximately19.1incidentseachday.AccordingtostatisticsprovidedbytheEmergencyCommunicationsDivisionoftheKentCountyDepartmentofPublicSafety,fromJanuarythroughOctoberof2015,EMSincidentsinDoverhadtotaled6,259,or20.8perday.Since2000therehasbeenasteadygrowthinthevolumeofEMSactivity,upapproximately90percentoverthis15‐yearperiod.(Figure5‐4)


FIGURE 5‐4: Dover EMS Incidents 2001‐2014

ThecurrentcontractwithPrimeCareisverylimitedinitsrequirementsregardingperformancecriteria,includingunitavailability.Thecontractincludesaturnouttimerequirementthatstipulatestheambulanceunitmustrespondtocallswithinanaverageofone(1)minute(00:01:00)afterreceiptofthecall.However,therearenootherresponsetimecriteriainthecurrentagreement.Theaveragetraveltimeinthetimeframereferencedabovewassix(6)minutes,thirty‐two(32)seconds(00:06:32)afteraturnouttimeofapproximatelyforty‐one(41)seconds(00:00:41).TheCommissiononAccreditationofAmbulanceServicesisanindependentagencythatpublishesaseriesofstandardsfortheambulanceserviceindustryanditrecommendsthatambulancesshouldachieveaneight(8)minute,fifty‐nine(59)seconds(00:08:59)responsetimein90percentofallresponses.18ItshouldbenotedthatthesereportsareforPrimeCareunits,whenitisabletorespond.WhenaPrimeCareunitisunavailableandamutualaidunitresponds,thesetimesareexcluded.Webelievethatiftheseincidentswerecalculatedintotheaverageresponse,theoverallaveragewouldbesignificantlyhigher.

18TheCommissiononAccreditationofAmbulanceServices(CAAS)isanindependentcommissionthatestablishedacomprehensiveseriesofstandardsfortheambulanceserviceindustry.


TABLE 5‐9: PrimeCare Statistics, June 2015‐September 2015

JUNE

2015

JULY

2015

AUGUST

2015

SEPTEMBER

2015

Total 9‐1‐1 Ambulance Runs 641 669 645 672

Gone on Arrival/Cancelled 82 65 82 79

Transport Refusals 31 29 13 30

Standby at Scene 2 5 2 3

Average Turnout Time 00:00:40 00:00:40 00:00:44 00:00:41

Average Travel Time to Scene 00:06:46 00:06:27 00:06:25 00:06:31

Average Time on Scene 00:10:12 00:10:30 00:09:27 00:09:50

Average Time to the Hospital 00:06:40 00:07:05 00:06:31 00:06:34

Average Daily Responses 21 22 21 22

Average Daily Transports 17 18 17 18

Total Patients Transported 517 561 541 553

ThenumberoftimesthatPrimeCareunitsareunavailableandmutualaidEMSunitsarerequiredtorespondintoDoverisexceedinglyhigh.Inthe10‐monthperiodfromJanuary2015throughOctober2015,therewere1,325instancesinwhichPrimeCareunitswereunavailableandamutualaidrequestforanambulancesquadwasrequired.Thisequatestoanaverageof4.6instanceseachday;overall,21.2percentofalltheEMSincidentsinDoversofarthisyearwerecoveredviamutualaidrequests.

TABLE 5‐10: 2015 Mutual Aid EMS Units Dispatched into Dover

January February March April May June July August September October Total

133 114 92 123 134 190 112 128 125 174 1,325

ThishasbeenanongoingissuedatingbackseveralyearsanddefinitelypriortothesigningofanewcontractforEMS.InanefforttoacknowledgetheservicesofthemutualaiddepartmentsthatcomeintoDoveronaregularbasis,theCityofDoverhasimplementedapaymentof$25.00percalltothoseagenciesprovidingassistance.Onanannualbasisthisaddsanadditional$40,000tothestipendpaidbythecitytomaintainambulanceservice.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldreviseitsperformancecriteriainfuturecontractswiththeambulanceprovider,withspecificguidelinesrelatingtounitavailability,turnouttime,andoverallresponsetimethatismeasuredatthe90percentfractilerate.

Manymunicipalitiesincludeintheirambulancecontractsapenaltyprovisioninwhichfinesandfinancialoff‐setsarerequiredwhenperformancecriteriaarenotmet.Thecityshouldconsiderthe


additionoffinancialpenaltiesagainsttheambulanceproviderincaseswherecriticalperformancecriteriaarenotmet.

ThecurrentcontractwiththecityrequiresthateachambulancebestaffedwithasingleEMT‐Bandadriver.ThecontractdoesnotstipulatethatthedriverneedstohavebasicCPR,AED,andfirstaidtraining.WhilehavingonlyasingleEMTonacareerBLSunitmaybepermittedbyDelawareregulations,itiscertainlynotthecommonlyacceptedpracticenationallyandCPSMbelievesthatbothcrewmembersshouldbeEMTs.Therearemanyreasonswhytwo(2)EMTsarepreferred,particularlyinbusysystemssuchasDover.Chiefamongthemistheneedforbothpersonneltobeactivelyinvolvedinpatientcareforseriouslyillorinjuredpatientsandtheneedtotreatmultiplepatientssimultaneouslyduringincidentssuchasmotorvehicleaccidents.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldamenditsfutureambulancecontracttorequirethatallambulancesoperatingwithinthecitybestaffedwithaminimumoftwo(2)EMTs.

EMSservicedemandintheCityofDoveraresignificantandthelevelofcarecurrentlyprovidedbyPrimeCareappearslacking.Thecityispayinginexcessof$275,000annuallytomaintainthePrimeCarecontract.CPSMbelievesthatthecurrentagreementwithPrimeCareshouldbereconsidered.ThereisasubstantialcallvolumeintheDoverareaandthepotentialtoobtainamorecompetitivebidislikelyifeffortsareinitiatedtoseekanationalambulanceproviderthroughadirectedRFPprocess.

Recommendation:AtthecloseofthecurrentcontractwithPrimeCare,theCityofDovershouldconsiderissuinganationalRFPforanambulanceproviderforthecityservicearea.

ThemostrecentRFPforanambulanceprovideronlyresultedintwoqualifiedcompaniesbiddingforthecontract.InthenextRFP,thecityshouldmakeaconcertedefforttosolicitbidsfromseveralofthenationalambulanceprovidersinanefforttoenhancethecompetitionandimprovepricing.AspartofthisRFPthecityshouldincludeaseriesofperformanceindicatorsandreportingrequirementsthatwillbepartofthenewcontractualagreement.Ifastipendisrequireditshouldbebasedonaperformanceindicatorandafterathoroughreviewoftheambulanceproviderrevenuesandcollectioneffortsthatjustifythepaymentofastipendandtheamount.

TheabilityofacommunitytomonitorandevaluatetheeffectivenessofitsEMSdeliverysystemisgreatlydependentupontheavailabilityofvaliddataandstatisticalanalysisthatmeasuressystemperformance,includingbothclinicalandfinancialoutcomes.Thecityshouldrequirethecontractortoprovidedetailedandperiodicreportingasfollows:

OperationalReportingRequirements

Totalresponses.

Totalemergencytransports.

Totalpatientstransported.


Totalresponsesandtransportactivitybyambulanceunit.

Totalcancelledcalls(priortoarrival).

Frequencyinwhichambulanceunitsareunavailableandthereason.

Totalpatientrefusals(treatmentandtransport).

Distributionofresponsesbytimeofdayanddayofweek.

Distributionofincidentsbylocation(ambulanceservicezones).

Descriptionofincidentsbyseverityofinjury/illness.

Summaryofpatientcomplaints(situationfound).

Responsetimesummaryforallresponses.

Responsetimesummarybyambulanceservicezones.

Responsetimesummarybyambulanceunit.

Frequencyofsimultaneouscallsforservice(citywide).

Summaryofmutualaidrequests.

Summaryofcallduration(transportsandnontransports).

Listingofequipmentorvehiclebreakdown/malfunctions.

Listinganddispositionofallpatientcomplaints(regardingservice).

FinancialReportingRequirements

Totalexpensesandrevenues.

Totalaveragechargeperpatient.

Totalaveragepatientchargeformedicalsuppliesanddisposableequipment.

Totalaveragepatientchargeformileage.

30‐,60‐,and90‐dayaccountsreceivable.

Distributionofpaymentsbyallpaymentgroups(Medicare,Medicaid,privateinsurance,directpayment,andnon‐collectables/baddebt).

Quarterlycollectionrate(percentage)forallambulancebillings.

Totalaccountswrittenoffasbaddebtafter180daysattemptedcollections.

MiscellaneousRecordkeeping

Deploymentplanningreports.

Vehiclemaintenancerecords.

Continuingeducationandcertificationrecordsdocumentingtrainingcompliance.


TheabilitytosupervisethedeliveryofEMStransportservicesisacriticalfunctionoflocalgovernment.Asindicatedbythealarmactivity,thousandsofresidentsinteractdirectlywiththeambulanceserviceproviderannually.Typically,whenaprivateambulanceserviceischargedwithprovidingtheseservices,amunicipalfiredepartmentisacoprovideroftheservice.Thisinvolvementcreatesanongoinginteractionandanindirectoversightoftheprocess.InthesystemcurrentlybeingutilizedinDover,thisrelationshipdoesnotexistbecausethevolunteerfireserviceislargelyuninvolvedinEMSdelivery.Inanearlierrecommendation,CPSMsuggestedtheutilizationoftheEmergencyServicesManagerintheoversightoffireresponseandpreventionactivities.Similarly,itisourrecommendationthattheoversightofambulanceservicedeliveryalsobetheresponsibilityoftheEmergencyServicesManager.Withtheproposaltoinstituteaseriesofcomprehensiveperformancecriteriaitiscriticalthatanongoingreviewoftheseperformanceindicators,combinedwithregularfieldevaluations,beenacted.Additionally,thecitymayconsidertheplacementofthecontractedambulanceunitsattheDoverfirestations.ThiswouldprovidedirectinteractionwiththeEmergencyServicesManageranddrawtheambulanceproviderclosertofireoperations.

Recommendation:ThecityshouldconsiderthehousinganddeploymentofambulanceunitsfromtheDoverfirestations.

PrimeCarecurrentlyleasesspaceforitsoperationsinDover.Theabilitytojointlyhousefireandambulanceoperationsatcityfacilitiesmaycreateafinancialincentivethatwouldattractanoutsidevendorandreducetheneedforacitystipendtosupplementambulancerevenues.

Workload Analysis/Fire Loss

Asindicatedabove,thefire‐relatedcallvolumeobservedinDoverequatesto2.72callsperday,withthemajorityofthesecallsbeingnonemergencyinnatureandpublicassists.Averageelapsedtimeforacallis26.7minutes(fromcallreceipttimetounitsreturningtothestation)andthetotaldeployedtimeforallunitsisjustovertwoandone‐half(2.5)hourseachday(158.8minutes).Themajorityofallalarmactivity(approximately60percent)occursduringthenine‐hourperiodfrom10:00a.m.to7:00p.m.OuranalysisshowsthatonlyoninfrequentoccasiondoestheDoversystemexperienceoverlappingorsimultaneousalarms.Therewere51occasionsinthetwelve(12)‐monthperiodsurveyedinwhichtwocallsoccurredsimultaneously.Theaveragetimeofthisoverlapwas12.1minutes.

Whenweexaminethebreakdownofcallactivityandthecorrespondingaveragedeployedminutesperdayforeachcalltype(Table5‐11),wecanevaluatethetimeDoverunitsarespendingonthevariouscalltypes.Itisimportanttonotethatatotal966hoursofdeployedtimeoccurredintheperiodevaluated.Thisisthecompositeofalltimeloggedforallrunsbythevariousunitsresponding.Ofthisamount,251hours(26percent)wereattributabletofalsealarmruns.Ifwelookattheothercategoriesoffireresponseactivitiesthataretypicallynonemergencyinnature(hazard,falsealarm,goodintent,andpublicservice),itshouldbenotedthat509.8hours(approx.62percent)ofallthetimeloggedwasattributabletothesecalltypes.Thisisofparticularinterest


becausethesearegenerallythecalltypesthatcouldbescreenedeffectivelyinordertoreducethenumberofunitsrespondingandthemodeofresponse(i.e.,hotvscold).

TABLE 5‐11: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Call Type

Call Type

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Run

Annual

Hours

Percent of

Total Hours

Deployed

Min. per Day

Total

Annual Runs

Runs

per Day

MVA 24.7 48.2 5.0 7.9 117 0.3

EMS 17.8 18.7 1.9 3.1 63 0.2

Structure fire 45.5 243.3 25.2 40.0 321 0.9

Outside fire 25.4 58.4 6.0 9.6 138 0.4

Hazard 28.8 125.4 13.0 20.6 261 0.7

False alarm 19.2 251.0 26.0 41.3 785 2.2

Good intent 24.0 109.9 11.4 18.1 275 0.8

Public service 34.6 104.5 10.8 17.2 181 0.5

Subtotal 26.9 959.4 99.3 157.7 2,141 5.9

Cancelled 15.3 6.6 0.7 1.1 26 0.1

Total 26.7 966.0 100.0 158.8 2,167 5.9

Observations:

Therewere2,167runsintheyearstudied,resultinginatotalof966hoursofdeployedtime.

Onaverage,therewere5.9runsperday,withanaverageof2.6hoursofdeployedtimeperday.

Structureandoutsidefiresresultedin459runs,withatotalworkloadof301.7hours,equalto32percentoftotalDFDworkload.

Structurefiresaveraged45.5minutesofdeployedtime.

Outsidefiresaveraged25.4minutesofdeployedtime.

WhenwelookedattheresponseactivitiesamongthevariousDFDunitsitwasinterestingtonotethatLadder1wasthebusiestunit,responding542times,with235.8hoursofannualtotaloperatingtime.Typically,laddertrucksaretheleastutilizedprimaryresponsevehicles.Thesevehiclesarelessmaneuverable,theirresponsetimesareslower,andbecauseoftheirweightthereismorewearandtearontheseapparatus.Aswell,thefrequencywithwhichaerialdevicesareactuallyneededisverylimited.



