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Original citation: Tomlin, Patrick (2014) What is the point of egalitarian social relationships? In: Kaufman, Alexander, (ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 151-179. ISBN 9781139940924

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WhatisthePointofEgalitarianSocialRelationships?*

PatrickTomlinUniversityofReading

Publishedin:AlexanderKaufmaned.,DistributiveJusticeandAccesstoAdvantage:G.A.Cohen’sEgalitarianism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015).

IIntroduction

ThesubjectmatterofthisessayisacertainunderstandingofthevalueofequalitywhichIwill

call‘relationalegalitarianism’–aviewwhichlocatesthevalueofequalitynotindistributions

butinsocialandpoliticalrelationships.1Thisisasuitabletopicforacontributiontoavolume

basedonthemesfromtheworkofG.A.Cohenfor(atleast)two,somewhatcontradictory,

reasons.

ThefirstisthatCohenwasoneoftheleadingproponentsofcertainviewofdistributive

equality,whichmakeshisworkatargetforrelationalegalitarians.Cohenwasprimarilya

reactivephilosopher,anditwasthroughhisengagementwiththeworkofothergreatfigures

incontemporarypoliticalphilosophy–Rawls,NozickandDworkin–thathehimselfbecame

one.2Perhapsthepositivethesiswithwhichhehasbecomemostassociatedisthetheoryof

distributivejusticeorfairnesswhichElizabethAndersonaptlydubbed‘luckegalitarianism’(a

labelwhichCohenwholeheartedlyadopted).3Cohen’smostdetailedexpositionanddefenceof

*IamdelightedtohavebeenaskedtocontributetothisvolumeofessaysinhonourofG.A.Cohen.AsidefromthedeepphilosophicaldebtthatI,alongwithallothercontemporarypoliticalphilosophers,owetoJerry,Iamalsoindebtedtohimpersonally.IdidnothavethechancetogettoknowJerrywellonapersonallevel,butasagraduatestudentatOxford(andonetowhomCohenhadnospecialresponsibilities)Ifoundhimtobehelpful,encouraging,funny,(usefully)criticalandgenerous.Asanaspiringmemberofthepoliticalphilosophicalprofessionandcommunity,thismeantagreatdealtome.IhavebenefittedfromwrittencommentsfromChristianSchemmelandLiamShields,andfromdiscussionwiththeManceptgroupattheUniversityofManchester.1Inusing‘relationalegalitarianism’inthisway,IamnotusingtheterminologyinthesamewayasitisemployedbyAndreaSangiovanni,where‘relational’theoriesholdthat‘thepractice-mediatedrelationsinwhichpeoplestandtooneanotherconditionthecontent,scope,andjustification’ofprinciplesofjustice.’SeeAndreaSangiovanni,‘GlobalJustice,ReciprocityandtheState’,Philosophy&PublicAffairs35(2007):3-37,at5.IamgratefultoSimonCaneyforalertingmetothisdifferentusage.2MichaelOtsukawrites:‘Cohenfoundhimself–hisphilosophicalbearings,histheoreticalcommitments,andhisdistinctivevoice–througharemarkableseriesofengagmentswiththethoughtsofothers:notonlyMarx,butalsohiscontemporariesNozick,Dworkin,andRawls.Throughhisengagmentwiththem,hereachedthesameheights.’‘Editor’sPreface’inG.A.Cohen,FindingOneselfintheOther,MichaelOtsukaed.(Princenton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2013):vii-xi,atp.xi.3ThelabeloriginallyappearsinElizabethS.Anderson,‘WhatisthePointofEquality?’,Ethics109(1999):287-337.ForCohen’sadoptionofthelabel,seehisRescuingJusticeandEquality(Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniversityPress,2008),p.8.

2

thatpositionwasarticulatedinhis1989essay‘OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice’4,apaper

that(characteristically)tookasitslaunchingpadoppositiontoRonaldDworkin’sthesisthat

egalitariansshouldcareaboutequalityofresources.5‘OntheCurrency’becameCohen’smost

well-known,andcommonlycited,article6andhelatercalledtheluckegalitarianpositionhis

‘animatingconvictioninpoliticalphilosophywithrespecttojustice’.Hedescribedthe

positionasfollows:‘anunequaldistributionwhoseinequalitycannotbevindicatedbysome

choiceorfaultordesertonthepartof(someof)therelevantaffectedagentsisunfair,and

therefore,protanto,unjust,andthatnothingcanremovethatparticularinjustice.’7

Thisluckegalitarianthesishasbeenchallengedfromavarietyofangles,andoneofthemost

challengingattackshascomefromrelationalegalitarians.Thesetheoristsagreethatequalityis

animportantpoliticalvalue,butregarditasonethatisprimarilyconcernedwithsocialor

politicalrelationships,ratherthandistributions.RelationalegalitarianssuchasElizabeth

AndersonandSamuelSchefflerhavepressedspecificargumentsagainsttheluckegalitarian

position,includingthepresentationofcaseswhereluckegalitarianismseemstogetthings

wrong,oratleastseemstogivetroublinganswers.Whatanimatestheirdeeperresistance,

however,istheclaimthatluckegalitarianshavesimplymisunderstoodtheverybasisofthe

valueofequality–theyhavetakenittobeadistributiveideal,whereasegalitarian

distributions,sotherelationalegalitariansclaim,canonlyhave,atbest,instrumentalor

derivativevalueorimportance.Whategalitariansshouldreallyvalue,respect,ortakeastheir

theoreticalstartingpoint,accordingtotherelationalegalitarians,aresocialrelationships

characterisedbycertainegalitarianfeatures,suchasequalrespectandnon-domination(or,at

least,theabsenceofrelationshipscharacterisedbyinegalitarianfeatures).Egalitarian

distributionscanonlybevaluableinsofarastheyhelptopromote,areexpressionsof,orare

demandedby,thesevaluableorimportantegalitariansocialrelationships.

So,relationalegalitarianismisanapttopicforthisvolumebecauserelationalegalitarianism

setsitselfupasaresponseandachallengetotheluckegalitarianviewofequality,whichwas

4G.A.Cohen,‘OntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice’,Ethics99(1989):906-944.(Reprintedasch.1ofhisOntheCurrencyofEgalitarianJustice,andOtherEssaysinPoliticalPhilosophy,MichaelOtsukaed.(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011).Chs.2-6ofOntheCurrencyalsofocusonCohen’sluckegalitarianism.)5RonaldDworkin,‘WhatisEquality?PartII:EqualityofResources’inPhilosophy&PublicAffairs10(1981):283-345.(Reprintedasch.2ofhisSovereignVirtue(Cambridge,Mass:HarvardUniversityPress,2000)).6MichaelOtsuka,‘Editor’sPreface’inCohen,OntheCurrency:vii-xi,atp.viii.7Cohen,Rescuing,p.7.

3

Cohen’s‘animatingconviction.’Somewhatintensionwiththatreasonforfocusingon

relationalegalitarianismismysecondreasonforfocusingonit:Cohenarguablywasa

relationalegalitarian.Inhislastbook8,theslenderWhyNotSocialism?,Cohenwroteabout

twoprinciples.Thefirstwasthefamiliarluckegalitarianprinciple,operatingthereunderthe

labelof‘socialistequalityofopportunity’,whichis‘theegalitarianprinciplethatjustice

endorses’.9Buthealsowroteofaprincipleofcommunity,saying‘“Community”canmean

manythingsbuttherequirementofcommunitythatiscentralhereisthatpeoplecareabout,

andwherenecessaryandpossible,careforoneanother,andtoo,carethattheycareaboutone

another.’10Cohengoesontodelineatetwo‘modes’ofcommunalcaring,oneofwhichhas

independentdistributiveimplications,asit‘curbstheinequalitiesthatresultfromsocialist

equalityofopportunity’:‘Wecannotenjoyfullcommunity,youandI,ifyoumake,andkeep,

say,tentimesasmuchmoneyasIdo[evenifthatiscompatiblewiththeluckegalitarian

principle]becausemylifewillthenlaborunderchallengesthatyouwillneverface’.11Sincethe

otherformofcommunalcaringisnotedtobe‘notstrictlyrequiredforequality’12,wecantake

it,Ithink,thatCohenthinksthefirstmodeofcaringisnecessaryforequality.Socialist

equalityofopportunity(andthusjustice)isnotenoughfortrueequalityandsometimeswill

beatoddswithit,itseems.Cohenconcludesthatjusticeandcommunitymaybe

incompatiblemoralideals,butbothformpartofhisegalitarianism.13Thisprincipleof

communitylooksquitesimilartorelationalegalitarianism.Althoughthefocusison‘caring’

ratherthanrespect,recognitionoranti-domination,itneverthelesscondemnsinequalities

thatareendorsedbyluckegalitarianisminthenameofanothervalue–avaluethattellsus

thatitisbetterwhenweareabletorecogniseandempathisewithoneanother’sstruggles;a

valuethattellsusitisbetterwhenweliveasequals.Further,lateinhislife,Cohenbeganto

sketchsomethoughtsonwhatitistoregardandtreatothersasequals.14Cohen’s

egalitarianism,then,clearlyexpandedbeyondthedistributiveluckegalitarianprinciple.We

shouldnotbesurprisedbythis.In‘OntheCurrency’Cohenhadfocusedonaccidental

inequality,buthadattheoutsetdeclaredthat‘theprimaryegalitarianimpulseistoextinguish

8Thatis,thelastbookpublishedwhileCohenwasalive.PrincetonUniversityPresshaveposthumouslypublishedthreefurthervolumesofCohen’swork:OntheCurrency;FindingOneselfintheOther;andLecturesontheHistoryofMoralandPoliticalPhilosophy,JonathanWolffed.(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2013).9G.A.Cohen,WhyNotSocialism?(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009),p.13.Emphasisinoriginal.10Ibid.,pp.34-35.11Ibid.,p.35.12Ibid.,p.35.13Ibid.,p.37.14G.A.Cohen,‘NotesonRegardingPeopleasEquals’inhisFindingOneselfintheOther.

4

theinfluenceondistributionofbothexploitationandbruteluck.’15So,Cohenalwayssaw

equalityasmorethanjustluck-neutralizeddistributions,andthethingsthathesoughtto

placealongsideit–anti-exploitation,community,regardingothersasequals–focusedonthe

waysinwhichwetreatoneanotherandlivetogether.

So,relationalegalitarianismrespondstoandrejectsCohen’sviewofequality,butCohenis

alsopossiblyamemberoftherelationalegalitarianfold–itisa(lessthanfullyarticulated)

elementofhisview.Thesearemy,somewhatcontradictory,tworeasonsforfocusingonthe

relationalviewofequalityinthisessay.

Cohenmaynothavefullyarticulatedordefendedhisprincipleofcommunity,butrelational

egalitarianismhasbeenexpoundedanddefendedbyseveralphilosophersinrecentyears.

