Oral Comps Slides

Oral Comps Slides

Major Ben ZweibelsonSeminar 4, SAMS

Lesson D316

Question 1: theory of warEach student likely needs their own stuff

here.

S

EG R

P

However, pleasure and pain are only root motives for decision to act. They would not fully explain much of human behavior in and out of war.

PL

PA

Schopenhauer: German Philosopher (1788-1860)

The Will to Survive (Live)

WTS

All human action relates to a core desire to survive, reproduce, and prosper.

Nietzsche: German Philosopher (1844-1900)

The Will to Power

WTP

All human action relates to a core desire to increase one’s power. This overrides survival in terms of risk.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1d/Schopenhauer(wiki).jpg

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1d/Portrait_of_Friedrich_Nietzsche.jpg

Orientation Phase

Decision Phase

Action Phase

Re-Orient Phase

Reflection Phase

adjust

adjust

adjust

adjust

Special Theory on Actors and Organized Conflict; The ODARR Cycle and Origin of Decisions to Act.

S

E

GR

P

PL

PA

WTS WTP

All actions are directed against critical vulnerabilities in the most recent observed enemy COG.

Adjust forces, values, and contextual factors

Enemy COGs

Friendly COGs

Actions are also taken to protect friendly COG vulnerabilities in the most recent observed friendly COG. Our COGs are linked to our

pain/loss of prosperity concepts as well as our WTS/WTP gravitational pulls. The enemy is linked the same.

Includes enemy and friendly COG analysis.

CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems

CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems

Question 2: Gaddis and ‘continuity/contingency with

history’

History

Histiography

Hayden White: The Content and the FormPeter Novack: That Noble DreamMary Jo Hatch: Operational TheoryDeluze/Guitari: A Thousand Plataeus

objectivity

Human Limitations in

Cognition

information

language

Known (interiority)

unknown (exteriority)

subjectivity

ValuesTenetsCultureIdentity

Change in Historical

Perspectives (Hatch’s Wheel)

event

Linear Time; Space

Continuity

Contingency

Gaddis: Why and How should Historians Think? (metacognition)

Gaddis: historians hide their methods

Gaddis: “distillation”- not every detail is critical; historians decide what gets relayed in narratives.

Gaddis: no time-traveling for history- no changing it.

Theories in science are reproducible; history does not repeat (but themes occur)

More Accurate/ Relevant History

Debatable/quasi- Relevant History

Inaccurate/ irrelevant History

Gaddis: “path dependency”- Hitler kicked out of art school caused WWII

Gaddis: “weighing concepts- Hitler’s love of dogs and children is irrelevant.”

Counter-Factual Arguments (what if Barbarossa…)

Gaddis: constructed memories: Churchill’s youthful portrait

Continuity: historians (unlike scientists) represent what they can never duplicate. History requires a level of consistency that is closer to objective truth than subjective interpretation (histiography explains how this often occurs, and why).

Contingency: historians must think critically about how they represent history- flawed processes produce faulty expectations of what the future is. If historians follow too abstract a path (or too detailed/pedantic), or if they give into social biases and faulty logic, they will misinterpret history.

PAST

PRESENT

FUTURE

Question 3: theories of Herbst, Kalyvas, Brinton, and Parsa

Herbst: States and Power in Africa

Follows Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel thesis that biological and geographic determinism shaped Africa- not the traditional Euro-centric theory of technological/genetic determinism.

Low densities of people over massive tracts of land- this generated a different set of values in African leaders (use Mary Jo Hatch wheel).

3x African costs for state expansion:1.Cost of expanding domestic power infrastructure. To rule a distant location, you needed to control military out there and transmit info over roads.2.The nature of national boundaries. capitals build container/distribution points out from central power; colonial “new capitals” were coastal; pre-colonial ones were not.

3.The design of state systems. – winning wars brought slaves; there was little organizational infrastructure to gain. Thus, post-conflict Africa differed from European conflicts over land.

Africans had different agriculture and industrial/economic structures; trading for guns, mining minerals, limited farming (migrant).

Colonial imposed boundaries remain- Africa struggles with post-imperialism.

Brinton: The Anatomy of Revolution

Brinton covers American, French, English, and Russian revolutions and acknowledges that his thesis on revolutionary cycles does not synch with all of them.

Brinton argues that revolutions end the worst abuses and inefficiencies of the old regime while bringing greater uniformity and equality to the state system. While man changes his mind on many issues (hereditary monarchy, aristocracy, classes, civil rights, land and property ownership, slavery) man does not change his habits. Originally radical ideas transition in the revolutionary cycle into state propaganda and national self-identity for posterity within the post-revolution society. Finally, successful revolts create a tradition of revolution within that society.

Parsa’s: States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions

Parsa uses states as his unit of analysis (realism perspective). He studies Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines revolutions by exploring social versus political factors.

Variables used:Popular opposition to regimeType of political regimeClass coalition- present or absentLevel of state intervention

Iran: centralized state power with extreme repression of moderate opposition; class structure transformation was moderate, and radical theocrats were in the power structure. Outcome: social revolution.

Nicaragua: Same as Iran in power and repression; popular opposition was high, and class coalition was present. Revolutionary challengers were initially weak- class structure transformation was high. Socialists in power structure; outcome: social revolution.

Philippines: centralized power with moderate repression of opposition. Class coalition was absent, and revolutionary challengers were initially strong; no transformation in class structure, reformist bourgeois were in the power structure- outcome: political revolution.

Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War

Kalyvas asks the question “why are civil wars so violent- or perceived as such?” He defines civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the hostilities.”

Five factors of Civil War bias: 1. Partisan bias (taking sides); 2. Political bias (equating war with peace); 3. Urban bias (overlooking bottom-up processes; emphasis on top-down hierarchy); 4. Selection bias (disregarding nonviolence); 5. Over-aggregation bias (working at too high a level of abstraction- “the will of the people”).

Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution“A Theory of Revolt”

Question 4: JP 3.0, 5.0- does current doctrine

reflect systems thinking?

FM 3-0 JP 3-0

• Traditional war and irregular war defined within Clausewitzian concept.

• 12 principles of war use Jominian systems thinking that use mechanistic, reductionist, and positivist constructs

• Joint Operation Planning Process

• Centers of Gravity

JP 3-0 Unified Action: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of the governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

Systems Thinking: a Logic of Positivism, Reductionism, Mechanistic and Linear Procedures

JP 3-0 LOGIC: the nature of warfare is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states…IW is a violent struggle between state and non-state actors.

JP 3-0 Foundation: Joint operations doctrine is built upon the bedrock principles of war and associated fundamentals of joint warfare.1.Objective2.Offensive3.Mass4.Economy of Force5.Maneuver6.Unity of Command7.Security8.Surprise9.Simplicity10.Restraint11.Perseverance12.Legitimacy

JOPP: Step 1: InitiationStep 2: Mission AnalysisStep 3: COA DevStep 4: COA Analysis and wargamingStep 5: COA ComparisonStep 6: COA ApprovalStep 7: Plan/Order Development

Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur.

Reverse engineer termination criteria to objectives, COGs, and DPs along a LOO.

Identifying desired and undesired effects with a systems perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3-0.

Effects: describe system behavior

• Operational and Mission Variables: FM 3-0 warns of “precise binning” but the positivist and reductionist procedures are lost.

• PMESII-PT centric.• Echoes JP 3-0’s

definition of ‘Unified Action.’

• Quotes Clausewitz on uncertainty, chance, and friction. (when your logic creates abnormalities, you can categorize them under these catch-alls).

FM 3-0 JP 3-0

Quotes Clausewitz: A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance.

A COG is singular in nature- JP 3-0 wants one at each level of war.

In conventional fights, JP 3-0 prefers strategic COG to be government or leader; and operational COG as the fielded forces. No tactical COGs.

LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs. Linear causality. Baseball makes the runner go to 1st, then 2nd base; war might require us to run to 3rd, then 1st, then 2nd…

Garandagangi makes the distinction between non-minded, uni-minded, and multi-minded systems; COGs work for uni-minded (EBO systems based) logic.

Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic

Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight.

Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling.

Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling.-Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function.-Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work.-Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or exploitation.

* JP 3-0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives.

Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states, COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time.

Quotes Clausewitz also.

The loss of a COG ultimately results in defeat. –this is linear causality and reverse engineering on a positivist logic base.

FM 3-0 goes beyond JP 3-0 and states “COGs are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral; eliminating them requires holistic integrated efforts of all national IOPs.” 6-8.

Supports JP 3-0 and sees a single COG at each level of war.

The Army does not have a COG at the tactical level either (just USMC). As Kem says, it is semantics- a tactical COG equals a decisive point.

FM 3-0 JP 3-0

Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0

1. Termination: military operations terminate when they achieve and preserve military objectives linked to the national strategic end-state. 3x approaches: imposed (threatened or actual occupation of enemy territory) or negotiated settlement (coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions), and the indirect approach (when gaining legitimacy and influence over the relevant population; this employs IW to erode an enemy’s power, influence and will over the population.

2. End State and Objectives: developed after the termination criteria are established (Reilly reverse engineering). The military end-state is the point after which the President does not require the military IOP in the lead.

3. Effects: “Combined with a systems perspective, the identification of desired and undesired effects can help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture. An effect is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, set of actions, or another effect.

1. Objectives: prescribe friendly goals.2. Effects: describe system behavior.3. Tasks: direct friendly action.

4. COGs: see previous slide.5. Decisive Points: a geographic place, specific key event,

critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success.-IV-12, JP 3-0.

Positivist logic; Clausewitzian.Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic.

Positivist logic; Describing instead of explaining. This deals with interiority instead of exteriority!

Linear causality: effect occurs when A+B equals C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism.

“This holistic understanding helps commanders and their staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and decisive points to formulate LOOs and visualize the CONOPs.” –IV-12 JP 3-0.


FM 3-0 does not use ‘termination’ in doctrine. It does use ‘strategic end state’ in 6-8. The POTUS translates national interests and policy into a national strategic end-state.

FM 3-0 ties ‘end-state’ to JP 3-0 same term. Operational objectives are linked to COGs, and tactical OBJs are linked to decisive points (which follow LOEs to target COG CVs. Very systematic process.

FM 3-0 does not use ‘effects’ in JP format; D-2 states that “Army forces DO NOT use joint systems analysis…or effects assessment.” Army forces conduct operations according to Army doctrine.

FM 3-0 JP 3-0


6. Direct versus Indirect: “In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory.” IV-12, JP 3-0. 7.Indirect: the indirect paths are used when a JTF cannot conduct a direct attack; they still indirectly target COG CVs in order to set the conditions for successful direct attacks. Once again, this uses positivist logic and linear causality.8.Lines of Operations: a LOO describes the linkage of various actions on nodes and or decisive points with an operational or strategic objective.9.Operational Reach: the distance and duration over which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination; geography may limit it- but technology offers methods for bypassing barriers and limitations.10.Simultaneity and Depth:

1. Simultaneity: the application of military and non-military power against enemy key capabilities and sources of strength; (JP 3-0 implies operational shock in a Naveh-style here; even talks about moral and or physical failure in cohesion. Simultaneity also refers to concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

2. Depth: overwhelming the enemy in multiple domains- depth applies to time as well as space; this goes into Boyd’s OODA Loop.