Unit Type Unit ID

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Run

Total

Annual Hours

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Day

Total

Annual Runs

Avg. Runs

per Day

Brush B1 17.0 3.4 0.6 12 0.0*

B9 18.0 31.5 5.2 105 0.3

Engine E2 27.8 199.4 32.8 431 1.2

E3 29.0 63.8 10.5 132 0.4

E4 27.2 164.4 27.0 363 1.0

E6 25.7 120.7 19.8 282 0.8

E7 32.7 20.7 3.4 38 0.1

Ladder L1 26.1 235.8 38.8 542 1.5

L2 26.0 50.6 8.3 117 0.3

Rescue R1 33.7 58.3 9.6 104 0.3

Utility U1 24.2 14.9 2.5 37 0.1

Other Other 36.3 2.4 0.4 4 0.0*

* These units had so few runs that their average runs per day, rounded to the nearest one‐tenth, appears to be zero.

Observations:

Ladder1madethemostruns(542intotalor1.5perday)andhadthehighesttotalannualdeployedtime(236hoursfortheyearor39minutesperday).

Engine2madethesecondmostruns(431totalor1.2perday)andhadthesecondhighesttotalannualdeployedtime(199hoursfortheyearor33minutesperday).

Fire Loss Inexaminingthefireincidentsinmoredetail,itwasdeterminedthatinfifty(50)ofthetotalfireincidents,nofirelosswasrecorded.Lossamountsrangedfrom$100to$100,000.Theaveragelossamountwas$9,869andinonlyseven(7)incidentsdidweseeareportedfirelossexceeding$20,000.Whenlookingatfirelosscomparisonsnationwideforstructurefires,NFPAestimatesthatin2012theaveragefirelossforastructurefirewas$20,345.19WhenthisiscomparedwiththeaveragefirelossinstructurefiresinDover,whichwas$9,869,weseetheDoveraveragelossislessthanhalfthefirelossbeingexperiencednationally.Althoughthefirelossin2014‐2015wasnotexceptionallyhigh,atanytimeasinglefirecanoccurthatresultsinmillionsofdollarsinfireloss.However,onecandeterminefromboththenumberofactualfiresoccurringinDoverandtheaveragefirelossduringtheseevents,thatthefireprobleminDoverisnotexceptionallyhigh.

19MichaelJ.KarterJr.,FireLossintheUnitedStatesduring2012,NFPASeptember2013,13.


TABLE 5‐13: Fire Loss

Call Type Calls Total Loss Average Loss

Structure Fire 35 $463,350 $13,239

Outside Fire 5 $23,100 $4,620

Good Intent 1 $250 $250

Hazard 9 $14,400 $1,600

Total 50 $501,100 $10,022

Note: This analysis only includes calls with recorded loss greater than 0.

Observations:

Overall

50incidentshadpropertyloss,withanaveragelossamountof$10,022.

Onlysevenincidentsinvolvedalossamountexceeding$20,000.

Structure Fires

Outof106structurefirecalls,35hadrecordedloss,withtotalrecordedlossvalueof$463,350andaveragelossof$13,239.

Fivestructurefireshadunder$500inloss,and20hadmorethan$500butlessthan$10,000inloss.

Thesmallestlosswas$100,andthelargestlosswas$100,000

Outside Fires

Outof69outsidefirecalls,fivehadrecordedloss,withtotalrecordedlossvalueof$23,100andaveragelossof$4,620.

Oneoutsidefirehadunder$500inloss,andtheremainingfourhadmorethan$500butlessthan$10,000inloss.

Thesmallestlosswas$100,andthelargestlosswas$10,000.

Service Relationship with Kent County

TheStateofDelaware,becauseofitssize,hasonlythree(3)countieswithinthestate.Countygovernmentsworkcloselywithcities,towns,andunincorporatedcommunitiesinprovidingarangeofcountyandmunicipalservices.Countygovernmentsalsoprovidesignificantsupporttovolunteerfirecompanies,whicharetheprimaryserviceprovidersforfireandEMSservicesinDelaware.WilmingtonisthelargestcityinDelawareandtheonlymunicipalitythatoperatesafull‐timecareerfiredepartment.Allothercities,towns,andfireprotectiondistrictsareservedbyfullyvolunteerorpaid‐on‐callfiredepartments.

TheCityofDoverisanincorporatedmunicipalitywithinKentCounty.Asthestatecapital,Doverhasacriticalworkingrelationshipwithmanystateagenciesthatarelocatedwithincitylimits.The


DoverFireDepartmentworkscloselywiththeKentCountyDepartmentofPublicSafetyandtheStateofDelawareinprovidingfireprotectiontoitsresidents,visitors,statebuildings,andbusinesses.TheKentCountyEmergencyCommunicationsCenterprovidescountywide911emergencycall‐taking,dispatching,andcentralizedcommunicationsservicestoseventeen(17)volunteerfiredepartmentsandfourteen(14)EMSagenciesfromastate‐of‐the‐artfacility.TheCityofDoverdoesnotutilizeKentCountyDepartmentofPublicSafetyfor911servicesandinsteadoperatesitsowndispatchsystemforitspoliceandfiredepartments.

Mutual Aid

TheDoverFireDepartmentispartofthestatewidemutualaidsystem.Eachparticipantofthissystemrecognizesthat“emergenciestranscendpoliticaljurisdictionalboundariesandthatintergovernmentalcoordinationisessentialfortheprotectionoflivesandpropertyandforbestuseofavailableassetsbothpublicandprivate.”20

TheCityofDoverutilizesfour(4)primarymutualaidpartners:Cheswold,LittleCreek,Hartly,andCamden‐Wyoming.ThemutualaidpartnersaredispatchedbyKentCounty911.Inaddition,two(2)ofthepartnershaveEMSambulancesthatfrequentlyrespondtocallsforserviceinDoverwhenPrimeCareunitsarenotavailable.MutualaidisusedextensivelyinDoverandamongthesurroundingfiredepartmentsinKentCounty.Inthetwelve12‐monthperiodevaluatedinouranalysistherewereatotaloftwenty‐five(25)occasionsinwhichaDoverunitprovidedassistancetoamutualaidpartner.Onapproximatelyeighty(80)occasions,Doverreceivedfireassistancefromitsneighboringpartners.Manytimesthisassistancetooktheformofa“stand‐by”or“cover‐up”response.Inthisscenario,theagencyprovidingassistancewouldrespondintotheneighboringcommunityandstand‐bywhiletheresidentagencywastieduponaninitialcall.ThesurroundingFireChiefsreportedthatthemutualaidprocesswasveryeffectiveandthattherewerenotactical,jurisdictional,orequipment/radioincompatibilitiesinthemutualaidprocess.OperationalandtacticalproceduresaredevelopedcollaborativelybytheKentCountyChief'sAssociationintheformofstandardoperatingprocedures.ThemutualaidsystemappearstobeveryfunctionalandCPSMviewsthiscombinedeffortasabestpracticethatiscommendable.

Emergency/Nonemergency Response

AnotherinterestingtrendCPSMcontinuestoevaluateisthefrequencyoftrueemergencycallsvs.nonemergencyorpublicassistcalls.Ourfindingsnationally(fromCPSMfiredatareports)indicatethatinmanyjurisdictionsmorethanfifty(50)percentofallresponses(fire,EMS,andother)arenonemergencyinnature.Thisfactoriscriticalwhenvolunteerpersonnelareutilizedandindividualsarecalledinforaresponseandthecallturnsouttobeafalsealarmorsomethingminorthatcouldhavebeenhandledwithalesserresponse.Inanefforttolimittheresponseofmultipleunits,DFDhasbuiltintoitsresponseprotocolstheuseofa“SilentAlarm”andthe“DutyOfficer

20DelawareCode§20,Chapter32,MilitaryandCivilDefenseIntrastateMutualAidCompact.


Call.”ThisisanexcellenteffortthatCPSMrecognizesasabestpractice.TheDover911CenterandtheDoverFireDispatchCenterareverylimitedintheircallscreeningefforts.Innearlyallfireresponses,unitsrespondinaHotmode,utilizinglightsandsirens.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldworkwiththeDover911PoliceCommunicationsCenterinanefforttoreducethenumberofresponsesthatrequireunitstorespondwithlightsandsirens.

Mostfireresponses,specificallythoseinvolvingautomaticfirealarmsoundings,smokeinvestigations,smellofgas,andpublicservicecalls,arenonemergencyanddonotrequireahotresponse.Inmostcases,aninvestigationofthesituationiswarrantedandminimalpersonnelshouldbeassigned.Inlookingatthefireresponsesthatoccurredinthetwelve(12)‐monthperiodfromJuly2014toJune‐2015,wefoundthatmorethan80percent(710incidents)wereclassifiedaseitherahazard,falsealarm,goodintent,orpublicservicecall.CPSMbelievesthatwithproperscreening,manyoftheseresponsescouldbehandledasnonemergencyresponses.

Ouranalysisalsofoundthaton35.6percentofallresponses,DFDrespondsasingleunit.CPSMbelievesthatthisnumberisverylow.Ourexperiencewithcallactivityinothercommunitiesindicatesthatupwardsof50percentto60percentofallfireresponsescanbescreenedsufficientlytoreducethelevelofresponse.Theabilitytorespondthefewestnumberofunitsandhavetheseunitsrespondina“coldmodeofresponse”(withoutlightsandsirensandfollowingtrafficpatterns)resultsinthemaximizationofresourcesandimprovedrespondersafety.Emergencyresponseunitsthatarerespondingwithlightsandsirensaremoresusceptibletotrafficaccidents.Accidentsinvolvingfirevehiclesrespondingtoemergenciesarethesecondhighestcauseforline‐of‐dutydeathsoffirefighters.21Itisestimatedthatmorethan30,000fireapparatusareinvolvedinaccidentswhenrespondingtoemergencieseachyearintheU.S.22Respondingfewerunitsandhavingtheseunitsrespondinanonemergencymodemakessenseintermsofsafetyandefficiency.

21“AnalysisofFiretruckCrashesandAssociatedFirefighterInjuriesintheU.S.”AssociationfortheAdvancementofAutomotiveMedicine.October‐2012.22Ibid.


FIGURE 5‐5: Number of Dover Fire Department Units Dispatched to Calls

TABLE 5‐14: Number of Units Dispatched to Calls

Call Type

Number of Units

Total One Two Three

Four or

More

MVA 10 11 19 7 47

EMS 30 7 5 1 43



Hazard 40 25 35 15 115

False alarm 96 130 95 34 355

Good intent 47 38 23 19 127


Subtotal 346 268 232 129 975


Total 354 276 234 129 993

Percentage 35.6 27.8 23.6 13.0 100.0


Observations:

Overall

Onaverage,2.2unitsweredispatchedpercall.

Oneunitwasdispatched36percentofthetime,twounitsweredispatched28percentofthetime,threeunitsweredispatched24percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched13percentofthetime.

Structure Fires

Threeunitsweredispatchedtostructurefires25percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched38percentofthetime.

Outside Fires

Threeunitsweredispatchedtooutsidefires19percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched10percentofthetime.

False Alarms

Threeunitsweredispatchedtofalsealarms37percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched10percentofthetime.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldmodifyitsresponseprotocolsinanefforttoreducethenumberofunitsrespondingtothosecallsthatarescreenedsufficientlytodeterminethattheyarenonemergencyinnature.

Theabilitytoscreencallssufficientlyatthedispatchleveltodeterminetheircriticalityisdoneonadailybasisindispatchcentersacrossthenation.Intoday’senvironmentinwhichcellulartelephonesarecarriedbymosteveryone,itisverylikelythatduringtrueemergenciesmultiplecallsarereceivedforthesameincident.Fromthisstandpoint,theabilitytoupgradeacallfromnonemergencytoemergencycanbedonewithlittletimedelayifmultipleorconfirmingcallsarereceived.


Section 6. Response Time Analysis

ResponsetimesaretypicallytheprimarymeasurementinevaluatingfireandEMSservices.Mostdeploymentmodelshavebeenbuiltaroundafour‐minuteinitialtraveltimeforEMSandaneight‐minutefull‐forcetraveltimeforfires.Thoughthesetimeshavevalidity,theactualimpactofaspeedyresponsetimeislimitedtoveryfewincidents.Forexample,inafullcardiacarrest,analysisshowsthatsuccessfuloutcomesarerarelyachievedifbasiclifesupport(CPR)isnotinitiatedwithinfourminutesoftheonset.However,cardiacarrestsoccurveryinfrequently;onaveragetheyare1percentto1.5percentofallEMSincidents.23TherearealsootherEMSincidentsthataretrulylife‐threateningandthetimeofresponsecanclearlyimpacttheoutcome.Theseinvolvefulldrownings,allergicreactions,electrocutions,andseveretrauma(oftencausedbygunshotwounds,stabbings,andseveremotorvehicleaccidents,etc.).Again,thefrequenciesofthesetypesofcallsarelimited.

Regardingresponsetimesforfireincidents,thecriterionisbasedontheconceptof“flashover.”Thisisthestateatwhichsuper‐heatedgassesfromafirearereleasedrapidly,causingthefiretoburnfreelyandbecomesovolatilethatthefirereachesanexplosivestate.Inthissituation,usuallyafteranextendedperiodoftime(ofteneight(8)totwelve(12)minutesafterignitionbuttimesasquicklyasfive(5)toseven(7)minutes),andacombinationoftherightconditions(fuelandoxygen),thefireexpandsrapidlyandismuchmoredifficulttocontain.Whenthefiredoesreachthisextremelyhazardousstate,initialfirefightingforcesareoftenoverwhelmed,largerandmoredestructivefireoccurs,andsignificantlymoreresourcesarerequiredtoaffectfirecontrolandextinguishment.Flashoverhasbeenobservedtooccurmorefrequentlytodayaspartofanincreaseinquantitiesofplastic‐andfoam‐basedproductsintohomesandbusinesses.Thesematerialsigniteandburnquicklyandproduceextremeheatandtoxicsmoke.Figure6‐1illustratestheflashoverphenomenonanditspotentialimpactonfirefightersandfireextinguishmentasthefirepropagationcurve.

23Myers,Slovis,Eckstein,Goodloeetal.(2007).”Evidence‐basedPerformanceMeasuresforEmergencyMedicalServicesSystem:AModelforExpandedEMSBenchmarking.”Pre‐hospitalEmergencyCare.


FIGURE 6‐1: Fire Propagation Curve

Anotherimportantfactorinthewholeresponsetimequestioniswhatweterm“detectiontime.”Thisisthetimeittakestodetectafireormedicalsituationandnotify911toinitiatetheresponse.Inmanyinstances,particularlyatnightorwhenautomaticdetectionsystems(firesprinklersandsmokedetectors)areunavailableorinoperable,thedetectionprocesscanbeextended.