Thesetheoristshavevariouslyreferredtothemselvesasdemocraticegalitarians16,relational

egalitarians17,andnon-intrinsicegalitarians18,andincludephilosopherssuchasElizabeth

Anderson,T.M.Scanlon,SamuelScheffler,MartinO’NeillandChristianSchemmel.Allthese

theoristsshareasuspicionofluckegalitarianism’sfocusondistributiveequalityasimportant

inandofitself.Theyseekafirmerbasisforthinkingdistributiveequalityvaluableortobe

pursued(ifindeeditis),andseethefoundationsofequalityasimportantlydifferent.Thus,

Anderson’squestionis‘WhatisthePointofEquality?’,seekingtouncoverthefoundationsof

acommitmenttoequality.Whatliesattherootofouregalitarianconcern?Forluck

egalitarians,theaimistocompensateunchosenorundeservedbadluck.Forrelational

egalitarians,accordingtoAndersonatleast,thenegativeaimistoendoppression,whilstthe

positiveaimisto‘createacommunityinwhichpeoplestandinrelationsofequalityto

others.’19

Insomeways,relationalegalitarianismhas(inthespiritofCohen)beenareactiveproject.The

centralarticlesinwhichitisarticulatedarecritiquesofluckegalitarianism20,ordistributive

15Cohen,‘OntheCurrency’,908.Myemphasis.Foranexaminationoftheanti-exploitationelementofCohen’sthinkingondistributivejustice,seeMichaelOtsuka,‘JusticeasFairness:LuckEgalitarian,notRawlsian’,JournalofEthics14(2010):217-230.16Anderson,‘WhatisthePoint?’;ElizabethS.Anderson,‘FairOpportunityinEducation:ADemocraticEqualityPerspective’,Ethics117(2007):595-622.17ChristianSchemmel,‘WhyRelationalEgalitariansShouldCareAboutDistributions’,SocialTheoryandPractice37(2011):365-390.18MartinO’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,Philosophy&PublicAffairs36(2008):119-156.19Anderson,‘WhatisthePoint?’,289.20Anderson,‘WhatisthePoint?’;SamuelScheffler,‘WhatisEgalitarianism?’,Philosophy&PublicAffairs31(2003):5-39.

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egalitarianism21,or,inScheffler’scase,adenialofastoryinwhichluckegalitarianismhasa

fullyRawlsianheritage.22Inreply,luckegalitarianshaveoftenfocussedonthefactthatsome

relationalegalitariansappeartohavetakentheluckegalitarianprincipletobeaprincipleof

socialpolicy,tobeapplieddirectlyandwithoutcompromise,ratherthananarticulationofa

singleprotantomoralvalueamongaplurality.23

InthispaperIdonotseektodefend(atleastdirectly)luckordistributiveegalitarianism.

RatherIwanttodothreethings.Myfirstaimistopressthesamekindofquestionthat

relationalegalitarianspressonluckegalitarians(anddistributiveegalitariansmoregenerally)

backontorelationalegalitariansthemselves.Luckegalitarianstellusthatequaldistributions

areimportant,andrelationalegalitariansaskthemtothinkaboutwhythey’reimportant–

whatkindofvaluedotheyhave?;whatisthepointofequality?;whatliesattherootofthe

egalitarianconcern?Therelationalegalitarianstellusthategalitariansocialrelationshipslieat

theheartofaconcernwithequality.Butwecan(andshould)thenaskrelationalegalitarians:

whyshouldwethinktheserelationshipsmorallyimportantorvaluable?

Explainingthevalueorimportanceofegalitariansocialrelationships,orwhatkindofvalueor

importancetheyarethoughttohold,hasnotplayedacentralroleinthearticulationof

relationaltheoriesofequality.24Butwhenrelationalegalitarianshavesoughttoexplainthe

valueof,reasonsforfostering,orreasonsforregardingasmorallyfundamental,such

relationships,interestinglytheoristswhohavebroadlyagreedwith,andidentifiedwith,one

anotherintheirrejectionofdistributiveegalitarianismandinembracinganunderstandingof

equalityfoundedinsocialandpoliticalrelationshipshaveofferedstrikinglydifferent

answers.25

21O’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’22Scheffler,‘WhatisEgalitarianism?’23See,forexample,Cohen,Rescuing,p.271.Foramoredetailedresponsethatrevolvesaroundthistheme,seeAlexanderBrown,‘LuckEgalitarianismandDemocraticEquality’,EthicalPerspectives12(2005):293-340.24Forexample,thecentralarticulationsoftheviewareoftentakentobeAnderson’s‘WhatisthePoint?’andScheffler’s‘WhatisEgalitarianism?’,neitherofwhichfocusesprimarilyonwhy,orinwhatway,egalitarianrelationshipsaretobethoughtvaluableorimportant.25ChristianSchemmelisrareinexplicitlyacknowledgingthedifferingfoundationsofrelationalegalitarianviews,dividingtheterrainbetweenwhollyjustice-basedviewsofsocialequalityandnon-wholly-justice-basedviews(‘WhyRelationalEgalitariansShouldCareAboutDistributions’,366-367).AsIshalllatermakeclear,IthinkthedistinctionSchemmelhasinmindistheoneIdrawbetweennormativeandevaluativeviews.

6

Thisshows,importantly,thatthereisnotonebodyofthought,‘relationalegalitarianism’,but

ratherapluralityofrelationalegalitarianismsthatdifferintheirmostfundamentalbeliefs–

theirbeliefsaboutwhyequalityinsocialandpoliticalrelationshipsisimportant,andthisthen

leadstopotentialdifferencesconcerninghowweshoulddistribute,promoteorrespectthat

kindofvalue.Thisisimportantbecauseweoftenthinkofthesethinkersascloselyaligned,

andtheyhavebyandlargebeenhappytoalignthemselveswithoneanother.Inonesense,

rightlyso:theydo,ofcourse,holdsimilarviewsonhowweshouldviewthevalueofequality

andontheimportanceofcertainkindsofrelationships.But,asItrytoshowhere,theyappear

todifferonwhy,orinwhatway,theserelationshipsmatter.

Mysecondaim,inexposingthesedifferingpotentialfoundationsforrelationalegalitarianism,

istoshowhowthepositionmaybevulnerabletosimilarworriesthatareexpressedabout

distributiveegalitarianism.Relationalegalitarianismmaywellbe,atthefundamentallevel,

eitherdistributiveorabstract,whicharetwoofthecriticismsthatrelationalegalitarianshave

laidatthedoorofdistributiveegalitarians.

Finally,Iwanttoshowhowoncewehaveahandleonwhatkindofvalueorimportance

egalitarianrelationshipsarethoughttohave,realiseorpromote,itcanbeshownthat

relationalegalitarianism(s)arecompatiblewithdistributiveegalitarianism.Therefore,the

distributivevs.relationaldichotomyintheliteratureonequalityisoverblown:wearebeing

askedtochoosewhenwedon’tnecessarilyneedto.Idon’tdenythatrelationalegalitarianstell

ussomethingimportant,butIsuggestthatwemaybeabletohousecertainversionsofthe

relationalpositionwithinoralongsidemorefamiliardistributivetheories,suchas

maximisation,sufficiency,priorityand,crucially,distributiveequality.Forexample,one

particularlypersuasiveviewofrelationalegalitarianism–thepersonalvalueview–seemsto

beoperatingonalmostentirelydistinctgroundfromdistributiveegalitarianism,andseemsto

metorequireorpresupposeadistributiveview.Exactlyhowrelationalanddistributive

egalitarianismmaybecombinedwilldifferaccordingtohowthevalueorimportanceof

relationalequalityisexplained,buteachvariantmayoffersomeroomfordistributive

egalitarianism.

IIRelationalEgalitarianism

InthissectionIwilllayouttherelationalegalitarianview,andsomeofthereasonsthatits

adherentsbelieveittobesuperiortodistributiveviewsofequality.Inparticular,Iwill

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emphasisetwo(related)worriesaboutdistributiveequality:thatitisoverly‘arithmetic’or

pattern-focused;andthatitisoverlyabstract–under-motivatedandmysterious.Iwillthen,in

thefollowingsection,examinesomestatementsthatvariousrelationalegalitarianshavemade

thatseemtopointtowarddifferinganswersthatrelationalegalitarianshavegiventoourtitle

question,andwillgroupthemaccordingtowhattypeofvalueorimportancesocialequalityis

thoughttohave.

Thecentralthoughtofrelationalegalitarians,asIhavesaid,isthatthevalueofequalityisnot,

fundamentally,aboutdistributinggoods:whatmattersisthequalityofsocialrelationships

thatpeoplehave.AsT.M.Scanlonputsit,theidealisofasocietyinwhichpeopleallregard

oneanotherasequals,andthisidealhas,accordingtoScanlon,‘playedamoreimportantrole

inradicalegalitarianthinkingthantheideaofdistributivejusticewhichdominatesmuch

discussionofequalityinourtime.’26AccordingtoMartinO’Neill,ourreasonsforaffirmingthe

importanceofequalitycan‘bestbeunderstoodaselementsthattogetherconstituteacomplex

backgroundpictureofhowpeopleshouldlivetogetherasequals.’27SamuelSchefflerwrites:

‘Equality,asitismorecommonlyunderstood,isnot,inthefirstinstance,adistributiveideal,

anditsaimisnottocompensateformisfortune.Itis,instead,amoralidealgoverningthe

relationsinwhichpeoplestandtooneanother.’28ElizabethAndersonarguesthat‘egalitarians

shouldaimatendingoppressivesocialrelations(whichareinherentlyrelationsofinequality)

andatrealizingsocietyconceivedasasystemofcooperationandaffiliationamongequals.’29

Shealsosaysthat‘Certainpatternsinthedistributionofgoodsmaybeinstrumentalto

securingsuch[egalitarian]relationships,followfromthem,orevenbeconstitutiveofthem.

Butdemocraticegalitariansarefundamentallyconcernedwiththerelationshipswithinwhich

goodsaredistributed,notonlywiththedistributionofgoodsthemselves.’30

Someofthecomplaintsthatrelationalegalitariansmakeaboutdistributiveequalityfocuson

itsfundamentallydistributivenature,and(relatedly)itsabstraction.O’Neillcomplainsthat

whendistributiveinequalityisseenas,inandofitself,regrettable,‘theidealofequalitycan

26T.M.Scanlon,‘TheDiversityofObjectionstoInequality’inMatthewClaytonandAndrewWilliamseds.,TheIdealofEquality(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2002):41-49,atp.43.Forfurtherreflectionsonthehistoricalpedigreeofthiskindofthinking,seeChristopherBrooke,‘AShortHistoryofNon-intrinsicEgalitarianismfromHobbestoRousseau’(unpublishedm/s).27O’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,125.28Scheffler,‘WhatisEgalitarianism?’,21.29ElizabethAnderson,‘ExpandingtheEgalitarianToolbox:EqualityandBureaucracy’inProceedingsoftheAristotelianSocietySupplementaryVolume,VolumeLXXXII(2008),143.30Anderson,‘WhatisthePoint?’,313-314.