Linear causality: effect occurs when A+B equals C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism. Direct paths imply linear causality again; not adaptive complex systems.

Very EBO centric thoughts here; that simultaneity in action against appropriate enemy forces results in a ‘moral failure’ echoes some of the British and USAAF’s flawed ‘morale bombing’ in WWII.

Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur.FM 3-0 shares LOO with

JP 3-0, but introduces Lines of Effort: the LOE helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end-state conditions; LOE follows LOO systems approach in linear causality and uni-minded systems (COGs).

FM 3-0 uses JP 3-0’s operational reach; the limit of a unit’s operational reach is it’s culminating point (6-74).

FM 3-0 uses similar terms as JP 3-0 with simultaneity and depth; and introduces ‘phases’ as a planning/execution tool to synchronize an operation.

FM 3-0 does not use JP 3-0’s phrasing of moral failure; it does paint a more holistic approach- within a systemic framework.

FM 3-0 JP 3-0


11. Timing and Tempo: “With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react.” IV-16 JP 3-0.12.Tempo: the rate of military action. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. “information superiority facilitated by a net-centric environment enables the JFC to dictate tempo.”13.Forces and Functions: JFCs focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both.

1. Attacking Functions: destroys/disrupts enemy’s ability to employ its forces;

2. Attacking Forces: self-evident. 14.Leverage: gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all domains and the information environment. Can be achieved through asymmetrical actions and concentration and integration of joint force capabilities (IV-17).15.Balance: the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. 16.Anticipation: JP 3-0 emphasizes description and volume of information as the means to understanding and anticipating what Taleeb calls ‘Black Swan’ events- unknown-unknowns. This does not work with Design’s logic of interiority and exteriority with complex adaptive systems.17.Synergy: combining military forces and capabilities so that their sum is greater than individual totals. Or, 1+1+1=5.18.Culmination: has both an offensive and defensive application; essentially when your chess opponent and you have the same number of pieces…


Description over explanation represents the systems thinking approach of Positivists. We had tons of information in Iraq, yet we did not dictate tempo in 2004-2005 at all. There is a difference between tons of description and the right explanation.

How can you anticipate this with a complex adaptive system if your planning logic requires you to reverse engineer within linear causality and uni-minded system logic such as EBO?


19. Arranging Operations: sounds like synergy, tempo, forces and functions, and balance. Not sure why JP 3-0 even uses this one…

Positivist logic; in FM 3-0 as well here.

Tempo: used in 6-80; FM 3-0 ties tempo to enemy specifically.

FM 3-0 uses ‘culmination’ where there is a point in time when a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations. This is a land-centric logic that differs with JP 3-0 (Air, Sea Power).

FM 3-0 includes RISK as well. This is Clausewitzian logic that addresses the fog, friction, and “luck” – risk relates to time and space; “it is a potential catalyst that fuels opportunity.”

Question 5: Jomini versus Clausewitz, Steel Cage Match

Clausewitz Jomini

Follow these rules exactly regardless of future conflict, and you will win.If not- you are an idiot.

The enemy is predictable and does not adapt.

Seek the Napoleonic victory- tactical wins that accomplish strategic goals. This ignores the operational level of war.

Jomini was widely read prior to the American Civil War; probably carried by most officers- geometric considerations continued with artillery, engineering, and naval applications in the 19th century.

Mechanistic Logic

• Both Clausewitz and Jomini see military conflict as a perpetual behavior by societies (nation states)- they do not subscribe to what Anatol Rapoport (On War intro, 1968 edition) terms ‘eschatalogical war theories.’

• Clausewitz goes mechanistic in some parts of ‘On War’ by arguing procedures and formulas for field artillery and relative troop strengths.

• Jomini follows Machiavelli's ‘The Prince’ by crafting a process, a checklist of war principles and formulas for a military general to follow. Doing this in ANY conflict will deliver them victory- this is pure mechanistic linear logic.

• Clausewitz does not follow principles of war, but he does take a positivist leap in logic by designating the ‘enemy’s fielded forces’ as the primary thing (COG) that must be destroyed to win.

“War is an extension of Politics.” -KVC“In total war, politics become an extension of war”- D/G, A Thousand Plateaus (they flip the maxim).

Warfare is complex- applying reductionist mathematics and procedures does not work well in complex war.

Clausewitz was not read outside of Prussia until the late 1880s- it arrived to West Point only then and Jomini still had a huge hold upon the US military.

Positivist Logic

Similarities in Warfare Theories

Differences in Warfare Theories

• Jomini remains tactical. He does not go operational level as Clausewitz does. Jomini wants the politicians to get out of the way of the military in war- Clausewitz sees the “trinity” between government, military, and violent passions of the masses.

• Jomini applies geometry, lines, and linear causality in a highly mechanistic fashion- Clausewitz goes further conceptually and avoids many of the pitfalls of prescriptive procedurizing that Jomini craves.

Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies(editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War”

Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War

Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies

of War

Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory

Global Cataclysmic War Theory

Divine Eschatological (religious final battle)

Natural Eschatological (planet extinction; human extinction)

Human (messianic) Eschatological (people

here now)

Religious movements that feature an “Armageddon plot” or the return of a savior with the destruction of all non-believers follow this logic.

A final war will, God Willing, end human conflict; this is pre-determined (linear causality), and the chosen people will reign supreme.

Example: Iran launching WMD at Israel to trigger emergence of 12th Imam.

Extreme environmentalism movements; anti-human movements (by humans, oddly). Non-human events such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life.

Example: the dinosaurs did not wage “war” but their existence was terminated this way. Humans waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles towards us makes a similar example….

A group of people already on the planet that will bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious groups followed this logic.

The Proletarian Revolution where workers of the world unit.

American Manifest Destiny during the Great Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic also.

Example: Soviet Party of the early 20th century followed this logic, according to Rapoport.

Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this during the Cold War- the chief difference is:1.War is NOT a tool.2.The outside world wants to destroy the unique ethnic identity of the select people.3.Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders out.4.The world will end in a final show-down.

Example: MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic; Soviets sought to preserve their state versus Capitalist westerners.

Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical approach. The principles are:

1.War is NOT a tool.2.ALL war is bad.3.Global government is the answer to ending conflict.4.International systems will aid in preventing global cataclysmic war.5.The nuclear age advanced this logic.

Example: The United Nations pursues international systems and a form of weak global governance with the general position that all war is bad…NATO is not an example of this; NATO is an alliance under Clausewitzian logic.

There is a final war.

Prevent all war.

Question 6: Explain relationship between conceptual and

detailed planning

FM 5-0 Design Doctrine (Teaching Artistry via. “Paint By Numbers”)

Create Environmental

FrameCreate Problem

Frame

Operational Approach

(design frame)Narrative and

graphical description

Relevant actors; interrelations-

PMESII-PT

Refinement of environmental

frameAreas for action to achieve end state

Initial guidance; end state; time

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3

tensions

Problem statement

Broad actions to achieve end state

Resources and Risks

Deliverables

1. Problem Statement2. Initial CDR’s Intent3. CDR’s Initial Planning

Guidance4. Mission Narrative5. Other Products

Decisive Points*

LOOs, LOEs*

‘Environment’ bounds. ‘Ecology’ conceptually allows distant yet relevant inclusion into the system.

Starting with an ‘End State’ and working backwards does not work with ill-structured problems.

PMESII-PT bounds the ‘known’ and goes

descriptive and deconstructive.

Doctrine is static. Theory is flexible.

Avoid description- seek explanation.

There is a problem with the word

‘problem.’

Phenomenon persist through feedback loops and ‘retention.’

Transformation requires emergence and anticipation (not

prediction).

Transformation requirements exceed military capabilities; cultural change

requires extensive time and resources.

Step 1

Detailed Planning Methodology: Linear Causality and Short Term Targets

Frame your environment with knowns (facts), known unknowns (assumptions and PIR/CCIR), and force influence the future of your world as a goal (end-state) to aim against.

Step 2Build COAs and “war-game” scenarios to decide upon the preferred action to undertake. Build detailed integrated instructions (OPORDs, graphics) to direct forces.

Step 3Execute action. Collect information and reflect upon action. Make adjustments and continue towards end-state.

Conceptual Planning: Detailed Planning:

Holistic Approaches (Design Theory)Positivist/Mechanistic Approaches (Systems Logic)

Clausewitzian (On War)

Jominian (principles of war)

Scientific Deduction (Kuhn, Capra, Taleeb, Laszlo, Bosquette)

Naveh (In Pursuit of…, other works also)Kuhn’s Paradigm ShiftsBetanafly’s General Systems TheoryOrganizational Theory (insert authors)Michael Foucote “Problematization” Lectures

Adaptive Metaphors (creation and destruction)

Historic Vignette Metaphor Preference

“This is like that”Historical Precedence

Fighting the Last Conflict (Linn)Weigley’s American Way of War

“Learning to Learn” –Naveh, Garandagangi, Foucote“Reflective Practitioner”- ShoenInteriority and Exteriority- Deluze and Gutari Unknown Unknowns- Black Swans (Taleeb)

Design Deliverables

FM 5-0: operational approach with graphic and CDR’s intent.Narratives in theory convey EXPLANATION not description.

Detailed Planning Deliverables

MDMP, JOPP, MCPP all follow procedures that create precise and detailed OPORDs, FRAGOs, and other actionable products. Military doctrine comes out of this logic, as does AAR and historical products.

The enemy is a state, group,

actor, or super powered

individual.

Rivals are phenomenon

within a complex system.

Linking understanding to action…

Each logic uses different vocabulary, theoretical concepts, narratives, and metaphor construction to make sense of the world (holistic in tension with positivist

reductionism)

Question 7: The relationship between Design and Battle

(Mission) Command

DesignMission (Battle) Command

Battle Command is the art and science of:

Understanding -

Visualizing

Describing

Directing

Leading

Assessing Forces

In order to impose a CDR’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy.

Mechanistic Logic

• Both Design and Battle Command consider the enemy (or rival) an adaptive and critical thinking (learning) actor instead of a static (mechanistic Jominian) opponent.

• Design doctrine and Battle Command place the Commander at the center (the architect) of both processes.

• Design doctrine (not theory) does suggest PEMESII-PT and METT-TC to support environmental framing and LOEs…

• Both Design doctrine (not theory) and Battle Cmd combine analytic and intuitive thinking…but Design theory does not limit thinking to within interiority of system and within positivist/reductionist logic with institutional biases.