Measuring Response Times

TherearenodocumentedstudiesthathavemadeadirectcorrelationbetweenresponsetimesandoutcomesinfireandEMSevents.Noonehasbeenabletoshowthatafour(4)‐minuteresponsetimeismeasurablymoreeffectivethanasix(6)‐minuteresponsetime.Thelogichasbeen“fasterisbetter”butthishasnotbeensubstantiatedbyanydetailedanalysis.Furthermore,theabilitytomeasurethedifferenceinoutcomes(patientsaves,reducedfiredamage,orsomeotherquantifiablemeasure)betweenasix(6)‐minute,eight(8)‐minute,orten(10)‐minuteresponseisnotaperformancemeasureoftenutilizedinthefireservice.

Thelevelofprotectioninacommunityshouldbebasedonthespecificneedsofthatcommunity.So,inlookingatresponsetimesitisprudenttodesignadeploymentstrategyaroundtheactualcircumstancesthatexistandthehistoricalservicedemandsthatareoccurring.

ForthepurposeofthisanalysisResponseTimeisaproductofthreecomponents;DispatchTime,TurnoutTime,andTravelTime.


Dispatchtimeisthetimeintervalthatbeginswhenthealarmisreceivedattheinitialpublicsafetyansweringpoint(PSAP)orcommunicationscenterandendswhentheresponseinformationbeginstobetransmittedviavoiceand/orelectronicmeanstotheemergencyresponsefacilityoremergencyresponseunitsorpersonnelinthefield.

Turnouttimeisthetimeintervalthatbeginswhenthenotificationprocesstoemergencyresponsefacilitiesandemergencyresponsepersonnelandunitsbeginsbyanaudiblealarmand/orvisualannouncementandendsatthebeginningpointoftraveltime.Thefiredepartmenthasthegreatestcontroloverthesefirsttwosegmentsofthetotalresponsetime.

Traveltimeisthetimeintervalthatinitiateswhentheemergencyresponseunitisactuallymovinginresponsetotheincidentandendswhentheunitarrivesatthescene.

Responsetime,alsoknownastotalresponsetime,isthetimeintervalthatbeginswhenthecallisreceivedbytheprimarydispatchcenterandendswhenthedispatchedunitarrivesonthesceneoftheincidenttoinitiateaction.

Forthisstudy,andunlessotherwiseindicated,responsetimesandtraveltimesmeasurethefirstarrivingunitonly.Theprimaryfocusofthissectionisthedispatchandresponsetimeofthefirstarrivingunitsforcallsrespondedwithlightsandsirens.

AccordingtoNFPA1710,StandardfortheOrganizationandDeploymentofFireSuppressionOperations,EmergencyMedicalOperations,andSpecialOperationstothePublicbyCareerDepartments,2014Edition,thealarmprocessingtimeordispatchtimeshouldbelessthanorequalto60seconds90percentofthetime.WhileDover’sfiredepartmentitselfisvolunteer,itsdispatchfunctionsarenot;thereforeforthepurposesofdispatchtime,thisstandardmaybeconsideredanapplicablebenchmark.

NFPA1720issilentoninitialunitresponsetimes.However,forfiredepartmentsservinganurbancommunityitstatestheinitialfirstalarmassignment(atotaloffifteen(15)personnelforasinglefamilyresidentialstructure)shouldbeassembledonscenein540seconds(nineminutes)90percentofthetime(includingturnouttimebutnotdispatchtime).NFPA1720responsetimecriterionisabenchmarkforservicedeliveryandnotnecessarilyaCPSMrecommendation.

Dover Fire Department Response Times

ThissectionfocusesondispatchandresponsetimeanalysisforthefirstarrivingDFDunit.Wetypicallyfocusonemergencycallswherethedepartmentwouldrespondwithlightsandsirens—alsoknownasahotresponse.TheDFDdoesnotrecordthepriorityofacallinitsrecordsmanagementsystem,soalleligiblecallswereincludedinthisanalysis.CPSMused940callsincreatingthisanalysis.Weexcludedcallsinwhichunitswerecanceledenroute,administrativecalls,andcallsinwhichthedatawereincompleteorinaccurate.Weincludedfirstarrivingunitswithcompleteunitdispatchtime,unitenroutetime,anduniton‐scenearrivaltime.


FortheDFDcallsanalyzedtheaveragedispatchtimewas1.3minutes.Theaverageturnouttimewas3.3minutes.Theaveragetraveltimewas3.5minutes.TheaverageDFDresponsetimeforEMScallswas5.8minutes.Theaverageresponsetimeforstructurefirecallswas7.8minutes.Theaverageresponsetimeforoutsidefirecallswasalso7.8minutes.Theaveragetotalresponsetimewas8.1minutes.

TABLE 6‐1: Average Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type (Minutes)

Call Type Dispatch Time Turnout Time Travel Time Response Time Sample Size

MVA 2.0 1.8 3.2 7.0 42

EMS 1.3 2.7 1.8 5.8 42

Structure fire 1.0 3.4 3.4 7.8 104

Outside fire 2.1 2.0 3.7 7.8 68

Hazard 1.3 3.4 3.3 8.0 111

False alarm 1.0 3.9 3.6 8.5 346

Good intent 1.3 3.1 3.7 8.1 125

Public service 1.6 2.5 4.4 8.5 102

Total 1.3 3.3 3.5 8.1 940

Observations:

48calls(5percent)hadadispatchhandlingtimegreaterthanfiveminutes.

370calls(39percent)hadaturnouttimeofgreaterthanfourminutes.

234calls(25percent)hadatotalresponsetimegreaterthantenminutes.

Averages – First Arriving Unit

Dispatchtime:1.3minutes.

Turnouttime:3.3minutes.

Traveltime:3.5minutes.

Totalresponsetime:8.1minutes.

Structurefireresponsetime:7.8minutes.

Outsidefireresponsetime:7.8minutes.

The90thpercentilemeasurement,oftenreferredasa“fractileresponse,”isamoreconservativeandstrictermeasureoftotalresponsetime.MostfireagenciesareunabletomeettheNFPAfractileresponsetimestandard.Simplyexplained,for90percentofcalls,thefirstunitarriveswithinaspecifiedtime,andifmeasured,thesecondandthirdunit.Table6‐2depictsthe90thpercentileresponsetimesinDoverforvariousresponses.Itisimportanttonotethatthe90thpercentiledispatchtimeforfireresponsesis3.3minuteswhiletheaveragedispatchtimewasjust1.3minutes.MVAsandoutsidefiresweremeasuredatfiveminutes(00:05:00)andfiveminutes,thirty


seconds(00:05:30),respectively.Structurefireshada90thpercentileturnouttimeofsixminutes,thirtyseconds(00:06:30).

TABLE 6‐2: 90th Percentile Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type

(Minutes)


MVA 5.0 4.5 5.5 10.4 42

EMS 2.5 6.7 4.5 11.0 42

Structure fire 2.2 6.5 5.8 12.2 104

Outside fire 5.5 5.5 6.6 11.1 68

Hazard 3.4 6.8 5.5 12.1 111

False alarm 2.4 7.1 5.8 12.0 346

Good intent 3.3 6.6 6.3 12.3 125

Public service 3.9 5.8 8.3 14.0 102

Total 3.3 6.7 6.1 12.1 940

Observations

90th Percentile – First Arriving Unit







Ingeneral,theresponsetimesreflectedinthisanalysisareexcellentconsideringtheuseofafullyvolunteeroperationandtheaverageturnoutofpersonnelthatwasachieved.Theabilitytoachieveanaveragetotalresponsetimeof8.1minutesanda90thpercentileresponsetimeof12.1minutes,isconsideredabestpractice,andwhichCPSMviewsasbeinghighlycommendable.


Station Locations

Thefirestationisacriticallinkinservicedeliveryandwherethesefacilitiesarelocatedisthesinglemostimportantfactorindeterminingoverallresponsetimesandworkloadmanagement.TheDoverFireDepartmentprovidesitsservicesfromtwo(2)firestations,whicharelocatedasfollows:

Station1/FireHeadquarters:103S.GovernorsAve.

Station2:911KentonRd.

PrimeCareambulancesrespondfromasinglefacilitylocatedat601FultonSt.

Typically,firestationshaveananticipatedservicelifeofapproximatelyfifty(50)years.Inmostcasesfacilitiesrequirereplacementbecauseofthesizeconstraintsofthebuildings,aneedtorelocatethefacilitytobetterservechangingpopulationcenters,theabsenceofneededsafetyfeaturesorserviceaccommodations,andthegeneralageandconditionofthefacility.AtthetimeofthisassessmentbothDoverstationswerefoundtohaveup‐to‐datebuildingsystems,suchasHVAC,andstationinfrastructurewasgenerallyinexcellentcondition.Bothstationsareequippedwithautomaticfiresuppressionsystemsanddieselexhaustremovalsystems.

Station1wasoriginallybuiltin1922.Itwasexpandedin1976andagain,alongwithextensiverenovationsandupgradingin2004.Itoccupiesatotalof23,000squarefeetthatencompassestwelve(12)apparatusbays,thedepartment’sadministrativeoffices,thedispatchcenter,meetingrooms,andoperational/memberspacesincludingbunkrooms,andafiremuseum.OperationalandmaintenancecostsforStation1arebornebytheVolunteerAssociation.

Station2wasconstructedin1993andcontains8,300squarefeet.Thisincludesfive(5)apparatusbaysandadministrativespace.Thereisaroomonthesecondfloorthatcouldbeconvertedintoabunkroomforusebyaninstationdutycrew.Station2’soperationalandmaintenancecostsarebornebythecity.

Assessment of Fire Station Locations TheDFDservesanestimatedpopulationof37,355peopleandatotalserviceareainexcessof25squaremiles.WhiletheCityofDoverencompasses23.15squaremiles,thefiredepartment’sserviceareaextendsbeyondthecityboundariesintocontiguousareasofKentCounty.Thisequatestoanaverageserviceareaforeachfirestationofapproximately12.5squaremiles.

InaFY2011ICMADataReport,ICMAreportedsurveyinformationfrom76municipalitieswithpopulationsrangingfrom25,000to100,000people.Inthisgroupingtheaveragefirestation


serviceareawas11squaremiles.24Themedianserviceareaforthisgroupingofcommunitieswas6.67squaremilesperfirestation.25

Inaddition,theNFPAandISOhaveestablisheddifferentindicesindeterminingfirestationdistribution.TheISOFireSuppressionRatingSchedule,Section560,indicatesthatfirst‐dueenginecompaniesshouldserveareasthatarewithina1.5‐miletraveldistance.26Theplacementoffirestationsthatachievesthistypeofseparationcreatesserviceareasthatareapproximately4.5squaremilesinsize,dependingontheroadnetworkandothergeographicalbarriers(rivers,lakes,railroads,limitedaccesshighways,etc.).TheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)referencestheplacementoffirestationsinanindirectway.Itrecommendsthatfirestationsbeplacedinadistributionthatachievesthedesiredminimumresponsetimes.NFPAStandard1710,Section5.2.4.1.1,suggestsanengineplacementthatachievesa240‐second(four‐minute)traveltime.27Usinganempiricalmodelcalledthe“piece‐wiselineartraveltimefunction”theRandInstitutehasestimatedthattheaverageemergencyresponsespeedforfireapparatusis35mph.Atthisspeedthedistanceafireenginecantravelinfourminutesisapproximately1.97miles.28Apolygonbasedona1.97miletraveldistanceresultsinaserviceareathatonaverageis7.3squaremiles.29

Fromthesecomparisons,itcanbeseenthattheaverage12.5square‐mileserviceareaperstationinDoverislargerthanallofthenotedreferences.ImmediatelyobviouswhenexaminingacitymapshowingthelocationofDover’sstationsisthatthenorthernandeasternsectionsofthecityappeartolackaneasyorrapidresponsefromeitheroftheexistingfirestations.Inparticular,forresponsestotheeasternsideofthecity,unitsmustcrossoverbothUSRoute13(DuPontHighway)andDelawareRoute1(KoreanWarVeteransMemorialHighway).Theseroadsessentiallydividethecity,astherearelimitedlocationswherestreetsdirectlycrossfromonesideofthesehighwaystotheother.Itisquitepossiblethatthelackofastationinthisarea,andthebarrierspresentedbythesehighways,impactsresponsetimes.

Asnoted,theDFDdeploysitsapparatusfromtwo(2)firestations.Figures6‐2,6‐3,and6‐5illustratestationlocations,alongwith240‐second(indicatedbytheredoverlay),360‐second(indicatedbythegreenoverlay),and480‐second(indicatedbytheblueoverlay)traveltimebenchmarks.

24ComparativePerformanceMeasurement,FY2011DataReport‐FireandEMS,ICMACenterforPerformanceMeasurement,August2012.25Ibid.26InsuranceServicesOffice.(2003)FireProtectionRatingSchedule(edition02‐02).JerseyCity,NJ:InsuranceServicesOffice(ISO).27NationalFireProtectionAssociation.(2010).NFPA1710,StandardfortheOrganizationandDeploymentofFireSuppressionOperations,EmergencyMedicalOperations,andSpecialOperationstothePublicbyCareerFireDepartments.Boston,MA:NationalFireProtectionAssociation.28UniversityofTennesseeMunicipalTechnicalAdvisoryService,ClintonFireLocationStationStudy,Knoxville,TN,November2012.p.8.29Ibid.,p.9.


FIGURE 6‐2: DFD Station Locations and Travel Times (red = 240 seconds)


FIGURE 6‐3: DFD Station Locations and Travel Times (green = 360 seconds)


FIGURE 6‐4: DFD Station Locations and Travel Times (blue = 480 seconds)

Figure6‐2showsthatapproximately50percentofthedevelopedareasofthecityarecoveredunderthe240‐secondbenchmark.Weestimatethatapproximately80percentofthedevelopedareaofthecityiscoveredunderthe360‐secondoverlayandmorethan90percentiscoveredunderthe480‐secondbenchmark.ItisimportanttonotethattheDoverAirForcebase,whichisofficiallylocatedwithincitylimitsinthefarsoutheastsectionofthecity,isnotservedbyDFD.Themajorityofthecity,thecommercial,andthemorebuilt‐uponareasarewellwithinthe240‐and360‐secondbenchmarks.ThisisconfirmedbytheinformationinTable6‐2showing90thpercentiletimes;itcanbeseenthatnearly90percentofthecallshandledbyDFDresultinatraveltimeinthesixminuterange(360seconds).Itis,however,importanttonotethatthesetraveltimedistancesdonottakeintoconsiderationalarmhandlingandturn‐outtimes.ThemapsinFigures6‐2,6‐3,and6‐4onlydepicttraveldistancesandnotactualresponsetimes.