8

seemundulyobscureandabstract:asamerelyarithmeticgoal,thevalueofwhichitis

impossibletograsp.’31Healsoallegesthat‘OntheTelic[egalitarian]view…theidealofequality

canseemmerelyarithmetic,insteadofbeingaproperlyintelligiblepoliticalvalue.Itisdifficult

tounderstandwhythis‘merelyarithmetic’ideaofequalityshouldbesoimportant’32andthat

this‘merelyarithmetic’nature‘underminesitsintuitiveappeal,andmakesitexcessively

abstractandmysteriousasadistributiveview.’33InasimilarveinT.M.Scanlonallegesthat

‘Opponentsofequalityseemmostcompellingwhentheyportrayequalityasapeculiarly

abstractgoal–conformitytoapattern–towhichspecialmoralvalueisattached.’34According

toAnderson,‘Whenwereconceiveequalityasfundamentallyasocialrelationshipratherthan

apatternofdistribution,wedonotabandondistributiveconcerns.Rather,wegivesuch

concernsarationale.’35

Wecandrawtwothemesfromthesecriticismsofdistributiveviewsofequality:thattheyare

atrootdistributivetheories,concernedwithpatternsandnotpeople;andthattheyare

abstract,mysteriousandstrange–theydonotconnectwithpeople’slivesorconcerns.

IIIWhyareEgalitarianSocialRelationshipsValuable?

Letusnowturnourattentiontoaskingrelationalegalitariansourtitlequestion:whatisthe

pointofegalitariansocialrelationships?Aswehaveseen,forrelationalegalitarians,wemust

aimtopromote,orrespect,egalitariansocialrelationships(or,atleast,toavoidinegalitarian

socialrelationships).Butwhyshouldwepromotetheseegalitarianrelationships(orabsenceof

inegalitarianrelationships)ortakesuchrelationshipstobemorallyfoundational?Whatis

good(orbad)aboutthem?

InthepreviousparagraphIhavemadevariousparentheticalqualifications.Theseallfocusour

attentiononwhetherrelationalegalitariansseektomakeapositiveclaimoranegativeone.

Thepositiveonewouldbethategalitariansocialrelationshipsareinsomewayimportant,

goodortobepromoted.Thenegativeonewouldbethatinegalitariansocialrelationshipsare

insomewaybadortobeavoided.Theseclaimsmaysoundequivalent,buttheyarenot.

Considerapersonwhoisinaninegalitarianrelationship.Thisisbad,ortoberectified,on

eitherview.Butwecanendtheinegalitarianrelationshipintwoways–byendingthe

31O’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,124.Emphasesamixtureoforiginalandadded.32Ibid.,139.Emphasisinoriginal.33Ibid.,140.Myemphases.34Scanlon,‘TheDiversityofObjectionstoEquality’,p.42.Myemphases.35Anderson,‘ExpandingtheEgalitarianToolbox’,143.Myemphasis.

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relationship,orbymakingitegalitarian.Holdingallelsefixed(suchastheperson’snon-

relationship-basedwelfare)thenegativeviewgivesusnoreasontopreferoneresponsetothe

other–whatisimportantisendingtheinegalitarianrelationship.Thepositiveview,however,

wouldmuchpreferthatwemaketherelationshipegalitarian.Ithinkthisisworthmentioning

becauseitisoftenunclearwhichviewrelationalegalitarianshaveinmind.Ingeneral

statementsofthepositiontheywilloftenfocusourmindsonequalsocialrelationshipsand

theirimportance,butintheirargumentstheywilloftenfocusonthebadnessofinegalitarian

socialrelations.36Perhapsthisisbecauserelationalegalitariansstartfromthefactualpremise

thattherewillbesocialrelationshipseitherway,andsotheonlywaytomakesurethatthere

arenoinegalitarianrelationshipsistomakerelationshipsegalitarian.Forexample,Elizabeth

Andersontakesasherfundamentalstartingpointtheidealofademocraticstate,writing:

‘Inliberaldemocraticversionsofsocialcontracttheory,thefundamentalaimofthe

stateistosecurethelibertyofitsmembers.Sincethedemocraticstateisnothingmore

thancitizensactingcollectively,itfollowsthatthefundamentalobligationofcitizens

tooneanotheristosecurethesocialconditionsofeveryone’sfreedom…[Democratic

egalitarianism]claimsthatthesocialconditionoflivingafreelifeisthatonestandin

relationsofequalitywithothers.’37

Giventhisstartingpoint,inwhichwebeginwiththeideaofsociety(andstate),itmaybethat

thereisnothingbutscholastichairsplittingatissuebetweenthepositiveandnegativethesis–

wearegoingtohavesocialrelationships,sowejustneedtodecidewhetherwewant

egalitarianorinegalitarianones.Thismaybeso,butnevertheless,forreasonstheoretical

clarity,Iwouldbeinterestedtoknowwhatreallyanimatestherelationalegalitarian:isitthat

weshouldwantandtrytoensurethategalitariansocialrelationships(andthussocial

relationships)exist;orisitthatweshouldseektoeradicatethebadnessofinegalitarian

relations,andbeindifferentastowhetherornotsocialrelationshipsexist?Thismaynot

matteronlyasamatteroftheoreticalclarity.Forexample,theviewswillpossiblydifferon

whoexactlyisharmedbyinegalitariansocialrelationships.Onthenegativeview,itispossible

thatonlytheoppressedareharmed,andtheyshouldbethelocusofourconcern.Onthe

positiveview,whereegalitariansocialrelationshipsarevaluable,iftheyarevaluablebecause

theymakelivesgobetter,thenbothoppressedandoppressorsareharmedbyinegalitarian

36See,forexample,Scanlon,‘TheDiversityofObjectionstoInequality’,whoseemsentirelyfocussedonthebadnessofinegalitarianrelationships,butmakesapositivegeneralstatement.AnexceptiontothisisMartinO’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,who,Ithink,makesitclearthathesupportsthepositiveview,believingfraternalrelationshipstobevaluable.37Anderson,‘WhatisthePoint?’,314-315.

10

relationships.Inaddition,theviewsmaydifferastohowtheydirectusbeyondtheconfinesof

ourexistingcommunities.Ifegalitariansocialrelationshipsaregood,perhapsweoughttogo

outbeyondourcommunitiesandformmore.Ifinegalitariansocialrelationshipsaresimply

bad,however,weshouldmerelyensurenottoformnewinegalitarianrelationships,butwe

willhavenospecialreasontogooutandformnewegalitarianones.

However,Iamgoingtosetasidesuchconcernshere.Iwillgenerallyfocuswhatitisthatis

thoughttobevaluableorimportantaboutegalitariansocialrelationships,eventhough

answerstothisquestionwilloftenfocusonwhatisdisvaluableorelimination-worthyabout

inegalitarianrelationships.Inotherwords,Iacceptthereasonableassumptionthattherewill

besocialrelationships,sothequestionishowtheyshouldlook,andwhy.Beforeturningto

whatsomerelationalegalitarianshavesaidaboutthisissue,itwillbeworthmakingsome

distinctionsbetweendifferentkindsofclaimsinmoralandpoliticaltheory.Thefirstis

betweenanormativeandevaluativeclaim.Normativeclaimsconcernwhatweought(not)to

do;evaluativeclaimsaboutwhatwouldmakethingsbetter(orworse).Consequentialistsseek

tomakeallnormativeclaimsintermsofevaluativeones,butnoteveryoneisa

consequentialist.Thesecondandthirddistinctionsarewithinthecategoryofevaluative

claims.Theyarecross-cutting,sothecategory‘evaluativeclaims’canbeseenasatwo-by-two

matrix.Alongoneaxisthedistinctionismadebetweeninstrumentalandintrinsicvalue–

thingsareinstrumentallyvaluablewhentheypromotesomethingofintrinsicvalue;

intrinsicallyvaluablethingsarevaluableinandofthemselves.Alongtheotheraxisisthe

distinctionbetweenimpersonalandpersonalvalue.Somethingispersonallyvaluableifitis

goodbecauseitisgoodforsomeone.Happinessisapersonalvalue–itisvaluable(ifitis)

becauseitisgoodforsomeone.Impersonalvaluesarenotgoodforanyone;theyarejustgood.

Telicegalitariansseeequalityasbeing,orasserving,animpersonalvalue.Inpunishment

theory,retributivistsseedeservedpunishmentashavingimpersonalvalue.38Bothdistributive

equalityandpunishmentareseenas(inoneway)good,evenwhenthey’renotgoodfor

anyone.

Letusnowturntowhatrelationalegalitarianshavesaidaboutwhyandinwhatwaythe

relationshipstheyfavourareimportant,valuableorworthyofpromotion.Doingsowill

38Onbothequalityandretributivejustice,seeLarryS.Temkin,’Equality,Priority,andtheLevellingDownObjection’inClaytonandWilliamseds.,TheIdealofEquality:126-161.Onretributivejusticeasanimpersonalvalue,seemy‘Retributivists!TheHarmPrincipleisnotforyou!’inEthics124(2014):272-298.

11

involvequotingthematlength,astheiranswersareoftencomplex.Theproblem,asSamuel

Schefflerseesit,isasfollows:

‘thebasicreasonit[equality]matterstousisbecausewebelievethatthereis

somethingvaluableabouthumanrelationshipsthatare,incertaincrucialrespectsat

least,unstructuredbydifferencesofrank,powerorstatus.Sounderstood,equalityis

insomewaysapuzzlingvalueandadifficultonetointerpret....[I]norderto

understandthevalueofequality,oneneedstoinvestigatethespecificrespectsin

whichegalitarianrelationshipsmustbefreefromregimentationbyconsiderationsof

rankorstatus.Oneneedstocharacterizeingreaterdetailthespecialvaluethat

egalitarianrelationshipsarethoughttohaveandtoconsiderwhichdifferencesof

authorityorstatushavethecapacitytocompromisethatvalue.’39

Manyrelationalegalitarianwritingsseemtoclaimthategalitarianrelationshipshavepersonal

value–they’regoodforthepeopleinvolved(or,negatively,inegalitariansocialrelationships

arebadforthepeopleinvolved).Forexample,considerthefollowingpassages.Schefflersays

thatonereasonwemaytakesuchrelationshipstobevaluableisthat,collectively,wethink

theyare–theideaofequalcitizenshipisimplicitinthepublicpoliticalcultureofmodern

democraticsociety,andassuchrepresentsapointofnormativeconvergence.40However,he

alsooffersamore‘philosophicallyventuresome’accountofwhatmakesegalitariansocial

relationshipsvaluable,whichputsthefocusfirmlyonthevalueofsuchrelationshipsto

individuallives:

‘[L]ivinginasocietyofequalsisgoodbothintrinsicallyandinstrumentally.Whenthe

relationshipsamongasociety’smembersarestructuredbyrigidhierarchical

distinctions,[thisaccount]claims,theresultingpatternsofdeferenceandprivilege

exertastiflingeffectonhumanfreedomandinhibitthepossibilitiesofhuman

exchange.Becauseoftheprofoundandformativeinfluenceofbasicpolitical

institutions,moreover,patternsofdeferenceandprivilegethatarepolitically

entrenchedspilloverintopersonalrelationshipsofallkinds.Theydistortpeople’s

attitudestowardthemselves,underminingtheself-respectofsomeandencouragingan

insidioussenseofsuperiorityinothers.Furthermore,socialhierarchiesrequire

stabilizingandsustainingmyths,andthenecessityofperpetuatingandenforcingthese

mythsdiscouragestruthfulrelationsamongpeopleandmakesgenuineself-

39SamuelScheffler,‘Choice,CircumstanceandtheValueofEquality’,Politics,Philosophy&Economics4(2005):5-28,at18.40Ibid.,18.