Design Theory differs from Army Design Doctrine. Do not confuse the two.

Design Theory seeks explanation, not description.

Mary Jo Hatch’s Cycle of Cultural Change is a good foil for illustrating why Design doctrine and Battle Command as procedures do not really ever challenge any core structures or logics of the military institution.

Battle Command borrows from Boyd’s OODA Loop- a cycle of leading and assessing the process while continuing to try to out-think and out-act the enemy. Design theory is not so proceduralized- complex systems are not susceptible to such linear causality.

Design operates on a different logic than MDMP and detailed planning. Battle Command acts as an overarching conceptual framework for detailed planning- but it uses the same Clausewitzian and Positivist logic unlike Design.

Positivist Logic

Similarities between both

Differences in logics

• Design Theory seeks EXPLANATION over description. Battle Command wants description- this reinforces the positivist, reductionist, and linear causality logic.

• Battle Command recommends PMESII-PT to understand, and METT-TC to visualize…Design Theory avoids proceduralization.

• BC relies on ‘pattern recognition’ for anticipation; this potentially follows Taleeb’s ‘Black Swan’ fallacy of only considering the known knowns; Deluze/Guatari and the interiority/exteriority.

Linear Causality

Holistic Approach

Metacognition/problematization

Naveh: Persistent Creativity

Analytic Decision making: “approach the problem systemically”

Intuitive Decision making: the act of

reaching a conclusion emphasizing pattern

recognition, experience, knowledge”

Battle Command returns to the reverse engineering logic of positivism: the CDR “visualizes a desired end-state…and then a broad concept of how to reach it.

Question 8: FM 6-22 Army Leadership: Informal Leadership

Informal Leadership: Getting someone that is higher in rank than you (or position of authority) to see things your way (IF you are right) without getting a beat-down.”

General MacArthur’s actions during the Korean War over which he got fired by the POTUS; McCrystal’s actions during OEF 2011.

Sliding Scale of Inform

al Leadership Approaches

Confrontational

Contrast in Logic

Passive Aggressive

Sua-Sponte

“My Big Fat Greek Wedding” Transfer of Creative Ownership

Problematize towards Cognitive Synergy

IDF and their problems with SOD and the Hezbollah 2006 War. Subordinate leaders like Naveh used logic arguments on why SOD was superior to detailed planning- they all got sacked by senior leadership.

COL xxxx and his position on COIN versus guerilla warfare in OEF 2010-2011. XXX was investigated (and cleared) of any insubordination.

General Benedict Arnold at Saratoga; he took off without explaining to his boss what he was doing, and directed the battle to an upset victory over Gentleman Johnny.

Turning your idea into “what the boss was saying all along” and having him take ownership of the “creation” of his idea.

See Design.

Question 9: complicated versus complex

•Simple problem: Completing my six year-old’s math homework.

•Intricate problem: Completing a tough crossword puzzle. There is only 1x right solution.

• Complicated problem: Normandy Amphibious Assault on D-day.

• Complex Problem: Accomplishing vague strategic goals that change under limited conditions (no troops on ground) with NATO and the Arab League in Libya while waging 2x other wars.

Simple:-Closed systems- Known knowns- clear actors- linear causality- reduction friendly- mechanistic friendly- principles/procedures- reverse engineerable- predictable

Complicated:-Closed systems-Known unknowns- many actors- often linear- description rich- reduction friendly- interiority- mechanistic prone (COGs)

Complex:- open systems- unknown unknowns- exteriority- adaptive actors- innovation- holistic approaches- dynamic- explanation over description- reduction does not explain- mechanistic resistant

Intricate:- one solution- many steps- time consuming- precise- reverse engineerable- mechanistic- 100% predictable

Question 10: function and utility of narrative in Design; relation to

discourse.

Narrative:

Narrative is defined by doctrine (FM 5-0) as: “mission narrative”- the expression of the operational approach for a specified mission. It describes the intended effects for the mission, including the conditions that define the desired end-state.” It represents the articulation of the CDR’s visualization of the mission (echoes battle command).

Narrative in Design Theory:

Naveh discusses “codification of doctrine” and “planners are shackled while designers create.”

Hayden White: The Content and the Form: history versus histiography;

Peter Novak: That Noble Dream: narratives are incomplete- historians are biased in writing them. Humans (feminist movement, civil rights movement) try to take ‘ownership’ of some narratives- the military may do the same (“We do amphibious assaults, not you…We do FID- you do SFA…”)

Discourse:

Design Theory: post-modern philosophy such as Deluze and Guatari’s A Thousand Plateaus devote a chapter to the tension between information (exteriority and interiority) and language (flawed, human- associated with thoughts, but not information). This is a tough concept- needs five more slides to really explain.

Discourse is mentioned in FM 5-0 Design Chapter 3 where the CDR fosters an environment where ‘problematization’ occurs- this is the critical thinking portion of seeking explanation (WHY questions and BECAUSE answers) instead of just description (WHAT questions with HOW, WHERE, WHEN answers).

FM 5-0 Design does imply some critical thinking benefits of Design: “Design enables commanders to view a situation from multiple perspectives”- this supports the logic that complexity requires organizational intelligence- not a lone Napoleon.

Information language

knownunknown emerging current extinct

Discourse occurs here: metaphoric processes to fuse new understanding and convey to others.

Narrative is a product of the system logic: empirical material explained with metaphor and language (flawed) and organized in theoretical concepts which publish into narratives.

Problematize!

metacognition New vocabulary

Question 11: Define Adaptive Work and describe how one

leads to this effort.

Solution: Unclear

PositivismReductionismMechanistic

LinearProcedures

Emergence

FlexibleProblematizingMetacognition

Creation/destructionProcess

Persistent Adaptation

Problem: Unclear

Pre-determined END STATE

Pre-determined END STATEReframe

Linear Causality

Linear Causality

Positivist, mechanistic ApproachesPositivist, mechanistic

Approaches

Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World; a Holistic Vision for Our Time. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. Fritjof Capra, The Web of LifeJeff Conklin, Wicked Problems and Social Complexity (CogNexus Institute, 2008. http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf Last accessed 05 January 2011) 4-5. “This is the pattern of thinking that everyone attempts to follow when they are faced with a problem…this linear pattern as being enshrined in policy manuals, textbooks, internal standards for project management, and even the most advanced tools and methods being used and taught in the organization.”

Alex Ryan, The Foundation For An Adaptive Approach; Australian Army Journal For the Profession of Arms, Volume VI, Number 3 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2009) 70. “With the industrial revolution, the planning and decision-making process gradually built up a well-oiled machine to reduce reliance on individual genius.”

Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982) 12. “If our previous experience with systems analysis proves anything, it proves that anyone who tries to use all the information- even about the simple systems existing today- will be drowned in paper and never accomplish anything…The synthesist is someone who makes very specific plans for action, and more often than not stays around during the execution of those plans to adjust them to ongoing reality.”

Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999) 140-141. Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20 years, the world has grown more complex, yet the military ignore the increased complexity of war and instead focus “on the level of weapons, deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects are also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it.”

Learning

Making Sense

Innovation

http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf

http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf

Question 12: How do you build organizational learning to

facilitate integrated planning?

Adaptive and Critical Thinking Organization

PositivismReductionismMechanistic

LinearProcedures

Examples of learning while in conflict:

1.US Army in Philippines 1899-1901 (Linn’s The Philippines War2.British in Malaya in 1956 versus US Army in Vietnam (Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife)3.Israeli military in 1973 war with Egypt- adaptation becomes necessity.4.Washington at Battle of Trenton (raid tactic achieved operational and strategic requirements)

FlexibleProblematizingMetacognition

Creation/destructionProcess

Persistent Adaptation

Rigid and Non-Learning Organization (Traditional, Proceduralized)

Examples of resistance to changing an organization while in conflict:

1.US Army in Cold War (Carl Builder’s Masks of War)2.Linn’s Echo of Battle- peacetime strategists reinvent themselves with emergent technology to reinforce worldviews.3.Egyptian military in 1973 war with Israel- planning phase 1 works, but what about phase 2?

Question 13: ANP- relationship between strategy and

operational art

Strategy Operational Art

Operational Art links tactical action to the pursuit of strategic objectives.

Clausewitzian logic guides operational art towards destroying the enemy to compel a nation to obey our will. Strachan in The Lost Meaning of Strategy says that now, non-state actors initiate conflict, they are fought by civilians, and principle victims are not soldiers but non-combatants.

FM 3-0 chapter 3, FSO: “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative…” the goal of FSO is to apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land.

FM 3-0 uses ‘operational variables’ to describe the operational environment in terms that describe military aspects of the system, but the population’s influence on it. This means that FM 3-0 doctrinal logic uses reductionism for PMESII-PT- they do consider strategic (DIME) factors.

Mechanistic Logic

• As Gaddis notes, western strategic form follows the hierarchy that operational art uses. “The White House is a necessary hierarchy because no one is the President’s equal.”

• Gaddis explains how Eisenhower built a large military industrial complex with more hierarchy and procedures.

• McDougall implies that Americans apply western values of democracy and the American Dream to all other societies- this is similar to how western militaries apply Clausewitzian logic to other rivals and enemies universally.

• Hew Strachan’s The Lost Meaning of Strategy: modern war is no longer the ‘golden era’ of Clausewitzian state-on-state total war. It is with non-state actors, failed states or rogues. European states now view war as a peacekeeping requirement (Rapoport’s global cataclysmic war theory, not Clausewitzian).

Gaddis: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience – Gaddis sees post 9-11 where Powell and Weinberger doctrines (nation-state centric) are irrelevant.

McDougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State explains US foreign policy as our assumption (Hatch’s model) that we can, should, and must reach out to help other nations share in the ‘American Dream.’

American values and tenets of democracy, freedom from government and military intrusions (see Leach’s Roots of Conflicts) do not equal the military hierarchical process and institutionalism logic.

Carnes Lord’s Crisis Management, A Primer. Lord presents Pearl Harbor as a political, not a military failure- the US enacted the 1941 oil embargo and Roosevelt sent mixed diplomatic messages- this drove Japan to make their move (just as they did against Russia in 1908).

Positivist Logic

Cohesive Elements

Tensions

• Operational art (western logic) relies upon hierarchy of control and procedures for uniformity and repetition- although Eisenhower increased this on the political side (strategy) after WWII, some components of American Strategic culture (Weigley) are in tension with this. Peacetime: small military;

• NSC-68 represents a tension between traditional American strategic culture (we pick our fights) and Cold War ‘containment’ that follows a military systems-process of ‘they pick were we fight.”

• B. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Hart sees indirect strategy as superior in the nuclear age- this is in tension with Clausewitzian logic (destroy the enemy directly).

Neo-Realism

Liberalism

Humanism

Clausewitzian Theory

Question 14: ANP- What is deterrence? What is the

military’s role?