Figure6‐5representstheactuallocationsoffireandotheremergencyresponsescarriedoutbytheDFD.ItisapparentthatmostresponsesarewithinfourtofiveminutesoftraveltimefromtheDoverfirestations.Itisalsorevealingthatthereareanumberofcallgeneratingpointsthatareintheeasternareasofthecitythatareatthefartherlimitsofthe480‐secondtraveldistance.Inaddition,thereisapocketofcallslocatedintheextremesoutheastsectionofthecity,adjacenttoDoverAirForcebase,andthesecallstypicallyresultinextendedtraveltimes.Thisareaincludesthe


GeneralGreenHousingdevelopment,asmallmobilehomepark,andsomebusinessestablishments.Weestimatethatabout50callsoccurinthisareaannually.

FIGURE 6‐5: DFD Fire Runs


Section 7. Measurement and Self‐Assessment

Performance Measurement

Firesuppression,preventionprograms,andsafetyservicesneedtobeplannedandmanagedtoachievespecific,agreed‐uponresults.Determininghowwellanorganizationorprogramisdoingrequiresthatthesegoalsbemeasurableandthattheyaremeasuredagainstdesiredresults.Thisisthegoalofperformancemeasurement.

Simplydefined,performancemeasurementistheongoingmonitoringandreportingofprogresstowardpre‐establishedgoals.Itcapturesdataaboutprograms,activities,andprocesses,anddisplaysdatainstandardizedwaysthathelpcommunicatetoserviceproviders,customers,andotherstakeholdershowwelltheagencyisperforminginkeyareas.Performancemeasurementprovidesanorganizationwithtoolstoassessperformanceandidentifyareasinneedofimprovement.Inshort,whatgetsmeasuredgetsdone.

Incidentreportingistheprimarymediumthroughwhichdepartmentactivitiesarerecordedandcansubsequentlybemeasured.Consistency,accuracy,andcompletenessinincidentreportingiscriticaltoaneffectiveperformancemeasurementsystem.CPSMbelievesthatimprovedoversightisneededregardingtheincidentreportingandactivityreporting(inspections,training,publiceducationpresentations,andfireinvestigations)systemscurrentlyutilizedbyDFD.Itisimportantthatallpersonnelbefullytrainedintheincidentandactivityreportprocessandthatclearguidelinesbeestablishedonwhensuchreportingisrequired.Inaddition,CPSMrecommendsthatanassignedperson(s)beresponsibleforthereviewofthesereportsforpurposesofqualitycontrol.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldinstituteaunifiedincidentandactivityreportingsystemforemergencyresponseandothersupportactivitiescarriedoutbyallpersonnel.

Performancemeasurementsystemsvarysignificantlyamongdifferenttypesofpublicagenciesandprograms.Somesystemsfocusprimarilyonefficiencyandproductivitywithinworkunits,whereasothersaredesignedtomonitoroutcomesproducedbymajorpublicprograms.Stillotherstrackthequalityofservicesprovidedbyanagencyandtheextenttowhichcitizensaresatisfiedwiththeseservices.

Withinthefireservice,performancemeasurestendtofocusoninputs(theamountofmoneyandresourcesspentonagivenprogramoractivity,numberofpersonnel,dailystaffinglevels,etc.)andshort‐termoutputs(thenumberoffiresandaverageresponsetimes).Oneofthegoalsofanyperformancemeasurementsystemshouldbetoincludeefficiencyandcost‐effectivenessindicators,aswellasexplanatoryinformationonhowthesemeasuresshouldbeinterpreted.ThevarioustypesofperformancemeasuresareshowninTable7‐1.


TABLE 7‐1: The Five GASB Performance Indicators30

Category Definition

Input Indicators These are designed to report the amount of resources, either financial or

other (especially personnel), that have been used for a specific service or

program.

Output Indicators These report the number of units produced or the services provided by a

service or program.

Outcome Indicators These are designed to report the results (including quality) of the service.

Efficiency (and cost‐

effectiveness) Indicators

These are defined as indicators that measure the cost (whether in dollars

or employee hours) per unit of output or outcome.

Explanatory Information This includes a variety of information about the environment and other

factors that might affect an organization’s performance.

AstheDFDevolvesitiscriticalthataseriesofmeasurementsbeestablishedtotracktheperformanceofalloperations.Currently,thedepartmentdoesnotuseperformancemeasureswithanyregularityinmonitoringsystemperformanceandefficiency.Tobeeffective,thefindingsfromthesereportsneedtobepublishedandsharedwithalltheaffectedstakeholders,includingthecitycouncil,theMayor’sOffice,theCityManager’sOffice,theVolunteerAssociation,andthefirstresponders.Ongoinganalysisandthemonitoringoftrendsaremostusefultojustifyprogrameffectiveness,directtrainingefforts,andtomeasureservicedeliverylevels.

Toaccomplishthislinkage,theuseofperformancemeasures,particularlyservice‐qualityandcustomer‐satisfactionmeasures,shouldbeincorporatedintothesystem.Staffthroughouttheorganizationshouldparticipateindevelopingperformancemeasures.Inadditiontohelpingfacilitatedepartmentwidebuy‐in,thiscouldprovideanopportunityfortheVolunteerAssociationandcityleadershiptobetterunderstandwhatthevolunteersbelievetobecriticalgoals—andviceversa.Forthesamereason,theprocessofdevelopingperformancemeasuresshouldincludecitizeninput,specificallywithregardtoservicelevelpreferences.Translatingthisadvicefromthecitizensintoperformancemeasureswilllinkthecitizensandbusinesscommunitytothedepartment,andwillarticulateclearlyifthepublic’sexpectationsarebeingmet.

EstablishingaperformancemanagementsystemwithintheframeworkofanoverallstrategicplanwouldhelpcitymanagementandelectedofficialstogainabetterunderstandingofwhattheDFDistryingtoachieve.Buildinganysuccessfulperformancemanagementsystemthatmeasuresmorethanoutputsrequiresaconsistentmodel.

30FromHarryP.Hatryetal.,eds.ServiceEffortsandAccomplishmentsReporting:ItsTimeHasCome(Norwalk,CT:GASB,1990).


Recommendation:TheDFDshouldundertakeaconcertedefforttodevelopacomprehensivesetofperformancemeasuresthatwillbeusedtomonitoritssystemperformanceandsystemoutcomes.TheprocessofdevelopingthesemeasuresshouldutilizeinputfromDFDmembers,thecommunity,electedofficials,andcityadministrators.

CPSMrecommendsthatDFDundertakeaconcertedefforttodevelopacomprehensivelistingofperformancemeasuresforbothemergencyandnonemergencyactivities.Thefollowingareanumberofsuggestedmeasuresthatmaybeconsidered:

Operations:

Responsetimes(fractal/average/frequencyofexcessivetimes).

○ Alarmhandlingtimes.

○ Turnouttimes.

○ Traveltimes.

○ On‐scenetime.

○ Callduration.

○ Cancelledenroute.

Workloadmeasures.

○ Emergencyvs.nonemergencyresponses.

○ Responsetoautomaticfirealarms/frequencyandoutcomes.

○ Smokedetectordistribution(installationsandfollow‐up).

○ Prefireplanning.

○ Publiceducation‐contacthours/numbersbyagegroup.

Outcomemeasures

○ Fireloss/limitoffirespread–pointoforigin,roomoforigin,etc.

○ On‐dutyinjuries.

○ Volunteerparticipationandattendanceatevents.

○ Vehicleaccidents.

○ Equipmentlostorbroken.

Staff Training and Development:

Firetrainingandparticipationatdrills.

Officerdevelopment.

Specialtytraining.


Professionaldevelopment/formaleducation/certifications.

Fire Prevention:

Plansreview(numbers/valuation$/completiontime).

Inspections(newandexisting).

○ Numbers.

○ Completiontime.

○ Violations(found/corrected).

○ Quantificationbytypeofviolationandoccupancytype.

Fireinvestigations.

○ Numbersanddeterminations.

○ Locationsandoccupancytypes.

○ Fireloss/structureandcontents.

○ Arsonarrests/convictions.

○ Firedeaths(demographics/occupancytype/causeandorigin).

Miscellaneous:

Customerservicesurveys.

○ Followingemergencyresponse.

○ Publicassist.

○ Inspections(preventionandcompany).

○ Publiceducation.

○ In‐servicetraining(volunteerassessments).

Financial/budgetary.

○ Apparatusrepaircostsandout‐of‐servicetime.

Hazard Analysis

TheCityManagerhasdesignatedthePublicAffairsCoordinatorasthecity’sEmergencyManagementCoordinatorandassuchisresponsibleforthecity’soverallemergencyplanninganddisasterpreparednessefforts.Thecityhasadoptedanemergencyoperationsplan(EOP)thatincludesalineofsuccession,identifyingtheFireChiefandPoliceChiefasalternatesintheabsenceoftheEmergencyManagementCoordinator.Thecity’splanisverywellwrittenandidentifiesthosepotentialhazardsthatcanaffectthecommunity.Theseinclude:


Hurricanes/tropicalstorms.

Coastalerosion/tidalsurge.

Flooding

Drought

WinterStorms

Energydisruption/shortage

Transportationaccident

Doverisalsovulnerabletoavarietyofhuman‐causedhazards,includingchemicalreleases,spills,orexplosionsassociatedwiththefixedstorageormobiletransportofhazardousmaterials.31Inaddition,theKentCountyMulti‐JurisdictionalHazardMitigationPlanencompassestheCityofDover.Thepurposeofhazardmitigationistoreduceoreliminatelong‐termriskstopeopleandpropertyfromnaturalhazards.Theemergencyoperationsplanincludesaseriesofresponseguidesthatidentifytheassociatedtasksandtowhomtheyareassigned,dependingonthetypeofincidentanditsmagnitude.

Linkingafiredepartment’soperationalfunctionalitytothecommunityriskanditsvulnerabilityassessmentisintendedtoassistfirepersonnelinrefiningtheirpreparednessefforts.Becauseoftheinvolvementofafullyvolunteerfiredepartment,CPSMhasobservedlimitedeffortsdirectedtowardthislevelofpreparednessandorganizedmanagementofthefiredepartmentintheeventoflarge‐scaledisasteroranemergencyeventwithabroadreach.WewilldiscussthisissueandourrecommendationsintheEmergencyManagementsectionofthisreport.

Fire Preplanning/Company Inspections

TheDoverFireDepartmenthasdevelopedanumberofprefireplansformajortargethazardswithintheresponsedistrict.Thesedocumentsaddressroutesoftravel,typesofoccupancies,watersupplies,sprinklerandstandpipeconnections,andhazardsassociatedwiththevariousoccupancies.Eachpieceofapparatushasabookwithrunningroutesandbuildinglayoutfortargethazards.

Riskassessmentandvulnerabilityanalysisarenotnewtothefireservice;theNFPA1620,RecommendedPracticeforPre‐IncidentPlanning,identifiestheneedtoutilizebothwrittennarrativeanddiagramstodepictthephysicalfeaturesofabuilding,itscontents,andanybuilt‐infireprotectionsystems.Theoccupanciesthataretypicallyspecifiedforpre‐incidentplans,or“preplans,”areasfollows:

Largeassembly.

31KentCountyMulti‐JurisdictionalHazardMitigationPlan,2015Update(Draft)


Educational.

Healthcare.

Detentionandcorrection.

High‐riseresidential.

Residentialboardandcare(assistedliving).

Mercantile.

Business.

Industrial.

Warehouseandstorage.

OfparticularnotearetheDangerousBuildingPlacards,whichmarkabandoned,damaged,andvacantstructuresthatcouldposeahazardtofirefightersrespondingtoafire.Placardsareaffixedatdesignatedlocations,ifapplicable,indicatingtheneedtousecautionordonotenter.Thisprocedureisabestpractice.

TheCityofDoverfirepreventionfunctionsaremanagedbytheFireMarshal,asectionwithinthecity’splanningdepartment.Thefiredepartmentdoesnotperformcompanyinspections;however,obviousfirehazardswhileperformingareafamiliarizationarereportedtotheFireMarshalbysuppressionpersonnel.

Thebuildinginspectionprocessistheidealmechanismforemergencyresponsepersonneltokeepcurrentwiththehundredsofcommercial,industrial,fabrication,storage,andresidentialoccupancies.Theabsenceoflinefirepersonnelwhoareinvolvedintheinspectionandcodeenforcementprocessisalostopportunityingivingemergencyrespondersup‐to‐dateinformationregardingstructuresandthestorageofmaterialsthattheymayencounterduringanemergency.Itisveryunderstandablethatasavolunteerforcetheabilitytoinvolvelinepersonnelintheinspectionprocessisdifficult.However,theinabilityforthisinteractiontooccurreducestheoveralleffectivenessofthesuppressioneffortandminimizesthesafetyconsiderationsthatwouldotherwisebegainedfromtheeffort.InoursectionregardingthereorganizationoftheDFDwespokeabouttheexpansionoftheFireDispatcherroleandmovingtheirfunctionalitytooneofaFireTechnician.InthiscapacitywewouldrecommendthattheFireTechshaveaninspectionresponsibilityinconjunctionwithcityfireinspectorsandthat,inadditiontotheircodeenforcementduties,theyalsobeinvolvedinthetransferofthisfamiliarizationprocessinthetacticalprefireplanningofkeyoccupancies.

Recommendation:DFDshouldexpandtheresponsibilitiesoftheFireTechnicianpositiontoincludeinspectionandcodeenforcement,includingtheprefireplanningofkeyoccupancies.


Thisinformation,alongwiththeimpactsofthisinformationontacticalconsiderations,canbediscussedinweeklytrainingsessionswiththevolunteers.Theutilizationofdigitalphotography,schematics,anddiagramsarerecommendedtofurtherenforcethisinformationexchange.

Accreditation

Accreditationisacomprehensiveself‐assessmentandevaluationmodelthatenablesorganizationstoexaminepast,current,andfutureservicelevels.Itisusedtoevaluateinternalperformanceandcomparesthisperformancetoindustrybestpractices.Theintentoftheprocessistoimproveservicedelivery.