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understandingmoredifficulttoachieve.Inalloftheseways,inegalitariansocieties

compromisehumanflourishing;theylimitpersonalfreedom,corrupthuman

relationships,undermineself-respectandinhibittruthfulliving....[Whereas]an

egalitariansocietyhelpstopromotetheflourishingofitscitizens...[and]tolivein

societyasanequalisagoodthinginitsownright.’41

Scanlonwrites:

‘‘itisanevilforpeopletobetreatedasinferior,ormadetofeelinferior’…[This]

statementofthisobjection[toinegalitariansocialrelationships]wascautiously

ambivalent.Itconsistedoftwoparts,thefirstofwhichsuggeststhatwhatis

objectionableisacertainformoftreatment(beingtreatedasinferior,ornotbeing

‘treatedasanequal’)andthesecondsuggeststhattheevilisanexperientialone(being

madetofeelinferior).Moreneedstobesaidabouthowthis‘experiential’component

istobeunderstoodandabouthowitissupposedtoberelatedtotheunderlyingforms

oftreatmentinordertogiverisetotheobjectioninquestion.

Theexperientialevilinvolvedherecanbecharacterizedinseveraldifferentways–

indeed,thereareseveraldifferentkindsofexperiencethatonemighthaveinmind.Let

medistinguishtwobroadcategories.Thefirst,more‘individualistic’,characterization

emphasizeswhatmightbecalleddamagetoindividuals’senseofself-worth…The

secondcategoryemphasizesdamagestothebondsbetweenpeople:whatmightbe

calledthelossoffraternity…Unlikethefirst,thisisalosssufferedbythebetteroffand

worseoffalike.’42

ElizabethAndersonalsosuggeststhatthevalueofnon-oppressivesocialrelationshipsto

individuallivesisatthefoundationofhercommitmenttorelationalequality:

‘Tobesubjecttoanother’scommandthreatensone’sinterests,asthoseincommand

areliabletoservethemselvesattheexpenseoftheirsub-ordinates.Itthreatens

subordinates’autonomy,theirstandingasself-governingindividuals.Without

substantialcontrolsonthecontentoflegitimatecommands,subjectioncanalsobe

degradingandhumiliating...Suchaconditionofsubjectiontothearbitrarywillsof

othersisobjectionableinitself,andhasfurtherobjectionableconsequences:timidity

41Ibid.,19.Myemphases.42Scanlon,‘TheDiversityofObjectionstoInequality’,p.51.Empahsesamixtureoforiginalandadded.

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andself-censorshipinthepresenceofsuperiors–orworse,grovellingandself-

abasement.’43

Laterinthesamepaper,Andersonstatesthat,‘thequestforfreedomisthequestforamodeof

relatingtoothersinwhichnooneisdominated,inwhicheachadultmeetseveryotheradult

memberofsocietyeyetoeye,asanequal.’44And,aswehavealreadyseen,shearguesthat‘In

liberaldemocraticversionsofsocialcontracttheory,thefundamentalaimofthestateisto

securethelibertyofitsmembers…[Democraticegalitarianism]claimsthatthesocial

conditionoflivingafreelifeisthatonestandinrelationsofequalitywithothers.’Here

egalitarianrelationshipsappeartobeimportantbecausetheyarenecessaryforfreedom.Itis

implied,further,thatfreedomisgoodforpeople,ornecessaryforpeople’sgood.Thatfreedom

isanintrinsicorinstrumentalpersonalgoodisimpliedbyAnderson’sappealto‘social

contracttheory’,sinceinsuchtheoriesthethingsthatpeoplepursue(primarygoods,security

etc.)arethethingsthatwillhelpthemleadgoodlives.

MartinO’Neillwrites:

‘ThereasonstowhichNon-Intrinsicegalitarianismappealsarethemselvesgenerated

bydistinctivelyegalitarianconcernswiththebadnessofservility,exploitation,

domination,anddifferencesinstatus.Thebadnessoftheseoutcomescanbestbe

understoodbyvirtueofthecontrastingvalueofcertainkindsoffraternal,egalitarian

socialrelations.Theexistenceofthesekindsofsocialrelationsshoulditselfbeseenas

intrinsicallyvaluable,independentofthepositiveeffectsthatsuchrelationsmayhave

forindividualwelfare.’45

O’Neillattachesafootnotetothistext,inwhichheadds:‘Recallthat,asParfitputsit,“wemay

thinkitbadforpeopleiftheyareservileortoodeferential,evenifthisdoesnotfrustratetheir

desires,oraffecttheirexperiencedwellbeing”’.46

43Anderson,‘ExpandingtheEgalitarianToolbox’,145-146.Myemphasis.44Ibid.,146.45O’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,130.46Ibid.,130,n.30.Myemphasis.IhaveincludedthisquotationofthefootnotebecausefromO’Neill’smaintext,onecouldsupposethathemeanttosaythategalitariansocialrelationshipshaveimpersonalvalue,andarethereforeintrinsicallyvaluablenotonlyasidefromexperientialwelfareconsiderations,butalsoasidefromconsiderationsofhumanflourishingorwellbeingaltogether.O’Neilldoes,asweshallsee,thinkthategalitariansocialrelationshipscouldhaveimpersonalvalue,butIdon’tthinkthatiswhatheisarguinghere:theParfitquotation,whilekeepingourfocusawayfromexperiencedwellbeing,maintainsthatservilityanddeferencearebadforpeople.

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Whatallthesestatementsconcerningthevalueofequalityinsocialrelationshipshavein

commonisthattheyallseemtoassertthategalitariansocialrelationshipsaregoodforpeople

–oratleastthatinegalitariansocialrelationshipsarebadforpeople.Thatistosay,theyall

seemtoassertthategalitariansocialrelationshipshavepersonalvalue.However,noticethat

divisionsarealreadybeginningtoshowbetweendifferentrelationalegalitarians.Alotof

reasonsforthinkingegalitariansocialrelationshipsvaluable,andinegalitarianonesbad,are

mentionedintheabovestatements.Inparticular,AndersonandO’Neillthrowourgazeonthe

dominatedoroppressed,arguingthatbeingdominatedandoppressedisbadforus.Scheffler

andScanlon,however,whilstnotignoringtheplightoftheoppressed,aremoreopentothe

possibilitythatinegalitarianrelationshipsarebadforbothsides(sincethey‘inhibittruthful

living’andourunderstandingofourselves,andmeana‘lossoffraternity’).Ofcourse,it

doesn’tshowmuchtoshowthatdifferentthinkersfocusondifferentaspectsofthebadnessof

inequality–shock!philosophersmaydisagreewithoneanother!–butitisworthhighlighting,

becausethesethinkershavelargelybeenhappytoassociatethemselveswithoneanother’s

work47,andwilleasilybeassociatedwitheachotherbyothers,duetotheclosenessoftheir

viewsincertainways,andthefactthatthewayinwhichtheirviewscohere(anemphasison

socialrelationshipsratherthandistributions)hasbeenthefocusoftheirwritings,whilstthe

areaswheretheyseemtodiffer(theirfoundationalreasonsforbelievingegalitarian

relationshipstomatter)hasnot.Thereality,however,isthatwhilethereisagreementatthe

leveloftherejectionofdistributiveegalitarianismandthebroadreasonswhy,thereappearsto

bedisagreementaboutwhatvaluesandprinciplesultimatelyunderpintheposition.

Inaddition,whilstthereappearstobeagreementintheabovestatementsthategalitarian

socialrelationshipsaregoodforpeople,thereislittleagreementorclarityoverwhethersuch

relationshipshaveintrinsicorinstrumentalvaluetous.Schefflerexplicitlysaystheyhave

both,butdoesnotdelineatewhichofthereasonshegivesareinstrumentalandwhich

intrinsic,nordoesheexplainwhattheintrinsicvaluesservedby(ifinstrumental)or

instantiatedin(ifintrinsic)theserelationshipsare.Allwegetisanassurancethatsuch

relationshipspromote‘humanflourishing’(leavingusinnodoubtthatthevalueispersonal),

butitisleftentirelyunclearwhether,say,‘truthfulliving’istobethoughtofasinstrumental

toagoodlife;adistinct,suigenerisformofhumanflourishing;ordirectlycontributingto

47ScheffleridentifieshiscritiquewithAnderson’s(‘Choice,CircumstanceandtheValueofEquality’,25,n.7),whilstO’NeillidentifieshistheorycloselywithScanlon(‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,122,126,130,132,133,139),and,toalesserdegree,withAndersonandScheffler(130).SchemmelidentifieshisviewwithAndersonandScheffler(‘WhyRelationalEgalitariansShouldCareAboutDistributions’,365).

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somemoreultimatehumangood,likehappiness(i.e.,notinstrumentaltohumanhappiness,

butconstitutiveofit).Anderson,however,seemstoseeegalitariansocialrelationshipsas

largelyinstrumentallyvaluable.Inegalitarianrelationshipsaredisvaluablebecausethey

‘threatenone’sinterests’(althoughshealsosaysthatsubjectionis‘objectionableinitself’).

Furthermore,egalitarianrelationshipsarevaluablebecausetheyarenecessaryforfreedom,

whichappearstobetheultimategoodweareseekingtoprovideinAnderson’sarchitectonic.48

Scanlon,likeScheffler,seemstoseeamixofintrinsicandinstrumentalvalue.Thedisvalueof

inegalitarianrelationshipsforthoseatthebottomisthelossofself-respect–making

inegalitarianrelationshipsinstrumentallydisvaluable–whilstfraternalsocialrelationsseem

tobeheldupasintrinsicallyvaluable,partofthegoodlife.

However,notallrelationalegalitarianshaveseenthevalueofegalitariansocialrelationships

aspersonal(instrumentallyorintrinsically).MartinO’Neillpositsthatsuchrelationshipsmay

beimpersonallyvaluable–notvaluablebecausetheyaregoodforpeople,butvaluablebecause

theyaregoodinandofthemselves(evenwhentheyactuallymakepeople’slivesgoworse).In

hisdiscussionofParfit’swell-known‘levellingdownobjection’49,O’Neillconsidersacaseof

twodistributions:

(1)Halfat100,Halfat150

(2)Everyoneat9950

Thelevelling-downobjectionisthattelicegalitarianswouldhavetosaythat(2)isinsomeway

bettereventhougheveryoneisworseoff,which,sotheobjectionclaims,isimplausible.