Super-power nationsLarge complex militaries

Failing nationsRogue state

Total warHigh Intensity

Conflict

Limited WarLow Intensity

Conflict

Q1 Q2

Q3Q4

= victory= undetermined= failure

Conflict in the Q1 is not direct; Nuclear nations

use proxy conflicts in Q4 for indirect action

Berlin Air Lift 1947

Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

Germany 1945

Japan 1945

Korean War

Vietnam War (RNA)

Vietnam War (Viet Cong)Iraq 1990

Iraq 2003

Iraqi Civil War 2004-present

Panama 1989

Libya 1985

Bosnia 1999

Afghanistan 2001-present

Lebanon 2006 (Israel)Conflict in the Q3 is between non-nuclear nations or with

one nuclear (usually superior) power.

Conflict in the Q2 is the golden era for most western

military cultures-

Conflict in the Q4 is where weaker nations and actors

seek to exploit super-power nations on terms that are

better than in Q3.

Afghanistan 1988 (USSR)

Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq)

Figure 1a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations

Advanced NationsComplex Military IOPs

High Intensity Conflict

Low Intensity Conflict

Failing or Failed StatesNon-State Actors; Weak military IOPs

Japan 1945 Germany 1945

USSR (Cold War)

US Victory Planned; not executed

US Failure Undetermined Outcome

Korea 1953

Vietnam 1974 (Chinese & Soviet Aided)

North Vietnam (subpar military IOP)

Vietcong Irregular Forces

Libya 1985

Panama 1989

Haiti 1994

Iraq 1991


Kosovo 1999

Somalia 1994

Iraq 2003+ Iraq 2003

Afghanistan 2001+

French in Algeria 1956

French Example 1

Q1 Q2

Q4 Q3French utilized D2DE for air power with tactical success (strategic failure)

Q1: Nuclear Nations in Q1 use

deterrence to not fight in Q2 with

other nuclear nations.


Soviet military maintains large ground forces; closed market economy (Socialist) does not grow as rapidly as U.S. free market; USSR spends higher ratio to balance.

Figure 1: D307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe

USSR United States

1940 Manhattan Project; 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki1945+ secret atomic program;

1949 atomic bomb

Reframe: expand nuclear delivery to IBCM, bomber, and submarine capabilities.

Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes lead on nuclear option; NASA space race. GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950s perceived missile gap with Moscow.

1957: Sputnik: first space satellite

WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists

1969: First man on moon; space race won by United States

U.S. reframing: NASA and space race increased due to Soviet satellite success

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

1980s: President Reagan begins ‘Star Wars program.

1970s: U.S. begins MIRV warheads.Soviets challenged to match MIRV quality; react with IBCM quantity for MAD.

SALT 1 Treaty

SALT 2 Treaty

START Treaty

Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now towards nuclear non-proliferation and reduction.

USSR obsolete. Russian Federal Republic rises from ashes and secures existing nuclear infrastructure. Attempts to maintain nuclear superpower status.

U.S. now looks from atop the nuclear gravity pipe; from here it attempts to prevent other nations from rising up.

Post-Cold War: U.S. downsizes nuclear arsenal while maintaining first strike capability for hostile actors.

Question 15: ANP- American Foreign Policy Traditions:

Golden Era

Colonial Period

Isolationist Early America

Cold War

Leach’s Roots of ConflictPaine’s Common SenseLocke, Hume, Age of Enlightenment

ImpressmentColonial ‘sub-status’Troop quarteringTaxes, economics

Peacetime small armyFear of European invasionCoastal forts and navyMonroe Doctrine foreign policyAvoid European warsJIB/JAB for democracyAmerican Civil War

Jomini’s Principles of WarTeddy Roosevelt and the navy Linn’s Guardians and Heroes (Echo of Battle)Mahan and Naval strength equals economic strengthMonroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny (messianic eschatological)PME establishment (West Point)

Military Industrial ComplexAir Power, Nuclear AgeTotal War (global threat)End of ImperialismClash of IdeologiesAmerica= defender of democracyWorld “Policeman”

French Indian War

Amer. Revolution

War 1812

Mex-Amer. War

Civil War

WWI

WWII

Span-Amer. War

Discarded Conflicts

Philippines 1899

Vietnam

Iraq?Afghanistan?

Libya?

Somalia

Korea

Berlin Airlift

Panama

Gulf War I

Builder’s Masks of WarWeigley’s American Way of War

Kennan’s Long TelegramNCS-68UN resolutionsBrinksmanshipProxy WarsDétenteGlasnost

Triggering Powell Doctrine: we need an exit strategy.Blackhawk Down: send enough combat power with right mission.Avoid COIN.“Training tomorrow’s enemies to help us Today”

ContrasCuba

Final Soviet Battle in Western Europe

Uni-polar 21st Century

Conventional War against China

Entering the World Stage

American Foreign Policy: U.S. Strategic Culture over 300 years (1711-2011)

Question 16: Historical Example of Military Force and Diplomacy-

the American Civil War

Doctrine

Resources

History

Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War)

Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)

Linn (Echo of Battle)Wiegley (American Way of War)Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)Hagerman (The American

Civil War)

ClausewitzJomini Napoleon (Legacy) Mahan

Winfield Scott

Crimean War

Politics

Confederate Army

Vicksburg

Logistics

Union Army

Tactics

Confederate prosperity

New Technology

Rifled musketsSteam enginesTrainsTelegraphArmorScrew propellers BalloonsArtillery

Frontal Assault

Mass Armies Defensive superiority

Mexican War

Prussian Staff

Mississippi- key waterway

Siege mentality

Geography in MississippiUnion Naval

Blockade

Army requires resources

President Davis in Richmond

Southern fixation on States Rights

Slave based agricultural economy

State-centric ‘gentlemen’ caste

Confederacy divided

South lacked international trade

South unable to industrialize faster than North

West Point

Political nepotism and corruption

Smaller population

Tobacco and Cotton Trade

South lacked infrastructure

Naval Armor

Theory

HistoryDoctrine


Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective) Linn (Echo of Battle)

Wiegley (American Way of War)Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)Hagerman (The American

Civil War)


Winfield Scott

Terrain

Industrialization

Forces

Tactics

US distrusts large standing army

Post Mexican War stand-down

Mexican WarNapoleonic

WarsOffensive frontal assaults

Defensive advantage

Rifled Muskets

Artillery dominates

Prussian Staff Centers of Gravity

Union organized some staff

specialization

Pre-industrial Warfare (tactical)

Post-Industrial Warfare (multiple campaigns)

New technology

Steam Engine

Speed and Mass increased

Increased casualties Inability to C2

Telegraph

Defensive advantages

Inter-war theorists unable to discourse new

technology vs old tactics

Infrastructure in North and

SouthSmall Officer Corps

Outdated Army (active)

JIB/JAB

Manifest Destiny

Western Territories

Military’s Role

Inter-war period discourse on tactics

Napoleonic tactics must adapt with paradigm shift in

technology

Screw propellers

Constitution

3/5 slave votes

State Rights

Divergent Cognitive Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861-1863

1

2

3

Figure C: Fishbone Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861-1863

Logistics

C2 & ISR

Failed Discourse(tactics vs. emerging technology)

Problem: failure to supply forces

Problem: failure to coordinate tactics and strategy

Problem: failure to apply violence effectively to accomplish ENDS.

Confederate supply lines lack rail

Dependent on water transit

Various caliber firearms require munitions

Confederates interior lines critical

Confederate supply dispersed across states

Confederacy organized around states

President Davis lacked influence and leadership

South lacked international trade partners

Telegraph vulnerable

Calvary sent north Siege mentality

lacked recon

State-centric mindset hamstrung strategy

Spies littered message couriers

Davis was removed from local environment

Vicksburg isolated by river; a strength was also a weakness

Armies too large to maneuver quickly without signal conditions optimal

Mexican War given too much credit; Clausewitz and Crimean War not enough.

Jomini and Napoleon favored frontal assaults

Artillery of 1820s outranged by muskets of 1860s

American value on life; militia factor

Mahan led West Pointers but Jomini and Mexican War veterans steered tactics

Rifled musketsSteam enginesTrainsTelegraph

ArmorScrew propellers BalloonsArtillerySouth lacked

industrial base of North

Question 17: How Economic Theory can Influence Military

Operations

Nation-state primary actors

Individuals comprise actors

Implicitly Chaotic World

Implicitly Peaceful World

Q1 Q2

Q3Q4

Realism

Figure 1a: Musings on Political Science Theories

Liberalism

Social Constructivists

Humans are anarchistic naturally; individual liberty is

trumped by state survival Zero-sum game for power; balance of powerStatism, Survivalism, Self-Help

Marxists; Communists;Socialists

Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual worker is the power- the state serves the worker; final battle vs. capitalism;Non-marxist nations will always threaten Marxist ones.

Anarchy is not the cause of conflict. Free trade and interdependent democracies will reduce conflict. Legitimacy in tension with cost to act.

Changing values and perceptions will change government and society; meta-cognition and game theory works here.

Compatible in some aspects



Ideology not compatible with others.


Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies(editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War”

Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War

Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies

of War

Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory

Global Cataclysmic War Theory

Divine Eschatological (religious final battle)

Natural Eschatological (planet extinction; human extinction)

Human (messianic) Eschatological (people

here now)

Religious movements that feature an “Armageddon plot” or the return of a savior with the destruction of all non-believers follow this logic.

A final war will, God Willing, end human conflict; this is pre-determined (linear causality), and the chosen people will reign supreme.

Example: Iran launching WMD at Israel to trigger emergence of 12th Imam.

Extreme environmentalism movements; anti-human movements (by humans, oddly). Non-human events such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life.

Example: the dinosaurs did not wage “war” but their existence was terminated this way. Humans waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles towards us makes a similar example….

A group of people already on the planet that will bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious groups followed this logic.

The Proletarian Revolution where workers of the world unit.

American Manifest Destiny during the Great Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic also.

Example: Soviet Party of the early 20th century followed this logic, according to Rapoport.

Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this during the Cold War- the chief difference is:1.War is NOT a tool.2.The outside world wants to destroy the unique ethnic identity of the select people.3.Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders out.4.The world will end in a final show-down.

Example: MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic; Soviets sought to preserve their state versus Capitalist westerners.

Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical approach. The principles are:

1.War is NOT a tool.2.ALL war is bad.3.Global government is the answer to ending conflict.4.International systems will aid in preventing global cataclysmic war.5.The nuclear age advanced this logic.

Example: The United Nations pursues international systems and a form of weak global governance with the general position that all war is bad…NATO is not an example of this; NATO is an alliance under Clausewitzian logic.

There is a final war.

Prevent all war.

Economy: Marxist Socialist Economy: Capitalist Liberal

Economy: Capitalist (realism; Smith) or liberal (global trade)

Economy: Marxist Socialist

Economy: Islamic (ideological)

Environment Economic Factors

Ethnic/Social Political Structure

Threat to world (WW2)

U.S. national goals in WW2.