TheCenterforPublicSafetyExcellence(CPSE)providesanextensiveevaluationprocess,onafeebasis,tomemberagenciesandwhichultimatelyleadstoaccreditation.CPSEisgovernedbytheCommissiononFireAccreditationInternational(CFAI),aneleven(11)‐membercommissionrepresentingacross‐sectionofthefireservice,includingfiredepartments,cityandcountymanagement,codecouncils,theU.S.DepartmentofDefense,andtheInternationalAssociationofFirefighters.

TheCPSEAccreditationProgramisbuiltaroundthefollowingkeymeasurements:

Determinecommunityriskandsafetyneeds.

Evaluatetheperformanceofthedepartment.

Establishamethodforachievingcontinuousorganizationalimprovement.

Localgovernmentexecutivesfaceincreasingpressureto"domorewithless"andjustifyexpendituresbydemonstratingadirectlinktoimprovedormeasuredserviceoutcomes.Particularlyforemergencyservices,localofficialsneedcriteriatoassessprofessionalperformanceandefficiency.

CPSEaccreditationhasnationalrecognitionandiswidelyusedthroughoutthefireservice.Thekeytoitssuccessisthatitallowscommunitiestosettheirownstandardsthatarereflectiveoftheirneedsandaservicedeliverymodelthatisspecifictotheirneeds.Inaddition,itisaprogramthatisbasedonongoingimprovementandcontinuousmonitoring.TheCPSEaccreditationmodelmaybewellsuitedfortheDoverFireDepartment.

Recommendation:TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldconsiderCPSEaccreditationinthefuture.

ISO

ISOcollectsdataformorethan47,000communitiesandfiredistrictsthroughoutthecountry.ThedataarethenanalyzedusingaproprietaryFireSuppressionRatingSchedule(FSRS).ThisanalysisthenresultsinaPPC(PublicProtectionClassification)scorebetween1and10tothecommunity,


withClass1representing"superiorpropertyfireprotection"andClass10indicatingthatanareadoesn'tmeettheminimumcriteriasetbytheISO.OnJuly1,2013,therevisedFSRSwasreleased;itaddsanemphasisonacommunity'sefforttolimitlossbeforeanincidentoccurs.

IndevelopingaPPC,thefollowingmajorcategoriesareevaluated:

EmergencyCommunications:Firealarmandcommunicationsystems,includingtelephonesystems,telephonelines,staffinganddispatchingsystems.

FireDepartment:Thefiredepartment,includingequipment,staffing,training,andgeographicdistributionoffirecompanies.

WaterSupply:Thewatersupplysystem,includingtheconditionandmaintenanceofhydrantsandtheamountofavailablewatercomparedtotheamountneedtosuppressfires.

FirePrevention:Programsthatcontainplanreview;certificateofoccupancyinspections;compliancefollow‐up;inspectionoffireprotectionequipment;andfirepreventionregulationsrelatedtofirelanesonarearoads,hazardousmaterialroutes,fireworks,barbecuegrills,andwildland‐urbaninterfaceareas.

PublicFireSafetyEducationPrograms:Firesafetyeducationtrainingandprogramsforschools,privatehomes,andbuildingswithlargelosspotentialorhazardousconditionsandajuvenilefiresetterinterventionprogram.

TheCityofDoverisratedas4/4Y.The4/4Yratingisanoutstandingachievementforacommunitywithsuchafireload,density,andpopulationprotectedbyanall‐volunteerfiredepartment.Inasplitclassificationforacommunitythefirstnumberistheclassthatappliestopropertieswithinfiveroadmilesoftherespondingfirestationand1,000feetofacrediblewatersupply,suchasafirehydrant,suctionpoint,ordryhydrant.Thesecondnumberistheclassthatappliestopropertieswithinfiveroadmilesofafirestationbutbeyond1,000feetofacrediblewatersupply.

Withatotalpointscoreof68.81,theCityofDoverisjust1.19pointsawayfromthe70pointsnecessarytoberatedasa3/3Y.CPSMhasreviewedthemostrecentISOevaluationandbelievesthatthecitycanachieveaClass‐3/3Yratingwithminimaleffort.

Recommendations:DovershouldrequestfromISOareevaluationofitsAugust2015reviewaftermakingadjustmentsinitsfirehydranttestingprocessandthetransferoffiredispatchingtoKentCounty.

InthemostrecentISOreviewthecitydidnotreceivethefullallotmentofpointsintheareasofEmergencyCommunicationsandtheWaterSupplysection.InEmergencyCommunications(440)thecityreceivedonly5.81pointsoutofatotalof10pointsavailable.PointdeductionsoccurredbecauseoftheEmergencyReportingprocess(1.5points),thenumberofTele‐Communicators(1.64points),andthenumberofDispatchCircuits(1.05points).IntheWaterSupplysection,specifically,inHydrantInspectionandFlowTesting(631),thecityreceived4.8pointsoutofatotalavailableof7points.IfthecitymovesitsfiredepartmentdispatchingservicetotheKentCountyCommunicationsCenter,andmakesadjustmentsinthefrequencyandrecordkeepingforits


hydranttesting,webelievethatasufficientpointincreasecanresultthatwillincreasetheoverallrating.ISOisverycooperativeinattemptingtoimproveonrecentreviewsandoftenentersintoaremediationplan,ifrequestedbyajurisdiction.CPSMbelievesthatthecityshouldcontactISOandrequestareconsiderationofthemostrecentrating.


Section 8. Essential Resources

Fire Prevention, Code Enforcement, Public Education, and

Investigations

Firepreventionisafunctionwithinthecity’splanningdepartment.Firecodeenforcement,fireplansreview,andinspectionactivitiesaretheresponsibilityofthecity’sFireMarshalandtwo(2)DeputyFireMarshals.Thisofficeisresponsiblefornearly574annualinspectionsatareabusinesses,institutionaloccupancies,publicofficebuildings,restaurants,andmultifamilyresidentialproperties.Thisofficeisalsochargedwiththeplansreviewprocess,primarilyinthereviewofnewoccupanciesthatrequirefireprotectionsystemsorfirealarmsystems.TheFireMarshalworkscloselywiththeBuildingOfficialinthesiteplanreviewprocess,preconstructionconferencesforlargerdevelopmentsandsubdivisionconstruction,andegressissues.Theyarealsoinvolvedintheissuanceofcityoccupancylicenses.CPSMwasadvisedthatbecauseoftheworkload,theFireMarshal’sofficeisonlyabletocompleteapproximately50percentoftherequiredannualoccupancyinspections.

ThereisnodirectorganizationalconnectionbetweentheDoverFireDepartmentandtheOfficeoftheFireMarshal,althoughoutstandingrelationshipsexistbetweenthetwoagencies.Theabilitytobridgefiresuppression,firecodeenforcement,andpubliceducationisessentialforsuccessfulfirepreventioninthecommunity.

Recommendation:Dovershouldconsiderthere‐assignmentoftheFireMarshal’sOfficeandtheirfirecodeenforcementdutiesundertheFireDepartment’sEmergencyServicesManager.

CPSMbelievesthatthedutiesoftheFireMarshal’sofficearemorecloselyalignedwiththeFireDepartmentthantheplanningdepartment.ThoughitisimportantthattherebeacloseworkingrelationshipbetweentheBuildingOfficialandtheFireMarshal,theday‐to‐daydutiesoffirepreventionandlifesafetyareaFireDepartmentfunction.Fromthestandpointofoccupantandemergencyrespondersafety,thefocusoftheFireMarshalgoesbeyondtheinitialconstructionanddesignofanoccupancy.Thefireinspectionprocessandfirecodeenforcementeffortsaremaintainedthroughoutthelifecycleofthebuildingandwithitschangingoccupants.Annualfireinspectionsensurethatthesesystemsareoperableandthatstorageandegresssystemsaremaintainedasdesignedandpermitted.

Firesuppressionandresponse,althoughnecessaryinminimizingpropertydamage,havelittleimpactonpreventingfires.Rather,publicfireeducation,fireprevention,andbuilt‐infireprotectionandnotificationsystemsareessentialelementsinprotectingcitizensfromdeathandinjuryduetofire.Thecitycurrentlyutilizesthe2009InternationalFireCode,whichisthecoderequiredtobeenforcedunderstateguidelines.Wehavebeenadvisedthatthestateisintheprocessofadoptingthe2015InternationalCodeCouncil(ICC)InternationalFireCodeandwhenthisoccursitwillbeappliedinDover.


Automaticfiresprinklershaveproventobeveryeffectiveinreducingfirelossandminimizingfiredeathsinresidentialstructures.Manycommunitieshavebeenreluctanttoimposecodeprovisionsthatrequiretheseinstallations.The2015ICCInternationalFireCodeincludestherequirementforautomaticfiresprinklersinsinglefamilyandduplexresidentialstructures.GiventhevolunteeroperationsutilizedinDover,CPSMbelievesitisessentialthatwhenadoptingthe2015ICCInternationalFireCode,thecityshouldmaintaintheresidentialfiresprinklerrequirement.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldincludetheresidentialfiresprinklerrequirementswhenitadoptsthe2015InternationalCodeCouncil(ICC)InternationalFireCode.

AccordingtotheNFPA,theaveragecostnationallyforinstallingautomaticfiresprinklersinnew,singlefamilyresidentialstructuresisestimatedtobe$1.61persquarefoot.32Fora2000square‐foothome,theestimatedcostwouldbeapproximately$3,220.Thiscanbelessthanthecostofgranitecountertopsoracarpetingupgrade.Inaddition,manyhomeownerinsurancepoliciesprovideadiscountforhomesequippedwithresidentialfiresprinklers.GiventhelimitedresourcesavailableforfiresuppressioneffortsintheDoverservicearea,CPSMbelievesthatthecityshouldincludeinits2015firecodeadoptiontherequirementforautomaticfiresprinklersinallnewsinglefamilyandduplexresidentialstructures.

TheDoverFireDepartmentplaysasignificantroleinfirepreventionefforts,mainlythroughpublicfiresafetyeducationintheannual“OpenHouse”duringFirePreventionWeekeachOctober.Membersofthefiredepartmentroutinelyrespondthroughouttheyeartorequestsfromschools,civicgroups,andthecommunitytoseethedepartment’sfireapparatus.Departmentmembersreviewbasicfiresafetywiththepublicsuchasexitdrillsinthehome;stop,dropandroll;andchangingsmoke/carbonmonoxidedetectorbatteriesinthespringandfall.Thesepublicfiresafetyeffortsareabestpractice.ThecityFireMarshalhaslimitedstaffingtoperformthepublicfiresafetyeducationfunction,butdoesrespondtorequestsforspecificevents,particularlyinvolvingthebusinesscommunity.

FireinvestigationsareconductedbythecityFireMarshal.TheFireMarshaliscertifiedtotheNFPA1031and1033level,withfulllawenforcementauthority.Histwodeputieshaveresponsibilitytoconductinitialoriginandcauseinvestigations,butdonothaveallofthesametraining,certifications,orauthority.InourdiscussionstherewereissuesraisedregardingtheneedtoobtainlawenforcementcertificationsfortheDeputyFireMarshals.Withthecurrentfireinvestigationworkload,CPSMdoesnotbelievethatobtainingtheadditionallawenforcementcertificationsarewarrantedatthistime.

32NFPA,“CostofInstallingResidentialFireSprinklersAverages$1.61perSquareFoot”Quincy,MA:September11,2008.


Education and Training Programs

Educationandtrainingprogramscreatethecharacterofafireserviceorganization.Agenciesthatplacearealemphasisontheirtraininghaveatendencytobemoreproficientincarryingoutday‐to‐dayduties.Theprioritizationoftrainingalsofostersprofessionalismandteamworkandinstillsprideintheorganization.Aneffectivefiredepartmenttrainingprogrammustcoveralloftheessentialelementsinthedepartment’scoremissionsandresponsibilities.Theprogrammustincludeanappropriatecombinationoftechnical/classroomtrainingandmanipulativeorhands‐on/practicalevolutions.Mostofthetraining,butparticularlythepracticalhands‐ontrainingevolutions,shouldbedevelopedbaseduponthedepartment’sownoperatingprocedures.Itisalsoimportantthatalltrainingevolutionsarereflectiveofthoseacceptedpracticesandindustrystandards.

TheDoverFireDepartmenthasaverygoodtrainingprogramandthereisadedicatedeffortfocusedonawidearrayoftrainingactivities.ThetrainingfunctionsoftheDFDareprimarilyhandledbytwo(2)oftheassistantfirechiefswhoalsoserveasthetrainingofficers.One(1)ofthemhandlesthegeneralfire‐relatedtrainingwhiletheotherfocusesondrivertraining.

Newmembersofthedepartmentreceiveabasicintroductiontothedepartmentanditsoperationsbyoneofthecaptainswhoservesastheorientationofficer.Attheconclusionofthisprocesstheprobationarymemberisrequiredtosuccessfullycompleteawrittentest.ThisisacommendableeffortthatCPSMconsidersabestpractice.AtthispointthepersonisconsideredtobeaFireFighter‐I(FF‐1),whocanrideinthe“hydrant”seat,workingunderthesupervisionoftheofficer.

Therearenostatestatutes/regulationsorlocalordinancesthatspecifyanyfiredepartmenttrainingorcertificationrequirements.Fromaregulatoryperspectivealltrainingisvoluntary.However,allDoverFireDepartmentmembersarerequired(bytheVolunteerAssociation)tocompletefourbasicfirefighterclassesthatareeach36hoursinlengthforatotalof144hoursoftraining.Theseclassesinclude:

BasicFirefighting.

StructuralFirefighting.

VehicleRescue.

HazardousMaterials.

OnceanindividualhassuccessfullycompletedthesecoursestheyareconsideredtobeaFF‐II,whichthenallowsthemtoutilizeSelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)andenteraburningbuildingorotherhazardousenvironmentsintheaccompanimentofaFF‐III.InordertoachieveFF‐IIIstatus,andbepermittedtorideinanyseatontheapparatus,includingtheofficer’sseat,theindividualneedstocompleteadditionalstructuralfirefightingtraining(sixhours)afterwhichtheyareevaluated.CPSMwasadvisedthattherewerenonewmembersofthedepartmentwhoachievedFF‐IIIqualificationin2015.


Recommendation:TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldrequireallprospectivefirefighterstomeetthetrainingqualificationsoftheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)Standard1001,StandardforFirefighterProfessionalQualificationsforFirefighterIandII.