O’Neillsideswiththetelicegalitarianhere,sayingthattherelationalornon-intrinsic

egalitarianshouldagreethat(2)couldbeinsomewaybetter.Hewrites:

‘Distribution(1)mightrepresentanaffluentbutclass-riddensociety,markedbyforms

ofservility,domination,andexploitation.TheNon-IntrinsicEgalitarianshouldthinkit

inonewaypreferabletomovefromsuchasocietytoamoreegalitariansociety(asin

(2))evenifthisadverselyaffectedeachperson’slevelofall-things-consideredwell-

being.ThisisbecausetheNon-Intrinsicegalitariancanallowthatcertainkindsof

egalitariansocialrelationshaveavaluethatisnotreducibletotheeffectsonindividual

48Seealso,‘WhatisthePoint?’,289:‘Democraticequalityguaranteesalllaw-abidingcitizenseffectiveaccesstothesocialconditionsoftheirfreedomatalltimes.’49DerekParfit,‘EqualityorPriority?’inClaytonandWilliamsed.,TheIdealofEquality:81-125,atp.9850InO’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,141,thesearenumbered(3)and(4).Inthequotationthatfollows,Ihavesubstitutedmynumbersforhis.

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welfarethatthosesocialrelationsmayhave.…Thismaysoundcounterintuitive,but

suchapositionisnotatallmysterious.Ifwethinkthatcertainegalitarianvalueshave

asignificancethatisindependentoftheeffectsofequalityonindividualwell-being,

thenwemaythinkthatthevalueofequalitycansometimestrumpthevalueof

maximizing(orafortioriofmerelyincreasing)well-being.’51

Recallthat,attheoutset,Idistinguishedbetweennormativeandevaluativeclaims.Sofarwe

havelookedatwhyegalitariansocialrelationshipsmaybethoughttobevaluable,personally

orimpersonally.And,ofcourse,somenormativeclaimsmaypiggy-backonthosevalues.But

egalitariansocialrelationshipscanalsobeunderstoodinamorepurelynormativelight–not

asvaluableperse,butratherasfundamentallymorallyimportant,asastartingpointfor

normativeclaims.Thiswayoflookingategalitariansocialrelationshipsdoesn’tseethemas

somethingtobepromoted,akindofvalue,butratherasamethodologicalstartingpoint.

Principlesofjustice,onthisview,areexpressionsoforproceedfromourfundamental

commitmenttosocialequality.ChristianSchemmelofferssuchanaccountoftheimportance

ofegalitariansocialrelationships.HefindsO’Neill’sviewthategalitarianrelationshipsare

impersonallyvaluable‘mysterious’52(whichis,ofcourse,exactlywhatO’Neillaccuses

distributiveviewsofbeing,andexactlywhathedenieshisclaimsasbeing)andproposesa

viewinwhich:

‘Relationalegalitarianism...isaviewaboutsocialjustice;itsaimistospecifyrightsand

dutiesthatindividualshaveasmembersofsociety,andwhichnormallyoverrideother

socialvalues...Theobjectionto[inegalitarian]relationshipsisnotmerelythattheyare,

insomesense,badforpeople,butthattheyconstituteunjusttreatment:domination

involvessubjectiontothearbitraryexerciseofpoweronthepartofsomebodyelse;

marginalizationinvolvesanunjustdenialofopportunitiestoparticipateinbasicsocial

andpoliticalinstitutions.’53

51Ibid.,141-142.Seealso,146:‘[W]emaybelievethatthesortoffraternal,egalitariansocialrelationsthatresultfromdistributiveequalityarevaluableinsomewaythatissimplyirreducibletoanygainfor,orbenefitto,anyparticularindividual.Wemaybelievethatsuchrelationshipshaveabasicmoralsignificancethatisnotexhaustedbytheirvalueforanyparticularindividual.’Emphasisinoriginal.52ChristianSchemmel,‘RelationalEgalitarianDistributions’(unpublishedm/s).Thispaperlaterbecame‘WhyRelationalEgalitariansShouldCareAboutDistributions’,butthisparticularpassagewasdeleted.Idon’tbelievethatthisamendmentreflectedachangeofheartintheauthoronthisissue,however.53Schemmel,‘WhyRelationalEgalitariansShouldCareAboutDistributions’,366.InthisquotationSchemmelseemsfocussedonthenegativeview–thejustice-basedimperativeistoendinegalitarianrelationships,notproduceegalitarianones.

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Schemmelgivescredencetotheideathatwhatisdisvaluableaboutinegalitarianrelationships

istheirpersonaldisvalue–theymakepeople’slivesgoworse.However,healsohasadeeper

commitmenttosuchegalitarianrelationships.Weshouldcareaboutsuchrelationships‘not

merely’becausetheymakepeopleslivesgobetterbutbecausetheyarerequiredbyjustice

evenwhen(inanindividualinstance54)theydon’tmakepeople’slivesgobetter.UnlikeO’Neill,

thisisnotbecausetheyarethoughttobeimpersonallyvaluable.Itis,rather,thattheyare

required,andnotinawaythatfeedsoftheirpersonalorimpersonalvalue.Thus,the

foundationsofSchemmel’srelationalegalitarianismaredifferentfromthepersonalvalueand

impersonalvalueviewsthatwehavethusfarconsidered.Rather,hisrelationalegalitarianism

is,atroot,normative.Ensuringegalitariansocialrelationshipsissomethingweoughttodo,

butnotbecause(oratleastnotonlywhen)they’regood(eitherforpeopleorimpersonally).

Andersonalsomakescommentsalongtheselines.Shesays,forexample,that‘Egalitarians

baseclaimstosocialandpoliticalequalityonthefactofuniversalmoralequality…egalitarians

seekasocialorderinwhichpersonsstandinrelationsofequality.’55Shealsosays,aswehave

seen,thatdistributivepatternsshouldnotbeseenpurelyasinstrumentaltoegalitariansocial

andpoliticalrelationships,butmayfollowfromorbedemandedbythem.Thisseemstoput

theserelationshipsattheapexofthenormativetree–itisn’t(just)thatweshouldexplainwhy

theymakepeople’slivesgowell,itis,rather,thatweshouldstartfromtheserelationshipsas

theappropriatewaytolivetogether.Weshouldhaveequalsocialrelationshipsbecause,

morally,weareequal.

Aswehaveseen,inhiswritingsonequality,Scanlonseemstoappealtopersonalvalueor

personalreasonsinarticulatingwhyweshouldcareaboutegalitarianrelationships.But,whilst

intheworksinwhichhedefendsrelationalegalitarianismhedoesnotlinkbacktohisbroader

moraltheory56,andinhismostfamousworkinmoraltheory(WhatWeOwetoEachOther57)

heis‘coy’aboutwhathiscontractualismdemandsinthesphereofdistributivejustice58,we

know,ofcourse,thatScanlonhasabroadermethodologicalframeworkanddeeper

54IamgratefultoSchemmelforencouragingmetomakethisparantheticalqualification–hewouldnotendorsetheviewthatsuchrelationshipsaremorallyimportantinaworldwheretheyareingeneralbadforpeople.55Anderson,‘WhatisthePoint?’,313.56AaronJamessaysthatScanlon’scontractualismis‘atbestperipheraltohispoliticalessays.’AaronJames,‘TheSignificanceofDistribution’inR.JayWallace,RahulKumar,andSamuelFreemaneds.,ReasonsandRecognition:EssaysonthePhilosophyofT.M.Scanlon,(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2011):276-304,atp.296,n.1.57T.M.Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge,Mass:BelknapPress,1998).58James,‘TheSignificanceofDistribution’,p.276.

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commitments:contractualismbasedonmutualjustificationandreasonablerejection.Atthe

rootofScanlon’scontractualism,wefindsomethingverylikerelationalequality–anidealof

peoplelivingtogetherinajustificatorycommunity,wheretheylivebyprinciplesthatnobody

couldreasonablyreject.AtthesummitofScanlon’stheoryappearstobeanideathatwhat

mattersislivingtogetherasequals.AsAaronJamesputsit,‘IfScanlon’stheoryimpliesthat

distributions,assuch,arenotwhatultimatelymatters,italsotellsuswhatisfinallyatstake:

thesignificanceofdistributiondependsonindependentlyvaluablerelationsamongpeople.

Wearetotreatothersastheyareowed,byactingonlyinwayswecouldjustifytothem,

becausethissustainsavaluable‘relationofmutualrecognition’withthem.’59Thus,Scanlon’s

demandthatwefosteregalitarianrelationshipsthroughourdistributionsmayimmediatelybe

justifiedwithreferencetoindividualwellbeing,butultimatelythejustificationmay,ifwe

connectitwithhiscontractualism,finditsterminationinamoralidealofequalityandequal

relationships–whatweowetoeachotheriswhatwecanjustifytooneanother,andweought

tojustifyourselvestooneanotherbecauseonlythencanwelivetogetherasequals.James

talksaboutjustificatoryequalityas‘independentlyvaluable’,sotheremaystillbediggingtodo

(whatkindofvalueisthis?presumablyimpersonal?),butitmayjustbethatScanlonthinks

thatallmoralandpoliticalphilosophymustproceedfromanideaofusasequals.

Thisnormativeformulationofrelationalegalitarianismseestheideaofegalitariansocialand

politicalrelationsasfoundational.Thepointofequality,touseAnderson’sterms,istoend

oppression.Oppressionisobjectionablebecausetheoppressordoesn’ttreattheoppressedas

anequal.Whatisthepointoftreatingapersonasanequal?Thereisn’tapoint.It’sjustwhat

we’resupposedtodo:weshouldtreateachotherasequalsbecauseweareequals.Onthis

view,politicaltheorymustproceedfromtheidealofrelationalequality,notexplainwhyor

howitisvaluableorimportant.

IVRelationalandDistributiveEgalitarianism

InthissectionIwanttoturnmyattentiontomysecondandthirdaimsasstatedinthe

introduction.Thatis,Iwanttolookatwhetherrelationalegalitarianism,inthevariousguises

outlinedabove,canbecriticizedinthesamewaythatdistributiveegalitarianismiscriticized–

as‘arithmetic’and‘abstract’–andtoseehowitmightrelatetodistributiveegalitarianism,to

seewhetherthereisroomforbothunderstandingsofequalitywithinasingleview,asCohen

appearedtobelieve.Wesawearlierhowrelationalegalitarianshavecomplainedthat

59Ibid.,p.277,quotingScanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther,p.162.Emphasisinoriginal.

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distributiveviewsofequalityareoverlyabstractormysterious,andthattheyareoverly

arithmetic,focusingon,asanearlierrelationalegalitarian,R.H.Tawney,putit,‘thedetailsof

thecountinghouse’.60Wehavealsoseen,broadlyspeaking,threedifferentwaysofviewing

egalitariansocialrelationships.Relationalegalitariansclaimthatequalityisavaluethatis

centrallyconcernedwithoursocialrelationships.Theserelationshipsmayhavepersonalvalue

(begoodforpeople),haveimpersonalvalue(begoodregardlessoftheircontributionto

individuallives),orberequiredby,orastartingpointfortheorizingabout,justice.Anyof

thesewaysofunderstandingwhyweshouldcareaboutegalitariansocialandpolitical

relationships,Iwillnowargue,isindangerofeitherleadustoadistributiveor‘arthimetic’

view,orisabstract.Furthermore,eachiscompatible,insomeway,withdistributive

egalitarianism.Therefore,itmaybeafalsedichotomytomakeuschoosebetweenthe

relationalanddistributiveunderstandingsofequality.