U.S. National resources

Limited Time (NLT 1943)

American Isolationism

Fascism diametrically

opposes Democracy

America located across oceans from

WW2.

inter-war military for U.S.

downsized

U.S. possesses massive

resources and industry.

U.S. has a large military age population

pool.

Technology advancements

empowered military action

Soviet Union as a German

buffer.

UK as a German buffer.

Training a military requires time/resources/technology

Global trade empowered US

economy

Pro-German lobby.

Pro-Allies lobby

Failure of League of Nations

Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan Problem 1941:

T=time

Z= goals

Military decisions require political and public discourse

German fascism

resulted from WWI and LoN

failures.

Current (1941) US military inadequate

to achieve goalsU.S. democracy will function with 10% population draft

national prosperityvs. entropyResources available to nation

vs. global resources

Political threat (internal and external)

Ethnic and social national identity seeks prosperity and power

American independence

American Democracy

UK was losing resources and

troops at a rapid rate.

USSR population and resources mobilized

slowly.

X (means) + y (ways) = z (ends)How to get x= t (time) / r (resources)/ enemyR= s (society) + e / p (political structure)

Question 18: American Foreign Policy Traditions and Small Wars




Conflict


Conflict

Q1 Q2

Q3Q4






Germany 1945

Japan 1945

Korean War

Vietnam War (RNA)


Iraq 2003


Panama 1989

Libya 1985

Bosnia 1999


Lebanon 2006 (Israel)Conflict in the Q3 is between non-nuclear nations or with



military cultures-



better than in Q3.




Question 19: Operational Art Development from 18th to 21st Centuries- theories, doctrine,

tech, politics, culture.

Doctrine

Resources

History


Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)

Linn (Echo of Battle)Wiegley (American Way of War)Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts)Hagerman (The American

Civil War)


Winfield Scott

Crimean War

Politics

Confederate Army

Vicksburg

Logistics

Union Army

Tactics

Confederate prosperity

New Technology

Rifled musketsSteam enginesTrainsTelegraphArmorScrew propellers BalloonsArtillery

Frontal Assault

Mass Armies Defensive superiority

Mexican War

Prussian Staff

Mississippi- key waterway

Siege mentality

Geography in MississippiUnion Naval

Blockade

Army requires resources

President Davis in Richmond

Southern fixation on States Rights

Slave based agricultural economy

State-centric ‘gentlemen’ caste

Confederacy divided

South lacked international trade

South unable to industrialize faster than North

West Point

Political nepotism and corruption

Smaller population

Tobacco and Cotton Trade

South lacked infrastructure

Theory

Resources

Politics

Technology

19th Century

20th Century

21th Century

Industrial Revolution

Information Revolution

Scientific Revolution (17-18th century)

Cyberspace

SpacesatellitesICBMs

worms

GRIN tech

Steam Engine

Combustion Engine

Airplanes

Submarines

Stealth Tech

UAVs

biometrics

Rifled barrel

democracies

Civil rights (race)

Monroe Doctrine

Civil Rights II

Gay Rights

Imperialism

Post-Imperialism

Colonialism

Manifest Destiny

Deterrence

Post Cold-War

International Law/Governance

Mahan

Clausewitz

Jomini

Schliffen

TH Lawrence

Machiavelli

Lenin

Marx

Kennan

Pentamic Army

NavehDesign

Complexity

Sayid Qtub

Unrestricted Conflict

American Exceptionalism

Tanks

Military Industrial Complex

Assembly Line

Resource Competition

Urban Populations

Global Middle Class

Limited Conflict

JIB/JAB refinement

Question 20: Element of Operational Art- explain with

historic example (COGs)

Koniggratz

FM 3-0 JP 3-0

Quotes Clausewitz: A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance.

A COG is singular in nature- JP 3-0 wants one at each level of war.

In conventional fights, JP 3-0 prefers strategic COG to be government or leader; and operational COG as the fielded forces. No tactical COGs.

LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs. Linear causality. Baseball makes the runner go to 1st, then 2nd base; war might require us to run to 3rd, then 1st, then 2nd…

Garandagangi makes the distinction between non-minded, uni-minded, and multi-minded systems; COGs work for uni-minded (EBO systems based) logic.

Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic

Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight.

Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling.

Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling.-Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function.-Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work.-Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or exploitation.

* JP 3-0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives.

Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states, COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time.

Quotes Clausewitz also.

The loss of a COG ultimately results in defeat. –this is linear causality and reverse engineering on a positivist logic base.

FM 3-0 goes beyond JP 3-0 and states “COGs are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral; eliminating them requires holistic integrated efforts of all national IOPs.” 6-8.

Supports JP 3-0 and sees a single COG at each level of war.

The Army does not have a COG at the tactical level either (just USMC). As Kem says, it is semantics- a tactical COG equals a decisive point.

Operational COG Operational COG

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level

Prussia Austria-Hungary

Bismark xxx

Moltke Benedek

Operational Center of Gravity: -Prussian Fielded Forces (250,000 troops)

Critical Capabilities:-General Staff Model-Breach-loading needle guns- common language (troops)-Excellent education level-Home region units (homogeneity)-Not tied to line formations of old (breach rifle advantage)

DP: Battle of Koniggratz

Critical Vulnerabilities:-Artillery corps less experienced with rifled cannon than Austrians-Austrians in position on terrain first-Austrians field artillery were more experienced and accurate

Critical Requirements:-Supplies; log train-Accurate intelligence-Superior Terrain-Maneuverability-Fires support (cannon)

Operational Center of Gravity: - Austro-Hungarian Fielded Forces (240,000 troops)

Critical Capabilities:-Rifled cannon (artillery corps)-Muzzle loading rifles-9x languages and cultures fused-Line formations and traditional tactics

Critical Vulnerabilities:-Muzzle loading guns (rate of fire)-Many languages and cultures (9)-Poor education level-No general staff- Genius of CDR only- chaotic C2 climate-Relied on muzzle-centric line formations for infantry

Critical Requirements:-Supplies, log train-Accurate intelligence-Superior Terrain-Maneuverability-Fires support (cannon)

Austrians compressed into 8 square mile area with 1x good road.

No staff- Benedek made all decisions- C2 was chaotic.

Moltke was brilliant, but his General Staff operated quickly and efficiently.

Moltke splits his force and conducts double envelopment of enemy.

Question 21: Historical Example of Mission Command- how CDR/staff developed and conducted a successful

campaign.

Mission Command Applied to xxx

CDR’s intent Subordinates’ Initiative

Mission Orders:Concept of operations

Minimum control measures

Resource Allocation Successful

Action

xxx Insert info Insert info Insert info Insert info

Question 22: Challenges of CMD at Operational Level- how do

they differ from Tactical CMD?

FM 3-0

• 12 principles of war still used;

• Relies upon procedures, uniformity, and repetition of effect

• Linear Causality• Reductionism-

emphasis on description (PIR, MCOO, DPs)

• End-States; LOOs, DPs- linked


Reverse engineer termination criteria to objectives, COGs, and DPs along a LOO.

Identifying desired and undesired effects with a systems perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3-0.

Effects: describe system behavior

• Operational and Mission Variables: FM 3-0 warns of “precise binning” but the positivist and reductionist procedures are lost.

• PMESII-PT centric.• Echoes JP 3-0’s

definition of ‘Unified Action.’

• Quotes Clausewitz on uncertainty, chance, and friction. (when your logic creates abnormalities, you can categorize them under these catch-alls).

Operational CMD

JP 3-0

• 12 principles of war use Jominian systems thinking that use mechanistic, reductionist, and positivist constructs

• Joint Operation Planning Process

• Centers of Gravity

JP 3-0 Unified Action: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of the governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

JP 3-0 LOGIC: the nature of warfare is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states…IW is a violent struggle between state and non-state actors.

Tactical CMDMDMP

Operational CMD: Joint, and inter-agency; Tactical CMD can be “ground-centric” and avoid some DIME and IGO/NGO/OGA considerations. “Stay in your lane” and “that is someone else’s problem” come to mind as comments made by BDE CDR individuals.

Operational CMD: Joint, and inter-agency; Tactical CMD can be “ground-centric” and avoid some DIME and IGO/NGO/OGA considerations. “Stay in your lane” and “that is someone else’s problem” come to mind as comments made by BDE CDR individuals.

• Tactical Unit specific• Institutionalism is

strong at tactical level• Naveh uses the term

“tacticization”• Tactical CMD- battle

centric; decisive points, there are no tactical COGs in Army doctrine.

TPPs, SOPs

Vas De Sege: SWJ Article on Operational Level of War- uses metaphor of explorer in unknown lands.

Tactical Level of War: violence or threat of violence in action to pursue strategic objectives as orchestrated and synergized by the Operational CDR’s vision.

Question 23: Operational CMD relationship in conventional and

COIN conflicts

Operational Command Relationships in Conventional Conflicts Using Mission Command

Successful Action

Conventional Conflict

COIN Conflict

Conventional conflicts feature distinct military termination criteria often associated with clear national goals- defeating a nation-state; unconditional surrender; or an enemy force retreating from contested territory. Conventional conflicts place the military IOP as the uncontested lead element.

COIN and IW conflicts are more ambiguous- termination criteria are illusive and often shift as conditions change. Non-state actors intermingle with nation states and groups; successful UW morphs into COIN or IW- and populations are generally key. The military IOP may not be the lead element even when combat occurs.

Clear linear logic- Clausewitzian and Jominian: destroy the enemy force.

The enemy is unclear- illusive. Clausewitz alone fails- Sun Tzu and Design provide additional understanding.

Detailed Planning logic provides procedures and uniformity/repetition that works.

Considerations: hierarchical (top-down) may be cumbersome. Air power (penny packets vs. CCDE)-Div. resistance of Awakening Movement

PLOs, LOOs, LOEs- linked to COG CVs and DPs. Doctrine suited for conventional task/purpose and reverse-engineered ENDs-ways -means

Linear logic may be problematic. C2 needs decentralization and self-organization that tailors to SPECIFIC areas; population-centric.

Resources tied to traditional employment of troop/equipment. Units do their METL tasks the way they train for.

Many units perform roles they are unfamiliar with or untrained on. New resources needed- adaptation and innovation is critical.

Mission Command




Resource Allocation

Question 24: Is operational art relevant for COIN/small wars or

just MCO?

Answer: Yes. Next Question.

Just kidding. See next slide.




Conflict


Conflict

Q1 Q2

Q3Q4






Germany 1945

Japan 1945

Korean War

Vietnam War (RNA)


Iraq 2003


Panama 1989

Libya 1985

Bosnia 1999


Lebanon 2006 (Israel)

Conflict in the Q3 is between non-nuclear nations or with



military cultures-



better than in Q3.