NFPA1001isanationallyrecognizedminimumfirefightertrainingcurriculumutilizedbynumerousstateregulatoryorganizations.TheDelawareStateFireSchoollocatedinDoverconductsperiodicwrittenandpracticaltestingopportunitiesforthistraining.CPSMsuggeststhattheFirefighter‐Irequirementbecompletedwithinone(1)yearofjoiningthedepartmentandFirefighter‐IIwithintwo(2)yearsorpriortothecompletionoftheprobationaryprocess.

TrainingwithintheVolunteerAssociationistypicallyconductedforthree(3)hours,three(3)Tuesdaynightseachmonth.However,verylittletrainingisconductedduringthesummer,fromlateJunethroughlateSeptember.Althoughtheremaybemoredemandsonthetimeofvolunteerpersonnelduringthesummermonths,thispracticecreatesathree‐monthgapintrainingactivitieswhichisnotconducivetooverallreadiness.CPSMbelievesthatfiredepartmenttrainingshouldbeconductedyear‐round.

Recommendation:TheDFDtrainingprogramshouldberevisedinordertoscheduletraininganddrillsthroughouttheyear.

Probationarymembersofthedepartmentarerequiredtocompleteaminimumof36hoursoftrainingannuallyduringtheirfirsttwo(2)years.Memberswhoareconsideredtobe“active”arerequiredtocomplete21hoursoftrainingannuallyforfive(5)years.Afterfiveyearsofmeetingtheseandothercompanyrequirementsmembersareconsideredtobe“life”membersandallmandatorytrainingparticipationrequirementsarewaived.CPSMbelievesthatthistrainingrequirementshouldbechanged.Allpersonnelwhoarepermittedtorespondtoemergencyincidentsshouldberequiredtotrainonaregularbasis.

Recommendation:TheDFDshouldrevisetheongoingtrainingrequirementsforallactivemembers(includinglife‐members)toensurethatskillsandproficiencytrainingiscarriedouttosufficientlyinsurefirefighterreadinessandsafety.

Itisourbeliefthatarealisticgoalforasuitabletrainingprogramwouldbetoprovideseventy‐two(72)hoursoftrainingpermemberperyear(anaverageofsix(6)hourspermonth).Allpersonnelshouldberequiredtocompletecertainmandatorytraining,andparticipateinanestablishedminimumnumberoftrainingsessionsortraininghoursinordertobeallowedtorespondtoemergencyincidents.

Thedepartmentdoesnothaveanytypeofformalofficertrainingortrainingrequirementsforfireofficers.Personnelwhohavecompletedthefourbasicfirefightertrainingclassesarepermittedtorunforofficerpositionsintheannualcompanyelections.Therearenoprerequisitesforpursuingofficerappointmentsincludingjobexperience,timeingraderequirements,orincidentcommandorsupervisorytraining.Inaddition,duetotheannualelectionprocess,themake‐upoftheofficercorpscouldchangeonaregularbasis.Onceelectedtotheirrespectivepositionsofficersdonot


haveanyadditionaltrainingorcertificationrequirementsnecessarytomaintaintheirpositionsotherthanbeingsuccessfulinthefollowingyear’selections.

Recommendation:Personnelseekingtobecomeanofficershouldberequiredtostartattherankofcaptainandserveineachsuccessiverankforaminimumperiodoftimebeforeseekingahigheroffice

AlthoughseveralfiredepartmentofficersarecertifiedasfireofficersinaccordancewithNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA)Standard1021:StandardforFireOfficerProfessionalQualifications,thisisnotarequirementtoeitherseekorretainanofficerposition.TheNFPAstandardsidentifynumerousskillstoassistindeterminingofficerqualifications.

Recommendation:TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldmandatethatallofficersparticipateinadditionalofficer‐relatedtrainingeachyearinordertobeeligibletoretaintheirposition.

Thereareanumberofvaluableofficertrainingprogramsavailableincludingthosethatfocuson;firefightingstrategyandtactics,incidentmanagement,scenesafety,leadershipandmanagementtraining,teambuilding,incidentreporting,buildingconstruction,publiceducation,companyinspections,etc.

Theabilitytotrainproperlyrequiressufficientfunding.Thisfundingisneededfortrainingmaterials,books,trainingvideoprograms,on‐linesubscriptions,tuitioncosts,andtheuseofoutsideinstructors.Thecitycurrentlybudgetsapproximately$7,000peryearfortrainingrelatedactivities.Withanactivemembershipofapproximatelyeighty(80)membersitisimportantthattheutilizationoftrainingdollarsissufficienttomeettheorganization’sneeds.

Recommendation:TheDFDshoulddevelopanannualtrainingbudgetthatidentifiestheneededtrainingforitsmembershipandtheassociatedcostsforeachelementofthetrainingprogram.

TheDFDdoesnotsubscribetoanyfirefightertrainingservicesorresourcesthatwouldpermitthemostup‐to‐dateinformationandtrendstobereadilyavailabletomembers.Thedepartmenttraininglibraryisalsolimitedinscope.CPSMbelievesthatannualtrainingfundsshouldbeutilizedtoupgradetrainingresources,includingmanuals,DVDs,andfiretrainingsubscriptions.


Internal Communications

Effectivecommunicationssystemsarethekeytosuccessfuloperationsinemergencyservicesorganizations.Standardoperatingprocedures(SOPs)/standardoperatingguidelines(SOGs)andotherordersarecriticaltothemissionofconsistent,effective,andsafeoperations.Thesepoliciesareintendedtoensurethatconsistencyandsafetyareconsideredinalloperations.Withoutthemthereisatendencyto“freelance”andpersonnelmaynotallbeonthe“samepage”regardingawiderangeofemergencyandadministrativeoperations.

Recommendation:UnderthedirectionoftheEmergencyServicesManager,theDFDshouldformacommitteecomprisedofacross‐sectionofthedepartment’smembershiptodevelopstandardoperatingguidelines(SOGs).

TheDoverFireDepartmentshouldalsoconsiderexpandingitswrittencommunicationssystemtoincludeTrainingBulletins,whichwouldbeissuedtoserveasreferencewithregardtotestedandapprovedmethodsofperformingtasks,andSafetyBulletins,whichareissuedtoserveasreferenceswithregardtogeneralandspecificsafetyandhealthissues.

Thedepartmentshouldalsodevelopaneffectivesystemforensuringthatanynewstandardoperatingguidelines,trainingbulletins,andsafetybulletinsaredistributedtoallpersonnelandstations.Electroniccommunicationsishighlyrecommendedasthemethodofchoicefordistributingdepartmentalcommunicationsanddocuments.AllcityanddepartmentpoliciesanddepartmentSOGsshouldbepostedonthedepartmentIntranet,inbothstations,andallpersonnelshouldberequiredtoreviewthisinformationandacknowledgetheirreceiptandunderstandingofit.AllrevisionsshouldalsobepostedineachstationandontheIntranetande‐mailedtoeverymember.

TheCityofDovershouldensurethatallfiredepartmentpersonnelarefamiliarwithapplicablecitypoliciesandthattheseareincludedintheannualtrainingcurriculum.

Emergency Management/COOP/Hazard Mitigation

EmergencymanagementintheCityofDoveriscoordinatedbyastaffmemberwhoservesinadual‐roleasthecity’sPublicAffairsCoordinatorandEmergencyManagementCoordinator.Thesepositionswereconsolidatedin2012asacost‐savingmeasureinresponsetobudgetconstraints.TheincumbenthasbeenanactiveparticipantontheCityManager’semergencymanagementteamandhastrainedtotheMasterExercisePractitioner(MEP)levelinaccordancewiththefederalgovernment’sHomelandSecurityExerciseandEvaluationProgram(HSEEP).WhiletheincumbentisqualifiedtoserveastheEmergencyManagementCoordinator,theadditionaldutiesassociatedwithpublicaffairsandtheresponsibilitiesinvolvedinmanagingthecity’sambulanceprovidercontract,iscreatingasignificantworkload.DuringasignificanteventboththefunctionofEmergencyManagementCoordinatorandPublicAffairsCoordinatorwillbeextremelydemandingandCPSMbelieveswillexceedthecapacityofasingleindividual.


AsrecommendedintheOrganizationalsectionofthisreport,CPSMsuggeststhatthecityreassignthedutiesofEmergencyManagementCoordinatortotheEmergencyServicesManager.WealsorecommendthatthePublicAffairsCoordinatorcontinuetomaintainaleadershiproleinthecity’semergencymanagementprocess,servingasanalternatecoordinatorduringextendedactivationsorduringtheabsenceoftheEmergencyServicesManager.

TheCityofDoverdoesnothaveaContinuityofOperationsPlan(COOP)foreachdepartmentofthecityandaContinuityofGovernment(COG)planforthecityasawhole.Thepurposeofcontinuityofoperationsplanningistoensurethatessentialcityservicesareprovidedinthewakeofcatastrophicordisruptiveevents.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershoulddevelopContinuityofOperationsPlans(COOP)foreachdepartmentandaligntheplanswithanoverallContinuityofGovernmentPlan(COG).

Continuityofoperationsplanningistheprocessinwhichgovernmentformallyreviewsandmakescontingencyplansintheeventthatgovernmentcannolongeroperateundernormalconditions.COOPlooksatthepotentialinabilityofalocalgovernmenttoutilizekeypublicbuildings,includingfirestationsorpolicestations,cityhall,orotherkeystructures.Theplanningprocessidentifiesalternativesitesthatcouldbeutilizedifthesefacilitiesareincapacitated.COOPalsolooksatcontingenciesifcurrentservicelevelsmustbecurtailedduetowide‐scaleemployeeabsences.Agenciesareaskedtoformulateplansiftheirworkforceisreducedbyvariousincrements(15percent,25percent,50percent,etc.).Thisexerciserequireseachdepartmenttodefineitsplanforwhichofitsserviceswillcontinueandwhichotherservicescouldbemodifiedoreliminated.TherearenumerousguidesthatprovideinsightsormodelsforCOOP.FEMAprovidesatemplatethatisoftenutilizedtoassistlocalgovernmentandfederalagenciesinthisprocess;itcanbefoundathttp://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/coop/continuity_plan_federal_d_a.pdf

Hazardmitigationistheefforttoreducelossoflifeandpropertybylesseningtheimpactofdisasters.Federal,state,andlocalgovernmentsengageinhazardmitigationplanningtoidentifynaturalhazardsthatimpactthem,identifystrategiesandactivitiestoreduceanylossesfromthosehazards,andestablishacoordinatedapproachtoimplementingtheplan,takingadvantageofawiderangeofresources.Mitigationplansarekeytofederal,state,andlocalgovernments’effortstobreakthecycleofdisasterdamage,reconstruction,andrepeateddamage.

Developinghazardmitigationplansenablesfederal,state,andlocalgovernmentsto:

Increaseeducationandawarenessaroundthreats,hazards,andvulnerabilities.

Buildpartnershipsforriskreductioninvolvinggovernment,organizations,businesses,andthepublic.

Identifylong‐termstrategiesforriskreductionthatareagreeduponbystakeholdersandthepublic.


Identifycosteffectivemitigationactions,focusingresourcesonthegreatestrisksandvulnerabilities.

Alignriskreductionwithothercommunityobjectives.

Communicateprioritiestopotentialsourcesoffunding.

TheCityofDover,asapoliticalsubdivisionofKentCounty,shouldworkwiththecountytoensurethathazardmitigationstrategiesandinvestmentsmeettheneedsofthecity.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldensurethatthehazardmitigationeffortsofKentCountyarealignedwiththeneedsofthecityandshouldidentifythosekeyinfrastructureandpublicoutreacheffortsnecessarytoprotectallcityresidents.

Emergency Communications Center (ECC)

TheCityofDoveroperatesitsPublicSafetyAnsweringPoint(PSAP)attheDoverPoliceDepartment.911callsthatoriginatefromlandlineswithinthecityarereceivedatthePoliceCenter.FirecallsthatarereceivedbythePoliceCenterarethenroutedtotheDoverFireDispatcherwhoislocatedatFireStation1.911callsthatoriginatefromacellulartelephonearefirstreceivedattheKentCounty911Centerandthentransferredtothecity.KentCountyestimatesthatapproximately80percentofallcallsreceivedatitsCenteraremadefromcellulartelephones.

FirecallsreceivedbytheKentCenterarenottransferred,butinsteadtheFireDispatchCenteriscalledbyadirectphonelineandtheinformationistransferredviavoicecommunications.ThisisbecausetheFireDispatchCenterisunabletoreceivetheANI/ALI(automatednameinformation/automatedlocationinformation)functionofthe911system.TheFireDispatchCenterisnotacertifieddispatchcenterundertheNationalAcademyofEmergencyDispatch(NAED).UponreceivingacalltheFireDispatcherwillnotifythevolunteerpersonnelviathepagingsystemandthencoordinatetheradiotrafficoftherespondingunits.IfadditionalassistanceoutsidetheCityofDoverisnecessary,theFireDispatchermustthencalltheKentCountyCenterandrequestmutualaidassistancefromsurroundingcommunities.

TheKentCountyDepartmentofPublicSafetyEmergencyCommunicationsCenterdispatchesallfireandEMSagenciesinKentCounty,exceptfortheDoverFireDepartment.TheCenterdispatchesfor17firedepartments,14BLSdepartments,andacountywideparamedicdepartment;ithas18dispatchconsolepositions.TheCenteralsodispatchesPrimeCareambulanceunits.TheKentCenteristheback‐upemergencycommunicationscenterfortheDoverFireandPoliceDepartments.

Uponreviewofthemultipledispatchoperationsandtheredundancythatwasobserved,CPSMrecommendstheconsolidationoftheDoverFireDispatchdutiesintoKentCounty.ThiswouldeliminatetheneedtotransfercallstoandfromtheDoverFireCenter.Inaddition,theDoverfiredispatchfunctionisstaffedwithone(1)person,whichleavesnoredundancyformultiplecalls.This


situationiscompoundedwiththeaddedresponsibilityofthesinglefiredispatcherinhandlingbothincomingtelephonecallsandtalkingviaradiotorespondingunits.

Recommendation:TheCityofDovershouldtransferitsfiredispatchingdutiestotheKentCounty911CommunicationsCenter.

TherecentISOevaluationelevatedanumberofdeficienciesinthecurrentfiredispatchoperationsandCPSMbelievesthatthetransferofthefiredispatchoperationstotheKentCountyCenterwilladdresstheseconcerns.Inaddition,byeliminatingthedispatchingdutiesforthecurrentFireDispatchers,CPSMbelievesthatanumberofsupportfunctionsmaybeaddressed,particularlyinthecoordinationofapparatusrepairs,prefireplanning,recordsmanagement,emergencyplanning,andtheoversightofambulanceoperations.