Let’stakethepersonalvalueviewfirst.Onthisview,thebasicclaimisthategalitariansocial

relationshipsmakepeople’slivesgobetter(andmakesthemgobetterinthekindofwaythat

egalitariansshouldcareabout).Ithinkthisistrue.Considertwoworldsinwhichallhave

equalholdings(andtheirlevelofholdingsisthesameinbothworlds).Inthefirst,everyone

participatesonanequalfootingandrelationshipsarecharacterizedbyhealthyfraternal

relations.Intheother,twogroupstakeitinturntodominateandoppressoneanother.It

seemstomethatthepeopleinthefirstworldhavebetterlivesthanthoseinthesecond.

Onequestionwemayaskishow‘perfectionist’thismakestherelationalegalitarianposition.

Manyoftheformsofwellbeingthoughttobepromoted,suchas‘genuineself-understanding’

and‘autonomy’arethekindsofpersonalvaluesthatwewouldassociatewith(aliberal)

perfectionism,likethatofJosephRaz.61Theseaccounts,especiallythosethatadheretothe

positiveviewthategalitariansocialrelationshipsaregoodforus(andnotonlythenegative

viewthatinegalitarianrelationshipsarebadforus)seemtoclaimsuperiorityforthose

conceptionsofthegoodthatmakespaceforsuchrelationships,orthegoodsthattheyare

thoughttopromote.Therefore,weareencouragedtolookdownonthoseconceptionsofthe

goodinwhichsuchrelationshipsarenotvalued,orinwhichgoodslikeautonomyandtruthful

livingdonotplayacentralrole.AccordingtoScheffler,wearetovaluetheserelationships

becauseoftheircontributiontohumanflourishing.Thislimitstheextenttowhichsucha

viewcanclaimneutralitybetweenconceptionsofthegood.Thisseemsespeciallyrelevantin60R.H.Tawney,Equality(London:Allen&Unwin,1964),p.113.61JosephRaz,TheMoralityofFreedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).

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Scheffler’scase,sincehisisastoryinwhichrelationalegalitarianismisapparentlyinspiredby,

andattributableto,Rawls,whomwedonotnormallyassociatewithperfectionism.62Of

course,Schefflerofferstheless‘philosophicallyvenutresome’accountofthevalueof

egalitarianrelationshipsaswell,andperhapshewouldwanttoassociateRawlswiththat

account.63

Let’simaginethatitistruethategalitariansocialrelationshipsareindeedgoodforus,and,

whatismore,goodforusinthekindofwaythatapoliticalcommunityoughttocareabout.

Allwehavelearnedfromthisisthatparticipationinegalitariansocialrelationshipsiseithera

suigenerisaspectofhumanflourishingorwellbeing,orcontributestohumanflourishingor

wellbeing.Thisdoesn’ttellusthatmuchaboutwhattodo,orwhichstatesofaffairsaremore

valuablethanothers.Ittellsusthat,allelseequal,ifwewanttopromotehumanflourishingor

wellbeing,weshouldpromotetheserelationships.Allpoliticalphilosophersthinkwemustbe

attentivetowhatmakeshumanlivestogowellalongsomemetric(thoughthatmetricmay

notbeorconcernwellbeingorflourishinginanythicksense,butrathertosomepolitical

analogueofthat64).Allelseequal(acrosseverythingelsethatmatters)ifwecanmakepeople

betteroff,weoughtto.Butoncewehaveidentifiedwhatmetricwecareabout,theotherkey

questionishowweoughttodistribute(themeansto)thatmetric.

Forexample,let’simaginethatSchefflerisright,thategalitariansocialrelationshipspromote

‘truthfulliving’.Letusalsoimagine(implausibly,andforillustrativepurposes)thatthisisthe

onlyreasonweshouldpromoteegalitarianrelationships,andthattruthfullivingisallthat

mattersinmakingalifegowell.Thequestionthenis:‘howshouldwedistributethemeansto

and/orpromotetruthfulliving?’Weknowthatitisvaluable,andthatthatexplainswhywe

shouldpromoteegalitariansocialrelationships.Butifpeoplecanbebetterandworse

informedaboutlife,assuchapositionrecognises,therewillthenbequestionsabouthowwe

shouldviewdifferentdistributionsoftruthfulliving.Shouldwemaximizeit,suchthatifone

personcouldknoweverythingthereistoknow,thatwouldbeasgoodaslotsofpeople

62JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism(NewYork:ColumbiaUnivesityPress,1993).63ItwouldbeconsistentwithRawlsianismforSchefflertoclaimthategalitarianrelationshipsarenecessaryforhumanflourishing,providedthatthatfactplaysnoroleingroundingtheclaimthatourpoliticalinstitutionsoughttopromoteorsupportsuchrelationships,althoughSchefflerhimselfdoesnotdistancehisclaimsabouthumanflourishingfromhispoliticalviewofequality.ItwouldalsobeconsistentwithRawlsianismtoclaim,asAndersondoes,thatsuchrelationshipsarenecessaryforliberty,iflibertyisthenviewedasaprimarysocialgood–i.e.,anall-purposegoodrequiredformostconceptionsofthegood.Thiswouldgiveegalitarianrelationshipsinstrumentalvaluewhilsttakingnostandontheirintrinsicvalueforhumanlives.64Forexample,Rawls’sprimarysocialgoods.

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knowingabit?Orshouldweequaliseit–oratleastfindvalueinpeoplehavingequalityof

accesstotruth?Orshouldweprioritisegivingaccesstotruthtothosewhocurrentlyhave

less?Allthesepositionsare,atroot,distributive.Thepointisthis:ifegalitariansocial

relationshipsarethoughttobevaluableorimportantbecauseoftheircontributiontohuman

wellbeing,anditisthenthoughtthatpoliticalinstitutionsanddistributionsoughttobe

arrangedsoastopromoteorrealisetheserelationships,thisshowsusthat(these)relational

egalitarianscareaboutpeople’swellbeing(andthinkourpoliticalinstitutionsoughttocare

aboutthiskindofwellbeing)andthatthiscareextendsbeyondthemoneyintheirpockets–

inotherwords,theyarenotresourcists.65Butlotsofdistributiveegalitarians,including

Cohen,arenotresourceegalitarians,theyarewelfareegalitarians.66Sothisdoesn’tseemtobe

astrikeagainstthedistributiveegalitarian,itisastrikeagainstresource-focussed

egalitarianism,whichcannottakeaccountofthewaythatafinanciallywell-offbutdominated

personisbadlyoff.

Oncewehaveidentifiedthewaythategalitariansocialrelationshipscontributetowellbeing,

westillthenneedtoask‘whatprinciple(s)shouldguideusinthedistributionofwellbeing?’

Heretherelationalegalitarianmustseeminglychoosebetween(orcombine)ourfamiliar

distributiveprinciples:egalitarianism,sufficiency,prioritarianism,maximin,or

maximisation.67Theymightnotproceeddirectlytothatquestion–theymay,forexample,

seektoansweritthroughsomecontractualmethod–buttheirclaimthatrelational

egalitarianismcontributestohumanwellbeingorflourishingcannotanswerthatquestion.

Therefore,thiskindofrelationalegalitarianismsimplyposesthequestionofhowtodistribute

themeanstoagoodlife,itdoesnotanswerit,orprovideouranswerswitharationale.So

relationalegalitarianswhoseeegalitarianrelationshipsasbeingimportantbecausetheyhave

personalvalueshouldnotcriticisedistributiveegalitariansforhavingatrootadistributive

65Fortheclassicstatementofaresoucistposition,seeDworkin,‘EqualityofResources’.66Morestrictly,Cohenofferthehybridmetricof‘advantage’asthemetricofegalitarianjustice.Seehis‘OntheCurrency’.Foramorestrictlywelfaristegalitarianview,seeRichardArneson,‘EqualityandEqualOpportunityforWelfare’inPhilosophicalStudies56(1989):77-93.67AlexanderBrownhasrecentlycriticizedO’Neillinparticularofbeingaclosetdistributiveegalitarian,sinceO’Neillinvokesself-respectindefenceofrelationalegalitarianism,andBrownbelievesthisshowsO’Neilltobeadistributiveegalitarianwithaself-respecttypemetric.Thismovestoofastfortworeasons.First,itignoresO’Neill’scommentsontheimpersonalvalueofsocialrelationships.Second,O’Neillisatmostcommittedtothepersonalgoodof(andotherslike)self-respect,andhisrelationalegalitarianismdoesnotcommithimtoanegalitariandistributionofthosegoods,letaloneanatrootdistributiveegalitarianism.(Forexample,O’Neillmightthinkweoughttohaveanegalitariansocialrelationships,butonlybecausethatwillmaximizeself-respect).See:AlexanderBrown,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieveIfTheyReallyAreEgalitarians?’,EuropeanJournalofPoliticalTheory(forthcoming),4-5.

22

view.Theyhavenotshownthattheirviewisnot,atroot,distributive:thedistributiveroots

maybeobscuredbythefocusonthecontributionthatcertainkindsofsocialrelationshipscan

maketoindividualwellbeing,butdistributivismmayneverthelesslurkunderneath.Indeed,

somerelationalegalitariansmay,atroot,be(welfarist)distributiveegalitarians.Andcertainly

thistypeofrelationalegalitarianismiseasilycombinablewithdistributiveviews.

Thisputsdistributiveequalityandrelationalequalityinaninterestingrelationship.Onthe

onehand,theycanbearticulatedascompetinginterpretationsofthesamevalue–namely,

equality.Ontheotherhand,theyappeartobeansweringcompletelydifferentquestions,and

focusingondifferentpartsofpoliticalphilosophy.Relationalegalitariansarefocusedonthe

questionofwhat(forpoliticalpurposes)is,orcontributesto,agoodlife–whatisitthatour

politicalinstitutionsshouldtrytoprovideforus?Distributiveegalitariansarefocusedonthe

questionofhowweshoulddistributethemeanstowhat(forpoliticalpurposes)is,or

contributesto,agoodlife.Thismakesthetwopositionspotentiallycomplimentary.

The‘personalvalue’relationalegalitariancouldstillcriticisethedistributiveegalitarianfor

believingequalitytobeatrootadistributivevalue,if,forexample,theythoughtthatweought

tomaximisewellbeingwhilstbelievingthategalitariansocialrelationshipsprovideawayfor

ustodothis.However,therelationalegalitarianwouldthenhavetorecognisethattheir

positionisnot,fundamentally,anegalitarianone–theircommitmenttoequalityisnottheir

fundamentalcommitment,theircommitmenttomaximisingwellbeingis.Andsuchaview

seems,ultimately,asdistributive,‘arithmetic’,andindeedasabstract,asthedistributive

egalitarianview.