Operational Art in COIN or IW is necessary to orchestrate all IOPs

efficiently in a limited conflict that will require longer time and

domestic long-term support. This is where 21st century conflict is trending- we need to adapt.

Operational Art in deterrence is less needed- WMD enabled nations use diplomacy and

strategic-level actions or proxy wars through surrogates to accomplish goals.

Operational Art needed here for threat of violence- and the application of it. When mis-matched forces wage war

in MCO, the need for operational art remains a given necessity. But- how many more Saddams will fight us like

this?

Operational Art needed here for threat of violence- although we won’t fight this

way again.

Question 25: Given the EOA course, what is your definition of Operational Art? How would you

change FM 3-0’s definition?

Operational Art: the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs- supported by their skill,

knowledge, and experience- to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and

employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 3-0)

US Army FM 3-0:

Operational Art: the application of persistent creativity and innovation by commanders and staffs- supported by their knowledge, experience, and critical thinking-

to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational

art synergizes tactical action with the pursuit of strategic aims for optimum effectiveness and

perpetual adaptation.

My Definition:

Personal Definition of Operational Art

• FM definition remains within institutional interiority

• Ends-Ways-Means reflects linear causality, reverse engineering, positivism, and mechanistic reductionism.

• Levels of war represents bounding.

• My definition emphasizes exteriority and interiority

• Learning and critical thinking are essential

• Synergy and pursuing strategic aims represents a holistic approach to evolving and emerging national goals as a complex system transforms.

Choice of words reflects different military logic

Question 26: Discuss tension between strategy, operations,

and tactics- provide 1x EOA example from course.

Strategy Operations TacticsTensions Tensions

EOA Conflict: The American Revolution (EOA 1)From General Gage and the British Perspective

British government wanted American colonies suppressed and British colonial dominance restored through military force.

Economic measures such as the Stamp Act, the Intolerable Acts aka- the Coercive Acts (Gage’s ideas)and economic positioning to ensure colonial dependence on British refined goods (thus maintaining a dependency relationship with the colonies at a disadvantage).

Taxation covered expensive European Wars.

Sending fielded forces over the Atlantic was expensive- and risky with European enemies maneuvering. Gage only had 3,000 soldiers- he wanted 10,000.

Gage appointed Royal Governor of Massachusetts by King.

Boston was viewed as the Colonial strategic “center of gravity” while militia arms and powder mills were considered the operational COGs.

Gates echoed a Herbst: States and Power in Africa theory and considered the cheap and available land as part of the problem in the colonies- too many people could move beyond the practical reach of the law.

Gates followed the law strictly.

Redcoats conducted forced impressment of colonial sailors and citizens into their armed forces.

Redcoats on mainland used forts as well as local homes for quartering of troops against colonial wishes.

Military patrols in Boston caused tensions- “The Boston Massacre”

British naval blockades impacted trade. The Coercive Acts closed the port of Boston by Gage.

Seizure of weapon caches and powder mills reduced militia capabilities (in theory).

British values over the right to bear arms differed from a frontiersman. DDR was not feasible.

Colonial militia were educated and religious men; British troops were from the dregs of society and illiterate.

Gates’ logic (and the British in general) framed the conflict with the wrong logic. They projected British logic onto an American one. Puritanism, anger over Imperialism (Leach’s Roots of Conflict), and frontier isolationism changed Americans.

Question 27: EOA- Moltke said no plan survives 1st contact with

enemy- support or disagree.

Moltke says “no plan survives first contact.” Metaphor: a plan “survives” as a living thing instead of a concept.First contact with the enemy- when first shots fired, the “plan” dies. This implies that the enemy always is more complex than a reductionist plan can anticipate.

On Moltke: Metaphors do not translate into Narratives

Moltke takes empirical material and deals with his interiority (known) in tension with exteriority (unknown)- as in, military conflicts involve tactical action of forces in environments where violence occurs for political aims. Experience counts, but each new conflict is unique and even the best plan cannot prepare for the chaos of the future battlefield.

Moltke espouses Clausewitzian political war theory by embracing the concepts of fog, friction, and chance in warfare. While genius may rise above all other rules and processes, the best efforts (a plan) is no match for real war complexity and uncertainty. Therefore, planning prepares a military organization for thinking about war- but it does not substitute for actual war conduct and execution where plans are discarded as new ones replace them.

Moltke’s comment is just a metaphor- an observation, a maxim that explains how fog and friction make any Jominian attempt at being a positivist or mechanistic reductionist in preparation for war is a waste. One cannot predict a conflict and build a plan that covers every contingency- war does not obey principles and mechanistic logic. As a narrative, one should not take Moltke’s comment as dogma any more than Moltke recommends against building a plan that becomes dogma for a future conflict. Like any initial plan, many maxims uttered by wise military men become casualties as well during the first shot of the next conflict.

Question 28: TCC- choose 1x form of warfare discussed in TCC 505-511; how does this develop in next 20-25 yrs, and how will it

interact with other forms of future warfare?

Mid-

21th Century

Theory

Resources

Politics

Technology

20th Century

Early

21th Century


Cyberspace


worms

GRIN tech

Stealth Tech

UAVs

biometrics

Civil Rights II

Gay Rights

Post-Imperialism

Deterrence

Post Cold-War


Kennan

Pentamic Army

Naveh

DesignComplexity

Sayid Qtub



Urban Populations

Limited Conflict

JIB/JAB refinement

Global Middle Class


Uni-polar Environment

Multi-polar EnvironmentLarge Aging Populations

Genetic Modification

Artificial Intelligence

How Radical Evolution Impacts Conventional War

EBO

Integrated Planning

GRIN tech will…

Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999) 19. Liang and Xiangsui take an eastern perspective on western warfare. “We still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about technology, believing that from this point on war will become a confrontation like an electronic game, and even simulated warfare in a computer room similarly must be premised upon a country’s actual overall capabilities…”

P8. “Technology is like ‘magic shoes’ on the feet of mankind, and after the spring has been wound tightly by commercial interests, people can only dance along with the shoes, whirling rapidly in time to the beat that they set.” Without understanding the importance of metaphor in eastern culture, it is easy to dismiss Liang and Xiangsui’s position on technology and society as ‘mad’ or ‘illogical.’ When we use our own logic to disregard others, we are using ‘madness’ as an excuse to ignore the alternate methods that their logic employs.

P10. Liang and Xiangsui criticize western emphasis on techno-centric logic with, “people have long been accustomed to blindly falling in love with the new and discarding the old…the endless pursuit of new technology has become a panacea to resolve all of the difficult questions of existence…In this way, the irrational expansion of technology causes mankind to continually lose his goals in the complex ramifications of the tree of technology, losing his way and forgetting how to get back.”

P13-14. “Some of the traditional models of war, as well as the logic and laws attached to it, will also be challenged. The outcome of the contest is not the collapse of the traditional mansion but rather one portion of the new construction site being in disorder.” Liang and Xiangsui present a non-western perspective on how a paradigm shift in military thinking in the 21st century does not destroy the old entirely, but reorganize an old structure into a new one; some parts remain useful while others go to the intellectual scrap heap.

P140-141. Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20 years, the world has grown more complex, yet the military ignore the increased complexity of war and instead focus “on the level of weapons, deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects are also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it.”

P141. “The enemy will possibly not be the originally significant enemy, and the weapons will possibly not be the original weapons, and the battlefield will also possibly not be the original battlefield. Nothing is definite. What can be ascertained is not definite. The game has already changed, and what we need to continue is ascertaining a new type of fighting method within various uncertainties.”

P181. Americans “would rather treat war as the opponent in the marathon race of military technology and are not willing to look at it more as a test of morale and courage…they believe that as long as the Edisons of today do not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always be open to the Americans.”

P95. “It is not so much that war follows the fixed race course of rivalry of technology and weaponry as it is a game field with continually changing direction and many irregular factors.”

On Unrestricted Warfare by Liang and Xiangsui

Question 29: What is the utility of scenario planning for future

operations?

Legitimate Economy Prosperity

Legitimate Economy Entropy

Illicit Economy Entropy

Illicit Economy Prosperity

This model features an improving Mexican legal

economy with a declining illicit economy; positive feed-back loops funnel greater security

resources against a diminishing rival criminal enterprise. Best

possible future scenario.

This model features a declining legal and illegal economy in

Mexico. With less legal enterprise options and no rival

illicit economy, Mexico will slide into a collapsed state condition where extreme

poverty occurs. Violence will be moderate due to limited

illicit options.

This model features a booming illicit commodity with a

declining legal economy. With limited resources for security

costs, Mexico will lose legitimacy and face state failure without outside

intervention. Cartel growth and robust black markets will

hasten this collapse.

This model features an improving Mexican legitimate economy with a booming illicit

commodity- violence will increase as Mexico buys more security capabilities while drug cartels can also purchase more

lethal hardware and mercenaries/influence.

Scenario Planning and the Mexico Cartel Design Model

High Violence

High Corruption

Low Violence

Low Corruption

Moderate Violence

High Corruption

High Violence

High Corruption

Benefits of Scenario Planning:

1.Merges well with Design’s conceptual planning…works as a potential intermediate step between conceptual and detailed planning.2.Generates options that reflect logic- not just wild speculation about the future; and avoids the cookie-cutter mentality of dealing only with “known-knowns” projected into the future (the economics of carriage companies in 1900 when automobiles entered the market).

Detriments of Scenario Planning:

1.Easy to misuse this tool. This is not a crystal ball. It generates options for planning- it does not make predictions.2.Black Swans are notoriously hard to anticipate. Scenario planning probably only captures white and grey swans…3.Special folks are necessary for this to work. Highly educated personnel can contribute- military organizations generally lack those types.

Question 30: Describe the Concept of Ops our group did-

what implications does this have for future force structure?

More to follow. I need to download our groups’ deliverable on Brazil.

In oral comps, I would want to steer this conversation towards Mexico instead and run with some of the Design products from that.

Question 31: What is the difference between war and

warfare? What does this matter for the 21st century and the US?

Question 32: What trends will influence the future operating

environment for the next 20-25 yrs?

Mid-

21th Century

Theory

Resources

Politics

Technology

20th Century

Early

21th Century


Cyberspace


worms

GRIN tech

Stealth Tech

UAVs

biometrics

Civil Rights II

Gay Rights

Post-Imperialism

Deterrence

Post Cold-War


Kennan

Pentamic Army

Naveh

DesignComplexity

Sayid Qtub



Urban Populations

Limited Conflict

JIB/JAB refinement

Global Middle Class


Uni-polar Environment

Multi-polar EnvironmentLarge Aging Populations

Genetic Modification

Artificial Intelligence

How Radical Evolution Impacts Conventional War

EBO

Integrated Planning

GRIN tech will…

GRIN: genetic, robotic, informational, and nano-tech

Question 33: FM 3-0 does offensive, defensive, and stability

ops as a central theme for US operational concept- what is the value of a concept that needs 3x

simultaneous operations?