Section 9. Data Analysis

Introduction

ThisdataanalysiswaspreparedasakeycomponentofthestudyconductedbytheCenterforPublicSafetyManagement,LLC(CPSM)oftheDoverFireDepartment(DFD).ThisanalysisexaminesallcallsforservicebetweenJuly1,2014,andJune30,2015,asrecordedintheDoverFireDepartmentCADsystem.

Thisanalysiscontainsfoursections:thefirstsectionfocusesoncalltypesanddispatches;thesecondsectionexplorestimespentandworkloadofindividualunits;thethirdsectionpresentsanalysisofthebusiesthoursinayear;andthefourthsectionprovidesaresponsetimeanalysisofthefirstarrivingon‐sceneDFDunits.

Thedepartmentutilizesfive(5)engines,two(2)ladders(includingone(1)aerial),two(2)specialtybrushunits(includingoneRTV),one(1)heavyrescue,two(2)utilitytrucks,one(1)boat,one(1)foamunit(trailer),andtwo(2)commandcars.

Duringthestudyperiod,thedepartmentrespondedto991calls.Thetotalcombinedyearlyworkload(deployedtime)forallDFDunitswas966hours.TheaveragedispatchtimeofthefirstarrivingDFDunitwas1.3minutes,andtheaverageresponsetimeofthefirstarrivingDFDunitwas8.1minutes.The90thpercentiledispatchtimewas3.3minutesandthe90thpercentileresponsetimewas12.1minutes.

Methodology Inthisreport,weanalyzecallsandruns.Acallisanemergencyservicerequestorincident.Arunisadispatchofaunit.Thus,acallmightincludemultipleruns.

WereceivedCADdatafortheDoverFireDepartmentalongwithitsNationalFireIncidentReportingSystem(NFIRS)data.WefirstremovedCADcallstowhichnoDFDunitrespondedortowhichadministrativeunits(chiefunits)werethesoleresponders—thisincludescallswhereunitsweredispatchedbutwerecancelledbeforegoingenroute.Weexcluded244incidentsthatmetthesecriteriafromthisreport.


Aggregate Call Totals and Dispatches

Inthisreport,eachcitizen‐initiatedemergencyservicerequestisacall.Duringtheyearstudied,Doverrespondedto991calls.Ofthese,106werestructurefirecallsand69wereoutsidefirecallswithinDover’sjurisdiction.Eachdispatchedunitisaseparate“run.”Asmultipleunitsrespondtoacall,therearemorerunsthancalls.Wereportthedepartment’stotalrunsandworkloadinthesecondsection.

Calls by Type Table9‐1andFigure9‐1showthenumberofcallsbycalltype,averagecallsperday,andthepercentageofcallsthatfallintoeachcalltypecategory.WhiletheDoverFireDepartmentdoesnotprovideambulanceservices,itdoesrespondtoemergencymedicalservice(EMS)callssuchasmotorvehicleaccidents(MVAs),extrications,andrescues.WeincludeMVAsasaseparatecalltypewhileweidentifyallotherEMS‐typecallsgroupedassimply“EMS.”

TABLE 9‐1: Call Types

Call Type Number of Calls Calls per Day Call Percentage

MVA 47 0.13 4.7

EMS 43 0.12 4.3

Structure fire 106 0.29 10.7

Outside fire 69 0.19 6.9

Hazard 115 0.32 11.6

False alarm 355 0.97 35.8

Good intent 127 0.35 12.8

Public service 113 0.31 11.4

Subtotal 975 2.67 98.2

Cancelled 16 0.04 1.6

Total 991 2.72 100.0


FIGURE 9‐1: Calls by Type

Observations:

Firecallsfortheyeartotaled975,averaging2.7perday.

Structureandoutsidefirescombinedtotaled175calls,averagingonecallevery2.1days.

Structurefires(106calls)accountedfor11percentoftotalcalls.

Outsidefires(69)accountedfor7percentoftotalcalls.

Falsealarms(355)accountedforthelargestpercentageofcallsat36percent.


Calls by Type and Duration Table9‐2showsthedurationofcallsbytypeanddurationusingfourdurationcategories:lessthan30minutes,30minutestoonehour,onetotwohours,morethantwohours.

TABLE 9‐2: Calls by Type and Duration

Call Type

Less than

One‐half Hour

One‐half Hour

to One Hour

One to

Two Hours

More than

Two Hours Total

MVA 33 12 2 0 47

EMS 38 4 1 0 43



Hazard 64 42 8 1 115

False alarm 324 29 2 0 355

Good intent 100 23 4 0 127


Subtotal 728 199 38 10 975


Total 743 200 38 10 991

Observations:

Overall

95percentofcalls(943)lastedlessthanonehour.

Fourpercentofcalls(38)lastedbetweenoneandtwohoursand1percent(10)lastedmorethantwohours.

Onaverage,0.1callsperday,orapproximatelyonecalleveryeightdays,lastedmorethanonehour.

Structure Fires

86percentofstructurefires(91)lastedlessthanonehour;8percent(8)lastedbetweenoneandtwohours;and7percent(7)lastedmorethantwohours.

Outside Fires

97percentofoutsidefires(67)lastedlessthanonehour;3percent(2)lastedbetweenoneandtwohours;andnonelastedmorethantwohours.

False Alarms

99percentoffalsealarms(353)lastedlessthanonehour,and1percent(2)lastedmorethananhour.


Average Calls per Day and per Hour Figure9‐2showsthemonthlyvariationintheaveragedailynumberofcallshandledbytheDFDduringtheyearstudied.Similarly,Figure9‐3illustratestheaveragenumberofcallsreceivedeachhouroftheday,shownintwo‐hourincrements.

FIGURE 9‐2: Average Calls per Day, by Month

FIGURE 9‐3: Calls by Hour of Day


Observations:

Averagecallsperdayrangedbetween1.9and4.0.

September2014hadthelowestaveragecallsperday(1.9)whileJune2015hadmorethandoublethatnumberofcallsperday,onaverage(4.0),whichwas110percenthigherthanSeptember.

○ MultiplelargemusicandculturalfestivalswereheldinDoverinJune2015,drawingcrowdsof10,000upto90,000.TheseincludedPositivelyDover,theBigBarrelCountyMusicFestival,andtheFireflyMusicFestival.

○ TheFireflyMusicFestivaldrewthelargestcrowdswith80,000to90,000peopleattendingthefour‐dayeventheldJune18throughJune21.

○ FourofJune’ssixbusiestdays(7ormorecalls)werethefourdaysoftheFireflyMusicFestival.OneadditionaldayofJune’ssixbusiestdayswasthelastdayoftheBigBarrelCountryMusicFestival(June28).

○ Thebusiestdayofthestudyperiodhad15callsandoccurredonJune21,thelastdayoftheFireflyMusicFestival.

Averagecallsperhourrangedbetween0.04(between2:00a.m.and6:00a.m.)and0.19(between6:00p.m.and8:00p.m.).

Overall,10:00a.m.to10:00p.m.werethebusiesttimeswithbetween0.13and0.19callsperhour,whichisthreetofivetimesmorethantheslowestperiodof2:00a.m.to6:00a.m.


Units Dispatched to Calls Table9‐3andFigure9‐4detailthenumberofDFDunitsdispatchedtocallsoverallandbrokendownbycalltype.

FIGURE 9‐4: Number of Dover Fire Department Units Dispatched to Calls

TABLE 9‐3: Number of Units Dispatched to Calls

Call Type

Number of Units

Total One Two Three

Four or

More

MVA 10 11 19 7 47

EMS 30 7 5 1 43



Hazard 40 25 35 15 115

False alarm 96 130 95 34 355

Good intent 47 38 23 19 127


Subtotal 346 268 232 129 975


Total 354 276 234 129 993

Percentage 35.6 27.8 23.6 13.0 100.0


Observations:

Overall

Onaverage,2.2unitsweredispatchedpercall.

Oneunitwasdispatched36percentofthetime,twounitsweredispatched28percentofthetime,threeunitsweredispatched24percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched13percentofthetime.

Structure Fires

Threeunitsweredispatchedtostructurefires25percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched38percentofthetime.

Outside Fires

Threeunitsweredispatchedtooutsidefires19percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched10percentofthetime.

False Alarms

Threeunitsweredispatchedtofalsealarms37percentofthetime,andfourormoreunitsweredispatched10percentofthetime.


Workload by Individual Unit—Calls and Total Time Spent

Inthissection,theworkloadofeachunitisreportedintwoways:deployedtimeandruns.Adispatchofaunitisdefinedasarun;thus,onecallmightincludemultipleruns,whichresultsinahighertotalnumberofrunsthantotalnumberofcalls.Thedeployedtimeofarunisfromthetimeaunitisdispatchedthroughthetimeaunitiscleared.

Runs and Deployed Time – All Units Deployedtime,alsoreferredtoasdeployedhours,isthetotaldeploymenttimeofalltheunitsdeployedonallcalls.Table9‐4showsthetotaldeployedtime,overallandbrokendownbytypeofcall,forDFDunitsduringtheyearstudied.

TABLE 9‐4: Annual Runs and Deployed Time by Call Type

Call Type

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Run

Annual

Hours

Percent of

Total Hours

Deployed

Min. per Day

Total

Annual Runs

Runs

per Day

MVA 24.7 48.2 5.0 7.9 117 0.3

EMS 17.8 18.7 1.9 3.1 63 0.2

Structure fire 45.5 243.3 25.2 40.0 321 0.9

Outside fire 25.4 58.4 6.0 9.6 138 0.4

Hazard 28.8 125.4 13.0 20.6 261 0.7

False alarm 19.2 251.0 26.0 41.3 785 2.2

Good intent 24.0 109.9 11.4 18.1 275 0.8

Public service 34.6 104.5 10.8 17.2 181 0.5

Subtotal 26.9 959.4 99.3 157.7 2,141 5.9

Cancelled 15.3 6.6 0.7 1.1 26 0.1

Total 26.7 966.0 100.0 158.8 2,167 5.9

Observations

Therewere2,167runsintheyearstudied,resultinginatotal966hoursofdeployedtime.

Onaverage,therewere5.9runsperdayforanaverageof2.6hoursofdeployedtimeperday.

Structureandoutsidefiresresultedin459runswithatotalworkloadof301.7hours,equalto32percentoftotalDFDworkload.

Structurefiresaveraged45.5minutesofdeployedtime.

Outsidefiresaveraged25.4minutesofdeployedtime.


Workload by Unit Table9‐5providesasummaryofeachunit’sworkloadoverall.Table9‐6andTable9‐7provideamoredetailedviewofworkload,showingeachunit’srunsbrokeoutbycalltype(Table9‐6)andtheresultingdeployedtimebycalltype(Table9‐7).Someunitsrespondedtofewcallsduringtheyear.Ratherthanshowingeachoftheseunitsindividually,weanalyzedtheirworkasagroupreferredtoas“other”inthetables.The“other”categoryincludestheunits:ACC1,FT,HRT,andSpecOps1.


Unit Type Unit ID

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Run

Total

Annual Hours

Avg. Deployed

Min. per Day

Total

Annual Runs

Avg. Runs

per Day

Brush B1 17.0 3.4 0.6 12 0.0*

B9 18.0 31.5 5.2 105 0.3

Engine E2 27.8 199.4 32.8 431 1.2

E3 29.0 63.8 10.5 132 0.4

E4 27.2 164.4 27.0 363 1.0

E6 25.7 120.7 19.8 282 0.8

E7 32.7 20.7 3.4 38 0.1

Ladder L1 26.1 235.8 38.8 542 1.5

L2 26.0 50.6 8.3 117 0.3

Rescue R1 33.7 58.3 9.6 104 0.3

Utility U1 24.2 14.9 2.5 37 0.1

Other Other 36.3 2.4 0.4 4 0.0*



TABLE 9‐6: Total Annual Runs by Call Type and Unit

Unit Type Brush Engine Ladder Rescue Utility Other

Unit B1 B9 E2 E3 E4 E6 E7 L1 L2 R1 U1 Other

MVA – 1 30 11 31 10 2 – – 30 1 1

EMS 1 21 5 1 7 4 – 9 3 6 5 1

Structure fire – 2 74 16 51 32 11 83 28 19 5 –

Outside fire 2 31 10 14 34 25 10 6 2 1 2 1

Hazard 1 12 52 11 51 38 4 60 15 14 3 –

False alarm 2 2 183 42 104 108 3 272 44 14 11 –

Good intent 2 16 54 16 49 39 5 63 15 13 3 –

Public service 4 18 21 16 31 19 3 44 10 7 7 1

Cancelled – 2 2 5 5 7 – 5 – – – –

Total 12 105 431 132 363 282 38 542 117 104 37 4

Runs per Day 0.0* 0.3 1.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0*



TABLE 9‐7: Daily Average Deployed Minutes by Call Type and Unit

Unit Type Brush Engine Ladder Rescue Utility Other

Unit B1 B9 E2 E3 E4 E6 E7 L1 L2 R1 U1 Other

MVA – 0.0* 2.0 0.7 2.3 0.7 0.0* – – 2.1 0.1 0.0*

EMS 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0* 0.5 0.2 – 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2

Structure fire – 0.4 9.0 2.3 5.6 4.9 1.3 9.7 2.8 3.5 0.5 –

Outside fire 0.1 2.0 0.6 1.2 2.2 2.0 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0*

Hazard 0.0* 0.6 4.6 0.8 4.1 3.0 0.2 4.7 1.1 1.3 0.2 –

False alarm 0.0* 0.0* 10.4 2.3 4.8 5.2 0.2 14.8 2.2 0.6 0.6 –

Good intent 0.0* 0.7 3.9 0.9 3.4 2.2 0.3 4.5 1.1 0.9 0.1 –

Public service 0.3 1.2 1.8 2.2 3.8 1.3 0.6 3.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.2

Cancelled – 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 – 0.2 – – – –

Total 0.6 5.2 32.8 10.5 27.0 19.8 3.4 38.8 8.3 9.6 2.5 0.4

* These units had such low total deployed minutes that average minutes per day, rounded to the nearest one‐tenth, appears to be zero

Observations:

Ladder1madethemostruns(542intotalor1.5perday)andhadthehighesttotalannualdeployedtime(236hoursfortheyearor39minutesperday).