Ofcourse,itwouldbeimplausibletothinkthategalitariansocialrelationshipsareallthat

thereistolivingagoodlife.Therefore,whatrelationalegalitariansofthistypehaveidentified

isonecontributingfactortohumanflourishingorwellbeing.Wethenneedtoidentifythe

others,anddecidehowweshouldregarddifferingdistributionsofit,anddifferent

combinationsofdifferentformsofwellbeing.Forexample,imaginethatbothhappinessand

truthfullivingaresuigenerisaspectsofwellbeing.Wethennotonlyneedtodecidehowwe

shouldviewdifferingdistributionsofwellbeingamongdifferentpeople,butalsodifferent

combinationsoftypesofwellbeingwithinpeople.

23

Seeingegalitarianrelationshipsasonecontributingfactortowellbeing(andmaybeevenone

contributingfactortoonetypeofwellbeing)doesnotmeanthatrelationalegalitarianismis

notanimportantprojectorinsight.Butitdoesplacethepersonalvalueversionoftheviewin

context.Evenifitcanbehousedwithinadistributiveview,though,ittellsussomething

importantabouthowweoughttoproceed.Distributiviststendtooperateasifwecanidentify

whatwellbeingis,andthendecidehowit(orthemeanstoit)shouldbedistributed.But,just

asutilitariansprovideargumentsforequalitybasedonthediminishingmarginalsignificance

ofutility,relationalegalitariansprovideuswithanargumentfordistributiveequality(broadly

conceived)basedonthecontributionofsuchdistributionstocertainkindsofrelationship,

andthecontributionofthoserelationshipstowellbeing.Thisviewshowsthatdistributions

(throughrelationships)canimpactonwellbeing,andsoweshouldnotviewthewellbeing-

distributionrelationshipasone-waytraffic.However,despitetheimportanceoftherelational

egalitarianinsight,thepersonalvalueviewmakestherelationalegalitarianprojectseempart

ofadistributiveview,oratleastaviewthatcouldeasilybeincorporatedbyadistributive

view.

Whatifegalitariansocialrelationshipsareinstead,asperO’Neill,viewedashavingimpersonal

value?Inthiscase,IaminclinedtoagreewithSchemmelthatsuchaviewseems‘mysterious’.

Theideaofimpersonalvalueitselfissometimesthoughttobemysterious.Cansomethingbe

valuableeventhoughitisnotgoodforanybody,oranything?Ithinkitcanbe,thoughthis

doesn’tmeanthatIfindtheviewnon-mysteriousor-abstract.Theideaofimpersonalvalue

seemsmostclearwhenthevalueiscompletelyindependentofhumanlives.Consider,tousea

well-knownexample,theGrandCanyon.Asidefromthevaluethatthishasforpeople,it

arguablyhasavaluebeyondthat.Evenifeveryoneintheworldwouldbeatinybitbetteroffif

webuiltagiantparkinglotintheGrandCanyon,thatwouldseemtodisrespecttheinherent

(andimpersonal)valuethatitholds.Anotherexamplemightbebiodiversity.Istheworldin

whichacommonbigcatsdiesasbadastheoneinwhichthelasttigerdies?Ithinkthesecond

maywellbeworse,anditishardtofullyspellthisoutintermswhichrelayallthevaluelost

backtoindividuallives–itmightjustbethataworldwithnotigersisworsethanaworldwith

tigers,evenifitisn’tworseforanybodyoranything.

Thinkingaboutimpersonalvalueintermsofhumanaffairs(likedistributionsorrelationships

betweenpeople)isharder.Toacceptthatsuchvaluesexistmeanrecognisingthatwecanand

shouldimpactonhumanlivesinwaysthatarenotgoodforanyofthoselives.Thevaluestobe

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promotedareofhumanlives,butnotvaluableforhumanlives.Despitetheapparent

strangenessoftheseideas,LarryTemkinshowsmanyintuitivecaseswhereweacceptthata

stateofaffairscouldbeinonewaybetter,eventhoughitisworseforsomeoneandbetterfor

noone.68However,thesearelargelycaseswherethedistributionhassomevalue(likefairness)

whichisindependentlyvaluable.Thinkingaboutinterpersonalrelationships,whichseem

intimatelyconnectedwithindividuallivesandidentities,intermsofimpersonalvalueisastill

furtherstep,and,tome,seemstobejustaboutthemostabstractandmysteriousclaimof

impersonalvalueyoucouldhave.Consideryourrelationshipswithyournearestanddearest,

andthenconsiderwhythey’revaluable.Isitbecausetheymakeourlivesbetter,because

they’retheappropriaterelationshipsforustohave,orbecausetheysimplymaketheworld

better,regardlessofwhattheydoforus?Thelatterseemsthemostmysteriousandabstractof

theseviews.Thesameseems,tomeatleast,trueofsocialrelationshipstoo.Canthevalueof

theserelationshipsreallybefoundoutsideourlives?

Idonotpointanyofthisouttosaythatitisimpossiblethategalitariansocialrelationships

haveimpersonalvalue.Butitiscertainlyanabstractandmysteriousthought.Inadditionto

theseworries,ifegalitariansocialrelationshipshaveimpersonalvalue,perhapsweshouldnot

careabouttheirlocationordistribution.Sincetheyarenotgoodforpeople,perhapswe

shouldnotcarewhotheyobtainbetween,orifsomepeoplehavemanyandothersnoneatall.

ImagineasocietywhereAliceviewseveryone,andisviewedbyeveryone,asanequal.But

everyoneelse’srelationshipsarecharacterisedbynastyinegalitarianelements.Holdingthe

numberofegalitarian/inegalitariansocialrelationshipsfixed,thissocietyisjustasgood,from

theperspectiveofimpersonallyvaluablerelationships,asoneinwhicheveryonehassome

egalitariansocialrelationshipsandsomeinegalitarianones.Thatis,unlesstheimpersonal

valueofsuchrelationshipsisconditionalontheirdistribution,orthereareimpersonalvalues

embodiedinthedistributionofsuchrelationships.Buttoacknowledgethiswouldbetosee

distributionsofgoods(certainkindsofrelationships)asholdingimpersonalvalue.Aren’twe

backinmysterious,abstractandarithmeticterritoryhere?69

Themainpointisthis:relationalegalitarians(andO’Neillinparticular)havecriticisedthe

distributiveegalitarianviewforbeingundermotivated,abstractandmysterious.Whenasked

whydistributiveequalityisvaluable,distributiveegalitarianssay‘itjustis’.O’Neillsaysthis

isn’tgoodenough.Hethinksthategalitariansshouldbeabletoofferreasonsforwhy68Temkin,‘Equality,PriorityandtheLevellingDownObjection’.69IamgratefultoLiamShieldsforusefulcommentshere.

25

distributiveinequalityisbad:‘theNon-Intrinsicegalitarianwillhaveamorefullyelaborated

accountofwhyandhowinequalityisbad,ofakindthatisunavailabletotheTelicegalitarian.

ItistothecreditofNon-Intrinsicegalitarianismthatthismakesthevieweasiertodefend.On

aNon-Intrinsicegalitarianview,theskepticaboutegalitarianismcanbecounteredbya

detailedaccountofthevarietyofconsiderationsinwhichthebadnessofinequalityis

grounded.’70

Yet,ifwepushO’Neill-stylerelationalegalitariansonwhythesethingsarebad,theiranswer

willconcernthevalueofegalitariansocialrelationships.Andifwepushthemonwhythey’re

sogood,theiranswerwillbe(atleastinpart)‘theyjustare’.Giventhis,aretheyonmuch,if

any,firmergroundthanthedistributiveegalitarian?Perhapsallmoralclaimsmust,

ultimately,begroundedinabstractandmysteriousclaims.Certainlythoseviewsthatinclude

claimsaboutimpersonalvalueseemtodestinedtobeabstract,mysterious,and

metaphysicallycontroversial.Soitdoesn’tseemaconsiderationinfavourofoneoveranother

thattheotherisabstractandmysterious.Certainlyitdoesn’tlooklikeaconsiderationin

favourofimpersonalrelationalegalitarianismoverdistributiveegalitarianism.

Inadditiontoarguingthatrelationalegalitarianismisasuperiorunderstandingofequalityto

distributiveegalitarianism,O’Neillarguesthat,onceweacceptrelationalegalitarianism,we

seethatParfit’squestion‘equalityorpriority?’presentsuswithafalsedichotomy.71Thisis

because,alongsideourrelationalegalitarianism,wecanendorsetheprioritydistributiveview

(theviewthattheworseoffsomeoneis,themoreimportantitistobenefitthem).Inthe

contextofO’Neill’srejectionofdistributiveegalitarianism,Ifindthisclaimstrange.Firstly

becauseifwecanendorsethepriorityviewalongsiderelationalegalitarianism,whycanwe

notendorsedistributiveegalitarianismalongsideherrelationalsister?O’Neillmayreplythat

wecouldhavethisview,asamatteroflogicalconsistency,butthatweshouldn’t,becauseof

thearithmeticnatureandabstractnessofthedistributiveegalitarianview.Butprioritarianism

seemstobearthesefeaturestooand,inaddition,asIngmarPerssonmakesclear72,thepriority

viewentailsendorsingakindofimpersonalvaluedirectlylocatedindistributions,whichis,at

leastpartly,whatseemstomakethetelicegalitarianviewabstractandmysterious.

70O’Neill,‘WhatShouldEgalitariansBelieve?’,133-134.71Ibid.,152-155.72IngmarPersson,‘Equality,PriorityandPerson-AffectingValue’inEthicalTheoryandMoralPractice4(2001):23-39,at26-29.

26

Indeed,asanaside,weneedn’tnecessarilychoosebetweendistributiveequalityandthe

priorityview.Muchoftherecentliteratureondistributiveethicshasconcernedwhetherwe

shouldbeegalitariansorprioritarians.ButsincedistributiveegalitarianssuchasCohenare

pluralists,theydon’tbelieveequalitytobetheonlydistributivevalue.Usually,equalityis

coupledwithaconcernforsomethinglike‘efficiency’or‘totalwellbeing’(i.e.,somekindof

maximizingconcern).Butthereisnoreasonwhyaconcernfordistributiveequalityshouldn’t

becoupledwiththepriorityviewinthesteadofthismaximizingconcern.Indeed,Iam

temptedtoendorsesuchaview:theworstoffareentitledtosupportbothbecausethey’reon

thewrongsideofinequality,andbecausethey’reworseoffinabsoluteterms.

Letusturnnowtothejustice-basedunderstandingpromotedmostclearlybyChristian

Schemmel.Schemmelclaimsthathisviewis,initsfoundations,thesameasthatofAnderson

andScheffler.73However,asIhavetriedtoshow,whentheytrytoshowtheimportanceof

egalitariansocialrelationships,bothAndersonandScheffleratleastinpartfocusonwhysuch

relationshipsaregoodforus,oratleastwhytheabsenceofdominationandoppressionisgood

forus.Thissuggestsa(partly)personalvalue-basedview,ratherthanajustice-based,or

ultimatelynormative,view.