More to follow.

Question 34: FG officers- explain your future role as a staff officer

on a general staff.

Answer: Making coffee and building pretty slides.

Question 35: You are a BDE CDR- what is your role in MDMP- how do you ensure your staff meets your intent and HHQ’s mission

requirements?

Step 1: Receipt of Mission

MDMP

Step 2: Mission Analysis

Step 3: COA Development

Step 4: COA Analysis (war-

gaming)

Step 5: COA comparison

Step 6: COA Approval

Step 7: Orders Production

Mission Command




Resource Allocation

Guidance must get staff looking at the problem from the right perspectives.

Analysis must lead to synthesis. Example: what does the weather data mean in relation to time, maneuver, and purpose?

War-gaming should not be lock-step; it also should not be without time hacks and a strong ref.

COA development should be done without compartmentalizing too much with small staff groups-

Design is not just for the first step of MDMP- it should be continuous and help refine each step of the MDMP process with the CDR as the lead designer.

Question 36: JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 explain a through mission

analysis…

More to follow.

Summarize ANP Course:(Applied Elements of National

Power)

Applied Elements of National Power

Course Outline: Historic Contexts: Improvements:

Strategic History (WWI mostly) with B.H. Liddell Hart’s Strategy.Collin Gray’s War, Peace, and International Relations.

Henry Hendrix’s Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy (turn of 20th century); the importance of Mahan on US strategic culture.Linn’s Echo of Battle would place both Mahan and TR as ‘guardians.’

Henry Gole’s The Road to Rainbow: this book covered pre-WWII peacetime planning with plans Orange (Japan) and others; UK was an enemy in one;

Cold War Era: the Deterrence Age. Keenan’s The Long TelegramNCS-68The Berlin Airlift (1957)Cuba Missile Crisis (1963?)Builder’s The Masks of War: the services fought over relevance and sought golden-era conflicts.

Cold War Era: the Deterrence Age.McDougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State.Bernard Brodie’s The Anatomy of Deterrence.Kenneth Osgood’s Total Cold WarYergin and Stanislaw: The Commanding Heights

Leach’s Roots of Conflict: spans the century prior to the Revolutionary War; how American culture grew away from British colonial values and tenets.

Post-Cold War to War on Terror:McDougall’s Promised Land…Gaddis’ Surprise, Security, and the American ExperienceDavid Ucko’s New Counterinsurgency Era

Is McDougall’s book appropriate for SAMS? He is writing history for historians- many folks were lost.

ANP explains how the US functions in the international arena, how foreign policy and strategy evolved over time, with a focus on the strategic context for operational art.

1.Analyze strategy and strategic history.2.Analyze the intellectual foundations of American foreign policy.3.Apply conceptual campaign planning to historic strategic contexts.4.Examine the relationships among diplomacy, information, economics, and military force (DIME).

Summarize Design Course:



Enter readings Enter readingsDesign did…

Summarize SDM Course:



Enter readings Enter readingsSDM did…

Summarize TCC Course:



Enter readings Enter readingsTCC did…

Process Modeling

Process ModelingProcess modeling uses a flowchart format to graphically depict complex interrelationships. This should help understand what Dr. Ryan’s article from D315 referred to concerning complexity: the variety of actors and the interconnectivity between them reflect complexity in the system.

Warning: process modeling lends itself to engineering and a Jominian ‘Industrial Revolution’ mindset. Intricate and complicated processes such as a Model-T Ford assembly plant are not complex, but would plot well in a process modeling diagram.

Linn’s Echo of Battle uses the ‘managerial’ guardian concept to help describe this faulty manner of approaching military problems.

Process modeling strikes me as a tool that, if wielded dangerously in the conceptual stage of design, will send your framing down a road of description, deconstructionism, and tunnel vision where influencing one actor will “solve the problem.”

Process Modeling

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/IDEF_Diagram_Example.jpg

Process Modeling and MexicoMexican rival actors (Army, politicians, elites, cartels, majority population, extreme poor, Religious Leaders) are not mechanical.

Input and output in a complicated closed system (car plant) exists and lend well to a diagram like the previous slide. Input and output in an open system need to consider positive and negative feedback loops, cooperation and competition between various actors, and sources of difference within the design frame.

This makes process modeling “messy” for the Mexican design frame.

The following slide attempts to conduct process modeling with Mexico.

Figure 3: Process Modeling in Mexico 2010

Observed System: there is difference between OS and desired state.

Attempt Change

System Compensation: resist change

Stabilization after resisting changes

Some Change occurs

Gradual Erosion of Change

ENERGY

LOE

LOE LOE

Positive Feedback Loop

Corruption exceeds System Carrying Capacity

Majority rejects current elite structure of power

Civil War

‘flooding’ the positive feedback loop to change it

Positive feedback loops are fragile.

New power structure with new elites.

System resists change.

Military Action

Mexican system resists action

Mexican System changed

Short Term Changes degrade over time (problem unsolved)

System restored to observed state with corruption cycles and drug problem

Too much violence and/or corruption

Acceptable violence and corruption

US military enters system

Rival relevant actors vulnerable

Problem remains; re-assignment of actors occurs

Drug cycle and corruption continues with restoration of violence and corruption tolerances

Sources: ‘me over us’‘Drugs are a Valuable Resource’‘corruption is persistent.’‘Elites over poor.’

Figure 3: Process Modeling in Mexico 2010

Observed System: there is difference between OS and desired state.

Attempt Change

System Compensation: resist change

Stabilization after resisting changes

Some Change occurs

Gradual Erosion of Change

ENERGY

LOE

LOE LOE

Positive Feedback Loop

Corruption exceeds System Carrying Capacity

Majority rejects current elite structure of power

Civil War

‘flooding’ the positive feedback loop to change it

Positive feedback loops are fragile.

New power structure with new elites.

System resists change.

Military Action

Mexican system resists action

Mexican System changed

Short Term Changes degrade over time (problem unsolved)

System restored to observed state with corruption cycles and drug problem

Too much violence and/or corruption

Acceptable violence and corruption

US military enters system

Rival relevant actors vulnerable

Problem remains; re-assignment of actors occurs

Drug cycle and corruption continues with restoration of violence and corruption tolerances

Sources: ‘me over us’‘Drugs are a Valuable Resource’‘corruption is persistent.’‘Elites over poor.’

Defeat a cartel

New politicians

Reduce organized crime

Reduce political corruptionCartels respond

Politicians respond

Cartels replaced

Politicians corrupted

Cartels respond

Politicians respond

1799

1810

1917

2000*

New cartel vehicle

New Elites

Rugged Landscapes

MAJOR BEN ZWEIBELSON, SEMINAR 4 SAMSFigure 1a: Rugged Landscape Information Modeling Improvement (adding the quad chart)

Prosperity

Entropy

Volatile

Stable

Kurdish

Shiite

Sunni

A hypothetical Iraqi Model for 2010:

Hatch’s Model of Cultural Transformation

Figure 1: Hatch’s Cultural Dynamic Model adapted by Zweibelson with Mexico 2010

Valuesrealization

Mexican society places elites above

the law

Symbols

Assumption Artifacts

manifesta

tion

interpretation

symbolization

1. World expects high levels of elitist corruption and crime in Mexico.

2. Perceptions of elitist action supporting assumption of Mexican corruption.

3. Organization (Mexico) begins influencing action by manifesting values opposing elitist corruption.

4. Value-based action produces cultural artifacts concerning corruption and elitism.

• Judicial reform• Alternate Political Parties• New Leaders• Military employed in areas Police are corrupted

5. Some of these Mexican artifacts gain symbolic meaning in communication with others.

• Presidents Fox and Calderon represent change.• Capture/killing Cartel leaders demonstrate resolve against elitism.

6. Symbols lead to interpretation and questioning assumptions.

• Mexican history, ideology, and culture gravitate towards charismatic elites; wealth is given back to masses to absolve sins of the elite. Can some level of elitism remain culturally acceptable in Mexico?

7. Presidents from new political parties may get elected on platforms of reform; but they also can perform the traditional role of elitist and function above the law.

8. Some artifacts in Mexican anti-elitism require refinement because their symbolic interpretation conflicts with rival aspects in Mexican culture and history.

Interpretation initiates CHANGE.

9. New leaders do not reflect anti-elitism if elected within the established political process. For new leadership artifacts to become symbols of elitist reform, they must gain power in a manner outside the established political process.

10. Mexican society that previously endorsed new political parties for change now realize that the corruption cycle absorbs all elected leaders. For change, society must now value alternate leadership functioning outside the political process.

11. When Mexican society promotes anti-elitist leadership from outside the political process (religious leaders, Cartel leaders, or other asymmetrical leader), this new value manifests itself by challenging common assumptions about Mexico and elitism/corruption.

12. If alternate leadership valued as a new symbolic artifact in Mexico (a religious leader rises to power), this challenges existing assumptions.

Figure 2: Hatch’s Cultural Dynamic Model adapted by Zweibelson with American Civil War (D324)

Valuesrealization

Slaves are unequal to Whites and necessary for

southern economic prosperity

Symbols

Assumption Artifacts

manifesta

tion

interpretation

symbolization

1. Southern continuation of slave-based economy will continue uninterrupted unless militarily defeated.

2. Technological improvements and industrial revolution in 1850s will not impact slave economies in the foreseeable future.

3. North conducts military action against Southern States in rebellion.

4. Value-based action produces cultural artifacts concerning continued enslavement of non-whites and tobacco/cotton economy

• Slavery• Southern Military• Attempts at Sovereignty• Cotton and Tobacco valued by world

5. Some of these Southern artifacts gain symbolic meaning in communication with others.

• Southern military leadership fights for southern values and southern prosperity; slave-based economy becomes symbolic of rival concepts of ‘freedom’

6. Symbols lead to interpretation and questioning assumptions.

• White Southern history, ideology, and culture gravitate towards valuing non-whites as sub-human; slave-based economies prosper in the pre-industrial revolution era. Why is ethnic inequality so pervasive in the South, and can it change?

7. The military defeat of the south is only one step in the process of cultural transformation

8. Some artifacts in Southern values require refinement because their symbolic interpretation conflicts with rival (Northern) values on ‘equal rights’ and economic prosperity.

Interpretation initiates CHANGE.

9. Emergent Southern action post-conflict in a loss must adjust Southern values but prevent destruction of Southern identity/culture. For new leadership artifacts to become symbols of human equality and economic reform, slaves must become unnecessary for southern prosperity.

10. Southern society that previously endorsed military revolt from Union now accept that slaves are unavailable for economic prosperity; the Southern economy (and social castes) will change. For change, society must now value alternate values that accept non-white changed status without weakening White Southern values or prosperity.