○ Structureandoutsidefiresaccountedfor89oftheseruns(16percent)and62hours(26percent)ofdeployedtime.

○ Falsealarmsaccountedfor272oftheseruns(50percent)and90hours(32percent)ofdeployedtime.

Engine2madethesecondmostruns(431totalor1.2perday)andhadthesecondhighesttotalannualdeployedtime(199hoursfortheyearor33minutesperday).

○ Structureandoutsidefiresaccountedfor84oftheseruns(20percent)and59hours(30percent)ofdeployedtime.

○ Falsealarmsaccountedfor183oftheseruns(42percent)and63hours(32percent)ofdeployedtime.


Analysis of Busiest Hours

Thereissignificantvariabilityinthenumberofcallsfromhourtohour.Onespecialconcernrelatestotheresourcesavailableforhourswiththeheaviestworkload.Wetabulatedthedataforeachofthe8,760hoursintheyear.Table9‐8showsthenumberofhoursintheyearwheretherewereone,two,orthreecallsduringthehour.

Table9‐9showsthe10one‐hourintervalsduringtheyearwheretherewerethreecalls.

TABLE 9‐8: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Calls

Calls in an Hour Frequency Percentage

0 7,864 89.8

1 809 9.2

2 77 0.9

3 10 0.1

TABLE 9‐9: Top 10 Hours with the Most Calls Received

Hour

Number

of Calls

Number

of Runs

Total

Deployed Hours*

9/14/2014 – 10 p.m. to 11 p.m. 3 12 3.2

7/23/2014 – 11 p.m. to 12 a.m. 3 8 2.1

5/29/2015 – 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. 3 8 3.0

7/24/2014 – 8 p.m. to 9 p.m. 3 7 3.3

2/22/2015 – 12 p.m. to 1 p.m. 3 7 3.4

6/23/2015 – 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. 3 6 2.1

6/30/2015 – 11 p.m. to 12 a.m. 3 6 0.8

6/28/2015 – 8 p.m. to 9 p.m.** 3 5 2.1

6/18/2015 – 2 p.m. to 3 p.m.** 3 3 0.6

6/20/2015 – 1 a.m. to 2 a.m.** 3 3 0.3

* The total deployed hours is time spent responding to calls received in the hour, which may extend into the next hour(s).

** 06/28/2015 was the last day of the Big Barrel Country Music Festival which drew a crowd of 30,000‐ 35,000. 06/18/2015 was the first day of the Firefly Music Festival, which drew a crowd of 80,000‐90,000. 06/20/2015 was the third day of the Firefly Music Festival.


Observations:

During87hoursintheyear(1percentofallhours),theDFDrespondedtotwoormorecalls.

Approximatelyonceeveryfourdays,therewasonehourduringwhichtwoormorecallsoccurred.

Therewere10hoursintheyear(0.1percentofallhours)wheretheDFDrespondedtothreecalls;therewerenevermorethanthreecallsinanhour.

Ofthese10hours,September14,2014,between10:00p.m.and11:00p.m.,hadthemostruns(12total)withatotalworkloadof3.2hours.Thelongestcallwasastructurefirethatlasted21minutes.

July23,2014,between11:00p.m.andmidnightandMay29,2015,between1:00p.m.and2:00p.m.,bothhadthesecondmostruns(eight).ThelongestcallwasapublicsafetycallonMay29thatlastedfor24minutesandtowhichfourunitsweredispatched.

Overlapping Calls Overlappingcallsaredefinedascallsthatstarted(basedondispatchtime)whileanothercallwasstillactive.Intheanalysis,callswithlessthan30secondsofoverlapwereexcluded.Therewere51callsduringtheperiodstudiedthatwereinitiatedwhileoneothercallwasalreadyactive.Onaverage,callsoverlappedfor12.1minutes.Therewerenocallsthatwereinitiatedwhiletwocallswerealreadyactive.

Ofthe51calls,23ofthecalls(47percent)werecompletelyoverlappingwithanothercall,meaningtheystartedandendedwhileanothercallwasactive.Onaverage,thesecallsoverlapped14minutes.Theremaining28overlappingcalls(53percent)partiallyoverlappedwithanothercall,meaningthecalltheyoverlappedwith(firstcall)endedbeforetheoverlappingcall(secondcall)ended.Onaveragethesecallsoverlapped10.3minutes.


Response Time

Thissectionpresentsresponsetimestatisticsfordifferentcalltypesandunits.

Differenttermsareusedtodescribethecomponentsofresponsetime.Dispatchprocessingtimeisthedifferencebetweenthetimeacallisreceivedandthetimeaunitisdispatched.Turnouttimeisthedifferencebetweendispatchtimeandthetimeaunitisenroute.Traveltimeisthedifferencebetweenthetimeenrouteandarrivalon‐scene.Responsetimeisthetotaltimeelapsedbetweenreceivingacalltoarrivingon‐scene.ThemainfocusinthissectionisthedispatchandresponsetimesofthefirstarrivingDFDunit.

Wetypicallyfocusonemergencycallswherethedepartmentwouldrespondwithlightsandsirens—alsoknownasahotresponse.TheDFDdoesnotrecordthepriorityofacallinitsrecordsmanagementsystem,soalleligiblecallswereincludedinthisanalysis.

Therewere991callsincludedintheanalysesinprevioussections.Thissectionuses940callsandexcludesthe16cancelledcalls,18additionalcallswhereanadministrativeunitwasthefirsttoarrive,and17callswithunreliabledata(e.g.,atwo‐secondtraveltime,aten‐hourdispatchtime,etc.).

Response Times by Type of Call Figure9‐5andTable9‐10showaveragedispatch,turnout,travel,andtotalresponsetimesforthefirstarrivingunits,brokenoutbycalltype.

Table9‐11showsthe90thpercentiletimesbrokenoutinthesamemanner.A90thpercentiletimemeansthat90percentofcallshaddispatch,turnout,travel,ortotalresponsetimesatorbelowthatnumber.

FIGURE 9‐5: Average Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type


TABLE 9‐10: Average Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type

(Minutes)


MVA 2.0 1.8 3.2 7.0 42

EMS 1.3 2.7 1.8 5.8 42

Structure fire 1.0 3.4 3.4 7.8 104

Outside fire 2.1 2.0 3.7 7.8 68

Hazard 1.3 3.4 3.3 8.0 111

False alarm 1.0 3.9 3.6 8.5 346

Good intent 1.3 3.1 3.7 8.1 125

Public service 1.6 2.5 4.4 8.5 102

Total 1.3 3.3 3.5 8.1 940

TABLE 9‐11: 90th Percentile Response Times of First Arriving Unit, by Call Type

(Minutes)


MVA 5.0 4.5 5.5 10.4 42

EMS 2.5 6.7 4.5 11.0 42

Structure fire 2.2 6.5 5.8 12.2 104

Outside fire 5.5 5.5 6.6 11.1 68

Hazard 3.4 6.8 5.5 12.1 111

False alarm 2.4 7.1 5.8 12.0 346

Good intent 3.3 6.6 6.3 12.3 125

Public service 3.9 5.8 8.3 14.0 102

Total 3.3 6.7 6.1 12.1 940


Observations:

48calls(5percent)hadadispatchhandlingtimegreaterthan5minutes.

370calls(39percent)hadaturnouttimegreaterthan4minutes.

234calls(25percent)hadatotalresponsetimegreaterthan10minutes.

Averages – First Arriving Unit







90th Percentile – First Arriving Unit








Response Times by Hour Averagedispatch,turnout,travel,andtotalresponsetimesbyhourareshowninFigure9‐6andTable9‐12.Thetablealsoshows90thpercentiletimes.

FIGURE 9‐6: Average Response Time of First Arriving Unit, by Hour of Day


TABLE 9‐12: Average and 90th Percentile Response Times of First Arriving Unit,

by Hour of Day

Hour

Dispatch

Time

Turnout

Time

Travel

Time

Response

Time

90th Percentile

Response Time

Sample

Size

0 1.3 3.3 3.9 8.5 12.0 25

1 1.0 4.8 3.1 8.9 12.7 24

2 2.5 4.5 4.2 11.1 15.3 15

3 1.2 5.3 3.3 9.8 15.8 12

4 2.4 5.5 3.0 11.0 13.9 14

5 0.9 5.5 5.7 12.1 17.3 13

6 2.0 4.8 3.2 10.0 14.0 20

7 0.9 5.3 4.8 11.0 17.1 25

8 1.2 3.4 4.6 9.2 13.9 31

9 1.5 3.5 3.3 8.3 11.5 40

10 1.0 3.2 3.7 7.9 13.0 50

11 1.7 2.9 3.4 8.0 11.8 41

12 1.2 2.9 3.5 7.5 11.0 59

13 1.3 2.7 3.5 7.4 11.5 52

14 2.0 2.3 3.8 8.1 11.3 50

15 1.3 2.4 4.0 7.7 12.1 48

16 1.1 2.9 3.2 7.1 10.5 52

17 1.3 2.5 3.2 7.0 10.4 54

18 0.8 3.0 3.7 7.6 10.8 59

19 1.0 2.8 3.5 7.2 10.2 72

20 1.1 2.8 3.2 7.1 10.3 61

21 1.1 3.6 2.9 7.6 11.0 43

22 1.2 3.0 3.9 8.2 12.1 33

23 1.2 4.0 3.0 8.3 11.8 47

Observations:

Dispatchtimeaveragedbetween0.8minutes(6:00p.m.)and2.5minutes(2:00a.m.).

Turnouttimeaveragedbetween2.3minutes(2:00p.m.)and5.5minutes(4:00a.m.and5:00a.m.).

Traveltimeaveragedbetween2.9minutes(9:00p.m.)and5.7minutes(5:00a.m.).

Totalresponsetimeaveragedbetween7.0minutes(5:00p.m.)and12.1minutes(5:00p.m.).

The90thpercentiletotalresponsetimerangedfrom10.2minutes(7:00p.m.)to17.1minutes(7:00a.m.).


Response Time Distribution Amoredetailedlookathowresponsetimesaredistributedamongunitsandcalltypesispresentedhere.Table9‐13andFigure9‐7detailhowofteneachunitwasthefirsttoarrivetoacall.Table9‐14givesthecumulativedistributionoftotalresponsetimeforfirstarrivingunit,andFigure9‐8showsthesameinformationforstructureandoutsidefiresonly.

TABLE 9‐13: Number of Total Calls by First Arriving Units

Unit

Structure and

Outside Fire Other Fire Total Percentage

Cumulative

Percentage

L1 63 287 350 37.2 37.2

E2 23 134 157 16.7 53.9

E4 30 127 157 16.7 70.6

E6 20 77 97 10.3 81.0

B9 22 66 88 9.4 90.3

E3 5 35 40 4.3 94.6

U1 4 18 22 2.3 96.9

B1 1 9 10 1.1 98.0

R1 2 7 9 1.0 98.9

E7 1 5 6 0.6 99.6

L2 1 3 4 0.4 100.0

FIGURE 9‐7: Number of Total Calls by First Arriving Units


TABLE 9‐14: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of Response Time of First

Arriving Unit

Response

Time

(minutes) Frequency

Cumulative

Percentage

0 ‐ 1 0 0.0

1 ‐ 2 13 1.4

2 ‐ 3 20 3.5

3 ‐ 4 19 5.5

4 ‐ 5 33 9.0

5 ‐ 6 69 16.4

6 ‐ 7 81 25.0

7 ‐ 8 125 38.3

8 ‐ 9 128 51.9

9 ‐ 10 110 63.6

10 ‐ 11 108 75.1

11 ‐ 12 84 84.0

12 ‐ 13 55 89.9

13 ‐ 14 39 94.0

14 ‐ 15 21 96.3

> 15 35 100.0


FIGURE 9‐8: Response Time Distribution — First Arriving Unit

Observations:

Forstructurefires,Ladder1(L1)wasthefirstunitonscenemostoftenwithanaverageresponsetimeof8.1minutes.

Theoverallaverageresponsetimeforthefirstarrivingunittostructurefireswas8.1minutes.

40percentofthetimethefirstunit'sresponsetimewaslessthan7.2minutes.

90percentofthetimethefirstunit'sresponsetimewaslessthan12.1minutes.


Addendum

TABLE 9‐15: Actions Taken Analysis for Structure and Outside Fire Calls

Action Taken

Number of Calls

Structure Fire Outside Fire

Assistance, other 4 0

Extinguishment by fire service personnel 26 45

Fire control or extinguishment, other 11 10

Information, investigation & enforcement, other 3 3

Investigate 48 7

Investigate fire out on arrival 12 4

Notify other agencies. 2 0

Provide equipment 1 0

Remove hazard 2 0

Salvage & overhaul 6 2

Search & rescue, other 5 0

Ventilate 3 0

Total* 123 71

* Totals are higher than the total number of calls because some calls had more than one action taken.

Observations

Atotalof43structurefirecallswereextinguishedbyfireservicepersonnel,whichaccountedfor41percentofstructurefirecallsinDFD’sjurisdiction.

Atotalof57outsidefirecallswereextinguishedbyfireservicepersonnel,whichaccountedfor83percentofoutsidefirecallsinDFD’sjurisdiction.


TABLE 9‐16: Fire Loss

Call Type Calls Total Loss Average Loss

Structure Fire 35 $463,350 $13,239

Outside Fire 5 $23,100 $4,620

Good Intent 1 $250 $250

Hazard 9 $14,400 $1,600

Total 50 $501,100 $10,022

Note: This analysis only includes calls with recorded loss greater than 0.

Observations:

Overall

50incidentshadpropertyloss,withanaveragelossamountof$10,022.

Only7incidentsinvolvedanamountexceeding$20,000.

Structure Fires

Outof106structurefirecalls,35hadrecordedloss,withtotalrecordedlossvalueof$463,350andaveragelossof$13,239.

Fivestructurefireshadunder$500inloss,and20hadmorethan$500butlessthan$10,000inloss.

Thesmallestlosswas$100,andthelargestlosswas$100,000

Outside Fires

Outof69outsidefirecalls,fivehadrecordedloss,withtotalrecordedlossvalueof$23,100andaveragelossof$4,620.

Oneoutsidefirehadunder$500inloss,andtheremainingfourhadmorethan$500butlessthan$10,000inloss.

Thesmallestlosswas$100,andthelargestlosswas$10,000.

Documents

Operational and Administrative Analysis Dover Fire