Again,liketheversionofrelationalegalitarianismbasedonimpersonalvalue,thisviewis

perhapsabstract.Considerjustificationstocitizensofformsofpoliticalarrangementdesigned

tofosteregalitariansocialrelationshipsthatmaybedetrimentaltotheirwellbeing,butthat

arejustifiedonthebasisthatasocietyhasanobligationtofostersuchrelationships.Unlike

thepreviousview,inwhichthepromotionofegalitariansocialrelationshipswasjustifiedon

thebasisthat,whilethingsmaybeworseforthecitizen,theywouldbebetterallthings

consideredbetter,heretheclaimisthatthingsmaybeworse,butthatwehaveanobligationto

makethingsworse.Idon’tthinkthatthismakestheviewimplausible–itisafamiliarthought

tonon-consequentialists.Butitdoesperhapsmakeitabstractandmysterious,whichisexactly

whatsomerelationalegalitarianshavesuggestediswrongwithdistributiveegalitarianism.

Afterall,whatexactlyisthebasisoftheideathatpeopleoughttobetreatedasequals,given

thatwe’veruledoutthatitisintheirinterests,orthattheequaldistributionofcertainthings

(likeself-respect)isvaluableinandofitself?Ifthemoralimportanceofegalitariansocial

relationshipsissimplyafoundational,unjustifiedclaim,atheoreticalstartingpoint,then,like

distributiveegalitarianism,itseemsabstract.Ihaveitalicizedthewordsseemsintheforegoing

73Schemmel,‘WhyRelationalEgalitariansShouldCareAboutDistributions’,365.

27

sentence,becauseIamalittleunsureofmygroundhere.ThatisbecauseIamalittleunsure

aboutwhat,exactly,thechargeofabstractionis,orwhyabstractionisabadthinginapolitical

philosophicalclaim.Butsince‘mystery’and‘abstraction’featuresoheavilyinO’Neilland

Scanlon’sattacksondistributiveequality,itisworthnotingthattherelationalviewsappearto

carrythesefeatures.74

Schemmel’snormativeviewalsoseemstoleavespacefordistributiveegalitarianism.Itsays

thatrelationalconcernscreatenormativeprescriptionswhichboundpermissibleaction.This

may(andSchemmelthinkswill)includeprescriptionsaboutdistributions.Butwecanimagine

thatrelationalegalitarianismwillcreatelimitstodistributions,suchthattherewillbea

pluralityofdistributionswhichmeettherelationalcriteria(Schemmelbelievesthatthisrange

willbenarrowerthanmostrelationalegalitarians,sincehethinksthatthedistributive

prescriptionswillbequiteprecise).However,withinthatpermissiblerange(howeverwideor

narrow),wecouldstillfindaplacefordistributiveegalitarianism.Forexample,manywould

acceptthatnormativeinjunctionsagainstkillingpreventthatbeingusedasameansto

realisingequality.Intherelationalegalitariancase,weshouldnotpromotedistributive

equalityinwaysthatwouldinvolvedisruptingpeople’srightstobeseenandtreatedasan

equal.Inotherwords,Schemmel’sviewdoesn’tseemtodirectlyopposedistributive

egalitarianism,butrathermaysimplyplace(egalitarian)limitsonit.Indeed,Cohenthinks

somethinglikethis,ashebelievesthatcommunityconsiderationsvetoluckegalitarian-

approvedinequalities.75ThisisalsoonewaytoreadJonathanWolff’srelationalegalitarianism.

Wolff’s‘Freedom,RespectandtheEgalitarianEthos’76issometimesplacedalongside

AndersonandScheffler’spapersasagroupofinfluentialrelationalegalitariancritiquesofluck

74IamgratefultothemembersofMancept,andLiamShieldsinparticular,andChristianSchemmelforpushingmetowardgreaterclarityhere,oratleastgreateracknowledgementofmyunclarityanduncertainty.75ThisreadingissuggestedbyWhyNotSocialism?,p.12:‘Thecommunityprincipleconstrainstheoperationoftheegalitarianprinciplebyforbiddingcertaininequalitiesthattheegalitarianprinciplepermits.’Andp.37:‘Dotherelevant[community-based]prohibitionsmerelydefinethetermswithinwhich[distributive]justicewilloperate,ordotheysometimes(justifiably?)contradictjustice?’Myemphases.IwouldhaveexpectedCohentoseecommunityandjusticeasintensionandaneedtointuitivelybalancetheircompetingdemands,butheseemstoseecommunityasplacingfirmlimitsonthepursuitofjustice(i.e.,distributiveequality).Itisworthnoting,toavoidconfusion,thatSchemmelandCohenhaveverydifferentunderstandingsofwhatkindsofclaimsclaimsofjusticeare.SowhenSchemmelsaysrelationalconsiderationsarejusticeconsiderations,hemeansthattheyhaveacertainpriorityorweight–apriorityorweightwhichCohendoesnotaccordtojustice,whichis(forexample)overriddenbycommunity.OnthisaspectofCohen’swork,seemy‘InternalDoubtsaboutCohen’sRescueofJustice’,JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy18(2010):228-247.76JonathanWolff,‘Fairness,RespectandtheEgalitarianEthos’,Philosophy&PublicAffairs27(1998):97-122.

28

egalitarianism.77However,Wolff’spaperisimportantlydifferent.Itsaysthatthereare

(egalitarian)limits,basedonrespect(aboutthewayweseeandtreatoneanother),tothe

pursuitofdistributivefairness.Butthatpositiondoesn’tdenythatdistributivefairnessor

equalityisavalue.78

AdistributiveegalitarianismmayenterScanlon’scontractualistviewinaslightlydifferent

way.AaronJameshasarguedthatcontractualismcannotsupportadistributivetheorylike

luckegalitarianism,sincecontractualismfocusesonthepersonalreasonswecanputforward

tooneanotherinfavouroforagainstparticularprinciples,principlesthatdefinewhatweowe

toeachother,whilst‘adistributiontakenassuch,cannotbeowed,andsocannotbejustice’.79

However,leavingasidequestionsofterminology(i.e.,whetherornotluckegalitarianismcan

beatheoryofjustice)itcancertainlystillgetalookin.Scanlonexplicitlyallowsthatnotall

personalreasons(thereasonswemusttrafficininordertoworkoutwhatweowetoeach

other)arereasonsgroundedinwellbeing.Forexample,reasonsgroundedinfairnessare

admissible.Scanlonwritesthat‘Wehavereasontoobjecttoprinciplessimplybecausethey

arbitrarilyfavortheclaimsofsomeoverothers:thatistosay,becausetheyareunfair.’80What

isitforaprincipleto‘arbitrarilyfavor’someoverothers?Scanlondoesn’tsay,buttheluck

egalitarianfocusonthosefactorsoverwhichwehavenocontrolorresponsibilityisaplausible

contenderhere.Soluckegalitarianismmayqualifyasatheoryoffairness,whichcangrounda

personalreasonwhichcanbeputforwardwithinanegalitarianjustificatoryframeworkto

workoutmattersofjustice(whatweowetoeachother).Ofcourse,wemayputforwardother

personalreasonstobeconcernedaboutdistributions,forexample,whethertheyleadto

objectionablerelationships,butreasonsoffairnesscanstillplayaroleinevaluatingwhich

principleswecanandcan’treasonablyreject.

Tosumupthissection,themosttangible,leastabstractoftheexplanationsastowhy

egalitariansocialrelationshipsarevaluableistoexplainthecontributionthatthese

relationships(ortheabsenceoftheiropposites)maketohumanlivesgoingwell.Theyarethe

77Wolffhimselfnotesthisinhis‘Fairness,RespectandtheEgalitarianEthosRevisited’,JournalofEthics14(2010):335-350.78Seeibid.79James,‘TheSignificanceofDistribution’,p.276.Emphasisinoriginal.80Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther,p.216.Seealso:James,‘TheSignificanceofDistribution’,p.280(whichnotesScanlon’scommentsonfairness);andp.281(wherethemethodemployedbydistributivetheoristsisdescribedas‘atbestincomplete’,notrulingoutapotentialrolewithincontractualism).Onp.282Jamesacknowledgesthatonewillhavesomepersonalreasontobecompensatedforbadluck,buthebasestheseonpersonalwelfare,ratherthanfairness.

29

mostimmediateandeasytograspreasonsforthinkingtheserelationshipsimportant.But

theseanswersmaypointus(a)toward(athin)perfectionism;and(b)onwardstodistributive

theoriesabouthowweshouldviewdifferentdistributionsofwellbeingorthemeanstoit.

Certainlytheseviewsarenotopposedtodistributiveviews,andcouldeasilybehousedwithin

them.Claimsabouttheimpersonalvalueofrelationshipswillbeabstract,andinO’Neill’s

viewappeartobecoupledwithdistributiveviews,thatarealsoabstract(oneofwhichmaybe

distributiveegalitarianism).Finally,normativeviewsarepotentiallyabstract,inthatthey

claimthatweoughttodosomethingtopeople,includingtryingtoformulatecertainkindsof

relationship,butnotbecausethisisinthosepeople’sinterests.Inaddition,suchaviewseems

toleavespacefordistributiveegalitarianism,eitherwithintheboundsofrelational-friendly

distributions,orasapersonalreasonputforwardwithinanegalitarianjustificatory

relationship.

VConcludingRemarks

InthischapterIhavesoughttocontributetothedebateaboutequalitywhichisoftenframed

asbeingaboutdistributiveorrelationalequality.Ihavetriedtodothisby,first,asking‘whatis

thepointofegalitariansocialrelationships?’,andshowingthatrelationalegalitariansseemto

offeravarietyofdifferentanswerstothisquestion.Second,Ihavetriedtoshowthatsomeof

theworriesthatsomerelationalegalitarianshavewithdistributiveegalitarianismmaybe

foundintherelationalegalitarianismsaswell.Finally,andrelatedly,Ihavetriedtoshowthat

allrelationalegalitariantheoriesarecompatiblewithsomerolefordistributiveegalitarianism,

andsomerelationalegalitariantheories–thosewhichfocusonhowegalitarianrelationships

improveindividuallives–mayevenpresupposetheneedfor(independent)distributive

principles.Thisfinalconclusionis,Ithink,inthespiritofG.A.Cohenintwoways.Thefirstis

thatCohen,asIpointedoutatthestart,hadvariouscommitmentswhichpointtowardsome

combinationofdistributiveandrelationalegalitarianism.ThesecondisthatCohenwasa

pluralist,andinarticulatinghisluckegalitarianbeliefshewasalwayskeentoemphasizethat

hewastryingtoarticulateonevalueamongaplurality81(or,indeed,onepartofonevalue

amongaplurality82).SoCohenoftenemphasizedthatwearenotalwaysforcedtochoose

betweenseeminglycompetingconceptionsorprinciples.AsIhavetriedtoshow,thismaybe

trueofrelationalanddistributiveversionsofegalitarianism.

81Seehis‘methodologicalpreliminaries’in‘OntheCurrency’,908-912.82InRescuing(p.7)Cohenstatesthattheluckegalitarianprincipleisaprincipleofjustice,butthatunjustinequalitiesmaybepermissiblebecauseofnon-justiceconsiderationsandnon-distributivejusticeconsiderations.