11. When Southern society promotes pro-White Southern leadership that promotes Southern preservation of power in post-war reconstruction, this new value manifests itself by challenging original assumptions that non-whites are unequal, yet preserves white prosperity in a non-slave based economy by valuing political intimidation of black Southern voters.

12. If alternate white Southern value of voter intimidation/blacks are unnecessary in post-war economy as new symbolic artifacts in the South (a change from active military resistance), this challenges existing assumptions.

Freedom versus Slavery;Human Rights versus Economic Prosperity

Swarming

Figure 2: Zweibelson Swarming Model

1

Principles of Swarming: 1.Collective Orientation: move in same direction2.Collective Proximity: remain close to neighbors3.Avoid Entropy: avoid collision with neighbors

28

3

4

9

6

5

7

10

11

1213

14

15

16

1718

19

Example of swarm principle: 3 and 2 are within 1’s collision ring; 1 must decide either to move towards grouping 3-9-8-7 or towards larger grouping 4-5-10-11-12-13. 1 moves towards larger grouping (swarm) while a smaller grouping attracts 3 and 2.

14 and 19 are ‘blitzing’ outside the swarm and will either join a swarm group, or locate a swarm objective (food, enemy, etc).

Political Science Considerations

Nation-state primary actors

Individuals comprise actors

Implicitly Chaotic World

Implicitly Peaceful World

Q1 Q2

Q3Q4

Realism

Figure 1a: Musings on Political Science Theories

Liberalism

Social Constructivists

Humans are anarchistic naturally; individual liberty is

trumped by state survival Zero-sum game for power; balance of powerStatism, Survivalism, Self-Help

Marxists; Communists;Socialists

Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual worker is the power- the state serves the worker; final battle vs. capitalism;Non-marxist nations will always threaten Marxist ones.

Anarchy is not the cause of conflict. Free trade and interdependent democracies will reduce conflict. Legitimacy in tension with cost to act.

Changing values and perceptions will change government and society; meta-cognition and game theory works here.




Ideology not compatible with others.


Interiority and Exteriority in Design Theory

Exteriority

Interiority

UnknownKnown

Q1 Q2

Q3 Q4

Unknown Unknowns

Known UnknownsKnown knowns

Reductionist Mechanistic Positivist System of Logic

Design Ontological Adaptive Innovative CreativeSystem of Logic

Black Swans

Gray SwansWhite Swans

“Knowing about the Unknown” in tension with “Knowing the Known”

Shattering expectations of the future

Reducing Tensions

Linking Design’s System of Logic with Detailed Planning’s System of Logic

Earthquakes occur at fault lines (Japan, Haiti, Chile)

Middle East Collapse9-11Internet Bubble BurstHousing Collapse

Disease Epidemics (AIDs)Energy and Resource LimitsPopulation GrowthGeography

Conventional Threats

Unconventional Threats

Unexpected Threats

Fuzzy Cognitive Maps

Environment Economic Factors

Ethnic/Social Political Structure

Threat to world (WW2)

U.S. national goals in WW2.

U.S. National resources

Limited Time (NLT 1943)

American Isolationism

Fascism diametrically

opposes Democracy

America located across oceans from

WW2.

inter-war military for U.S.

downsized

U.S. possesses massive

resources and industry.

U.S. has a large military age population

pool.

Technology advancements

empowered military action

Soviet Union as a German

buffer.

UK as a German buffer.

Training a military requires time/resources/technology

Global trade empowered US

economy

Pro-German lobby.

Pro-Allies lobby

Failure of League of Nations

Fuzzy Cognitive Map on Kirkpatrick Victory Plan Problem 1941:

T=time

Z= goals

Military decisions require political and public discourse

German fascism

resulted from WWI and LoN

failures.

Current (1941) US military inadequate

to achieve goalsU.S. democracy will function with 10% population draft

national prosperityvs. entropyResources available to nation

vs. global resources

Political threat (internal and external)

Ethnic and social national identity seeks prosperity and power

American independence

American Democracy

UK was losing resources and

troops at a rapid rate.

USSR population and resources mobilized

slowly.

X (means) + y (ways) = z (ends)How to get x= t (time) / r (resources)/ enemyR= s (society) + e / p (political structure)

Gravity Pipe Metaphors

Soviet military maintains large ground forces; closed market economy (Socialist) does not grow as rapidly as U.S. free market; USSR spends higher ratio to balance.

Figure 1: D307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe

USSR United States

1940 Manhattan Project; 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki1945+ secret atomic program;

1949 atomic bomb

Reframe: expand nuclear delivery to IBCM, bomber, and submarine capabilities.

Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes lead on nuclear option; NASA space race. GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950s perceived missile gap with Moscow.

1957: Sputnik: first space satellite

WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists

1969: First man on moon; space race won by United States

U.S. reframing: NASA and space race increased due to Soviet satellite success

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

GDP ratio

1980s: President Reagan begins ‘Star Wars program.

1970s: U.S. begins MIRV warheads.Soviets challenged to match MIRV quality; react with IBCM quantity for MAD.

SALT 1 Treaty

SALT 2 Treaty

START Treaty

Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now towards nuclear non-proliferation and reduction.

USSR obsolete. Russian Federal Republic rises from ashes and secures existing nuclear infrastructure. Attempts to maintain nuclear superpower status.

U.S. now looks from atop the nuclear gravity pipe; from here it attempts to prevent other nations from rising up.

Post-Cold War: U.S. downsizes nuclear arsenal while maintaining first strike capability for hostile actors.

Design and the MCPP exercise: Applying Critical Thinking to

“Indalyasia”

GOALS

Democratic Republic of Indolaysia

Figure 1: Emergent Propensity for OBSERVED SYSTEM

Republic of Singapore

Republic of Northern Indolaysia

ConventionalATTACK

UW and indirectATTACK

Economic Disparities

Ethnic & Cultural Ties

1985: Malaysia and Indonesia merger

2006: Indonesian Economic Crisis

1. Regional Hegemony2. Nationalism beyond

Interiority island boundaries

3. Anti-Western (Rival) position of COMPETITION over COOPERATION.

4. Social Justice restores wealth balance to ‘islandism’ cycle of tradition.

VALUES

ARTIFACTS

SYMBOLS

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Nationalism over Traditional Island Diversity2. Conquest over Cooperation/Competition3. Social Justice to restore Island Traditional Balance

1. Seizing Singapore = Economic Prosperity

2. UW success in RNI = ethnocentric hegemony

MIOP holds SingaporeCapitalStraitsWealth

1. Nationalism of ‘Greater Indalaysia

2. Region Hegemony3. Economic Broker

(Straits)

Sources: Jared Diamond (G,G,S; Collapse)Mary Jo Hatch’s Cultural WheelDeluze/Gutarrai’s ‘A Thousand Plateaus’Hogbin’s Experiments in CivilizationNaveh’s collected readings and writingsClausewitzAnatol Rapaport

Figure 2: Explanation of Observed System (WHY)

Native Island Sociological

Development

Mainland Civilization

Advancement

Beginning Middle End

Mainland Civilization

Advancement

Native Island Sociological

Development

‘islandism’ ‘de-islandism’Tension

Imperialism

Industrial Revolution

Globalization

Metallurgic Revolutions limited to Island Resources and

Specialization Limits

Mainland Parity

Hybrid Island Nationalism and

State Parity

Tension

islandism: Design requires operational vocabulary and new terminology to convey deep understanding. In this open system, this term covers the sociological development of micro-civilizations bounded by the topographic realities of island formations.

De-islandism: While ‘islandism’ explains the beginning and middle of this design narrative for the environmental frame, it does not explain the rival phenomenon in the observed system (why we are looking at it). This term explains how the exteriority of island micro-systems transforms and is in tension with the global ecological frame.

Naveh: “When doing design, you are in a process of creating and inventing new things…things that old words are incapable of explaining. You must invent new words, new things, to explain what you gain in understanding….” (personal interview Jan 2011)

Figure 3: Explanation of ‘islandism’

Physical Boundaries of

Islands

Interiority of Tribe through values and structure

Smooth versus StriatedExterior versus Interior

Nomad versus Farmer/Merchant

Define interiority and exteriority for artifacts and symbols based on cultural

VALUES

Magic explains; No science.

Self Organization and Seek

Prosperity Group Collective is superior to individual

Wealth equated to family and food sources

Decentralized Power Structure; no nationalism; local ‘man of importance’

Competition and

Cooperation Patterns

Warring Raids against ‘rivals’ on island or neighboring

island; returning prosperity to source tribe

Trade with rivals to prosper when conflict

produces entropy Tension

islandism continues cycle with origin element

Nomadism and

Colonization

Faction departs island (interior) to find more smooth space to striate.

By departing ‘interior’- decedents of new colony form separate

interiority distinct from parent.

Emergent rivals

Sources: Jared Diamond (G,G,S; Collapse)Mary Jo Hatch’s Cultural WheelDeluze/Gutarrai’s ‘A Thousand Plateaus’Hogbin’s Experiments in CivilizationNaveh’s collected readings and writingsClausewitzAnatol Rapaport

Self-organization

adaptation

Cooperation and competition

Smooth-Striated Tension of Islands

Figure 4: Explanation of ‘De-islandism’


Islands


Prosperity

Competition and


Nomadism and

Colonization

islandism Cycle

3. Imperialism

4. Industrial Revolution

1. Renaissance2. Scientific Revolution

5. GlobalizationConceptual

Boundaries of Nationalism

Smooth Space of Ocean boundaries now striated.

Interiority Flexible; Self-

Identity Threatened


Who is interior? ‘Us’ is nationalized.

Exteriority threatens non-

adaptive Interiority

The war-machine of globalization (and

predecessors) threatens the prosperity of non-

compliance

Centralizing over

Decentralizing

National Leader disrupts decentralized ‘local man of importance’ concepts

Competition with non-neighbors

drives adaptation of ‘mainlandism’

War Raids and Nomadism replaced

by Permanent Conquests

Tension

Tension

Tension

Tension

Tension

Tension

Figure 5: Exploiting the Environment to Accomplish Goals


Islands


Prosperity

Competition and


Nomadism and

Colonization

islandism Cycle

3. Imperialism

4. Industrial Revolution

5. GlobalizationConceptual

Boundaries of Nationalism

Interiority Flexible; Self-

Identity Threatened


Exteriority threatens non-

adaptive Interiority

Centralizing over

Decentralizing

Competition with non-neighbors

drives adaptation of ‘mainlandism’

War Raids and Nomadism replaced

by Permanent Conquests

Tension

Tension

Tension

Tension

Tension

Tension

Blockade and threaten National

Capital. Capital defines

Nationalism of de-islandisation.

Blockade in straits; filter non-

aggressor trade until compliance

Occupation of capital island of rival mirrors

their own actions with Singapore;

promotes “swap.”

Rival expects Coalition to

attempt to regain Singapore; anticipates Amphibious

Ops/Air/Naval.

Documents

Oral Comps Slides